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The Geopolitical Position of Central Europe Development Tendencies in the 21st Century

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Madrid Summit and Development Tendencies in the 21st Century
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The Geopolitical Position of Central Europe
Development Tendencies in the 21st Century

International conference

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Introduction, selection of contributions, processing of discussion

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INTRODUCTION

This year, like last year, the Centre for Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic and its civilian partners (the Slovak Foreign Policy Association and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung) organized a cycle of seminars on the problem of national security. An international seminar on the theme: The Geopolitical Position of Central Europe after the NATO Madrid Summit – Possible Development Tendencies in the 21st Century, was held on 4th and 5th June 1998 at Častá-Papierníčka, Slovakia. This two-day international seminar was preceded by two supporting seminars on the developing tendencies of the geopolitics of the 21st century, and on the position of the Slovak Republic in the European security system. The main aim of the cycle of seminars was to form a professional group of experts from different areas of the state and non-state educational and research institutions, who will devote systematic attention to the problems of national security. According to our experience up to now, this method of developing theory is very effective, and creates a good framework of possibilities for the exchange of views, findings and knowledge on both the national and international levels. Ukraine, Russia, Poland, the Czech Republic, France, Netherlands, Rumania, Slovenia, Slovakia and NATO were represented at the seminars.

The result was an exchange of views on the building of European security architecture, and the roles of NATO, the WEU, EU and OSCE in creating security for the whole of Europe.

The seminar concentrated its attention on the following areas of concern:

- Globalization and its influence on the development of security in Europe,
- The position of the Slovak Republic in the security architecture of Europe after Madrid,
- Regional processes and their influence on national security,
- The new geopolitical world order and the shaping of national security in European states after the end of the Cold War,
- The geopolitical consequences of the division of Czechoslovakia,
- Perspectives for cooperation by Slovakia as an associated partner of the WEU,
- A look at the role of the OSCE in the security architecture of the 21st century.

The results of the seminar also show that the Army of the Slovak Republic still regards an orientation towards the enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance and the integration of Slovakia into the EU and NATO as the priority role of the foreign and security policy of Slovakia. In the area of military cooperation with NATO and with its individual member states, the Army of the Slovak Republic will continue to cooperate in fulfillment of the obligations accepted

in the framework of the programme Partnership for Peace and bilateral co-operation.

We perceive the enlargement of NATO as widening of the zone of security and stability on the European continent, which is not aimed against any country.

The Slovak Republic welcomed the programme Partnership for Peace as a step towards further strengthening of relations, not only between the member countries of NATO and their partners in Central and Eastern Europe, but also between the different countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Army of the Slovak Republic has a permanent interest in fulfillment of the aims of this programme.

It will equally actively fulfill all its accepted obligations in the area of cooperation with the Western European Union and in the framework of UN peace keeping missions.

Peter Link

THE EASTWARD ENLARGEMENT OF NATO: NEW FACTORS IN THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION FOR UKRAINE

In a well known survey on the enlargement of NATO (1995), oriented towards the general public, the aims and principles of enlargement are formulated according to the views of NATO on a model for the structure of a security system for the 21st century in the North Atlantic region.

The main role is allocated to providing stability and general security for all states of the North Atlantic region without creating new lines of division. The priority spheres of general security for NATO that have been selected are political, economic and defensive. It is necessary to emphasize that while proclaiming itself a defensive alliance, NATO remains a military-political union with a perspective for transformation into a military-economic-political alliance.

The analysis of the developmental tendencies of the geopolitical situation in the world testifies to the general decrease in the role of purely military methods of security in regions and escalating efforts to create mechanisms to prevent interstate conflicts, at stages prior to open military confrontation. The political part of NATO's doctrine is based, as before, on two basic principles:

The first of these – "defense" – means raising the military defensive potential and its practical use in case of necessity (the necessity is justified by the leadership of the Alliance and includes elements of subjectivism, for example, acceleration the development of events in the Persian Gulf by the USA in 1998).

The second principle – "dialogue" – prescribes a mitigation of strength, but from a "position of strength".

Recently this doctrine has been supplemented by a new principle – "co-operation" – , and here, a lot of attention is given to strengthening ties with Russia and Ukraine. Nevertheless, the "Washington Post" – a newspaper of one of Ukraine's strategic partners – reported recently that a document contained the statement: "to protect against the possibilities of nuclear strikes against the civil and military leadership of the other strategic partner of Ukraine – Russia and against her nuclear arsenals".

In relations with Ukraine, the West considers two approaches:

Firstly: Ukraine is regarded as a bridge for communications with the Middle East through the south of the country, the Black Sea and the Caucasus;

Secondly: as a "buffer" zone for neutralizing Eastern threats to the West.

The effective realization of these approaches is favored by the beneficial geographical position of Ukraine, her compact territory, long coastline and ava-

liability of important transport communications. Important air, rail, road and pipeline links connecting the countries of the CIS to the states of Central and Western Europe, and providing access to the Black Sea ports of the CIS and Baltic regions pass through the territory of Ukraine.

The key feature of the Ukrainian Black Sea coastal region is its coastal and frontier position. The region is located at the intersection of major international routes from Europe to Asia, from Central and Northern Europe (via the system of waterways of the River Danube and the Rhine-Main-Danube waterway) to the Middle East and further to South-East Asia, from the states of the CIS to the Mediterranean countries. Major rivers, such as the Dnieper (connection with Belarus and the Baltic States), the Southern Buh, the Dnestr (connection with Moldova) flow through the Ukrainian lowlands near the Black Sea. The region is connected with the Caspian, Baltic and White Seas, and with Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Iran through the Sea of Azov and the Volga-Don system of waterways.

From the point of view of the influence of the geographical factor on the military security of Ukraine, it is necessary to observe that, in the event of armed conflict between East and West, its territory will inevitable be a zone of active combat.

Since the architecture of NATO strategic planning is oriented towards neutralizing threats from the East, and first of all from the countries of the Arab world, with constantly increasing Islamic fundamentalism, the majority of threats considered by NATO are expected on the territory of Ukraine. Figuratively speaking, Ukraine is assigned the role of a child between parents who are not going to live in union, and if the parents start fighting (regardless of who is first), the child can stop them only with a plaintive scream.

Analysis of the process of eastward enlargement, has allowed us to select a number of new factors essentially affecting the level of military danger for Ukraine. Let us name the most important of these factors:

1. Use of the territory of Ukraine in the event of armed conflict. The historical examples of recent centuries show that in the event of armed conflict, a country such as Ukraine will not be rescued by non-aligned status, the position of a strategic partner or plaintive appeals to systems of regional security. An armed conflict between NATO and a possible opponent from the East, even of low intensity, would be a national catastrophe for Ukraine, because of the inevitable losses of population, national wealth and irreparable ecological damage.

2. The appearance of new military forces near the frontiers of Ukraine. While Ukraine and the other states of the post-Soviet and post-Warsaw Pact space were eliminating their elite military engineering concerns without any coordination, for the sake of their lean budgets, NATO dealt with this question differently: on a considered and planned basis. The most modern systems were redistributed between the allies, and some of them were relocated to the USA and Canada. While reducing some of its arms in Europe, NATO has taken care of its qualitative preservation. In fact, the USA has not reduced its quanti-

of military equipment, while from 1990 to 1995 such states as France, Great Britain, Italy, Greece, Spain and Turkey increased their combined total of military aircraft by 1179 units, and their total number of assault helicopters by 133, to reach the maximum allowed within the established quotas.

Today, it is necessary to emphasize especially that NATO is equipped with the most modern weapons and military equipment, tested in local conflicts and backed by sufficient resources. NATO has shown its ability to rapidly concentrate forces in the Persian Gulf zone. It is natural that such a situation is very favorable to a NATO state, where improvement of political and defensive security is concerned. Without itemizing the economic side of NATO enlargement, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the USA practically never participates in military-political projects and actions, which threaten its economy.

As a whole, the actual realization of this factor increases a country's military and political security, and also increases the country's and therefore also NATO's ability to suddenly apply force or use the threat of the application of military forces to put political pressure on the leadership of a border country (realization of the second principle of the military doctrine).

3. The expected strengthening of radio electronic intelligence from the territory of Ukraine, will inevitably cause growth in the volume of information from Ukraine, an increased possibility of sabotage activity in the country, an increase in the level of electronic jamming of the command and control systems for air traffic etc. will inevitably decrease the efficiency of measures for the mobilization and preparation of the country's infrastructure to oppose possible aggression. It is necessary to take special note of the fact that strengthening of the radio electronic intelligence on the territory of Ukraine will be accompanied by the increased power of electromagnetic fields caused by radar, both from the direction of the NATO countries and from the direction of Russia. In other words, for many years and perhaps decades, the population of Ukraine will be compelled to live under the influence of a high-power electromagnetic field, especially near the western and eastern frontiers of the state. Although the long-term effects of electromagnetic fields on humans has not been fully investigated up to now, it is possible to say unequivocally that they will not improve the health of the nation, but will inevitably cause deterioration of the demographic characteristics of the population, so that the mobilization possibilities of the state will decrease within a decade.

4. The expected strengthening of ideological propaganda from the West, as new military units come with their radio and TV channels, may result in final neutralization of the national idea, which would strengthen the flow of illegal migration and stimulate the moral decomposition of the population and armed forces of Ukraine.

