

**DANIEL W. DREZNER:**  
**The Future of US Foreign Policy**

The American public has lost whatever appetite it may have had for a neo-conservative foreign policy. Opinion poll after opinion poll shows that Americans place a low priority on democracy promotion as compared to »realist« foreign policies. Americans are increasingly enthusiastic about multilateralism, but the major reason they support international organizations is that these institutions can facilitate burden-sharing. Within the foreign-policy establishment, too, there has been a waning appetite for using force as a tool for American foreign policy. Among think tanks and the academy, there exists a growing pessimism concerning the global war on terror, the »surge« strategy in Iraq, and the wisdom of using force to deal with Iran. A bevy of foreign-policy experts have articulated alternatives to the current national security strategy. All the proposed strategies contain a mixture of realist and liberal approaches to foreign policy.

Against this background the question of the possible influence of the upcoming US elections on US foreign policy comes to the fore. The top-tier candidates for both the Democrats and Republicans share some similarities in their foreign-policy pronouncements to date. They articulate a common desire to pursue energy independence, bolster America's state-building and peacekeeping capabilities, and embrace multilateralism. But the candidates are by no means homogeneous. The Republicans and Democrats diverge sharply on Iraq and the global war on terror, with the Republicans preferring to stay the course. Among the Democrats, Senator Hillary Clinton has taken a more hawkish line than the other top-tier candidates. From a European perspective, however, there are reasons to be optimistic about American foreign policy in 2009. The next president is more likely to act in a multilateral manner to tackle humanitarian, peacekeeping, or energy crises. In all likelihood, an effort will be made to reach out to European leaders as a symbolic gesture to show a break with the Bush administration's occasionally brusque diplomatic style.

Despite these new multilateral perspectives, a number of foreign-policy issues will remain relatively unaffected by such concerns. Although relatively few interest groups focus on US foreign-policy issues their limited number in fact

enhances their influence. For a small set of issues that have caused transatlantic friction – agricultural subsidies, support for Israel, sanctions against Cuba – US foreign policy is unlikely to change dramatically, regardless of who wins the presidency in 2008.

## **STEFAN LASZLO:**

### **Towards the Center: A new Religious Policy in the USA?**

Public perceptions of religious political involvement in the USA have been characterized for a quarter of a century by the political alliance of the Christian Right with the Republican Party. Recently, however, even the Democratic Party has been confronted by demands that it cease to neglect its own electoral attractiveness to religiously motivated, above all evangelical Christian voters and no longer leave the shaping of dialogue at the disputed interface between religion and politics to the strategists of its political opponents. Hitherto, the Democrats had tended to adopt the role of liberal adversary to stymie the Republicans' conservative-religious activities. But in 2004 George W. Bush was re-elected and evangelical Christians – on whose extensive mobilization the Christian Right prided itself – played a significant role, as a result of which they demanded a corresponding reward from the Bush administration. In the meantime, however, this great success has not been consolidated and active resistance has intensified against the conduct of the Christian Right among the middle-left segment of the approximately 55 million US evangelicals. Organizations and activists of the center combine accusations of the unilateral sellout of their religion with an enlarged and more voter-friendly agenda that does not focus on campaigning against abortion and homosexual marriage, but on fighting poverty, environmental issues, and fair income redistribution. Their party-political profile puts the Democrats closer to such issues than the Republicans. Because, in addition, they have to some extent made themselves more amenable to the sensitivities of religiously motivated voters they have already had their first electoral successes in this connection in the fall midterm elections in 2006. The alliance of Republicans and the Christian Right, however, is facing a crisis: until a Republican presidential candidate comes forward behind whom the Christian Right can form a united front it will not be able to mobilize. This is made more difficult by the diversification of issues in the evangelical segment which makes it possible to link up with more than one party and above all frees the younger generation of evangelical Christians from the old structural pattern of inherited party affiliation.

If the Democrats continue, as the center party, to focus the interests of their heterogeneous support for the public good, the polarized political model personified by the Republicans of the Rove era will continue to weaken and the political center will be more widely representative than ever before.

