


**RULING ELITE  
IN CONTEMPORARY  
UKRAINE**



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## 1. ELITES IN SOCIETY AS THEORETICAL PROBLEM

### 1.1. Notion of Elite: Power, Economic, Intellectual

Study of elite is rather a new direction for the Ukrainian science. The notion of "elite" was hardly used in the national social sciences in the previous decades. It was researched purely in negative sense and only in regard to bourgeois societies.<sup>1</sup> Thus, we should, taking into account foreign and national studies of the past years, define the "elite" preliminarily as top groups of the society, social minorities, consisting of people, who hold leading positions in various areas of social life — economy, politics, science, culture etc. The meaning of the concept of elite becomes more visible through its opposition, the concept of the "mass".

Sociological theory of elite was developed by Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Max Weber, Robert Michels, Karl Mannheim, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Arnold Toynbee, Wright Mills. Thus V. Pareto argued that elites include members of the upper strata of society, whose exclusive qualities ensure them power and fame. Whereas W. Mills focused at the fact that an elite holds top positions in a society and take decisions leading to serious consequences.

Let us stop here with examples of definitions of elites. However, we should point out that each of them reflects some particular aspect of existence of these groups in society, stresses one or several features of these groups.

The role of elite in society is versatile. The elite is divided into classes and types in accordance with its functions. There is a number of classifications of elites at present. Thus, Mannheim distinguished the following groups of elites: political, managerial, intellectual, artistic, moral and religious.<sup>2</sup> D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan proposed their classification of elites including the following types: (1) those who hold the official power; (2) noble; (3) "just"; (4) "populists"; (5) "brave"; (6) the rich; (7) professionals; and (8) ideologists<sup>3</sup>. Wright Mills provided the most detailed classification of elites in the US society. They are as follows: (1) local fellowship areas; (2) four hundred elite of metropolis (i.e. the old and rich NYC families — M.S.); (3) "fame" (prominent movie, theater, and sport stars etc. — M.S.); (4) "the big rich"; (5) top managers; (6) the corporate rich; and (7) political bosses.<sup>4</sup>

These definitions and classifications of elites were formulated for stable societies. However, these definitions do not conform to the conditions of societies in transition. Indeed, a society in the situation of systemic transformation differs greatly from a stable society. Distinguishing feature of the systemic transformation is a fundamental change of social values and social norms. Processes of social changes occur through functioning (or non-functioning) of a society's state and public institutions. In the stable society the

<sup>1</sup> Yu.N. Davydov, *Arts and Elite*, Moscow, 1996; G.K. Ashin, *Critique of Modern Bourgeois Concepts of Leadership*, Moscow, 1978; P.S. Gurevich, "Modern Bourgeois Elitism: Sources, Versions, Tendencies," *Social and Historical Theories of Modern Bourgeois Ideology*, Moscow, 1981.

<sup>2</sup> K. Mannheim, *Człowiek i społeczeństwo w dobie przebudowy*, Warsaw, 1974, p. 120.

<sup>3</sup> H.D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, *Power and Society. A Framework for Political Inquiry*, N.Y. and London, 1950, pp. 208-214.

<sup>4</sup> W. Mills, *Ruling Elite*, Moscow, 1956.

latter perform the following functions: (1) formulation of goals; (2) adaptation; (3) integration; and (4) legitimacy.

Not all of these functions are performed or just performed partially during the societal transformations. Paralysis of social institutions is compensated by active behavior of elites to a certain extent. Hence, the role of elite groups increases greatly under such circumstances. However, the discrepancy of the situation is that the role of elite in imposing the system of its values and attitudes on the social consciousness increases greatly during the period of social instability, on the one hand, and it experiences less and less confidence on behalf of the masses, on the other hand.

The process of transformation in the post-Soviet countries is extremely complicated. Many of them have had no traditions of state building or it has been broken off for centuries. The process of fundamental social and political changes, therefore, has coincided with the process of state building. It also means that the process of creation of national elite is taking place in an extremely complicated and non-traditional situation.

Post-Soviet societies also differ by the features of their elite groups themselves. Thus, in a stable society, an elite is defined as "a group of individuals, who have power, take decisions concerning the content and distribution of the basic values within the society. It is those who are at the top of the hierarchy in different areas of activity, fill some important privileged positions due to their prestige or richness."<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, the groups, which functionally perform the roles of elite in societies in transition are not stable yet. Power elite groups are not strictly differentiated in political terms. For instance, the President of Ukraine as well as the majority of the Government or a considerable number of MPs are non-partisan. In political context, the Ukrainian policy-makers after their election or appointment are in fact not controlled by anyone. This makes their behavior unpredictable. It often happens that some policy-makers change their political positions for several times while holding the same posts. That is why one can hardly talk about the elite groups as stable ones because their membership changes constantly (at least in those groups which declare their certain ideological positions and political orientations or attitudes). Thus, it sounds like a pun that the most stable in the post-Soviet period is instability in all spheres of the society: weak social structuring, indistinct understanding of their own interests by particular groups of population, political instability, intensive processes of formation and renewing of elites following by clashes in their competition for the spheres of influence.

Foreign scholars also pay attention to the fact that it is complicated to determine the groups which belong to an elite in the periods of transition. A German scholar U. Hoffman-Lunge points out that "it is hardly sensible to extend extremely the notion of elite or use it to describe individuals or groups which played the role of 'the heroes of one day' in the political process. Thus, leaders of the protest movements, which contributed greatly to abolish the authoritarian regime, cannot be considered the national elite unless they are successful in institutionalization of their political influence, through setting up stable organizations, that is, political parties or lobby groups."<sup>6</sup>

This situation pushes some scholars to raise a question, "Is there a political elite as such in Ukraine?"<sup>7</sup> And they tend to conclude that the political elite is just in its early period of formation in this country.

Anyway, there are people who perform functions of elite in the society more or less successfully. These conditionally elite groups include those who can be called the *proto-elite* (leaders of public associations, parliamentary groups, policy-makers, leaders of industrial and financial groups, banks) and those who can be called the *pseudo-elite* (some MPs, casual political actors, bosses of criminal groups), *post-elite* (part of the old elite, which still holds positions in rudimentary social institutions, leaders of the old state trade unions, leaders of the old women's, children's, WWII veteran's associations etc.) and also the *stable elite* (scientists, artists, well-known journalists, doctors, teachers, that is, those whose public prestige does not depend on social changes).

However, it is extremely hard to differ these sub-groups now. Therefore, members of the groups performing the role of elite should be called the elite groups or elite (bearing in mind its current specific features).

On the whole, taking into account rather abstract character of the notion of "elite", scholars propose other additional notions, reflecting some aspect, characteristic of people belonging to the ruling groups. Thus, instead of definition "elite" the term "clitocracy" is proposed, i.e. the rule of professionals responsible for their deeds to history. Besides, such terms as "technopatria", i.e. the rule of technocrats, "cognitariat" (those who cognize, analyze, etc.) are proposed.<sup>8</sup>

From the point of view of scholar, the identification criterion of elite group can be both subjective indicators, i.e. self-identification of some persons to the given group, and objective, possessing power or money, allowing to take decisive and large-scale social decisions.

As for everyday consciousness in this society, the term *elite* was not widely spread in previous decades in it. Other terms were used to define the decision makers. That is why the elite is identified by the public according to rather simplified but traditional scheme: "people" and "power" (or "ordinary people" and "bosses").

Question: *what does the Ukrainian national elite mean?* also is a complicated one. First, it should be pointed out that we don't mean the problem of ethnic origins of the people constituted the elite. We want to present this issue in other perspective, that is, can we call national, the elite if it acts not in the interests of society, all citizens, that is, all political nation? Can we call national the elite, which understands temporary character of possessing power and uses this possession only for its own enrichment, understanding that its activity aimed at own well-being, destroys economy and social sphere of society, pose under threat the very existence of state and society? Can we call national the elite, if it grounding on the instinct of its own (not social) self-protection transfer its capitals abroad, in order to follow them in an emergency?

<sup>5</sup> E.E. Burenkov, "Transformation of Society and Internal Characteristics of Elite Groups," *The World of Russia*, No. 3-4, 1995, 4.

<sup>6</sup> U. Hoffman-Lunge, "Elites and Democratization: German Experience," *Socis*, No. 4, 1998, 50-51.

<sup>7</sup> Olena Lazorenko, "It is Hard to Live Without Political Elite...", *News from Ukraine*, Feb. 2, 1995.

<sup>8</sup> See N.V. Kuznetsov, "Ruling Elites in Russian History," *Russian Nation: Historical Past and Problems of Renaissance*, Moscow, 1995, p.108.

If it is impossible to answer these questions positively, then a new question arise — what does allow these groups to imitate the behavior of national elite? And how long can this imitation take place?

Partially these questions will be answered in the following chapters of this Report. However, the full answer will be given only by the future of the Ukrainian society itself.

## 1.2. What Is Nomenclature and Can It Be Included into Elite?

In the last years of existence of the USSR and after its collapse researchers often used the word "nomenclature" to define the ruling groups in the Soviet society.<sup>9</sup> One should mention that the term "nomenclature" has the same indistinct forms as the elite does. Some researchers means the CPSU when using the term "nomenclature", i.e. all those people who held the leading posts controlled by the Communist party committees. Nobody could be appointed to these posts without the approval of these committees. Others consider that nomenclature includes only the top level of Soviet party bosses, which took principal political and economic decisions. The third group of scholars suppose that it is only the professional party employees, staff of the party committees. The fourth group thinks that the term "nomenclature" refers not only to ex-party white collars (the so called apparatus workers), but also to the top decision makers and administrators, who turned into the core of ruling and commercial class of post-communist Russia.<sup>10</sup> Each of the said definitions reflects some aspect of this complicated social and political phenomenon.

Concerning the correlation between the terms "elite" and "nomenclature", then a view of O.Kryshchanovskaya seems to be reasonable. She does not oppose these terms, and considers nomenclature to be a type of elite. Researcher defines the specific character of the old elite as a nomenclature character of the Soviet elite.

What was a distinguishing feature of nomenclature elite? According to O.Kryshchanovskaya, these are: (1) homogeneity (all nomenclature belonged to the CPSU); (2) hierarchy; (3) absence of self reproduction; (4) geographic mobility; (5) internal rotation; (6) system of privileges.<sup>11</sup>

The history of existence of the Soviet nomenclature is quite long and has some qualitatively different periods. That is why we cannot talk about nomenclature in general. For example, the nomenclature in the 30s is much different from the nomenclature of the 80s. If in the first case political capital of the person played a key and almost monopoly role — his attitudes, devotion to the party, then in the second case, political capital had some importance, but was not crucial. In that time the educational capital of an individual, his professional skills, competence played considerable role. Psychological features such as

arrogance, devotion to carrier, and self-confidence (usually as a group member) were desirable.

Due to high formal educational level of nomenclature in the 80s, it did not differed greatly from social groups traditionally called the elite. New features of the Soviet nomenclature of the 80s allowed researchers to call it "technocracy". Technocratic nomenclature by its features was ready to exchange its political privileges to economic capital. That is why shifts in the old nomenclature system and then collapse of the Soviet system became possible.

Hence, a conclusion can be made that *the notion of nomenclature reflects the elite group typical for the Soviet society and other countries of the Soviet bloc*. These term can be used to describe and analyze other totalitarian societies, where elite groups are strictly controlled by a ruling party or other power structure. The term "nomenclature" is also widely used to define post-socialist regimes because *the new elite in post-socialist societies both has its direct roots in the nomenclature ("neo-nomenclature") and has been closely connected to it*.

## 1.3. Ruling Elite and Counter-Elite

Except the above-mentioned classifications of elite, it can be divided by other criteria. In particular, the elites are divided into the ruling elite and the counter-elite, the elite and the anti-elite, active and reserve, powerful and opposite. On the face of it, this division is logical and has some sense. It is natural that here are always those who are out of power in an elite group or those who are in the opposition to the power. But after more precise analysis, it reveals that this matter is not so simple as it seems to be.

Proceeding from scientific perspective, this division into the elite and the counter-elite has no comprehensive character. As some part of the elite cannot be divided through a line "the ruling elite — counter-elite" at all. Some groups of elite perform other functions than state governing or possessing of power.

Division into the elite and counter-elite has some sense for the political elite. And the scientific elite, artistic elite play the role of generators of ideas, masters of artistic, cultural products, best players. Their elite belonging reveals itself in the prominent talents, inventions, influence on the mass, due to their skills. Certainly, there is the opposition, there is a struggle between the old and new, innovatory and conservative, different trends and attitudes in the framework of this elite group. Anyway these processes take place within the given group of elite.

One can deny this thought and say that scientific ideas (especially philosophical, economic, social, humanitarian) can be (and generally are) included into the political struggle in society. And members of the intellectual elite, through this aspect of their activities, can be involved in the division of the ruling elite and the counter-elite.

Moreover, it is the intellectual elite often which initiates creation of public and political associations and political parties. The counter-elite is the elite which has been expelled from (or just trying to gain) the power. First, these are the leaders of political parties, which are in the opposition to the ruling regime,

<sup>9</sup> Yu.Afanasiev, "Nomenclature at Communal Meeting," *Independent Newspaper*, April 2, 1992; S.Barzlov and A.Chernyshev, "Province: Elite, Nomenclature, Intellectuals," *Free Thought*, No.1, 1996; Yu.Burtin, *New Order. On the Neo-nomenclature Capitalism*, Moscow, 1995; M.Voslensky, *Nomenclature. Ruling Class of the Soviet Union*, Moscow, 1991; O.V.Kryshchanovskaya, "Transformation of the Old Nomenclature into the New Russian Elite," *Social Sciences and Modernity*, No. 1, 1995; V.V.Fesenko, "Political Elite in Ukraine: Controversies of Formation and Development," *Polis*, No. 6, 1995.

<sup>10</sup> R.Sakva, "Regime System and Civil Society in Russia," *Polis*, No. 1, 1997.

<sup>11</sup> O.V.Kryshchanovskaya, "Transformation of the Old Nomenclature into the New Russian Elite," *Social Sciences and the Present*, No. 1, 1995, 52-53.

part of intellectual and artistic elite, which does not share the political, ideological, philosophical, social, cultural and moral concepts of the ruling elite.

But there are other notions of the counter-elite. Thus, Polish researchers Ivan and Szonja Szelenyi consider that the counter-elite is an opposition group and it existed only in Poland, as Polish intellectuals stayed apart from the authorities and were permanently in the opposition to them.<sup>12</sup> But these authors also point out that the term "counter-elite" is not a synonym of the term "opposition". For example, their point of view is that there were considerable oppositions in Russia and Hungary during the Communist period, but there was no counter-elites in these countries. "Institutionalization should take place in order to give grounds for the opposition to be called the counter-elite. Institutes of counter-elite in different ways pose a threat to the dominating elite. Certainly, its legitimacy is questioned and authority of the principle of recruitment is ruined. Alternative institutes can be called institutes of counter-elite when conflicts and tensions between the ruling groups and those opposite to them also are institutionalized. In Poland, the counter-elite emerged together with the Solidarity and institutionalized in the 1980-81. The Polish society was quite different in the 80s: an alternative power structure with the widely spread network of connections, organized infrastructure and influential underground press existed."<sup>13</sup> The counter-elite which could correspond this meaning did not exist in Ukraine neither before proclaiming of independence nor after it. The tendencies of strengthening of the opposition organizations are apparent now though.

However, the opposition to the authorities in Ukraine is not homogeneous by its political direction and political goals. As existing power did not reach anything in the domain of economy, social sphere and other areas, then it is profitable for any political group to proclaim its opposition towards the authorities.

The absence of strict division between then political elite and the counter-elite and even the ruling elite and opposition in Ukraine can be explained by a number of reasons.

First, the process of social, economic and then political structuring of society has not been finished and even is still in its initial stage. Social forces, strata, which are subjects of power did not revealed apparently. Consequently, the process of development of political parties is also in its first stage. There are already many, even too many of them, more than 50, but the process of establishment of new parties has not finished. The coming Parliament election in March 1998 additionally inspired their creation. For example, in July-August 1997, establishments of some new parties were proclaimed including the Reforms and Order Party headed by ex-Vice Prime Minister V.Pinzenyk, The Party of Muslims of Ukraine, the Social Liberal Union (Elephant), with its leaders V.Gryniov and V.Malynkovych. In November 1997, the Workers' Donbas Peoples Patriotic Association was set up. The Gromada (Community) Party established in 1993, also became more active in this period without any visible political successes.

Meanwhile, despite such an immense quantity of political parties, state power does not belong to each of them. Although members of some parties occupy some positions in government, they were recruited there not as plenipotentiary representatives of these parties who would act in accordance with their party programs, but as professionals, people with the experience of state, managerial work, personally devoted to President or Prime Minister.

The Ukrainian policy makers are aware of the hopelessness of the current situation. It was especially visible during the governmental crisis in spring 1997, when substitute to Prime Minister P.Lazarenko was needed. For example, V.Chornovil, leader of the People's Rukh Movement explained it in the following way, "the People's Democratic Party (PDP) possess only 3% of votes in the Parliament, i.e. 15 MPs. It is nonsense to vote for the candidate — member of the party, who in fact has no support in the Parliament (he means V.Pustovoitenko, member of the board of the PDP), even if we talk about a coalition government. Coalition with the left is not a coalition. How can we harness in the same carriage those who are for the State and against the State? And when we take into consideration the centrist forces, we should say they are scanty. There are less than a hundred of them in the Supreme Rada. That is why Government organized on a party basis is not possible. Obviously, the Parliament will not be structured until a new law on election is adopted. And it is reasonable to take a usual way and to propose a non-party Prime Minister, because the majority in the Supreme Rada is non-party members."<sup>14</sup>

After all, the Parliament voted for the party candidate to the post of Prime Minister, though with minimum prevalence — only one vote. And the new Prime Minister didn't declare in his first speech that he would be led by the PDP program in his activity. But when a time has come to put forward candidates to the Supreme Rada election, V.Pustovoitenko agreed to be number one in the list of the PDP candidates.

In such a situation it is very hard to talk about the ruling political elite and opposition, the counter-elite in the sociological sense, i.e. as a stable social group. This situation of uncertainty does not allow us to use classical definitions and notions for its analysis. Therefore, metaphors, semi-scientific definitions, and journalistic cliches are used. For example, absence of a classical political opposition and existence of the partial opposition, take a phrase "pendulum opposition" into being, that is, the opposition which behaves as a full-fledged opposition concerning some issues but supports the authorities in other matters.

Thus, it is impossible to talk about the stable power or the established elite in Ukraine. All those belonging to the elite are experiencing intensive social dynamics. Some of them will stay within the elite, but considerable part will be expelled from it.

Second, composition of the ruling elite is very changeable. Bearing in mind that a mean term of office for the Prime Minister is one year, and that dismissal of Prime Minister is usually followed by the expelling of many members of his cabinet, it becomes clear why membership in the ruling elite is temporary, and even too short in term.

<sup>12</sup> See Ivan Szelenyi and Szonja Szelenyi, "Wstęp — założenia teoretyczne i metodologia," *Elity w Polsce, w Rosji i na Węgrzech. Wymiany czy reprodukcja?* Warszawa, 1995, pp. 7-33.

<sup>13</sup> Ivan Szelenyi and Szonja Szelenyi, "Wstęp — założenia teoretyczne i metodologia," *Elity w Polsce, w Rosji i na Węgrzech. Wymiany czy reprodukcja?* Warszawa, 1995, p. 24.

<sup>14</sup> See Den, July 15, 1997.

Such a situation leads to new consequences now. As the circle of those who are able to make decisions is rather close, some people join the ruling elite for two-three times. For example, a return of A.Franchuk, head of the Crimean government, to his post, several returns of Mr. O.Yemets, appointments and dismissal of such policy-makers and economists as V.Pinzenyk, V. Yevtukhov, I.Mytyukov, and M. Kovalko.

Horizontal moves, shuffle of the elite pack is also quite common in Ukrainian politics. For example, horizontal sliding of V.Gureev from the post of the Minister of Military and Industrial Complex to the post of the Minister of Economy, and then back (he is the Minister of Industrial Policy now); or of Yu.Yekhanurov from the post of the Head of the Committee of State Property to the post of the Minister of Economy with the following replacement in three months to the Post of the Committee of State Enterprises; second appointment of Yu.Karasik the Minister of Agriculture.