5. The reduction of the Ukrainian armed forces, being carried out at present, is increasing the gap between the level of military danger and the possibilities of the state, not only to defeat any possible foreign aggression, as is determined in the military doctrine of Ukraine, but also to prevent aggression. It is enough to recall how easily Ukraine gave up her nuclear weapons.

Research conducted according to modern methods of systems analysis, with the aim of forecasting the possible consequences for Ukraine of the first wave of NATO enlargement, have enabled us to select the following priorities among the considered factors:

- Use of Ukrainian territory in the event of armed conflict (65% - this would mean national catastrophe for Ukraine);
- Appearance of new military forces near the frontiers of Ukraine (15%);
- Strengthening of radio electronic intelligence on the territory of Ukraine (15%);
- Continued reduction of the Ukrainian armed forces (6%);
- Strengthening of ideological propaganda from the West (4%).

The probable negative consequences for the military security of Ukraine were predicted on the basis of the research and of expert estimation:

1. Loss of sovereignty and territorial integrity in the event of armed conflict between NATO and Russia.
 2. Loss of national originality, replacement of the culture and customs of the Ukrainian people.
 3. Growth of ecological danger.
 4. Deterioration of the demographic characteristics of the population of Ukraine.
 5. Growth of power pressure on the military-political leadership of the state.
 6. Decline of the state's potential for mobilization and military action.
 7. Increased military danger.
 8. Decline of the scientific-technological potential of the state.
 9. Reduction of the efficiency of the military-industrial complex of the country.
- Most of these probable consequences or threats have a long-term character, but all of them have a destructive effect on the security of the country. It is necessary to pay attention to what we say about the probable consequences, but it does not mean that all of them will occur equally in practice. For example, if the military-political situation develops in such a manner that armed conflict between NATO and Russia never occurs, the factor of use of the territory of Ukraine will not apply, and there will be no national catastrophe.

The variant of placing an airport within a city can serve as an actual example of such a situation. If appropriate security measures are undertaken, the city can avoid such probable consequences as planes falling on buildings, or ecologically dangerous buildings. Although the danger of plane crashes and the damage caused could be large, such cases are observed.

The eastward enlargement of NATO is nothing other than a new geopolitical reality in Europe. The enlargement of NATO undermines the architecture of European security and casts doubt on the continued existence of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, because after the Madrid Summit, parts of Europe with different international-legal statuses are formed, and confrontation between West and East is revived. Unfortunately, geopolitics as interstate rationalism does not recognize general human va-

lues, but only national interests, or to be more precise, the interests of ruling elites.

The enlargement of NATO in the suggested context, promotes strengthening of the role of the USA in Europe. This strengthening touches many key spheres of interstate relations, especially the military, economic and political aspects, because one of the main problems of the enlargement – financing – will be solved in a way determined by the USA. According to "Foreign Affairs" (1998), the cost of the enlargement of NATO was evaluated for five possible variants – from the least expensive: assistance to the new members for independent defense in the event of frontier conflicts or a limited attack on one of the Eastern European states, to four more serious variants in the event of a threat from Russia. In the event of this, NATO's ground and air forces based on the territory of Germany, would move east, taking with them ammunition stores and accommodation for a "limited" NATO force on a front line near the Ukrainian frontier. The estimated costs of implementing these five variants over 15 years (1996-2010) range from 61 to 125 billion dollars. The share of the USA is planned to be from 5 to 19 billion dollars. Naturally, the new members of NATO will not be able to obtain such resources independently and will be compelled to request credits from the USA, on American conditions (political-military-economic).

The program to re-equip and modernize the armed forces of the new member countries of NATO will enlarge the market for American weapons and military equipment in the period up to 2010, and so stimulate the activities of the military-industrial complex of the USA. The Pentagon, taking into account the given circumstances, probably justifies the enlargement of NATO mainly for political and economic reasons, that is why economic and political security is required for the pursuit of economic interests.

The enlargement of NATO is occurring under conditions in which NATO has no real opponent and there is no serious military threat from the East. If there is no enemy, there seems to be no need for the creation and deployment of additional forces. The references to the need to protect the alliance states against instability do not look convincing. An alternative route could be strengthening of the OSCE and extension of its powers. However, it seems to us that this alternative would weaken the role of the USA in Europe, and reduce the market for American weapons, by reducing the need for new member countries to purchase weapons from the USA. Therefore, the Americans are not interested in strengthening the OSCE at present, because that would have a significant influence on their economic interests.

The analysts engaged in substantiating NATO enlargement proceed mainly from the strategy of preparing for war against Russia, although there are other sources of instability in Europe. For example, Hungary has problems with three neighbors – Romania, Slovakia and Serbia, caused by the treatment of the Hungarian minorities in these countries. Nevertheless, NATO sees Russia as its main threat, and Russia's political future is rather uncertain.

Analysis of Russia's views on the enlargement of NATO shows that her atti-

tude to this process has been and remains extremely negative, for several basic reasons. Firstly, the first wave of enlargement will bring the NATO military machine right up to her western border. The Polish tanks, even those made in the Soviet Union, will automatically become NATO tanks. This also applies to other types of weapons. Secondly, there is the influence of the psychological factor and especially of the historical memory of the Russians. For centuries, the West has been the actual threat to Russia, bringing her peoples incalculable losses. This memory of the present-day Russians cannot be erased, even by specially created mechanisms for interaction between NATO and Russia. Therefore, it is necessary to expect an adequate Russian response to NATO enlargement. If we assume that Russia sees NATO as her main threat, the position of the territory of Ukraine becomes obvious.

Today, Ukraine has three alternatives:

1. to build an independent system of military security;
2. integration into NATO;
3. integration into the CIS.

Analysis of the developmental tendencies of the geopolitical situation in the European-Atlantic region, as well as the socio-economic and political processes in Ukraine, does not allow us to justify an unequivocal choice of one of these alternatives. Consideration of the influence of many contradictory factors, political will and large financial resources are required. It is possible to state unequivocally that if Ukraine is integrated into either NATO or the CIS, Europe will become more polarized, the opposition between West and East will increase, and under a concatenation of circumstances, an escalation of tension, comparable to that between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is not excluded. In the event of armed conflict between West and East, the territory of Ukraine would certainly be a zone of active combat operations, with the only difference, that if Ukraine maintains a non-aligned status, she will have the right to appeal to international legal institutions for compensation, after the conflict has been solved.

The variant of integration into NATO seems tempting. In this case, Ukraine would receive guarantees of military security on a higher level. If Ukraine faces a real military threat, it would be possible to recommend that the military-political leadership of the country should choose this alternative. But a number of factors of a political, economic, ethnic and historical nature force the command structures to abstain from such a choice.

Declarations about the ability of the state's armed forces to ensure the inviolability of the state's frontiers, in the air, on land and at sea, to stop provocations and defeat possible aggression from any state, should have at least some material foundations. It is easy to see that to prevent the escalation of an armed conflict between East and West on Ukrainian territory, Ukraine would need twice as much force as she is physically capable of producing.

Therefore, in our view, it would be rational to reconsider the provisions of the military doctrine requiring an ability to repel a possible aggression from any state, to avoid the doctrine having only a declarative character. The most accep-

table way in modern conditions seems to be one based on determining the set of states, against which Ukraine is physically incapable of providing the necessary level of security, if they decide on aggression. Then relations must be established with these states, which would avoid armed conflict in any circumstances. This includes the possibility of establishing regional or universal security systems. Where other states are concerned, it is possible to offer an approach based on adaptations of the state's military-political model and policy to the actual military-political situation developing in the region, and taking into account any tendencies towards change in the foreseeable future.

This approach assumes determination of the maximum amounts of financial, material and human resources which can be involved in providing the military security of the state, assessing the potential abilities of the armed forces and other military formations according to the resources involved, identifying the possible military threats and determining which states are capable of armed aggression, against which the state cannot provide the necessary level of military security.

In relation to these states, Ukraine's foreign policy should aim to neutralize in advance the threat of armed aggression. The military and military technical policy should provide adequate abilities of the armed forces and make changes where necessary.

Naturally, the practical implementation of this approach would reduce the role of military-power methods in the pursuit of national interests, and therefore, also the role of NATO. But the role of the OSCE would increase. It is possible to conclude from this, that on the threshold of the third millennium, strengthening of the OSCE and extension of its functions and authority could be the alternative to the enlargement of NATO. However, the choice of this alternative does not suit the USA, for the reasons stated above.

The stability provided mainly by the balance of forces between two antagonistic systems cannot continue with the operation of only one force, after the disappearance of the other. The situation is inevitably transformed into stability imposed by the surviving force. Figuratively speaking, a dictated stability is coming into the Euro-Atlantic region. It is easy to guess who claims the role of dictator. As history shows, dictatorship is a temporary phenomenon, but the transition from dictatorship to democracy is usually associated with tragic consequences. Is it not better to learn from history, than to repeat it?

Discussion on the paper by Volodimir Bogdanovič (The Eastward Enlargement of NATO: New Factors in the Military and Political Situation for Ukraine)

Andrej Žiarovský: With her military strength and geographical position, Ukraine is at least a regional power. At the same time, in the light of the foreign policy situation, we see how the position of Ukraine lags behind her actual strength and importance. I am interested in whether Ukraine has the ambition to strengthen her position in the region and play an active role in the Central or Eastern European region.

