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Europe and Islam: No Securitization, Please!

- Intolerance and discrimination against Muslims in Europe have been increasing in recent years. In public discussions and the media, Islam is portrayed as a monolithic bloc that differs totally from or is even hostile to a similarly closed “West”.
- Over 23 million Muslims live in Europe; if one includes Turkey the figure reaches over 90 million Muslims, making Islam the second largest religion in Europe.
- Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde’s securitization theory and Habermasian ideals of dialogue show the problems that arise from the “Dialogue between Peoples and Cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Area”.
- The Dialogue unintentionally securitizes Islam, that is, it claims that in the absence of the Dialogue we face a dangerous future.

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"All religions are equally naked in this Turkish bath."¹

European Perceptions of Islam

On 7 March 2005 the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights released a report entitled "Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims in the EU – Developments since September 11." It revealed increasing distrust, enmity, and prejudice towards Muslims and was extremely worrying. Aaron Rhodes, Executive Director of the Institute, stated: "As the fight against terrorism has been stepped up and the perceived threat of religious extremism has become a major focus of public debate, pre-existing patterns of prejudice and discrimination have been reinforced and Muslims have increasingly felt that they are stigmatized because of their beliefs."² The report presented media reports portraying Muslims as "aliens" to and "enemies" of Europe, verbal and physical acts of violence against Muslims, prejudice in employment, the hostile political slogans of rightist parties, and negative immigration measures.³

According to Enes Karic, enmity against Muslims tends to derive from those who are not familiar with the "Other" and who are still not "citizens of the world and who still persist in political, philosophical, cultural and civilizational Eurocentrism."⁴ Christian values are (re-)emerging at the level of Europe's self-definition in relation to its Muslim neighbors, as shown in the discussion about Turkey's EU member-

ship, which has been converted into a dispute about "European shared values," building on the dangerous and bogus idea that Europe is a union of Christian states.

Over 23 million Muslims live in Europe today, that is nearly 5 percent of the population; if Turkey was to become an EU member, the number would be over 90 million or 15 percent. Since the 1970s, the Muslim population in Europe has increased twofold. And the tendency is rising. In the coming decades millions of Muslims will merge with the European tradition, while presumably maintaining some devotion to their native soil. As the religion with the second largest number of adherents in Europe, Europe has to accept Islam as a genuine component of its culture. Certainly, Islam has become an internal/national and an external/international factor for the EU, as it is a "permanent feature of European society and ... the transnational nature of the Muslim population in Europe plays a role in the process of European integration."⁵

In public discussions and the media Islam is mostly portrayed as a monolithic bloc, a closed and united group of people who are totally different from or even intimidating and hostile to a likewise closed "West," which is Christian, secular, liberal, and democratic.⁶ Without doubt, the description of the Muslim and Western worlds as two contrasting, opposing, and contradictory poles leads to a dualistic interpretation of relations, disregarding many nuances and exceptions, and the internal heterogeneity of both parties. It ignores the fact that cultures and societies are not solid and durable, but in a condition of permanent change. The explanation does not consider the all-encompassing mixture, constant overlaps, and intermingled fields between the cultures.⁷ Nor does this portrayal take into account the fact that Muslims, Christians, Jews, and others differ amongst themselves in terms of their religious and/or secular affiliations and orientations, not to mention their practices and involvements. It also ignores the heterogeneity of Islamic states: Islam does not inevitably take a fixed political form.

Islamic studies scholars have been trying for years to show that there is no *single* Islam. A Muslim in Europe has to deal with very different conditions to a

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- Urdu proverb, taken from Mohammed Ayoob, Political Islam: Image and Reality, *World Policy Journal* (Fall 2004), p. 10.
- http://www.ihf-hr.org/documents/doc_summary.php?sec_id=3&d_id=4029 Report from IHF (7 March 2005).
- Examples of discrimination from the report: the Belgian Vlaams Blok and the Austrian Freedom Party's negative rhetoric on Muslim immigrants as a "security threat"; survey results revealing 80 % of Germans equate "Islam" with "terrorism"; discriminatory hiring practices in Sweden; and campaigns against the building of mosques in Greece. Other examples: British MP Winston Churchill lamented the "excessive" entry of Muslims into Great Britain; Jean-Marie Le Pen, head of the French nationalist Front National, pleaded for a "halt to the Islamization of France"; the leader of the right-wing German Republikaner Party, Franz Schönhuber, stated, "Never will the green flag of Islam fly over Germany"; and the election slogan of the Denmark Progressive Party was: "Denmark without Muslims." See Enes Karic: Is 'Euro-Islam' a Myth, Challenge or a Real Opportunity for Muslims and Europe?, *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2002): p. 438.
- Enes Karic, Is 'Euro-Islam' a Myth?, p. 438.

