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1. According to the STABEX regulation, payments can be claimed for goods in which, during the year preceding the claim, the concerned country suffered a 5 % loss (4% in the case of sisal) in total export proceeds, after trade with all destination countries had been completed.
2. Every country that shows an average decline of at least 4.5 % in export proceeds over the six years preceding the year in which a claim is made, is eligible for STABEX. Neither the highest nor lowest annual values are taken into consideration. (For the least developed ACP states, as well as landlocked and island ACP states, the percentage at which the countries become eligible for stabilisation claims, lies at 1% in both cases).
This facility is meant to absorb disadvantageous effects on proceeds caused by severe temporary disruptions in the mining sector. A country is eligible for SYSMIN claims when a) the products in question have made up an average of more than 15% of total exports four years in succession (10% in the case of the least developed countries), or b) the proportion of export proceeds obtained through all mining products lies at 20% or more (12% in the case of the least developed countries, as well as landlocked and island states). Since Lomé IV, the funds are allocated as non-repayable grants. As opposed to STABEX, SYSMIN is not a revenue stabilisation system, even though it does compensate for losses in proceeds. SYSMIN aims at safeguarding raw material supplies for the EC. SYSMIN funds are allotted to avoid the danger of a stand-still in mining production, caused by a decline in raw material proceeds. Diversification measures are not provided for. Between 1980 and 1990, four countries, i.e. Zambia, Zaire, Guinea and Guyana were the recipients of more than two thirds of all available funds (see Table 6). SYSMIN is fundamentally governed by strict conditionality. The EU is involved in modernisation and rehabilitation measures, exerting her influence on the efficient expenditure of the funds.
According to the guidelines set out in the Councils Resolution of May 1992, the following are the objectives of the EU, in conjunction with the Bretton Woods Institutions:
A total of 1.8 billion ECU has been set aside in Lomé N/2 to be used in implementing the EU-SAS.
EU-SAS are granted in the form of general import programmes, hence ensuring that participants in the economy have foreign exchange at their disposal. Equalisation funds have been established within the framework of SAPsto meet public expenditure required for administration and/or investments in the most important social services, as well as for investment in economic and social infrastructure.
Taking into account that the transfers tend to contribute to the reinforcement of lop-sided production structures and not to the diversification of production, subsidy systems will be reduced. The vast majority of exports carried out by Africa, and concurrently incorporated in the STABEX and SYSMIN regime, have a demand elasticity of less than 1. As such, further subsidisation is not justifiable. The idea behind this opinion is that the marginalisation of most African countries cannot be reversed by a raw materials price boom, nor by an increase in exports of raw materials. It is only through development of a diversification strategy, which should, however, not be coupled with STABEX (the Lomé Treaty does not accommodate diversification anyway, as far as SYSMIN is concerned), and particularly through the development of endogenous industrial structures, that a new economic perspective can be achieved.
The reduced funds should be specially directed into a fund for the promotion of the private sector (including the activities of the CDI). Agriculture as well as small and medium-sized industry in particular, should be promoted. Developing agriculture and promoting enterprises within the informal sector would be the most effective method of securing employment and increasing income. This would also contribute to poverty alleviation. With this fund, urgently needed means could finally be set aside for the expansion and improvement of CDI activities (the CDI being a joint ACP-EU institution). Incidentally, the CDI which, in my opinion, is capable of reform and expansion should decentralise and localise its activities, in conjunction with the IFC (International Finance Corporation), regional development banks, the African Development Bank and national economic promotion institutions and banks. In this way, the CDI can better contribute to industrialisation and the development of the informal sector. Owing to an extreme shortage of funds, CDI activities have previously been greatly restricted. This calls for immediate remedy, especially, since the CDI is a joint institution and thus closest to the partnership idea. The CDI could definitely make a valuable contribution to the promotion of small and medium-sized enter-
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prises and even in the informal sector, if it had the necessary concepts and funds at its disposal. The CDI could, above all, become active in the establishment and provision of expertise with regard to the formulation of national and regional concepts for industrial promotion. So far, however, the CDI has been inexcusably neglected.