Volodimir Bogdanovič: I think that Ukraine especially needs to improve her legal system. On the basis of this, it will also be possible to improve the economy, which, in turn, will be helpful for achieving the aims of foreign and military policy. Obviously, Ukraine will endeavor to play a more active role in the region, but this will hardly be possible without the appropriate economic background.

Peter Šimlovič: Ukraine is certainly very important for security in Europe, both for NATO and for the Russian Federation. It will be interesting to watch how Ukraine behaves in future, because both these security entities will attempt to gain it for their side. The Ukrainian position is illustrated, for example, also by the claim of Zbigniew Brzezinski, who said this week that Ukraine will be able to join NATO in 2010. However, the steps of Ukraine up to now do not show that she would try very hard to join NATO. Therefore, my question is: Will Ukraine want to join NATO in the next decade? Or will she – like the Russian Federation – place the emphasis on creating a pan-European security system based on the OSCE? Or is a third way possible?

Volodimir Bogdanovič: The Ukrainian government obviously has an official position on this question. The president and the minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine declared that the ultimate aim of Ukraine is integration into the European and trans-Atlantic structures, and it depends on everyone, how one interprets the term "Euro-Atlantic". However, at present Ukraine has no interest in strongly emphasizing her willingness to integrate into NATO. The internal political situation is not favorable to this, it cannot be described as stable, and it would not be wise for Ukraine to destabilize the situation further, by explicitly declaring the security orientation of the country. A more favorable situation can be expected after the presidential election next year, when the right-left balance of power in the country should be clearer. At present the balance is entire-

ly equal. Support for integration into NATO will be helped by any improvement in the economic situation, which would naturally weaken the left-wing parties.

Elemir Nečej: The talk by Prof. Bogdanović shows that Ukraine understands the stationing of contingents of NATO forces in countries which will join NATO, as a kind of threat. How does Ukraine intend to deal with such a perceived threat from the point of view of the possible acceptance of new members in the second wave? This also especially concerns Slovakia. I see a further problem in the possible integration of Ukraine into the EU, because it would amount to the possibility of securing defense of the state in another way, that is by the WEU. The association agreements, which the EU signed with the candidate countries also do not show that the countries of the former USSR, which are associated in the CIS, could be integrated into the EU in the foreseeable future.

Volodimir Bogdanović: This question makes me aware that in the presentation of the paper of Prof. Bogdanović, I incorrectly interpreted the expression "risk" used by him as "threat", which shifted his view onto a somewhat different level. The correct version of his view is that the stationing of NATO contingents in the new member countries would expose Ukraine to increased risk, not to a threat. Where Slovakia is concerned, or the Ukrainian connections of Slovak membership of NATO, it is necessary to add that the Slovak - Ukrainian frontier is short, and only a small number of forces would be stationed in Slovakia. Therefore, Slovak membership of NATO would not increase the risk I spoke of, more than Polish or Hungarian membership. In the question of the problem of Ukrainian membership in the EU and WEU we start from the view that membership is possible and necessary for Ukraine.

Tomaš Zálesák: I was originally expecting to hear a lecture about globalization and its impact on the development of security in Europe. Instead we heard about the problems of Ukrainian national consciousness. In this sense, the lecture was something of a disappointment for me. If we speak of the OSCE as an alternative to the enlargement of NATO, it would be interesting to know how the speaker sees the strengthening of this multi-lateral organization, which has existed for some time and still not sufficiently proved its ability to fulfill the role of a force which could secure peace in Europe.

Volodimir Bogdanović: So far, NATO has demonstrated only one approach to the prevention of conflicts - military force. That is not the best way. It is also necessary to support the military prevention of conflicts with political resources. From this point of view, the OSCE is a more appropriate forum for political consultations, because the OSCE is able to create a joint European approach to the prevention of conflicts with the participation of both Russia and the USA, an approach which would exclude military force.

R. van den Akker: I think it is clear from the presentation that it does not re-

present the official Ukrainian position. The experience of NATO with the Ukrainian government and its policy towards NATO is entirely different to that presented in this paper. Obviously, NATO has long recognized that Ukraine has a special position on the security map of Europe. She is important geographically, strategically, politically, and potentially also economically. In the last few years, the Ukrainian government has also recognized the importance of NATO for Ukraine and for stability and security in Europe in general. For this reason, individual Ukrainian governments have endeavored to intensify cooperation with NATO, and NATO was favorably inclined to such cooperation. This fits in with NATO's approach to security, as accepted by NATO after the end of the Cold War. It is an extraordinarily cooperative approach to security. NATO is well aware that the security situation at the end of this century is completely different to that during the Cold War, and it will be at the beginning of the next millennium. More ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is expected. NATO, with its cooperative approach, is adapting to precisely this type of conflict. It starts from the view that such conflicts cannot be solved individually by any single state or institution. The special programs of NATO - such as Partnership for Peace - therefore, prefer cooperation with individual countries. This proves that NATO is an open organization, and that countries which want to participate in security in the Euro-Atlantic region, can cooperate with NATO. Therefore, we also decided to invite further states to join NATO. Therefore, NATO does not exclude Ukraine from future membership of NATO, or even Russia. However these countries never officially expressed a desire for integration into the Alliance. But NATO never excluded their membership. Any European country which wants to contribute to building stability and security in Europe has an open door to Europe. The cooperative model, which NATO applies, also applies to further partnership relations with Ukraine and Russia, because just as we recognize the special importance of Ukraine, we also recognize the special importance of Russia for the system of European security. Last week we had a meeting of ministers in Luxembourg and we arranged special meetings with both the Ukrainian and the Russian ministers of defense. However, from the Ukrainian minister of defense, we heard something quite different to today's view from Professor Bogdanović. According to the Ukrainian minister of defense, the Ukrainian government is much more open to cooperation with NATO, and in my view, the government of that country understands the role of NATO in the European security system better. The OSCE is clearly a very important organization and contributes to international cooperation and the improvement of European security. But the OSCE is not able to guarantee European security by itself. I also see the OSCE as an extremely important institution from the point of view of strengthening the principles of democracy and human rights. But it cannot be adequate on its own, because the OSCE has no resources, and it is necessary to have a mechanism for the defense of democracy and human rights in the event that they are not respected. Bosnia is good evidence for my view. It was not the OSCE

which brought peace to Bosnia. Definitive peace there was not brought by NATO either, but NATO and the OSCE together were able to create the pre-conditions for long-term peace and prosperity in that region. I would describe the OSCE as an institution which contributes to peace in Europe, but is not able to guarantee peace on its own.

Volodimir Bogdanovič: Naturally the positive aspects of the enlargement of NATO are well known, and I see no reason to expand on them. Less is said, however, about the negative consequences of the enlargement of NATO, so I gave priority to talking about them. Where the OSCE is concerned, I think that this organization should be transformed and strengthened. However, this does not mean that the OSCE should be the only organization guaranteeing peace and stability in Europe.

Vladimir Kmec: I appreciate that Prof. Bogdanovič is presenting his own view, the view of a researcher. Perhaps it would not be good, if we had to hear the official view here, for that it is enough to read the newspapers or the Internet. I agree with the comment of T. Zálesák. I also expected a paper more on the theme of globalization, but I think it would be no problem for Prof. Bogdanovič to express a view on this question during the discussion. I am interested in the question of which globalization trends have the greatest importance for the question of security and for the creation of a future security model in Europe. I also think that we still have not succeeded in overcoming bipolar thinking, although you specified that the talk deliberately concentrated more on the negative effects of the results of the Madrid summit. The idea was also heard that the future of Europe lies either in unipolarity, or in a strengthened position of the USA or NATO, or that the greatest risk threatens NATO from the east, that is from Russia, and that this could mean a return to bipolarity. However, there are many theories, which also speak of many parameters, which confirm that at least three power poles exist in the world at present. Sometimes five such poles are mentioned. I would like hear about the speaker's vision or his idea about the global development of the world, and about its impact on the European security structure. Is there a greater probability of the origin of unipolarity, bipolarity or multipolarity?

Volodimir Bogdanovič: To speak in connection with the enlargement of NATO about globalization is really extremely complicated, and this requires further demanding and precise research. Otherwise, the enlargement of NATO could be regarded as the globalization of policy. In the case of the question of power centers, I see the future of Europe as bipolar.

Vladimir Leška: The lecture included an observation on the position of Ukraine between Russia and NATO, and on the position of the neighbors of Ukraine, which will become members of NATO. Undoubtedly the role of Poland in the whole region will increase, but there are other countries in the region. From

the point of view of the approach of Russia to the whole problem, this is a very sensitive group of countries. These states are striving to get included in the next round of enlargement, and the positions of Russia on their efforts are very ostentatious. Precisely this is the sensitive, neuralgic point of enlargement, and it can also be said that precisely the acceptance of the Baltic States would be most justified from the point of view of their security needs. It would be good to know what is the approach of Ukraine to this problem, and where does Ukraine stand on the question of the cooperation between Russia and Byelorussia in the area of security. These small countries form the actual collision zone between NATO and Russia. At the same time, I start from the pessimistic version, presented in the lecture.

