

PEACE AND SECURITY

# MOVING BEYOND SOLILOQUY

Youth Perceptions on Politics, Peace  
and Inter-Communal Contacts

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Youth's low level of interest in politics is not solely related to their political apathy, but to their inadequate representation in politics and lack of confidence in politician and political parties.



Turkish Cypriot youth are more disposed to the idea of friendship with Greek Cypriot youth than their counterparts are.



The negative narratives targeting the other community — as the 'enemy' or 'untrustworthy' — do not dominate the mindsets of any Cypriot youth on both sides.



More than half of Cypriot youth respondents on either side reported that they believe the Cyprus problem will never be solved.



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# INTRODUCTION

This report focuses on a under-researched but important topic: the perception and opinions of the youth of Cyprus in regard to politics, peace and inter-communal contact. Although the potential of youth has recently become a subject of the growing scholarly research agenda –in parallel to youth mobilisation around the world– the voices of Cypriot youth continue to be ignored in their respective communities as well as across the country. I suggest the term ‘soliloquy’<sup>1</sup> that refers the ‘act of ‘talking to oneself’ to describe the situation of Cypriot youth. There has been, and continues to be, a tendency towards underestimating the political, social and economic agency of Cypriot youth.

Cypriot youth have been marginalised largely because of the nationalist education system, intergenerational transmission, nationalist discourse in media and politics, and physical barriers in common spaces. And they continue to live between the past legacies and present realities of a divided society. Despite the failures of countless peacebuilding initiatives and criticism of the elite-level, closed-door, ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ format of negotiations, there is a constant hesitation to include the wider public—including youth and women—in the peace process (Lordos, 2009; Lordos, Kaymak and Tocci, 2009; Jarraud, Louise and Filippou, 2013; Pimond et al., 2019). Community leaders have continued to act on the assumption that an agreement acceptable to them would respond to the needs of all Cypriots. However, as McEvoy-Levy (2001, p. 5) suggests, ‘A peace agreement’s endurance depends on whether the next generations accept or reject it, how they are socialized during the peace process, and their perceptions of what that peace process has achieved.’ Youth is the generation that builds social trust and social cohesion in the community through their activities, dialogue and social engagement in their daily lives.

Five years ago, Hatay and Charalambous (2015), in their report published by the PRIO Cyprus Centre and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, drew attention to the ‘radically differing voting patterns’ of Cypriot youth on the two sides of the island during the Annan Plan referendum and the post-Annan periods. The youth of that era have become the adults of today, so it

is critical that we periodically investigate the trends in youth perceptions to observe whether there have been any shifts in hopes for the future, perceptions towards the other community, readiness for the peace process, and willingness to coexist.

Ironically, due to the long-lasting deadlock in the island, almost every aspect of the ‘Cyprus Problem’ can boast a substantial literature; yet the role of Cypriot youth has received scant attention apart from rare instances (Hadjipavlou and Kanol, 2008; Lordos, Kaymak and Tocci, 2009; UNDP, 2009; Kanol, 2013; Hatay and Charalambous, 2015; Özgür, Köprülü and Reuchamps, 2017). Cyprus is not, of course, alone in this regard. Although discussion of youth roles and contributions has recently begun and demonstrated the importance of the topic, the agency and voice of the youth are often ignored or underutilised (Dizdaroğlu, 2020b). This trend has slowly been replaced by critical studies — particularly in peacebuilding — that focus instead on the positive contributions of youth in post-conflict situations. Such contributions are also reflected in the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and in the reports of other institutions such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The UNSC Resolution 2250 on ‘Youth, Peace and Conflict’, which was adopted on 9 December 2015, is the outcome of all these efforts and a significant step towards recognising youth agency in conflict and post-conflict settings.

Notwithstanding the progress made since the adoption of the landmark UNSC Resolution 2250, there remains much to be done in many countries to effectively incorporate youth voices; this is because such an endeavour necessitates a general mindset shift towards youth as well as a parallel shift in the national political will (Dizdaroğlu, 2020a). Cyprus is one such country that must do more to utilise the contributions and experiences of youth. As reflected in the first-ever United Nations Human Development Report (HDR) for Cyprus conducted over ten years ago, politicians have not given youth any opportunity to take part in the peace process — moreover, they do not even consider their perceptions and demands. Instead, Cypriot youth have been relegated to the role of passive bystanders (UNDP, 2009, pp. 12 and 164). There has been only limited progress since then, and this report will focus on the tremendous amount of work that remains to be

<sup>1</sup> The etymology of soliloquy stems from late Latin *soliloquium* ‘a talking to oneself,’ from Latin *solus* ‘alone’ + *loqui* ‘to speak’. Also used in translation of Latin *‘Liber Soliloquiorum,’* a treatise by Augustine (Etymonline, 2020).

done in this area--not only in regard to the peace process, but also to decision-making at every level.

This policy report focuses on the neglected Cypriot youth with the aim of outlining a strategy to include the youth in the decision-making and peace processes. The first section briefly concentrates on identifying Cypriot youth, while the next section introduces UNSC Resolution 2250 as a legal framework for youth engagement. Then it presents the survey findings based on the survey findings within three sub-sections including politics, inter-communal contacts and peace. The last part covers the discussion and recommendations, with the aim of devising a strategy for action. I hope that this report, which suggests how to more effectively engage youth in these processes—in accordance with the pillars of UNSC Resolution 2250 (2015)—will foster debate among academics, policy experts, civil society organisations and international third parties actively working on the ground.

## 1

## DEFINING CYPRIOT YOUTH

The term youth has no universally accepted definition; it revolves around age, social and cultural roles, and psychological factors (Özderem and Podder, 2015, pp. 1–3). The United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) landmark Resolution 2250 (2015) on 'Youth, Peace and Security' established youth as those aged between 18 and 29, while also acknowledging the discrepancy between definitions, and noting that 'variations of definition of the term that may exist on the national and international levels' (S/RES/2250, 2015). As there is no standard age range for youth, this range can drop, for instance, to as low as 12 in Jordan and rise to 35 in several countries, including Cyprus. The National Youth Strategy of Cyprus,<sup>2</sup> which was prepared by the Youth Board of Cyprus and adopted in 2017, defines youth as individuals aged between 14 and 35. However, it should be noted that, as in many other countries and national and international organisations, several different age ranges are in effect for the Cypriot youth population.<sup>3</sup>

These conflicting—or overlapping—age-defined boundaries are inconsistent and largely depend on a country's social and cultural contexts. In fact, some scholars argue that youth is a 'socially-constructed' concept that relates to categories that are unnatural and embedded in personal relationships, social practices, politics, laws and public policies (Honwana, 2012, p. 11). Youth are characterised by assorted social attributes that differentiate them from other social groups, such as age, authority, social position, power, ability, rights, dependence/independence, knowledge and responsibility (Durham, 2004, p. 593).