Even those who managed to declare their dissent with some aspects of the policy of authorities and were sent in designation, still stay in the elite. After a pause, they returned to the same team. For example, O.Razumkov, ex-Assistant of the President of Ukraine, A.Galchynskiy, ex-Advisor to President. And V.Lanovyi, despite the fact that he was a competitor of L.Kuchma during the presidential election, being a prodigal son for some time, returned to the team of L.Kuchma as an advisor, and then as Head of the Committee of State Property.

The dismissal of D.Tabachnyk, Head of the President's Administration, in December 1996 (and the followed his deprivation of military ranks) and then his return to the Administration in October 1997 as Advisor to President should be mentioned in this context.

Meanwhile, not all policy-makers consider that the reserve group of Ukrainian elite is limited. Thus, the point of view of ex-Prime Minister of Ukraine Ye.Marchuk is that the circle of those people who are recruited to the governments and regional authorities, is limited not on the reason of real complications, but because of the crisis of President's staff policy. Shortly after the government headed by V.Pustovoitenko was formed, he said, "composition of the Government in general is an evidence of the staff crisis in the state... It is the crisis of the staff policy of the President. If the President failed to find new, young and experienced people for Ministerial posts throughout the country, it is an evidence that he or his advisors cannot understand the real situation, real staff potential in the country."<sup>15</sup>

These are the evidences of the controversial situation concerning the political elite in Ukraine. On the one hand, there was no full-powered political elite in Ukraine during the Soviet period, and the significant part of experienced politicians moved to Moscow, and potential of political power in Ukraine is less then, in Poland, Hungary or Russia. But on the other hand, it does not excuse mistakes in the staff policy made in the years of independence, especially in the period of Kuchma's presidency.

Third, and it is probably the most important, membership in the elite or not belonging to it is more or less clearly observed in Ukraine nowadays. And it is not so important which pack you are in: the ruling elite or the counter-elite.

A huge gap emerged between the elite and the non-elite in the income level, regularity of its receiving, living standards, level of the possibility to influence the state decisions, etc. This gap is so deep that it seems that two different social worlds exist within the same society, two parallel worlds which never intersect. This fact is observed not only by scholars. Its evidences are so shocking that there is no needs to use some sophisticated scientific methods for register them. (Although everyday life self-realization of the population is not an obstacle for its scientific studying. The last chapter of the Report is devoted to the analysis of public opinion concerning the elite). Majority of ordinary citizens feel this inner social "iron curtain" in their life. And this gap divides not only "the powers that be" and the "common people"; the present-day ruling elite is too far even from the other traditional parts of the elite, scientists, artists, etc.

A prominent Ukrainian actor Yuriy Mazhuga describes this situation, "The people and the authorities are acting in different plays. And this produces a great false. The chiefs and the government live their own life, and we live ours. At our level, people borrow money, try to survive, work hard for their daily bread. And there, among the top crust, it seems nobody knows what it is like to live here, at the bottom. And their hearts do not bleed for us."<sup>16</sup>

Besides division of elite into the ruling and the opposite, it is reasonable also to distinguish the open and shadowy groups.

The open or "transparent" ruling elite includes the public policy makers, who hold some positions in the state power: MPs, members of the Government, top-rank state officials, etc.

The shadowy ruling elite includes the people who have strong influence on taking the state decisions due to their richness, special individual capacities, but they act not openly, "in the shade".

Shadowy ruling elites exist in all societies. But in democratic, stable societies its share, influence and possibilities are comparatively small. In the societies in transition, favorable conditions exist for increasing the role of the shadowy elite. There are many reasons for this. They are, for example, the primary accumulation of capital, which as a rule is not legal, and the controversial legal system which stimulates the whole branches of industry to become shadowy businesses, and some other reasons.

The distinguishing feature of the contemporary elite in Ukraine now, according to O.Potekhin, one of the authors of this Report, is its indivisibility which can be derived from the conscious neglecting of the principle of distribution of power between its branches.<sup>17</sup> Indicative of this is a group of governmental officials among the Ukrainian MPs; sometimes it numbered more than 60 persons. This is the most obvious, but not the most essential feature of the "indivisibility of the ruling elite" phenomenon which is impossible in democratic society. It is useful to remember that the competition, "constructive conflicts" among the elite groups are considered, according to some theories, the necessary incentives to the dynamic development of society. Simultaneous membership in several elite groups including (a) the ownership of the means of production or informal control over them and the appropriation of the results of productive labor; (b) executive power; (c) legislative power (it is enough to remember the

<sup>15</sup> Ye.Marchuk, "Young People Possessing the Power: A Chance for Ukraine," *Den'*, Sept. 6, 1997.

<sup>16</sup> Yu.Mazhuga, "I'm not Ashamed of My Roles," *Den'*, August 8, 1997.

<sup>17</sup> Political Elite or Ruling Class, Washington, D.C.: Kennan Institute, 1996 (Unpublished manuscript).

competition among business leaders for the places in the Parliament); (d) criminal groups (both direct or indirect use of their "services") is a necessary requirement to consider a person active, not imaginary member of the ruling elite.

Another distinguishing feature of the membership in the ruling elite is a person's ability to determine a legal field of his/her activities on his/her own. The active members of the ruling elite seem to be advocates of the rule of law-based state, but they use law as a means to achieve their own objects in fact, not as the set of rules which must be observed by all the citizens. And it is evident especially when such a person, after being "pushed out" of the ruling group, becomes "suddenly" accused of a crime which was "imperceptible" while he held a top office. Legal nihilism of the ruling elite is also apparent in its use of the following "rule": that which is permitted to its people, members of the club, group, clan (see 3.4), is forbidden to the strangers (including all the rest non-elite population).

#### 1.4. Concept of Reproduction, Recruiting and Circulation of Elites

Processes of formation and shift of elites in society are analyzed by using the system of concepts and categories. There are such notions as Among them are "recruitment", "reproduction", "circulation", "transformation", "vertical mobility", "change of composition" of elites among them. The concept of circulation possesses a central place among them. This concept was introduced into the scientific lexicon by V.Pareto. Actually its initial sense can be understood only in the context of his theory, where he distinguished between two types of elites, namely the "lions" and the "foxes". In his view, "circulation" occurred because some people (the "lions") were more suited to the maintenance of the *status quo* under stable conditions, while others (the "foxes") were adaptive and innovative and coped better during periods of change. However, a British scholar T.Bottomore argues that it is not clear from the writings of V.Pareto what circulation he means, whether dynamics inside the elite or replacement of elite by the elements of non-elite.<sup>18</sup> He means that it is necessary to distinguish among the inner circulation of elites, the shift of elites (replacement of the old elite by a new one) and the mixed type of existence of the inner circulation and shift of elites.

There is a separate definition for each type of elite shift. *Enlisting of new people without qualitative definition of this process and social and group origin of these people is called "recruitment"*. Recruitment of elites is also known as the selection of elite.<sup>19</sup>

*Restoration of elite within its own limits, i.e. within the limits of the given social group is called reproduction. And "circulation" is a changing of elite when representatives of other social groups take its positions; it is "a shift of personnel, which possesses key positions in key institutions of the given society"*<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> T.Bottomore, *Elite & Society*, London, 1993, pp.49-50.

<sup>19</sup> See N.V.Kuznetsov, "Ruling Elites in Russian History," *Russian Nation: Historical Past and Problems of Renaissance*, Moscow, 1995, p.107.

<sup>20</sup> Ivan Szeleńy and Szorja Szeleńy, "Wstęp — założenia teoretyczne i metodologia," *Elity w Polsce, w Rosji i na Węgrzech. Wymiany czy reprodukcja?* Warszawa, 1995, p. 22.

Reproduction of elite in real life is more complicated than it is described in theoretical schemes. But formulation of theoretical categories allows us to conduct more strict analysis of these phenomena.

From the point of view of political theory, elite groups within democratic societies are open to outside influences and circulation of the elites takes place there permanently. "Circulation of elites is democratic mechanism which prevents monopolization of power, instills fresh blood (in the allegorical meaning, i.e. new people, fresh ideas)."<sup>21</sup>

The question about the correlation between the old and new elites has several aspects. First, it has always been the problem, both in stable and unstable societies. This aspect exists as a problem of the elite circulation. In its turn, the elite circulation can be considered as replacement of one elite by another and as movement from the non-elite into the elite.<sup>22</sup>

Second, it is not easy to find the border between the old and the new elites. As not only processes of elite replacement but also processes of elite transformation take place. And in its turn, elite transformation can exist in two variants. The first one is that some organizations are changed by themselves very weak. They just change their top managerial staff, and all other elements of organization's structure remain unchanged. For example, such changes took place in the army, railroad transport, many large enterprises. The second variant takes place when elite transformation passes through re-distribution of functions among the existed organizations as well as existed organizations and newly established organizations. "Study of elite transformation as a result of regime change provides for distinguishing between the both aspects. As it is possible that the old organizations are enriched by the new elites, and new organizations got the old elites, it is reasonable to analyze both the old and the new institutional structures and also the elite circulation and their social and attitudes characteristics", says a German scholar U.Hoffman-Lange.<sup>23</sup> Therefore it is necessary to distinguish between the internal elite circulation, shift of elites (replacement of the old elite by the new one) as well as the mixed variant — existence of internal circulation and shift of elites.

But circulation should not be considered a purely positive process, and reproduction, purely negative. Indeed, when only reproduction of elite takes place in a society it leads to monopolization of power, stagnation, and decrease of the quality of elite. But permanent circulation leads to scatteration of elite, loss of its hereditary character, and hence loss of many elite's features necessary to rule a society.

There are two kinds of elite circulation: first if all, shift of one elite groups by other ones (for example, replacement of the elite by a counter-elite), second, replacement of the elite by the non-elite (as it was, for example, during the early Soviet period and partially after the proclaiming of independence in Ukraine).

But this statement also is not universal. Transformation processes in Ukraine showed the phenomena which can hardly be identified by these schemes. For example, conversion of political capital into economic capital performed by considerable part of the old elite, i.e. the nomenclature, could be considered

<sup>21</sup> A.Kresteva, "Power and Elite in the Society Lacking Civil Society," *Socis*, No. 4, 1995, 24.

<sup>22</sup> See A. Kresteva, "Power and Elite in the Society Lacking Civil Society," *Socis*, No. 4, 1995, 24.

<sup>23</sup> U. Hoffman-Lunge, "Elites and Democratization: German Experience," *Socis*, No. 4, 1996, 51.



as the circulation of elite. But it is also reproduction of the same elite, as it takes the form of "whirling in the sphere of elite," according to Ivan and Szonja Szelenyi.<sup>24</sup> That is why such type of elite shift is proposed to be called the "reproduction through conversion" as distinct to simple reproduction.

The fact that many former members of the old elite represent the new elite now is not specific only for systemic transformation in post-Soviet countries. This phenomenon is typical and natural for many societies in transition. The process of transformation of the whole structure of elite is typical for such societies, not only elite shifting in the form of reproduction or circulation.

The process of elite system transformation, that is in our case the transition from the structure of nomenclature elite towards the structure of new elite (which can hardly be described in details), needs special study. It can be just pointed out that this process is directed into two different ways. The first one is transformation of the elite in those social institutes which have been preserved in the society (for example, circulation of elites in the army, transport, media, etc). The second one is the formation of elite in those social institutions which emerge in the new society. For example, formation of finance and banking elite, multi-party political elite, etc.

U. Hoffmann-Lange refers to historical examples of the elite transformation in the German Empire (1871-1918), the Weimar Republic, in Nazi Germany, West Germany, Eastern Germany after 1989 and notes that "elite, as a rule, emerges in a comparatively thin strata of population, i.e. among those who have high educational level, professional experience in complex organizations. After the change of political regime, many members of the new elite are usually recruited from the reserve, which usually includes those who were successful within the old regime. If such individuals are considered to be only the members of the old elite, as some critically minded observers do, then according to the definition, the term of elite transformation is meaningless."<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Ivan Szelenyi and Szonja Szelenyi, "Wstęp — założenia teoretyczne i metodologia," *Elity w Polsce, w Rosji i na Węgrzech. Wymienność czy reprodukcja?* Warszawa, 1995, p. 22.

<sup>25</sup> U. Hoffmann-Lange, "Elites and Democratization: German Experience," *Socis*, No. 4, 1996, 51.

## 2. DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROCESS OF SHIFT OF RULING ELITES IN THE PERIOD OF SYSTEMIC TRANSFORMATION IN SOCIETY

### 2.1. Specific Features of Political Processes in Ukraine in the Period of Gorbachev's Perestroika

It was the period of Gorbachev's perestroika which was followed by the first stage of development of new elite in independent Ukraine. The meaning of the former still remains the subject of political and theoretical discussion. Explanation of this historical stage in the life of Ukraine is somehow connected to the process of development of the party and economic nomenclature, i.e. the old ruling elite. One of the specific features of Ukrainian political life in that time was belonging of the party and economic authorities to the "old guard" or "gerontocrats" originating from Dnipropetrovsk. This group was holding the ruling positions for a long time even after the change of generations in the Moscow authorities. The change of political leadership took place in Ukraine in the final period of perestroika. There was not much time for strengthening of party authorities in Ukraine, as V. Shcherbytskyi was replaced by V. Ivashko, who didn't stay too long at the position of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPU. Soon he was transferred to Moscow and a new change of political power took place. Hence, process of exchange of political power to property in Ukraine was much more short-term and weak than in Moscow. The most mobile in this process were Komsomol leaders who later constituted one of the most powerful economic group of independent Ukraine.

Some researchers consider perestroika to be the final stage of split of the Soviet nomenclature into the party and economic elite and the starting point of the rebellion of the latter against the former.<sup>26</sup> The economic elite wanted more freedoms for its activities. Their demands were supported by some members of the party elite, especially in the regions. These groups of the old nomenclature constituted the core of the new elite. According to this version, Ukraine didn't differ from other regions of the USSR.

### 2.2. Destiny of the Old Elite

The topic of the new elite meets first of all the question about the destiny of the old one. As researches of Ukrainian and foreign scientists the majority of the new elite are the people who held high positions in the hierarchy of the old authority, that is, they belonged to the Soviet party nomenclature.<sup>27</sup> Even without clarifying the reasons of the collapse of the USSR and change of political regime, it should be pointed out however, that many former members of republican nomenclature became advocates of sovereignty and

<sup>26</sup> See A. V. Zabelin, "Province attacks," *Power*, 1994, #6.

<sup>27</sup> See V. V. Fesenko, "Political Elite in Ukraine: Controversies of Formation and Development," *Polis*, No. 6, 1995; O. Kryshchanovskaya, "Transformation of the Old Nomenclature into the New Russian Elite," *Social Sciences and Modernity*, No. 1, 1995.

independence due to these qualitative social changes. The old nomenclature turned into the ethocracy based on anti-Communist, populist, and nationalist ideology.<sup>28</sup> In Ukraine, this was the part of the old elite which understood the situation in proper time and began to defend the ideas of independence. The most important figures of the old nomenclature including L.Kravchuk, I.Plushch, L.Kuchma, Ye.Marchuk, V.Diomin, V.Durdinets, V.Cherep, A.Matvienko and others became the adherents of the independent Ukrainian statehood. As some researchers point out, "members of the old republic nomenclature tried to get and in some cases got the status of the first persons, through a simple 'operation of division': they were 'second' persons in the state, when 'first' persons sat in Moscow; they automatically became the first through the political separation from Moscow."<sup>29</sup>

A slogan of the necessity of economic reforms and transition to market economy became a supplementary slogan of this flexible part of the old elite which adapted itself quickly to the new situation.

The second consequence of these changes was a mass (but not total) transformation of the former nomenclature into the new elite by conversion of their old posts into the economic and/or political power.

We should mention economic managers, i.e. directors of big enterprises, agricultural companies, warehouses, supermarkets, chairmen of collective farms, and others among the old elite which successfully performed the process of transformation into the new elite.

Under Kravchuk presidency, directors of enterprises became influential public, and therefore, political force. This situation irritated right political circles, ignored by them. That is why right-wingers invented nickname "red directors" in order to requite them. Mouthpiece of the interests of industrial bosses was Ukrainian Union of Manufacturers and Entrepreneurs (UUME). L.Kuchma stepped to presidential chair from leading position in it.

But in the period of presidency of the latter processes of structuring of economy deepened, changed, got new features, new quality. Corporate, clan groups took the leadership in organizational aspect. The UUME played some role in social and political life but not the leading one. Its basis, directors became more integrated into clan and corporate groups, their interests scattered and became more diversified. Clan, corporations and parties helped directors to recognize their special interests, more clear (but not always publicly) formulate them.

Step by step such elite group as financial elite developed. Wide range of banks emerged early in the 1990s. Some of them failed in competition and disappeared, others united and became more powerful. They also actively involved into struggle for control over resources.

Economic and financial clans became more and more influential in society. They started impact on politics, defend their interests in the Parliament, Government, Presidential environment. Such alliance of political and financial

actors is called *the political and financial groups* (PFG) or oligarchy by researchers.<sup>30</sup>

The final stage of old elite transformation is some act of its legitimization. Type of such public or community events are election of these people into local governance units, the Parliament, appointment to Presidential Administration, or other units of presidential authorities, getting posts in the Cabinet of Ministers, Ministries, state committees, various chairs, councils of financial enterprises groups etc. There are also other types of legitimization in the circumstances of the old elite.

### 2.3. Social Backgrounds and Political Positions of New Ruling Elite

In order to understand the character and essence of new Ukrainian elite it is necessary to clarify what events took place in Ukraine in August-September 1991. This task is too complicated to be solved within the framework of the given research. It is complicated, first, because it was not purely Ukrainian events, but only part of events, taking place in the Soviet Union. Second, it was not Ukraine, who initiated these events. That is why, events of August 1991, their radical character were unexpected for the Ukrainian elite. Third, these events are difficult for analysis as we are still inside of them, still cannot look upon them indifferently. Besides, not all tendencies born these days are now visible.

Meanwhile we can make some notes on this topic. Partially on the reason secondary character of events taking place in Kyiv in compare with Moscow (as success of fail of the coup was decided there), events of these days in Ukraine can not be called revolution. An accent is made on proclaiming independence of Ukraine.

For the topic of our research a conclusion can be made that *the August days of 1991 didn't lead to radical changes or moreover to the overthrow of the old elite in Ukraine*. It was the old elite — nomenclature who defined the essence of these events. For own self-preservation it proclaimed independence of Ukraine. It was professional party elite who suffered most of all, as the Communist Party of Ukraine was banned. All other groups of nomenclature stayed at their places.

Later, especially referendum on independence of December 1991 the old elite was forced by the counter-elite or national democrats to share the power.

That is why new elite of Ukraine is various by its content social group. It consists partially of new people, who had no relations to authority in the old times, but also those, under Soviet times possessed the power.

A set of theoretical problems appears, connected to definition of the new elite. By no doubt those who received power only after the change of regime, can be defined as new elite. And debates took place on those, who belonged to various levels of old regime nomenclature. Some researchers reckon that these people cannot be included into new elite. But others reasonably consider those part of the old elite, which did not loose its political status, managed to

<sup>28</sup> See: V.M.Zubok, *Sources of De-legitimization of the Soviet Regime*, "Polis", No. 2, 1994, 88-89.

<sup>29</sup> N.V.Kuznetsov, "Ruling Elites in Russian History," *Russian Nation: Historical Past and Problems of Renaissance*, Moscow, 1995, p. 113.

<sup>30</sup> I.V.Kukolev, "Transformation of Political Elites," *Social Sciences and Modernity*, No. 4, 1997, 86-89.

find support of influential social groups, is wholesome part of new elite. As not all ex-members of nomenclature turned into new elite, but only those, who passed trial of rebellious time, got social legitimization. Hence, *only those member of the of nomenclature who changed qualitatively, politically, ideologically psychologically and ethically adapted to the requirements of new system.*

Such personal content of new elite allows some researchers to call it the "post-nomenclature conglomerate."<sup>31</sup> Other call this elite "nomenclature bourgeoisie".<sup>32</sup>

Academician T.Zaslavskaya generalizing results of many research, devoted to correlation of the old Soviet nomenclature with content of the modern Russian elite as a whole (not only on the regional level), says that "the new elite has been formed from the young part of the old approximately on 60%: these are the people who hold top nomenclature posts, or stayed in the 'second pack'. Approximately 30% of them are members of legalized shadowy business. And only 10% are those who came 'from outside', including arts, science. S.Filatov, G.Starovoitova, V.Sheinis, G.Burbulis belong, for example, to the people, who came into politics at the democratic wave of 1989 and remained. On the whole, it was nomenclature, its most modern and energetic part, who felt itself tensed in the narrow frames of the Soviet system, falling apart, gained from changes."<sup>33</sup>

To the point of view of researchers, special political barter took place in Ukraine after the collapse of the USSR — Soviet party elite recruited to its ranks almost of confronting leaders of counter-elite, preserving at the same time its power and its property.<sup>34</sup> During the presidency of L.Kuchma the profile of those who support him on national and local levels of executive power became more visible. The most numerous layer of new ruling elite of Ukraine form second and third packs of nomenclature of the Communist Party of Ukraine — former workers of local municipal executive committees, district party committees, party committees of big enterprises (like, by the way, President by himself) and Komsomol workers, who quickly changed their political and ideological banners and became the "state builders".