5 Sara Silvestri, EU Relations with Islam in the Context of the EMP's Cultural Dialogue, *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (November 2005): p. 385.

6 Sami Zubaida, Islam in Europe, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/5isf/5/Papers/Zubaida_%20paper_III.2.pdf p. 1.

7 Salwa Bakr/Basem Ezbid/Dato' Mohammed Jawhar Hassan/Fikret Karcic/Hanan Kassab-Hassan/Mazhar Zaidi, Die muslimische Welt und der Westen, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 37/2003, pp. 6–7.

Muslim in Asia or Africa and so will act differently. Reality decides how Islam is practiced. Beyond that, the holy texts are interpretable. Islam is, in the words of Gudrun Kraemer, "what Muslims define and practice as Islamic at a certain place and at a certain time."⁸

Those who seek to totalize the Western and the Islamic worlds forget that neither a "Western" world of "pure Europeans," sharing the same Christian tradition, nor a pure, clearly defined Muslim society exists in reality. Millions of Muslim migrants in Western countries have been living there for years: they consider these states more and more as their homeland, have European nationalities, and are assimilated. Besides, these Muslims have influenced Western societies as their traditions, arts, and cuisine have gradually become elements of everyday cultural life in Europe and the United States. Indisputable too is the historical influence of Islamic civilization on natural science, medicine, and philosophy, and thereby on Western culture. And in any case, is the West best characterized in terms of Christianity or secularization? Is it a place of Enlightenment and human rights or of fascism and racism – or of all these things? The West is heterogeneous, a vague conception of contradictions. Equally, there is no clearly defined Muslim world. All Muslim societies are affected and influenced by Western culture via technology and the media. The Muslim world, too, is neither homogeneous nor monolithic. Trying to define it leads to vague generalizations and neglects the differences, contradictions, and internal conflicts. Besides, there is no clear boundary differentiating the industrialized Western world from the developing Muslim countries.⁹

The media play an important role in education and in conveying information generally. Cinema and television in particular can serve as ways of learning about the world, especially for those who rely on the media for information. Undeniably, movies can assist in the formulation of stereotypes and clichés to a more profound extent than the written word. This is indeed what Hollywood movies have been doing for decades: projecting racist, negative images of Arabs and Muslims, over and over again. In this connection, Jack G. Shaheen, a professor of mass communication, has watched and analysed over 900 films. According to

him, "filmmakers have collectively indicted all Arabs as Public Enemy – brutal, heartless, uncivilized religious fanatics and money-mad cultural 'others' bent on terrorizing civilized Westerners, especially Christians and Jews."¹⁰ Only 5 (!) percent of the movies showed Arabs as "normal" human beings. This, of course, is not enough to change minds and end the "othering" of people from the Middle East.

Not only movies, but also other parts of the media act in a similar fashion. When the Muslim world is portrayed in the Western media, the picture is frequently one of backwardness, religious fanaticism, suppression, lack of freedom and human and women's rights, even terrorism. Even to the extent that this Western perception contains a germ of truth, it remains an unfair generalization. Spread persistently by the media and conservative politicians and intellectuals, it has mutated into stereotypes and prejudices. Racism and animosity against all Muslims is growing, without differentiating between those who pursue violence and those who suffer from its consequences.¹¹

Writer and commentator Edward Said was very critical of the Western media's influence in creating a negative image of Islam. He considered the outcome as a new form of "Orientalism," which he interpreted as a "European theory that both serves and justifies European and occidental domination of the Orient. In the politics and ideology of orientalism, there is an artificially produced Orient, produced for European colonial and post-colonial purposes."¹² By dangerously repeating and promoting the public's misunderstandings of Islam and Muslims, the media has become partly responsible for their negative image in Europe. In most cases, what is presented is superficial; the means and patience required to understand difficult issues are missing. "Changing the way Islam is reported, freeing it of rhetoric and commonplace misconceptions could be an effective means of alleviating the fear of Islam amongst Europeans."¹³

8 Gudrun Krämer, *Gottes Staat als Republik – Reflexionen zeitgenössischer Muslime zu Islam, Menschenrechten und Demokratie*, Baden-Baden (1999), pp. 25–26: "das, was Muslime an einem bestimmten Ort und zu einer bestimmten Zeit als islamisch definieren und praktizieren," cited from Albrecht Metzger, *Die vielen Gesichter des Islamismus*, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 3–4/2002, p. 7.

