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**WOMEN AND MEN
IN ELITES**

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The Character of the Elites

Research of the composition of elites has its long tradition in political science and sociology. The subject of research included those, who were described by the term „decision-makers“, „persons at the top of authority structures“, or the members of the elite or political class, defined one way or the other. In this last case this was a group of families or - to a lesser extent - certain professions or institutions, from which the persons at the top of the authority structures were recruited. Such a definition of the political class meant that often these persons were tied by bonds of kinship or other relationship and its members were usually the graduates of the same schools, which prepared them for the roles they were to play in their adult life. Both of these circumstances were the basis for creating group bonds and identity. They applied to the awareness of the place occupied in society, as well as the feeling of certain issues and duties with respect to one's own group and society, resulting from this. The method of recruitment and the unchanging way for preparing the young generation ensured continuity for the existing political class and the possibility of reproduction. There was the supposition, expressed by e.g. Mosca and Schumpeter, that the members of the political class understood in this way were characterized by dispositions and attitudes necessary in order to rule effectively, the ability to assess the situation and make the correct calculation regarding the possibility of being successful, have a conception of with whom and against whom activity should be undertaken. All this resulted from the experiences cumulated by generations and subsequently passed on by the family, the appropriate schools, as well as attained in certain professions (Shill, 1982). Political classes defined in this way have lost their signifi-

cance in societies of a new type, which began forming in the era of rapid industrialization. Mass migrations to towns, raising the education level, the appearance of new professions, the creation of affluence remaining in the hands of people, who had nothing in common with the old political class, all formed a new situation (Etzioni-Halevy, 1993). The ideas of democracy, citizens' participation in the process of making important decisions, which appeared at this time, signified a need to create mechanisms for the members of the newly created social groups to gain access to power. This does not mean, however, that in all of the contemporary societies one cannot find the remnants of the old political classes. But its representatives are only a part of those, in whose hands power is located, often playing a marginal role. Therefore, in order to describe the current mechanisms deciding on the composition of decision-making bodies created by way of election or nomination, it is necessary to refer to these theories, which allow us to answer the question to what extent we are dealing with the continuity of elites over longer periods of time (I mean both intra-generational, as well as inter-generational continuity) that is their reproduction and to what extent with the phenomenon of their circulation. This process - as researchers demonstrate - is more complicated. The cultural, economic, and social capital may be the basis for remaining in a given segment of the elite or allow to pass into another one, but it may also lose its meaning, which will be the reason for excluding certain groups or units from the elite. By cultural capital I understand the level and type of education, by economic capital - owning goods, and by social capital - placement in the network of social rela-

tions, as these terms are defined by Pierre Bourdieu (1984).

Even though, as Shils points out, the conception of the political class proposed by Mosca cannot be used to describe the elites in all contemporary societies, nevertheless it may be used in the countries characterized by having oligarchic systems or where political participation is restricted. In addition, as the analyses of the systems of values and the methods by which elites operate show, despite the fact that they are not closed or almost closed structures, such as the political classes described by Mosca, elites at present are characterized by a feeling of their worth and internal solidarity, determination in aiming towards the realization of their own plans, being at the same time aware when to reach compromises, and when they should be avoided, which was considered as the exclusive trait of the political classes (Shils 1982).

The analysis of the composition of the political and economic elites and the ways in which they were recruited conducted in many countries on the basis of information from the last several decades, and sometimes longer periods of time, has shown that the degree of their continuity differed in the various states and over different periods of time, that sometimes the changes were evolutionary, and at other times - the continuation was severed. The degree of continuity of the elites was significantly affected by political events. The appearance of fascist systems, followed by their downfall in Italy, Germany, or its transformation into a democratic system, as was the case in Spain, were connected with different transformations in the way the elites were recruited and how they were composed (e.g. Czudnowski, 1982). And so, for example, transformations in the Spanish elite are considered as evolutionary, whereas in Italy, apart from a few persons, who were a part of the elite in fascist times and after World War II found a place for themselves in extreme right-wing parties, the remaining ones were joined by

opposition towards the just overthrown system (Cotta, 1982).

A peculiar situation appears in the case of Central and Eastern European countries, in which in the late 1980s and early 1990s we witnessed the collapse of the communist system. At that time those countries embarked on a road of economic and political transformations, a shift from the authoritarian system to a democratic one and from a centrally-planned economy to a free market one. A question appeared at the time whether the changes in the system will be accompanied by an exchange of political and economic elites, or whether the old elites will be able to retain their influence in both or one of them. Observations made in the early 1990s inclined some researchers to formulate a thesis that the communist political elites had managed to take control over economic goods, which through privatization according to favorable conditions, became their property. In this way its members became the nomenclature economic elite under the new conditions (e.g. Hankiss, 1989; Staniszki, 1991). Systematic analyses carried out in the early 1990s has shown that the hypothesis quoted above was only partially confirmed, and this was to a different extent in Russia, Hungary and Poland (Szelenyi, Treiman, Wnuk-Lipiński, 1995; Wasilewski, 1992; Wasilewski, Wesołowski, 1992). In all of these countries the political elites circulated to a much greater extent than economic elites, where their reproduction took place on a relatively larger scale due to a gradual transformation of the socialist economy into one based on private ownership. But the changes in the elites in Russia and Poland had already started in the 1980s as a result of the introduction of martial law in Poland and Gorbachov's reforms in Russia. In Hungary, on the other hand, the circulation of elites took place on a much wider scale after 1989. In Hungary, in the new economic elite and on the highest positions in public administration we are observing a

higher reproduction than in Poland. Here, contrary to Hungary and Russia, the elites from the early 1990s to a larger extent were strengthened by members from the lower classes. Generally speaking, the process of creating elites on the basis of lower classes was typical for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe after World War II, when the new communist authorities based their programs on people from the ranks of the communist party from the past, and people of a peasants' or workers' origin, which it wanted to attract and which, as a consequence, were to play a key role in creating the system, and maintain it. Later on, in the 1960s, the number of educated people in the elites in these countries grew. These changes basically took place in two ways: (a) by adaptation, based on raising the qualifications of people already employed in the managerial positions in the party and administration on different levels, but also in the economy and (b) by co-opting people from outside this circle, but with the necessary qualifications (Beck, 1970; Siemińska, 1983; 1994a, 1994b; Bartkowski, 1996; Wiatr, 1998). A large number of the members of the communist elites was of peasant origin. This was the result of the combination of the previously described process of looking for allies among people, who, valuing the social advancement opened before them, could become loyal groups in the communist system, and the fact that the countries in this part of Europe - most of them backward in their socio-economic development - to a large extent consisted of peasantry when entering the period of their post-war history. The higher classes - the gentry and the intelligentsia, also to a large extent coming from the gentry and nobility - were as a rule rejected by the newly implemented communist authorities after World War II and throughout the entire period of communist power they did not have their representatives in the political and economic elites. After the communist system was overthrown, the inflow of the heirs of the

old intelligentsia, bourgeoisie and aristocracy was slightly more apparent in Hungary than in Poland. In both of these countries they play a marginal role from the point of view of the composition of the appearing elites (Szelenyi, 1995). The political turmoil in the newly forming democracies, the shifting social support based on, first of all, rejecting communist governments and replacing them by new ones, evolving from political opposition, and later, after the next parliamentary elections, the appearance of growing support for the parties and groups with a communist background, caused evident changes in the composition of the political elites and, incomparably smaller ones, in the composition of economic elites, which in the period of system transformations were strengthened to a certain extent by members of their former economic nomenclature (persons who up to now held managerial positions) and coming from the former political elites.

Contrary to, for example, Italy, where the participation and significance of elites from the pre-fascist period in building democracy after World War II was analyzed (e.g. Cotta, 1982), in the post-communist countries the duration of communism in fact eliminated the possibility of pre-war politicians to play any active role. A large number of them died during the war or after the war from the hands of communists, did not return from abroad, and those few, who survived and reached old age, were unable to play such a role. Therefore, when we speak of new people and their political experience, we mainly mean people, who for a longer or shorter period of time took an active part in the activity of political opposition, mainly illegally. Of course we must be aware of the fact that their number depended on the size of the opposition in the various countries. In Poland it was large, in Hungary and Czechoslovakia we may speak of the existence of dissident movements, in which only a small number of people were in-

volved. And in the remaining countries these were individuals only.

Deliberations on the methods of forming elites, the degree of openness when reaching for new social groups or their reproduction in the various systems generally do not answer the question why there are more women in some of them, whereas in other they are practically absent. For many researchers the issue of the composition of the elites with respect to gender, does not exist. In the few instances when the researchers set themselves the goal of explaining this problem, going beyond the statement of the fact and a stereotyped explanation that women are absent on high managerial positions, both elected and appointed, because they do not want to hold them, researchers reach the conclusion that in democratic systems the answer must be sought for in the way the political parties operate, their strategic tactics and electoral law, as the parties are currently the basic channel for entering the elite and promoting individuals to high positions (e.g. Lovenduski, Norris, 1993). It would appear that exceptional opportunities exist in countries, where owing to the transformation of the political system taking place, the hitherto selection mechanisms have been rejected, therefore there are no consolidated principles for promoting persons and well-established political parties on the political arena, could be conducive to women appearing on a greater scale in the managerial bodies. Periods of transformation signify introducing new institutional and individual actors. New parties and groups gathering persons often coming from the illegal opposition have at their disposal different experiences. Work in conspiracy is based on principles which are specific to it. The organization and participation in the struggle against the existing system, preceding this change, requires particular abilities and is a source of such experiences. Participation in political opposition has a dual character. It lies in taking part in groups, organizations, which have the goal of pre-

paring various types of forms of protest and promoting political and social change, as well as in direct participation in the protest, even though these people are not necessarily connected with the groups or organizations forming the nucleus of the movement (Rucht, 1996:186). As we see from the analysis of social and political movements, which brought about or evidently contributed to transforming systems, e.g. in South America (Argentina, Chile), or in the post-communist countries (Poland), women played a significant part in them. But the way in which they were activated differed in the above mentioned countries.

