

PEACE AND SECURITY

EU INSTRUMENTS TO COUNTER FRAGILITY AND CRISES

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The European Union has a set of instruments to promote peace and counter fragility and crisis outside of its territory.



This document gives a brief overview of these instruments and how they are deployed. It summarises the principal political bodies involved in policy formulation, decision-making and operationalising the EU's engagement in this sector.



In order to illustrate the application of these instruments, the document provides a country example. It concludes with an analytical note on the EU's limitations when it comes to steering its responses to fragility and crisis situations.

EU INSTRUMENTS TO COUNTER FRAGILITY AND CRISES

This text focuses on the European Union's (EU) instruments to promote peace and counter fragility and crisis outside the EU. Its aim is to brief a wide audience of foreign affairs decision-makers and practitioners in need of a succinct overview of EU instruments and how these are deployed. This document identifies the main EU institutions that play a significant role in countering fragility and crisis. It summarises the principal political bodies involved in policy formulation, decision-making and operationalising the EU's engagement in this sector. And it presents the various political, financial and military instruments the EU has at its disposal to promote peace and counter fragility, crisis and conflict. Finally, it gives an insight into how decisions are triggered and made operationally and it provides a country example to illustrate the application of these instruments. The document concludes with a short analytical note highlighting the EU's limitations when it comes to steering its responses to fragility and crisis situations.

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1 INTRODUCTION

This FES Perspectives focuses on the European Union's (EU) instruments to promote peace and counter fragility and crisis outside the EU.¹ Its aim is to brief a wide audience of foreign affairs decision-makers and practitioners in need of a succinct overview of EU instruments and how these are deployed. First, this document identifies the main EU institutions that play a significant role in countering fragility and crisis. Second, it summarises the principal political bodies involved in policy formulation, decision-making and operationalising the EU's engagement in this sector. Third, it presents the various political, financial and military instruments the EU has at its disposal to promote peace and counter fragility, crisis and conflict. Fourth, it gives an insight into how decisions are triggered and made operationally² and fifth, it provides a country example to illustrate the application of these instruments. The document concludes with a short analytical note highlighting the EU's limitations when it comes to steering its responses to fragility and crisis situations.

2 RELEVANT EU INSTITUTIONS

The complex nature of and interrelationships between the EU institutions that deal with EU external action must be understood against the backdrop of past EU foreign policy, which has traditionally been divided into two main 'pillars': the "Community pillar" and the "intergovernmental pillar". The former was of a supranational nature, focused on trade, development, agriculture and other areas, with decisions being made through EU institutions based on consultations and agreements with EU Member States. The second pillar was controlled by the EU Member States and focused on foreign policy and security, with all decisions requiring unanimous agreement among those states. The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) then aimed to simplify the EU's structure, abolishing the pillar system by merging the two into a single legal entity. Today, the EU's *Common Foreign and Security (CFSP)* still operates according to a largely intergovernmental approach but is more integrated into the overall EU institutional set-up, allowing for more coherent external action than in the past.

The EU, at Brussels level as well as its diplomatic representations, is equipped with a broad set of actors, institutions and specialised departments to deal with external crises and fragility. The **European External Action Service (EEAS)**, formally established in 2011, supports the *High Representative (HR)* of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who also serves as the *Vice-President (VP)* of the European Com-

mission.³ Directing some 140 EU delegations and offices⁴, the EEAS serves as the EU diplomatic service and foreign and security policy arm. As such, it coordinates the *CFSP* across the Member States and helps to formulate, implement and monitor the EU's foreign policy strategies and actions. The EEAS is not part of the Commission but works closely with all institutions dealing with the EU's foreign international cooperation, humanitarian and security policy.

The remit of the EEAS department for Peace, Security and Defence includes promoting an integrated approach to peace, security and crisis prevention, as well as issues of counter-terrorism and hybrid threats. It plays an instrumental role in crisis management and conflict prevention through the coordination of the EU's civilian and military *Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)* missions and operations. The EEAS also encompasses the EU Military Staff, under the direct authority of the High Representative/Vice-President, providing military expertise related to early warning, intelligence, military operations and logistics.⁵