What consequences could Maastricht have on monetary co-operation with CFA countries? There are three possibilities:
1. The Abolition of currency co-operation between the French Franc (FF) and the CFA. Ties with the FF have such wide-reaching disadvantages, that it is no longer acceptable to keep holding on to co-operation. The following arguments can be presented as the major points against monetary integration:
A whole range of monetary liberation strategies have been discussed with regard to the future of the CFA Zone. An ECOWAS currency zone has been one of the proposals made in this connection, a monetary union that could also incorporate CFA countries. One common aspect to the suggestions made is that they all want to avoid any ties to one of the hard currencies. Other alternative but not well advanced concepts pertaining to the CFA Zone could exist basically in ties to a currency basket, or in the release of a fixed exchange rate. Monetary self-reliance joins in with economic and political self-reliance, in addition to African regionalism. In my opinion, this strict dissociation course does not adequately take economic dependencies into consideration. In the face of the huge problems in West Africa, the close interdependencies with the EU and the poorly developed regional integration, there is hardly any chance of realising this independent development strategy in monetary policy.
2. Continuing Ties to the FF. The success of the CFA Zone (like the low inflation rate), speaks for this process. Not only the above mentioned advocates of the self-reliance concept have taken a stand against this idea, but even authors from the World Bank and the IMF. The subsidiary principle permits ties to the French Franc. Once national currencies are abolished, however, the question concerning a European solution would automatically be raised.
3. Ties with the European Economic and Monetary Union. Monetary co-operation along these lines would have to be integrated into a new economic-political concept, whose aim would be to encourage autonomous development in Africa. The "déconnexion" that has set in, could turn into a "réconnexion" of the monetary zone will be extended to incorporate all excluded
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African countries. The prerequisite, however, lies in the new institutional integration of African member states.
What is the role of a Lomé Currency Co-operation (LCC) organised in this way?
1. The necessary structural adjustments that have hitherto been implemented nationally by the World Bank and the IMF, could now be implemented within the framework of the Lomé Treaty (or that of a similarly oriented special agreement), with the new LCC now being implemented on a regional basis. Regional structural adjustment, on the other hand, can contribute to regional integration, the establishment of regional institutions, and to an extension of intra-regional trade. This would be the key to structural adjustment concepts (economic reforms), that should be supported by the EU.
2. A huge drift apart in developments with regard to countries devaluing their currencies in both anglophile West Africa and the CFA zone has been taking place. A common economic and monetary zone could help to avoid this. Membership in the LLC should, however, be voluntary.
3. For member states, the common LLC could serve as a competent force in the face of the EUs monetary and economic strength. Common institutions similar to the Lomé Treaty could contribute to securing the weight of the LCC, hence abating too much dependence.
4. The newly formed LCC would have two effects:
5. The monetary co-operation LCC would intensify "restraints". The association between the LCC and the European currency would have to comprise monetary barriers as is the case in the CFA Zone , if the convertibility of the LCC is to be guaranteed. In keeping with European modalities for adjusting currencies to the current economic developments, revaluation and devaluation processes would have to be instituted. Well-functioning economies require independent banks to a certain degree, in order to guarantee economic stability. This was the "compte dopérations" in the CFA Zone. A corresponding institution would have to be established in the LCC, as well. Experiences in Africas anglophile countries show that stability is impossible without a strong and independent central bank. Integrating the LCC into the European currency system would enable monetary conditions to take effect. But this would also lead to the establishment of boundaries that would limit the sovereignty of member states (as is incidentally the case even within the EU or other co-operation agreements).
In contrast, however, to the ad hoc SAP conditionalities of the World Bank and the IMF, which practically hardly allow for the involvement of concerned countries, the institutional monetary conditions laid out within the framework of the LCC would be connected to member states involvement.
The advantages of such co-operation would be the result of a hard currency status, on the one hand, and the preferential status within the framework of the Lomé Treaty to which all LCC countries belong on the other.
6. Compensatory measures for weaker partners would, however, be imperative, if back-wash effects are to be counteracted. A rigid monetary and financial policy on the part of the LCC could intensify differences in economic structures and aggravate regional imbalances. Coherence measures, such as those applied in the EU, would be required on the level of regional policy, if these demanding conditions of monetary co-operation are to be met. These measures would, however, need to be adapted to the particular situation in the LCC zone.