While talking about the old and new elite, one should take into account that these two groups are not totally opposite. They confront only in some aspects. It becomes visible, if one studies such qualities of elite groups as "totalitarianism and democratism. For example, the new elite is "post-totalitarian" but it does not mean that it is necessary democratic. It is rather vice versa. Both the "post-totalitarian" elite and the "old" elite were formed under the similar circumstances. As G.Ashin notes, "both elites consist of people, brought up in the conditions of the long years of totalitarian rule, which produced special mentality, special habits, stereotypes of behavior. And confrontation of two elites does not necessary mean their full opposition, sometimes close to each other elites confront especially hard."<sup>35</sup>

## 2.4. Sociological Portrait of the Ukrainian Government: 1990 to 1997

The political elite is a social group comprising various sub-groups. According to the traditional division of power into legislative, executive and judiciary ones, the elite in power could be distributed into several sub-groups. In the present Ukrainian state, each of them has its peculiarities. We are not going to pay attention to causes and determinants of those peculiarities. It is only important for us to fix the attention at the fact that each of those sub-groups has its specificity.

For the analysis, the elite constituting the executive branch was chosen, though this group is rather great, comprising representatives of executive power from different levels — central, regional and local bodies of the state.

Certainly, it is extremely difficult to assess the whole stratum of this elite group by analysis of peculiar personalities. Therefore, the task was set to find a group of elite in power capable of being analyzed as a whole, its qualitative features being available for researchers.

The greatest attention in the report is focused at the issues of shifts of elites, their circulation, birth and formation of new elites. Therefore, the Ukrainian Government is most interesting. There are several reasons for it. First, the Government is one of the highest elite sub-groups and, in this respect it constitutes an ideal model of elite sub-group, its features and characteristics.

Second, such an elite sub-group allows to collect most comprehensive data concerning biography of every member of the Government, since these characteristics are comparatively well known to the public — the Decrees on appointment and quitting are promulgated, as well as biographical data: birthplace, education, career, professional and public and political experience, family, etc.

This very group can reflect the processes of recruitment of the highest level of Ukrainian elite during an extremely interesting period of our history. It is the period in the course of which Ukraine's independence was proclaimed, social-economic and social-political transformations began, the outlook and political pluralism confirmed, the formation of institutions of democracy and civil society started, new legal space created and attribute of legal state appeared.

It is evident that the study of the Government, except the attractiveness from scientific and methodical point of view, is important as a self-sufficient problem, the role and importance of this specific social group in the society being extremely great. The government constitutes the result and reflection of complex social-political and economic processes. Representatives of new political formations, carriers of new ideas (in some cases, really new, in other — imitated ones) are trying to occupy the key positions in the Government and other state power bodies. However the old nomenclature is getting accustomed to new conditions and is not in a hurry to free the key posts. Nobody wants to part with the power. Therefore, the research of the process of circulation of elite in power and analysis of its social features are of such a great interest.

The fact that governments are shifted very often is peculiar to this period. Probably, it is the most graphic feature of Ukrainian political realities. When

<sup>31</sup> M.Cheshkov, "Nomenclature Never Dies," *World Economy and International Relations*, No. 6, 1995.

<sup>32</sup> Janusz Sztumski, *Elity, ich miejsce i rola w społeczeństwie*, Katowice, 1997.

<sup>33</sup> "Social Disbalance of Society in Transition. Interview with Academician T.Zaslavskaya," *Social Sciences and Modernity*, No. 4, 1996, 11.

<sup>34</sup> See V.Polokhalo, "Ukraine: Leadership, Elite, and Power," *Nezavisimost*, Sept 9, 1994.

<sup>35</sup> G.Ashin, "Change of Elites," *Social Sciences and Modernity*, No. 1, 1995, 44.

we compare the situation with other countries, for instance with Russia, we shall see that since 1990 only three prime ministers headed the Government. The last one, V.Chernomyrdin was inaugurated in 1992. As regards Ukraine, from 1990 till the end of 1997 eight staffs of the Government had shifted.

**Object of Research.** What are the reasons for it? Perhaps there are a lot of reasons, not all of them falling within the Government itself. But interesting is the analysis of what were the governments, what people they comprised. This very analysis has become the object of our research. The period studied is limited to the period from 1990 till 1997 inclusive. It was the period of two parliamentary staffs elected in a democratic way. During this period the following 8 governments shifted in Ukraine:

- 1 — the Government of Prime Minister V.Masol (1990);
- 2 — the Government of Prime Minister V.Fokin (1990-1992);
- 3 — the Government of Prime Minister L.Kuchma (1992-1993);
- 4 — the Government of Prime Minister Yu.Zviagilsky (1993-1994);
- 5 — the Government of Prime Minister V.Masol (1994-1995);
- 6 — the Government of Prime Minister E.Marchuk (1995-1996);
- 7 — the Government of Prime Minister P.Lazarenko (1996-1997);
- 8 — the Government of Prime Minister V.Pustovoitenko (since 1997).

Besides, according to another criterion (the period of certain presidency) three groups of governments can be ear-marked: 1) the Government of Ukraine which acted before the elections of the first President of Ukraine; 2) the governments under President L.M.Kravchuk; 3) the governments under President L.D.Kuchma.

**Sources and Methods of Research.** For the analysis of cadre changes taking place in the Government from 1990 till 1997, the data from the following sources was used: "News of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine. Collections of Resolutions", since 1990; "Worldland Government Directory. 1992 Year"; "Uryadovy Kuryer" newspaper (since 1992); "Who is Who in Ukrainian Policies?" (issues 1, 2 and 3).

Biographies of governmental officials of the period between 1990 and 1997 were extracted from these sources and analyzed. Today these materials are most reliable issues providing the opportunity of acquisition of biographical data of the people, which occupy highest posts in the state or occupied them in the past.

For the analysis of biographical data, a number of indices was ear-marked:

1. Name.
2. Year of birth.
3. Region of birth.
4. Birthplace (country or city).
5. Educational institution the person had graduated from.
6. The year of graduation.
7. The year of beginning working activity.
8. Second education.
9. Scientific degree.
10. Type of education obtained (technical, humanitarian, economic or legal).
11. Time within the Government.

In the methodical respect, it was necessary to determine the circle of officials whom we regard as "the government". This question, which was easy for the

first sight, has turned out to be complicated during the realization of the aim of our research — tracking the changes in different staffs of the Government. The matter is that during the period analyzed there was no official definition of the term "member of government". The Law on the Cabinet of Ministers was adopted by the Supreme Rada of Ukraine only in the end of 1997, but it still has not been signed by the President. Therefore, during the analysis we proceeded from the idea that in the course of the analyzed period "members of government" meant Prime Minister, Vice Prime Ministers and Ministers. Heads of state committees were not included into the Government by the researchers. Though some of those officials are unlikely to have less influence on governmental policies than many ministers. For instance, the importance of heads of such departments as Security Service (SSU), Frontier and Customs Services, State Property Fund in the life of the state and society is not less than that of the ministers.

Another methodical difficulty consisted in the fact that the structure of the Government had been constantly altered. Some Ministries were liquidated, other ones — established, the criteria of their establishment and liquidation constantly changed. Extending and merging of departments took place resulting in emergence of a new Ministry, or a new Ministry was formed of several ones. Cases of division of Ministries into new departments also took place. However, all the transformations did not exceed certain, rather stable limits. Thus, in 1990 the government of V.Masol comprised 23 Ministers and 7 Vice Prime Ministers, while in 1997 the government of V.Pustovoitenko consisted of 21 Ministers and 4 Vice Prime Ministers.

It is clear, that these changes create difficulties for theoretical conclusions. For example, a particular person heads, in fact, the same department under several staffs of the Government. But this department is given now the status of Ministry, now the status of a state committee. Certainly, it accomplishes research work at conclusions, because this person actually remains the first and most influential official in his sphere of activities. He preserves close ties with the Government, political authority and importance, but ceases to be member of the Government. Such structural shifts also intensify the formal indices of dynamics of changes in the governmental staff. Though actually a circulation of governmental elite is taking place.

One more obstacle to quantitative calculations connected with certain officials staying within the Government, consists in the fact that ministers were appointed to their posts and quitted not only during the formation of the Government by a new Prime Minister, but also during his term in power. Thus, for example, in spring, 1997 Vice Prime Minister V.Pynzenyk, ministers I.Dankevych, V.Mazur, O.Osaulenko retired.

**Dynamics of Shifts in the Governments.** During six years of Ukraine's independence, eight staffs of the government functioned in the state.

If we do not take into account the short-lasting staying in office of V.Masol's government of 1990, when it retired under the pressure of hunger-striking students, and the term of activities of V.Pustovoitenko's government which is still working, the average term of a government in office will be 12.5 months. The record of duration was set by the government of V.Fokin.

Here, we do not intend to analyze the reasons for retirement of each government. Let us draw attention to the only fact, that a year in office is too

little to realize the own program of activities, if it was not just of a formal and ritual character and even had a chance for success. This means, that the governmental "reshuffle" was one of the causes, though, probably, not the main one, of the present crisis situation in the society.

**Table 1. Governments of Independent Ukraine**

Prime Minister	Term in office, months	Period in office
V.Masol	2	1990
V.Fokin	19	1990-1992
L.Kuchma	12	1992-1993
Yu.Zviagilsky	10	1993-1994
V.Masol	11	1994-1995
E.Marchuk	12	1995-1996
P.Lazarenko	11	1996-1997
V.Pustovoitenko	?	1997-?

In the context of our research, it is important to clarify the dynamics of alterations in the governmental elite, the extent of refreshments in the governmental staff, preservation of management traditions. That may be indicated by the number of persons keeping their posts under new governments. Among the members of eight governments 61 person had only one term in office. However among this elite group there are many persons who occupied the minister's post several times.

The government of E.Marchuk was the last one where the executive power representatives having worked in teams of six prime ministers were still present. Cardinal changes in P.Lazarenko's government in 1996 did not touch only one minister — V.Samoplovsky. He set an original record in keeping the ministerial post: having been appointed the minister of forestry at the age of 35 (in 1987), he kept this post till 1997, having succeeded to be not only minister, but also vice prime minister during this period. Today he is still head of the same department whose status has been changed to that of a state committee, accordingly the ministerial post of V.Samoplovsky having been changed to that of head of state committee. The second and third places in this governmental "marathon" are occupied by Yu.Kostenko (from 1992) and V.Pustovoitenko (from 1993, with a short break in 1994).


**Circulation of Members of Government.** The circulation of elite in power is a mechanism which has to impede usurpation of power. This process may reveal in two main forms: replacement of one elite by another and non-elite persons' advancement towards the elite status.

The specificity of advancement from a non-elite environment to the elite one is most often revealed in the beginning of transformation processes. Such an undisguised character of the elite being formed is natural, for the lack of "internal" resources requires a recruitment of new members from without. An essential indicator of an elite's viability consists in preservation of an external source of renewal.

However this thesis cannot be absolute. Constant replacements of cadres in higher echelon, their uncertainty in their future, the absence of a sufficient


experience of work at the highest level — all this has a negative influence upon the state's controllability. Therefore it is important to find an optimal correlation between experienced officials and energetic carriers of new ideas within the Government. For Ukraine an average percentage of renewal of the Government, compared with the previous one, constitutes 46%.

**Diagram 1. Ministers which did not belong to nomenclature before**



As the diagram 2 shows, the least changes took place in the Government after the first retirement of prime minister V.Masol and V.Fokin's coming to this post — the changes constituted only one third, while acting prime minister Yu.Zviagilsky renewed his government by more than 80 per cent.


**Diagram 2. Renewals in the governments (compared with the previous one)**



Every new renewal of the government means an increase of those who did not belong to the old nomenclature. These are new people bringing a new mode of behavior. Under the first type of governments there were 20% of such people, while in the governments of the second type — 50%, in those of the third type — 53%.

Despite the fact that governments are shifted very quickly, the circle of persons getting to the governments is not as wide as it may seem for the first sight. The matter is that a share of ministers works within several governments. Thus, the general number of seats in eight governments from 1990 till 1997 makes 284. But the number of individuals having worked in the governments constitutes 156 persons. The average time of a person in office makes 1.95 of the term.

**Diagram 3. Dynamics of average age of the Government**



Thus, a constant "reshuffle" of cadres is taking place within the Government. Some of the ministers keep their posts for a long period, "oversitting" some prime ministers, while there are ministerial posts that ministers fail to keep for a long time. The latter type comprises the posts of the ministers for coal-mining industry, power engineering, transport, finance, national relations and migration. During the analyzed period 4-5 ministers were shifted in these departments.


**Age Characteristics of Members of Government.** Let us allude now to qualitative features of members of the Government. The analysis of biographical data testifies that a rejuvenation of the Government is going on (Diagram 3).

During the period from 1990 till 1997 the average age of members of the Government decreased by more than 10 years. In 1990, the average age of a governmental officer was 59.2 years, while in 1997 — 48.9 years. It is interesting that the index of rejuvenation of government in Ukraine has become the highest one compared with those of the Soviet and Russian governments. The average age of the USSR's Government under M.Gorbachev's presidency constituted 56.2 years, that of the Russian Government under President B.Yeltsin making 52 years (the data of the Center for the Study of Elites, Institute of Sociology, the Russian Academy of Sciences). Thus, we can state that during the years of independence the Ukrainian Government got better, according to the age indices.

**Rural and Urban Origin.** The birthplace of a person — city or countryside — has an essential effect on the behavior of the person and the character of his outlook. As known, each of these types of an individual's socialization environment creates different forms of self-control, determines the character of communication, certain directions and values. Certainly all this reflects in the

forms of public behavior of a person. However the connection between the place of origin of a person and the type of political behavior consists of many stages.

**Diagram 4. Persons of rural origin within the Government**



Therefore, not trying to make a simplified, schematic explanation of behavior of this or that staff of the Government, we shall examine them according to the birthplace criterion: city or country. Most "rural" were the governments of E.Marchuk and Yu.Zviagilsky. Two thirds of governmental officials in their staff originated from the countryside. In turn, most "urbanized" is V.Pustovoitenko's government, where there are more than 60% of ministers originating from the city.

In the governments which acted till 1996, an increase of the number of persons of a rural origin was observed, while in the further governments a decrease of their number took place.

**"Country-Fellow" Groups.** At all times, and especially under transition ones, the factor of country-fellowship, origin from the same region, was one of uniting determinants for elites in power. A person having got to the highest links of power tried to strengthen his management team through including into it people from his town or region. Thus, the power teams, like "Kharkiv" or "Donetsk" ones, were formed. Especially well-known was the Dnipropetrovsk power group which kept higher posts of the Soviet Union as far back as under L.Brezhnev, as long as for two decades.

Having strong positions among the old Ukrainian nomenclature, the Dnipropetrovsk group strengthened them after proclaiming independence. As soon as in 1992 L.Kuchma became the prime minister. At that time a lot of new people from Dnipropetrovsk joined the Cabinet of Ministers apparatus. Owing to the attach of new force to old nomenclature originating from Dnipropetrovsk, the positions of this "country-fellow" alignment got stronger. This reinforcement played a considerable role at presidential elections of 1994.

In turn, the election of L.Kuchma, who used to live and work in Dnipropetrovsk, led to involvement of a new group of country-fellows into

cabinets of Kyiv. Soon, many people from Dnipropetrovsk became members of the Government, deputy-ministers and deputy heads of committees, the headed departments of the President's administration and the Cabinet of Ministers. As observers say, "by the end of 1996 the general number of people from Dnipropetrovsk in power structures of Kyiv and in "groups of influence" (executive, legislative, judiciary branches of power, political parties, the army, banks, churches, mass media, youth, women's, law-enforcing, veterans' organizations and trade-unions, business and non-profit R&D institutions and funds) made, according to our calculations, about 206 persons".<sup>36</sup>

Let us note that the term "person from Dnipropetrovsk" is not strict. It could mean birthplace or a certain term of work in this territory or place of graduation. The main uniting factor consists in personal ties having emerged during a long-lasting presence in this territory.

The following table demonstrates two more interesting indices: a) the general number of people originating from a particular region, which had worked in eight governments, and b) an average number of persons originating from a particular region in each of the eight governments. The first index testifies that the greatest number of governmental officials were delegated by the Kyiv oblast (together with the city of Kyiv) — 11 persons. The second place is occupied by the Dnipropetrovsk oblast — 10 persons. Though there were governments which did not include any person who was born in Dnipropetrovsk. For example, such a situation existed under the first government headed by V.Masol.

**Table 2. Birthplace\***

Birth region	Government								General number**	Average number***
	8th	7th	6th	5th	4th	3rd	2nd	1st		
<b>Kyiv</b>	3	2	3	5	3	3	5	3	12	3.4
<b>Dnipropetrovsk</b>	3	7	4	2	2	2	2	-	11	2.8
<b>Russia</b>	3	2	3	1	-	2	3	3	10	2.1
<b>Donetsk</b>	2	1	1	3	3	4	-	-	9	1.8
<b>Chernihiv</b>	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	8	1.8
<b>Odesa</b>	-	4	3	3	1	1	1	2	7	1.9
<b>Vinnitsa</b>	1	1	3	5	4	2	1	-	6	2.1
<b>Zaporizha</b>	1	2	1	-	1	2	1	2	7	1.3
<b>Luhansk</b>	-	-	-	1	1	2	2	-	5	0.8

The fact that among the members of government the third place according to their quantity is occupied by people originating from Russia, also arrests attention. They even override the persons originating from the Donetsk oblast, the largest in Ukraine.

<sup>36</sup> Svitlana Kononchuk, *Vstup. Dnipropetrovska simya 2*, Kyiv: Fond Demokratsii, 1997, p. 9.

\* The table shows the first nine positions. Other positions are excluded as insignificant.

\*\* This figure means the general number of persons originating from a particular region in all eight staffs of the Government.

\*\*\* This figure means the average number of persons originating from a particular region in all eight staffs of the Government.

The second index (b) shows the average number of persons originating from the same region in each of the eight governments. Here, the same rating of oblasts as that corresponding to the first index is preserved: Kyiv, then Dnipropetrovsk, Russia, etc.

In the staff of particular governments, the number of representatives of some regions exceeded the average indices peculiar to them. Thus, the greatest number of persons from Dnipropetrovsk was present in the government of P.Lazarenko — 7 persons. The government of V.Fokin, as well as the second government of V.Masol comprised 5 persons from the Kyiv region.

According to the place of graduation from a higher educational institution, the members of government are even more closely grouped than according to their birthplace. It is clear, that cities, where most higher educational institutions are situated — Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Lviv, Odesa, Kharkiv — are leading in this regard. However there is no direct correlation between the number of higher educational institutions in a city and a corresponding share of governmental officials having graduated from them. The first and second places with the same number of HEI are kept by Kharkiv and Kyiv. But most governmental officials have graduated from HEIs of Kyiv. It is comparatively easier for the graduates of the capital to make career in the capital. Therefore most members of all staffs of the Government — 44 persons — had graduated from higher educational institutions of Kyiv.

The noticeable lagging behind of the graduates of Kharkiv HEIs from the rest of members of all the staffs of the Government (they were only ten) requires a particular explanation. It is evident that they have been ejected by graduates of HEIs of other cities, first of all, of those of Dnipropetrovsk. During the analyzed period 18 graduates from the Dnipropetrovsk HEIs had been members of the Cabinet of Ministers. Thus, the Dnipropetrovsk "country-fellowship" occupies the second place according to this criterion. The third place, as it has become known, was occupied by the graduates from the Lviv HEIs. This allows to speak about a certain strengthening of influence of the Western region of Ukraine in the Cabinet of Ministers.