Considering who is a youth from a 'psychological perspective' relates to the period of transition between childhood and adulthood. This perspective entails no clear-cut transition,

though there are some markers such as marital status, child-birth, land ownership, and ritual or spiritual initiation. Accordingly, a person may still be considered a youth even after having outgrown the official age range. In some African countries, this period of transition can be prolonged: Honwana (2013) defines this phase as 'waithood', and even a 40-year-old unemployed or unmarried person can still be considered a 'youthman'.

In addition to these definitional challenges, there is also another difficulty in presenting a clear picture of the Cypriot youth: the imprecise demographic data due to the ongoing division of the island.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, it is possible to conclude that the Greek and Turkish Cypriot youth collectively constitute an estimated 20–25 percent of the island's total population.<sup>5</sup> Cypriot youth represent an important demographic dividend in their country, but this is not all: they are active agents who believe that they also have a responsibility to find a peaceful solution to the seemingly endless Cyprus problem.

<sup>2</sup> The Youth Board of Cyprus, which was founded in 1994, comprises representatives from the youth wings of the political parties represented in the parliament and operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Education and Culture. However, it is not inclusive, as it mainly focuses on Greek Cypriot youth and does not include the Turkish Cypriot youth in its strategy, activities or reports.

<sup>3</sup> For instance, the National Action Plan for Youth Employment defines youth as between 15–29 years old, while a 2007 Council of Europe report on youth policy in Cyprus states that 'the international review team accepted a working definition of 'youth' in Cyprus as those between the ages of 10 and 25'. The Human Development Report of Cyprus has adopted the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) narrow age range of 15–24.

<sup>4</sup> The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is only recognised by the Republic of Turkey. While for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, Mustafa Akinci serves as President of the TRNC, the international community considers him the communal leader of the Turkish Cypriots. As the government of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) remains internationally recognised as the government of the whole of the island, the entire island is now considered to be a member of the European Union. However, the *acquis communautaire* is suspended in Northern Cyprus pending a political settlement to the Cyprus problem (see Protocol no. 10 of the Accession Treaty).

<sup>5</sup> While the RoC announces the population results based on the government controlled area, the population of the northern part has been a source of a controversy. For a detailed account of the population issue, see Mete Hatay (2017), *Population and Politics in North Cyprus: An Overview of the Ethno-demography of North Cyprus in the Light of the 2011 Census*. PRIO Cyprus Centre and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

## 2

## UNSC RESOLUTION 2250 AS A LEGAL FRAMEWORK

On 9 December 2015, after years of lobbying and advocacy, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2250 (2015), 'Youth, Peace and Security', acknowledging earlier youth-led efforts in 'creating a foundation that promotes young people's inclusive participation and positive contribution to building peace in conflict and post-conflict situations'. The resolution identified five pillars to enable youth participation, especially in peace processes (S/RES/2250, 2015):

**PARTICIPATION:** This urges member states to consider ways to increase youth representation at all levels of decision-making for the prevention and resolution of conflict. It also calls on all relevant actors to consider the participation and views of youth when negotiating and implementing peace agreements.

**PROTECTION:** This refers to the guaranteed protection of civilians, particularly the youth, from all forms of sexual and gender-based violence during periods of armed conflict as well as post-conflict.

**PREVENTION:** This urges member states to facilitate an environment in which youth are recognised and to adequately support them in their efforts and activities for violence prevention and social cohesion. This pillar includes promoting a culture of peace, tolerance, as well as intercultural and inter-religious dialogue involving youth.

**PARTNERSHIP:** Member states should increase their political, financial, technical and logistical support systems to meet the needs of the youth and to ensure their participation in peace efforts in conflict and post-conflict situations. Member states are asked to engage with the relevant local communities and non-governmental actors to develop strategies to counter violent, extremist narratives.

**DISENGAGEMENT AND REINTEGRATION:** This encourages all actors engaged in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration activities to consider the needs of youth impacted by armed conflict. It also stresses the importance of investing in youth capabilities and skills through relevant education opportunities designed to prevent the marginalisation of youth and to promote a culture of peace.

resolution by adopting the subsequent UNSC Resolution 2419 (2018), which promotes the inclusion of youth in conflict prevention and resolution. Since Resolution 2250 was adopted there has been significant progress, at least in recognising the 'essential role' of youth as well as increasing their visibility in areas of peace and security. However, as reflected in the UN Secretary-General's report on the implementation of the resolution, some core challenges remain to be addressed. These include the 'structural barriers limiting the participation of young people and their capacity to influence decision-making; violations of their human rights; and insufficient investment in facilitating their inclusion, in particular through education' (UN Secretary General, 2020, para. 10).

Though no solution applies universally to all cases, the best approach is to consider particular cases, such as this evaluation of the youth and their role in Cyprus. The Resolution and its five pillars may not be clear-cut for the Cyprus case, but they underline the necessity of creating mechanisms to include the experiences and needs of youth in creating a culture of peace. The comparative findings in this report highlight the youth's perception of politics, peace and inter-communal contact. It will thus help us to prioritise the necessary points of action in order to recognise the economic, political and social agency of youth as well as to effectively integrate them in decision-making and peace processes.

The UNSC reaffirmed its commitment to implement this



# 3

## YOUTH PERCEPTIONS TOWARD POLITICS, INTER-COMMUNAL CONTACTS AND PEACE


This policy report details the findings of a telephone survey conducted simultaneously in the two communities of Cyprus, by Noverna Analytics in the south and Lipa Consultancy in the north. The survey commenced on 30 November 2019 in the north and 3 December 2019 in the south and concluded for both sides on 10 January 2020. The Ethical Board of Coventry University provided the necessary ethical approval for the survey, which is a part of the research project ‘The Role of Youth in Peacebuilding: The Cyprus Case | YOUPEACEBUILDER’. The project has received funding from the EU Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grants.

The sample included 250 Greek Cypriot youth and 250 Turkish Cypriot youth; male and females were equally represented. Although the National Youth Strategy of Cyprus defines youth as between the range of 14 and 35 years old, survey respondents were between 18 and 35 years old. Details about the survey and sample are available in the methodology section.

A comparative analysis of the survey findings will be presented according to the three areas of focus: the political attitudes of youth, youth perceptions of inter-communal contact and youth perceptions of peace.

