

**Friedrich Ebert Foundation**

***Young People of New Russia: Who are they?  
What are their Goals and Values?***

**A brief summary of the analytical report prepared by  
Russian Independent Institute for Social and Ethnic Problems**

**Moscow, January, 1998**

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In November - December, 1997 on commission from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation the Russian Independent Institute for Social and Ethnic Problems conducted a sociological study representative on a national scale to probe into the life values and goals of the young people of Russia and attempt to profile the younger generation of this country.

The target of the study based on a special sociological questionnaire and the concept of formalized interview included two groups; the principal group consisting of young people aged between 17 and 26 (a total of 1974 persons) and the control group representative of the older generation aged between 40 and 60 (a total of 774 persons).

Considering the pattern whereby the main and control study groups were formed the comparative analysis of the data acquired was done based on the one hand, on the model of that part of Russia's younger generation who matured and became integrated into the social fabric and the division of labor during the early years of market-oriented reforms, a period known as "perestroika". On the other hand, the study accounted for the model of civic integration that was followed during the earlier Krushchev and Brezhnev periods of Soviet history.

The study was conducted in 12 territorially administered economic regions of the Russian Federation and also in Moscow and St. Petersburg using a sample based on national parameters for the quotas for sex, age, ethnic composition and social and professional status based on the data from the National Board of Statistics for 01/01/97. In keeping with the statistical data available and the purposes of the study the poll was conducted among the following social and professional groups of young people: workers at industrial enterprises, mines and construction sites, engineers and technicians, people in creative and humanitarian professions, the services industry, including intellectual services, career army and police officers, small and medium-sized businesses, college students and young people living in the rural areas. The same groups were polled in the older sample with the exception of students for the purposes of cross-generational analysis.

Despite the fact that the principal object of the study was the young people of the new emerging Russian society and the main purpose of it was to draw their social portrait the analytical report also gives a comparative cross-generational analysis.

The analytical report was prepared by a team of the RIISEP consisting of M. Gorshkov, team leader, N. Tikhonov, assistant team leader, L. Byzov, N. Davydova, A. Zdravomyslov, M. Mchedlov, V. Petukhov, A. Ryabov and F. Sheregy. Computer typesetting was done by N. Dyagiliva and S. Sherbina.

The full text of the report is available in Russia. This brief summary of the report in English offers a concise selection of the principal findings describing the mindset and life style of today's young people in Russia.

The report consists of seven sections. The first section, "Young People and their Incomes and Standard of living" concludes that the standard of living of

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young people is well below their expectations, but much better than the standard of living of older generation (Figure 1).

According to the data in Figure 1, 66 percent of the young people view their standard of living as positive, versus 44.5 percent of the older people. Besides, twice as many people in the older group as in the young group experienced a decline in the standard of living over the past year. In the younger sample there are at least three times as many people whose standard of living grew better.

Therefore the standard of living of the younger people, albeit self-assessed, is by far better than the standard of living of the older group. According to the findings of the study this is due to the fact that the bulk of younger people have better adapted professionally, organizationally and psychologically to the new social conditions and were quicker to find ways of earning a living than the older people.

Among the younger people complaining about their standard of living the lead is taken by those who are employed by state-run enterprises - 36.2 percent and those employed by privatized enterprises - 36.3 percent. A lesser percentage of younger people unhappy about their standard of living is among those who are employed by private joint stock companies - 22.4 percent and private enterprises - 17.9 percent. That is why of those young people who are employed by private enterprises a mere 7.7 percent would like to go back to the state employer, whereas of the young people employed by the state one out of every two would like to go work for private business.

The ways used by the young people to improve their standard of living do not differ much on the whole from the ways employed by the older people to meet the same objective. The difference is, however, that 23.5 percent of the young people (most of whom live in the country) are for the most part supported by their parents. In general, both younger and older generations seek to improve their standard of living by working on the side, running small businesses, or seeking assistance from relatives and friends (Figure 2).