In Latin America feminist organizations, strongly and clearly visible in political life, appeared in the period preceding the period of transforming the system (Jacquette, 1991). In the post-communist countries, and we can mainly speak of Poland, as political mobilization encompassed a significant part of society here, women's participation in the „Solidarity” movement was as large as men's. Women constituted a half of the Solidarity members in the early 1980s, but among the movement's activists there were much fewer women. The number of women elected as delegates to the First National Congress in 1981 did not exceed 7 per cent, not to mention the even lower participation in the management elected at the time. This movement (formally registered as a trade union due to political considerations) did not have the goal of increasing women's participation in public life, but rather supported the conception of their traditional role. The main goal of the movement was to change the system and this was the basis for involvement both in the case of women as well as men (Siemińska, 1986). Despite the fact that, as Jacquette (1991) points out, the period of transformation creates particular opportunities owing to a lack of formed political mechanisms, as far as for example undertaking new issues is concerned, women's participation in politics in the post-communist countries is small. The

number of women in the parliaments in these countries in the mid-1990s was slightly over 10 per cent in most of them (Women in Parliaments 1945-1995, 1995) and formally speaking it has decreased compared to the communist period when it stood at over 20 to approximately 35 per cent in 1985, being close to the proportions in the Scandinavian countries, proud of their highest representation of women. At present the percentage of women in the post-communist countries in most of them approximate to the average number of women in parliaments in the world. The described changes in the size of women's representation in parliaments in post-communist countries compared to the period preceding the change of the political system, cannot be treated as a measure of the influence of women in the various periods and under different political systems. The analysis of political and cultural „resources”, being at the disposal of women compared to men in the period preceding the change, clearly showed that they rather performed the role of „tokens”, persons present, but with much lesser influence than their representation in numbers could suggest. And usually they did not represent the group interests of women. Their presence in parliament was only to be proof that all segments of society were present, according to the ideologically assumed vision of elected bodies under the communist system. The fact that the women deputies were less educated than men deputies, represented such sectors of the national economy, as education, individual farming, etc., therefore with a smaller driving force, relatively more frequently than the men they did not belong to any political parties, guaranteed that they will not go beyond the expectations set out by the actual decision-makers (Siemińska, 1990, 1996a, 1996b). We might also add that under communist systems the role of the parliament was mainly symbolical. In the first place it performed decorative functions and was a „rubber stamp” for the decisions made by

the bodies of the communist parties monopolizing authority in their hands. Research on the composition of the political, economic and cultural elites carried out in the early nineties in Poland, Hungary and Russia on samples consisting of about 2000 persons (including 1000 persons, who were the members of the economic, political and cultural elite in 1993) in each of the above mentioned countries showed that women were not represented in large numbers. In Poland they constituted 12.1%, in Hungary - 11.9%, and in Russia - 4.7% of the members of political elites. These studies included persons, who were the members of parliaments and high officials and a central level. Among those holding high positions in administration, who were included in the above study, women constituted 21% in Poland, 15% in Hungary and only 5% in Russia (Fodor, Jerzowa, Wnuk-Lipiński, 1995:166). In the cultural elites there were slightly less women by several per cent in each of these countries, with a relatively largest number in Poland, slightly less in Hungary and less still in Russia. According to the adopted definition these included persons on the highest positions in the mass media, education, the largest publishing houses and the chairmen of creative associations, i.e. persons holding strategic positions in the formal decision-making structure in the area of science and culture. As we see from the same study, a change of the political system and the process of transformation in the ownership structure in the economic sector did not bring about any significant changes, as far as the proportions of women and men are concerned. In Hungary and Russia, the percentage of women does not exceed 10% in the new elite in state-owned, privatized and private-owned enterprises. In Poland, on the other hand, the percentage of women in the two latter types of enterprises is definitely higher (approx. 15%); in state-owned enterprises it is 4%, which corresponds to the percentage of women in state-owned firms in 1988 i.e. before the change of the system

and the fundamental economic reforms, based on the development of the private sector and a decrease of the state-owned one (Borocz, Rona-Tas, 1995:151). The analyses carried out in the former Czechoslovakia brought similar results (Wolchik, 1994). The authors of the previously quoted study, in characterizing the participation of women in the economic elites make the reservation, that in reality their number may be lower, as the persons studied by them could have included women, who gave their name to an enterprise in fact managed by their husbands.

The quoted figures show that the participation of women in the elites of the post-communist countries is quite small. The transformations taking place in them, the changing elites, which is taking place on a larger scale than elsewhere, are not accompanied by women's increasing participation in the decision-making bodies on the highest levels. Research conducted on lower level authorities, local ones, have also shown that women continue to be underrepresented there as well (Siemieńska, 1994a, 1996a, 1996b; Bartkowski, 1996; Jasińska-Kania, 1998; Wiatr, 1998). In Poland in 1995 they constituted 22% of the studied national sample of the representatives of the local authorities. More frequently they held positions in local administration rather than politics, usually on the lower levels of authority. During the nineties the number of women elected to local authorities grew slightly from 11% in 1990 up to 13.2% in 1994 (Elections to councils in districts - June 14, GUS 1994). In comparison in 1989 there were 22% of women in local councils, therefore the phenomenon observed on the national level was repeated on the local level and, what is interesting, the proportions by which the number of women decreased in the elective bodies are the same at both levels.

Nevertheless a series of questions arises as to the method of forming the elites in the new democracies. What and to what extent do they differ from the paths of the

careers of women and men in the countries undergoing transformation from the way in which they are recruited in states with stable democracies? To what extent are the persons on the highest positions representative for the population in their countries with respect to the basic orientations at values and what factors differentiate between them?

The recognition of the range of the existing gender inequalities and the acceptance of the given model of relations between women and men in society is particularly significant, as the members of elite make decisions regarding others, or have influence over the shape of the conducted policy by decision-making groups, to which they belong. We assume - in accordance with several psychological theories - that these persons, similarly as studied populations, have a tendency to undertake actions which are consistent with their systems of values, even though, this does not at all mean that in fact their behaviors will always be directly set out by them (Van Deth, Scarbrough, 1995). The above mentioned conceptions may also describe the way in which one's own possibilities in public life are perceived by the elite members, affect the formation of their individual aspirations in life, in order to avoid the barriers of „what is impossible” (glass ceilings, glass walls), determine their cultural and social capital as these terms are defined by Bourdieu (1984)(Hale, Kelly, 1989; Guy, 1992).

Considering value orientations of members of elites we have to have in mind that the ways of entering public life by women have been different in communist and non-communist countries.

We may basically distinguish two types of models for the professional activation of women after World War II: „externally controlled”, more typical for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe throughout the last 50 years, and „internally controlled”, which better describes the situation which existed at that time in

Western Europe and many non-European countries (Vianello, Siemieńska, 1990). The first model was characterized by the fact that the change in the behavior of women took place as a result of an external pressure on them (and the family), the pressure of political power, which also controlled the distribution of economic goods. Changes in the sphere of awareness, a departure from the traditionally defined social roles for the sake of a non-traditional model, based on partnership between men and women, took place at a very slow rate. In fact, women had to combine professional work with the roles traditionally ascribed to them. The propaganda existing during the period, treated the problem of equality between women and men as „taken care of”. The situation was perceived by members of the communist societies not as requiring a re-evaluation of the roles of men and women, so that the burden of numerous duties would be distributed more evenly, but as the existence of „excessive equality between the genders”. The only way out of the situation - in the opinion of a significant part of society - was a return to the traditional division of roles (Siemieńska, 1986; 1990). Other factors which have strengthened traditional conceptions of women's role in the societies were - to point out the most important: „frozen” by the communist system the relations between men and women in the private life, to a large extent brought over from the traditional peasant societies; lack of possibility to realize one's orientations at values with a simultaneous need to undertake actions contrary to them which may raise first of all a desire for „withdrawal” from public life to diminish the divergencies; an „automatic” attainment of certain rights and so-called privileges of welfare state, which in the context of imposed duties and forced behaviors were perceived as a way of reinforcing the inequalities between women and men and their exploitation; lack of possibility of organization (e.g. women's interest groups, including

feminist groups), so typical of democratic societies, but contrary to the conception of controlling society by the authorities under communism (Einhorn, 1993; Wolchik, 1994).

All of these factors hindered or even counteracted the transformations in the sphere of values and attitudes throughout the last several decades. Nevertheless, certain processes in the sphere of awareness, as far as changes of attitudes with respect to the role of women in society are concerned, did take place, being connected mainly with an increase in the education level of women. The relationship between the level of education and the perceived need to grant them equal rights and greater independence is a tendency which is generally observed in the world.