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Urbanisation processes are massive due to rural migration coupled with a simultaneously high rate of population growth. Today it is hardly justifiable to speak of city preference, especially when one considers the survival problems facing the poor in cities. This poverty economy should, however, not hide the fact, that young people, the old, as well as mother-headed families are among the poorest, and that the circumstances in the countryside are often worse than in the city. They have no access to resources, which are, furthermore, extremely unequally distributed. The disparity between the poor and rich has increased sharply, even between different regions. Rising unemployment and increased growth in the informal sector are a clear indication of a huge and ever-increasing employment crisis in the majority of cities in ACP countries. And the situation is bound to worsen. Distribution struggles are at hand to get ones share of the ever-decreasing cake. Per-capita income has declined in numerous countries. And it may well take a long time until the niveau of 1970 is attained. One should not even start to talk of the growing number of the ultra-poor.
Potential for an even greater poverty economy is fed by net immigration from rural areas, on the one hand, and by urban population growth, on the other. School leavers cannot find employment in the modern sector (including government jobs) and thus have to depend on the informal sector for survival. The concepts of employment, unemployment and underemployment are obviously seen in a totally different context in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. This has been caused, above all, by the lack of almost any sort of public social security system. The number of people with no employment perspectives whatsoever has been rising at an increasing pace for decades, rendering the informal sector the dominant economy. From approximately 100 million employees in Africa in 1965, the figure rose to 214 million in 1995 and is expected to stand at 537 million by the year 2025. There is, however, no reliable data on employment. Therefore, Kenya is used to represent the situation. Approximately 80% of the wage earners are to be found in the agricultural sector, yet an ever-increasing number of small farmers are crowding on the scarce good land good land (only about 10% of the countrys surface area), cultivating decreasing parcels of land. Rural migration has now reached dramatic proportions. In 1984, the population capable of employment stood at 7.5 million. Urban immigration (with an annual growth rate of 7%), one of the highest birth rates in the world (3.5%) and half a million school leavers per year are factors that will cause this figure to at least double by the year 2000. According to a prognosis made by the International Labour Office (ILO) in 1993, the number of newly-created jobs would have to double, if the present unemployment quota (50% in cities) is only to be maintained. Due to structural adjustment measures which have led to a reduction of posts in the civil service (with approx. 45,000 dismissals in the 1st half of the 1990s), privatisation and rationalisation effects, as well as a stagnating economy with a limited absorption capacity (as a rule, only 10% find jobs in the modern, urban sector), 90% of the population is left with very modest opportunities in the agricultural and informal sectors.
Population growth in African cities is very high and in a few years, the majority of African population will be found in urban areas. A systematic co-operation policy that takes up the poverty and population issues has not been a part of the Lomé Treaty up to now.
Poverty and urbanisation are the heralds of "future anarchy" (Robert Kaplan), if no breakthrough is made in formulating new successful approaches. One can, however, presume that this will be the case. Increased development aid will certainly not be the universal remedy needed to combat poverty and "future anarchy".
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Taking the knowledge and experiences of development politics into account, it is necessary to stress that development can only be achieved through endogenous potentials and processes and not through development co-operation, i.e. by modernising agriculture, by initiating industrialisation based on agricultural development, by transforming the informal sector from a purely survival-oriented strategy into an area that secures employment and income, and by developing small and medium-sized companies, as well as entrepreneurship. Development can only be of help in encouraging such processes, but not in taking these processes into its own hands.