9 Bakr et al. op. cit., pp. 6–7.

10 Jack G. Shaheen, *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People*, *Annals, AAPSS*, 588 (July 2003): p. 172.

11 Bakr et al. op. cit., p. 7.

12 Edward Said quoted in Karic (2002), p. 438.

13 Tiziana Sforza, *The Islamic Invasion*, *cafebabel*, European current affairs magazine (31.10.2005), <http://www.cafebabel.com/en/article.asp?T=T&Id=5107>

Huntington's Harm

An article published by Samuel P. Huntington in 1993, purporting to analyse a new phase in world politics, caused a great deal of commotion, to say the least. In it he argued that whereas until the end of the Cold War conflicts between nation states and ideologies – both World Wars and the Cold War itself – were mostly within Western civilization, in the post-Cold War period the causes of divergence and dispute would no longer be political, ideological, or economic, but cultural and due to differences among “civilizations.” Differing religious and cultural values would bring about a “clash of civilizations” which would dominate international politics. “Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world,”¹⁴ he went on. As, according to Huntington, the next major conflict will be between Islam and the West, the West ought to maintain its “superiority” and restrict the extension of Islamic civilization by policies of *divide et impera*.

The alleged threat to Western civilization from Islam again promotes black-and-white thinking, dividing the world into hostile camps, such as Islam vs Christian, Islamic vs Western democracy, darkness vs Enlightenment. It is therefore hardly surprising that Samuel P. Huntington's thesis on a putative “clash of civilizations” is again being widely read (and sold). The excessive instrumentalization of their respective cultural values by Islamic and Christian extremists and the revival of historically rooted hostile images has allegedly provided empirical proof for Huntington's simple interpretations of a reality that is in fact highly complex.¹⁵ The division of the world into “allegedly clashing cultures, or civilizations, may be attractive as it provides simple black-and-white answers to very complex phenomena in world politics.”¹⁶ It is distressing when representatives of the “clash of civilizations” standpoint consider Islam as the sole reason for the lack of democracy in the Middle East. Furthermore, it is positively dangerous to brand as an “enemy”¹⁷ in

14 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations?*, *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993). While his article included a question mark in the title, the book of the same title published in 1996 does without one, revealing a hardening of position on the part of the author.

15 Mohssen Massarrat, *Der 11. September: Neues Feindbild Islam? Anmerkungen über tief greifende Konfliktstrukturen*, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 3–4/2001, p. 3.

16 Raffaella A. Del Sarto, *Setting the (Cultural) Agenda: Concepts, Communities and Representation in Euro-Mediterranean Relations*, *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (November 2005): p. 316.

17 Albrecht Metzger, *Die vielen Gesichter des Islamismus*, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 3–4/2002, p. 10.

this way a religion that has deep roots in the world and historically has been responsible for high cultures.

Huntington's thesis has contributed to obstructing the observation and analysis of global conflicts and to neglect of the fact that the roots of conflict are to be primarily sought not between, but within cultures, and that the rapid, economically one-dimensional and politically asymmetrical globalization has caused deep and dangerous social divisions over the last half century. Even militant Islamism is to be understood as a reaction to this asymmetrically structured globalization.¹⁸

Securitization and Dialogue

According to the Copenhagen School of security studies, it is possible to study security in terms of speech acts; indeed, all topics in turn can be turned into security problems. This is because security is a social construction and need to portray a frightening reality. “Security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise or naming a ship). By uttering ‘security’ a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.”¹⁹ Securitization implies the construction of a danger that needs to be addressed by rapid action. By securitizing an issue, the public authorities present it as “an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.”²⁰ Securitization thus “has an enormous power as an instrument of social and political mobilization. Putting something on the security agenda persuades us of the need to furnish urgent and unprecedented responses; it signals imminent danger and is therefore given a high priority.”²¹

For an analysis of the securitization of “intercultural dialogue,” a glance at the Report by the High Level Advisory Group on the “Dialogue between Peoples and Cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Area” should suffice. The Dialogue was envisaged as a peaceful reaction to the US's harsh “War on Terror”

18 Massarrat, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

19 Ole Wæver, *Securitization and Desecuritization*, in Ronnie Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security*, New York: Columbia University Press (1995), p. 55.