What was characteristic for the second, „Western” model were mainly the changes in the awareness of women, regarding their place and role in social life, which became an important factor drawing them to look for work outside of the family and the home. The existing feminism movement in non-communist countries significantly contributed to a raise of concept of women's rights and their role in society. Neither of the models appeared in a „pure” form. Nevertheless, their dominance in given groups in countries were the reason why in the late eighties and early nineties, when the communist system was collapsing, the expectations of the members of the post-communist societies and societies in Western European and North American countries clearly differed as far as the conceptions of the desired roles of women and men were concerned. At the time the societies of Central and Eastern Europe expected that the transformations will bring changes enabling the realization of the hitherto unfulfilled dreams of prosperity, of a lifestyle based on the traditional family model, according to which it is mainly the woman who takes care of the home and children, and the man provides money (Siemieńska, 1996a; 1996b).

The following hypotheses will be tested in the paper:

- (1) the composition of the „top” of elites in post-communist countries is more the result of the circulation of elites than reproduction than in other countries,
- (2) similarities in the systems of values of elites and society should be greater in countries, which are currently undergoing the process of transformation and the process of replacing the elites is taking place on a larger scale,
- (3) the presence of the feminist movement in the given country (or a lack of one) should influence the degree of difference in the value orientation between women and

men found in their political and economic elites. Where it has its traditions, these differences should appear, and in countries, where the integration axis runs differently, dividing society into two oppositional blocks: „us” - society, and „them” - the forced (e.g. communist) authorities, the differences between the orientations of women and men should be small;

- (4) the political and economic elites have their specific traits, even though it is also known that often they are mutually reinforced. Persons with a strong position in the economic elite combine it periodically, for example, with a political career and vice versa.

Advancement - paths for reaching a position on the top of power

The data analysed in the next part of the paper were collected between 1992 and 1995 in 27 countries in the framework of the project „Gender and Leadership in Cross-cultural Perspective”. The goal of the study has been to find out similarities and differences in career paths of men and women who had been successful in becoming members of top political and economic elites. In each of the countries 15 to 30 women were interviewed in each of the elite and the same number of men selected as a „matching” group (with similar position in structure of authorities, in similar age).

Owing to the specific traits of the compared countries, their different history and the various participation of women in public life, they have been grouped as follows: (1) Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) which stand out because of their particularly high rate of women’s participation in public life, advanced welfare state, high standard of living and an active feminist movement, (2) the relatively new democracies in Western Europe (Portugal, Spain, Greece), with relatively lower living standards, (3) post-communist countries being at the stage of political and economic transformations (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, Russia), (4) stable democracies in Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Switzerland, Great Britain, Ireland), (5) non-European democratic countries (United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Israel), whose development was affected by mass immigration.

Persons belonging to the „top” of the political and economic elite in post-communist countries, as we see from our study, are slightly younger than the members of elites in other countries. Women,

particularly in the economic elites - similarly as in other states - are slightly younger than men. The number of persons with university level education differs in different countries. Over a half have university level education in the Scandinavian, post-communist and stable western democracies countries; particularly in the first two groups of states (approx. 70%). In the new democracies of Southern Europe and the non-European democracies the figure stands at 30-45%. Generally speaking, women are slightly less educated compared to men (the level of education is measured by the completed years of study and the attained degrees), even though there are exceptions from this rule. For example, in the economic elite in the Scandinavian countries and the non-European democracies and in the political elite of the new democracies in Southern Europe, women are better educated than men.

In both types of the elites women were distinguished by lesser mobility in their hitherto professional careers, less frequently changing their place of work, compared to men; men - politicians changed them 3.71 times, women - politicians - 3.45, men from the economic elite - 4.51, women - 4.00. The members of the post-communist elites, next to Scandinavian ones, were characterized by greater mobility. In the political elite in Scandinavia - men changed places 4.65 times on average, women - 3.99, in the post-communist elite - men - 4.49, women - 4.01. In the Scandinavian economic elite - men changed work 5.13 times on average, women - 5.02, in the post-communist economic elite - men - 5.10 times, women - 4.40. The elites from Southern Europe and Western Europe least frequently changed jobs before attaining the positions at the time the study was carried out. A logical consequence of the above

differences between the elites was the fact that the length of work on a position held in the period the study was being conducted was the shortest in the Scandinavian countries and in the post-communist world of politics (men held their jobs for an average of 3.40 years, women - 2.97). At the same time it turned out that in general women on managerial positions on a high level are „newer” persons, with a shorter period of work, compared to men. Their period of waiting for advancement to the present position was also shorter than in the case of men. In politics the average number of years of waiting was 7.99 years for men in politics, and 6.58 for women and 5.21 and 4.63 respectively in the economic elites. In the post-communist countries the periods of remaining at the former job were shorter compared to most other countries.

A definite majority of the persons (approx. 70% of women and men in the political elite and 80% in the economic elite) before being nominated or elected to their present position held positions at least on the average managerial level or - much more frequently - managerial ones, managing the work of entire institutions or enterprises. Nevertheless, the number of persons evidently advancing, moving from lower positions that the previously mentioned ones, was slightly higher among women than men. They also more frequently held rank and file positions in their workplaces preceding the ones from which they advanced to the jobs held at present. Generally speaking, usually starting off from lower positions, when beginning professional work, women were slower in climbing the steps of the organizational structures; they were relatively less frequently promoted, but their careers clearly accelerated as they started approaching their current positions.

The observation often made about the fact that attaining high positions usually requires a long and tedious gathering of various resources during the professional and/or political career, is confirmed here.

The studied women seldom (although more frequently than men) pointed to family considerations, which interfered with their careers (the reason for quitting the first job). This was a total of 15.3% of women and 2.9% of men active in politics and 7% and 2.4% respectively in the economy. This relatively small percentage which considered the family when stopping or changing the first job for another one, demonstrates that most of them could one way or another solve the dilemma of the conflict of roles resulting from combining activity in public and private life at different stages of professional careers and was decided to do it.

One of the resources, which „counts” in advancement to political and economic elites is the support and having ties in political parties, which are frequently attained through active involvement in their activity (Lovenduski, Norris, 1993). Between 70 and 100 per cent of the studied members of political elites in all of the groups of countries, both women and men, are presently the members of political parties. Sometimes even the number of women is greater than that of men. Only in the post-communist countries the percentage of persons belonging to political parties is definitely lower (62%) and identical for women and men. The reasons for the differences in the elites in post-communist countries are evident. The change of the political and economic system has caused that one of the goals of the opposition which gained influence on forming new groups of decision-makers, was replacing the members of the old elites with new persons. The parties, which appeared on the political scene in the early nineties had different origins. By classifying them from this point of view, we may divide them into several categories. A part of them groups activists from the previous opposition, others were created as a result of transforming parties existing under communism, there are also parties, which are to be a continuation of parties functioning before

World War II; there are also parties with a mixed character from the point of view of the origin of their members. What is more, as we see for example in Poland's case, a particularly important role on the political scene is played by „Solidarity” - a trade union, which promotes its representatives to the top political and economic elite. Apart from that, in these countries, similarly as in other ones, where the democratic system had been reinstated relatively recently (Spain) or established (post-communist countries), the number of persons, who have joined political parties is relatively small, and their activity is to a large extent based on gaining support during elections. In the post-communist countries this phenomenon appears to a much more vivid extent. Very often persons supported by one party or another or a coalition, are not formally their members. The aspiration of new elites to deprive the persons, who were in the elite during the

communist regime, of influence, as well as the tendency of the post-communist parties to introduce new people and not showing members known from the past is the reason why also the length of operating in parties, administration and elective bodies is relatively short and much lower compared to politicians from other countries. In other words, a significant part of the present politicians does not have the experience usually possessed by politicians belonging to the narrowly understood elite. In almost all groups of countries women have a shorter period of activity in political parties (with the exception of non-European states) and in activity in elective bodies. As far as positions held in administration are concerned, the picture is not as explicit; women - politicians in Southern Europe and in post-communist countries have more years of work in administration behind them (table 1).

Table 1. Politicians' experience in political parties, elected bodies and administration (mean of years)

Region:	Years of activity in parties		Years of activity in administration		Years of activity in elected bodies		Total number of years in politics	
	men	women	men	women	men	women	men	women
Total	5.06	4.77	1.49	1.31	3.04	2.70	19.42	17.40
Scandinavia	9.40	7.23	2.63	1.86	8.64	5.44	24.64	20.08
Southern Europe	6.12	5.67	1.65	1.78	3.11	3.26	22.42	21.57
Western Europe	5.48	5.36	1.64	1.62	2.93	3.00	22.13	19.53
Non-European democracies	4.77	5.27	1.66	.62	2.64	1.57	19.46	17.79
Post-Communist countries	1.81	1.12	.49	.63	.82	.90	10.67	8.82
N	374	392	374	392	374	392	374	392

The connection of economic elites with politics differs in the various groups of countries. The strongest links and „mixed” careers are found in the post-communist, non-European and Southern European countries; there, approx. 30% of the per-

sons were or are active in political parties, and among men in post-communist countries their percentage reaches 50%. Women in general were/are less active. The number of persons holding political posts in any given period in their lives does not exceed

several per cent in most of the countries, with the exception of Southern Europe and post-communist countries, where it reaches

a dozen or so per cent both among women and men.