### 3.1 POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF GREEK-CYPRriot AND TURKISH-CYPRriot YOUTH

The political participation of the younger generation is dismal in most places around the globe. Analysis of voter turnout, which is one of the most common methods of political participation, reveals that this is lower among the youth than all other age groups. For instance, although in the May 2019 European elections, youth turnout (aged under 25) had grown since 2014, it remained the lowest among age groups (European Parliament, 2019b). This abysmal rate of electoral participation likely applies to Cyprus, especially with previous European elections (Kanol, 2013). However, this youth voting trend resembled that in Europe in the latest election, as was reflected in the survey results. When Cypriot youth were asked whether they voted in the most recent European Parliament elections, which had a total turnout of 44.99 percent, 40.8 percent of Greek Cypriot youth (Figure 1) said they had cast ballots (European Parliament, 2019a). This is only 5.2 percent among Turkish Cypriot youth. Nonetheless, this lower turnout among Turkish Cypriots youth is normal considering the total number of registered Turkish Cypriots — 81,611 — represents just 2 percent of the total voter turnout (Andreou, 2019).



As Figure 2 below demonstrates, 63.6 percent of Turkish Cypriot youth and 46 percent of Greek Cypriot youth are generally 'not interested' or 'a little bit' interested in politics. Yet the low interest does not reflect solely the political apathy of the youth. Not only do the Cypriot youth of both communities feel underrepresented in politics (Figure 3), they also clearly have no confidence politicians' and political parties' ability to effect change (Figure 4). While youth harbour negative attitudes towards politics, it is conceivable to argue that Greek Cypriot youth are more interested in politics than Turkish Cypriot youth.

As seen more specifically in figure 3, 70 percent of Greek Cypriot youth and 58.8 of Turkish Cypriot youth feel inadequately represented in politics; only a very small percentage of

both Greek and Turkish young Cypriots feel that their representation is sufficient. This is also reflected in the statement of a 21-year old Turkish Cypriot: 'Political parties are hesitant to encourage youth candidates in politics, and they don't have any intention to open the doors to youth, either.' In Cyprus, the domination of politics by older men prevents youth from participating in any governmental body (Dizdaroğlu, 2020b).

On both sides of the island, the youth express very low levels of confidence in institutions and persons (Figure 4). The levels of confidence in Mustafa Akıncı (35.2 percent) and Nicos Anastasiades (16.8 percent), the two community leaders, are the highest on both sides in comparison with other institutions/persons, including the government, the parliament, political parties and politicians. It is politicians --among all polit-






Figure 4  
Confidence Level in Political Institutions and Persons





ical institutions/persons—who are awarded the lowest level of confidence on both sides, with 49.2 percent of Greek Cypriot and 47.6 percent of Turkish Cypriot youth stating that they have no confidence whatsoever in politicians. The politicians are followed by the political parties and the governments on both sides.

These rankings change when evaluating various institutions and persons all together (see Figure 5). While the three most trusted institutions/persons in the south are the universities (70.4 percent), the military (33.6 percent) and the judicial system (33.2 percent), in the north they are the military (60.8 percent), the police (40 percent) and the president (35.2 percent). The high confidence in the military is perhaps a reflection of the youth’s security concerns, which are much higher in the north. The politicians, political parties and the governments are the least trusted institutions/persons among the various others in both communities, reading figures 4, 5 and 6 all together. These figures can be evaluated among the reasons behind the low voter turnouts on both sides.

Comparing with all institutions/persons, imams are the least trusted, which corroborates an earlier study (Hatay and Charalambous, 2015, p. 7) that revealed how much Turkish Cypriots value secularism.



Looking at Figure 6, among the international actors, the European Union (EU) is the most trusted entity amongst all Cypriot youth. Almost one in three Greek Cypriot youths declare confidence in the EU; this level is about one in four for Turkish Cypriot respondents. After the EU, Turkish Cypriots are most confident in the UN mission in Cyprus (18.4 percent) and the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres (18 percent). In contrast, for Greek Cypriot youth, the UN Secretary-General (16 percent) is more trusted than the UN Mission in Cyprus (13.6 percent).



### 3.2 YOUTH PERCEPTION TOWARD INTER-COMMUNAL CONTACTS

The youth of Cyprus were born and raised in a divided country. Most of them have no or few memories of the years of no contact between the two communities. It has been more than 17 years since Turkish Cypriot authorities lifted the restrictions on the UN-administered Buffer Zone, also known as the Green Line, and allowed crossings between the north and south. As such, the overwhelming majority of Cypriot youth today have the right to visit the other side. The exception is Turkish nationals who live in the north.

Earlier studies identified significant improvement in the breadth of trust between the two communities since the checkpoints were opened after decades of separation. As Yücel and Psaltis (2019, pp. 2–13) deduced, intergroup contact is associated with positive outcomes: decreased prejudice, increased trust and a willingness to peacefully coexist. However, another report identified a need to focus on specific groups, including the Greek Cypriot youth and older Turkish Cypriots, as these groups were most resistant to reconciliation; at the same time, the report noted a need to improve the quantity and quality of contact (Lordos, Kaymak and Tocci, 2009). Nevertheless, it is impossible to underestimate the positive impact of opening the checkpoints for furthering trust between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.



As reflected in Figure 7, the two communities diverge substantially in their support for opening new checkpoints between the two sides. While half of Turkish Cypriot youth ‘support’ or ‘definitely support’ opening more checkpoints, half of the Greek Cypriot youth feel the opposite and ‘do not’ or ‘definitely do not’ support this idea. The same difference also appears in the survey findings regarding the frequency of crossings (Figure 8) and maintaining inter-community friendships (Figure 11). These negative trends among Greek Cypriot youth clearly demonstrate the importance of focusing on their attitudes to increase the dialogue between the two communities. It is notable that the positive trend among

Turkish Cypriot youth relates not just to coexistence, but it also includes accessing opportunities in the RoC that stem from the state’s EU membership.

There is also a remarkable discrepancy in the frequency of checkpoint crossings between Greek and Turkish Cypriot youth. A total of 41.4 percent of Turkish Cypriot youth say that they cross the checkpoints every day, a few times each week or at least once in a month. Only 7.2 percent of Greek Cypriot youth reported the same frequency of checkpoint crossings (Figure 8). Another key point is the percentage of youth who have never crossed to the other side of the island.

Figure 9  
Reasons for Crossing the Check-Points




Figure 10  
Reasons for NOT Crossing the Check-Points





Figure 11  
Having Friends from the Other Community



While 38 percent of Greek Cypriot youth say they have never crossed the other side, 24.9 percent of the surveyed Turkish Cypriots say that they have not yet crossed. It is relevant, however, that included in the percentage of Turkish Cypriots who have not crossed the checkpoints are Turkish nationals who are not allowed to do so. The percentage of respondents who have crossed the checkpoints just once or twice is quite high among Greek Cypriots. As many as seven in ten Greek Cypriot youth are disinterested in the other side of the island.