20 Berry Buzan/Ole Wæver/Jaap de Wilde, *Security. A New Framework For Analysis*, Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner (1998), p. 24.

21 Wæver, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

in the wake of September 11 and was initiated by former European Commission President Romano Prodi in 2003 as a means of “involv[ing] civil societies in ending the discriminations from which European citizens of immigrant origin still too often suffer and the persistent situation of injustice, violence and insecurity in the Middle East, in implementing educational programmes designed to replace negative mutual perceptions with mutual knowledge and understanding”.²²

Unfortunately, while the intentions were noble and the “intercultural” dialogue was motivated by Habermasian ideals of dialogue,²³ the dialogue itself was transformed into an instrument for avoiding conflicts and war. That is, it was securitized in that it identified a source of conflict between cultures, even if different from that envisaged by Huntington, and described the dialogue as an “urgent necessity,” threatening an intimidating future in the absence of such dialogue.²⁴ But a dialogue along Habermasian lines is not to be realized if structured around security and claiming exceptional authority and importance.

Indeed, the report admits, “The ‘*dialog of civilizations*’ derives from the polemical, not to say war-mongering, concept of the ‘*clash of civilizations*’, and while it may be intended as a counterblast, it unfortunately shares the same logic in spite of itself by giving credence to the idea that the whole question is thrashed out between ‘blocs’ distinguished by quasi-ontological differences. However, it is paradoxically between ‘civilizations’ that dialogue is easiest” (p. 11). This means that, although the High-Level Advisory Group deeply dislikes Huntington’s thesis, it nevertheless relies on the same phrases and logic and perceives ready-made “blocs,” “distinguished by ... differences”, just as Huntington did.

It is interesting to note that the Group’s endeavors to depart from Huntington even verbally were not successful, as this paragraph from the report reveals: “Previously desirable, dialogue is now more than ever a necessity – ... to thwart ignorance, ... For the problem is rather the *clash of ignorances [our emphasis]*, which is much more destructive” (p. 16). As a consequence, by locating the source of conflict at the level of “ignorance,” different answers from those of Huntington can be expected, namely a “dialogue”

to spread information and thus understanding of the “Other” and to change our positions about and even stereotypes of the “Other.” Although this clearly diverges from Huntington’s concept of condescension and his recommendations of *divide et impera*, nonetheless this wording reveals that, in the report’s view, a conflict or even clash à la Huntington may occur in future and thereby precisely reproduces Huntington’s thesis.²⁵ The securitization proceeds as the report goes on to declare that “the clash of civilisations is for the moment just a fiction manipulated by some and hoped for by others. If it is to remain this way – despite the worrying portents on the international scene – we must act now” (p. 38). Moreover, “this is a matter of urgency, and by urgency we mean starting tomorrow and not stopping the day after tomorrow. Urgency also means daily awareness and continuous effort” (p. 36). In these terms, among others, the securitization of the dialogue is complete: in order to require dialogue, urgency and necessity have to be underlined in dire terms. The appeals for rapid action construct a dangerous future which will be realized if dialogue does not commence soon, as this can “produce terrifying examples of deviancy – terrifying in the true sense of inspiring terror by setting off a chain of unstoppable collective reactions which produce fanaticism and ultimately **violence**” (p. 36). Thereby, “what is at stake is nothing less than peace itself” (p. 35). Consequently, intercultural dialogue is not endorsed to reinforce culture, but culture is invoked to reinforce security. Therefore it is no longer a goal in itself, but a means to a higher end, namely security.

Securitization attracts resources and political attention. But security is not an unmitigated good and there are a number of topics that should not be securitized at all. Securitization is a severe type of politicization and involves closure, tight governmental control, and monitoring, while complicating and diminishing the influence of non-governmental groups.²⁶ This has already happened in the Dialogue between Cultures, which has been politicized and is closely controlled by governments.