Several parts of the **European Commission** are focused on promoting peace and countering (man-made and natural) fragility, crisis and conflict. These include the *Directorate-General (DG) for International Partnerships (DG INTPA)*⁶, responsible for international cooperation, and the DG for *Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR)*⁷, in charge of the EU's relations and engagement with its closest neighbours to the east of the EU. The *Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI)* was set up to manage, both operationally and financially, the budgets for the EU's CFSP. The new DG Mediterranean, operational since December 2024, is in charge of the EU's relationships with its closest neighbours south of Europe. The service falls under the remit of the HR/VP and works very closely with the EEAS, which has no operational budgets of its own (FPI is located in the same building as the EEAS).⁸ Along with FPI, the DGs INTPA and NEAR are jointly responsible for programming the main EU financial instrument for EU external engagement, the *Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE)* (see below). Another of the Commission's institutional actors is the DG for *European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO)*. Its decisions and operations are based on humanitarian principles and not subject to directives given by any other EU actors.

The **EU's delegations**, which play a similar role to that of an embassy, have a political section and a cooperation section for countries and regions where support for international

¹ This note does not cover internal EU crisis response mechanisms such as, for example, the European Defence Fund, which is the European Commission's instrument for supporting research and development in defence.

² The description of the decision-making process is limited to the EU's most relevant structures and processes. A range of other actors on both sides, that of the EU institutions and the EU Member States, can also play a role in agenda setting and decision-making processes.

³ European External Action Service (EEAS), [Background and creation](#)

⁴ EEAS, EU in the World: [Diplomatic Representations and ongoing Missions and Operations](#)

⁵ European External Action Service (EEAS), [Organisational chart](#)

⁶ European Commission, [Directorate General for International Partnerships \(DG INTPA\)](#).

⁷ European Commission, [Directorate-General for European Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations \(DG NEAR\)](#)

⁸ European Commission, [Service for Foreign Policy Instruments](#)

cooperation is provided. In countries with European military operations, EU delegations can also be staffed by military advisors, often with a regional portfolio. The Directorate-General **ECHO and FPI have regional offices** which are mostly within or close to the buildings where the EU delegations are based. The EU Head of Delegation in a country also chairs the Head of Missions (HOMs) meeting which brings together all the EU Member States' ambassadors and any other EU Heads of Mission (e.g. of civil or military missions).

3 POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING BODIES, WORKING PARTIES AND COMMITTEES

As EU foreign policy is not a shared competency, the EU institutions outlined above receive broad political and policy directions from EU Member States and their representation in Brussels. Directions are first and foremost received from the **European Council**⁹ on broad peace and security related issues, such as support to Ukraine, and the *Foreign Affairs Council (FAC)*, composed of the foreign ministers of all EU Member States, *which is an institution of the Council of the European Union*.¹⁰ Depending on the agenda, the Council can bring together defence ministers (to discuss common security and defence policy) or development ministers (to address development cooperation). With the EU's rotating (six month) presidencies, presiding EU Member States have the right of initiative for development cooperation and humanitarian assistance in terms of setting agendas at the lower levels and this then has to be negotiated when it reaches the FAC. The overall agenda of the FAC has to be agreed with the HRVP as chair (a change introduced since the Lisbon Treaty).

The work of the Council of the European Union is informed and assisted by a **number of preparatory bodies known as working parties or committees**. The *Political and Security Committee (PSC)* is composed of the Member States' ambassadors based in Brussels and is chaired by the EEAS. It meets twice a week, or more often if necessary, to monitor the international situation and recommend strategic approaches and policy options to the European Council. It provides guidance to the military committees and groupings, which also serves to ensure the political control and strategic direction of EU crisis management operations.¹¹

Several working parties, normally staffed by diplomats from EU Member State Permanent Representations in Brussels, are instrumental in preparing the work of the Council of the European Union. These include the Working Party on *Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid (COHAFA)*, on *Development*

Cooperation and International Partnerships (CODEV-PI) and on *International Terrorism (TWP-COTER)* which works closely with the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator's Office.¹² Supporting the Political and Security Committee are the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and the Politico-Military Group (PMG).