Fig. 1



Fig.2




Fig.3





Fig.4

Number of years in politics



The family - as a resource conducive to a political career

The structure of the parent's education of persons belonging to political and economic elites substantially departs from the educational structure of societies, to which they belong. Particularly the level of

the father's education is significantly higher, and in particular the fathers of women - politicians. The percentage of mothers with university level education is three times lower than the fathers (table 2).

Table 2. Father's and mother's education of members of political and economic elites (in %)

Education	Father's education						Mother's education					
	Political elite			Economic elite			Political elite			Economic elite		
	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F
primary	16.2	21.6	11.1	12.7	15.0	10.6	23.5	27.6	19.5	19.8	23.0	16.8
vocational	17.2	19.2	15.4	15.8	19.2	12.5	21.0	22.1	19.9	23.5	24.5	22.6
secondary general	16.0	15.8	16.2	16.7	17.9	15.5	22.3	19.9	24.5	23.4	25.7	21.1
secondary vocational	14.1	11.3	16.7	15.4	14.1	16.7	14.0	10.8	16.9	13.3	11.4	15.0
more than secondary	18.8	16.3	21.2	18.5	16.0	20.8	13.2	13.2	13.1	12.9	9.4	16.2
university	17.7	15.8	19.4	21.0	17.8	23.9	6.2	6.4	6.1	7.2	5.9	8.3

It should also be stressed that much less frequently the mother's education was limited to primary school, particularly in the case of women - politicians or members of the economic elites. In summing up, the

parents of women - elite members are more educated than the parents of men, which points to the importance of socialization conditions, particularly in the case of socialization for non-typical roles, as is the case with women.

Women, who have become the members of economic elites have - in a great part - fathers holding managerial positions. The same, even though to a slightly lesser extent, applies to men. Also in the world of politics it is possible to speak of a significant, also higher in the case of women, reproduction of the elites, even though more broadly understood (i.e. the fathers of the present members of the political elites did not necessarily have to be or are at present the members of the close political elite, but for example, they held managerial positions in the economy). A similar correlation exists, even though it is not as strong, in the case of women and men belonging to both elites and the positions held at present or in the past by their

mothers. The degree of reproduction is therefore significant in all types of countries. A region, where the positions of the parents play a particularly important part, are the countries of the new democracies of Southern Europe. A region, where their role is least - for obvious reasons - the post-communist countries. Even though also in their case we can speak of a large degree of reproduction, as far as the economic elites are concerned (over a half have fathers, who held managerial positions). The position of mothers here was similarly significant in the case of women's careers in the economic elite as, for example, in Scandinavia and the non-European democracies, where it is lower than in most European countries (Table 3).

Table 3. Mother's and Father's Supervisory Positions in Their Jobs (in %)

Region:	Mother's supervisory position				Father's supervisory position			
	Political elite		Economic elite		Political elite		Economic elite	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Total	32.3	37.9	25.4	39.7	67.6	73.0	72.1	77.9
Scandinavia	29.7	33.3	18.0	29.2	69.1	69.4	65.0	80.9
Southern Europe	57.9	55.0	57.1	58.3	87.2	82.5	71.1	97.2
Western Europe	26.8	36.6	31.5	49.5	67.3	81.7	72.5	73.2
Non-European democracies	25.9	59.2	26.1	38.0	62.1	69.0	82.6	82.8
Post-Communist countries	32.7	22.9	9.0	32.1	60.8	58.8	62.0	63.7

Fig.5





Fig.6






Fig.7



Economic elite





Fig.8



Many persons come from families, whose members are found in the structures of authority in political institutions. It is difficult to say on the basis of the question asked in the questionnaire whether this is the result of socialization for interest in politics, or a trump card, facilitating entering the elite, even though we expect that the meaning of both of these factors is intertwined. Having a family involved in political activity is mainly conducive to entering the world of politics, but also plays an important role in the case of finding oneself in the economic elite. Similarly as in the case of the previously discussed „resource” („parents on managerial positions”), having family members in the structures of political power is a more important factor for women in entering the elite than for men. This applied to a total of 33.9% of men and 36.9% of women belonging to the studies political elites, and 17.7% and 20.1% respectively for the members of the studies economic elites. It may therefore be said that it is mainly a given resource of family influence in the area of politics or economy that is conducive to the children or kin entering the given elite, but it is also helpful in

reaching high positions in the social elite in general. Having family members in the structures of political power is particularly frequent in the Scandinavian countries, and relatively least frequent in the post-communist ones.

Over 80% of the women found in the political and economic elites has husbands with above average education, which may be treated as yet another trump card in women making careers (owing to a better understanding for the aspirations of their partners, as well as the higher positions they hold). In the case of men this percentage is definitely lower - approx. 60% in each of the discussed elites.

The perception of factors conducive to making a career is to a certain extent divergent with the factors given above, which we have defined as „family resources” held by the elite members. Women slightly more frequently than men are convinced that their promotion was the result of their personal abilities; this applies both to the area of politics, as well as the economy. Nevertheless, they also more frequently believe that political connections played an important role in their careers.

What did advancement depend on? The determinants of advancement

It is often pointed out that the presence and promotion of decision-making positions depend on the social, political and cultural capital, being at the disposal of the individual. As far as women are concerned, also on the acceptance of equality between women and men and their presence in public life.

In the conducted analyses, the measure of the speed of advancement was the age at which the respondents reached the top of the political or economic ladder, that is the posts which they held at the time of the study.

Their social capital was defined by:

the characteristics of their family environment

- (a) the political activity of family members
- (b) the position held by the mother (whether she held a managerial position)
- (c) the position held by the father (whether he held a managerial position)
- (d) the education level of the spouse/partner

the respondent's individual resources:

- (e) gender
- (f) the education level (measured by the number of years of education)
- (g) the type of the first job
- (h) the type of the previous job, before the present one
- (i) the respondent's political activity (measured in years)
- (j) activity in student's organizations

the perceived level of equal chances of women and men in society:

- (l) the perceived acceptance of women on managerial positions in the given area
- (m) the perceived acceptance of women on managerial positions in the respondent's workplace
- (n) the conviction that a woman must make a greater effort in order to advance, compared to a man.

Multiple regression analysis conducted separately for the members of political and economic elites have demonstrated that the above mentioned factors had a statistically significant effect on the course of the respondents' careers in politics (adjusted R square = .054) and in the economy (adjusted R square = .069). In the case of persons from the political elite the most important factors were (given according to the size of the beta regression coefficient): the respondent holding a managerial position at the job preceding the current one (beta .29, sign. .008), the mother holding a managerial position (beta .23, sign. .04), activity in students' organizations (beta .17, insign.), the managerial character of the first job (beta .16, insign.), total years of education (beta .14, insign.). The beta coefficient for gender placed it on the 11th position from among 14 predictors included in the analysis and was statistically insignificant. But in the case of the economic elite the most significant predictor was the managerial position in the last job before attaining the current one (beta .24, sign .007), gender (beta -.20, sign .04), the perceived acceptance of women on managerial positions in the respondent's workplace (beta -.13,), help of a given person in advancement (beta -.12), and having a father holding a managerial position (beta -.11). The last predictors were not statistically significant.

Therefore, the role of the various resources is partially different in the case of careers in politics and the economy. In the area of politics they demanded greater resources, collected over a longer period of time compared to careers in the economy. In the case of the former, it is worth pointing to the social role of the respondents' mothers; mothers holding decision-making positions are an important „resource” conducive to a career. Whereas in the careers in the economic area the position of the

fathers seems to play a more important part. As far as gender is one of the two most important predictors affecting the rate at which careers are made, in the area of politics it plays a secondary role, yielding before many other predictors. Perceiving social order as inconducive to the career of women plays an incomparably small part compared to other predictors in the case of both types of elites. Among others, this

may explain the fact that the respondents were persons of both genders, who had been successful, therefore those who could believe that the existence of a system based on gender inequality is not an obstacle which would prevent making a career, and the barriers or factors experienced by them, which helped them, were of a different type - individually held resources.

The Impact of Culture, Politics and Economic Growth on Elites' Value Orientation

The longitudinal studies on values conducted in many countries demonstrate value changes of societies being a result of the rapid economic development and the expansion of the welfare state that followed World War II. The basic structure of values and attitudes concerning a social order are changing. Inglehart suggests that societies are moving from values characteristic for stage of „modernization” to the stage of „postmodernization” (1990; 1997). He defines „materialist” values as those which emphasize economic and physical security and are typical for the former stage while „postmaterialist” which emphasize self-expression and the quality of life are characteristic for the stage of „postmodernization”. „*Postmaterialist are not materialists, still less are they anti-materialists. The term „Post-materialist” denotes a set of goals that are emphasized after people have attained material security, and because they have attained materialist security.*” (Inglehart, 1997: 35). The rise of the latter - called also „postmodern” - he considers as partially responsible for the decline of state socialist regimes. He also found that persons attaching great significance to post-materialist values, are more frequently in favor of gender equality and a less traditional family model. However, the relationship is more complicated; the type of value orientation is determined by a series of factors on the level of society as a whole, as well as an individual one.