Volodimir Bogdanovič: Ukrainian security policy should rest in elimination of the risk of conflict between Ukraine and Russia, and between Ukraine and the Western states. Therefore, it is entirely logical for Ukraine to cultivate intensive relations with both sides – with Russia and Byelorussia, and with NATO, but without membership of the security structures of the CIS based on the Tashkent agreement. Ukraine should gradually become more active in relation to NATO, but not in the sense of seeking full membership in this organization.

Question: (Department of International Relations, Ministry of Defense of Slovenia) We can practically divide the potential future members of NATO (apart from the already de facto accepted states, that is the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) into two groups. From the point of view of the position of Prof. Bogdanovič, that the future power structure will be bipolar, it follows that membership of the Baltic states or even Ukraine or Byelorussia in NATO would represent continuity with the Cold War. I want to point to the situation in the post-Yugoslav region, where NATO came too late to prevent war breaking out. In this region, we find a group of states directly threatened by war, but without any connection with any collision zone between east and west.

Volodimir Bogdanovič: In this case, the OSCE is more concerned with peace-making operations.

Vladimir Kmec: At present, a new strategic concept for NATO is being discussed within NATO. It is clear that, so far, nobody from the narrow circles working on this conception has released exact information about it. In spite of this, I would like to know the view of the speaker on the form of the new strategic conception of NATO. What should be preserved in it, and what should be changed?

Volodimir Bogdanovič: The new strategic conception of NATO should unambiguously aim at reducing the risks mentioned in the lecture, including reduction of armed forces in the Central European countries, as well as reduction of reconnaissance activities.

POSITION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC IN THE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OF EUROPE AFTER THE MADRID SUMMIT

INTRODUCTION

The present European security is being built on three levels:

- the transcontinental level is represented by the phenomenon of Atlantic co-operation, which, within the framework of NATO and the OCSE, forms the widest base for European security;
- the continental level is represented by European organizations such as the EU, the Western European Union (WEU), the Council of Europe, etc.;
- the regional level is particularly important for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The surging new democracies in the countries have learned that independence also means responsibility and common responsibility towards the other countries of the region. Slovakia and its national security are also in this situation. Bilateral conventions between the neighboring countries of the region are the basis for national security on the regional level. Central Europe is not a bridge between the West and Asia, and it is not "another Europe". The onset of the '90s means also for Slovakia a refusal of any concept of the so-called "Inter-Europe" and a clear declaration of will and interest to be integrated into the pan-European Atlantic Community.

The aim of this paper is to indicate possibilities for the security orientation of the Slovak Republic after the Madrid summit evolution and to show the prospects and issues of steps in the integration endeavor to become a member of security structures of Europe.

Conclusions and Issues after the Madrid Summit

- Slovakia, a former front runner for NATO membership, was excluded from the first wave of enlargement, due to its instability on the home political scene (insufficiencies in the domain of the democratic life of society);
- Three of the five neighbors of Slovakia will be accepted as NATO members in 1999;
- In spite of existing national-political problems, there are many positive elements which emerge from the moderate political center (local, regional po-

litical leaders, entrepreneurs, soldiers, and university students) – a key for the Slovak future;

It is necessary to direct the endeavor of NATO policy after the summit to the group of "failed runners" and to form an environment of trustworthiness and "openness" of the enlargement process, to support Slovakia and other interested countries.

Owing to the present position of Slovakia in the Central European region and owing to the evolution of the security orientation, the following alternatives to treat this question can be considered.

Alternative No.1: to continue the endeavor of the Slovak Republic (SR) to enter the Atlantic Alliance

ARGUMENTATION:

Even after the SR was not included among the States with which process of discussions on entry into NATO has already begun, the standpoint of the SR remains unchanged in the sense of accomplishment of the Government program of the SR – the endeavor to enter the Atlantic Alliance in the process of NATO enlargement. The Slovak Republic supports the standpoints which are based on the prospect of its membership, as the basic foreign-policy priority and orientation. From the political viewpoint, this alternative is unique and unchangeable; it is closely related to the principle of transition from individual defense to collective defense. All the other opinions related to the problem regarding the membership or non-membership of NATO/WEU can move only on the level of opinionative hypothetical considerations. We encounter many opinions on the level of oral expressions of politicians, or on the level of theoretical contributions in the expert press on the fact, that the process of enlargement also has its paradoxical background. The paradoxes may have an evident existing nature; on the other hand, hypothetical to speculative paradoxes can be found. In relation to them it is important that further development should confirm their speculative and hypothetical character, and it is necessary to prevent them becoming really existing paradoxes or hypotheses.

In becoming members of the European security structures, we emphasize the fact, that the principle of collective defense is, for the SR, especially important not only from the military point of view, but also from the economic viewpoint. The Slovak Republic must be ready to take part in the tasks, risks, responsibilities, advantages, and costs resulting from common security in the Alliance and from collective defense. It is expected that Slovakia will accept a strategy anchored in the Strategic Conception. Then the aim will be to tune our concept with the Strategic Conception. The ability to make military contribution to the collective defense and to the new tasks of the Alliance will be

a criterion for decision-making about beginning discussions aiming at entry into the Alliance. An important element of the military contribution will be the engagement to take part in the targets of standardization, which is a basis for strategy and operational efficiency. Above all, it will be necessary to concentrate on interoperability and to accept such procedures related to standardization, which will enable us to reach a sufficient level of training and equipment for an effective operational common activity. The activities of the SR are oriented to the facts within the framework of the PIP, including the Process of Planning and Evaluation. To reach at least a minimal level of interoperability within as short periods possible is an important military requirement owing to securing military efficiency. According to NATO representatives, the Slovak Republic is progressing very responsibly and purposefully in this sense. There is also a political demand for the internal solidarity of the Alliance, in the sense that its new members, and those expected to join in the near future should feel that they are equal participants having equal rights in collective defense.

At present 92 % of the foreign investments, which are crucially important to master successfully the restructuring of industry and to complete the economic transformation, are concentrated (TREND, weekly in economics and business - July 16, 1997) in the three countries (the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary) which will be accepted as members of the Alliance in 1999.

This is another reason why it is necessary for the Slovak Republic to become member of NATO. According to the last statements or opinions of experts, at home and abroad, the Slovak Republic is not included among the most important candidates for the second wave of enlargement. But it is too early to reflect in such a way. In the nearest future, the situation may be different; Slovakia may be included among the prominent candidates for the second wave; even in a sense it can be "enriched" by ideas and experience from reception of its neighbors and so it can avoid entry defects and mistakes which can occur during the actual process of integration.

From the economic and armaments point of view (conversion - reconversion), Slovakia's entry to NATO would mean a direct export opportunity for our mechanical engineering. The need to renew the production of arms would create a market potential for at least 10 years, also resulting in more jobs. It is more than probable that contribution in taxes and savings of allowances in unemployment and the effect on the overall growth of the economy would cover the increased defense expenses linked with NATO entry.

The cooperation with top armaments firms would provide Slovakia, as a NATO member, with the highest technologies and know-how. The Slovak arms would attain the world competitive level and they would also find sales also outside NATO (solvent customers without political risks).

Our entry in NATO would, undoubtedly, mean increased expenses for defense. At present, each member country has higher defense expenses than Slovakia. The annual contribution of each member country to running the Alliance must also be considered.

We must also consider the process of balancing the differences in the armaments and readiness of our army and those of the Alliance countries, which could last 10 to 15 years, and in this period, defense expenditure would be higher. This results from the system operated by NATO in common planning, with the whole system based on budgeting; further expenditure is related to normalization and standardization of the armaments and material by the national armaments industries.

However, this does not prevent the development of such activities as for example in Southeast Asia, where the market with Indonesia is explored (concluded contract) by the enterprise PPS Detva. Promising relationships have also begun in Malaysia and the Philippines. This region appears to be very important to Slovak mechanical engineering.

If Slovakia remains outside NATO, the following scenario of evolution is possible:

- probably, sales of Slovak armaments to NATO members would not be considered;
- even if the Slovak Republic revives armament production and improves it to the necessary technological level, NATO member States will have no reason to purchase armaments from an external source (a potential possible enemy?);
- if a defensive alliance is formed with Russia, Slovakia's armament production would be concerned with production according to Russian license (in such a case, especially the armament production of the Russian Federation will compete with us, and our armament industry would achieve little).

Alternative No. 2: A neutral Slovakia according to the slogan "We'll seek neutrality!"

ARGUMENTATION:

This alternative has no prevailing support in intellectual political and academic circles. The present globalization, and the associated integration processes, now include all domains of economic and social life (new high technologies, information age). In direct connection with the laws of social development, and the repeated tendencies of rise and fall, anybody who does not accept this global trend, will very soon (2000 - 2005) be unable to take advantage, on the European economic and socio-economic scene (EU, OSCE, WEU), of the economic growth and positive economic indicators recorded in Slovakia in recent years.

In the last 2 - 3 years the Slovak economy has recorded the highest rate of the economical growth and the lowest inflation rate among all the applicants for EU membership. According to the data of the European Commission, the Slovak Republic is in third place among the associated countries in volume of the

gross domestic product per inhabitant. Alas, it may be stated that in spite of these results, the Slovak Republic, in the document of the European Commission "Agenda 2000", is not cited in the first group of countries recommended for beginning discussions on membership. Insufficient appraisal of our economic results is evidently related to evaluation of the accomplishment of political criteria of membership by the Slovak Republic, which have been marked as unsatisfactory by the Commission.