By the way, this data almost completely coincides with the idea of the population of where the power elite of Ukraine is recruited. According to our poll, the respondents consider that most people among the elite in power are from Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Lviv.

The above-given data shows the general quantity of graduates of these or those HEIs having worked in the Government. But it is important to examine their share in different staffs of the Government. According to this index, there is a hierarchy of graduates of HEIs of certain regions, which is different from that formed in accordance with their general number.

According to an average index of presence of graduates of HEIs in the staff of the governments, the regions rank as follows:

1. Kyiv — 11.75;
2. Lviv — 4.12;
3. Kharkiv — 2.5;
4. Dnipropetrovsk — 2.25;
5. Odesa — 2.12;
6. Donetsk — 1.25.

As we can see, the graduates of Kyiv HEIs head the hierarchy again. They had had the greatest number of seats in each government. However in the last one, headed by V.Pustovoitenko, the level of their representation essentially decreased. In the previous staffs of government they had always been more than 10 persons (except the government of E.Marchuk, when they were nine), while in the government of V.Pustovoitenko there are only four ministers from Kyiv. Today the first place among the members of the Government according to their quantity is occupied by those from Kharkiv. This situation is unprecedented. However the influence of the Kharkiv group is unlikely essential, because it numbers to only five persons. We should rather speak about the government of V.Pustovoitenko as one having no dominating group, according to the criterion of graduates from HEIs of the same region.

**Table 3. The place of getting education**

City	Government								General number**	Average number***
	8th	7th	6th	5th	4th	3rd	2nd	1st		
Kyiv	4	14	9	16	14	11	12	14	44	11.8
Dnipropetrovsk	4	5	2	1	-	1	5	4	18	2.8
Lviv	2	7	3	5	4	4	5	3	15	4.1
Kharkiv	5	4	3	1	2	3	1	1	10	2.5
Russia	3	3	3	1	-	2	3	1	10	2.0
Odesa	1	4	1	2	3	2	1	3	9	2.1
Donetsk	-	-	-	1	6	3	-	1	6	1.4
Kirovograd	1	1	2	1	1	1	-	1	3	1.0
Bila Tserkov	1	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	3	0.75

This data testifies to the fact that some regions are keeping firm positions in the Government through the graduates of their HEIs. These are the Kyiv, Lviv and Dnipropetrovsk regions. The graduates from HEIs of other regions, such as Donetsk, Kharkiv and Odesa have been ejected from the Government during the years of independence. Though under certain periods they acquired significant importance. In particular, the graduates from Donetsk HEIs occupied influential positions in the Government under acting prime minister Yu.Zviagilsky — 6 persons. However this took place only in one staff of the Government, while in other staffs there were no graduates from Donetsk HEIs (the governments of V.Fokin, E.Marchuk, P.Lazarenko and V.Pustovoitenko), or 1-3 persons per staff (the governments of V.Masol and L.Kuchma).

**Beginning of working activities.** The beginning of working activities to a great extent determines the further life of a personality, its career. The first steps in independent life are not only remembered very well, but also form stable stereotypes of production and public behavior. The development of models of behavior depends not only on micro-environment, the working team where labor activity begins, but also on the time, when this beginning takes

place, on the social reference-points of this time, on the predominating atmosphere.

For the members of Ukrainian governments of the first group (before the presidency of L.Kravchuk), the average year of beginning of working activities was 1959. It was the period of Khrushchyov's "thaw", the period of the onset of political romanticism of the 60s intelligentsia. The members of the second group of governments (under L.Kravchuk) entered their labor life in 1964. It was the edge between the Khrushchyov's stage of the country's life and beginning of L.Brezhnev's epoch, the epoch of strengthening the Ukrainian-Dnipropetrovsk alignment in the Soviet elite in power. It was a prospect for making career for the people who were loyal, accurate, considerate and conservative.

The third group of Ukrainian governmental officials (under L.Kuchma) started its working activities in the beginning of the so called stagnation (1968-1970). A successful career required professional knowledge and high "social activeness", loyalty to the existing political regime, which was always demonstrated, success in Komsomol work and considerable cynicism to declare things in which one does not believe himself. People from this very group are in power today.

**Table 4. Beginning of working activities**

Government	8th	7th	6th	5th	4th	3rd	2nd	1st
Year	68.2	70	68.2	68.4	66.2	64.9	62.1	59.3
Age	20.4	20.3	20.4	21	21.8	21.3	21.1	20.8

The time of beginning of working activities — before or after graduation from HEI — has a certain importance for formation of a personality. Certainly, it depends on many reasons in biography of a person, on how his or her life went on in young years. However, attention should be paid to two aspects. First, these are the requirements of the society to those entering a HEI. In the course of Soviet history, including the post-war one, several alterations in these requirements took place. Thus, it is necessary to keep in mind that under M.Khrushchyov it was required as a rule that a person entering the HEI should have a length of work. During this very period young men were not granted any deferments of military service. Therefore it is clear that the age group which started its working life before 1965 began to work before entering the HEI.

**Table 5. The time of beginning of working activities (%)**

Government	8th	7th	6th	5th	4th	3rd	2nd	1st
before graduation	46.1	42.1	51.3	34.3	35.3	36.1	46.9	56.7
after graduation	53.9	57.9	50	65.7	64.7	63.9	53.1	56.7

Second, the index pointing out the beginning of working activities before entering the HEI testifies to the fact that a person could study at the evening department or at extra-mural courses. Unfortunately, we have not managed to clarify, who studied at daily or evening departments or at extra-mural courses.

\*\* This figure means the general number of persons originating from a particular region in all eight staffs of the Government  
 \*\*\* This figure means the average number of persons originating from a particular region in all eight staffs of the Government



It would be a very important index. The quality of evening and extra-mural studying is much more low than that of the daily one. However, beginning of working activities before entering the HEI can indirectly, though not very correctly, testify to certain defects of quality of studying, especially for those who entered the HEI after 1966-1967.

**Education.** The indices of the level of education are of a great importance for characterizing the government. The governmental elite has always had a high formal educational status. During the examined period all representatives of all the governments had higher education. Under Soviet times, most members of the Government had technical education. This feature of Soviet governmental elite was an object of criticism under Gorbachev's perestroika. The public was being convinced that in the government there must be more lawyers and economists, because it is required by the tasks of democratization of society, its transition to market reforms. As a whole these arguments were accepted by the society.

In what way has it influenced the formation of Ukrainian governments? Did any changes in the character of education of members of the Government take place? The analysis shows that the number of persons with legal and economic education in the Government really increased. However it has not become an irreversible trend. Thus, in the governments of Yu.Zviagilsky, E.Marchuk and the second government of V.Masol, lawyers and economists pressed the persons with technical education. Lawyers and economists made more than one third of these governments. The share of technicians decreased to 42%. But in the government of P.Lazarenko the share of lawyers and economists decreased again to 29%, and in the government of V.Pustovoitenko — to 23%. The present level of their representation in the Government is even low than that of 1990.

The humanitarians (ideologists) constantly make 20-23% of members of the Government. In the government of P.Lazarenko, their share decreased to 14%. But in the succeeding government of V.Pustovoitenko, the humanitarians regained their positions.

Among the members of the government noticeable is a group of people having two higher educations. This fact is connected with various reasons.

**Table 6. The character of education obtained (%)**

Government	8th	7th	6th	5th	4th	3rd	2nd	1st
<b>Technical</b>	<b>53.8</b>	<b>56.1</b>	<b>42.9</b>	<b>41.7</b>	<b>42.9</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>53.1</b>	<b>51.7</b>
<b>Economic or Judicial</b>	<b>23.1</b>	<b>29.3</b>	<b>38.1</b>	<b>36.1</b>	<b>34.3</b>	<b>27.7</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>24.1</b>
<b>Humanitarian</b>	<b>23.1</b>	<b>14.6</b>	<b>19.1</b>	<b>22.2</b>	<b>22.9</b>	<b>22.2</b>	<b>21.9</b>	<b>24.1</b>

One of them consists in the need of getting extra knowledge, especially in economy and management. The average quantity of those having two higher educations in each government is about 14%. However, this percentage would increase if we take into account those having got education in the higher party school. There are a lot of such people among the nomenclature, and this does not mean that all of them are elderly people. In each government they made from 7% to 10%. Alongside with this, for instance, in the last government headed by V.Pustovoitenko there are more such persons

than in the first government of V.Masol — 7.7% and 6.9% accordingly. As a whole, taking into account the education obtained at higher party school, one fifth of the members of the Government has two higher educations.

**Table 7. Persons having two higher educations (% correlation)**

Government	8th	7th	6th	5th	4th	3rd	2nd	1st
<b>two educations</b>	<b>11.5</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>13.2</b>	<b>14.3</b>	<b>13.9</b>	<b>18.8</b>	<b>13.8</b>
<b>including the Higher Party School</b>	<b>19.2</b>	<b>17.5</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>15.8</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>19.4</b>	<b>28.1</b>	<b>20.7</b>

The data concerning the number of persons having a scientific degree testifies to a high level of education of members of the Government. The number of those having a scientific degree in the Government is two times as great as that of those having second higher education. As a whole in all staffs of the Government one half of the members has a scientific degree. There is also a considerable share of Doctors of Sciences in the Government. Thus, in the governments of V.Masol and V.Pustovoitenko one fifth of ministers has a degree of Doctor of Sciences.

Giving a sociological portrait of the Government, it would be advisable to analyze political reference-points of its members. However, we do not make analysis of party structures of the governments. The reason for it consists in the fact that before August, 1991 the party structure of the Government was not variable. All the Ministers were members of Communist Party of the Soviet Union. After the prohibition of Communist Party of Ukraine several staffs of the Government were non-party. Only since 1993 persons, who publicly declared their party affiliation and had been promoted to the Government by their parties, began to emerge. Yu.Kostenko was the first of such Ministers. From 1993 he has headed the Ministry for Protection from the Chernobyl Disaster Consequences, later the joint Ministry for Chernobyl Disaster and Nuclear Security.

**Table 8. Persons having a scientific degree (% correlation)**

Government	8th	7th	6th	5th	4th	3rd	2nd	1st
<b>persons with scientific degree</b>	<b>42.3</b>	<b>47.5</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>45.9</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>45.7</b>	<b>40.6</b>	<b>37.9</b>
<b>including Doctor of Sciences degree</b>	<b>19.2</b>	<b>15.0</b>	<b>17.5</b>	<b>13.5</b>	<b>11.8</b>	<b>11.4</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>20.7</b>

However the demonstration of party affiliation in the Government is not of a political character. All the governments established after proclaiming independence were not only non-party, but also non-coalition ones. The social conditions for governments of both these types had not been created. The parliament was elected by a majoritary scheme, in the Supreme Rada there acted political groups of deputies, not party fractions, therefore the governments were formed not in accordance with party affiliation, but on the basis of certain compromises, according to the principle of personal selection made by the President.

The number of party ministers had been gradually growing. However it did not affect the political character of the Government. The party ministers came

to the Government not to implement the program documents of their party, but just to stress its existence in the Government. Their greatest achievement at the "party line" within the Government consisted in extremely rare declarations of their own standpoint in this or that regard.

The greatest number of party ministers has joined the government of V.Pustovoitenko. V.Pustovoitenko himself became the first party prime minister after proclaiming Independence. Besides him, in the Government there are representatives of the National-Democratic Party, the Rukh, the bloc of Socialist and Peasants' Party. However, nothing has changed in the respect of political responsibility of the Government, its strategy and direction of activities.

## 2.5. Professional Stratum and Foreign-Policy Orientations of Elite in Ukraine

The foreign-policy elite (the establishment) comprises holders of power, formal power in the organizations and institutions which determine principle directions of the state foreign policy. They are united to a certain extent by the group interest and their feeling of membership in a closed privileged "club". During the Soviet period, a small group of professional nomenclature-diplomats, who gained their experience working in the Ukrainian SSR "Missions" and USSR international organizations or embassies abroad, was formed in Ukraine.

The foreign-policy elite of Ukraine comprises the President, the governing body of the Board of the President's Administration for Foreign Affairs, the Council for National Security and Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ambassadors in foreign countries and international organizations, managers of the Supreme Rada and its Committee for Foreign Affairs and Ties with CIS. The peculiarity of the early period of formation of professional foreign-policy elite (corps diplomatique) in independent Ukraine was its forming (largely in spite of its party and nomenclature origin) under the influence of the national-democratic ideology. The most striking example of this tendency is the phenomenon of Rukh-oriented G.Udovenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs. National democrats in the Supreme Rada of 1991-1994 had great influence on the professional diplomatic corps, and some of them were appointed the Ambassadors of Ukraine abroad. Decline of their influences on the political arena, starting from the summer of 1994, has resulted in partial discharging of the diplomatic corps from the subordination to the ordered political orientation. It is a paradox that only ideas of national democracy or autocracy can ensure the survival of professional diplomatic corps; denial of these ideas is the way to self-destruction for them.

### 2.5.1. Diplomatic elite of the present-day Ukraine

The excerpt of diplomatic elite (the professional foreign-policy establishment) has been prepared by the UCPCRS experts on the basis of analysis of the reference book "The Present-Day Ukraine Diplomacy" (1997). It represents biographical sketches about well-known diplomats and eminent state figures, both of the present and previous times, which are concerned in foreign affairs and setting up foreign policy of independent Ukraine. The overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian diplomatic elite consists of the persons in the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine (the USSR) —

70.8%, and Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary — 27%. Besides, 2.2% of the diplomats have the rank of a first-class Advisor. As a whole, thus selected elite comprised 95 persons, 10 of them (10.5%) being already gone.

Hereinafter a sociological research of the present Ukrainian diplomacy staff based on the analysis of brief biographies according to such determinants as birthplace (type of settlement), country, age, education, occupation prior to diplomatic activities, scientific degree, is represented.

**The birthplace according to the type of settlement, country.** The analysis of the data received testifies that most diplomats originate from the countryside (49.5%) or tiny towns (20%). Only 16.8% future diplomats have been born in Kyiv, and 13.7% in other large cities. On one hand it testifies to the fact that those having come to Kyiv from the provinces to a greater extent strive for success and self-affirmation than the city inhabitants. Certainly, the latter have more mild living conditions, that does not promote considerable activation of efforts and energy for achieving the goal. On the other hand, this is the direct result of the realization of the Soviet cadre policy principles, which stated that the rural origin was the best start point for making a career because it guaranteed loyalty towards the regime. In large cities, the youth which did not have a working/peasant origin, especially the intelligentsia, though having access to higher education was screened due to the impossibility to join the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Noteworthy is the fact that only 13.7% of the diplomats have been born in the Russian Federation or other countries. The overwhelming majority — 86.3% — are from the Ukrainian countryside, towns or cities.

**Age.** It is not easy to determine the average age of the present-day Ukrainian diplomatic elite because it comprises diplomats from 35 to 91 years of age. However it is possible to mark out the basic "active" age group which consists of persons from 45 to 65 and constitute 61.1% of the total quantity of the described diplomats — 23.2% being between 45 and 55 years of age, 39.9% — between 55 and 65). The "young" diplomats, i.e. under 45, constitute 16.8%, while the diplomats over 65 — 22.1%. The average statistical age of the high-rank diplomats is close to 58.

It is interesting, that among the younger diplomats (under 45) the share of Kyiv residents is essential (about 50%), while among the older diplomats this share lessens depending on the age and vice versa — the share of the diplomats with rural origin considerably grows reaching 60-67% among those between 55 and 65, and over 65. At the same time, the Kyiv residents over 55 constitute only 4-11%. Thus we can assume that since the early 70s (since the very this time the "young" diplomats had the opportunity of obtaining education at the renewed faculty of international relations of Kyiv State University and starting professional activities) the preconditions for a more successful career of Kyiv residents than of those originating from other cities emerged. Here we can speak about the creation of a "same-year mates" clan which comprised the students of the extremely privileged Department of International Relations in Brezhnev's times when the hereditary nomenclature was being formed.

**Education and previous activities.** According to the diplomats' education, several directions may be marked out: 1) the largest group which consists of diplomats with a higher *special* education, i.e. those having obtained

education on international relations (Department of International Relations, Kyiv State University, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR etc.) makes 33%, 22.1% of them (about 70%) having started working by their profession at corresponding institutions right after the graduating, i.e. started diplomatic activities; 2) a less significant group consists of diplomats with *philological* education specializing in foreign languages which worked generally as interpreters — 18.9%; 3) a group with a general *humanitarian* education obtained by 14.7% of the diplomats after graduating from the faculties of history, philosophy or law; 4) a group with a conditionally mentioned *technical* education which constitutes 11.6% of the diplomats having mastered the profession of an engineer or medical education; 5) the group with a *higher CPSU party* education — 9.5%; 6) the group with an *economic* education — 6.3%. Besides, there is a group which constitutes about 5% of the diplomats about which one could only say that they have graduated from Kyiv State University, but there is no trustworthy data of their specialization. As a whole, 46.3% of the diplomats graduated from Kyiv State University, while 36.1% — from Moscow higher educational institutions. The share of other institutes is insignificant and is not worth attention. By the way, 53% of the diplomats — Kyivans by origin have a higher education in international relations, while this specialization is available among not more than 23% of representatives of other categories.

As mentioned, only 22.1% of specialists in international relations were involved in diplomatic activities right after graduating from higher educational institutions. Therefore, 77.9% of the diplomats joined the diplomatic activities a bit later, being concerned in *some other spheres of activity* than diplomacy. Alongside with "professional diplomats" there is a considerable group of persons which belonged to the so called *party nomenclature* occupying high posts at party and Komsomol service. The diplomats from this sphere constitute 23.2%. Most of them have a higher CPSU party education. 60% of the diplomats from the party nomenclature are of a rural origin, while only 4.9% of them are from Kyiv. One more source of the diplomatic corps consists in *academy circles* connected with various scientific and educational institutions. The diplomats which were engaged in scientific or educational activities make 18.9% and mostly have a technical, philological or general humanitarian education. 10.5% of the diplomats are represented by former *interpreters* which obtained philological education and worked abroad, including various international organizations. *Occasional* spheres of activities are as follows: journalism and literature — 5.3% of the diplomats; trade, engineering, working at customs — 5.3%; other spheres not covered with trustworthy information — 14.3%.

13.7% of the diplomatic elite were or are members of the Supreme Rada (parliament) of Ukraine. As a general, these are the persons whose diplomatic activities began rather late, after 45 years of age (77%), and who have a general humanitarian (non-special) or technical education.

Continuing the analysis of the data obtained, we could note that the period from 22 to 45 years of age is most suitable for the beginning of diplomatic activities. Thus 36.8 and 36.8% accordingly started their diplomatic career at the age from 22 to 30 and from 30 to 45 (total — 73.6%). Most of those starting between 22 and 30 years of age have a higher education in international relations or are interpreters with philological education. Those starting between 30 and 45 are the same interpreters and representatives of

academy sphere or party nomenclature with a general humanitarian education. After 45, the level of engagement considerably decreases, this is rather the age of continuation than of beginning. 16.8% of the diplomats started their activities at the age from 45 to 55, being generally represented by scientists and party nomenclature officials with a general humanitarian or technical education; while after 55 — 10.5% of diplomats being generally party nomenclature representatives with a higher party education.

Analyzing the periods when the future diplomatic elite started its professional activities, we should point out three "waves" of appointments to different posts at certain structures that actually meant the "beginning of diplomatic career". The latter means the beginning of work (appointment) at the central apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or embassies, various political international organizations, etc. The first "wave" falls within the period of 1962-68 when 24.2% of the persons examined started their diplomatic career. The second means the period of 1973-81, when 25.3% of the diplomats started their career. Most diplomats which started during this very period (60-75%) specialized by university education in international relations. None of the 28.4% of the diplomats which started their diplomatic activities during the "third wave" period (1991-96) has such education. The reason for the last, third "wave" consisted in proclaiming independence of Ukraine in 1991, establishing relations with different countries and, as a result, — involving new persons into the ranks of diplomacy. During other periods, the diplomacy involved not more than 8% per each 8 years.