The older generation are far more passive than the younger generation in trying to improve their standard of living. Seeking or having a second source of income is more common among young people in most social-professional groups. The percentage of those who draw a fixed income is higher among the older group.

The material standard of living of younger people is notably better than that of the older people. The dynamics of change of the standard of living is in favor of the younger people since they tend to seek employment or a second job in the private sector.

The second section of the report, *Work in the Life of Young Russians*, concludes that the younger people have a higher educational standard compared to the older generation. Despite the fact that one out of every ten young

people is a college drop out, one out of every three has graduated to get a higher education.

Readiness to go for new jobs is today one of the most important factors for success in finding a job as the economy goes through structural change and the younger people are far more active job-seekers. Only 51.2 percent of the young people work in the professions for which they have been trained in college. Of the remaining 48.8 percent nearly a half changed their profession or trade after acquiring initial professional experience and the other half have never worked in the profession for which they were trained having acquired a more socially appealing profession. Professional and trade preferences of the young Russians are given in Figures 3 and 4.

Generally speaking, the younger people believe that those professions that are significant as the country goes through a transition to a market-led economy are most prestigious. In the 60s and 70s those professions which reflected the priorities of the USSR as a great power or helped it to maintain its positions in the arms race were considered most prestigious (such as nuclear physics or cosmonautics). By the same token younger people quite adequately respond to the demands of today's society, although those demands have changed. That is the reason why in responding to the question about what should help get a good job the young people assigned the highest priority to "good training and knowledge base".

The bulk of the younger people are motivated to seek employment in the private sector. The top priority goes to foreign firms operating in Russia, private Russian enterprises, and entrepreneurial activities. Only one out of every six young Russians would like to be employed by the state sector of the economy. For the most part those are the people who have to take jobs in the state sector because of the nature of their training. The priorities of the older generation are substantially different, but 44.7 percent of them would like to take jobs in the private sector too. High on the list of their preferences also are foreign companies, private companies and entrepreneurial activities, but the state-run enterprises remain the top preference of the older generation.

The standards of training of the younger people and the nature of their motivation in seeking jobs and readiness to account for the demand on the labor market offer them an advantage complemented by the fact that common among them are those skills which are valued by the labor market today, such as computer literacy, command of foreign languages, and driving skills. The study revealed that on the whole younger people today represent a better labor force compared to the older age group and the differences in their position on the labor market appropriately reflect upon their standard of living. It is not at all surprising therefore that the younger people have a more optimistic attitude toward the effects upon them of the economic reform.

One in seven young people believes that the economic reform made his or her life better. In the older age group nearly three times fewer people have the same attitude. On the other hand, twice as many people in the older age group as in the younger group believe that they lost from the reform.

At the same time there are distinct groups of "successful" and "unsuccessful" people in the younger age group. An important factor here is the region of residence. In Nizhny Novgorod, Tver, Vladivostok, Kaliningrad and other regions where the private sector has made strides and small businesses in particular are doing well, the position of the younger people is notably better. The extensive labor market here readily accommodates job-seekers. In Tver, for instance the percentages of the "successful" and "unsuccessful" are practically the same, 15.2 percent and 15.9 percent, respectively (the others rated their status as satisfactory), whereas in Nizhny Novgorod the ratio between the "successful" and "unsuccessful" was 21.8 percent versus 30.3 percent.

In Kemerovo, Novgorod and regions with a lower rate of market reform and a depressed labor market the situation of the younger people is quite hard. In Kemerovo, for one, only 1.4 percent of the young people described their status as good versus 37.2 percent who said they were not doing well at all. The ratio between success and failure in Novgorod was 4.9 percent versus 50.7 percent. As the findings of the study show the "successful" young people possess better skills which add to their value on the job market and display more drive in acquiring those skills.

The third section of the report is titled **"Plans, System of Values and Moral Standards of the Young People"**. Its principal finding is that a big majority of the young Russians do have a clear-cut goal in life (70 percent).