The EU and the WEU as its security structure have formulated the basic characteristics for the future steps to enlargement. It follows that the process of NATO adaptation and EU/WEU enlargement are two related processes, but different in their essence. The new EU member countries will have to be capable of incorporation into the common EU defense policy. It means that in practice a country will not be able to be accepted as an EU member, if it does not express clearly its will to become a NATO and WEU member. In the case of three countries (the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary) one may assume that their EU entry will be simpler. Slovakia must clearly and especially with political unity declare this fact (if it wishes to be part of Europe). Thereafter, neutrality has no justification and does not solve the alternative of Slovakia's security from the military point of view. Theoretically, neutrality is impossible without self-sufficiency in armaments.

Neutrality loses its theoretical and military-political substantiation in the international-political context. Not only in relation to the statements cited above, but also as military-security attributes of classic neutrality or "positive" neutrality, or "dynamic" neutrality (the notions occurred as parts of East-West relations), have lost their sense in the present Europe of the future European peace, without conflicts and threats of a military character. In global politics, we do not assume a revival of antagonisms of any character. The new model of collaboration of the world and European economical and military political groupings assumes (and this is the aim of general globalization of economic and political life) a steadily deeper knowledge and scientifically substantiated prognostic outcome of strategic partnership between the subjects (Russia, NATO, see "The Founding Act" - Paris 1997).

Then, what is the justification of neutrality for Slovakia?

Slovakia as a very small state in Central Europe has a national-strategic interest to take part and really evaluate its globalization tendency and possibilities towards the globalizing world. And so the question occurs between whom Slovakia is endeavoring to be neutral?

Neutrality or "non-participation" would lead Slovakia into isolation within the framework of Europe and it is questionable if this neutrality, in case of military threats, would be accepted by the potential military-political groupings. The history of the former neutral European countries says the opposite.

And finally, there is another, also essential argumentation. Even based on a gross pragmatic viewpoint, a lively discussion is being led in all the neutral States on the simplest way, and above all in a constitutional legislative form, to get rid of neutrality, which is very costly, and morally and politically obsolete.

Last but not least, the economic security of the Slovak Republic is being affected and will be affected in the future by the decisive European political, economical and security integration processes - NATO enlargement and increasing its effect on the European and world security and stability, EU enlargement and its effect on the management of political and economic processes.

Alternative No. 3: Security of Slovakia according to the slogan "We'll go East if the West rejects us!"

ARGUMENTATION:

The future security arrangement of Europe on the continental and regional levels will have to find alternatives which will not cause undesirable reactions by Moscow. Russia is considered to be an uncertain and inconstant colossus, but its raw-material and also marked human potential is understood as a possible contribution to Europe and the world. Therefore, Russia itself, in spite of its internal economic and social problems, is strong enough to choose its own security orientation.

The present Russia, "new" Russia is above all a completely different country to the former USSR. The Russian army is not led politically; its numbers have been decreased; its equipment is economically limited. The International Herald Tribune, in its article "Fantasies About NATO" from October 17th last year, deals with the fact that Russia represents neither a military nor a political threat to Europe. It is a country giving birth to democracy, where market economics opens its path and which has a weakened conventional military force ... and even if alarming political changes occur in Moscow, Russia would need several years to renew its former military machinery. The causes of Russian return to a military confrontation would be, in spite of the facts cited above, as follows:

- economical problems in the economically weakest regions;
- political instability which could continue in military-political instability;
- instability in the domain of ethnic policy, or the effect of religion;
- other, possible conflicts and threats of a non-military nature.

This potential possibility of return of Russia to a policy based on force and military confrontation is real, and therefore one cannot absolutely exclude it. Slovakia in its security orientation must also consider such possible alternati-

ves of evolution in Russia, but also in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The general economic and political processes of instability, however, are so great, that the Slovak Republic has no reason to search for its security guarantees in the Russian Federation. But this does not mean that within the framework of well developing neighborly relations with the Russian Federation, in almost all important domains of economic, social, and political life, the Slovak Republic will not develop collaboration in the domain of security policy. On the contrary, in this domain it is necessary to respect the strong partner in the East; there is a steady sense to consider the fact that elimination of unclear conditions in Central Europe could also be an advantage for Russia. The process of NATO adaptation (including enlargement) could also be a new historical impulse in forming relations between Russia and the rest of the world.

However, after our transformation to a market economy and an economic orientation towards the West, the EU and CEFTA countries consume 83 % of our exports, while the states of the former USSR take only 6.6 % of them (data from 1997).

Objective Declarations to the Suitors, Especially to the Slovak Republic, From the Madrid Summit

- To continue dialogues of the existing (16+1) countries with Slovakia and other "failed suitors", which are endeavoring to become members;
- NATO and its members allot detached means to continue activities in the PfP, especially to Slovakia and the "failed suitors", still endeavoring to become members;
- The Slovak peacekeeping training spaces can be used as places for partner peacekeeping activities.
- The assurance of Slovakia and other failed suitors that they will continue in the policy of integration with the Alliance is also recommended to increase their endeavor to work more in the Atlantic Partnership Community (APC).
- It is necessary for the APC structures and functions to be clearly defined so that the engagement of NATO to Slovakia will be evident. The fact should bind the APC to meetings – periodical consultations (e.g. once a month) with the NAC;
- It is necessary that after inauguration by heads of state at the highest level, programs be established and developed for periodical APC meetings at the level of defense ministers and ministers of foreign affairs. Concrete programs need to be visibly demonstrated (NATO engagements) in order to deepen political relationships with the failed countries.

In the following period, it will be necessary to elaborate the following items as a contribution of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic:

methodological starting points:

1. To prevent the occurrence of new dividing lines in Europe.
2. Protection of democracy and human rights.
3. Elimination of economic and social differences.
4. Contribution of the SR to the European security architecture.
5. Transition from national-security interests to pan-European security interests related to possible new risks in the 21st century.
6. Tuning our concept with the Strategic Conception.

(POSITION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC IN THE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OF EUROPE AFTER THE MADRID SUMMIT)

Andrej Žiarovský: I would like to return to the contribution of the representative of the Ministry of Defense of Poland at the preceding seminar in this series. In his lecture, the Polish representative gave a detailed description of the specific steps, which Poland has undertaken in her approach to NATO. In Slovakia, however, the impression arises that instead of specific steps, only political arguments are carried on. I would like to hear what activity the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic wants to undertake in this area in the near future.

Peter Link: I do not think it is possible to avoid solving this problem any longer. The approach up to now started more from categories of interest, and really did involve more political argument than implementation of a real policy. Without regard for the fact that, at this seminar it is not possible to change much, it is not possible to agree with the claims of some politicians. For example, Jozef Šesták, the state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the SR reacted to the appeal of the speaker of the Russian Duma Gennadij Seleznev, that "it would be good if neutral Austria was neighbored by a neutral Slovakia". The reason for this statement essentially means that since NATO already decided on the question of the first enlargement, it is now necessary to wait for a signal that NATO will also decide to accept Slovakia. Such a statement is very neutral and cryptic. I would expect a statement that it is not NATO which has to decide whether to accept Slovakia, but above all that Slovakia is still interested in joining NATO. Such a signal should not be issued by NATO, but it is Slovakia which must prepare to remove the distance between NATO and Slovakia. I think that something was indirectly signaled to NATO, that Slovakia is pursuing neutrality. The activity of the Ministry of Defense of the SR oriented towards joining NATO will be the subject of another contribution, so I do not want to open it now. However, I could speak of the activities which the Center for Strategic Studies is developing in this direction.

Vladimír Kmec: It is necessary to emphasize here that the basic documents, basic activities, basic domains etc., which Brussels offered to the states of Eastern and Central Europe, are the same for all the states. With regard to what the colleague from Poland said at the preceding seminar, it is necessary for the Army of the SR to find ways to make its activity more effective, also using the

experience of Polish colleagues. The Poles are also willing and prepared to help Slovakia in the area of military co-operation, and this concerns also the Czech Republic and Hungary. It is necessary to say that Western experts evaluated the level of preparation of the Slovak Army for integration into NATO very positively. It is not necessary to make a tragedy out of the area in which Slovakia was best.

Peter Barták: I would like to direct attention to the area the speaker indirectly touched, when he spoke of three alternatives, his relation to them, their evaluation and finally his inclination to the first. He also does not exclude further many-sided cooperation in all areas of security with the Russian Federation. I would like to point out a contradiction. It is impossible to prefer the Western European and trans-Atlantic structures in questions of defense and security, and at the same time continue many-sided cooperation in the area of security with another alternative. This is already because, according to my estimate, the number of state secrets in the area of defense is second only to the number in the secret service. It is necessary to be cautious, in all areas of cooperation, in the area of security and defense with an entity representing an alternative different to that about which the speaker was talking, and to which the official government documents and programs relate, and which is supported by a growing majority of the citizens according to opinion polls. The whole area of military equipment, weapons, munitions and other specific ties further widens this question. To summarize, doesn't it seem to you that there is a contradiction here?