**Scientific degree.** 30.5% of the persons which became diplomats decided to improve their qualification and receive a scientific degree. 10.5% of them obtained a degree of Doctor of Sciences, and 20% became Candidates of Sciences in this or that sphere. We should notify that 90% of the diplomats with degree of Doctor proceeded to diplomatic activities from the research sphere and have a technical or humanitarian education. As a general, under previous times this sphere and party nomenclature comprised a considerable share of diplomats with degree of Candidate of Sciences (26.3% and 36.8% accordingly). In turn, besides the former journalists and writers (there are no diplomats with a scientific degree among them), the categories of diplomats having a higher education in international relations (especially those who started working in diplomatic circles right after graduation) and interpreters were least willing to obtain a scientific degree: not more than 10% of them have a degree of Candidate of Sciences.

## 2.5.2. Foreign-policy orientations of elites

The authors of this Report developed and introduced in 1997 their own methods to survey foreign-policy views of the elite by using the expert poll. The advisory assistance was provided by Dr. Ye.Holovakha.

During the survey, representatives of the institutions which are involved in forming the foreign policy of Ukraine and reflect the opinion of the foreign-policy elite were interviewed for four times (in March, June, September, and December 1997). Their total number comprised 41 to 44 persons. They were divided into four groups, approximately equal in composition, namely:

1. Employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and research workers of research institutions which serve as advisory agencies for State institutions (the National Institute for Strategic Research, Institute of World Economy

and International Relations of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, etc);

2. Ukrainian MPs, first of all, the members of the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Ties with CIS, and the Committee for Defense and State Security. They represent the entire political spectrum including the left wing forces, the centrists and right wingers;
3. Servicemen of the Military Forces of Ukraine ranked majors including employees of the Ministry of Defense, lecturers and specialists of the military institutions of higher education and research centers; the majority of them have got scientific degrees (the military intellectual elite);
4. Prominent journalists who specialize in international relations and represent the most influential media. There is every reason to consider them to be influential both in forming public opinion regarding the topic of the survey and on the position of the political elite (the establishment).

No essential divergence's between the standpoints of deputies (elite group) and other social groups, which were not represented in the poll, were observed. Among the shortcomings of the principle of formation of the expert group, the absence of representatives of industrial and financial elite in the group should be mentioned. It happened so because they are not supposed to express an original opinion, from the point of view of foreign affairs issues. On the other hand, their foreign-policy preferences were assessed.

According to their general foreign-policy orientations, the expert belong to four comparatively stable groups, as testify the results of polls conducted during the year. As a general, the experts' preferences are distributed between two main orientations. The first, greater group consists of adherents of Ukraine's accession to NATO. According to the latest data (December, 1997), they totaled to 51.2% of experts. This group can be deemed rather stable, because 50% of the experts sympathized with this orientation in September and about one half of them — in March and June. The second considerable group consists of adherents of "Ukraine's non-aligned or neutral status". Since the beginning of the year their number had been gradually growing — from 28.6% in March to 41.5% in December. It took place at the expense of decline or entire exclusion of such alternatives as "Ukraine's joining a military union of CIS countries, as an alternative of accession to NATO" (in December this group did not win any per cent, while before it constituted 7-9%), or "other" alternatives (7.1% in March and June; 0% in September and December). There is one more, insignificant but rather stable group, which constantly gains about 5-7% and comprises the adherents of "accession to NATO together with CIS countries".

The experts are unanimous in respect of the countries relations with which should be developed at the first place. These are Russia, Germany, the USA and Poland. On the other hand, according to most experts, Ukraine's relations with these very countries were developed most intensively. Such a situation was emphasized during the year as for all the mentioned countries, except Russia and Belarus. In March the experts put Russia on the first place (in June — on the second) among the countries developing relations with which would be most desirable for Ukraine, but at the same time it was the last among the 24 mentioned countries with which Ukraine's relations were successfully and intensively developed. But in June Russia occupied the third place as such.

Estimating the efforts of career diplomats in the sphere of realization of Ukraine's national interests, the experts ear-marked four most successful directions of cooperation. These are relations with Poland, the UN, NATO and the USA. According to the criterion of successfulness of Ukrainian diplomacy, the mentioned countries and international organizations received, at a 5-point scale, the following marks: 3.10-2.95 in March; 4.03-3.50 in June; 3.95-3.46 in September (3.29 for the USA); 4.10-3.60 in December. Besides, a high evaluation was given to the successfulness and effectiveness of relations with the Baltic states and Germany, compared with other states, especially in March and September: accordingly 2.95 and 2.93 in March; 3.28 and 3.23 in June; 3.68 and 3.24 in September; 3.45 and 3.50 in December. The least effective directions, which had been estimated by the experts under "3" during the year, were relations with the Northern European countries (from 2.60 points in March to 2.93 in the end of the year), the Middle East and Persian Gulf countries (from 2.56 to 2.73 points in March-September and 2.61 in December), the Asian and Pacific region countries (2.30-2.63 points), the Central and South America countries (2.41 in March; from 2.13 in June to 2.56 in the end of the year), relations with Russia (2.07-2.74 points, except June — 3.13). It is necessary to notify that since June, against the background of flights and falls of other countries' ratings, a gradual growth of the general rating of Ukrainian diplomacy's effectiveness at these directions was observed. As for relations with CIS as a whole, European structures (EU, etc.) and international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, EBRD), in June a noticeable growth of positive estimation of Ukrainian diplomats' activities at these directions, compared with March, was observed. The situation grew worse in September improved a little in December. The expert estimations of Ukrainian diplomats' activities at these directions were less than "3" points in March and September and essentially grew in June and December exceeding "3". Such a curve, though with other figures, could be seen at several directions, in particular in relations with Russia, the USA, NATO and the UN.

In turn, the effectiveness of the Supreme Rada's Committee for Foreign Affairs and Ties with CIS was rather estimated as "low", as well as the activities of the SR Committee for Defense and State Security, though the expert considered that the work of these Committees had grown better to some extent, compared with March.

The expert estimations of Ukraine's foreign policy as a whole from the point of view of its stability, balance and predictability essentially increased compared with March. As a whole, estimations at all the three indices almost coincided (the estimation of predictability a little lower) and were very close to the "medium" level, while in March they were close to the "low" one.

Since March, the experts gave a higher estimation to the current level of the elite leaders' confidence in and influence on heads of the state structures in charge of Ukraine's foreign and defense policies. Only lately the expert estimation of the level of confidence in the leaders of the state structures in charge of foreign policy became a little lower. In the end of 1997, the general level of elite's confidence in heads of the mentioned structures ranged between "medium" and "low", while in March it was more close to "low". As a whole, the level of confidence is estimated lower than that of influence. According to expert estimations, from the beginning (March) the level of influence of the elite on the structures in charge of foreign policy has been to some extent higher than that on the structures in charge of defense policy of

Ukraine. By the end of the year this divergence remained the same. The general level of influence was estimated by the experts as one close to "medium", as regards foreign-policy structures — as "medium", while in March the estimation was more close to "low".

The level of support of the state leadership by the military grew a little during the year, remaining between "medium" and "low".

The status of external security of Ukraine in December, 1997 was estimated by the elites quite calmly, compared with other periods of that year. In December the experts were least anxious about the presence of external threat to Ukraine during the year, the greatest anxiety registered in March and September, a little less — in June: in December only 19.5% of experts stressed the existence of a "threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity" (it is by 1.5 times less than in March and September, in June — 22.5%), 31.7% of experts speaking about the "probability of its emergence at any moment" (50% in March; 42.5% in June; 43.9% in September). Instead of it, 34.1% of experts stated that "this threat does not exist, and there are all preconditions for preventing it" (this is two times as much as in March — 14.3% and three times as much as in September — 9.8%, though in June this index reached 27.5%). The opinion that "one should expect such threat in 1-2 years" or "in 3-5 years" dominated among 2.4% in March and 7.3% of experts in September.

When estimating the international security in Europe as a whole, the experts stressed a certain improvement of the situation compared to the beginning of the year. Thus, there are grounds to speak about a comparatively optimistic standpoint of the elite against the background of the growing pessimism of the population of Ukraine as a whole. Ever increasing number of experts considers that since March its status not only failed to get worse, but rather remained unchanged, or even to some extent "grew better". As regards the "latest status of Ukraine's international security", during the year the experts deemed it a bit lower than that of Europe as a whole. Though at the same time the elite considers that the level of international security guarantees to Ukraine from other countries had gradually grown during 1997, having estimated it in December as one close to "medium", while in March it was determined as "low". Besides, since June, when a worsening of the situation according to this index was observed, the experts considered that Ukraine must to ever growing extent rely on its own Armed Forces. Unfortunately, according to expert estimation, their readiness is gradually getting worse. According to the elite, the role of economic determinants (this group was mentioned by 63-73% of experts) and political determinants (27-46% of experts) in providing international security of Ukraine is constantly growing.

The estimation of the situation concerning Ukraine's constraint to follow the lead of other states and alignments, to be submitted to their orders and expectations, even if it were at conflict with its national interest, was rather ambiguous. According to expert estimation, in June and September such "constraint" was growing, ranging between "high" and "medium" (more close to "medium"), but lessened in December, ranging between "medium" and "low" (more close to "medium"). At the same time, the expert estimation of the extent to which Ukraine "has to rely on its allies in realization of its foreign-policy goals", which almost had not changed by December, 1997, grew a little and became more close to "medium" than before.

Among the allies on which Ukraine can rely, the absolute preference of the elite is given to the USA (41-61%), especially within the framework of reformation of the Armed Forces (51-63%). Only in September Poland attracted more attention as an ally (64%), while in other cases it had been following the USA (43-50%). Among other important allies the elite emphasized the Baltic states (21-29%, especially in September — 37% and in December — 44%) and NATO (24-26%, especially in September — 47.5% and in December — 56.1% of experts). Other, less important groups, according to the experts, comprise the centrists in the Supreme Rada (mentioned by 30% to 40.5% of experts, firmly occupying the 3rd position) and medium businessmen (mentioned by 26%-35% of experts, the 4th position). Among the adherents of integration with the West, up to accession to NATO, they also mention "the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the general staff" (16.7% in March, 28-24% — since June). An ambiguous opinion was expressed by the experts as regards producers of arms and specialized technics: in March and September this group was almost insignificant (4.8% and 2.5% accordingly), while in June and December its importance increased a little (10.3% and 14.6% accordingly). The same way, the leaders of MIC enterprises were mentioned by 4-5% from March till September, while in December — by 17.1%. Since September the situation almost has not altered, except an insignificant decrease of the role of leading groups of the elite and increase of the role of the latter ones, that has not essentially affected the order of their ranking.

During the year the elites outlined the priority directions of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO as "providing additional guarantees to Ukraine" from NATO and "creation of preconditions for Ukraine's joining NATO in future". The importance of these directions gradually decreased: from 57% of experts in March to 41% in December, as for the first one, and from 55% to 39% of experts, as for the second one. But this did not prevent them from being the most important directions. The elites did not estimate highly the capability of the Charter on Distinctive Cooperation between Ukraine and NATO signed in Madrid on July 9, 1997 of providing the national interest of Ukraine. 52% of experts determined its quality in performing this function as "medium", while 33% — as "low". Only 5% of experts deem it "high", against 10% — "nought". Among the main shortcomings of it, first of all "the absence of effective guarantees to Ukraine from NATO" — 58.5%, and "the absence of guarantees of Ukraine's integration into European security structures" — 39%, were mentioned. These were followed by such a direction of cooperation as "direct assistance in carrying out military reform" which occupied the 3rd position in March and June and the 4th — in September and December. Generally, it was mentioned by 30-35% of experts. The next direction which concerns "coordination of policies in view of NATO's eastward enlargement" lost its rating in December, to a considerable extent. Until that time, this problem arrested the greatest attention and rose concern of from 28% in March to 38% in September and occupied the 4th position, in September — even the 3rd one. Against the background of a general increase of the rating of NATO, in December this direction ("coordination of policies in connection with NATO's eastward enlargement") was mentioned only by 19% of the experts, and now it shares 8-10th places with such directions of cooperation as "coordination of military-technical policy and maintenance of the MIC" and "staff training". Instead of this, such a direction of cooperation as "arms, specialized technics and services of military

purpose", which was put at the last positions before and acquired popularity during the year, occupied the 3rd place. In March it was stressed by 12% of experts, in June — by 15%, in September — by 23%, in December — by 36.6% of experts (this means the 10th, 9th, 7th and 3rd places accordingly). The positions of the direction of "joint development of conceptual grounds of policy with NATO" almost did not alter, it gathered 25-29% and occupied 5-6th places. The same was the position of "participation in peace-making operations" in September and December (27.5-29.3%), which raised from the 6-8th place (16.7%) in March and the 8th (15%) in June. The expert estimation of the priority of "joint exercises" was a little higher than in previous polls — 22%, that means the 7th position. In March this direction was mentioned by 17% (6-8th place), in June — 8% (11th place), in September — 15% (9th place).

As mentioned before, in December such directions of cooperation as "coordination of military-technical policies and maintenance of the MIC" and "staff training" shared the 8-10th places. As a general, during the year they were not of great importance for the elite. "Coordination of military-technical policies and maintenance of the MIC" was mentioned by 14-22% of experts, while "staff training" — by 16-19%.

**Table 9 At the forthcoming elections to the Supreme Rada you will vote for a candidate, who...**

	Nov	Dec
... adheres to unification with Russia, up to establishment of a coherent state	33%	32%
... supports Ukraine's comprehensive economic integration with the West	13%	10%
... speaks for the priority of developing relations with Poland	2%	1%
... speaks for a balanced development of Ukraine's relations with both Russia and the West	34%	27%
... supports an "independent" (self-reliable) foreign policy, a non-aligned status of Ukraine	10%	15%
... speaks for Ukraine's joining NATO as soon as possible	4%	3%

Summing up, we should, first of all, draw attention to the presence of an obvious gap, if not discrepancy between foreign-policy orientations of the elite and those of the population of Ukraine. It threatened the further political career of those representatives of the elite for whom the condition of preserving their status consisted in being elected to the Supreme Rada. The influence of the foreign-policy program of a candidate-deputy on the electors was analyzed in two all-national polls conducted by SOCIS-Gallup in November and December, 1997. The results of the polls testify that the mentioned determinant has a significant influence upon the formation of electoral orientations of the public. In particular, in December, 1997 more than one third of the respondents (36%) stressed significance of such influence, one fourth (25%) pointed out insignificance of influence of a candidate's foreign-policy orientation on the choice whether to vote for or against him. Compare: 14% stressed an absence of such influence, the rest having no clear standpoint.

In the polls the respondents were asked question regarding the influence of foreign-policy programs of candidate-deputies to the Supreme Rada on the electoral behavior (Table 9).

The results obtained give grounds to speak about the existence of basic trends of public political consciousness in this issue. First of all, among the variety of directions of Ukraine's foreign policy, two directions are rather clear: pro-Russian and balanced ones.

The analysis has registered a correlation between the support of particular political forces at the forthcoming elections and foreign-policy orientations. In particular, the fact was registered, that the overwhelming majority of adherents of Communists supports the pro-Russian trend of foreign policy. In turn, one half of adherents of Democrats speaks for a balanced policy, only insignificant share of them (not more than 10-12%) supporting the pro-Russian trend.

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### 3. FUNCTIONING OF RULING ELITE IN POST-SOVIET PERIOD

#### 3.1. Grounds for Relations between the Old and New Ruling Elite

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While studying the issues of relations between the old and new ruling elites, one should pay attention to some peculiarities of these relations and answer some questions. What are the peculiarities of the interaction between the two teams of elites?

The first peculiarity is that in practice these two categories do not form institutionally separate groups. Indeed, they can be considered abstract categories which have been separated as a result of analysis based on some criteria. The main criterion is whether a certain person held the top, nomenclature, elite position within the old social system or not. At the same time, this criteria shows whether the person had the decision-making experience or managerial skills or not. And this is a very important indicator for the elite because the absence of decision-making experience or managerial skills could be the reason of inability to hold a top position in the elite for a long time. This is one of the reasons why considerable part of those who constituted the old nomenclature have been included into the present ruling elite.

Many people who used to be in the counter-elite under Soviet times came to higher echelons after the proclaiming of Ukrainian independence. There were many scientists, scholars and artists among them. However, some time has passed and only part of them has remained at the top positions. It was much easier to reach the top in the rebellious time of social changes than to hold the power. The other part turned out to be unable to realize those ideas and slogans that helped them to reach the high echelons. It incorporated into the new system of elite relations.

By no means, the process of incorporation of elite recruits can be described only as the process of adaptation of representatives of the new elite to the old. In real life, this process is much more complicated. One should bear in mind that political and ideological leadership belongs to the new political forces of the society now. They produced new ideological rhetoric and slogans, models of state loyalty, verbal stereotypes that demonstrate their patriotism, and devotion to the idea of Ukrainian independence etc. From the political and ideological perspective, it was the old elite, ex-nomenclature which borrowed the national-democratic slogans that incorporated into the present elite. As for the managerial methods, style of work and public behavior, private life-style, various privileges, the new elite successfully inherited them from the old.

It is the presence of the same persons in the ranks of the authorities as before that leads to the impression that nothing has changed in Ukraine. The same people who used to rule under Soviet times are still among the rulers today. The only change took place: Ukraine became an independent state. Volodymyr Malynkovych, well-known dissident and active contemporary Ukrainian politician, expresses the same point of view. In a dialogue with

Vadym Skuratovsky on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of General Petro Grygorenko, he said, "You say that nobody in the present-day system of KGB cages, but it is the same system and the same people, just promoted. And it is possible that this state will go the same way. And the next compromise between the nationalists and the nomenclature may be possible 'in the name of preservation of the Ukrainian state'. Nomenclature is the same and even worse".

This point of view, to our mind, seems to be simplified. Indeed, many concrete people, possess the power in all the times. The Soviet power and the present power are social institutes serving to qualitatively different social systems. Certainly, current social system is rather fuzzy, not structured. But a principle of its standing differs substantially from the principles of development of the previous one. Each system has its own elite, working for its (system's) preservation, reproduction and development. From the point of view of sociology and political science, it does not really matter that considerable part of the persons belonging to the ruling elite used to serve different political regimes. It means that a "quality of human material" has no social meaning, it does not impact the social processes. Personal experience could play both positive and negative roles. Absence of experience can make the behavior of an individual ineffective, presence of experience presses on him/her and can serve as an obstacle for understanding and execution of new tasks.

But it is the character of social relations, current political regime that determines new tasks for individual. And phenomenon of political "turning" of individual, change in his ideology from one to another is also interesting for science, though it is subject of ethics, psychology, and political psychology.

It is hard to define now how a system of economic, political and social relations in Ukraine will look like. Process of systemic transformation is still going on. We can do only preliminary conclusions now. In particular, one can say, that some part of the old nomenclature, especially regional, gained from these changes in the society. It replaced its bureaucratic privileges with property, real estate, shares in the enterprises gained in the process of nomenclature privatization.

However, it should be mentioned that process of nomenclature privatization in Ukraine goes on much slower than, for example, in Russia. Period of redistribution of state property in this country has been delayed. Evidently, correlation of social forces in society, abilities of the new elite, "reformers" to conduct privatization and "the resistance of materials", i.e. the staff of enterprises, public opinion as a whole and other reasons contributed to such a situation. We will not analyze them here as it is not the topic of this research. Anyway, it is important for us to note that a special type of ruling elite developed as a result of delaying the period of uncertainty of the property owners, period of the "pseudo-ownership". Their characteristic features are possessing of both the power and revenues from the state property, use of official position in private purposes, grafting, corruption.

This is the period of the neo-nomenclature officials rule. It is determined by the clan character of resource management and state power possessing, corruption of all level of the power from the lowest to the highest levels, lack of professionalism, perfidy, unscrupulousness and psychology of "temporary rulers". The temporary psychology is shown in everything, for example, in inability of members of the ruling elite to realize their promises.

Unlike other societies where the problem of keeping promise also is actual, it has its specific features in Ukraine. In other countries, the problem of political false is fixed after some years or months, in Ukraine it is the matter of a few weeks or even days. Ukrainian politician (not only a public figure, but a person who hold a state post, usually a top rank position) would change his point of view within a very short period of time, forget his political promises even in two or three days.

For example, Prime Minister P.Lazarenko proclaimed in February 1997, that in a few days he would announce a new structure of the Government. However, a week had passed and he said that the structure of the Government was discussed with President and corrections would be made during the following two or three days. A week, a month and two months passed, but nobody even mentioned about the new the structure of the Government.