Compared to other regions of the world, there has been increased loss of significance in the flow of direct investment to, as well as the investment stocks in Africa. The proportion of foreign direct investment (FDI) flowing into Africa is on the decline and the stock in many African countries is either constant or decreasing. Only Nigeria and Angola have significant FDI (crude oil sector) at their disposal. FDI from the EU fluctuates, having shown a slight upward trend since the mid 1980s (diagram 2). The United Nations World Trade Conference (UNCTAD) recently published a report, in which it investigated and determined the role of foreign investment in Africa. According to the report, it was determined that there is potential for foreign investment and that this potential has even improved due to economic reforms in the majority of countries. It is striking that Africas share of world FDI (without counting South Africa) has been less than 2% for years. During the period from 1986 to 1994, FDI accounted for an annual average of approximately $ 3 billion. This investment inflow was concentrated in the oil-exporting countries Angola, Congo, Egypt, Cameroon, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria and Tunisia (with more than 60%). Egypt and Nigeria are the most significant countries in Africa for foreign investors. Of those countries ranked as LLDCs (least developed countries a total of 32 out of 48 countries), a large number had absolutely no FDI inflow. The order of magnitude clearly shows that investment mostly occurs in small amounts (the largest recipients include Zambia with 124 million $ in 1993, Mozambique with 30 million, Equatorial Guinea with 23 million, Sierra Leone with 20 million and Tanzania with 20 million). FDI flowing into Liberia is also of statistical importance. It comes in the form of ships registered and managed in the USA which have hardly any connection with Liberia. Not considering Angola and Liberia, investment flows to the LLDCs accounted for an average of $ 200 million over the past several years.
The dramatic decline in direct investment on the African continent is also reflected in the Federal Republic of Germanys investment in Africa. While Europe showed a 27% and North America a 104% investment increase in Africa (in the period from 1990 to 1987), Germanys African investments showed a 72% decline. With the exception of 1990, German direct investment in Africa has been negative since 1989. The emphasis of foreign investment activities lies in the extraction sector (oil and mining), while just about 20% is apportioned to the processing industry. Of the total 1992 FDI stock amounting to US $ 22.2 billion, Great Britain invested 6.2 billion, the USA 4.4 billion, Japan 3.3 billion and France 2.5 billion. With investments of US $ 0.9 billion, German investors play a rather subordinate role. Numerous reasons can be cited as the cause for the low investment activity carried out by foreign companies: political conflict, markets that are small as a rule, low growth rates, inadequate infra-
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structure (especially in transport and communication), high indebtedness, slow progress as far as economic reforms are concerned, the low level of education and technical skills, as well as high production costs in short: there is no positive atmosphere conducive to investment.
During the preliminary stages of the Lomé IV Agreement, differences in opinion arose between ACP countries, the EC Commission and the European Parliament. As in preceding years, the European Parliament excelled in serving as a corrective of the exceedingly pragmatic EU Commission. In the end, one chapter (Article 5) on Human Rights was, for the first time, incorporated in the Lomé IV Convention (19901995). The chapter explicitly emphasises human rights and human dignity. On top of that, human rights conventions are referred to in the preamble. There is, however, no obligation to observe human rights. The sanctioning element established in Article 1, Paragraph 1 (which states that people-oriented development requires "respect for and the promotion of human rights above all else") was often used after the agreement (which ran from 19901995) had been signed. The "wind of change" that lead to extensive political change even in Africa is, however, not a result of the Lomé Agreements. It has more to do with altered conditions brought about by the resolution of the East-West conflict. Within the countries themselves, improved scopes of action were the result. The changes made in the contract (that were for the most part greeted with euphoria) were also brought about by conditioned economic reforms as well as the successful effects of action taken by international human rights organisations (e.g. Africa Watch, Amnesty International) and numerous non-governmental organisations which pro-moted even within th EU consciousness with regard to human rights violations and democratisation processes in the third world. The altered state of world politics, the newly established coalitions between lobby groups and foundations in the EU and political parties, lobby organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the South, all these factors finally put the EU and the ACP group of states under pressure to put greater emphasis on democratisation and human rights. This resulted in a hitherto unknown activism among EU authorities:
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In December 1993, the Commission initiated negotiations with ACP states by way of the "Proposal for a decision of the Council"
[See Commission 1993a. The second Financial Protocol for the second half of Lomé IV was finally signed on the 30th of June, 1995, almost half a year late.].
Although highly contradictory and controversial, "The policy of Development Co-operation up to the year 2000" was the fundamental document central to discussions regarding the financial framework for the second half as well as review proposals of the Lomé IV Agreement. The Commission presumes that being the most significant economic block, the EU will, in future, carry great responsibility in the development of the world community. The international community, including the EU, has failed during the past decades. Furthermore, development models from the North have had no success. The EU Commission acknowledges that there are reciprocal dependencies. Economic competition governs the world market. Environmental, population and drug problems, as well as AIDS have turned into a threat. This problem is increasingly becoming a question of risk and security for humanity, an issue that calls for solidarity.