Only 9 percent of the young people have no clear-cut goal in life and 21 percent never gave it a thought. The responses evoked by an explicit question about what that goal is are given in Figure 5 which assumes that 100 percent of the young people have a goal in life.

As the responses indicate the young people of Russia today pursue both spiritual and moral and purely pragmatic and materialistic goals in life. Table 1 illustrates how the young people assess the options open to them in gaining their goals in various pursuits of life.

Both generations are similar in the life values they entertain, the principal difference being that by virtue of age older people have managed to achieve much in life already whereas the younger people have yet to do that. At the same time the younger generation tend to have a higher rating of their ability to create a good family, get a good education, take a good job, visit various countries and start their own business.

**The basic values of the young people and the older age group are very close.** Both categories tend to prefer liberty to material well being. Both are also oriented toward having a rewarding, rather than merely paying job. At the same time, among the older generation most people believe that those who have done

well must take care of and assist those who have not been so lucky, whereas younger people tend to believe that everyone must fend for himself in assuring his or her material success.

**As for moral values young Russians demonstrated a high degree of continuity from the older generation, although the changes in the moral values do give rise to concern.** Most young Russians are convinced for instance that material values and careers should not take precedence over moral values. At the same time, however, 43.8 percent of them are determined to fight for their place under the Sun and transgress moral norms for the sake of personal gain. The ratio between these two attitudes in the older age group was 75.5 percent and 23.8 percent. Respectively.

However, these differences between values reflect more the differences between the set goal attitudes in the two age groups, rather than a real readiness of the young people to violate moral rules or break the law. The view that one must draw only legitimate income, rather than be indiscriminate with regard to sources of revenue was expressed by two-thirds of the young people. Alarming, however, one in three young people maintain an ambivalent attitude toward the source of income. Twice as few people in the older age group tend to share that sentiment.

Another notable finding is that both generations tend to have a nihilistic attitude toward the law. Only one in ten young people and one seven older people are prepared to follow the dictates of the law unconditionally. The bulk of both age groups are prepared to obey the law only on condition that the law be obeyed by everyone, in other words that those in power obey the law just as ordinary citizens.

An important aspect of the present study is an attempt to probe only into the declared attitudes, but also to reveal the actual forms of antisocial behavior of the young people. The poll concluded on the whole that the percentage of those who have some experience of antisocial behavior is quite substantial, but still below what one may assume from tabloid newspaper cliches. The three most common negative practices among the young people are smoking, use of strong alcoholic drinks and premarital sex (36-48 percent).

The highest percentage of drug users was observed among those who have no secondary education, 7.7 percent in that group used drugs frequently. In general, that group with inadequate education revealed a pronounced peak of devious behavior against the overall backdrop, despite the fact that the bulk of that group (84.6 percent) are below 20 and live with their parents (89.7 percent). In that group 12.8 percent have regularly used sex for gain and one in four gave bribes for the most part evidently to resolve some personal problems. The main thing that unites that group is their sense of belonging to the social margin. The percentage of young people in that group who believed that his or her father failed in life is 51.3 versus 23.8 for the entire sample. **Given the relatively high level of devious behavior among the young people as a whole the distribution**

**of various forms of social deviations across various youth groups is not a uniform one.**

The fourth section of the report titled **“Political Self-Identification of the Younger Generation”** deals largely with the alienation of a substantial percentage of young people in Russia from politics. The number of young people who have a sustained interest in politics in the 18-26 age group amounts to a third of the number of people with the same attitude in the older age group, 13.2 percent and 37.5 percent, respectively. The percentage of those who are totally indifferent to politics is high - 33.4 percent, whereas in the older group it amounts to 20.6 percent (Table 2).

At the same time political indifference among the young people does not go across the board as one may assume at first glance. More than 50 percent (52.0 percent) do follow the political events although not continuously, 62.3 percent do so from time to time and 29.5 percent follow news and political coverage on TV regularly, versus 52.7 percent who do so now and then and 13.8 percent who regularly watch programs analyzing political and economic current events and 17.9 percent who regularly read the newspapers.