The analyses presented further on allow us to find out what kind of value orientation prevails in elites in different types of societies and, also, to state which factors - apart from individual traits and experiences of the respondents - are conducive to the appearance of persons in the elites with a post-materialist orientation.

The value orientation was examined by using Inglehart's 4-item battery, from

which the respondent selected two most important goals, which should be realized over the next 10 years. It included two materialist goals „*maintaining order in the nation*” and „*fighting rising prices*”, and two post-materialist ones „*giving people more say in important government decisions*” and „*protecting freedom of speech*” (Inglehart, 1977; 1990; 1997).

Our analyses show - comparing the findings with the earlier obtained results on representative national samples (Inglehart, 1990; 1997) - that in reality groups of countries clearly differ between each other as far as orientations at values are concerned, both in the case of entire societies, as well as persons on the top positions in the political and economic structures (Table 4 and 5).

The degree of similarity in orientations at materialist - post-materialist values between societies as a whole and the studied members of the elites is very different in the particular countries. As a rule they are more post-materialistically oriented compared to the inhabitants of their countries (table 5). (Table 5 contains also the basic characteristics for the analyzed countries which will be used in further analyses.). Earlier analyses carried out in Poland at the beginning of 1990s (Siemienska, 1998) gave similar results. Parliamentarians interviewed in 1992 and councillors and administrators of local governments - one year later - were more postmaterialist oriented than teachers and Polish random sample interviewed in 1988, 1992, 1993, 1995 and 1997 (see Appendix). The comparison of value orientation of public and decision-making groups in West Germany in the early 1980s and in the United States in the late 1980s gave similar findings. The studies demonstrated also that the business elites where relatively less postmaterialist oriented than others confirming results of

Table 4. Differences in elites' value orientation among groups of countries (in %)

Region/ value orientation:	Political elite:			Economic elite:		
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
Scandinavia:						
materialist	5	11	--	15	15	15
postmaterialist	27	17	34	12	12	12
mixed	68	72	66	73	73	73
Southern Europe:						
materialist	12	5	18	15	17	13
postmaterialist	35	31	40	21	30	13
mixed	53	64	42	64	53	74
Western Europe:						
materialist	15	14	15	15	21	9
postmaterialist	36	34	39	23	19	27
mixed	49	52	46	62	60	64
Non-European democracies:						
materialist	6	8	4	16	17	15
postmaterialist	37	35	40	20	19	22
mixed	57	57	56	64	64	63
Post-communist countries:						
materialist	15	19	12	23	23	24
postmaterialist	15	13	16	10	12	8
mixed	70	68	72	67	65	68

our study, and even in both countries less postmaterialist than the general public (Inglehart, 1990).

Inglehart (1990; 1997) proves that the existence of a stable democratic system over a longer period of time, the accompanying satisfaction of society with living conditions, an increase in the education level cause that post-materialist values are frequently considered as important. He also found that young persons are characterized by a greater orientation at post-materialist values, similarly as persons which had better economic conditions when they were

growing up (14 years of age is adopted as the age when the hierarchy of values becomes crystallized).

Our goal was to find out to what extent his theory supported on the national level will be confirmed in a case of elites and whether value orientation of society influences their value orientation. Therefore the multiple regression analysis model adopted for further analysis included variables of two types: (a) macro-economic and characterizing the level of development of democracies in the various countries (GNP/capita, 1990, percentage in higher

Table 5. Economic, Social Structure, Political, Cultural Variables and Value Orientation

	GNP/ Capita 1990*	Percent in Higher Education*	Years of Continuous Democracy*	Level of Democracy 1990*	Subjective Well-being of Society **	Post-materialist Values of Society 1990's %***		Post-materialist Values of Politicians %		Post-materialist Values of Econ. Elite %	
						M	F	M	F	M	F
Austria	19,000	33	49	14	59	26	24	54	36	18	35
Belgium	17,580	37	75	14	77	27	20	50	58	40	23
Britain	16,080	25	75	14	75	22	18	33	38	15	46
Canada	20,380	70	75	14	69	30	21	na	na	na	--
Czech Republic	3,190	18	04	4	32	11	10	29	38	12	13
Denmark	22,440	32	75	14	85	17	15	30	59	21	27
Finland	24,540	47	75	14	76	33	25	7	15	7	--
France	19,590	40	37	13	67	28	23	27	64	36	43
Hungary	2,780	15	4	9	28	5	3	25	7	na	na
Ireland	10,370	26	75	14	80	18	20	na	na	na	na
Italy	16,882	20	49	14	66	26	19	18	19	--	6
Japan	25,840	31	49	14	54	10	10	54	58	31	14
Netherlands	17,570	34	75	14	85	33	37	36	30	33	18
Norway	22,830	43	75	14	81	11	8	na	33	na	17
Poland	1,690	22	4	9	58	11	9	4	7	19	4
Portugal	4,950	18	18	13	51	13	12	43	46	36	21
Russia	3,430	20	0	5	-1	8	4	--	14	na	na
Slovenia	3,000	18	3	2	23	9	4	6	16	--	6
Spain	11,010	34	17	14	65	24	17	23	22	23	8
Sweden	23,780	33	75	14	86	23	22	na	33	--	--
Switzerland	32,250	26	75	14	86	26	22	22	23	--	25
United States	21,810	75	75	14	77	24	21	30	22	25	31
(W.)Germany	22,360	32	46	14	70	29	28	na	na	na	na

* GNP per capita 1990 from World Bank *World Development Report 1993*; the percentage of the college-age population enrolled in higher education in 1988 is from the World Bank, *World Development Report 1993*, 294-95; years of continuous democracy and the level of democracy in 1990 based on the Freedom House score, which range from 2 (low) to 14 (high) are from Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 1990* from Inglehart (1997) *Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*. p.357 and next.

** The subjective well-being index for a particular society is the mean of two differences - the percent of respondents answering happy minus the percent unhappy, and the percent satisfied minus the percent dissatisfied. The index was constructed by Inglehart on a basis World Values Survey 1990-1993 (R. Inglehart (1997) *Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic and political Change in 43 Societies*. p.357.

***Score of postmaterialism is based on four item battery developed by Inglehart (described in the text). Data from : M.Basanez, R. Inglehart, A. Moreno (1996) *Human Values and Beliefs: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook*.

education, percentage of people with post-materialist orientation in total population in each country, level of democracy in 1990, subjective well-being and group of countries with a specific history), as well as (b) regarding the members of the studied elites (gender, age group, family's economic po-

sition when the respondent was 14, total years of the respondent's education).

The multiple regression analysis was carried out separately for persons from the world of politics and business. In the case of the former (considering the size of beta coefficients) the most important predictors

explaining the orientations were (1) the subjective well-being of society (beta -.30, sign .0009), (2) level of democracy in 1990 (beta .24, sign .003), (3) GNP/capita in 1990 (beta .10, insign.), (4) percentage of persons with a post-materialist orientation (beta .07, insign.), (5) gender (beta .06, insign.), (6) the percentage of people in higher education (beta .05, statis. insign.). The model as a whole was statistically significant; adjusted R square = .021.

In the case of persons representing the world of business the interactions between the various predictors were different. The most important predictors (considering the size of beta coefficients) were: (1) level of democracy in 1990 (beta .32, sign.000), (2) belonging to generations born before 1935 (beta -.25, sign. .000), (3) subjective well-being of society (beta -.18, sign. .02), (4) percentage of persons with a post-materialist orientation in society as a whole (beta -.15, sign. .06), (5) living in Scandinavian countries (beta .11, sign.05), (6) the percentage in higher education in the particular country (beta .08, insign.).

The model was statistically significant, adjusted R square = .083. The predictors included in the model to a larger extent explained the value orientation of people who attained top positions in business compared to those active in politics.

There are also some differences in opinions between both types of elites and between men and women within each of them as far as a role of government and market mechanisms are considered as basic factors shaping economy and social rela-

tionships. The respondents were asked about the most preferred type of the relationships replying to the following question:

„Many approaches to social and economic change have been used by governments in modern societies. Here are some options:

(1) A major government role in directing political and social change, such as economic planning.

(2) A moderately active government role, such as government guidelines and incentives,

(3) A modified market approach with some government incentives,

(4) A basic market approach with the smallest possible role of government.”