Peter Link: Naturally doubts are justified and I am willing to accept them. But Slovakia will clearly not develop cooperation in all questions of national security, but in the area of the security policy of the state. And that already implies a different interpretation.

Tomáš Zálešák: If Slovakia will not develop many-sided co-operation with Russia in areas of security, which would be in conflict with our proclaimed security and with our orientation towards the Western security structures, does it mean that such cooperation exists at present? Does Slovakia co-operate with Russia in areas which are incompatible with us joining NATO?

Peter Link: I don't know about any activities, which would be incompatible with us joining NATO.

Milan Koščo: I was not present at the first seminars in this series, and so the aim of this seminar is not clear to me. A representative of the Ministry of Defense has spoken, and a representative of Ukraine spoke here, and showed that personal views are also spoken here. I think it would be a good idea to make clear what result is expected. Is it confirmation of policy, or are academic

findings the aim? Is the aim to create personal contacts, or to persuade the persuaded? I lack the initial information, which would enable me to assess where we have come from and where we are going. Up to now I had the impression that the questions are best. I would like the expert guarantor to clearly state the intended result of this seminar. And one further observation. It is not usual at a meeting of such importance to speak about people who are not present – if only for the simple reason that they do not have the opportunity to defend themselves. Please take this into account in the further course of the seminar.

Vladimir Kmec: I said that the aim of the series of seminars about national security, which we have organized since 1997, is to create a civilian-military forum of experts – people who are close to the area of national security, a forum for discussion and exchange of views, for reflections in the area of national security on a civilian-military, national and international basis. The participants in the seminars up to now could evaluate whether it is useful or not. Since the response was positive after the first year, we decided to continue in 1998. The principle we accepted a year ago led to us accepting unofficial views, the views of experts from any expert field, that is not only from the military and foreign ministry area. Young people, journalists, the academic community and foreign partners also belong here.

Alexander Levčenko: Perhaps I have a view different to that of our Russian colleague present here, but I think that the reaction of Moscow to the results of the Madrid Summit, clearly demonstrated a Russian effort to become a partner for the West and not an opponent. For Russia, the enlargement of NATO is a problem of internal policy, or internal stability, and not a military risk for her security. The countries which are neighbors of Russia should endeavor to support this tendency and not hurry to join NATO. Ukraine and Slovakia should pursue the same aim – to gain the confidence of both NATO and Russia, to achieve an equal level of interoperability with NATO and with Russia. I mean by this, not military, but security interoperability, that is interoperability providing the possibility of jointly participating in peace-keeping operations and preventing conflicts. Only if the situation in Russia does not develop positively, should we jointly approach integration into NATO.

Peter Link: I think that the Founding Act contains an idea, which was mentioned here, about creating confidence between NATO and Russia. However, Slovakia is implementing a policy anchored in the government program, and this means an orientation towards the Euro-Atlantic structures. Therefore, Slovakia accepts the policy of enlargement, and in this context it would be good to consider the fact that enlargement also presupposes approximation. The problem is in the answer to the question of how Russia on one side and Slovakia on the other think about approximation, how she will approximate to NA-

TO. In this context, it is possible to appeal to geopolitical thinking and to a change in this thinking. It can be claimed that the idea of enlargement of NATO is actually a continuation of the idea of the European house. Representatives of NATO have often expressed a similar view. Although NATO still has more a military than a political character, it is a military-political structure, which is gradually transforming itself from military to political. In this position, with NATO considering transformation, it is already possible to see elements of the new thinking, which appears clearly in the new military doctrine of the Alliance. In the security area, it has changed very much in recent times. For example, 1991 is the year of the Program for Peace, and this program is still not anchored in the doctrine of NATO, but will undoubtedly be included in the new strategy. In my presentation, I spoke of threats. It is possible to object, that this was also a methodological error, but in this sphere threats and risks overlap. Recently, in discussion with Belgian partners, we agreed with the view that it is better to speak, not of threats of a non-military character, but rather about risks, and it is necessary to talk about risks in the 21st century.

Pieter van Duin: I think that one of the previous questions about the aim of the seminar is very relevant. I asked myself the question, and I have the impression that one of the aims of this seminar is to avoid at any price, talking about politics, that is about the very critical situation, which prevails in Slovakia. It is entirely incomprehensible to speak about security, or about the security integration of Slovakia into NATO, without talking about the political dimension of this problem. This would be a very traditional academic seminar, if we spoke about the enlargement of NATO, but ignored the logical connection between security and the political situation. It is necessary to ask a simple question: "What is the enlargement of NATO about?" Van den Akker already answered this question. The enlargement of NATO is about security and stability. That is the truth, but not the whole truth. NATO is about security and stability, but security and stability are the result of a democratic order. It is generally known that the history of NATO is not entirely clean. In the sixties and seventies, Greece and Portugal became members. The first country was then only beginning to build a democratic system, while the second was waging a colonial war in Africa. Here, it is naturally possible to find a mitigating circumstance: this was the time of the Cold War. However, after the end of the Cold War, it is unimaginable to speak of the enlargement of NATO without political conditions for acceptance.

Vladimir Kmec: In their book "The Shaping of a New Civilization", the Teoflers say that the new civilization is here, but the extremists are everywhere trying to suppress it. This new civilization brings with it a new model of the family, a new form of work, new forms of human relationships, a new economics, new political situations and a change of consciousness. And since we are in a democratic state, we can talk about it at this seminar.

R. van den Akker: I highly value the steps, which Slovakia has taken in the process of approximation to NATO. These steps include the activities of Slovakia in the program Partnership for Peace, a realistic effort in the direction of achieving interoperability with NATO, and effective participation in conceptual work during the prevention of conflicts. As was said in the lecture, an important part of preparation for entry to NATO is ability to cooperate with neighbors and learn from those who were accepted into NATO in the first round of enlargement. This also includes the possibility of learning from their negative experiences. The regional element of cooperation is really extremely important. In the question of practical cooperation between Slovakia and NATO, I see significant progress in various areas and these successes will certainly count, when NATO decides which countries to accept for further enlargement. But we have to be objective. The leadership of NATO – as of the European Union – starts from the idea that NATO is not only a matter of mechanical structures. It is also a community of values, and first of all, of democratic values. From this point of view – and there is no reason to avoid it – NATO expressed a certain dissatisfaction with internal political development in Slovakia. For example, this concerns specifically the dead end with the election of a president of Slovakia and other matters, but above all it is about the principle of democratic development. The question of this development concerns not only the present NATO, but also the present neighbors of Slovakia, which will participate in deciding about the membership of Slovakia in the Alliance, because then they will also be accepting new members among themselves.

Zdeněk Matějka: I would like to ask the specific reasons, which individual countries, individual components of the apparatus and individual personalities in NATO set or will set as a basis for the decision not to accept Slovakia in the first wave of enlargement. I ask in spite of the fact that the reasons are obviously well known to the Slovak participants. What does the lecturer consider most important among the reservations of the Western countries towards Slovakia, what is less important, what is justified and what unjustified? What is the position of the individual political forces in Slovakia on these issues?

Peter Link: Not so long ago, Slovakia was one of the leading candidates for the first wave of enlargement of NATO. In my view, Slovakia was not accepted into NATO because of the instability on her domestic political scene, and specifically because of deficiencies in the area of the development of a democratic society. These facts were already known before Madrid, and Madrid only stated what was already known. We will find nothing about these matters in the declaration, but the deficits in democracy were the main reason, and this also appeared in the quality of the recommendations. I think that solution of this problem will be a task for the future coalition grouping after the election.

Peter Ošváth: I would like to react to the contribution of our Dutch colleague (Pieter van Duin), who has positively provoked me to contribute to the discus-

sion as at the previous seminar. Personally, I agree with what he said. It is necessary to discuss not only the military level of the problem of joining NATO, but also the political. NATO is a political-military organization, and both aspects play an equal role in the widening of NATO. Slovakia has democratic laws anchored in the constitution, but a very serious deficit is felt in the culture of application of these democratic mechanisms. I will support this claim with three examples: Firstly, failure of the government majority in parliament to respect decisions of the Constitutional Court. This is the first illustrative example of an insufficient culture of application of democratic principles. Secondly, the gradual creation of unlimited or uncheckable power by the present government representatives in such a way that they are really repeating the same principles of anchoring their unlimited power in the organs of the state administration, as the old dictatorship did before 1989. This means occupation of all the important places in the state administration by the present government power, or forcing employees of the state administration to join the parties, which belong to the present ruling coalition. Thirdly, the approved amendment about parliamentary elections, where the present parliamentary majority unambiguously and deliberately manipulated the law so that the present opposition would not be able to win. With these three examples, I point to the fact that although parliamentary democracy is anchored in the constitution, it is not applied by the present government. There is also the example of how the political aspects are connected with policy and affect the ambitions of countries to integrate into the security architecture in Europe.

Vladimír Leška: We spoke about the wider European "macro-contexts" of Slovak security policy. A time will soon come, when Slovakia will be outside the framework of the Alliance, while the neighboring countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – will already be members of NATO. Slovakia will then have one neighbor, with which she has traditional problems, and this could also be reflected in the security situation of Slovakia in that period. The problem of Slovak – Hungarian relations could also be projected into relations with other neighbors. This problem could really burden the situation in the Central European region.