**DIRK SCHMITTCHEN / HOLGER STRITZEL:**

**Different »Languages« in Germany and the USA?**

**A Comparison of Transatlantic Security Discourses on Rogue States**

The discourses on *rogue states* in Germany and the US are in many respects paradigmatic for general differences in the two countries' security policies. While the *rogue states* image has been a central continuity in US strategic discourse since the end of the Cold War, its reception in Germany has been marked by skepticism, irony, and open hostility towards the US. Differences such as these have in the past often been interpreted in cultural terms. But while there is a grain of truth in cultural explanations, they often suffer from treating heterogeneous discourses too simplistically as monolithic blocs. Rather than resorting too quickly to monolithic cultural explanations, scholars and policymakers alike should pay more attention to the social and political dynamics behind threat perceptions and how language can influence these dynamics as part of transnational communicative exchange. As the leader of at least the Western alliance, the US has to communicate with and find a common language for several audiences. And the language they decide to use not only affects the mobilization dynamics in their own domestic context, but also those in other countries, such as Germany. The different effects of the metaphor of *rogue states* in the US and in Germany thus illustrate the importance of language in understanding contemporary security policy in general and transatlantic differences in particular.

**STEPHAN KLECHA:**

**Europe's Social Policy as a Difficult Negotiation Process:**

**Actors and Options with Particular Reference to Working Time Policy**

While social democracy and their allied trade unions dreamed of a unified Europe, the conservative European project began to form. The unification process was only gradually augmented by attempts at a European social policy. Under the Commission Presidency of Jacques Delors Social Europe then came to form a decisive basis of legitimation for the realization of the Single Market in 1993. The Maastricht Treaty, which must be considered in this connection, made it possible for trade unions and employers' organizations to conclude joint, binding directives on a European scale, although this was rare. Europe's social-policy organization also fell behind, as the dispute over the Working Time Directive shows. Although European law in this respect mostly lags behind national regulations, it has nevertheless influenced the working time policy of individual countries, as well as trade union strategies.

Certain member states, such as the UK and Greece, seek either to avoid common social-policy regulations on a European scale or insist on circumventions.

In the case of the revised version of the Working Time Directive the European Parliament was unwilling to support such attempts. The Commission then chose the path of least resistance, but the Parliament lacks the broad support of the trade unions in order to exert adequate pressure. The trade unions in particular, as civil society actors, are best placed to bridge the gap between the Parliament and the general public. They could apply this power to persuade the Parliament to call for effective social-policy regulations from the Commission and the Council by means of the adroit combination of different policy areas.

**MARY MARTIN:**

**Human Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo**

In July 2006, the European Union deployed a military mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), comprising 2 400 troops from 19 contributing countries, under German operational command. EUFOR DRC's mission was to provide support for the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in DRC during the crucial period of the first free presidential elections to be held in over four decades. The mission marked a milestone in the development of the European Union's Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in that it demonstrated a new kind of EU capability as a global actor, and it introduced a number of significant innovations in the way the mission was conducted. Not only were the willingness to use dissuasive force in a location well beyond the EU's own borders and the key role played by German troops novel, but in terms of its methodology EUFOR broke new ground in the way a military force can be used in the context of protecting a civilian population and treating them as if they were citizens rather than an alien people. From being regarded on the ground as at best an ineffective initiative and at worst a partisan, neo-colonialist force, EUFOR succeeded in establishing itself as both neutral and credible. The use of human rights advisors, gender awareness, and an outreach programme which sought to engage local public opinion meant that the EUFOR mission implemented what could be called a Human Security approach. Measured against the five principles of Human Security outlined in the Barcelona Report on European Security Capabilities, the mission demonstrated a respect for human rights, a bottom-up approach, and effective multilateralism. Less satisfactory in Human Security terms were the weakness of its mission and the lack of coherence with other EU initiatives in the country, despite the presence of two civilian missions undertaking police and security sector reform and the European Commission's substantial donor program. The lack of follow-through impaired the military mission's ability to link short-term »rapid reaction« measures and long-term assistance, or »crisis management« and conflict prevention. Although the mission has provided the EU with benefits in terms of lessons learned – including demonstrating the viability of a Human Security approach –

a parallel conclusion is that the EUFOR DRC mission represented a clearer gain for the EU than for DRC and its citizens.