Despite of differences among particular countries there is a regularity that political elites more opt for a some role of government („moderate active government role.” and „modified market approach...”) than economic elites (table 6). There are differences among political elites of the groups of countries. Post-communist political elites are more ready to ascribe a leading role to market than political elites of many other countries. Economic elites are more convinced that market mechanisms should play a decisive role in economic and political changes. In majority of countries women - politicians and female members of economic elites more often than men, consider that government should play a some role in the changes while men are more market oriented. The exception - in this respect - are almost all new democracies of Southern Europe. (Siemienska, 1999 a, 1999 b)

Table 6. Elites' opinions on the desired role of government and market mechanisms in social and economic life (%)

Country:	Political elite								Economic elite							
	Major government role		Moderately active government role		Modified market role		Basic market role		Major government role		Moderately active government role		Modified market role		Basic market role	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Austria	13	6	69	50	6	44	13	-	6	10	22	20	72	60	-	10
Belgium	20	10	40	60	20	25	20	5	-	6	18	33	46	28	36	33
Britain	5	10	37	30	21	30	37	30	-	-	22	28	39	61	39	11
Canada	27	39	36	39	27	17	9	6	6	5	6	41	41	27	47	27
Czech Republic	21	13	7	13	50	53	21	20	-	-	13	40	53	47	33	13
Denmark	15	29	31	29	46	43	8	-	7	17	7	-	80	58	7	25
Finland	7	21	40	50	53	21	-	7	-	7	40	13	23	67	36	13
France	39	10	54	80	8	10	-	-	2	4	40	61	23	7	36	29
Hungary	-	-	29	40	50	47	21	13	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Ireland	25	33	25	13	50	40	-	13	25	7	25	36	32	43	19	14
Italy	13	-	44	47	44	32	-	21	7	11	14	16	50	53	29	21
Japan	-	-	8	15	75	69	17	15	13	13	-	13	73	53	13	20
Netherlands	-	7	40	57	40	21	20	14	-	-	53	33	20	27	27	40
Norway	na	50	na	-	na	38	na	13	na	18	na	41	na	36	na	5
Poland	3	3	33	33	33	33	30	30	3	3	13	13	17	33	67	50
Portugal	-	13	47	47	40	40	13	-	7	47	36	27	36	27	21	
Russia	25	13	38	50	13	25	25	13	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Slovenia	-	15	11	30	74	50	16	5	-	10	-	-	67	40	33	50
Spain	13	13	67	53	13	13	7	20	-	-	20	33	40	20	40	47
Sweden	31	21	39	43	23	36	8	-	13	13	7	20	53	67	27	-
Switzerland	-	13	40	67	47	13	13	7	-	-	8	23	75	62	17	15
United States	18	9	36	46	18	36	27	9	-	-	15	13	39	47	46	40
(W.)Germany	-	7	40	67	60	27	-	-	-	-	43	27	50	73	-	-
Greece	36	7	9	21	27	36	27	36	17	7	25	-	-	21	58	71
Israel	14	57	14	29	57	-	14	14	17	16	33	26	50	32	-	26
New Zealand	27	47	27	27	13	7	33	20	-	7	20	-	54	60	54	33
Australia	21	60	36	33	29	7	14	-	7	15	-	39	50	23	43	23

The Perception of Gender Inequality as a Barrier to Advancement

The analyses in this and next paragraphs aim to trace relationship between the value orientation and recognition of the existing barriers in women's advancement, as well as an attempt to answer the question to what extent the elites are representative of their societies, as far as orientations at values and attitudes towards the inequality of women and men are concerned.

We are aware that the presented evaluations of the respondents may be based on their own experiences, observations of the situations of other people, as well as an element of a broader, more abstract knowledge of the mechanisms according to which societies operate, founded in certain political and cultural traditions.

Our study demonstrates that various aspects of the inequalities between women and men are noticed with varying intensity in the different groups of countries. They are relatively most frequently stressed by the elite members of „non-European democratic countries” and the „new democracies of Southern Europe”. Least frequently - by the elites in post-communist countries. In addition, in some of them, in certain cases the attitudes and opinions of women and men are very similar, whereas in others they clearly differ. But generally speaking, women more frequently than men notice the inequalities, as well as barriers of a cultural and social nature, which make it more difficult for women to enter the political and economic elites. For example the number of women and men, who do not agree with the view that women prefer men on decision-making positions, as well as that women lack the specific preparation to perform such roles is quite similar. Women, on the other hand much more frequently

than men are convinced that they are isolated in the mainly male professional environment, that they are unwillingly elected (or appointed) to the highest positions, and also that they must attain more than men in order to get noticed (Tables 7 and 8). Also more frequently than men they believe that earning money is the best way to ensure women's independence, definitely more frequently than men they disagree with the opinion that when there are not enough jobs, men should have priority in getting them (Table 9).

The members of the political elite more frequently notice the inequalities and the social and cultural barriers in women attaining positions at the top of the decision-making circles of authority than the members of economic elites.

The low values of the indices (Figures 9a-b, 10 a-b, 11 a-b) stem partially from the fact that a large part of the respondents - both women as well as men - are not strongly convinced whether the problem of discrimination exists, and also what place should women hold in society. Answers „agree” and „disagree” given by members of elites can be rather considered as an expression of a „political correctness” in modern societies than the expression of their crystallized views. But, we are not able to prove this assumption on a basis of available data. In total, 790 respondents did not give even one response „strongly agree” or „strongly disagree” in the case of the index of „Sources of Women's Social Discrimination”, 1325 persons - in the case of the index „Perceived Gender Inequality in Work” and 581 elite members - in the case of the index „Concept of Women's Role in Public and Private Life” for a total of 1799 included in the study.

Table 7a. „Sources of Women’s Social Discrimination”
 Perception of macro- social and cultural barriers faced by women to reach top positions
 (answers „strongly agree”* or „strongly disagree”** depend on the question) (%)

	Political elite											
	women prefer men in top position**		women lack specific training**		women are isolated in mainly male environment*		women are prevented from reaching top*		due to how women are reared*		women lack informal contacts*	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Scandinavia	38	33	36	25	3	3	14	12	--	6	2	11
Southern Europe	45	41	25	28	19	27	14	16	9	7	7	7
Western Europe	28	34	28	26	7	19	19	34	4	15	6	18
Non-European democracies	35	47	27	30	18	21	12	24	5	5	4	19
Post-Communist countries	6	12	28	32	5	4	16	18	3	7	4	11

Table 7 b. „Sources of Women’s Social Discrimination”(cont.)

	Economic elite											
	women prefer men in top position**		women lack specific training**		women are isolated in mainly male environment*		women are prevented from reaching top*		due to how women are reared*		women lack informal contacts*	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Scandinavia	11	25	36	30	5	6	2	14	4	7	--	6
Southern Europe	31	19	25	34	17	21	5	17	2	17	2	15
Western Europe	23	27	29	26	7	11	12	16	7	15	2	9
Non-European democracies	20	37	14	15	14	22	7	13	--	6	3	11
Post-Communist countries	8	14	29	54	3	7	9	6	16	11	2	3




Figure 9a. Index „Sources of Women’s Social Discrimination”* (means) - The political elite
 (Based on the questions in the table 7; see the description under the figure 9b)




Figure 9b. Index „Sources of Women’s Social Discrimination”* (means) - The economic elite
 *The index is based on the answers „strongly agree” and „strongly disagree” as marked in the tables 9a and 9b. The higher means = the higher perception of sources of women’s discrimination. „0” means - respondent did not give any answer „strongly agree” or „strongly disagree”; „6” - the respondent answered „strongly agree” or „strongly disagree” to the all questions included to the index.

Table 8. „Gender Inequality in Work“

Perception of gender inequality in respondents' field and organization to reach top positions (answers „strongly agree“* or „strongly disagree“** depend on the question) (%)

	Political elite						Economic elite					
	Women are accepted in leadership positions in the field**		men & women treated equally in my organization**		in my field women have to achieve more than men to receive recognition*		Women are accepted in leadership positions in the field**		men & women treated equally in my organization**		in my field women have to achieve more than men to receive recognition*	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Scandinavia	2	10	--	1	1	27	4	11	2	2	14	13
Southern Europe	9	9	2	15	19	52	7	9	--	5	5	34
Western Europe	2	7	3	14	13	43	5	9	6	9	9	32
Non-European democracies	2	10	--	16	12	48	1	7	--	9	5	40
Post-Communist countries	2	13	3	3	9	40	2	3	--	3	5	34




Figure 10a. Index: „Gender Inequality in Work“ (means) - The political elite (based on the questions in the table 8; see description under the figure 10b.)




Figure 10b. Index: „Gender Inequality in Work“ (means) - The economic elite
*The index is based on the answers „strongly agree“ and „strongly disagree“ as marked in the table 8. The higher means = the higher perception of women's discrimination. „0“ means - respondent did not give any answer „strongly agree“ or „strongly disagree“; „3“ - the respondent answered „strongly agree“ or „strongly disagree“ to the all questions included to the index.

Table 9. „Concept of Women's Role in Public and Private Life“ (answers „strongly agree“* or „strongly disagree“** depends on the question) (%)

	Political elite						Economic elite					
	when jobs are scarce men should have more rights**		family suffer when women work full time**		paid job best for women's independence*		when jobs are scarce men should have more rights**		family suffer when women work full time**		paid job best for women's independence*	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Scandinavia	80	93	45	32	41	49	69	84	11	30	27	50
Southern Europe	66	74	27	22	52	63	52	57	7	11	46	65
Western Europe	61	83	19	34	20	38	49	70	5	28	14	32
Non-European democracies	69	87	28	43	17	35	55	86	8	23	19	49
Post-Communist countries	27	15	17	8	17	31	28	27	12	17	28	42




Figure 11a. Index: „Concept of Women's Role in Public and Private Life” (means) - The political elite.

(Based on the questions in the table 9; see the description under the figure 11b).




Figure 11b. Index: „Concept of Women's Role in Public and Private Life”^{****} (means) - The economic elite.

*The index is based on the answers „strongly agree” and „strongly disagree” as marked in the table 9. The higher means = less traditional concept of women's role. „0” means - respondent did not give any answer „strongly agree” or „strongly disagree”; „3” - the respondent answered „strongly agree” or „strongly disagree” to the all questions included to the index.