Peter Link: A change of approach from our side is also necessary in relation to policy towards Hungary. If one side (Hungary) attacks, it is not wise to reply equally. It will clearly be necessary to find a methodological starting point for future progress in the Hungarian question. A whole series of Hungarian reservations – naturally with the exception of chauvinist or nationalist attacks, autonomist demands etc. etc. – can be objectively respected. The group of three, which is becoming a guarantor of security in Central Europe, will then certainly accept the integration of Slovakia into NATO without problems, and in the near future. I would formulate five methodological starting points for the orientation of Slovak security policy in the coming period. Firstly, it is necessary to

look at what is in the interest of European security policy and work out ways for Slovakia to contribute to European security architecture. The second task is to shift the national-security interests of Slovakia to pan-European security interests in connection with the new security risks of the 21st century. In this way, we will help to harmonize our conception with the new strategic conception of NATO. Thirdly, it is necessary to prevent the origin of a new dividing line in Europe. I would mention defense of human and civil rights as the fourth methodological starting point. Fifthly, we should strive for the elimination of economic and social differences. Slovakia can contribute to the fight against fundamentalism, extremism and other dangers.

Radboud van den Akker

THE NEW GEOPOLITICAL WORLD ORDER – FORMING NATIONAL SECURITY IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR

When I saw the title of the seminar and of my proposed presentation with reference to geopolitics and even the notion of a "new geopolitical world order", I have to admit that I was slightly taken aback. As a NATO employee, even though I deal with political issues, my geographical area of operations is certainly more narrowly defined. And even in this area of operations, the North Atlantic area, the security landscape can hardly be described as orderly.

What is clear, however, is that we, all our nations, have made tremendous progress in the almost ten years since the end of the Cold War in establishing a more just and peaceful order on the European continent, in building a security architecture which is based on a common understanding of collective security that reaches far beyond narrow national definitions.

I am very pleased to be able to discuss NATO's role in this on going process with you, to look back briefly at last weeks NATO Ministerial meetings in Luxembourg, and to look ahead towards the NATO Summit meeting that will be held in Washington next April.

The Cold War was an abnormal state of affairs, but it was also an excellent compass. There was no need to define our security priorities, for the circumstances defined them for us. For Europe, this meant putting the emphasis on collective defense. Defending our national territories was our main concern. In safeguarding our territories we safeguarded our values, our beliefs, or – in the case of countries in Central and Eastern Europe – what we were led to believe.

NATO Unclassified

By contrast, defending values elsewhere seemed like a risky diversion from the pressing issues of maintaining a solid collective defense. With the East-West confrontation dividing Europe, arguing for a collective security system seemed outright naive.

This has changed dramatically. The end of the Cold War has given a new lease of life to the concept of collective security. The UN Security Council has been de-blocked, traditional adversarial relationships have disappeared, and certain nations no longer automatically side together in opposing others.

At the same time, however, new threats have emerged; ethnic and religious conflict, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international crime and terrorism, to name just a few. All these phenomena may appear suddenly

and from any direction. If they are not addressed properly, they all have the potential to escalate and to affect security beyond the area where they first emerge. The best way to address them is by collective action through broad international coalitions. That is what collective security is all about.

I would like to advance three propositions on the future of collective security in Europe. I will then focus on NATO's role in this concept.

First, for collective security to work requires us to acknowledge its limitations. Individual states will continue to have different security interests. They will continue to take stronger interest in their immediate neighborhood than in places further afield. They will continue to weigh the costs of indifference versus engagement on a case-by-case basis. The appeal to uphold moral principles will not be enough to always generate a coherent response to challenge. In any case, a policy based on moral impulse alone would probably not be a good policy in the first place – and certainly not a sustainable one. Experience shows that the public mood can change suddenly once interventions are seen to carry risks, or to last longer than initially expected.

So the system we seek will remain an imperfect one. Having said that, however, my second proposition is that we have the opportunity to tackle security problems far more rapidly and comprehensively than ever before. We have institutions – the United Nations, OSCE, NATO, the WEU, the Council of Europe – that are better geared to modern-day security challenges. We also have the diplomatic, economic, and military means that should enable us to react rapidly to any unfolding crisis and to suffocate it before it turns into a brushfire.

Thirdly and finally, the challenges of crisis management in post-Cold War Europe requires an unprecedented degree of multinational cooperation – political, military and not least institutional cooperation. None of our nations and none of our institutions can act alone. No single nation or institution possesses all the political, economic and military means for successful crisis management. Only their mutually reinforcing cooperation gives us the full spectrum of tools needed to cope with the challenges of today and tomorrow.

It is encouraging, in this regard, that we are witnessing a changing attitude regarding the need for comprehensive crisis management. The Balkans are a case in point. In the late 19th century Bismarck said that the Balkans were “not worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier”. Today, over 30 000 soldiers from more than 30 countries, and a whole range of international organizations, are working together to bring lasting peace to the Balkans.

All this suggests that in re-organizing European security we cannot afford to be dogmatic. We need an approach that evolves in an organic way, building on the institutions we have. Adapting these institutions in ways that are conducive to their cooperation is thus a key challenge.

NATO has played a significant role in establishing collective security principles across Europe. Over the past ten years, the Alliance has adapted more significantly than any other international organization, and this process is still continuing. Although NATO's core function remains that of collective defense,

the Allies realized that the end of the Cold war offered opportunities to pursue a much broader, co-operative approach. Moreover, NATO Allies believed that several decades of successful security co-operation had given them a unique expertise in organizing multinational security – an expertise they were ready to share with others, in the interest of all.

Accordingly, over the course of this decade NATO has developed co-operative relations with almost all nations of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the program Partnership for Peace offer truly unprecedented opportunities for both political consultation and practical co-operation. Fostering common approaches to security is a key objective in all these efforts.

NATO has also offered peacekeeping assistance to the OSCE and to the United Nations, and has revised its strategy and force structures to take into account the new challenges of crisis management and peacekeeping.

Moreover, by opening up to new members, NATO – as well as the European Union – have created a powerful incentive for many countries to resolve bilateral disputes with their neighbors.

In recent years, NATO has also constructively engaged Russia, without which collective security in Europe would be impossible. A distinct relationship with Ukraine and a dialogue with countries from the Southern Mediterranean complete the picture.

Together, these initiatives demonstrate NATO's commitment to a wider co-operative approach to security. Together, they have generated a powerful momentum in Euro-Atlantic security co-operation.

In Bosnia, these initiatives have converged to form a coherent strategy. NATO's support for the UN-led peacekeeping efforts ended several decades of mutual suspicion or, at best, “benign neglect” between these two institutions. The deployment of the multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) was equally significant. It brought together NATO Allies and more than a dozen Partner countries in their first joint operation. It thus vindicated the strategic logic of NATO's cooperative approach to security. By incorporating a sizeable Russian contribution, IFOR also ended the notion of NATO and Russia being forever locked in an adversarial posture. And, of course, it demonstrated the continued validity of a well-oiled multinational, transatlantic structure such as NATO.

The international presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina also created in practice a working system of “interlocking institutions”. For the peace-building process which emerged in Bosnia rests on mutual reliance, rather than competition, among institutions. IFOR and SFOR have co-ordinated closely with the many other institutions currently rebuilding Bosnia. Without the secure environment provided by NATO and its Partners, the OSCE could not have organized democratic elections. Without IFOR and SFOR, the economic and political reconstruction efforts led by the EU, the UN and many non-governmental organizations could not have started.

Where do we stand today in Bosnia? We are still along way from true recon-

ciliation. But the overall trends are encouraging. Infrastructure is being rebuilt. The economy is slowly regaining momentum. A new currency will soon be introduced. Refugees are returning home. War criminals are being put where they belong - in the Hague.

In sum, Bosnia is heading in the right direction. But we must persevere. The Dayton Peace Accords must be implemented to the fullest. That is why the international military presence will be maintained until the job is done. And that is why Allied and troop-contributing Partner countries are preparing to stay longer.

Just a few days ago in Luxembourg, Allied Foreign Ministers approved the Operational Planning for the continuation of SFOR beyond the end of its current mandate.

Our determination to get the job done in Bosnia should give us the confidence that the international community can have a role to play in addressing the serious problems today in Kosovo. The crisis in Kosovo demonstrates that Europe's consolidation will be seriously undermined if the Balkans remain volatile. Without a comprehensive strategy for the Balkans, our continent will not find the tranquillity it so urgently needs.

That is why NATO Allies are monitoring the situation in Kosovo very closely, seeking to help find peaceful solutions to the growing tension and violence in that part of the former Yugoslavia. In addition, they are undertaking concrete steps to promote stability and security in neighboring countries, particularly in our Partner countries - Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Following decisions last week in Luxembourg, NATO is stepping up its military assistance through the Partnership for Peace for both countries. We intend to use PIP and related programs to promote stability and security in the region and to signal NATO's interest in containing the crisis and in seeking its peaceful resolution.

In addition, in order to keep options open for possible further steps if necessary, NATO Foreign Ministers have requested military advice on support for UN and OSCE monitoring activity as well as on NATO preventive deployments in Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Together, these measures should strengthen considerably the hand of the international community in finding a solution to the Kosovo crisis. They demonstrate that a key institution like NATO cannot and will not stand idly by, but will be prepared to go as far as deploying forces in support of international diplomatic efforts to prevent an escalation of the crisis and restore stability.