Among the social-professional groups there is pronounced interest in politics among the young military (30.6 percent), entrepreneurs (17.1 percent), and people in humanitarian professions (14.7 percent). The absence of any interest in politics is typical of engineers and technicians above all (41.9 percent), rural residents (34.1 percent) and college students (30.8 percent).

The results of the study do not confirm the view that there is a rigid dependence between interest in politics, or absence thereof and the extent of the adaptation of the various youth groups to the new realities of Russia. The percentages of those who are interested in politics and who are not interested in politics are evenly spread among those who estimate that they have “rather gained from Russia’s reforms” and those who estimate that they have “rather lost from the reforms”.

The preferences of the young people compared to those of the older people with respect to today’s ideological and political movements are less clearly pronounced. Only 32.8 percent of the polled have identified themselves with any part of the current political spectrum. While 26.2 percent attributed themselves to supporters of a combination of various social ideas (liberalism, socialism, Russian values) the majority, 41.0 percent, do not support any of the political movements of the day (Table 3).

The distribution is caused not so much by the factors of an ideological nature, but by the circumstances of specific political practices or life situations. The extremely small percentage of supporters of the socialist idea among the young people (4.5 percent of the poll) relates evidently to the fact that the young people are becoming distinctly aware that there can be no going back to the past. Nor do they perceive any presence in the political spectrum of the nation of the “true left”, who could come up with an alternative that would not essentially seek

a restoration, and third, they have before their eyes the generation of their father and grandfathers who have given themselves wholly to the nation, but as a result of the upheavals of the past years are now on the brink of destitution.

The percentage of those who support the “radical economic reforms” is not so high either (13.1 percent). That is more than one can observe among the subsequent generations, but far fewer than one would expect to see among the younger people considering the fact that they tend to be given to “spontaneous liberalism”. The younger generation rejects much of what is perceived as “specifically Russian capitalism”. Stemming from this is an insignificant, but still tangible preference for an independent way of development for Russia among the young people. However, nationalistically patriotic sentiments among a considerable part of today’s young people in Russia do not betoken a longing for an archaic imperial past, but rather derive from understanding that having found itself on the periphery of the Western world Russian will never break the charmed circle of delayed development and dependence.

From time to time various newspapers project the notion that fascist ideology is becoming common among young Russians. The findings of the study indicate that a vast majority of the Russians (88.3 percent) regard fascist logos and those who profess ideas of fascism or use fascist emblems negatively, and 62.9 percent of them, extremely negatively. Only 1.2 percent of the Russians have a positive attitude toward fascist logos and fascists with 0.4 percent entertaining a benevolent attitude and 10.5 percent being indifferent. The spread of attitudes across age groups is given in Figure 6.

The Figure indicates that pockets of support for fascist ideology can be found in youth groups under 21 and between 22 and 26. But even in those age groups they do not unite sufficient number for the assumption that “the fascist infection” is germinating in the minds of today’s young people or Russia or manifests itself in their behavior.

The fifth section of the report is titled **“Russian Youth on Political Leaders of the nation and their Readiness for Social Protest”**. It concludes that just as the majority of the population of Russia at large, the young people predominantly support the idea that Russia needs a “strongman” who would set the house in order (53.7 percent in favor and 18.9 percent against). However, the reverse proposition that Russia needs not the dictatorship of one man, but reliance upon democratic institutions and laws received roughly the same support (50.8 percent versus 14.0 percent, respectively). Just as the older generation the young people are still not clear under which political system they would really like to live. The main issue is how can society combine the two principal values; individual liberties and social order and ethnic peace essential for Russia to become competitive in today’s world. At any rate it is clear that the young people will reject a dictatorship lead by one strongman which would inevitably interfere with the individual’s privacy.