Another example, in September 1997, President announced that he would sign any law on election, which is adopted by the Supreme Rada. The law was adopted, and President's people claimed that President would put a veto on the law and appeal to the Constitutional Court etc.

In April-May 1997, President L.Kuchma publicly insisted on the necessity of adoption of "budget package" consisting of six laws. In May, he accused Prime Minister P.Lazarenko in "collaborationism" because he agreed to consider the budget based on execution of only three of these laws. But in July, President L.Kuchma put forward the initiative to adopt budget based only on two of these laws.

One of the form of non-keeping a promise is a formal, not principal attitude to the law or decisions adopted by the state organs. And a few examples can illustrate it. Thus, according to the 1994 law on election, every candidate was obliged to write a statement where he/she noted that in the case of his/her election he/she works in the Parliament on the permanent basis. What was the result? During the following four years, this provision of the law was violating en mass in the supreme legislative body of the state. Another example: the constitutional agreement of 1995 contained the provision that following election would be hold using the mixed system. But in practice, this provision was forgotten at all and even not mentioned within the framework of several month long discussion on the law on election, which took place in the Supreme Rada in 1997.

Especially memorable for the majority of citizens of Ukraine were the promises to pay the debts on salaries. The consequence of such irresponsible promises is mass disbelief to the promises of top officials and state authorities. Thus, Prime Minister V.Pustovoitenko in nine days after his appointment publicly proclaimed, "In accordance with the assignment of the President, we have to repay debts on salaries and pensions before November 1, 1997."<sup>37</sup> But according to the SOGIS-Gallup public-opinion poll conducted in September 1997 among the adult population of Ukraine, 61% of respondents did not believe that the Government of V.Pustovoitenko would fulfill its promise and repay the debts on salaries, pensions, and scholarships before the end of 1997.<sup>38</sup> And as if for strengthening of this disbelief, V.Pustovoitenko stated

<sup>37</sup> See *Pravda Ukrainy*, November 11, 1997.

<sup>38</sup> See *Den*, October 3, 1997.



early in November 1997 that debts on salaries and pensions cannot be repaid before March 1, 1998.

Numerous examples of the promises of MPs, prime ministers, and Presidents could be presented. We could quote official statements and excuses of many politicians, their attempts to present such sort of things as their political flexibility, ability to find compromise and even as recognition of their faults etc. But nobody believes in their words. The ruling elite has lost one of its most important features — authority and trust of the mass. And it no longer could be called the elite without these features. It just turns into officials without authority.

### 3.2. Current Social Conditions of Formation of Political Elite in Ukraine

Intensive social stratification took place within 5-7 years as a result of intensive crisis and degradation processes in the sphere of economy, inflation in financial sphere, ruining of social cohesion and other regressive social phenomena. Middle class, formed in Ukraine in the 70-80s was dissolved and approximately 10% of the rich and 80-85% of the poor emerged at the social poles of society.

Process of development of political parties is still in its initial stage. Taking into account sharp polarization of the society, this process will last very long. Parties with the exception of the Communist Party and partially the Rukh have no political experience.

These social and political conditions determine specific development formation and circulation of the ruling elite. The process of development of the new elite in Ukraine is similar to the respective processes in other post-Soviet states, in particular in Russia. Russian scholars define three stages in the process of transformation of elites. The first stage (Brezhnev's period) includes the period from the mid-60s to the mid-80s. It is the stage of the stable developed Soviet elite. The second stage includes years 1985-1995. It is the period of elite transformation. The third period or the period of a new elite formation started in 1995.<sup>39</sup>

In Ukraine, in the authors' opinion, the process of elite transformation has had rather different character. That is why such a division into periods cannot be appropriate for this country.

Ukraine has differences even at the first stage of elite transformation. Change of political leadership took place in Ukraine 4 years later than in Moscow. However, the main difference is the second stage. The period of elite transformation is still going on in Ukraine. In Russia, the second stage was finished after the tragic events of 1993, when not only the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation was shot down, but in accordance with the new Constitution of the Russian Federation, the role of the Parliament was considerably limited and the role of President increased.

In Ukraine, the adoption of the new Constitution did not strengthen the institute of presidency and the Parliament keeps influence in all aspects of state life. It

means that there are more space for actions of various political forces, that process of political competition and struggle between them will be longer, and hence, the process of elite transformation will be much more long and continuous. Thus, a conclusion can be made that the second stage of elite transformation still goes on in Ukraine, and it is difficult to say when it finishes.

Another important feature of the elite formation in Ukraine is the unstable political structure of society. Political parties and groups continue to appear. This process is especially intensive on the eve of election to the Parliament and local government. Evidently, these organizations have no experience. They are organizationally weak, ideologically scattered.

It seems that development of political parties creates favorable conditions for formation of the new political elite. This statement is correct in general. However, it cannot be considered in abstract way, as a universal concept. The problem is that those set of political parties existing today, especially on the eve of parliamentary election of 1998 cannot be reckon a mature system of political parties. They haven't become an influential and authoritative power for the population. The authors agree with R.Sakva that a pseudo-party system has been formed in this country now (R.Sakva writes about Russia, but the situation with political parties in Ukraine, in its qualitative characteristics, does not differ greatly from Russia). "Parties did not managed to become either mass unions, appealing to individual social strata or target group of electors, or classic universal ("catch-all") organizations, similar to the American or Western European parties of the post-war period. A 'professional' party system started to form instead, oriented not to perform typical functions of mediator between the state and civil society, but to support the inter-elite relations."<sup>40</sup>

The so called groups or unions of MPs existing in the Parliament also lead to the conclusion that the political structure of the society and ruling elite is weak. What is a MPs group in the current Ukrainian parliament? This is a union of MPs which differs greatly from a faction. MPs groups are rather mobile by its structure. They came into being on the basis of rather abstract slogans, they have no programs developed in detail. Current political situation and the attitude of the Ukrainian President and his administration to these groups have a considerable influence on the existence of the MPs groups. Under these circumstances, no programs of political parties supported by the MPs, but back-door manipulations, grafts and pressure on the MPs are more important.

Meanwhile, mentioning weak political structures, their positive role in the current public and political life of Ukraine should be pointed out. They serve as the predecessors of stable political structures, they are a necessary stage in the development of strong political structure of the society.

One more peculiarity of the ruling political elite of Ukraine is their non-transparent political direction for the public. In order to understand this phenomenon, we should describe in brief political peculiarities of the Ukrainian political elite as a whole.

In each period, one can name some political subgroups in it with more or less visible political characteristics. Almost the entire classical political spectrum does exist in Ukraine including radical left-wingers, left-wingers, left centrists,

<sup>39</sup> See I.V.Kukolev, "Transformation of Political Elites," *Social Sciences and Modernity*, No. 4, 1997, 85-87.

<sup>40</sup> R.Sakva, "Regime System and Civil Society in Russia," *Polis*, No. 1, 1997, 63.

right centrists, right-wingers, radical right-wingers. This conclusion can be made on the basis of party programs, decisions of party congresses, statements, other instruments of political parties, public organizations, movements, and associations etc. As for the concrete bearers of these ideas, then this matter is much more complicated.

Leaders of these organizations have more or less clear positions. They are more publicly open. But it has its opposite aspect: they cannot change their positions without losing their political image. Although this statement is not absolute.

Politically active individuals look for the political associations close to their political convictions, find them, get disappointed and leave them. Some individuals get disappointed in the whole political sphere and leave it. And some keep looking for "their own" political party, join it and so on. Thus, for the outsiders, these people seem to be weather cocks who always adapt themselves to the outer conditions with revenues for their own. Unfortunately, this forms a negative image of the elite representatives for the public. Anyway, there are practically no examples of charismatic leaders, brilliant persons of the Ukrainian elite, who devote themselves to the service of the people.

Second pack of the new political actors is less known and its members are even more inclined to change their affiliations. This fact can be explained that life changes, people get new experiences, change their opinions under the pressure of their experiences. But we mean a different phenomenon, that is, political situation. Its essence is that many Ukrainian politicians now do not have fixed and stable ideological and political positions. And their substitutes let the politicians adapt themselves painlessly and quickly to the current political moment.

Democratic mechanism of keeping and handing over the power in Ukraine, especially the responsibility of the rulers to the society, has just been declared. It is true that some progress takes place in this direction in the society. From the political declarations of the necessity to elect President and the Parliament democratically, the Ukrainian society has moved to their almost full realization. Both the Parliament and President were elected democratically, not only in the first time but in the second as well. That is, there was a democratic transfer of power from one Parliament to another, from the first president to the second one. These mechanisms of transfer of power were legalized on the level of the new Constitution. Hence, one can say that progress in political, state, social life takes place.

But there is another aspect in it. This society is only at the first stage of this movement. Many facts can illustrate that formation of the mechanisms of possessing power is still imperfect and unfinished.

First of all, the fact that the Government is still formed not on the basis of the party affiliation, hence, without responsibilities of the parties. The authors do not mean only the first years of independence but all the eight governments. Organizational weakness of political parties, lack of experience leads to the situation when they are actually afraid of coming to power though they proclaim it as their aim. To put it in different terms, the political elite in Ukraine is weak and scattered, it cannot take the challenges of the society.

Some facts can illustrate this. First, political parties do not have experienced economists, executives and organizers which are able to be involved

immediately after their victory in the management of state affairs. The parties lack experience of creation of shadow cabinets of ministers (the first attempt was made by the *Gromada* in November 1997). They have no people trained to hold the concrete top positions in the state machinery.

Situations connected to annual appointments and dismissals of Prime Ministers are evidence of this as well. Some politicians are not brave enough to lead themselves with all this work. Thus, for example, when asked why he did not want to be a new Prime Minister, V.Gorbulin, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, told that he was not insane to do it<sup>41</sup>. And none of the parties proposed its candidate to this post. And if it had done so, these proposals shouldn't have been called serious enough. Thus, in the period of the "Prime Minister crisis" of 1997, the Rukh declared that it proposed Yu.Kostenko to the post.

But it was known that he had no experience to hold such a responsible post. Despite the fact that a leading member of the Peoples Democratic Party was appointed Prime Minister in 1997, one could not state that the PDP came to power and that Prime Minister would implement its program objective while being at the post. As V.Pustovoitenko was appointed the Prime Minister not on the reason of his party affiliation and not on the reason of his leadership in the party.

The reason is different. One can agree with *Den'* newspaper which wrote on the occasion of the appointment of V.Pustovoitenko at the post of Prime Minister, "Among the 'pro' arguments the greatest is one that can hardly be missed in Ukrainian reality — all other variants are much worse."<sup>42</sup>

In the current economic situation, members of young political parties can be elected to the parliament, and the most influential of them can even form parliamentary groups. But nothing more than that. Pretensions for something more, even after their realization, would fail. None of the modern political parties can be responsible for the situation in society. And this is another reason why the governments are formed not on the basis of political majority in the society or political coalitions.

What is the basis of their formation?

We can agree with conclusion of an analyst of *Den'* newspaper V.Zaitsev, who argues that "actually, all the cabinets of the past years were the results of big and little compromises, intrigues and negotiations among various structures and individual politicians."<sup>43</sup> During the several years of independence, certain principles of formation of the new elite started to form in this country. First, personal devotion as a main criterion of selection to the top posts; second, regional fellowship, experience of previous joint business activities, mutual obligations; third, clan character; fourth, protectionism.

It means that at the current stage of political life in Ukraine all the principal decisions are made in secret from the public.

According to some analysts, the reason is that "contemporary political epoch in this country is marked by the great following paradox. On the one hand, the nomenclature-bureaucratic class invaded all the leading positions in the

<sup>41</sup> Volodymyr Gorbulin, "Should I Be Prime Minister? I'm not Insane," *Den'*, July 12, 1997.

<sup>42</sup> Larysa Trilenko, "Parliament Said Yes Through Clenched Teeth," *Den'*, July 17, 1997.

<sup>43</sup> V.Zaitsev, "Mysterious Island of Dr. Kuchma," *Den'*, July 11, 1997.

society and permanently tries to dictate its will. On the other hand, it ignores the responsibility which is incumbent upon it, despite its desire.<sup>44</sup> That is why backstage, secret politics prevails. And under the conditions of economic crisis, such type of politics determines apathy and skeptical mood of the population to politics, and increases the gap between the elite and the mass.

Unfinished formation of political system gives birth to another phenomenon, the existence of several power centers. It is mixed sometimes with democratic division of powers in a state. But actually this fact is the evidence of the opposite situation. In such a situation, a real division of powers its balance and existence of the mechanisms of its stabilization is unattainable.

At this stage of development of the Ukrainian society and state, such power centers as President (in some periods, in particular in Tabachnik times, the Administration of President played the role of a separate power center), the Supreme Rada, the Cabinet of Ministers. But judicial power did not get place of a separate power center. The said power centers compete for their influence on it.

Under such circumstances, each center tries to broad the sphere of its impact on the state and public institutions. Thus, President tries to subordinate directly power structures, the Administration of President strengthens the vertical of local state administration, President and his Administration try to create subordinated to them political parties (as the PDP and the Agrarian Party), the Supreme Rada supports local councils and supports the idea of broadening of the functions of administrations. This situation produces pseudo-pluralistic system which promotes the style of confrontation, hunting for those who "lay obstacles" and "prevent".

On this reason President, for example, has the front of confrontation not only with those who call themselves the opposition but also confrontation with the Chairman of the Supreme Rada, the Supreme Rada as a whole, sometimes with the apparatus of the Cabinet of Ministers and even with appointed by himself Prime Ministers and Ministers. It allowed analysts to talk about the syndrome of "eternal duel" of President Kuchma.<sup>45</sup>

The confrontation of the power centers will not end in the nearest future. For example, the appointment of D.Tabachnik President's Advisor is considered to be evident challenge to the Supreme Rada. Thus, Victor Musiyaka, Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Rada, said on this occasion, "As for Tabachnik, then in the case of his appointment the old memories and feelings will revive. And Parliament will consider this step of the President as some sort of a 'signal'. His coming to the Government will lead to the huge negative pressure and become a signal of the final confrontation between the President and the Parliament."<sup>46</sup> Meanwhile D.Tabachnik was appointed not to the government but as President's Advisor. But it does not change the situation.

The way out of this situation of pluralism of the power centers lies evidently in the deepening of the process of social, property structuring, strengthening and increasing of the role of political parties in the society.

### 3.3. What Is the Party of Power

The party of power has different ways of manifestation. In the first turn, it is an abstract organization of those who possess the power, i.e. all the vertical branches of the executive power: from the President of Ukraine, his Administration, the Government, regional state administrations to local administrations. Main sense of creating and defining this group, even symbolically, is keeping power after the referendums, elections and other constitutional acts related to the re-election of the authorities. In order to turn this conventional organization into an actual political party, it is necessary to legitimate it, find approval of concrete people possessing these posts. As, first, the situation in the society is not stable, especially on the reason of the sharp decrease of the living standards of almost all the population, it is very hard to incline all the state officials to join this organization, and second, it is hard to do it as the Constitution is still in force, and, hence transfer of the power takes place. And it is very hard for the same people to take the same elective offices under such circumstances.

However, in the situation of formation of political parties, the *party of power* can create the image of political organization. It is partially possible to do by organizing political parties from above for the political support of state officials or including top officials of the country and its particular branches. The PDP can serve the first variant and the second variant is the Agrarian Party.

The current *party of power* in Ukraine as it was mentioned before, consists mainly of the former Communist party nomenclature. This is its difference from the party of power in Russia. Much more new people came into the structures of the central authorities after the August coup of 1991. And it is them who are identified with the *party of power* in Russia. For example, a British political scientist Richard Sakva says that "democratic waves of 1989-1991 were swallowed by a thing which was called soon a 'party of power'.<sup>47</sup>

Previous life experience of the contemporary Ukrainian elite impacts in the material way the formation of typical notions about the party building in this environment. Unfortunately, these notions include many obsolete stereotypes. One of them is the intention to unify state and party structures. For example, A.Matvienko, leader of the PDP and the chairman of Vinnitsa state administration, says that "the goal of the PDP is *paritization* of national bureaucracy."<sup>48</sup>

V.Fedorov, First Deputy of Vinnitsa municipal administration, explains what are the results of such policy, "I was permanently advised to join the PDP and after all to look for another job. I was forced to take an office in the city executive committee."<sup>49</sup>

One-folded notions about the power is characteristic for the neo-nomenclature ideology. It is not the matter of moral and individual features of people constituting this social strata, but the matter of their interests. As access to the resources of this group is based on the gaining of some status within the system of power, then its desire to preserve monopoly of power is natural. Democratic society, in its turn, is based on the division of powers. It is evident

<sup>44</sup> V.Matvienko, "Who Can Suggest A Brand New Idea to President?" *Kievskie Vedomosti*, July 24, 1997.

<sup>45</sup> V.Matvienko, "Who Can Suggest A Brand New Idea to President?" *Kievskie Vedomosti*, July 24, 1997.

<sup>46</sup> Viktor Musiyaka, "Question of Dissolution of Parliament is Ridiculous and Sad," *Den*, August 8, 1997.

<sup>47</sup> R.Sakva, "Regime System and Civil Society in Russia," *Polis*, No. 1, 1997, 63.

<sup>48</sup> See *Megapolis of Ukraine*, June 25 — July 1, 1997.

<sup>49</sup> Nina Sotnik, "Social Experiment with Party Coloration," *Pravda Ukrainy*, October 1997.

that such an order does not meet the interests of those in the party of power and they struggle for their monopolistic ruling.

The struggle takes place not only between those who are out of power and want to get it, but also between the power centers. As it was mentioned before, there are several such centers in Ukraine. The most fierce struggle takes place between the presidential and parliamentary structures. The opposition between the Parliament and President started right after introduction of the institute of presidency in this country. As time showed, it is not a matter of individuals, but the logic of development of social and political processes in the post-socialist society. *The party of power* moves gradually towards the executive structures and tries to use it and monopolize.

Re-election of the President, replacement of the leaders of the Supreme Rada did not change the situation principally. Confrontation between these two institutes took place as in the 1992-1994, as in the 1995-1997.

Crisis of relations between the Parliament and President is periodical, while taking into account day by day confrontation between the Presidential Administration and the Supreme Rada, then this crisis is permanent.

It takes different forms in different period of times. This crisis has been revealed for several times in initiating the dismissal of Chairman of the Supreme Rada O.Moroz. There were three such attempts. The last one took place on May 13, 1997. This action should be considered not like personal dislike of O.Moroz by the President or the *party of power*, but as an attempt to weaken the Parliament as state institute. "May 13 proved again the fact that O.Moroz, even as the Speaker of the Parliament, is not a personal enemy of the state, but the Parliament itself. L.Kuchma understands (...) he could win only under the conditions of the absence of choice, in one or another form of 'Belorussian variant'. And it is necessary for him to ruin the current Parliament, in order to build 'the law of irreversibility', says I.Pogorelova.<sup>50</sup>

One of the peak moments of the struggle for the power was a procedure of impeachment of President proclaimed by the Committee on Legislative Policy of the Supreme Rada late in August — early in September 1997. As ex-Prime Minister Ye.Marchuk noted, "the decision of the Committee on Legislative Policy on the procedure of impeachment is the evidence of the fact that the conflict in the relations of the Parliament and President becomes deeper and deeper, and is already out of the sphere of interpersonal relations Kuchma — Moroz. The decision was made by the profile committee, where different political forces are represented, including diametrically opposite by their ideological doctrines."<sup>51</sup>

Party of power attempts to take monopoly in the access to power is shown as open efforts to violate democratic basis of state-building. Certainly, these attempts are presented in attractive wrappers. Say, an anti-democratic attempt to violate the regularity of presidential and parliamentary elections in the summer of 1997 was presented under the name of "prolongation of powers". And even during the time when the media was under the strict control by the party of power these proposals produced sharp critics of various political forces, public and after all authority had to reject this idea.

### 3.4. Clan Character of Elites

Term *clan* is used quite frequently in the studies of the post-Soviet elites. Is the term *elite* insufficient to define these groups? Why is this subsidiary term used? And what does the word *clan* mean? Let us dwell first on the last question.

The term *clan* derives from the Gaelic word *clann*, which means "offspring". In Scotland and Ireland it means a tribal division. Then this word was used to describe a social group composed of several families which act together in the economic or other area. However, it has a sad enough tinge because Mafia groups are also organized and act as family groups.