In such a situation, partners must become increasingly aware of the fact that underdevelopment in the South brings high costs for the North in its wake, while economic models from the North are a huge burden for the South, restricting its long-term development perspectives [Kommission 1992: 8.].
This realisation led the EU to formulate four top priority objectives for development co-operation: First, democracy should be promoted. Second, the third world should be harmoniously integrated into the world economy. Third, Poverty alleviation should be of prime importance. Four, sustainable economic development is a necessity.
Concrete demands were:
The promotion of human rights, democracy, rule of law, responsible governance: Democracy and human rights are viewed as the essential elements of the Lomé Convention. As such, institutional reform was proposed aimed at encouraging the rule of law and responsible governance. Further proposals included the promotion of democracy, the participation of local initiatives (protagonists of decentralised co-operation), with direct access to funding of their plans, as well as a reform in the equal assembly of the EU and the ACP group of states (more parliamentarians and fewer government officials).
Adjustment of instruments in the ACP-EU dialogue: The objectives of the Maastricht Treaty (sustainable economic and social development; integration into the world economy; poverty alleviation; respect for human rights; democracy promotion) should become part of the Lomé Convention. Adjusting the instruments of political dialogue is a necessity. Above all, it is of absolute importance to organise political dialogue in an efficient manner during the implementation of guiding programmes, if implementation is to be improved. Private enterprises should be accorded special support (strengthening internal structures; trade co-operation; reviewing CDI activities; greater flexibility in allocating risk capital via the European Investment Bank).
More consistent and efficient instruments and processes in EU-ACP Co-operation: The EUs
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objective is to achieve the harmonious utilisation of STABEX funds with the help of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). Structural adjustment financing should be allocated as budget aid and no longer in the cumbersome form of import programmes.
Changes planned by the ACP group of states were based on conditions contractually agreed upon, but did not show any intention for fundamental alterations.
Principles finally agreed upon showed increasing economic and political conditionalisation:
1. Strengthening of human rights, democracy and "good governance". Any violation of obligations can lead to the enforcement of a "Suspension clause". Consultations with the concerned country are taken up according to a certain procedure. Should negotiations reach an impasse, suspension could in the worst case be the result. 80 million ECU of the regional programme have been allotted to promote administrative and institutional reforms.
It was also decided that representatives of ACP states to the "ACP-EU Joint Assembly" would be nominated by the respective parliaments.
2. In accordance with the Maastricht Resolutions, development co-operation should be agreed upon together with the ACP states. The underlying intention is to encourage integration in world trade, poverty alleviation and to guarantee basic civil rights.
3. Priority should be given to the development of trade (diversification; regional co-operation). Originally, the EU was not willing to allow any further concessions in trade issues. She has, however, declared her readiness to undertake greater efforts towards the development of trade in a number of ways, including a further opening of markets for certain agricultural products, which have previously been subject to quantity restrictions and which had no preference status. There will be a distinction, whereby different products will be accorded different preferences (a reduction in customs duty, quantity increase, preferences for further products). The rule of origin was also improved. Furthermore, partners agreed on the implementation of the Rio Declaration to preserve endangered tropical rain forests, to implement the sustainable use of forests, to improve local forest management and regional plans of action.
4. There has been renewed emphasis on the necessity of decentralising co-operation, i.e. increased co-operation with para-state and non-governmental organisations.
5. An essential change was introduced, i.e. the slicing of payments. The second "tranche" of payments from the National Indicative Plan will depend on the amount of funds available, progress shown in the implementation of funds from the first "tranche", and the specific situation of the concerned ACP state. This slicing of funds represents great conditionalisation.