In response to the explicit question "Is there any one politician in Russia today whom you would trust?" 56.5 percent of the young people responded negatively and 23.3 percent did not comment. Only 20 percent of the young people therefore registered a positive attitude toward to any of the personages of the current political scene. The ratings of the principal runners in the year 2,000 Presidential election are extremely low. Nearly 40 percent of the polled do not see a worthy candidate for the presidency.

Significantly, the most skeptical attitudes toward the Russian political elite are entertained by young entrepreneurs who represent the most socially advanced group of young people. Nearly half of them were not able or willing to give their preference to any of the potential current claimants to "Yeltsin's legacy". Of those who did identify their preferences, as the data acquired show, the young people support Boris Nemtsov, Yuri Luzhkov, Grigory Yavlinski, and Alexander Lebed. In the older age group the preferences follow the same pattern in a different order which also includes Gennady Zyuganov.

One of the pivotal points of current discussions has been that the debate on the chances of the radicalization of today's young people of Russia. The study did not return an unambiguous answer to that question. On the one hand, a considerable number of young people are inert. On the other hand, a variety of trends compete with each other among the active part of Russia's youth. The following response was obtained to the question about how they would behave should the standards of living decline (Table 4).

The above data show that a vast majority of the young people (and older people alike) opt for an individual way of adapting themselves to a possible decline in the standard of living, rather than any collective form of social protest. Notably, the protest potential among certain social groups of young people exceeds the average values across the board especially among rural dwellers, army and police officers, on the one hand, and employees of the services and retail trade industries and people in the creative professions, on the other. The study revealed that this goes not only for those who have failed to adapt to the current realities of life. There is much radical sentiment among those who consider their standard of living today to be quite good as well.

But nevertheless, even given a worsening of the social situation the probability of a dramatic radicalization of a considerable part of today's youth is relatively low, above all because of an extremely low extent of its self-fulfillment. There does not appear to be any "horizontal" ties or rallying points capable of consolidating at least the active part of today's youth.

The sixth section of the report deals with "**Ethnic Attitudes and Religious Feelings of Young Russians**".

The authors of the report proceeded from the assumption that one of the more reliable criteria of the extent of ethnocentric attitudes is the attitude toward mixed marriages. The data acquired indicate that **ethnic attitudes of the population have not gone through substantial changes as a result of the**

**collapse of the SSR and ethnic conflicts.** The view that marriages should be concluded only between people of the same ethnic extraction was supported by 10.1 percent of the younger people and 9.8 percent of the older people, whereas 75.7 percent of the younger people and 74.6 percent of the older people supported ethnically mixed marriages versus 14.2 percent and 15.6 percent, respectively, who did not comment.

That stand should not be taken to mean that the young people are ethnically indifferent. The fact that the idea of dropping the nationality clause from the new Russian internal passport evoked a substantial response bears witness to the contrary. Public opinion among the younger and older sections of society became sharply divided over the issue (Figure 7).

**The data acquired by the study indicate that nationalistic sentiments are on the whole not peculiar to the younger or older generations of Russians.** Wherever such sentiments manifest themselves they stem not from mass ethnocentrism, but rather from socioeconomic and political change and the amplified projection of some conflict situations by the media. Only very few Russians build their attitude toward other nations upon ethnocentrism. That is indicated by the data about the sentiments of Russians toward representatives of various nationalities and countries cited in the report.

The main target for ethnic animosity for Russians today is representatives of the ethnic groups that predominantly live in the Caucasus. It would appear to be right to assume that this animosity is rooted, not in ethnocentrism, but in social and political conflicts. That is confirmed by the coincidence of views held by both younger and older generations.

Regardless of the ethnic likes and dislikes of the young people or their attitudes toward some countries the social shock experienced by the population stimulates part of it to leave the country. Of course stimuli of that kind do not constitute a solid behavioral pattern, but they do form the basis of an attitude that is relatively widespread among the young people.

**According to the data obtained 65.4 percent of the young people would like to take up temporary or permanent residence abroad (one in ten would like to leave for good) versus 36.7 percent of the older people (one in twenty would like to leave for good).**

Younger people would like to leave for the U.S., Germany, England and France to make some money. Older people would like to leave for the U.S. and Germany, or other industrialized capitalist countries.