The prioritization of topics and selection of civil society groups has prevented other civil society groups from expressing their preferences and goals, thereby curtailing the Dialogue’s openness and inclusiveness by means of which it seeks to address stereotypes and to launch new perceptions in their place. Besides, instead of including the public the dialogue largely consists of intellectual exchanges and conferences among elites. The dialogue has to become more open

22 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/publication/euromed_report68_en.pdf, p. 2.

23 Jürgen Habermas, *A Theory of Communicative Action*, Parts I & II, Cambridge: Polity Press (1984).

24 Helle Malvig, *Security through Intercultural Dialogue? Implications of the Securitization of Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue between Cultures*, *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (November 2005): p. 355.

25 Malvig, *op. cit.*, p. 357.

26 Malvig, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

and all-encompassing in terms of actors and topics.²⁷

“Intercultural” Dialogue

It is sad that attempts are being made to solve complex and diverse international problems in terms of “cultural politics” alone. Whenever problems arise between the “Western value community” and other parts of the world the most non-committal form of all political communication, “cultural dialogue” – or the even vaguer “critical dialogue” – emerges as a possible solution. In this way the West hopes to indicate that it is being proactive. In the current political situation, however, this is utterly inadequate.²⁸ If international problems are to be solved states must focus on essential issues and juxtapose a realistic picture to the disastrous propaganda of “hostile cultures” à la Huntington. While topics as different as economic development, authoritarianism, and women’s rights are all “explained” in terms of “culture,”²⁹ the core of current troubles is not to be found in religious or ethical values, but in economic and social structures. It is well known that values such as human rights, democracy, and civil society, which ensure peaceful living together, can prosper only on a sustainable economic and social basis. Unfortunately, the West has acted against this many times by pursuing its economic interests against the social needs of other countries.

As already mentioned, despite the goodwill underlying the concept of the Dialogue, it is “a paradoxical and conflictual operation” as it relies on the one hand on “culture” to differentiate – which includes “pre-conceived views and valorizations”³⁰ –, whilst seeking to promote the overcoming of divisions on the other hand. In this way the “prescribed cure” of an “inter-cultural” dialogue adopts Huntington’s thesis of “clashing civilizations,” as Huntington’s concepts and the inter-cultural dialogue itself contrast “the West”/“Europe” with the “Arab world”/“Islam,” and thereby accepts the idea of distinct and incompatible “cultures” as the basis for formalized dialogue.

These “differing” cultures can maintain conflict à la Huntington or dialogue à la High Level Advisory Group. Moreover, this strain of thinking is also embodied in the discourse of Islamist terrorism.³¹ These “cultures,” represented by political leaders (many of whom are not even elected democratically and rule on an authoritarian basis) and clerics (some of whom are not well educated or tolerant), act as “agents” in international relations, whereby states are “subordinated entities.” Certainly, with this definition of “culture” in terms of the “West vs. Islam” dichotomy, the “intercultural dialogue” empowers political and religious leaders and their visions, enabling them to privilege their own priorities, thereby ignoring such important issues as disparities in and between states, education, human rights, poverty, and sustainable development.³²

Whereas the construction of two differing “sides” is needed for a “cultural dialogue,” internally these sides have no sense of common collective identity, as there exist only the rudiments of a single “European identity,” while Islam is given an inclusive meaning encompassing also the Southern Mediterranean. Therefore, the process realized by “the establishment of a symbolic border that separates the EU from the ‘non-EU’ depends on communicative processes of ‘Othering’. ‘Othering’ then means that collective identities are always constructed against the difference of an ‘other’”³³ and this is dangerous. These deficits notwithstanding, the High Level Advisory Group’s report stated that the Euro-Mediterranean area should “become the focus of a continuing concerted effort by all towards the principle of equality (between countries, peoples, cultures, individuals, men and women), beyond differences (all to be respected) and inequalities too often endured.”³⁴ It laid down three important guidelines: (i) education as a means of learning and respecting diversity; (ii) mobility and exchange; and (iii) the media as a key instrument for promoting equality and reciprocal knowledge.

27 Malvig, op. cit., pp. 361–62.

28 Hans Arnold, Der Dialog mit dem Islam. The West und der Rest, *Zeitschrift für Kulturaustausch*, 1/2002, <http://cms.imf.de/publikationen/zeitschrift-fuer-kulturaustausch/archiv/ausgaben-2002>

29 Del Sarto, op. cit., pp. 315–16.

30 Stephan Stetter, The Politics of De-Paradoxification in Euro-Mediterranean Relations: Semantics and Structures of ‘Cultural Dialogue’, *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (November 2005): p. 332.