When respondents were asked about their most recent crossing, one in five Turkish Cypriots say that they had crossed the checkpoints this week. Again, this percentage for Greek Cypriots is considerably lower.

Those who indicated that they cross the checkpoints at least once a year — a percentage that includes 53 respondents from the south and 147 from the north — were asked a follow-up question on their reasons for crossing. The free response section reveals that Greek Cypriots mainly visit the other side for things such having a walk or a coffee (17 percent) or to visit family or previous homes (17 percent).

In comparison, Turkish Cypriot youth visited mainly for shopping and recreation (50.3 percent), taking a walk or having a coffee (43.5 percent), as well as work-related visits such as trade, acquiring a passport or travelling from Larnaca airport. The Greek Cypriot youth who cross the checkpoints indicate that shopping and recreation, cheap fuel and cigarettes, cultural events with TCs and historic site visits are among their prominent motivations for crossing the checkpoints.

Figure 10 reveals the reasons for not crossing to the other side. The question was asked of those who reported their frequency of crossing the checkpoints as 'less often', 'never'

and 'only once or twice' (the total number of respondents who gave these answers were 197 in the south and 103 in the north). In response to an open-ended question on the reasons for not crossing the other side, respondents from the south said that they were not interested in going or had no reason to go (44.7 percent), did not want to show an ID (14.7 percent) and were angered by the occupation of their land (8.6 percent). Following these top reasons are 'do not want to subsidize the north' (7.6 percent) and 'ethical reasons' (6.1 percent).

The reasons for respondents from the north were quite different from those of their counterparts in the south. Accordingly, most respondents noted that either they are 'Turkish nationals' (29.5 percent) or 'children of settlers' (16.8 percent) — meaning they do not have the right to cross the checkpoints. The other reasons Turkish Cypriot youth gave for not crossing include 'no specific reason' (27.4 percent), 'not interested/no reason to go' (13.7 percent) and 'different perceptions of Greek Cypriots' (6.3 percent).

When questioned on attitudes to friendship with the members of the other community, Turkish Cypriot youth are more open to such relationships than are Greek Cypriot youth. As reflected below in Figure 11, of the Turkish Cypriot respondents 48.4 percent say that they have Greek Cypriot friends, while this percentage drops to 16.8 for the Greek Cypriot youth. Regardless of the meaning of friendship, what this finding importantly reveals is that most of the Turkish Cypriot youth and overwhelming majority of the Greek Cypriot youth do not have friends across the checkpoint. These findings highlight the weak communication between the youth of both communities — and this a reality for the broader population as well.

Figures 12 and 13 list the reasons given by respondents for lack of friends from the other community. Greek Cypriot

Figure 12

**Reasons for NOT Having Friends from the Other Community**





Figure 13  
Reasons for **NOT** Having Friends from the Other Community





youth (208 out of 250 youth) most commonly responded with: ‘it just has not happened’ (51 percent), ‘nothing specific’ (14 percent) and ‘do not have contact with the other side since they don’t visit’ (10.6 percent). This trend differs greatly for Turkish Cypriots (128 of 250 youth without Greek Cypriot friends), who indicated the same initial two responses, though in different order. Thus, the highest percentage of those without friends from the opposite community responded with ‘nothing specific’ (39.1 percent), ‘it just has not happened’ (11.7 percent) or ‘different language’ (9.7 percent). These figures show clearly that the negative narratives against the other community — ‘enemy’ and ‘untrustworthy’ — do not dominate the mindset of the youth. It is, therefore, possible to argue that this issue pertains solely to creating common and safe spaces to foster these relationships between the two communities. This may increase youth’s willingness to meet with other community.

Figure 14 confirms our conclusion that communication between the two communities is lacking. When asked about the frequency of contact with other community, very few youth respondents said that they ‘often’ or ‘very often’ have contact. Although the percentage of Turkish Cypriot youth seems higher than that of Greek Cypriot, this figure does not inspire much hope in terms of creating meaningful dialogue between the two communities. Further establishing this conclusion are the reasons Cypriots visit the other side of the island: shopping, leisure and work. What is significant is the percentage of respondents in both communities who indicated that they have never had contact with the other community: 39.2 percent in the north and 69.2 percent in the south (Figure 14).

Regardless of frequency — excepting those who have never had contact — Figure 15 below reflects the location of inter-communal contact. In response to an open-ended question, the Greek Cypriots (77 out of 250 respondents) who have contact with Turkish Cypriots listed the locations of this contact as work (35.8 percent), social settings such as cafes and shops (23.9 percent), home (11.9 percent) and university (10.5 percent). Turkish Cypriots responded in much the same way: Turkish Cypriots (152 out of 250 respondents) indicated that they meet with Greek Cypriots in social settings (41.7 percent), at places of work (16.3 percent), on social media (10.8 percent) or in their neighbourhoods (10.2 percent).

The series of abovementioned figures demonstrate the lowest level of interaction between the two communities. In addition to the degree of contact, it is also important to question how acceptable respondents view interaction between the communities. The data in Figures 16 and 17 highlight the different modes of interaction between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, and it also supports the conclusion that there are no serious ideological factors preventing greater contact or interaction between the youth. The figures below are promising, as more than half of all Cypriot youth respondents find most types of interactions with the other community acceptable. The weak spot for each community, as reflected in Figures 16 and 17, is having a president from the other community: 64.4 percent of youth in the south and 67.2 percent of youth in the north find this idea unacceptable. In the south, having a Turkish Cypriot president garnered the lowest level of acceptability, followed by ‘employed by’ (37.2 percent) and having ‘a family member to be married to’ (32.8 percent) a Turkish Cypriot. For the north, ‘employed





by a Greek Cypriot' (40.4 percent) and 'having a Greek Cypriot business partner' (33.2 percent) earned the second and third lowest levels of acceptability. It is well-known that most of these modes of interaction are still rare across the island, yet these figures reveal that this has the potential for radical transformation.

Figure 16  
**Acceptability of Interactions with Turkish Cypriots**





Figure 17  
**Acceptability of Interactions with Greek Cypriots**



### 3.3 YOUTH PERCEPTIONS OF PEACE


The lasting separation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the small island of Cyprus has long been a contentious issue in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities have been living on an island that has been politically divided for more than 55 years, and physically divided for more than 45 years. Much effort and energy has been spent in search of a comprehensive solution to ethno-national dispute,<sup>6</sup> but the parties have yet to find such a solution. Therefore, the questionnaire also investigates youth perceptions of the never-ending peace negotiations, the possible solution scenarios, as well as how they are likely to vote in a future referendum.