The analysis of the religious sentiments of the young Russians revealed a new phenomenon which was not largely observed prior to the start of Gorbachev's reforms. The young people appear to have shed the old negative stereotypes promulgated in the past by the school curricula and atheistic education as a whole such as "religion slows down the progress of science" or "religion is the lot of old Moms" etc.

Ten or fifteen years ago the lowest percentage of believers was recorded among the young people (1-2 percent versus 10 percent among the adults). Now, the age differences do not appear to influence the religious preferences of the population tangibly. This is indicated by the responses from all respondents. According to them of the young people polled 32.1 percent believe in God compared to 34.9 percent in the older age group; 27 percent and 27.6 percent, respectively, vacillate between faith and atheism; 13.9 percent and 14.7 percent are indifferent, and 14.6 and 13.5 percent, respectively, are atheists. The only pronounced difference is between believers in the supernatural (12.4 percent and 9.3 percent, respectively). This is largely due to the spread of various forms of unconventional religions and extra-confessional mystic beliefs (communication with the spirits of the dead, black and white magic, healing, fortune telling, astrology) and the para-scientific beliefs that appeared more recently. A contributing factor to the spread of the interest in the occult and esoteric tendencies is the availability of occult literature which attracts considerable interest from the young people and women in particular.

**In order to be able impartially to assess the part of religion in the mindset of the young people it is important to realize that a considerable number of the young people, not only believers, but those subscribing to other world views as well, including those who are indifferent to religion or call themselves atheists support traditional confessions.**

This is due the close relationship between religious and ethnic self-identification. **While rejecting the idea of religion as part of their self-identification young respondents do at the same time attribute themselves to supporters of traditional religious faiths.** In other words, Orthodoxy or Islam is perceived not only as a system of religious beliefs, but also as a cultural medium and life style natural to the respondents ( I am Russian and therefore I am an Orthodox believer, I am Tatar and therefore I am a Muslim).

Another important observation is that **most young people while professing a positive attitude toward the spread of the influence of religious organizations actually profess a wish that religious organizations clearly define their part in public life and do not venture into areas that are beyond their competence.** The study indicated that the population at large and the young people in particular do not accept the idea that any one religion should be held as exclusive. Most people in all groups polled support the idea of the equality of all religions.

The study as a whole showed that the non-religious type of world view continues to be a substantial part of the mindset of today's young Russians. The religious young people for the most part uphold and family and national values and despite their concern over today's social and political realities has no intention of interfering in them decisively.

The final seventh section of the reports is titled **"Contemporary Youth as Portrayed by Prevailing Interests and Modes of Social Communication".**

**The study attempted to assign the young people of today to various types according to the forms social communication and leisurely pursuits.** The authors of the study identified six types of young people.

The first type was designated "Family Man". **Young people of that type are characterized by a narrow and traditional circle of communication, orientation toward stable contacts with relatives, neighbors and acquaintances, and in some cases with colleagues and also simple forms of leisurely pursuits centered around the home such as reading, TV, radio, newspapers, house-keeping or just rest.** That type is wide spread among today's young people and accounts for 11 percent of the respondents.

The second type is far more widely spread (30 percent of the young people) is largely oriented toward contacts with a broad circle of friends unlike the former type. **Representatives of that type go for more advanced leisurely pastimes, such as computers, music, hobbies. Their predominant form of social communication is regular get-togethers with friends.**

The third type (25 percent of the young people) is represented by people who have social contacts outside of the family and friends and can be designated as "Fun Lover". **These people not only meet with their friends, but also go to the movies, theaters, concerts, cafes and bars, and youth clubs.** The consumption of entertainment is an important aspect of their leisure, popular music fans make up a large percentage of people of that type.