1. Evaluation of EIB and CDI activities through an independent expert commission
EIB activities within the framework of the Lomé Convention need to undergo evaluation. Through its evaluations section (operations department) the World Bank gave an important impetus to better assess its own activities. It would be appropriate to evaluate EIB activities within the framework of the Lomé Treaty (as in the World Bank, see Wapenhans Report and the African Development Bank, see Knox Report). The reasons for such an evaluation are obvious. The sci-
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entific and political public has not been aware of any evaluation in the past. Scrutiny could lead to the implementation of reform in EIB activities. Whereas the EIB should first be assessed to determine whether it does justice to the tasks for which it is charged, in the case of the CDI, concepts will have to be developed towards expanding its scope. (see Exposition 4).
2. Budgeting via the EU
The EDF budget of the Lomé Convention is negotiated among EU countries for the respective term of the Treaty. No-one who followed the unprofessional tussle among member states for the second phase of Lomé IV can imagine that the "national" embodiment of European development policy would constitute a suitable process. European development policy is still highly dependent on the decisions of member states, who through the Council of Ministers pass judgement on every measure taken by the Commission. Apart from EDF means, ACP states also receive funds from the EU budget, e.g. food and emergency aid, quick aid, NGO co-financing, promotion of science and technology, environmental protection, the promotion of democracy processes and human rights, as well as AIDS control and a fund set up to preserve tropical rain forests.
Maastricht resolutions call for a better planned cohabitation and co-ordination of policies. Budgeting the Lomé Convention through the EU would basically change nothing as far as decision-making processes are concerned. This is because, according to Article 130u of the Maastricht Treaty "the policy of the Community in the area of development co-operation supplements the respective policies of member states". Budgeting would, however, put an end to negotiations that take place every five years with regard to total amounts and national contributions. Furthermore, incorporating the EDF into the EU Budget would considerably increase the role of the European Parliament as far as control of Lomé co-operation is concerned and lead to greater transparency, as well. EU budgeting would thus be a step towards a common European policy.
Closely connected to this question is the issue of a coherent EU development policy, for which five commissioners have hitherto been responsible. Veto problems, bureaucratic diversity, low efficiency, temporal delays, etc. have been the result. In order to achieve efficiency even from the point of view of non-governmental organisations, ACP countries and the European Parliament , the long overdue step should be taken towards a coherent European development policy. This would help to remove the fragmentation of programmes and instruments, promote the establishment of greater autonomy in planning and implementation, as well as the removal of haphazard coexistence of national and European development policy.
3. Co-operation with institutions
In addition to further promotion and incorporation of NGOs, intensification of activities promoting trade and industrial chambers, associations, unions, municipal associations and interest groups, as well as public institutions and charitable organisations should take place. This is an essential contribution towards strengthening endogenous potential.
4. Removing the institutional weaknesses of the "National Authorising Officer" (NAO)
The extreme concentration of decision-making power of the NAO within the EDF administration, is not in line with the new concept of participatory management. In addition, the NAO often leaves the practical implementation of the National Indicative Programme to the EU delegation. Reforms are necessary in this area to increase the incorporation of national capacities (middle levels of management and local administration, NGOs, and the institutions and associations mentioned under No. 3). This would en-
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sure the sustainable success of development co-operation. Incidentally, "phased programming" has increased competence in favour of the EU, instead of reinforcing national institutions.
5. Aid tying
Lomé development aid is still strongly tied to delivery terms although to a lesser extent than is the case with bilateral aid. One should strive for greater consideration of ACP companies (e.g. through the introduction of a minimum quota of 50% for ACP countries). This would also contribute to the reinforcement of local capacities and firms from ACP countries (including the informal sector), hence strengthening endogenous potential.
6. Participation and decentralisation
It is necessary to further develop the concepts of partnership and participation through
The majority of ACP states belong to the Least Developed Countries (LLDCs). Only a few have a high per-capita income, including Gabon and Mauritius. But in general, the ACP group of states is a "poverty community", which is why the majority of countries have received particularly large amounts of development aid as well as special preferences as a group. Many observers have recently suggested greater differentiation and the need to take the abilities of regimes to reform and progress in political reform (democratisation, respect of human rights) into consideration.