Figure 18 reveals how the youth view the peace negotiation process, and it should be noted that there were no ongoing negotiations during the time of fieldwork of survey. However, all Cypriot youth are accustomed to the term ‘negotiations’, as the Cyprus problem is inevitably entwined in their daily lives and profoundly impacts both communities. It is therefore important to discover youth perceptions of the issue. As the figures below clearly reveal, youth respondents are not optimistic about the negotiation process between their leaders. The survey data demonstrate that only 10 percent of youth in the south and 19.2 percent in the north think that negotiations will produce a solution. On the contrary, the over-


whelming majority of Greek Cypriot youth and most Turkish Cypriot youth believe that the negotiations are futile, and cannot produce a viable solution.

Figure 19 confirms this pessimistic scenario. In answer to a question about the Cyprus problem, more than half of all Cypriot youth respondents stated that they expected it would never be solved. A mere 29.2 percent of youth in the north think the problem will be solved within 10 years and only 18 percent in the south. These figures are quite understandable, as negotiations between the two communities have failed to reach a permanent solution since 1968, when they initially agreed to meet to solve the Cyprus problem (Sözen, 2007).

Asking about the various solution options, ranging from continuing the status quo to the indefinite partition of the island, is an inescapable component of surveys conducted in Cyprus. It is well-known that Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been at odds, with Greek Cypriots mainly supporting a unitary state, and Turkish Cypriots favouring two separate internationally recognised states. The most recent survey, conducted by the World Bank and the EU in May 2019, reported that over 60 percent of respondents on both sides support these options (World Bank and EU, 2019, p. 12). It should also be noted that, in this survey, Turkish Cypriots considered the bi-zonal and bi-communal federation models to be the most acceptable.




<sup>6</sup> The most recent UN-facilitated negotiations, held in July 2017 in Crans Montana, Switzerland, between Nicos Anastasiades and Mustafa Akinci, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, respectively, failed. More recently, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres convened leaders from both communities at an informal meeting in Berlin on 25 November 2019. But the parties have yet to agree to the ‘terms of reference’ to initiate settlement talks.




This trend does not vary substantially among the island’s youth. The findings of this survey mirror their degrees of support the different solution models, and, as shown in Figure 20 and 21, the most favoured solution models for Greek and Turkish Cypriot youth are exactly the opposite. While 54 per cent of Greek Cypriot youth ‘support’ or ‘definitely support’ the notion of a unitary state, 62.4 per cent of Turkish Cypriot youth favour two separate and internationally recognised states.. The second most acceptable solution model, for all Cypriots, is the bi-zonal and bi-communal federation, although support among Greek Cypriot respondents (18 per cent) is low relative to the north (54 per cent). It is worth to mention that the support level toward bi-zonal and bi-com-

munal federation solution is not significantly differed among Turkish Cypriot youth of mainland Turkish descent. These figures also demonstrate the greater extent to which Greek Cypriot youth are unified about their preferred solution; Turkish Cypriot youth, in contrast, paint a more fragmented picture, as the survey findings depict.

Interestingly, however, the percentage of Greek Cypriot youth (61.6 per cent) who ‘do not support’ or ‘definitely do not support’ the continuation of the status quo is much higher than the percentage of Turkish Cypriot youth who responded similarly (38.8 per cent).






Another common survey question in Cyprus relates to voting behaviour in potential referenda about a solution to the enduring Cyprus problem. More than half of the Turkish Cypriot respondents indicated that they would vote 'yes' in such a referendum, against 16.8 percent who would vote 'no'. These voting patterns among youth, when compared to the World Bank-EU survey, nearly mirror those of the general Turkish Cypriot population. The Greek Cypriot youth, on the other hand, seem generally willing to vote in the opposite direction; 37.6 percent responded that they would vote 'no'. In actual fact, however, the difference between voting 'yes'

and 'no' are not very drastic: 34 percent affirming they would vote 'yes'. In contrast, the World Bank-EU survey reported the opposite result for the wider Greek Cypriot population, revealing only a 15 percent difference between 'yes' and 'no' votes, and suggesting that overall the population was more inclined to favour a referendum (World Bank and EU, 2019)

The percentage of undecided Greek and Turkish youth Cypriot respondents was similar, with one in four being unsure. These numbers resemble those of the wider population as shown in the World Bank-EU survey.



While youth are generally pessimistic about the negotiation process between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, in Figure 23 we see that almost half of all Cypriot respondents believe that a solution depends on the encouragement of international actors. In fact, 51.2 percent of youth in the north and 44.2 percent of youth in the south respond that they either ‘agree’ or ‘definitely agree’ that international encouragement is necessary to a solution. This can be evaluated as yet another reflection of the appallingly low level of confidence the youth have in their community leaders to initiate negotiations. Moreover, all earlier negotiation processes confirm that parties remain hesitant to discuss issues regarding a solution without the involvement of international parties, especially the UN.

Regarding the responsibility of youth to influence a peaceful settlement, more than half of the Greek Cypriot youth respondents agree or definitely agreed, while only 34 percent of Turkish Cypriot youth felt that they had an impact. This divide stresses the need for further research into these two questions in order to understand the minutiae of youth impact and responsibility: (1) What kind of responsibility do youth have? (2) What kind of impact do youth have? (3) Is the impact of youth at individual or societal level? (4) What are the obstacles that hinder the impact of youth on the solution?

Perusing the endless stream of news about the Cyprus problem, one could easily interpret countless peace-building efforts over time as the ‘last chance for Cyprus’. It is well known that this never-ending cycle of ‘last chances’ in Cyprus has precipitated the failure of countless negotiation processes. Despite the criticism of the closed-door and elite style of negotiations, community leaders have been reluctant to engage the wider public (Lordos, 2009). However, as seen below in Figure 24, Cypriot youth on both sides — 48.8 percent in the north and 54.4 percent in the south — believe that they have a responsibility to find a peaceful settlement to the problem. It should also be noted that one in three Turkish Cypriot youths do not feel that they share this responsibility.