The fourth type of young people can be defined as the "Socially Active Individual". It brings together 25 percent of the young people who tend to prefer active forms of leisure and pastimes. They go to sports clubs, museums, art exhibits, interest clubs and they take course to get additional training and education rather than just meet with their friends to have a good time. Their attitude toward leisure is more selective and that type has a considerable potential for productive social involvement which it makes it closer to the typical representatives of the young people of the Western middle classes.

The fifth type, the "Spiritually Aware Individual", is distinct from the youth subculture. People of that type stay away from the social environment and confine themselves to established family ties. **They tend to become isolated from the company of young people, which depletes their leisure of diverse pastimes, but the young social environment for them is replaced by "soul friends", people with a similar world view or teachers.** People of that type regularly go to Church, religious meetings or actively contribute to the activities of political movements. However, religious or political involvement of today's young people is fairly low as this type of young person accounts for less than 5 percent of all young people.

The sixth type "Harmonious Communicator" accounts for 4 percent of the young people, who enjoy harmonious social relationships. Along with the fourth type of "Socially Active Individual" these people represent the most diverse life

style involving to a maximum extent all forms of social communication and leisure characteristic of all other above types.

The ratings of TV shows and newspapers among young people are given in Tables 5 and 6.

**In conclusion one may say that the above types of social communication peculiar to the young people of Russia in the 90s draw a prototype of Russia's future. The styles of communication, perceptions, values and life styles that are becoming established today are the basis for the trends in the evolution of the social structure of Russian society and those factors that determine the process of social stratification. The potential "middle class" of a not too distant future may be made up by up to one third by the present younger generation . How it will evolve will depend not only on what life style is chosen today by a young person, although that is very important too, but above all on how successful the socioeconomic reform in Russia will be and the prospects of Russia overcoming the crisis.**

TABLE 1 The past and present goals and achievements of the young people (percent)

Area of success	Already achieved	Not achieved so far, but still can achieve	Would still like to achieve, but am unlikely to	Never planned to achieve this	TOTAL
To get a good education	33.4	48.2	11.4	7.0	100
To take a prestigious job	15.5	59.5	19.4	5.6	100
To create a happy family	27.8	59.9	6.9	5.4	100
To start one's own business	5.9	28.3	26.3	39.4	100
To become wealthy	2.0	40.4	37.8	19.8	100
To pursue a rewarding occupation	27.7	55.6	13.2	19.8	100
To become famous and attract public attention	1.6	13.3	11.4	73.7	100
To visit various countries	7.6	49.4	34.5	8.5	100

TABLE 2

To what extent younger and older generations are interested in politics (percent)

Younger generation		Older generation
13.2	Closely follow coverage of political events	37.5
52.0	Do not follow coverage of political events closely, but discuss political events with friends and relatives occasionally	40.1
1.4	Was personally involved in political activities, meetings, demonstrations, industrial action	1.8
33.4	Indifferent to politics	20.6
100	TOTAL	100



TABLE 3

Ideological leanings of the younger and older generations (percent)

Younger generation		Older generation
13.1	Supporters of radical market reforms	7.2
15.2	Supporters of the 'Russian' way of development	20.9
4.5	Supporters of Socialism	15.2
26.2	Supporters of a combination of all these ideas	32.3
41.0	Do not subscribe to any ideology	24.4
100	Total	100

TABLE 4

Possible forms of response from the younger and older generations to a worsening of the economic situation (percent)

Younger generation		Older generation
0.9	Will join a political party	1.0
8.0	Will take part in protests (strike, rallies, demonstrations)	18.6
6.1	Will take up arms to defend my interests	5.2
11.8	Will decide to leave Russia	4.7
62.1	Will look for additional source of revenue	60.7
5.1	Will not respond at all, will carry on	11.9
9.5	Will do as my parents would	1.0

TABLE 5

TV viewing preferences of various youth groups (percent)

