

2022 security radar.

KEY FINDINGS


Overview

How do people in the OSCE countries perceive security and peace in Europe and beyond? What do they want politicians to do about it? Security Radar 2022 is the second edition of an FES representative survey gauging public opinion in 14 states across the OSCE region.

The Radar reflects on major obstacles to achieving peace in Europe and distils policy recommendations on how to overcome them. It builds on a **representative public opinion**

poll conducted in 14 countries and **expert group discussions** with leading experts and policy advisors conducted in each participating country.

- Armenia
- Austria
- France
- Germany
- Italy
- Latvia
- Norway
- Poland
- Russia
- Serbia
- Turkey
- Ukraine
- United Kingdom
- United States



Security Radar 2022 appears at a time of alarming instability on the European continent. With Russian troops at the Ukrainian border, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) assesses the risk of a war in Europe as higher than at any time over the past 30 years. These developments are un-

folding against the backdrop of skyrocketing coronavirus cases. Security Radar 2022 clearly shows that overwhelming majorities want peace and cooperation to be a political priority. It also indicates that pragmatism is the way forward to break the current deadlock.

<p>What? 2022 Representative public opinion poll in 14 countries Expert group discussions in 14 countries</p>	<p>Who? 27,500 respondents surveyed in 14 countries Representative samples in each country</p>	<p>When? March–June 2021 Expert group discussions September–October 2021 Public opinion poll</p>	<p>How? Expert discussions under Chatham House Rule via online conferencing CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing) in Armenia CAWI (Computer Assisted Web Interviewing) in 13 other countries</p>
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Challenges

Status dissatisfaction

There are a disquieting number of countries in which a majority of citizens are dissatisfied with their country’s status in the world.

Those dissatisfied countries that possess strong power resources and lack a functioning system of checks and balances give most cause for concern. Their governments have ample room to exploit this sense of dissatisfaction in pursuit of an assertive foreign policy. For example, Russia has already expressed its aim of renegotiating the pillars of European security by defining red lines, threatening its neighbour Ukraine


and demanding concessions from NATO, thus trying to rectify its perceived lack of status through a revision of the post-Cold War order.

Turkey, though a distinctly different case, has also exhibited a rather assertive foreign policy in its immediate neighbourhood, most recently in the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

All in all, a reservoir of people’s discontent with their countries’ place in the world could thus pose a future challenge for European security.

In my opinion my country does not have the status in the world it deserves in comparison with other countries.


Countries ranked in descending order (Combined responses “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree”)



Belligerent Russia

Russia had amassed troops in the vicinity of the Ukrainian border, feeding fears of an imminent attack. The exchange of mutual threats between Russia and NATO, as well as the European Union dominates the headlines. Arguably never since the break-up of the Soviet Union has the possibility of a war

with Russia been closer than today. The Russian government is demanding the fundamental reorganisation of European security, including a guarantee that NATO halts enlargement. This is a dangerous undertaking with very high stakes and a high risk of escalation.




Persisting East–West divisions

The divisions in countries that were on different sides of the Iron Curtain are still visible in our survey. Countries that used to be on the Eastern side seem to feel less safe and more concerned than their Western peers. The division is visible even within the

EU, where the Eastern member states are more concerned than the Western members. This is disquieting 30 years after the end of the Cold War.

Concern about wars and conflicts

Deviations from 100 % result from: “don’t know” and “no answer”. All figures in %




The ‘fearful three’ – Ukraine, Armenia and Turkey – stand out. Citizens of these countries exhibit the highest levels of threat perception, want to increase military expenditure and in general

perceive dangers to be more imminent and pressing than those of other countries. That might have something to do with their recent involvement in conflicts.

Comparison of perceptions in Armenia, Turkey and Ukraine

Combined responses “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree”. All figures in %



The United States is wavering


There is a widespread assumption that Washington is losing interest in European affairs, although the current series of talks between Russia and the United States on European security seem to suggest otherwise.

The withdrawal from the joint mission in Afghanistan, poorly coordinated and communicated, has been a public reminder for Europe that the transatlantic superpower is in the

process of reorientation, directed primarily to the perceived priorities of the domestic audience, which lie at home. The data clearly show an isolationist tendency in the United States, with many respondents either supporting a limitation of US foreign involvement or focussing on matters such as the protection of American territory, a strong military and technological supremacy.

Attitudes to an active foreign policy

Deviations from 100 % result from: "don't know" and "no answer". All figures in %



European Union missing in action


The EU, the actor aspiring to fill the potential gap left by a United States focused on domestic matters or the growing Sino-American differences, is still nowhere to be seen. Much of EU security policy is shaped by intergovernmental procedures and still decided on by unanimity. The EU's three key states after Brexit – France, Germany and Poland, the so-called Weimar triangle – disagree on many crucial issues, a fact that is visible in Security Radar 2022.