Within the context of Ukrainian social life of the last years, it has got its own meaning. A shadowy and closed group, which has not been sanctioned by law and is organized on the basis of common interests of its members is called a clan. Its members are connected with each other by common economic and pecuniary interests. The clan is united also by its own norms of mutual relationship — mutual responsibility, group egoism, its own "ethics", cynical attitude to the public interest, etc, not only the common group interest. The clans are called the "fifth power", and the shadowy economy is their ground.

The clans' distinctive features are not only opposition of their own interests to those of public or state, but the opposition to other clans. Clans try to extend their spheres of influence by subordinating or destroying their competitors. The struggle of clans takes place out of legal sphere, by using illegitimate methods. In this struggle, the clans use graft, blackmail, discreditable information in the media, conspiracy, and terror etc.

Favorable environment for clans' development is such a social situation, when social forces, being a social basis for the authorities, have not been formed yet, when the state power is weak, when deep crisis covers economy, politics, and social sphere.

Some observers believe that there are "four clans (the Military and Industrial Complex, Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk fuel and energy, and banking clans) in Ukraine now, which have divided their spheres of influence and are involved in a latent but violent struggle for legitimate power."<sup>52</sup> And this observation is quite correct when considering their area of activities the "struggle for Kyiv" as well, without taking into consideration the local clans (for example, those in Crimea or Odesa) which limit their interests by the local level.

The more powerful is a clan the more actively it is involved into the politics. In this sphere, the clan tries to adopt itself to the rules of behavior in political area, embedding its proteges into politics and grafting leading politicians. Clan character of politics manifests itself in borrowing many methods and ways of achieving ends from the criminal sphere, not only in untransparency of decision making process for the society.

Methods of intimidation, blackmail and even assassination are introducing into the politics. This creates a special atmosphere in social life, a selection of the participants of the process by their moral and strong will takes place. Honest people of high moral principles are forced out of politics. Such conditions are not appropriate for them both from the point of view of moral principles and

<sup>50</sup> Iryna Pogorelova, "Law of Irreversibility or the Price for One Head-2," *Zerkalo Nedeli*, May 17, 1997.

<sup>51</sup> Yevgen Marchuk, "President Has Lost Real Chance to Start Political Reform," *Den*, September 9, 1997.

<sup>52</sup> Volodymyr Lartsev, "Which Clan's Victory is Preferable to the Country," *Kievskie Vedomosti*, July 15, 1997.

psychological attitudes. R.Bodelan, Chairman of Odesa oblast state administration states, "When people are horrified and persecuted, it is quite clear that some of them cannot stand it, and they start thinking: is it worth to ballot in the next election? Many of my acquaintances tell me that in such a situation, they would not put forward their candidatures or take an active part in the election."<sup>53</sup>

Officials also talk about invasion of criminals into the Ukrainian political establishment. Prime Minister V.Pustovoitenko in his address in Dnipropetrovsk said, "I will say it frankly, we have every reason to say that a criminalized economic elite which longs for the power is being formed and strengthened. Economic criminal structures seek, and successfully, officials to protect their interests in shadowy economy functioning and money washing."<sup>54</sup>

Especially dangerous symptom is a gradual spread of terrorism in the state governance and politics. An attempt to assassinate Prime Minister of Ukraine P.Lazarenko in July 1996, assassination of Ye.Shcherban, in the fall of the same year, assassinations of Oleksiy Golovizin, Chairman of the Committee of the State Property of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, in spring 1997 and some other state officials.

At the same time, the economic elite claims that corruption has flourished among the top state officials. Such accusations appear both in the national and foreign media. Big national entrepreneurs, bankers blame the authorities of the so called "state racket". Characteristics of this phenomenon was described by M.Brodskiy in some interviews to Kyiv newspapers and radio. In the interview to Radio Liberty he described the phenomenon of the state racket in the following way, "They (top state officials — M.Sh.) told me they could put into prison my directors and fabricate criminal cases. If they would not testify against me. And it happened so. It happens exactly as Mr. Gorbulin told me. I see that the Ukrainian authorities keep their promises."<sup>55</sup>

The media reflects the symptoms of the authorities with ex-Prime Minister P.Lazarenko and his environment. Dismissal of P.Lazarenko from the post of Prime Minister was followed immediately by the dismissal of Ye.Dubinin, Deputy Chairman of Dnipropetrovsk oblast administration, who was blamed for the illegal transactions concerning the United Energy Systems of Ukraine Company. Ex-Prime Minister is considered one of the owners of this company.

Some media consider the car accident with M.Golyshev, Press-Secretary of ex-Prime Minister, several days after the dismissal of P.Lazarenko as intimidation of the latter or revenge to his press-secretary for the creation of positive public

image of Prime Minister.<sup>56</sup> On the whole, the dismissal of P.Lazarenko has been connected also with suicide attempt of ex-Minister of Agriculture Horishko.<sup>57</sup> These facts are analyzed by many observers, as phenomenon of competition of clans.

<sup>53</sup> Mykhailo Aksanyuk, "Bodelan is Confident that Murder of Boris Derevyanko was a Typical Assassination," *Den*, Sept. 23, 1997.

<sup>54</sup> See Vadym Ryzhkov, "They Were Talking About the 'Rope' in the Presence of the 'Hanged'," *Den*, September 6, 1997.

<sup>55</sup> Mykhailo Brodskiy, "It Was My Own Decision to Be A Victim," *Den*, Sept. 6, 1997.

<sup>56</sup> See, for example, Vitaliy Pashchenko, "Traces of 'Dnipropetrovsk Accident' Could Be Found in Political Kyiv," *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 11, 1997.

<sup>57</sup> See *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 18, 1997.

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## 4. RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRAL AND REGIONAL ELITES

### 4.1. Formation of Post-Soviet Regional Elites

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In the previous chapters, the all-Ukrainian, national or central elite has been discussed. However, the elite as a social phenomenon consists of two different parts — the central and regional elites. The latter is our main point of interest in this chapter.

The Soviet regional elite started to play more or less independent role in the social and political life of the country when the Union Center became weak and lost its total control over the regions. Political elites of the Baltic states were leaders at this process, and they were followed by the Transcaucasian elites soon. Then, elites of national autonomous republics, oblasts and regions of the Russian Federation became more active.

It was the period when the opposition between the Center and regions started to be understood in the Soviet society. The ideas that the Center was "fleecing" funds from the regions, that it is better to be independent from the Center and so on were widespread in the society. The "Center-regions" problem became very actual for the Russian Federation.

In Ukraine which was a region itself, just before the collapse of the USSR, this problem was called the problem of "Union-Ukraine". It was a period when the social and political processes in Ukraine were directed from without, against the Center. The internal Ukrainian regional problems were latent, and the problem of opposition "Kyiv-regions" was not clear and sharp. It was a time when only first poor-reasoned ideas about an eventual "land" state system of Ukraine have been proclaimed, and some scholars and leaders of a few national and cultural associations raised general questions about special interests of the Transcarpathian region, Bukovyna, Novorussia and also proposed to establish the Gagauz-Bulgarian autonomy on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR and the Moldovian SSR respectively.

The problems of the Crimean autonomy were on the separate agenda. Unsettled issue of the Crimean Tatars made these problems sharper. Thousands of deported Crimean Tatars were returning to Crimea. The Union Center failed to find the formula of solution of this issue, and all the practical difficulties were shifted off to the local Crimean authorities.

The official Kyiv held rather indifferent, distanced position in the issue of Crimean Tatars. It stimulated autonomist claims in Crimea. Besides, the activists of the Crimean Tatar movement popularized the idea to establish the Crimean Tatar Autonomy. This and other events resulted in the Crimean referendum in January 1994 on the restoration of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and population supported the idea. The local elite gained some importance in the region thanks to the proclamation of the Crimean Autonomous SSR. During this period, the second important regional elite became the Lviv oblast council where supporters of the People's Rukh Movement won the election. However, local elites in other regions had no notable political importance then.

Therefore, the problem of wider powers for the regions has become more actual since Ukraine gained its independence. First, the idea of federalization became popular. Its advocates argued that the state would be strong when regions become stronger; and the latter would be strong when their natural, economic, historical, ethno-cultural, linguistic, and religious features are taken into account. Second, adequate regional policy could not be formed in the center.

Federalist tendencies had different shades in different regions. The Constitution was developed in the Crimean Autonomous Republic which stipulated wide powers to this autonomy. In the Transcarpathian region, Bukovyna and Odesa regions, projects of free economic zones were developed.

Attempts of regional elites of Ukraine to increase their roles in the state were reflected in the process of the preparation of the Constitution of Ukraine. And as this work was extended for six years, preferences for the tendencies of unitarianism or federalism can be seen in the texts of every new draft version of the document.

In general, advocates of wide powers for the regions prevailed in 1992-1993. The Supreme Rada of Ukraine and its leadership represented these ideas. For example, in the draft Constitution of January 28, 1993, regions (in this text, the oblasts were proposed to be called the "lands") were given rather broad administrative autonomy, wide powers in all areas of the state and social life. Functions of the representatives of the President in oblasts were limited to monitoring and control as well as to the functions of coordination of the activities of the agencies subordinated to the central authorities. The role of representatives of the regions in the Central authorities increased at the same time. Thus, the National Assembly, parliament of two houses, was proposed. The Lower House or the People's Council had to represent the interests of the entire Ukraine. The Upper House or the Council of Territories had to represent the interests of the "lands". In 1992-1993, the opponents to the "federalists" paid attention to the dangers of increasing the roles of the territories in the life of the Ukrainian state. They expressed fears that decentralization during the process of state-building could lead to the state collapse, that autonomization of "lands" could complicate the consolidation of Ukrainian people etc. "Federalists" insisted that "it is the initial stage of the state-building when advantages of land-federal type of the state could become apparent completely. It is rather this type of state system that is the only possible way to preserve the integrity of the state."<sup>58</sup>

There was a sort of balance between "federalists" and "unitarianists" in this period in Ukraine. And final solution of the issue of territorial structure was postponed, everybody expected that the new Constitution would find the way to settle the dispute about the state territorial system and the number of houses in the Parliament.

Getting ahead of the story, it should be noted that the struggle for the Ukrainian Parliament consisting of one or two houses lasted in the country until the adoption of the Constitution. Thus, in the draft Constitution of March 11, 1996, we still could read a proposal to form the National Assembly, parliament of two houses: the House of the Deputies as lower house and Senate as upper house. Three senators from each oblast and the Autonomous

Republic of Crimea and two from Sevastopol had to be elected in Senate. However, the draft Constitution of Ukraine of May 5, 1996, took the idea of traditional Parliament of one house. The idea was stated in the Constitution.

The forms of state governance have changed several times since 1991 in Ukraine. After the introduction of Presidential branch of power and the first Presidential election in 1991, a new vertical order of state governance was established: local representatives of the President and their administrations. Taking into account that the vertical order of Councils also existed, two parallel power structures acted competing at every level. This led to their mutual weakening and weakening of the power in the society in general. It was a reason that the new local elite which could oppose the official Kyiv effectively have never developed or become strong since the Ukrainian independence was proclaimed.

The strongest opposition to Kyiv used to be from Simferopol. It was the only region in Ukraine which insisted strongly and willingly on its autonomy. Crimean experience in conducting autonomous regional policy was unsuccessful: unprofessional leadership and mutual opposition of local power elite — President of the ARC and the Supreme Council of the ARC, inability to solve the economic and social problems of the region, sharp increasing of criminal rate. Crimea was used as an example to prove that autonomization of the regions and federalization of the state was a wrong way. This example was a tool for those who opposed federalization, the local Kyiv authorities in the first turn, gave them numerous arguments of inappropriateness to refuse Unitarianism in general and during the state-building or deep and long-lasting economic crisis in particular.

The situation was such that more or less powerful regional elites in the rest of the country's territory supported the Center, not opposed it. At the beginning, in 1991-1993, the top state offices in Kyiv were taken mainly by representatives of the Western region. And after the Presidential election in 1994, the Kyiv Olympus was invaded step by step by representatives of the eastern regions, headed by the representatives of the Dnipropetrovsk elite.

According to an American analyst James Perle who referred to the data collected by the Center for Independent Political Studies, the people from Dnipropetrovsk have been appointed to more than 200 positions including 55 top positions since L.Kuchma was elected President of Ukraine. Thus, the Dnipropetrovsk inhabitants received disproportional access to the power and economic trophies.<sup>59</sup>

Peculiarities of Ukrainian regional elites which come to power in Kyiv can be seen in their strict demarcation to "ours" and "strangers" by regional belonging. One can agree that "the Western integrative type of a member of political elite, whose political abilities and skills makes unimportant his/her pre-political profession, education, and background, haven't formed yet"<sup>60</sup> in Ukraine. After taking key positions in Kyiv, the representatives of respective regional elite extrude "strangers" from high state offices energetically. Such a practice reminds tribalism which is typical for African countries. A top state official there, as a rule, chooses his subordinates from his tribe or clan in order

<sup>58</sup> James Perle, "Capitalist Way of Ukraine Can Be Blocked by Those from Political Clique," *Zerkalo Nedeli*, October 19, 1996.

<sup>60</sup> Dmytro Vydrin, "Ukrainian Political Elite: Peculiarities of Evolution and Evolution of Peculiarities," *Kievskie Vedomosti*, Sept. 3, 1994.

<sup>58</sup> V.B. Grynyov, *New Ukraine As I See It*, Kyiv, 1995, p.29.

to be fully confident in them. In this country, it becomes apparent as a fellowship of townsmen or regional solidarity.

By the way, this trend emerged in personnel policy in the Soviet period. People from a particular region, after being appointed to top positions in the central authorities, "take with them" those colleagues who have worked with them earlier. This usually resulted in extrusion of the previous group by the new one.

Thus, it is possible to trace some stages in the processes of development of regional elites in Ukraine. During 1992 and first half of 1994, the stage of opposition of the ideas of unitarianism and federalism took place. On the one hand, the ideas of wider powers for the regions were popularized mainly by oblast councils and young regional elites, and the possibility of federal state structure was discussed. These proposals found support in the Supreme Rada of Ukraine. On the other hand, President of Ukraine, his staff in the Center and in the regions argued that the Unitarian system is most important for the country, i.e. the indirect support to the Central authorities and control over the local elite and its place in the life of the state and society took place.

After the Presidential election of 1994 in Ukraine, an attempt to change a vertical structure of executive power and cut down powers of the local councils was made (especially when the Constitutional agreement was adopted). It was a period when the post of President of the ARC was abolished, a veto of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine was put upon several laws and decisions of the Supreme Council of the ARC. However, the competition between the central and regional elites is far from being finished. It is not apparent in the public political life of Ukraine now, but it cannot be evidence of the final "victory" of the Center.

## 4.2. Social and Political Characteristics of Regional Elites in Ukraine

A notion about regional elites as something homogeneous and undifferentiated is typical for the studies on elites. Meanwhile, it is not true. Regional elites are as variegated as central elites are. And regional elite groups also experience contradictions, not only differences.

There are several types of elites usually distinguished among the regional power structures. For example, V.Shubkin defines five such types (in Russia). First, it is a group including top officials of the executive branch of power: heads of oblast administrations, their deputies, heads of the departments etc. The author of the typology "conditionally calls them the "executives". The second group of regional elite consists of representatives of the legislative branch of power. These are the members of the Legislative Councils and oblast or regional Dumas. They are called the "legislators". The third type of regional elite includes "directors" who are at the head of the largest enterprises and stock companies which controlling block of shares belongs to the state. The fourth group includes heads of the large private enterprises, companies, co-operatives etc. These are the "businessmen". The last group of the regional elite includes the "ci-devants" or "have-beens". They are the

former top Communist leaders of an oblast or a region who still have influence on public, political, and economic life of the region.<sup>61</sup>

This typology can be used for the analysis of regional elite in Ukraine. The Ukrainian local elite does not differ greatly from its Russian counterpart by its structure. Thus, in the Supreme Rada of Ukraine of the twelfth convocation, 110 MPs from 450 presented were representatives of the regional elite which consisted mainly of the former chiefs of Communist party local units.<sup>62</sup>

When analyzing social and political characteristics of the new regional elites, attention should be paid to its such characteristics as experience and world outlook. The typical way for them to reach the highest levels of regional elite during the Soviet period was to get education in Moscow (even if they graduated from institutes of higher education in their own region): at the Academy of Social Sciences, the Higher Communist Party School, the Higher Komsomol School, the Institute of National Economy Management etc. Besides, they usually spent several years working in Moscow and then were appointed at top positions in their regions. Thanks to this order the representatives of regional elite understood better the role of their region in the state system as a whole, understood the logic of decisions of their bosses in Moscow, had their personal contacts in Moscow. They had their own positive attitude towards Moscow, connected to their own biography and experience.

After the collapse of the USSR, many members of the new regional elite were recruited from the local political figures who very often had not managed to pass all the stairs of power hierarchy in their careers. However, the role of this strata of "neophytes" among the regional elite should not be underestimated. Thus, according to the data collected by O.Kryzhanovskaya, 82.3 percent of regional elite in the Yeltsin pack in Russia (unlike the Brezhnev and Gorbachev packs) were recruited from the old party and administrative nomenclature.<sup>63</sup>

It is better to say that the old nomenclature has not been recruited into the new elite, but it remained within the elite which just started to be called the new, as it proclaimed new values and new policy. Some researchers consider that "it is possible to state the existence of social strata of nomenclature 'mutants' who made some efforts to survive the political changes, and moreover, they strengthened their positions".<sup>64</sup>

Under the present conditions, the ruling elite has merged with the state bureaucratic apparatus in practice, and this led to the unprecedented increasing of the role of state apparatus in the social life. The strengthening of positions of the local elite reflects this situation at the regional level. One of the reasons for this situation was that the old state apparatus, preserved almost completely and integrated into the new circumstances, haven't got its new "master" after the loss of its old CPSU "master", the then ruling state political organization, but started to play its own role of the master of the state and society. This freedom is as twice as much in the regions because the power of the vertical structure has weakened and the control over the apparatus from the local party institutions has disappeared.

<sup>61</sup> See V.Shubkin, "Ruling Elites of Siberia", *Sociological Journal*, No. 1, 1995, 149.

<sup>62</sup> V.V.Fesenko, "Political Elite in Ukraine: Controversies of Formation and Development," *Polis*, No. 6, 1995, 89.

<sup>63</sup> O.V.Kryzhanovskaya, "Transformation of the Old Nomenclature into the New Russian Elite, *Social Sciences and Modernity*, No. 1, 1995, 64.

<sup>64</sup> A.V.Obolonsky, "Post-Soviet Officials, Quasi-bureaucratic Ruling Class," *Social Sciences and Modernity*, No. 5, 1996, 7.



Thus, regional elites became more powerful and confident within their regions.

#### 4.3. New Tendencies in Behavior of Regional Elites in Ukraine

Weakening of the central power because of the inter-clan and intra-clan struggle makes the position of the regional leaders stronger. The local elite in Ukraine can strengthen its positions only at the regional level and mainly in the economic aspect. Politically, it is still a force of little significance. The central authority does not want to share its power with the local elite and is not going to do it in the future. It results in increasing of the hidden opposition between Kyiv and the regions, and between some regions as well.

Regions in any country have their special interests and it is a basis for the controversies and contradictions between them. In Ukraine, competition of regions for distribution of budget financing in the Supreme Rada is appreciable. The interests of donor-regions (Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Lugansk, and Kharkiv oblasts) and recipient-regions clash there. Moreover, some donor-regions are dissatisfied with Kyiv because they finance the Center, but have no political impact on it.

Some regions including the Kyiv, Zhitomyr, and Rivno oblasts, which suffered from the Chernobyl disaster most, or the Autonomous Republic of Crimea which experiences a lot of problems with the integration of deported people argue that the Center's attention to their specific problems is insufficient.

Ukraine had no legislative mechanism before to overcome such contradictions. There were some hopes that the corresponding legal instruments in the Constitution could serve as a tool to solve the interregional problems. However, it became apparent soon that the Constitution does not envisage special agency to solve the contests between the regions, between the Central authorities and local governments.