**ROGER HÅLLHAG:**

**Political Party Internationals as Guardians of Democracy –  
Their Untapped Potential**

In the new landscape of global democratic politics most ideologies and political families are struggling to define themselves. Hardly any has a truly global following. The Socialist International remains paramount around the world, but all Political Party Internationals are under challenge. Singing »The International Unites the Human Race« no longer really rings true.

In the face of globalization and rising popular expectations that national political parties should respond more adequately, the Party Internationals are skeletal and overstretched: politics are largely national and political parties are increasingly having to cover the inflated costs of media politics. They are generally not willing to invest their often meager financial and intellectual resources in global ventures. Consequently, Party Internationals are not given a strong mandate or role.

But an International's seal of approval is still regarded as important by many new – and some old – political parties in recently democratized world regions. It lends legitimacy and an identity, and supplies networks. Meanwhile, on their home turf of Western Europe, Party Internationals are in practice, if not by intent, being superseded by the European Parties. These transnational parties are an emerging innovation with direct relevance for the EU agenda and also well funded.

Despite these difficulties, the author argues that Party Internationals can make a critical and unique contribution to consolidating democratic gains worldwide. Universal political ideas can prevent the international political climate from sliding further into the morass of suspicion and confrontation. Internationals are operating below their potential.

Party Internationals have the opportunity to leverage their unique character and exercise peer pressure, if democratic membership criteria are properly applied. More intense interaction among like-minded political forces and interest groups could improve the quality of policies and politics, both at national level and in international forums. The conservative, liberal, and Green political families have each adopted useful strategies and practices for political coherence, while socialists and centrist democrats are broader churches with less clear profiles.

**REGINA BERNHARD / CHRISTIAN KELLERMANN:**  
**Against All Debts?**  
**Solutions for Future Sovereign Defaults**

Sovereign debts and debt crises have been a major topic for international policymakers for quite some time. Generally, it is characteristic of global financial markets that debtors and creditors systemically tend to overshoot, periodically evoking unsustainable debt situations, which end up in a liquidity crisis or, in the worst case, a default. Even if there is no international consensus on how to establish a debt restructuring mechanism, a solution for dealing with sovereign defaults is urgently required.

A core problem of sovereign debt restructuring is the fact that creditor coordination has become increasingly difficult as a consequence of a diversified and anonymous creditor community. Problems of collective action arise in the event of a sovereign default due to specific creditor behaviour, such as individual creditors acting as free riders, sudden withdrawals of investors in times of crisis, and the risk of litigation by individual creditors. Existing concepts at the disposal of the international community concerning how to handle sovereign defaults have either failed (the IMF's *Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism*) due to conflicts of interest or have several shortcomings (*Collective Action Clauses*). As an alternative, we evaluate two proposals from NGOs and think tanks: (i) the *Fair and Transparent Arbitration Process* (FTAP) which proposes an international insolvency procedure analogous to the US Bankruptcy Code, and (ii) the *International Debt Framework* (IDF), a concept associated primarily with the *Group of 20* (G20). Our question is, would these frameworks establish an appropriate regime for dealing with sovereign default?

The IDF's weakness lies in its lack of a fully inclusive and equitable mechanism due to its strong orientation towards G20 countries. The FTAP, in contrast, would provide an inclusive mechanism with equitable regulations. Furthermore, the FTAP's arbitration process, in combination with its sanction mechanism, would potentially be more effective than the IDF's mediation process, which lacks enforcement. Both proposals have the potential to address the collective action problem appropriately in all its dimensions.

To achieve an optimum solution, the approach would have to be universal in order to make the framework binding on all creditors and to enforce decisions. But this would require an international consensus, for which there has been no obvious window of opportunity in recent years. Governments closely tied to financial interests have so far successfully impeded such a universal approach.