31 Del Sarto, op. cit., p. 314.

32 Del Sarto, op. cit., pp. 326–27.

33 Thomas Diez, Europe’s Other and the Return of Geopolitics, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2004): p. 321, cited in Stetter, op. cit., p. 335.

34 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/publication/euromed_report68_en.pdf p. 22.

European Union Endeavors

Unfortunately, the EU Council's "Directive prohibiting discrimination in employment on grounds of religion and belief, disability, age, and sexual orientation",³⁵ the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia's³⁶ country reports,³⁷ together with other reports, workshops, and roundtables on anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and "intercultural dialogue," have so far not issued practicable guidelines for policies. Nevertheless, while the EU still has problems in achieving a single voice in its foreign policy, these activities reinforce its "normative power"³⁸ and will to add to peace and democracy. Indeed, the EU's soft power and peaceful policies stand in stark contrast to the USA's methods, as seen in the ongoing "War on Terror."³⁹ At a meeting shortly after the September 11 attacks, former EU Commission President Romano Prodi declared: "We must avoid at all costs the association between terrorism and the Arab and Islamic world. We are engaged in a dialogue between equals and we should promote this through cultural exchanges. It is of utmost political importance that we continue our dialogue."⁴⁰ European attempts to promote human rights, democracy, and development require a sensitive, prudent strategy. As for many Arab governments, retaining power ranks above development policy: many reform programs have been delayed and even terminated too early. Also, Western states often give priority to the maintenance of domestic stability. These attitudes have had negative effects on the reliability of participants on both sides. The EU should concentrate on young elites and deliberately address issues important in the Mediterranean area, such as climate change, desertification, water shortages, social tensions, and political destabilization.⁴¹ European governments must also promote the

integration of Muslims in all areas of society. Pluralism could meet the aims of Muslims in Europe: "Islam recognized as a Western religion, Muslims as full citizens – while avoiding the creation of a closed community, ghettos, and minority status."⁴² Besides, the rigid visa regulations limiting the mobility of Southern Mediterranean people to the EU and hindering international cultural and educational exchanges should quickly be removed.⁴³ It is vital that *respect* is generalized to all, particularly what others hold sacred. Islamic clerics should strongly criticize all acts of terrorism and violence, especially those committed in the name of Islam, and make it clear that such acts do grave harm to Islam. In the words of Hélène Flautre, Chair of the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Human Rights, Europeans finally "must abandon the idea that the European Union (EU) is the 'teacher' in matters of democracy and avoid what borders on a neo-colonialist attitude."⁴⁴ If Europeans succeed in this and see themselves on an equal footing with Muslims, the situation of Europe's many Muslims will improve enormously. The West must therefore cease securitizing Islam and instead try to understand that there is an Islam in Europe as much as there is a Europe in Islam.

35 Council of the European Union, Directive Prohibiting Discrimination in Employment on the Grounds of Religion and Belief, Disability, Age and Sexual Orientation, 2000/78/EC (27 November 2000).

36 http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/fundamental_rights/pdf/pubsg/finalroundtable_de.pdf For more information on EUMC, see: <http://www.eumc.eu.int>.

37 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), Report on Anti-Islamic Reactions in the EU after the Terrorist Acts against the USA, Vienna (2001).

38 Silvestri, op. cit., p. 389.

39 Christian Koch, The Societal Sources of Change in the Middle East, *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, 4/2004, p. 68.

40 <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/01/359&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

41 Dieter Weiss, Freiheit und Entwicklung in der arabischen Welt, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 45/2005, pp. 44–45.

42 Olivier Roy, Europe's Response to Radical Islam, *Current History* (November 2005): p. 364.

43 Michelle Pace, Imagining Co-presence in Euro-Mediterranean Relations: The Role of 'Dialogue', *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (November 2005): p. 301.

44 Hélène Flautre, The EU is Not the Teacher in Terms of Democracy, interview with Stéphane Carrara, Sarah Wolff, and Vanessa Witkowski, *cafebabel*, European current affairs magazine (28.11.2005): <http://www.cafebabel.com/en/article.asp?T=T&Id=5315>

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