Factors Shaping Elites' Perception of Gender Inequality in Public and Private Life

As it was stated earlier, women - members of both elites - perceive inequalities between women and men, as far as advancement opportunities are concerned, much more frequently than men. Younger more often than older their representatives. The members of the political elite with post-materialist orientations notice them much more frequently than the members of the economic elite. The higher mothers' education, the more frequent members of political elites have perceived this inequality, especially, that women are isolated in male environment and lack informal contacts. Also - even though to a lesser extent - the father's education - influences the perception of the unequal possibilities of women and men (table 10).

The found relationship between the held value orientation and the perception of the unequal possibilities of women's advancement by the members of the economic and political elites is consistent with the dependence demonstrated by Inglehart between the more general value orientation and the preference for several other values in the countries on different continents, with different political experiences and representing different levels of economic development (Inglehart, 1990; 1997).

The degree of similarity of the attitudes of societies and the attitudes of the members of political and economic elites to a large extent depends on the object of the attitude. For example, granting the right of priority to men in getting jobs is rejected in all countries by the elite members, with the exception of post-communist ones, where a significant part of the women and men, often even more women, is willing to accept it. Differences in the attitudes between

„society” and the elites are very large. The situation is different in the case of the concept of work as the best road to ensure independence by women. Elites and societies in most cases have identical opinions in this matter, and men are usually more willing to accept that women's work is a road to their independence (table 11).

Two types of multiple regression analysis were carried out for each of the previously discussed indices to find out which predictors play a part in perceiving discrimination and forming the model of the concept of women's role in society by the elite members: individual „resources” of the respondents or the broader political, economic and cultural context.

First type: which included the following variables as the predictors: (a) macro-economic and characterizing the level of the development of democracy in the various countries (GNP/capita 1990, percentage in higher education, percentage of people with post-materialist orientation in total population in each country, the level of democracy in 1990, years of continuous democracy, subjective well-being), as well as (b) regarding the members of the studied elites (gender, age group, family's economic position when respondent was 14, total years of the respondent's education);

Second type: in addition to the group of predictors given above (a) and (b), it also included types of regions (groups of countries), which were taken into consideration in the earlier analysis as groups of countries with different history and culture. As previously, the analyses were conducted separately for the members of the political and economic elites.

Table 10. Factors determining perception of barriers faced by women to reach top positions (Pearson's correlation coefficients)

	Political elite						Economic elite					
	Gender	Mother's education	Father's education	Year of R's birth	Years of R's education	Value orientation	Gender	Mother's education	Father's education	Year of R's birth	Years of R's education	Value orientation
women prefer men in top position					-.07*	.26***						.18***
women lack specific training	-.06*			.09**	.09**					.07*		
women are isolated in mainly male environment	-.16***	.09**										
women are prevented from reaching top	-.12***			-.12***		-.16***						-.08*
due to how women are reared	-.13***			-.12***			-.13***	-.08*	-.07*			
women lack informal contacts	-.29***	-.07*				-.11**	-.25***			-.11***		-.08*
women are accepted in leadership positions in the field	.16***			.07*		.10**	.09**					
men & women treated equally in my organization	.24***			.06*		.12**	.11**					
women have to achieve more than men to receive recognition	-.38***				.07*	-.10**	-.31***			-.07*		
when jobs are scarce men should have more rights						.22***	.14***	-.08*		.11***	.13***	.08*
family suffer when women work full time	.13***			.11**		.23***	.31***			.10**	.07*	
paid job best for women's independence	-.16***						-.20***	-.11**	-.09**			

Level of significance: ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05. Only statistically significant correlation coefficients are shown in the table.

Table 11. Attitudes of societies and political and economic elites toward gender equality on labor market and jobs as a way to gain an independence by women (percentages of respondents who „strongly agree” and „agree”)

Country	Men more rights to a job						Women's way to independence							
	Society in the early 1990s*			Political elite		Economic elite		Society in the early 1990s*			Political elite		Economic elite	
	T	M	F	M	F	M	F	T	M	F	M	F	M	F
Austria	50	54	48	--	6	22	--	74	71	76	80	88	61	90
Belgium	38	38	38	9	--	25	9	70	68	72	29	63	58	43
Britain	34	31	36	5	10	5	5	68	65	70	26	70	28	58
Canada	19	18	20	9	6	12	--	55	56	54	55	35	53	82
Czech Republic	55	57	52	31	--	--	--	55	50	59	23	54	73	67
Denmark	11	7	14	--	--	--	--	81	79	82	41	80	33	54
Finland	15	16	15	--	--	--	--	77	75	79	73	100	87	80
France	33	35	31	--	--	13	7	79	77	81	23	20	28	33
Hungary	42	41	44	14	47	na	--	48	49	46	40	53	na	na
Ireland	36	36	35	8	--	6	7	61	62	60	69	73	44	67
Italy	43	45	41	18	5	7	5	74	70	78	53	74	67	79
Japan	34	38	30	8	--	53	64	78	76	81	46	60	27	7
Netherlands	22	26	21	6	--	--	--	56	52	57	80	60	60	53
Norway	16	17	15	na	--	na	--	75	77	74	na	78	na	7
Poland	55	58	52	67	80	57	57	na	na	na	87	83	67	87
Portugal	34	35	32	--	--	8	--	80	75	85	47	73	86	71
Russia	40	46	36	25	55	na	na	58	51	63	37	78	na	na
Slovenia	29	34	25	32	74	20	15	73	69	77	84	80	67	95
Spain	31	30	31	7	7	--	--	79	75	83	86	86	93	93
Sweden	8	7	9	--	7	--	--	74	76	72	67	80	60	87
Switzerland	na	na	na	7	--	13	--	na	na	na	47	73	73	57
United States	24	26	23	na	na	--	--	60	60	60	40	45	50	73
(W.)Germany	31	37	27	--	--	10	20	75	73	77	60	80	87	73

* Data from : M.Basanez, R. Inglehart, A. Moreno (1996) *Human Values and Beliefs: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook*

The models of multiple regression (Type I and Type II) explained more perception and attitudes toward gender inequality of members of political than economic elites. The most important predictors are gender and characteristics of the respondents 'countries. In general, women, postmaterialist oriented respondents, mem-

bers of elites of more postmaterialist oriented societies, with higher level of democracy, living in countries of longer experience in continuous democracy and higher economic level are more sensitive to women's situation and more often perceived their discrimination.

Table 12. Predictors of „Sources of Women’s Social Discrimination”, „Gender Inequality” and Women’s Role in Public and Private Life” (multiple regression analyses - type I) (beta coefficients)

Predictors:	Political elite			Economic elite		
	Sources of Women’s Social Discrimination	Gender Inequality in Work	Women’s Role in Public and Private Life	Sources of Women’s Social Discrimination	Gender Inequality in Work	Women’s Role in Public and Private Life
R’s characteristics:						
1.Gender	.143**	.339***	.163***	.161***	.262***	.289***
2.Family’s economic position when R was 14 years old	.028	.035	.003	.036	-.008	.007
3.R born before 1935	-.052	-3.33E-04	-.098*	-.057	.029	-.119*
4.R born between 1936-1945	-.060	-.015	-.038	.003	-.002	-.040
5.R born after 1945	-.002	-.051	.016	.041	-.069	-.070
6.R’s postmat-mat. orientation	.152***	.004	.150***	-.011	-.042	.031
7.R’s total years of education	-.007	.066	.032	.010	.044	.092
Characteristics of R’s country:						
8.years of continuous democracy	-.181	-.155	.126	-.186*	-.074	-.048
9.level of democracy in 1990	.194	.157*	.201**	.006	-.019	-.011
10.postmat.-mat. orientation of society	.238**	.181*	.259***	.274***	.190**	.132
11.subjective well-being	-.104	-.053	3.812E-04	.010	.031	.088
12.GNP/capita in 1990	-.012	-.268***	-.170*	-.148	-.107	-.068
13.percent in higher education in 1990	-.030	.072	-.173**	.082	-.016	.047
Adjusted R Square (Type I)	.06***	.14***	.16***	.04**	.05***	.11***
Adjusted R Square (Type II)#	.14***	.16***	.19***	.06**	.09***	.13***

Level of significance: ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05 . # - Adjusted R squared - (type II) is shown in the table for the comparison with the model not including the groups of countries. All beta coefficients are for the Type I of the analysis.

The inclusion of the grouping of the countries to the analyses showed that it is important predictor of the differences in attitudes and perception of gender inequality,

demonstrating the role of specific history has been experienced by different groups of countries (table 12).

Conclusions

Our study also demonstrates that various aspects of the inequalities between women and men are noticed with varying intensity in the different groups of countries. They are relatively most frequently stressed by the elite members of „non-European democratic countries” and the „new democracies of Southern Europe”. Least frequently - by the elites in post-communist countries. In addition, in some of them, in certain cases the attitudes and opinions of women and men are very similar, whereas in others they clearly differ. But generally speaking, women more frequently than men notice the inequalities, as well as barriers of a cultural and social nature, which make it more difficult for women to enter the political and economic elites. For example the number of women and men, who do not agree with the view that women prefer men on decision-making positions, as well as that women lack the specific preparation to perform such roles is quite similar. Women, on the other hand much more frequently than men are convinced that they are isolated in the mainly male professional environment, that they are unwillingly elected to the highest positions, and also that they must attain more than men in order to get noticed. Also more frequently than men they believe that earning money is the best way to ensure women’s independence, definitely more frequently than men they disagree with the opinion that when there are not enough jobs, men should have priority in getting them. Certain differences also appear between the members of the political and economic elites. The members of the political elite more frequently notice the inequalities and the social and cultural barriers in women attaining positions at the top of the decision-making circles of authority.