The **European Parliament (EP)**, including its Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) and the Security and Defence Subcommittee, can play a relevant role in the EU's foreign policy, with legislative, supervisory and budgetary responsibilities. While the EP does not have the same level of direct influence over foreign policy as the Commission or the Council, it still exercises oversight and constitutes, along with the Council, the EU's budgetary authority. It has the power to approve, amend or reject the EU budget in its entirety, including funding allocated to foreign policy, external action and international development. The EP is also informed about key CFSP and CSDP decisions and can, with the agreement of the country concerned, send its members to observe elections in third countries.¹³

4 EU POLITICAL, FINANCING AND MILITARY INSTRUMENTS

The EU can act externally via its political, financial and military instruments. These are deployed in various combinations, often simultaneously, to respond to fragility, crisis situations and conflicts.¹⁴

4.1 POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS

The following political instruments can support the work and activities of the actors and organisations outlined above.

The **EU Special Representatives (EUSRs)** promote the EU's policies and interests in specific regions and countries (including, for example, the Horn of Africa) and support the work of the EU HR/VP in the regions concerned. The Special Representatives are proposed by, and report to, the HR/VP, but their mandate and budget are defined by the Council. In the past, the EU has also appointed a range of **EU Special Envoys** for thematic issues, e.g. disarmament and non-proliferation, or specific countries, such as Afghanistan.¹⁵ To support its operations and programmes, the EU also conducts **political and policy dialogue**, at various levels, with and in partner countries. Sometimes this is done with or on behalf of EU Member States. The EU Delegations at country and regional level also conduct political and policy dialogue,

⁹ This includes the Heads of State and Government of all EU countries, together with the President of the EU and the European Commission. It is the highest level policymaking body in the EU.

¹⁰ Also known as the Council of Ministers, this institution consists of government ministers (from different sectors) from all EU Member States.

¹¹ European Council, *Political and Security Committee (PSC)*

¹² European Council, *Council preparatory bodies*

¹³ European Parliament, *Foreign policy: aims, instruments and achievements*

¹⁴ The EU also acts externally by means of trade relations, including trade agreements through DG TRADE, the Commission department responsible for EU trade policy with countries beyond the EU's borders, and through trade-related instruments. The DG TRADE is not one of the EU's 'traditional' external action institutions and its instruments are not used to any great extent in relation to fragility and crisis.

¹⁵ EEAS, *EU Special Representatives*

usually under the lead of the EU Head of Delegation. Political dialogue at delegation level can be conducted in conjunction with the EEAS, or line DGs such as DG INTPA or DG NEAR. Another important political instrument is the **restrictive measures (sanctions)** imposed by the EU. Sanctions are always applied in conjunction with political dialogue or other actions, and can take many forms.¹⁶ The EU can also adopt sectoral measures, such as economic and financial actions (e.g. import and export restrictions, restrictions on banking services) or arms embargoes (prohibition on exporting certain military goods).

Two additional types of activities are worth mentioning here. First, the EU conducts and supports **conflict mediation and peace dialogue**.¹⁷ This can be done at high levels by the EU itself, for example the past mediation and dialogue process on nuclear safety with Iran. But the EU also supports mediation processes at other levels by financing the peacebuilding and mediation organisations conducting them. Second, the EU also funds **election monitoring and deploys election monitoring missions**.¹⁸ The EU also provides election monitoring support in contexts of heightened (electoral) conflict, or funds processes to support peaceful dialogue and mediation prior to or after elections. This support can be seen as a political instrument as it promotes the EU's fundamental values on democracy and governance in conjunction with cooperation programmes and political dialogue.

4.2 FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS

The EU has a number of financial instruments at its disposal to counter fragility, crisis situations and conflicts. Some of these are included in the overall EU budget ('on-budget') meaning these instruments are part of the budget proposed by the European Commission and negotiated with the EP and Council. Others are 'off-budget', meaning decisions are taken by EU Member States with no direct involvement of the EP.¹⁹

European funding can take place through three financial instruments. The first two instruments, presented below, are part of the EU's current seven-year *Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)* for 2020 to 2027.²⁰ These are the *Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe* (NDICI-GE), mentioned above, the EU Humanitarian Budget and three special purpose

funds.²¹ The use of the third instrument, the *European Peace Facility (EPF)* is under the authority of the Council.

The **NDICI-GE** merges several former external financing instruments. With an overall allocation of €79.5 billion, the instrument consists of two so-called 'programmable' pillars with funding for geographic and thematic interventions, one 'non-programmable' *Rapid Response Pillar (RPP)*, and the *Emerging Challenges and Priorities Cushion ('Cushion')*.