TV shows	Frequent viewing
1. Foreign movies	52.7
2. Home-made movies	45.6
3. Music & entertainment shows	49.5
4. Current events programs	29.5
5. Travel programs	23.6
6. Erotic shows	13.7
7. Popular science	11.6
8. TV games	18.6
9. Animated cartoons	17.9
10. Historical programs	12.0
11. Sports	26.5
12. Culture and the arts	8.7
13. Analytical programs	13.8

TABLE 6

Reading preferences of various youth groups (percent)

Type of reading	Percent	Group preferences
1. Detective stories	48.4	All groups, but to a lesser extent those involved in religion or politics
2. Sci-fi	30.1 percent	All groups, but to a greater extent the socially active, communicative and harmonious individuals
3. Romance	28.1	Fun lovers, spiritually aware
4. Prose by Russian and Soviet authors	23.0	Socially active, harmonious communicators
5. Biography	22.9	Harmonious communicators, Socially active individuals
6. Prose by foreign authors		Socially active individuals, harmonious communicators
7. Popular science	13.0	Harmonious. Socially active, spiritually aware
8. Russian and Soviet poetry	12.6	Harmonious, Socially active
9. Erotic novels	9.3	Fun lovers
10. Other	8.5	Harmonious, Spiritually aware
11. Political reminiscences	8.0	Harmonious Communicators
12. Foreign poetry	4.4	Harmonious Communicators
13. Do not like reading	9.4	Family type, communicative, fun lovers

FIGURE 1

Assessment of today's standard of living by the younger and older generations (percent)

Younger generation		Older generation
11.3	good	4.7
54.6	satisfactory	39.8
29.8	bad	53.7
4.3	no comment	1.8

FIGURE 2

Ways of improving one's standard of living preferred by younger and older generations (percent)

Younger generation		Older generation
17.6	Take several jobs	20.7
37.4	Do one time jobs	37.0
8.4	Run small trade outlets	8.3
20.0	Receive assistance from family and friends	9.3
9.5	Borrow money	11.9
30.5	Have fixed income	42.1
11.2	Draw a grant or scholarship	3.6

FIGURE 3

Professions viewed as most prestigious by the younger and older generations (percent)

Younger generation	Professions	Older generation
43.1	Lawyer, notary, attorney	33.9
18.6	Economist	13.2
27.0	Banker, financier	31.5
10.5	Manager	9.0
12.7	Entrepreneur	15.2
9.6	Civil servant	15.2
9.2	Physician, dentist	11.1
5.4	Singer, actor	4.1
2.6	Journalist	1.3
2.6	Military	2.1

FIGURE 4

Professions and pursuits considered to be most lucrative by the younger and older generations (percent).

Younger group		Older group
22.5	Lawyer, notary, attorney	15.8
7.9	Economist	6.7
29.4	Banker, financier	32.8
8.2	Manager	8.6
37.4	Entrepreneur	37.0
9.8	Civil servant	11.9
2.2	Physician, dentist	5.4
2.1	Singer, actor	1.3
2.2	Army or police officer	2.6
5.9	Criminal, prostitute	7.2

FIGURE 5

Principal goals in life of the young people (percent)

To have a good family	11.3
To get a good education	13.9
To get a good job	12.0
To own an apartment	6.3
To earn a lot of money	3.4
To assure a good future for kids	6.9
To start own business	2.0
To become affluent	9.6
To buy expensive items	21.3

FIGURE 6

The percentages of various age groups condemning or approving manifestations of fascism among Russian young people (percent)

Condemn	Age group	Approve
74.5	Under 21	3.0
79.0	22-26	2.1
84.9	27-30	0.7
89.9	31-40	89.9
90.6	41-50	0.4
93.8	51-60	0.8

FIGURE 7

Opinions of the younger and older generations as to what needs to be done to the "nationality" clause in the Russian passport.

Younger generation	Recommended action	Older generation
22.4	No mention of nationality in the passport	17.3
23.7	Nationality clause should remain	33.3
38.7	Everyone should be free to state one's nationality as one wishes, but the clause should be kept	39.3
15.5	No comment	10.1