Figure 24  
**Impact and Responsibility of Youth in a Peaceful Settlement to the Problem**



## 4

## DISCUSSION &amp; RECOMMENDATIONS

The aim of this policy report is present Cypriot youth's perceptions based on a survey taken on both sides of the island. Analysis of the data has led to draw below conclusions, which will foster a debate, in order to move beyond soliloquy of youth:

1. The findings in this report highlight the diminished interest that youth have in politics, though the underlying reason should not be associated with the broad notion of youth political apathy. **Despite the lack of obstacles for youth to run as candidates in an election** — a 21-year-old in the south and 25-year-old in the north can run for office — **youth political representation is still meagre all around the island.** Figure 3 demonstrates that most Cypriot youth feel they are underrepresented in politics. This is not merely a sentiment shared by youth, but reflects the reality of the situation: the average age of MPs (after the most recent parliamentary election) is 49.5 in the south and 50.6 in the north. Furthermore, **parliamentary representation by individuals under the age of 35 is 2 percent in the north and 9 percent in the south.** These figures confirm how imperative it is to engage youth in decision-making processes—as noted in the UNSC 2250's first pillar. This may start with the **creation of safe spaces for youth in local and national decision-making mechanisms** and the temporary designation of a youth quota.
2. **The negligible level of youth representation spawns collective mistrust in political institutions and figures.** The youth have no confidence in either politicians or existing political parties to actuate change. **Apart from the youth wings of political parties, Cypriot youth have limited influence and little voice in decision-making processes.** While Greek Cypriot youth have an advisory body called the Youth Board of Cyprus, no such mechanism exists in the north for Turkish Cypriot youth. This implies that Greek Cypriot youth have a more unified body than Turkish Cypriot youth (Dizdaroğlu, 2020a). As they lack confidence in the existing institutions to effect change, youth participate actively in civil society organisations or platform creation to amplify their voices. Therefore, in addition to the traditional methods of increasing youth representation in the parliament, **there exists a need to consider what youth**

**say and want.**<sup>7</sup> Cypriot youth are more than capable of suggesting ways to encourage political engagement—that is, if anyone is willing to listen.

3. Regarding inter-communal contact, **communication between the youth of both communities is very weak.** Variables such as support for opening new checkpoints, the frequency of crossing checkpoints and friendships with members of the opposite community reveal that **Turkish Cypriots are more inclined to positive attitudes.** As noted previously, Turkish Cypriot youth's support for opening more checkpoints and the frequency of crossings do not inherently correlate to interaction with the Greek Cypriot community — the reasons for crossing relate primarily to shopping and recreation, going for a walk or having a coffee, and work. In contrast, **Greek Cypriot youth are more reluctant to cross to the other side and to make friends from the Turkish Cypriot community.** Thus, the level of support for opening new checkpoints is, expectedly, lower than that of their Turkish Cypriot counterparts. A myriad of factors, including an unwillingness to show an ID, subsidising the north, a lack of interest in crossing and the occupation of their land, result in fewer crossings by Greek Cypriot youth. **These results are not promising in terms of reconciliation and establishing meaningful dialogue between the two communities. Intergroup contact, as earlier studies (Yücel and Psaltis, 2019) have shown, is associated with positive outcomes: prejudice reduction, trust-building and willingness for a peaceful co-existence.** More efforts to foster trust, reconciliation and cooperation are necessary to address this issue. The initiative 'Imagine', which the Bi-communal Technical Committee on Education has been implementing with

<sup>7</sup> For instance, four of the youth associations in the north (including the Nicosia Youth Association, the Federation of Turkish Cypriot Students in the UK, Youth Initiative in Education and Famagusta Youth Centre) organized a Turkish Cypriot Youth Congress in 2019 in order to discuss youth-related issues. The Congress's concluding report has been shared with all political parties as well as Turkish Cypriot community leader Mustafa Akinci. Likewise, a recent project entitled 'House of Youth Representatives', a joint initiative of the Cyprus Youth Council and Cyprus Youth Diplomacy, has been shortlisted in May 2020 among best projects in Europe regarding youth empowerment and youth participation in decision-making (See at <https://cyc.org.cy/en/house-of-youth-representatives-shortlisted-for-salto-pi-award/>).




children, represents a good example of how to increase the willingness of all Cypriots to explore the other side of the island.

4. Given the conclusion that **there are no significant barriers to the establishment of friendship with the members of the other community**, increasing the frequency of inter-communal visits could increase dialogue in informal spaces, such as cafes, restaurants and pubs. Reinforcing a culture of peace among children and youth through education will also help to promote inter-communal dialogue by eliminating prejudices. Safe spaces, such as the Home for Cooperation in the Buffer Zone, and dialogue and collaboration activities hosted by civil society organisations play crucial roles in enhancing contact between the two communities. **Although the number of initiatives has to date been inconsequential, individual and collective youth-led initiatives are enormously important.** Some recent examples include ‘Lead Cyprus’, which was started by two youth-led organisations in Cyprus and sought to ensure reconciliation through economic dialogue and cooperation, and the ‘Bicommunal Network of Cypriot Students UK’, which helps Greek and Turkish Cypriots studying in the UK foster connections between the two communities off the island. Thus, supporting and encouraging these kinds of initiatives financially, politically, technically and logistically will improve chances for coexistence.
5. Youth perceptions of the endless peace negotiations, possible scenarios for a solution and potential voting patterns in a future referendum constitute invaluable inputs for practitioners to determine a road map to a solution that responds to the needs of youth. As earlier studies (Pimond *et al.*, 2019, p. 7) have shown, ‘the creation of linkages and information flows between negotiation teams, civil society and the wider public can help to foster inclusive and constructive dialogue.’ The lack of such information flows with the wider community, as well as the insistence on **ignoring youth’s agency in peace processes, will damage the legitimacy and sustainability of the overall process. Youth have the potential to play different roles** — as observers or chroniclers in the room or as activists outside the room — **in preserving peace if they are included and actively participate in the process** (Altiok and Grizelj, 2019). Many Cypriot youth stated that they feel a responsibility to find a peaceful solution — 48.8 percent in the north and 54.4 percent in the south. It is the duty of practitioners to engage these youth.
6. **Cypriot youth’s influence on peace negotiations is minimal** considering the current format of the negotiation process in Cyprus. There are no direct mechanisms that deliver youth messages to community leaders. **It would be good starting point to establish a ‘Bi-communal Technical Committee on Youth’, which would be responsible for dealing with the everyday problems of the youth and work to nurture cooperation and trust between the two communities** (Dizdarođlu, 2020a). None of the existing bi-communal technical communities or Cypriot youth bodies represent, or work with, all Cypriot youth-- a cohort that would also include Maronite, Armenian and Latins. Such a body would, therefore, greatly empower youth voices on the island.
7. **The overlap of the issues of youth, women and children has devalued youth priorities in discussions of their unique contributions.** Bi-communal technical committees on education and gender equality have already devoted significant energy to enhancing the roles of women and children in peacebuilding (Demetriou and Hadjipavlou, 2018). Therefore, there remains a need to change the mentality in Cyprus in order to recognise the social, economic and political agency of youth. **If youth agency can be recognised through equal rights, they can contribute meaningfully and become powerful agents of change.** Otherwise, their contributions to peacebuilding will continue to be ignored or underutilised.
8. **These recommendations and points of action will also lead to the successful implementation of UNSC Resolution 2250 (2015).** Increasing youth representation in decision-making mechanisms, providing them with platforms to amplify their voices, hearing what they say and establishing a special youth technical committee will respond to the first pillar of Resolution 2250: participation. The resolution’s pillar on **protection** refers equally to the young peacebuilders and human rights defenders, who might be targeted because of their activities. Support for individual and collective peacebuilding activities at the local level will bolster community ownership and prevent these youths from being blamed by their respective communities. Encouraging efforts at trust-building, reconciliation and cooperation would help to promote a culture of ‘peace, tolerance, intercultural and interreligious dialogue that involve youth’, as is emphasised by the resolution’s third pillar, prevention. Such an environment across the island will preclude the engagement of Cypriot youth with far-right and ultra nationalist groups, and will culminate in social cohesion. **In doing so, Cyprus may set an example for other countries by becoming a rare instance where UNSC Resolution 2250 is implemented successfully.**