Cooperation programmes are developed under the geographic and regional pillar (amounting to some €60 billion), including funding for civilian security, such as support for security sector reform in a particular country. Under the thematic pillar (some €6.4 billion), the NDICI-GE can fund a range of activities supporting peace, stability and good governance in a country or region. The thematic programme 'Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention', also covering trans-regional threats and challenges, was allocated €908 million for longer-term support, while 'Human Rights and Democracy' and 'Civil Society Organisations' were each allocated €1.362 billion. The Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) is charged with formulating and managing interventions, under the Thematic Programme on Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention.²²

For the 'non-programmable RPP', some €3.2 billion was allocated. Most of this funding is used, first, to rapidly respond to urgent crisis situations and conflicts (managed by FPI) and, second, to support activities which can link humanitarian, development and peacebuilding measures (managed by DG INTPA and DG NEAR). The NDICI-GE's 'Cushion' was allocated around €9.5 billion and is intended as a fund for unforeseen expenditures.²³ Approximately 80 percent was consumed during the first three years of the MFF, mainly for Covid-19 expenses, support for Ukraine and the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey.²⁴

The EU's budget for **humanitarian operations and activities** amounts to €11.57 billion for the MFF (2021–2027). In addition to the initial budget, an EU Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve can be called upon to respond to unforeseen events and major crises, financing humanitarian, civilian crisis management and protection operations in non-EU countries, in particular. Moreover, unused amounts from other EU funding programmes can be transferred to humanitarian aid over the course of the year.

The EU's **Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget** of €2.68 billion funds a variety of activities aimed at

¹⁶ Restrictive measures imposed by the EU may target governments of third countries, or non-state entities (e.g. companies) and individuals (such as terrorists and terrorist groups). The majority of sanctions regimes comprise measures (such as asset freezes and travel bans) targeting individuals and entities.

¹⁷ EEAS, Mediation support, see also: [Integrated Approach for Peace and Security Directorate Mediation factsheet](#)

¹⁸ EEAS, [EU Election Observation Missions](#)

¹⁹ All figures in this section represent the allocations for the different instruments as of the beginning of the new MFF (2021). In 2024, budget cuts of approx. 8 to 10 percent for external action were decided for 2025. See: European Commission. 2024. Statement of Estimates of the European Commission for the financial year 2025. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/7a0420e1-599e-4246-9131-cb7d505d6d9_en?filename=DB2025-Statement-of-Estimates_1.pdf

²⁰ European Union, [Multiannual financial framework factsheet](#)

²¹ These other instruments (or funds) for external action are the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), the Decision on the Overseas Association including Greenland (DOAG) Fund, and the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC).

²² In particular the Thematic Programme on Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/global-europe-peace-stability-and-conflict-prevention-thematic-programme-2021-2027_en

²³ The European Commission, specifically through DG INTPA and other relevant DGs, is responsible for the allocation and management of these funds.

²⁴ European Commission, [Evaluation of the European Union's External Financing Instruments \(2014–2020 and 2021–2027\)](#), 2024

promoting international peace, security and stability. It comprises funding for civilian CSDP missions, non-proliferation and arms control, EUSRs and a number of smaller activities such as the European Security and Defence College.

The **European Peace Facility (EPF)**, established in 2021, is a €17 billion fund financed outside the EU budget ('off-budget') for a period of seven years (2021–2027).²⁵ It functions as a single mechanism to finance lethal and non-lethal military equipment and training under the CFSP which are provided by the EU Member States. The EPF is financed by direct contributions from EU Member States based on their *gross national income (GNI)*. In March 2024, the Council decided to establish a dedicated *Ukraine Assistance Fund (UAF)* to the value of €5 billion, which is included in the total €17 billion. A further €5 billion per year for 2025–2027 is envisaged for the UAF but this needs to be decided on annually.²⁶ So far, more than 80 percent of the EPF has been spent on Ukraine. The aforementioned Service for Foreign Policy Instruments is responsible for the financial management of actions under the EPF. The EEAS is in charge of policy oversight, as well as the planning and design of the support.²⁷

4.3 MILITARY INSTRUMENTS

The EU also deploys a range of peace support operations, the above-mentioned **CSDP military and civilian missions**. There are currently 24 missions and operations including 13 civilian, 10 military and one civilian-military.²⁸ Their tasks range from conflict prevention and peacekeeping, crisis management, joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance to humanitarian, rescue and post-conflict stabilisation activities.²⁹

The **CSDP budget** for missions and operations is funded through various means. Expenditures for *military CSDP missions* cannot be covered by the EU budget. For this reason, the 'Athena mechanism' was designed in 2004 to handle the financing of common costs relating to EU military operations, which cannot be attributed to any single EU Member State.³⁰ The contributions to the mechanism are based on a cost-sharing formula based on the GNI of the EU Member States.³¹ Today, the 'Athena mechanism', as a way of determining the voluntary contributions from EU Member States³², has been

absorbed into the EPF. The management of the mechanism falls under the authority of the Member States.