A crucial issue here is EU strategic autonomy, understood as a more independent ability of the Union to act on the

international scene. There remains a fundamental difference in the understanding of this concept among the Weimar triangle countries, affecting not only EU–NATO cooperation, but also questions regarding a European army. In Poland the public positions itself as pro-US and pro-NATO, leaving the EU to play second fiddle. Germany and, to a larger degree, France, are more supportive of EU strategic autonomy, but still both the opinion polls and the expert group discussions show a lack of ambition, making strategic autonomy very hard to achieve.


Comparison of perceptions in the Weimar Triangle

Combined responses “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree”. All figures in %



Here are four statements on future relations between the EU and NATO. Please choose one that you agree with most.

NATO members only. Deviations from 100% result from: “don’t know” and “no answer”



Recommendations

The situation in Europe is grave and complex, but that should not entail inaction, complacency or fatalism. There are major stumbling blocks in the way of progress and it would seem to


be a Herculean task to overcome them, but the poll makes clear that citizens do understand the various difficulties and dilemmas.

Pragmatism as a political guideline

A pragmatic approach premised on recognition of status and respect could pave the way for restoring European security. It should build on a diverse set of foreign policy instruments, with a clear focus on diplomacy, and commit to interest-based negotiations across ideological divisions.

The public does not perceive any contradiction between interest-based and value-based foreign policy. Concerning the instruments of choice, military, economic and diplomatic means

are accepted, with a clear preference for diplomacy over the use of force or sanctions. According to the survey, the respondents do not perceive ideology or values as an impediment to dialogue and negotiation. A broad majority are in favour of cooperating with other countries, even if they do not share the same values. This public pragmatism gives governments room and impetus to shape bold policies aimed at cooperative security.



The **pragmatism matrix** reveals that key actors such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany and France are confident and capable of leadership, but less pragmatic than the other polled countries. To use their leadership potential to the fullest, status-satisfied countries should act out of a sense of confidence and endorse cooperation with countries that do

not necessarily share their values. This will allow agents of change to shape policy in a constructive manner without applying their own moral benchmarks to actors that do not share their values and aim for a change in the status quo. This can be the beginning of a political process towards cooperative European security.


Update and upgrade multilateral institutions

Security Radar 2022 offers several indications of public support for serious negotiations aimed at renewing European security through multilateral institutions. First, respondents are willing

to cooperate, realising a sense of belonging to Europe and the mutual dependence of their respective countries.

I think that my country is part of the European cultural sphere.


Combined responses “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree”. All figures in %



Second, multilateral institutions are viewed positively and still broadly garner high levels of trust, especially the United Nations, the EU and the OSCE. Agreements are only as strong as the commitment of the participating actors. But the main actors have changed course from the central points of

reference in European security, such as the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, and thus confer different meanings and importance on the set of rules shaping Europe. Therefore, a renewed debate on European Security needs to take place on the basis of the existing framework.

Which of these organisations should play a bigger role in the future?




14 countries total average. Response “Yes, it should play a bigger role”. Deviations from 100% result from: “No, it should not play a bigger role”, “don’t know” and “no answer”


Third, overwhelming majorities of those polled prioritise peace and security. The global problems that people identify as most pressing – terrorism, climate change and pandemics – can be dealt with only internationally. They can thus serve as islands of

cooperation in a fairly competitive environment and can help to revitalise a sense of successful and effective cooperation in Europe. Starting from topics like these, more congruent interests can be identified in the process of negotiation.

Peace in Europe should be a policy priority in my country.



Which of the following global foreign and security policy problems do you think should currently be given top priority?
 Respondents were asked to select and rank three items out of nine



Strengthen the EU as a foreign policy actor


As long as the EU is unclear about policy priorities and divided when it comes to relations with assertive powers, it will remain an observer rather than an active participant. Strengthening the EU as a foreign policy actor is a crucial precondition for being able to shape relations with Russia, China or the United States. In almost all polled countries a clear majority of respondents support a larger role for the EU in the future.

The European Union in theory possesses the means neces-

sary to play an active role in shaping security on the European continent. A combination of its economic, regulatory and security instruments could change the EU's relationship with Russia and pave the way for genuine negotiations about the main pillars of a stable European security architecture. Such a European approach would also fit the preferences of those polled, because the main focus would not be military means, but rather framing relations by economic means and diplomacy.

Foreign policy instruments

14 countries total average. All figures in %




The need for Europe to get its act together becomes even more obvious when we widen the scope and look at the global stage. The rise of China is further complicating the situation, and a similar dynamic to the current situation with Russia could be looming in the Far East.

The Weimar Triangle – Germany, France and Poland – could be the key to European strategic autonomy. An EU foreign

policy modelled along the lines of a commonly agreed agenda of the three key states of the Weimar triangle would probably be acceptable for most other member states, thereby breaking the deadlock of unanimity. The EU possesses a range of instruments, but needs to apply them strategically. As long as the Union is unclear about priorities and divided, it will remain an observer, even in questions of European security.

How do you think the European Union should position itself?

14 countries total average. All figures in %



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