## 5

## METHODOLOGY

This study is a part of a research project entitled *'The Role of Youth in Peacebuilding: The Cyprus Case | YOUPEACEBUILDER'*, which has received funding from the EU's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement, No. 796053. The survey was conducted in both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, with ethical approval from Coventry University in the United Kingdom. Two identical telephone surveys were conducted by Noverna Analytics and by Lipa Consultancy, in the south and north, respectively.



The sampling was drawn from both urban and rural areas in each district on both sides of the island (Table 1). There was a total of 500 respondents, 250 respondents from each community in a gender-equal sample. The National Youth Strategy of Cyprus defines the lower age limit for youth as 14 years old. However, for ethical reasons, all survey participants were over 18 years old and had the right to vote. The upper limit was set at 35, also the same as the Youth Strategy. A more detailed categorisation of the respondents by gender, education level, location and refugee status can be found in table below and the map.

The employment status of the respondents can be seen below. As reflected in Figure 25, almost three-fourths of the youth on both sides work part-time, full-time or are self-em-

ployed. There were 20 percent students on each side, while the rate of unemployment on both sides is fairly equal, around 5-6 percent. The unemployment rate in the survey is quite low considering the actual unemployment rate among youth which is above 20 percent.

The questionnaire was written in English and then translated into both Greek and Turkish to administer the survey in each community's native languages. The English version of the questionnaire can be found in Annex I. Earlier fieldwork observations and face-to-face interviews with Cypriot youth for the YOUPEACEBUILDER project were used as guidance to develop the questionnaire, which was fine-tuned using the inputs of Harris Papageorgiou from Noverna, and Eliz Tefik from Lipa Consultancy. Additionally, the aforementioned studies 'Human Development Report of Cyprus' (2009) and 'The Post-Annan Generation: Student Attitudes towards the Cyprus Problem' (2015) inspired the researcher to conduct a follow-up youth survey for this study.


The telephone survey was conducted using CATI software, with which both companies randomly generated mobile numbers with the prefixes of the respective country. In order to attain the sample size of 250, a total of 724 people in the south and 759 people in the north were contacted. The survey was completely voluntary, and respondents had the right to opt out. Reading off a verbal script, surveyors asked respondents for explicit consent to conduct the survey.

The survey commenced on 30 November 2019 in the north, and on 3 December 2019 in the south. The surveys were completed on 10 January 2020 on both sides of the island. Each survey lasted approximately 11 to 13 minutes. The margin of error of the results is 5 percent for both sides.

Table 1  
Demographic Categorisation of the Sample

	GREEK CYPRIOTS (n= 250)		TURKISH CYPRIOTS (n= 250)	
	n	%	n	%
<b>GENDER</b>				
Male	127	50,8	129	51,6
Female	123	49,2	121	48,4
<b>EDUCATION LEVEL</b>				
Up to high school	97	38,8	116	46,4
Up to undergraduate	85	34,0	113	45,2
Masters/PhD	68	27,2	21	8,4
<b>AREA</b>				
Rural	72	28,8	101	40,4
Urban	178	71,2	149	59,6
<b>REFUGEE STATUS</b>				
From Refugee Family	119	47,6	98	39,2
Not from Refugee Family	131	52,4	152	60,8

Figure 25  
Employment Status



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## ANNEX I: QUESTIONNAIRE

### DEMOGRAPHY

#### Gender

Male	1
Female	2

#### How old are you?

### POLITICS

#### 1. To what extent are you generally interested in politics?

Not at all	1
A little bit	2
Somewhat	3
Quite a bit	4
Very much	5

#### 2. Did you vote in the most recent national parliamentary elections in the RoC/TRNC?

Yes	1	Continue with <b>2.1</b>
No	2	Continue with <b>3</b>

#### 2.1. FOLLOW UP FOR THOSE WHO ANSWERS 'YES' | Which party did you vote for?

Democratic Rally - <b>DISY</b>	1
Progressive Party of Working People – <b>AKEL</b>	2
Democratic Party - <b>DIKO</b>	3
Movement for Social Democracy – <b>EDEK</b>	4
Movement of Ecologists - <b>KOSP</b>	5
National Popular Front - <b>ELAM</b>	6
Citizen's Alliance - <b>SYPOL</b>	7
Solidarity Movement - <b>KA</b>	8
Other	9

Republican Turkish Party - <b>CTP</b>	1
National Unity Party - <b>UBP</b>	2
Democratic Party - <b>DP</b>	3
Communal Democratic Party – <b>TDP</b>	4
People's Party - <b>HP</b>	5
Rebirth Party - <b>YDP</b>	6
United Cyprus Party - <b>BKP</b>	7
Communal Liberation Party – <b>TKP-YG</b>	8
Nationalist Democracy Party – <b>MDP</b>	9
Other	10

#### 3. Did you vote in the 2019 European Parliament election in Cyprus?

Yes	1	Continue with <b>3.1</b>
No	2	Continue with <b>4</b>

#### 3.1. FOLLOW UP FOR THOSE WHO ANSWERS YES | Which party did you vote for?

Democratic Rally - <b>DISY</b>	1
Progressive Party of Working People – <b>AKEL</b>	2
Democratic Party - <b>DIKO</b>	3
Movement for Social Democracy – <b>EDEK</b>	4
Movement of Ecologists & Citizen's Alliance <b>KOSP/ SYPOL</b>	5
National Popular Front - <b>ELAM</b>	6
Democratic Alignment - <b>Dipa</b>	7
Other	9