Civilian CSDP missions are sourced from the CFSP budget and EU Member States.

Contribution arrangements: Each EU Member State participating in a military and civilian CSDP mission provides and finances its own troops, equipment and other operational costs. In many cases, EU Member States support civilian CSDP missions with seconded personnel who provide short-term expertise (for example police officers or gender experts).³³ In addition, the host country of a military mission may provide logistical assistance and other resources. Non-EU countries, international organisations or other partners may also contribute financially or in kind. Additional funding may come from specific grants, international funds or other financial instruments that align with the mission's objectives and are designed to enhance its capabilities.

Besides the operations and missions themselves, several EU delegations host EU military advisors — seconded by EU Member States.

5 HOW DECISIONS ARE TRIGGERED AND MADE OPERATIONALLY

The use of the above-described instruments is the result of a myriad types of decision-making process. Depending on the funding to be decided on, different institutional actors — including those in the individual EU Member States — can be involved.

In theory, there are **distinct decision-making procedures** for the use of each of these EU instruments. In practice, however, these **processes are influenced by the varying levels of attention devoted or political weight** given to them by EU institutions and actors, especially the EU Member States. Different actors at various levels within EU institutions, but also within the Member States, may take the lead in proposing EU action, depending on a range of factors such as an EU Member State's national interest, the level of urgency, the scope of the crisis, etc. The extent to which an EU Member State might become involved is conditional on the political weight or attention that country gives to a matter. Disagreement among EU Member States or within the European Commission may lead to delays in responding, or failures to take appropriate action.

An important aspect here is the **coordination of internal and external actors around decisions** on the use of EU instruments. In many cases, such decisions are taken unilaterally by the EU (ideally in collaboration with EU Member States). In some cases, the decision to employ certain instruments is made in exchange with relevant non-EU partners

²⁵ Hauck, V., *The latest on the European Peace Facility and what's in it for the African Union*, September 2020

²⁶ EPSR Research Service, *European Peace Facility: Continued EU military assistance to Ukraine*, 21 February 2024

²⁷ EPSR Research Service, *European Peace Facility: Continued EU military assistance to Ukraine*, 21 February 2024

²⁸ EU Common Security and Defence policy (CSDP) *Missions and Operations EU Fact Sheet*

²⁹ EU Common Security and Defence policy (CSDP) *Missions and Operations EU Fact Sheet*

³⁰ European Union, EUR-Lex: *The mechanism for financing military operations (Athena)*

³¹ Deneckere, M., *The uncharted path towards a European Peace Facility*, 2019

³² EU Member States can opt out of the mechanism. Non-EU countries may also participate, but they do not have a vote in its decision-making.

³³ Salzinger, M. & Desmidt, S., *Gender equality in EU external action: The gender action plan and the women, peace and security agenda*, 2023

(such as the UN institutions, or key partners, such as the United States and other Western military actors, but also international financial institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, as well as continental and regional organisations, such as the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities in Africa). Crucially, decisions on using instruments are also made in exchange with the partner countries receiving the support or those affected by such decisions, based on mutual dialogue.

Decisions on **activities funded by the NDICI-GE aimed at countering fragility, crisis and conflict** are mostly made by means of an intensive process of coordination between the EEAS, EU delegations, DG INTPA or DG NEAR (depending on the country or region of engagement) and FPI, and are taken in consultation with DG ECHO which can decide on its involvement based on humanitarian principles. One challenge for EU delegations, as reported in various strategic independent evaluations of the EU³⁴, can be the absence of a clear political direction provided by headquarters on how to operate politically at particular points in time. This situation is impacted by the fragmented set-up of the EU's foreign policy, whereby the EEAS has a coordinating role vis-à-vis the EU Member States. In the absence of a shared agreement between EU Member States on a politically relevant topic, the EEAS has no mandate to take a decision on behalf of the entire EU.