This paper supports the theory that
a) it is necessary to differentiate according to needs (poverty, per-capita income, social circumstances): i.e. a tailor-made policy suited to secure survival, alleviate poverty and develop endogenous potential. Lomé requires new impetus in this direction and, incidentally, a review of the actual benefits ensuing Lomé-EDF where poverty and survival criteria are concerned. The Lomé Treaty expressly formulates its objective as being the creation of living conditions commensurate to human dignity. This objective leads to an examination of previous instruments. Although there is no doubt about the benefits of a tailor-made policy, first of all, there is need for conceptional reflection.
b) Differentiation depending on the willingness to institute political reform on the part of the government with regard to the further development of previous regulations and concepts. All in all, one can no longer ignore the fact that conditionalities did hardly (have been able to) bring about results. Mauritius, being democratic and prepared to carry out reforms, recognised the signs of the times early enough. In other countries, undemocratic regimes keep on taking turns, while structural adjustment programmes continue to fail. In this case, one should take into account the realisation that conditionalities cannot replace an endogenous willingness to reform. Lomé signatory states would hence be well advised to strive for development co-opera-
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tion with long-term effects. Improved economic framework conditions, a stable civil society and willingness to carry out economic, political and social reform can only result in sustainable success when based on long-term planning. Therefore, there is need for greater predictability, more intense dialogue between the EU, governments and social groups in ACP countries, hence, need for partnership at all levels of society. Positive steps towards reinforcing human rights, supporting civil society organisations, as well as economic reform measures should naturally be pursued further. In the case of extreme human rights violations, already existing mechanisms should be applied effectively.
Development agreements are probably a central instrument to alleviate poverty. But one will certainly have to take into consideration the fact that every country has to follow its own path towards poverty alleviation, the development of democratic conditions, and towards better consideration of social groups and economic development. Such development treaties would thus have to be tailor-made, too. But priority should, however, be accorded to national development concepts.
Decentralised co-operation cannot replace EU-ACP co-operation. What is needed is better co-ordination between the state and decentralised institutions. It should not be presumed that state failure in the majority of ACP countries is identical to positive developments on a decentralised level. The decentralisation and participation, that has been called for in recent years, is based on certain positive assumptions with regard to civil society in ACP states. But as has been proved on several occasions, it is precisely this crisis of the neo-patrimonial state in Africa, that is closely related to a weakness in civil society. From this point of view, co-operation with the state should not be replaced by co-operation with civil society organisations (neo-traditional organisations) [Comp. Hillebrand 1994; Adam 1995.]. In the end, the whole issue is a balance between decentralisation and participation and state co-operation. Without the states "guiding" framework conditions on the macro- and meso-level, development from below will not function. Whether criticism directed at the central state is not in the same way applicable to local administrations and civil society organisations, is an issue that cannot be dealt with here. There are, however, indications of such assumptions. To find a new balance in these terms would also be the task of development co-operation. Increased support of organisations, initiatives, co-operatives, unions, urban and rural self-help organisations and non-governmental organisations, is definitely a step towards participatory development, which could also help support democratic processes. Participation of these organisations within the institutions of the Lomé Treaty is also part of this.
An assessment of past experiences and the fine tuning of future decentralised co-operation would probably be the first step. These experiences are partly positive, but partly negative, as well
[Comp. Bossuyt 1995a; in one publication, the Commission draws an absolutely positive picture, which Bossuyt has reasons to oppose, Comp. Commission 1995.].
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with civil society organisations. In order to promote previously poor dialogue, MWENGO calls for five reform measures that are well worth supporting:
These would be necessary steps towards a partnership model that has previously prevented ACP governments and particularly civil society institutions and organisations from successfully voicing their concerns. The EUs power is dominant. A counterbalance of development-oriented and democratic governments in ACP states and NGOs should now be implemented.
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Dr. Robert Kappel is professor at the University of Leipzig, teaching "Economics and Politics in Africa" at the Institute of African Studies. He has made numerous visits to Africa during which he conducted research particularly in the following areas: the development of the informal sector, small and medium-sized enterprises, Africas foreign economic relations in the globalisation process and regional co-operation. He is co-author of the book "Schwarz-weiße Mythen Afrika und der entwicklungspolitische Diskurs" (3rd edition 1997 under preparation, LIT-Verlag, Münster).
© Friedrich Ebert Stiftung | technical support | net edition fes-library | April 2002