#### 4. To what degree are you confident in each of the following institutions/persons (please read out in rotation)?

	Not at all	A little bit	Somewhat	A lot	Completely
The President	1	2	3	4	5
The government	1	2	3	4	5
The parliament	1	2	3	4	5
Political parties	1	2	3	4	5
Politicians	1	2	3	4	5
The judiciary	1	2	3	4	5
Priests/imams	1	2	3	4	5
The police	1	2	3	4	5
The military	1	2	3	4	5
Universities	1	2	3	4	5
Media	1	2	3	4	5
Social media	1	2	3	4	5
UN Secretary General	1	2	3	4	5
UN Mission in Cyprus	1	2	3	4	5
The European Union	1	2	3	4	5

**CHECKPOINTS/CONTACTS WITH THE OTHER COMMUNITY**

**5. To what extent do you support opening more checkpoints between the two parts of the island?**

Definitely do not support	1
Do not support	2
Neither support nor do not support	3
Support	4
Definitely support	5
No opinion	99

**6. How often do you cross the other side of the island?**

*DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS*

Everyday	1	Continue with <b>6.1</b>
Once in a week	2	
A few times in a week	3	
Once a month	4	
Once every 2-3 months	5	
Once every 4-6 months	6	
Once a year	7	
Less often	8	Continue with <b>6.3</b>
Have only been once or twice	9	
Never	10	

**6.1. When was the last time you went to the other side?**

*DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS*

Today	1	Continue with <b>6.2</b>
Yesterday	2	
This week	3	
Last week	4	
Last month	5	
Within last 2-3 months	6	
Within last 4-6 months	7	
Last year	8	

**6.2. Which are the reasons why you personally visit the other side? You may mention more than one reason. (Free text answer)**

**6.3. FOLLOW UP FOR THOSE WHO ANSWER 'RARELY' AND 'NEVER' Which are the reasons why you do not personally visit the other side? You may mention more than one reason. (Free text answer)**

**7. Do you have friends from the other community?**

Yes	1	Continue with <b>8</b>
No	2	Continue with <b>7.1</b>

**7.1. FOLLOW UP - FOR THOSE WHO ANSWER IN THE NEGATIVE What prevents you from having G/C | T/C friends? (Free text answer)**

**8. How frequently do you have contact with G/Cs | T/Cs?**

Never	1	Continue with <b>9</b>
Rarely	2	Continue with <b>8.1</b>
Occasionally	3	
Often	4	
Very often	5	

**8.1. Where have you recently established contact with G/Cs | T/Cs?**

MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE

At home	1
At bi-communal gatherings/events	2
In my neighbourhood	3
At work/workplace	4
At university	5
In a social atmosphere (cafes, shops, restaurants, shopping malls etc.)	6
On social media (twitter, facebook)	7
Other (Please specify)	8

**9. I will read out some statements and I would like you to tell me for each one if it is acceptable or not acceptable to you.**

	Not Acceptable	Acceptable	Don't know
A member of your family to have a G/C or T/C girlfriend/ boyfriend	1	2	99
A member of your family to be married with a G/C or T/C	1	2	99
Have a close G/C or T/C friend	1	2	99
Live in the same neighbourhood with G/C or T/C	1	2	99
Live in the same town with G/Cs or T/Cs	1	2	99
Work in the same place with G/Cs or T/Cs	1	2	99
Have a G/C or T/C business partner	1	2	99
Be employed by a G/C or T/C	1	2	99
Children to go to same school	1	2	99
Go to the same cafes/bars with G/Cs or T/Cs	1	2	99
President of Cyprus to be G/C or T/C	1	2	99

**PEACE IN CYPRUS**

**10. Do you expect that the attempts/negotiations for the solution of the Cyprus problem will lead to a solution of the problem or not?'**

Yes	1
No	2
Unsure	3

**11. When do you think the Cyprus problem will be solved?**

**12. To what extent do you agree with the following statements:**

	Definitely disagree	Disagree	Neither agree no disagree	Agree	Definitely agree
Young people are interested in building bridges between G/C and T/Cs	1	2	3	4	5
Young people are sufficiently represented in politics	1	2	3	4	5
Young Cypriots have a responsibility to find a peaceful settlement to the problem	1	2	3	4	5
Young Cypriots have impact on peaceful settlement to the problem	1	2	3	4	5
The progress regarding a solution depends on the encouragement from the international parties	1	2	3	4	5

**13. To what extent do you support the following solution for the political problem of Cyprus?**

READ OUT POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS. ROTATE ORDER

	Definitely do not support	Do not support	Neither support nor do not support	Support	Definitely Support
One unitary state and central government for the whole of Cyprus	1	2	3	4	5
Bi-zonal, bicomunal federation	1	2	3	4	5
Continuation of the current situation/status quo	1	2	3	4	5
A confederation with two sovereign states	1	2	3	4	5
Two separate and internationally recognized states	1	2	3	4	5

**14. Based on what you know today, if a referendum was agreed by the leaders of the two communities, would you vote in favour (that is YES) or against (that is NO) the proposed solution.**

Yes	1
No	2
Unsure	3

**FOLLOW UP DEMOGRAPHY QUESTIONS****What is the highest level of education you have achieved?**

Finished primary school	1
Finished Lower Secondary (i.e, 3 <sup>rd</sup> class of high school)	2
High-school graduate	3
Undergraduate	4
Master	5
PhD	6

**In which district do you live?**

Nicosia	1
Limassol	2
Larnaca	3
Paphos	4
Famagusta	5

**Type of district**

Urban	1
Rural	2

**Which of the following describes your current employment status?**

Full-time employment	1
Part-time employment	2
Student	3
Self-employed	4
Unemployed	5
Army service	6
Other	7

**Are either or both of your parents a refugee/displaced person(s)?**  
**By this, I mean that did they use to live in the north/south before 1974**

Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	99

*Below questions only pertain to the TIC side***Where are your parents from?****Are you a citizen of ...?**

TRNC	1
Turkey	2
Other	3

FOLLOW UP FOR THOSE WHO ANSWERS 1 |

**Do you also hold citizenship of RoC?**

Yes	1
No	2



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## IMPRINT

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# MOVING BEYOND SOLILOQUY

## Youth Perceptions on Politics, Peace and Inter-Communal Contacts

Youth is the generation that builds social trust and social cohesion in their respective communities through their activities, dialogue and engagement in their daily lives. In order to understand youth demands, the periodic investigation of youth attitudes and trends is critical to observe any shifts in hopes for the future, perceptions towards the other community, readiness for the

peace process or willingness to co-exist. This report thus examines the neglected Cypriot youth's perceptions of politics, peace and inter-communal contact through telephone surveys conducted simultaneously both sides of the island.

Based on the findings of the survey, this report presents extensive policy recommendations and action points

that will enable Cypriot youth's participation into decision-making and peace processes. The implementation of these action points will portray Cyprus as example for other countries and a rare instance of the successful implementation of UNSC Resolution 2250 (2015) on 'Youth, Peace and Security'.