Programmed actions: Support to partner countries or regions begins with **'programming'**. This is the EU jargon used to describe the process during which it defines its medium and long-term international cooperation priorities. It is primarily relevant for the NDICI-GE, which covers the geographic and thematic programmes and budgets, including under the current 2021–2027 MFF. Programming under the *NDICI-GE* started in November 2020 and was concluded in December 2021, with the adoption of country, regional, ERASMUS+ and thematic multi-annual indicative programmes (MIPs) for the years from 2021 to 2023. A new round of programming took place in 2024 for the remainder of the MFF. The key players here are DGs INTPA and NEAR, but the EEAS, sometimes FPI and the Member States also have a role.

Non-programmed actions: Under the *RRP*, the decision-making procedure is considerably shorter, but is based on an intensive internal coordination process. For emergency response decisions under the *RRP*, the Commission only needs to inform the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on the use of the crisis response budget. Decisions on the *'Cushion'* are also rapidly taken and fall under the responsibility of the Commission. Funding allocations for *humanitarian aid* are made on an annual basis. Decisions on the use of the budget for humanitarian support projects are made by DG ECHO.

Decisions on establishing and **funding civilian CSDP missions**, including EUSRs, are also taken rapidly and are the

result of intensive exchange between EU Member States, the EEAS and the Commission. When it comes to the **European Peace Facility (EPF)**, the EEAS is in charge of identifying demands and the support to be provided. It acts on the overall guidance of the Council and informs the PSC on the use of the budget.

6 COUNTRY EXAMPLE: APPLICATION OF EU TOOLS AND INSTRUMENTS IN SOMALIA

The EU engages in Somalia via a range of political, financial and military instruments. At the *political level*, through its delegation, the EU has had a presence in the country since 2017.³⁵ The EU delegation's cooperation section has remained part of its regional delegation Nairobi. Since 2012, an EUSR for the Horn of Africa has been contributing politically to the EU's multifaceted engagement in the region, including Somalia.³⁶

In terms of *international cooperation*, the EU funds activities in the domains of governance, economic support and resilience via the NDICI-GE, managed by the EU delegation's cooperation section and FPI.³⁷ The EU also provides humanitarian support to Somalia, managed by ECHO. The EU's cooperation section, the regional offices of FPI and ECHO are all based in the same building in Nairobi. The EU also operates three *CSDP missions* in or around Somalia. The EU Military Training Mission to Somalia (EUTM) was launched in 2010 to help strengthen the Somali federal defence institutions. The civilian CSDP mission, EUCAP Somalia, was established in 2012 in support of developing Somali maritime security and wider police capacity. Operation Atalanta, the second military CSDP mission — in place since 2008 — is a counter-piracy military operation at sea off the Horn of Africa.

The overall coordination of the EU's engagement in Somalia is led by the EU's Head of Delegation (HoD) based in Mogadishu. The HoD also leads on the *coordination of EU activities with Member States and other EU institutions*, including Team Europe Initiatives. For example, the Somalia Green Deal TEI is led by the EU, together with several EU Member States³⁸, the European Investment Bank and the KfW Development Bank.³⁹

³⁵ European Commission, *Evaluation of the EU cooperation with the Federal Republic of Somalia (2014–2021)*

³⁶ EEAS, EU Special Representatives: EUSR for the Horn of Africa Annette Weber

³⁷ Somalia 2021–2017 Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/44bcd681-0141-4b0a-b63c-1e5b4674f805_en

³⁸ Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden

³⁹ Capacity4Dev, Team Europe Initiatives Tracker: *Somalia Green Deal*

³⁴ European Commission, *Strategic Evaluation Reports*

ANALYSIS OF ACTION

For over two decades, the EU has claimed that in its response to crisis and fragility, it can adopt a unique comprehensive or integrated approach bringing together its various instruments. External evaluations have noted that when the EU is able to act in a comprehensive or integrated fashion, it is more likely to achieve impact. Yet, most analysis has also noted that both political and bureaucratic factors along with the complexity of the system often mean that the EU's approach is more piecemeal. The claim of any one EU instrument to have a significant impact should be met with caution. The EU processes described above provide no more than an overview, as the details in all their complexity would require more space than this document permits.

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