President L.Kuchma, while paying much attention to the issue of balancing the interests of the regions, and the Center and regions as well, proposed a new organizational form of their co-operation in the first weeks after his inauguration. He approved the establishment of the Council of Regions, as the President's advisory body, consisting of senior officers of oblast councils, and of heads of oblast state administrations after the adoption of Constitutional agreement in 1995. President is also supported in his work by the Association of Mayors of Cities and Towns of the Basic Level, a civil agency which was established earlier. It is true that civil agencies can play a positive role in coordination of efforts of the Central and local authorities, but they cannot solve all the problems which have been emerged in this area. This limits the abilities of the regional elites in the protection of their interests, irritates them, creates some opposition attitudes to the Central authority among them. That is why some political scientists and observers propose to establish a special ministry or institution to solve the problems of territories.

Contradictions between the real interests of regions and their administrations can be seen as a background of the contradictions among the regional shadowy structures or clans as they are called. Opposition of regional clans has become clearly apparent in Ukraine lately. Unlike Russia, where the media "strengthens" positive images of regional power leaders — presidents of

republics, governors of the regions and oblasts, public opinion in Ukraine, shaped by the media, is focused on the chiefs of regional clans, groups, not the leaders of regional power structures. These groups by themselves reflect regional interests (that is why the "Donetsk", "Dnipropetrovsk", "Lviv", "Odesa", "Kharkiv" and other clans are fixed) as well as interests of certain industrial branches (the oil and gas clan, the metallurgic, agrarian, and energetic clans etc). These informal and shadowy groups are widely covered by the media which discusses who of the top officials belongs to which group or clan or controls it.

The process of opposition between the Central and regional elites, official elites and shadowy clans takes place in the situation of sharp decrease of living standards of the population, delays in payment of salaries and pensions, increase of official and hidden unemployment rate in Ukraine which deepens more and more alienation of political authorities from the population.

All this leads to a negative social psychological reaction of common citizens. That is why the word-combination "political authorities" is associated in minds of common people with the word "mafia", not the "elite".<sup>65</sup> And these negative associations have become the fixed social and psychological stereotypes in the public consciousness after the so-called resounding cases involving the top officials, after the attempts of assassination of some political and state persons, and after the assassinations of some famous politicians.

Democratic channels to form new types of ruling elites are getting narrow. Some of them are changed (or turned into) less democratic or pseudo-democratic means to recruit the elite (for example, number of top elective offices is becoming less and less). The process of re-establishment of the system of high rank state officials is far from being democratic; qualification exams, attestations, advertising vacancies where envisaged are not kept in practice. Therefore, it can be concluded that the mechanisms of public control over the ruling elite are absent or ineffective in the regions. This situation results in public distrust to the elite, public disillusionment in democratic slogans, public disbelief in a possibility to establish a fair social order in the country, and decrease of political and electoral activity of the population.

Under these circumstances, the ideas of building civil society by authoritative means through giving wide powers to a democratically-oriented political leader have appeared. The authoritarianism of a progressive president, the "icebreaker of democracy", that could effectively overcome the conservative forces opposed the modernization of the social system is justified.<sup>66</sup>

Egalitarian concepts, popular in the period of Gorbachev's *perestroika*, have been changed by elitarian theories that justify the view that effective people's power is practically impossible in this country. And this is a reason why, first, it is necessary to give the powers of people to the ruling elite in the sphere of political governance. Second, the mass is supposedly ignorant and ill-informed to take reasonable and wise political decisions. The wise and professional elite can do it better than the people. Sometimes the following arguments are added: the people have been lumpenized during the years of the Soviet power and they reveals the so called "communal and barrack" thinking. That

<sup>65</sup> Andriy Fedorov, "Ukraine: Leadership, Elite, Power," *Nezavisimost*, Sept. 9, 1994.

<sup>66</sup> See A.V. Obolonskiy, "Post-Soviet Officials: Quasi-bureaucratic Ruling Class," *Social Sciences and Modernity*, No. 5, 1996, 14.

is why it is dangerous to let the people make serious political decisions because they can harm itself.

Promotion of elitarianism ideas also reveals in Ukraine. The idea on the pedagogical role of elite for those who are not included into it is widely propagated. The elite is said to be far beyond the mass in understanding of social tendencies, their nature, not only superficial phenomena; it sets social objectives, goals and produces social values etc.

However, the Ukrainian central elite, especially that which is closer to the state power, has no reason to claim to be a "dominant influence" taking into account its qualities. An indicator of its decline and militant anti-intellectualism can be found in the "phenomenon of M.Poplavskiy", manager-culturologist, whose promotion to top offices reflects the intellectual and educational level (in content, not in form) of the Ukrainian powers that be.

Efficiency of the efforts of the elite to introduce its ideas into the social behavior of "ordinary people" can also give rise to doubt. It has been an old pain of intellectuals that ordinary people do not understand and do not want to accept their "genius ideas". And this is a source of their complaints, "It seems that intellectuals of different countries can easier come to terms with each other than with their own 'common people', which still are captured by historical myths and respond to any rational arguments badly."<sup>67</sup> The topic of "wrong people", which has been "deeply Sovietized" and has bad political genes, is rather spread among the Ukrainian elite, both political and intellectual.

Thus, under the conditions of political crisis, political inability of the central authority, some circles are preparing the public thought to accept the idea that state power should be given to a narrow group of professionals, namely the "real elite" (i.e. the Central elite), which is the only one able to overcome the crisis in society. However, these trends are opposed by the regional elite, which has become stronger and understands the threat to its own interests in this indoctrination, not only true democratic forces and ordinary people.

In Ukraine, the regional elite has never gained such political importance and authority as that in Russia has. This can be confirmed by the following example. According to the results of the expert interviewing conducted in March 1996, only Volodymyr Sherban, Head of Donetsk oblast administration, and Eduard Gurvitz, Mayor of Odesa, among other representatives of the local elites were included into the fifty most influential politicians in Ukraine. However, their political careers cannot be called successful; V.Sherban, for example, was removed from his post of the Head of state administration and he had to sent in his own resignation from the post of the Head of oblast council.

Those politicians of regional level who openly put themselves into the opposition to Kyiv, has had short political biographies as a rule. We can name Yu.Meshkov, the then president of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, S.Tsekov, Speaker of the Crimean Parliament, P.Kupin, Head of the Lugansk oblast state administration.

When talking about political perspectives of the Ukrainian regional elite, then the issue is not only about personal abilities of its representatives. Regional

elite's chances for its legitimate self-affirmation in the area of top state power have been limited since the Constitution of Ukraine, which established the single-chamber parliamentary system, was adopted.

It should be mentioned that this view is not supported by all researchers in Ukraine. Thus, G.Pochepstov thinks that "we can note some features of structured elite, even without a structured society in Ukraine. The elite becomes an important factor of political life when it is supported by the regions economically and financially. The Central authority should change the models of its relationship with it, if it want to avoid conflict situations."<sup>68</sup> The authors' opinion is that we should distinguish between the real financial and economic power of some regional elite groups and their real influence on the policy of the top state structures in Kyiv. It is the latter that does not satisfy them.

Thus, free competition of elite groups is a prerequisite to strengthen democracy and establish democratic civil society in societies in transition, and in Ukraine in particular. Only the people themselves, the voters whose free choice can be considered a social and political evaluation of the powers that be, political parties which reflect the interests of various social groups can be an arbiter of political positions and values promoted by elite groups. The basis for civil society should be strengthened and deepened by encouraging all the people to develop and take part in independent public associations.

Elite groups should be subject to public control either directly or through the independent media. Mechanisms of public control should be created to react to the population's attitude to the ruling elite. Alienation of the power structures from the population, absence of permanent public dialog between the mass and the power elite is fraught with the establishment of authoritarianism and totalitarianism in this country.

That is why *conditions for dynamic circulation of the elite groups in the society should be created*. The latter should be open to representatives of different strata of the population and different regions to enter them. Numerical superiority of representatives from one particular region in the authorities, that is asymmetry of regional representation in the Central authorities, leads to the distrust of the regions towards the Center and creates the attitudes of regional political egoism.

<sup>68</sup> Georgiy Pochepstov, "Tail is the Head of Everything. The Center is Losing its Influence in the Regions," *Den'*, January 4, 1997.

<sup>67</sup> Mykola Ryabchuk, "What Can We Learn from Our Neighbors," *Den'*, July 11, 1997.

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## 5. UKRAINIAN PUBLIC OPINION ON THE RULING ELITE

### 5.1. Who Is Considered the Ruling Elite by the Population?

The topic of Ukrainian elite has its phenomenological aspect. It implies the population's perception of the elite as social phenomenon. It was the Ukrainian population's perception of the ruling elite that became the aim of our sociological survey conducted in December 1996. The survey was all-Ukrainian, it represented the entire population of the country, and the sample for it covered 1,200 people.

The notion of power or political elite was not used in the Soviet social science and journalism regarding its own society. The reason for it was evident — there was no place for the institutionalized elitarity in the society built on the basis of egalitarianism. That is why the category of elite is rather a new notion in the lexicon of a wide range of citizens of the post-Soviet societies, and it can be understood in different ways.

Hence, we invited our respondents to finish the sentence "Elite is..." to study the public view on the Ukrainian elite. 44 percent of respondents said that the most rich people constitute the elite. 42 percent consider that the elite is those who hold top positions. And only 15 percent of respondents think that the elite include the best, most profound people in their field. Therefore the elite is understood today mostly as a ruling elite, not intellectual.

This conclusion has been confirmed by another question in the survey, which intended to define more exactly how respondents understand the term "elite". 15 social categories of people were presented to the respondents, and they were asked to define which one is the closest to the word "elite". The very first places were taken by President (41%), Ministers (31%), MPs (32%), businessmen (31%), bankers (21%). Answers have differed considerably in different regions. Thus, President is most closely connected to the elite in the Western part (Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil oblasts) of Ukraine — 63.3%; Ministers were also estimated higher in these regions — 53.8%.

It is interesting that the writers (5%), actors (7%), leaders of political parties (7.5%), top military men (2.5%) took extremely low places. By the way, only 12 percent of respondents consider scientists and scholars to be the elite. Their rating is even lower than that of leaders of criminal groups. The latter were included to the elite by 14 percent of respondents. The rating of scientists and scholars is somewhat higher in the places of their concentration, though. Thus in Kyiv, scientists and scholars were included to the elite group by 21.6 percent of respondents.

Thus, the Ukrainian population understands the notion of elite in connection with the top groups of executive and legislative power as well as with the entrepreneurs and bankers who are considered wealthy people. The image of top official has merged with the image of a wealthy person in the conscience of a common citizen of Ukraine.

What does the population think about the ruling elite from the perspective of its power roots? There were following answers to the question, "Did the

change of the ruling elite take place in Ukraine after proclaiming its independence?": 8 percent of respondents answered that it had changed fully, 40 percent answered that ruling elite had changed partially, and 34 percent thought that the same people who had power before still have remained in the ruling elite after proclaiming the independence. These answers not only reflect the public views about staff changes in the ruling groups of the country, but also present public understanding of the quality of the changes in the society after Ukraine gained its independence. Some people think that revolution took place in this country and estimate their real life respectively, and others think that the society is experiencing deep systemic transformation, that social order is changing evolutionary, without cataclysms, pressures to anybody, and assess the reality from this point of view.

Those who think that revolution took place express their dissatisfaction that many people in the ruling elite have been recruited from the old elite and it does not respond to their view of the revolutionary changes. Those who think that deep system transformation took place, on the other hand, are not satisfied with the use of intellectual potential, state managerial skills of those who previously were the members of the ruling elite. In this issue the differences among the regions are quite substantial. Especially visible are the differences among the regions are evident especially in the answers of those people who think that the same people have remained in the ruling elite after proclaiming the independence. Thus, there are 60.3% of such people in the Western region and only 19.0% in the South-Eastern region (Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia.)

Openness of elite groups to outside recruits from non-elite groups is an important indicator of the formation of democratic society. The population's trust that common people can join the elite is also a certain indicator of its openness.

Our survey also included the question: "Could you find yourself in the ruling elite in the future?" The answer of the considerable part of respondents was that they didn't pursue this aim (44.3%). Almost the same percentage of respondents just do not believe in such a possibility. The answer "I won't be able to do it, even if I do my best, because strangers are not allowed there" was chosen by 44.0% of respondents. The largest part of those who do not hope to join the elite is in the North-Eastern region (Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts) — 65.0%, and 64.5% in the Crimea. There are only 3 percent of respondents in this region who believe in their ability and intention to join the top ruling group. The largest number of such optimists is in the Crimea and Kyiv, 9.9% and 5.5% respectively.

It has been interesting to find out whether non-elite groups believe in the future democratization of recruiting to the elite groups, at least for their own children. The Ukrainian citizens turned out to be pessimistic in this respect. The answers to the question "Do you believe your children would have the possibility to join ruling elite?" were the following: only 5 percent of optimistically-minded respondents answered, "I'm sure they will have such possibility." There were 21.9 percent of those who have some hope and answered, "I want to believe in it, though I'm not sure". And there were 55.2% of respondents, or more than half, whose answer was rather pessimistic, "I'm sure it is impossible".

## 5.2. Level of Confidence of the Population in the Ruling Elite

The role of the elite increases during the systemic transformation in a society as it was mentioned before. The elite champions reforms and generates new social ideas. However, it can perform these functions only when it enjoys the confidence of the population. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian elite has passed the stage of high confidence of the masses. The thing is that sharp stratification of society in terms of income put a minority of the population of the society into the opposition to its majority. This property opposition became apparent as political, and social and psychological alienation of masses from the ruling elite, distrust of the lower strata to the upper.

While talking about the reasons of distrust of the population to the ruling elite moral and psychological reasons should be mentioned. The thing is that the considerable part of the current ruling elite are the people who used to take up top positions in the Soviet party nomenclature, who were the 'militant' advocates of the Soviet way of life and Communist ideology. Many of them are still remembered as active members of party committees and frequent speakers at party meetings, who used to hold up to shame those who did not want to follow the moral code of the builders of Communism. In order to preserve their positions in the ruling elite, they changed easy their Marxist ideological 'suits' for Ukrainian nationalist 'embroidered shirts'.


Among today's political leaders, there are many yesterday's poets and writers who snatched their chances to get either a medal for a pathetic 'Communist' oratorio or a literary prize for a patriotic essay under Communist rule. Personal cynicism of this people leads to moral disgust and stable distrust of the common people.

There is no such thing as free lunch. We mean that false, cynicism, perfidy should be paid for. And this results in distrust to the upper strata by the masses, and dissatisfaction and demoralization of the lower strata themselves.

In the stable society, the elite does not play only the role of the direct manager of the state and public affairs; it also influence the society in an indirect way. Thus, possessing high moral authority in the stable society, it establishes some social behavioral patterns which non elite groups share and are guided by. While producing the social values, the elite serves as value by itself. It serves as a reference group to the masses. However, during the systemic transformation in Ukraine, the elite has lost or just has not got the role of the reference group.

Thus, controversial character of the current situation is also that the role of the elite in imposing the system of values and estimations on public consciousness increases in the period of instability, on the one hand, and the influence of the ruling elite on the masses is decreasing, on the other hand.

Public opinion poll supports this supposition. A question "What group of people do you trust?" was answered with "President" by 17.6% only. Miserable is public trust to Ministers (2.4%), MPs (3.9%), senior officers of oblasts administrations (2.7%), leaders of political parties (1.2%), entrepreneurs (4.4%), and bankers (3.1%). The poll has demonstrated that the ruling elite is extremely distrusted by the population.



The answers to the question "Whose opinion do you consider most today, trying to understand where is truth and where is false in our society?" also supported this fact. There were only 1.9 percent of those who considered the ruling elite's opinion.

However, it is not only the ruling elite which has lost the trust of the masses. Sharp change of arguments about what is progressive and what is conservative, what is positive and what is negative in the press and TV led to the decline of public confidence in the media, and journalists in particular. It will be recalled that they propagated equality, condemned high salaries of some state officials just a few years ago or they used to insist, for example, that nuclear energy is dangerous and now they advocate just the opposite things. Evidently, it is one of the reasons why the question "Whose opinion do you consider most today, trying to understand where is truth and where is false in our society?" was answered "To journalists" only by 18.6% of respondents.

Under the circumstances, the elite does not perform its most important social-psychological function: the role of a model of the social behavior in the public consciousness to be followed by the public.

Then who has the authority in the society? Who is still trusted by the people? Or they do not trust anybody at all? On the whole, the level of distrust crossed the socially dangerous line. Scientists and scholars have the highest level of trust. However, they are trusted only by 36 percent of respondents (i.e. only one third of the pollees). Besides, we should remind that only 12 percent of the respondents include scientists and scholars into the elite. Therefore, though the level of trust to the scientists and scholars is rather high, it is not the trust to the elite by itself but trust to the bearers of knowledge.

The trust to top clergy, writers and actors is rather considerable — approximately 16 percent for each group. But certainly these categories have no influence on the decision making process in Ukraine.

What is the reason of such distrust? The most popular explanation of it is as follows: those who have got the power just stop thinking of other people and began to think only about themselves. Sixty eight percent of respondents agree with that, and 22.5 percent more are rather agree. Only 3.5% of respondents do not agree with these statement.

These answers reflect generalization of the whole range of expectations of the behavior of various groups of the ruling elite that have never been realized — non-fulfillment of election promises by MPs and the President, re-calculation of savings of the population, pauperization, loss of living perspectives and many others.

The opinion that the ruling elite takes wrong decisions very often is wide spread among the respondents. However, the problem is not only that wrong decisions are adopted, but why they are adopted.

The alienation between the elite and the public has no neutral character. A great supply of public dissatisfaction concerning the ruling elite, not only its dissatisfaction concerning the circumstances, has been concentrated in this estrangement's distance. This dissatisfaction is being expressed both in rational and emotional forms.

Rationally, it is expressed as follows: the question, "Do you think your living standards depend on those from the elite groups and to what extent?" was answered with "Depends largely" by 36 percent of respondents, "Depends to a certain extent" by 37 percent, and "Hardly depends" — by 8.5 percent of respondents only. Thus, we can see that the majority of the Ukrainian population connects its dissatisfaction over the living standards with the ruling elite, not with the circumstances or itself.

The answers to this question in different regions differ considerably. The answer "Depends largely" was given by 57.9 percent of respondents in the western region and 57.2 percent in the south-eastern region respectively. The most number of those who think their living standards hardly depend on the ruling elite (26.2%) are among Kyivans. Therefore, it is possible to assume that paternalistic illusions and attitudes toward the ruling elite are fading away among the inhabitants of the Ukrainian capital, which is forestalling the regions in social tendencies. However, the public expectations of the elite are still great in most regions of the country.

### 5.3. Public Emotional Attitudes toward the Ruling Elite

The emotional dimension of the attitude of the population towards the elite can be understood in the light of the aforesaid. A question "What do you feel toward the ruling elite?" was answered with "Offense" by 21 percent of respondents and "Hostility" by 13.5 percent respectively. That is, the reaction to the ruling elite of one third of the population is actively negative. And more than 54 percent of respondents declared that they feel indifference towards the elite. These psychological indicators are extremely unfavorable for the strengthening of democracy and development of civil society.

There are some other indicators signifying the erosion of the value of democratic institutes in the society. Ideas that mechanisms of political life in Ukraine seem to be far from democratic are wide spread among the population. Thus, 12 percent of respondents answered the question "Imagine you or your children are going to make a political carrier; what would help you most certainly?" that active political activities would be of most certain assistance to them, "Big money" was answered by 52 percent, "Ties of family and friendship in the power structures" was answered by 31 percent.

Thus, the survey has demonstrated that *the population of Ukraine has mostly negative image of the ruling elite. The Ukrainian elite does not fit the most important social function elite groups perform in stable societies, i. e. the function of the reference group, a model of social behavior, and the moral and psychological leadership to be followed by the public.*

Alienation between the elite and non-elite is increasing. The links between the elite and the public has been broken. Under the present conditions, the dialog between the rulers and the ruled is hardly possible. Anyway, there has been no evidence of special efforts made by the ruling elite to initiate such a dialog lately.

All this is especially dangerous on the threshold of the election to the Supreme Rada. Today, the election is practically the only form of public control over the elite. There was no normal and regular stable communication between the elite and the public in the period between the election and the mass feels itself

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deceived by the elite. Public distrust to the elite is great. Thus, the behavior of the mass (i.e. the electorate) during the election can be realized in the models of revenge to the elite. The first model of such behavior is refusal to vote. The second model is to vote against all. The third model is to vote for the forces which can take vengeance on the today's powers that be if they come to power. This situation creates unfavorable conditions both for the development of democracy and active involvement of the wide strata of population in political life and the fostering of state-building in Ukraine.

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