Summing up, the broader context of a political and economic character, as well

as the value orientation of society mainly affect the value orientation of persons found at the top of the political and economic ladders, demonstrating that to a certain extent they are representative for the populations in their countries. The members of political elites are much more post-materialistically oriented compared to the members of the economic elites in all groups of countries. Relatively the smallest differences are observed between both elites in the post-communist countries, which may result from the fact that these elites are just forming, and are frequently enforced by persons who had been previously active in the political elite, or in the opposition, or completely not belonging previously to any of the above mentioned categories. The gender of the respondents is a predictor to a greater extent differentiating the attitudes of persons from the world of politics than of business. Women are more post-materialistically oriented; this pattern is clearly visible among the members of political elites and appears in most cases in the economic elites. The lower, compared to all other groups of countries, post-materialist orientation of the members of elites in the post-communist countries confirms earlier findings (Siemienska, 1996b) as well the previously presented Inglehart’s theory. The described differences in preferences concerning leading role of government or market mechanisms in social and economic change also show a little higher tendency among women than men to opt for the solutions maintaining the role of government usually guaranteeing more just redistribution of resources.

The career paths in post-communist countries, of both women and men, to a greater degree than elsewhere are the result of the circulation of elites, which is the consequence of the specific history of the

countries in this region, the change of the political and economic system in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Despite this, in many respects, the differences in the careers of women and men are similar to those in other countries, in which development is evolutionary over a shorter or longer period of time. This demonstrates that certain models of behavior, selection mechanisms differentiating the life paths of women and men in the area of public life are characterized by greater permanence, the value orientations including the concepts of the roles of women and men deeply embedded in the cultures of various societies. It is preconditioned by the entire

juncture of factors of a political and economic character existing both at present, as well as in the past. They include the way in which women are mobilized to go beyond their traditional roles and joining them with participation in public life, to a large extent reduced to appearing in the form of an additional labor force, as was the case, for example, in the communist countries. These different experiences of the last decades clearly affected both the consciousness of these societies, as well as their elites, clearly differing from the elites in other countries, although these also often significantly differ one from the other.

NOTES

The construction of indices:

The items included in the index: women prefer men in top position**, women lack specific training**, women are prevented from reaching top*, due to how women are reared*, women lack informal contacts*.

The items included in the index: women are accepted in leadership positions in the field**, men and women are treated equally in my organization**, in my field

women have to achieve more than men to receive recognition*.

The items included in the index: When jobs are scarce men should have more rights**, family suffer when women work full time**, paid job best for women 's independence*.

* „strongly agree”, ** „strongly disagree”

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APPENDIX

Table A Perception of gender inequality and its reasons according to men in political elites (Pearson's correlations)

Men are in top positions because:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(1) women prefer men in top position	1.00											
(2) women lack specific training	.25 ***	1.00										
(3) women are isolated in mainly male environment	-.15 **		1.00									
(4) women are prevented from reaching top	-.27 ***		.34 ***	1.00								
(5) due to how women are reared	.10 *	.16 ***	.16 ***	.15 **	1.00							
(6) women lack informal contacts		.11 *	.28 ***	.28 ***	.13 **	1.00						
(7) women are accepted in leadership positions in the field	.11 *		-.19 ***	-.19 ***		-.13 **	1.00					
(8) men & women treated equally in my organization	.15 **		-.26 ***	-.26 ***		-.19 ***	.61 ***	1.00				
(9) women have to achieve more than men to receive recognition	-.22 ***		.27 ***	.34 ***		.21 ***	-.37 ***	-.44 ***	1.00			
(10) when jobs are scarce men should have more rights	.37 ***									1.00		
(11) family suffer when women work full time	.41 ***	.19 ***								.36 ***	1.00	
(12) paid job best for women's independence	-.13 **	-.12 **	.19 ***	-.15 ***	.10 *				.16 ***		-.13 **	1.00

Level of significance:***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. Only statistically significant correlation coefficients are shown in the table.

Table B Perception of gender inequality and its reasons according to women in political elites (Pearson's correlations)

Men are in top positions because:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(1) women prefer men in top position	1.00											
(2) women lack specific training	.13 **	1.00										
(3) women are isolated in mainly male environment	-.11 **	.12 **	1.00									
(4) women are prevented from reaching top	-.26 ***		.42 ***	1.00								
(5) due to how women are reared		.15 ***	.15 ***	.31 ***	1.00							
(6) women lack informal contacts	-.23 ***		.29 ***	.36 ***	.26 ***	1.00						
(7) women are accepted in leadership positions in the field			-.10 *	-.17 ***			1.00					
(8) men & women treated equally in my organization	.15 ***		-.15 ***	-.09 *			.53 ***	1.00				
(9) women have to achieve more than men to receive recognition			.19 ***	.19 ***		.16 ***	-.19 ***	-.25 ***	1.00			
(10) when jobs are scarce men should have more rights	.24 ***		-.14 **	-.10 *		-.14 **				1.00		
(11) family suffer when women work full time	.13 **		-.09 *						-.15 ***	.22 ***	1.00	
(12) paid job best for women's independence			.13 **	.15 ***	.12 **				.12 **		-.15 ***	1.00

Table C. Perception of gender inequality and its reasons according to men in economic elites (Pearson's correlations)

Men are in top positions because:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(1) women prefer men in top position	1.00											
(2) women lack specific training	.13*	1.00										
(3) women are isolated in mainly male environment	-.17***		1.00									
(4) women are prevented from reaching top	-.13**		.41***	1.00								
(5) due to how women are reared	.26***	.26***		.11*	1.00							
(6) women lack informal contacts		.17***	.24***	.23***	.17***	1.00						
(7) women are accepted in leadership positions in the field				-.16***			1.00					
(8) men & women treated equally in my organization			-.16**	-.21***		-.18***	.56***	1.00				
(9) women have to achieve more than men to receive recognition	-.13**		.21***	.22***		.20***	-.22***	-.26***	1.00			
(10) when jobs are scarce men should have more rights	.24***						-.13**	-.11*		1.00		
(11) family suffer when women work full time										.22***	1.00	
(12) paid job best for women's independence				.12**	.15**			.11*				1.00

Table D. Perception of gender inequality and its reasons according to women in economic elites (Pearson's correlations)

Men are in top positions because:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(1) women prefer men in top position	1.00											
(2) women lack specific training	.12**	1.00										
(3) women are isolated in mainly male environment	-.17***		1.00									
(4) women are prevented from reaching top	-.20***		.44***	1.00								
(5) due to how women are reared		.22***		.14**	1.00							
(6) women lack informal contacts	-.11*		.30***	.25***	.19***	1.00						
(7) women are accepted in leadership positions in the field	.12**		-.20***	-.21***			1.00					
(8) men & women treated equally in my organization	.24***		-.22***	-.22***			.40***	1.00				
(9) women have to achieve more than men to receive recognition	-.13**		.23***	.17***			-.23***	-.27***	1.00			
(10) when jobs are scarce men should have more rights	.12**			-.16***					-.21***	1.00		
(11) family suffer when women work full time							.10*		-.11*	.16***	1.00	
(12) paid job best for women's independence	.10*				.11**			.15**	.11*			1.00

Table : The most important goals of politics (%)

Goals of politics :	Parents of school-pupils		Teachers		Parliamentarians of I term	Councilors & members of local governments **	Polish national sample ***				
	State	Non-state	State	Non-state			1992	1993	1994	1997****	
	1992										
No answer	9,8	18,2	9,4	5,2	20,8	-	-	-	2,7		
Maintaining order in the nation (+)	49,1	57,3	60,5	58,5	73,6	57,2	73,0	72,2	74,9	67,4	
Giving people more say in important government decisions	55,1	58,9	56,3	48,1	71,6	68,9	34,8	37,6	35,1	47,3	
Fighting rising prices (+)	75,1	55,3	71,9	74,1	38,8	49,1	69,0	68,8	66,8	62,2	
Protecting freedom of speech	11,0	10,3	2,0	14,3	16,0	16,0	20,4	16,9	16,9	15,8	

In the table : Percentages of people who selected a given goal as „the most important“ or as a second one from a point of view of its importance. + Materialist goals of politics.

* The study carried out by the author in 1992 (grant of KBN). All female parliamentarians and 254 male parliamentarians have been interviewed.

** Results of author's study conducted in the framework of the research „Ethics of members of local governments and councils in Poland: two provinces“ financed by American National Science Foundation.

*** B. Cichomski, Z. Sawinski, Polish General Social Surveys 1992-1994.

**** Polish part of World Values Survey conducted for R. Steniska by CBOS.

Source: R. Steniska (ed.), 1995, Szkoły niepaństwowe w polskim systemie edukacyjnym, (Nonpublic Schools in the Polish Educational System), Vol. 151-152.