The second highlight of last week's Ministerial meetings which I would like to mention briefly is the convergence of views, not just among NATO Allies, but among Allies and Partners as well, regarding a possible arms race between India and Pakistan.

The NATO Allies have long been concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery. This concern was reiterated in the Communiqué which NATO Foreign Ministers adopted last Thursday. One day later, the nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan served to uni-

te first the NATO countries and Russia, then the NATO countries and Ukraine, and finally NATO and all its Partner countries in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, in expressing a strong condemnation of such action.

Underlying this unanimous condemnation was the sober realization that, in today's global, "decompartmentalized" security environment, destabilizing developments as far a field as on the Indian sub-continent almost inevitably affect the security, or at least the feeling of security, of nations elsewhere, including in the North Atlantic area.

Finally, let me briefly look ahead towards the Summit meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government in Washington next April.

In Washington, the Allies will not merely celebrate the 50th anniversary of the NATO Alliance and look back upon its achievements, but also ensure that the Alliance is ready to face the challenges of the next century. By the time of the Washington Summit, the Alliance will:

1. complete the accession of three new members - the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland;
2. adopt a new Strategic Concept, defining anew balance between NATO's traditional and new missions;
3. have a new command structure, with more flexibility and a stronger European element in it;
4. have turned the NATO-Russia relationship into a major element of the new security architecture;
5. have developed a distinct and dynamic relationship with Ukraine;
6. have made the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council permanent fixtures of Euro-Atlantic security cooperation; and
7. have moved closer towards a re-balanced transatlantic relationship, in which Europe and North America are sharing the burdens more equally.

This is an ambitious, but, in my view, realistic agenda. In defining NATO's role for the 21st century we have every reason to be bold. Our objective is clear: to contribute to a new European security architecture built on close cooperation between nations and institutions. We are not there yet. But we have made a very good start.

(THE NEW GEOPOLITICAL WORLD ORDER – FORMING NATIONAL SECURITY IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR)

Alexander Duleba: In discussions with Polish and Hungarian colleagues, I met with the idea that for these two countries, membership of NATO will cease to be the aim of their foreign policy and become the instrument of their foreign policy, including their policy in the framework of the region and relations with their eastern neighbors. Are there really possibilities for the new member countries to use NATO as an instrument of their foreign policy? A further question concerns adaptation of the treaty on conventional weapons – the CFE. At what stage are discussions in NATO in the area of adaptation of the treaty about conventional weapons in connection with the fact that in the Founding Act, NATO and Russia declared that the treaty will be adapted to the new situation. Is the signing of this new treaty – the so-called second treaty – expected before the Washington Summit, that is before the three accepted countries actually join NATO?

R. van den Akker: I will begin by answering the second question, because I am not an expert on the question of arms control. Therefore, my answer will be brief. The basic effort undertaken in the area of adaptation of the CFE treaty – which is still considered a pillar of European security and stability – is being developed in Vienna in the context of the joint consultation group. NATO naturally has an eminent interest in this process, and meetings between the member countries are regularly held at NATO HQ, to formulate proposals addressed to the Vienna group. Regarding the use of NATO as an instrument of foreign policy by the three new member countries, I would rather hear the specific views of the representatives of these three countries. But I consider it entirely natural that during a stage when these countries are still not formally members of the Alliance, they already regard their coming membership as a definite stimulus for their foreign policy. Their membership is considered certain, and these three countries already accepted the policy of NATO, the Atlantic acquis. They start from the principle that their foreign policy is based on this acquis. However, if they are really preparing to use their coming membership of NATO to support their foreign policy towards regional neighbors, I do not have the evidence for this. I do not know if they did this, or if they attempted manipulation with neighboring countries. I do not have to remind you that NATO is not only a military, but also a political alliance, that is an alliance which requires a consensus of all sixteen (in the future nineteen) countries. Therefore, it is qu-

ite problematic for a country to use NATO as a political instrument and manipulate NATO in favor of its own foreign policy. The policy of NATO is not the policy of one country, but the joint policy of all the member states, based on consensus.

Alexander Levčenko: Many Ukrainian experts think that if Ukraine is integrated into the EU, it will be better to cultivate close relationships especially with the Western European states. I do not think that Washington and the Brussels bureaucracy of NATO are very enthusiastic about this idea. Do countries like Ukraine or Slovakia, which remain outside NATO, have the possibility of building up special relationships with the Western European countries, and so become a European pillar of NATO? Is such a development acceptable for the USA?

R. van den Akker: It is very dangerous to look at NATO as a closed club. NATO is an open alliance, open to new members, but this does not mean that it can simply accept all the countries which want to join. It is important to realize that NATO does not limit its members in the planning and implementation of their foreign policy. The member countries can individually develop relations with any countries in the world. Regional initiatives are very welcome for NATO as a whole – whether they are regional groupings in Central Europe, in Northern Europe or the Black Sea region. These initiatives contribute to European security, and any multilateral or bilateral cooperation between Central European and Eastern European countries, that is also between Slovakia and Ukraine, is a contribution in every area: military, cultural, cooperation in the sphere of infrastructure. This also concerns the cooperation of individual regions within individual countries.

Vladimir Kmec: The idea of grasping the need and building the idea of a European identity starts precisely from the idea that if we take the scenario or hypothesis of the global level, of global processes – one of them is also integration – then multipolarity is bringing three poles: the USA and its immediate surroundings, Western Europe, around which an important process is occurring, and Japan. If I develop a scenario from this, it appears to me that in the next century, Europe must solve this problem. This is a matter, which objectively exists here, but which does not mean that in pragmatic steps towards implementation, it means the withdrawal of the Americans from Europe and the liquidation of the trans-Atlantic alliance. I agree with the idea expressed by van den Akker and Peter Volten that real security structures exist here, and it is necessary to use them. It is necessary to preserve the principle not of duplication, but of complementarity.

Peter Vršanský: Collective security in the European framework, which was discussed here today, is being realized by the European states roughly on

three levels: the level of the UN, associating about 185 countries, then in the framework of OSCE associating 55 European countries and finally in the framework of NATO, which associates 16 countries including the Atlantic states, plus further countries connected to NATO in the framework of Partnership for Peace and plus the Russian Federation, which is connected to NATO by a special treaty. None of these levels of building collective security is mutually exclusive. However, according to article No.100/SSN, in the event of conflict between obligations according to the Charter of the UN and obligations according to other international treaties (e.g. the North Atlantic Treaty), the obligations according to the Charter of the UN have priority. This means that in the event of use of the right to individual or collective self-defense, NATO or other international organizations must immediately notify the Security Council of the UN about the action it has taken, and follow the suggestions of the Security Council. By this, I only want to say that a system of building security on a wider membership base should, theoretically, be more effective in practice. However, I am afraid that real interstate practice does not show that it would be. Specifically, the conflict in former Yugoslavia was partially solved by the intervention of the regional organization - NATO - only after several years. These are very complex questions, but my personal view is that the above mentioned complementary approach represents the best route to achieving the desired result. I also welcome the comment, that for Slovakia, membership of NATO is not an aim, but only a means to contribute to achieving the aims pursued by the UN, OSCE, NATO and individual states, in co-operation with other states, that is to create an effective system of collective defense and security. I would like to hear the view of the speaker on whether it is possible to create a new world order without liquidating the old order. It is written in the Old Testament that everything began with chaos and will end with the Kingdom of God, which will establish definitive order. Therefore, the general trend of our existence is from chaos to order. Do you think that it is possible to make order in order? Or that we now live in an era of such disorder?

R. van den Akker: This is more a philosophical, almost a theological question. I am not sure I am able to react adequately. That which exists here, which will exist is something like organized chaos. We have behind us a period of relative stability, and I think that gives a good sign of our joint ability to organizationally overcome this chaos. There will always be the possibility of crises, which can also escalate. In the decade after the end of the Cold War, we have learnt the ability to react appropriately to the origin of sudden crises, but we must be aware that the world in which we live is far from perfect. I point only to the recent crises in countries such as India and Pakistan. I have justified doubts about the ability of NATO to control tension in areas beyond the treaty area of NATO.

Vladimir Leška

THE GEOPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE BREAK UP OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1. Introduction

When I thought about the theme for my talk, I thought of the opposite question: what would have been the geopolitical consequences if Czechoslovakia had not broken up.

I admit that I was never a supporter of the method of division of the common state applied by the prime ministers of the republics at that time - Václav Klaus and Vladimír Mečiar. Perhaps this is because I am one of the citizens of former Czechoslovakia who suffered not only a lot of anxiety and considerable material harm, but above all because of its psychological effect on me. I am not the only one who had difficulty coming to terms with the break up of Czechoslovakia. In spite of the fact that several years ago, I acquired the conviction that the creation of new sovereign states was unavoidable, if only so that the results of their creation as a historical experience could be reflected in the lives of the part of the present generation, which endeavored for this experience. Therefore, it is impossible to disagree with Karol Wolf, author of the recently published book "After the Second and Last or Peaceful Division of Czechoslovakia", in which he stated: "With the passage of time, even the most obstinate Czechoslovak must admit that if the citizens had decided to preserve the common state in 1992, it would have broken up in the end with a big bang and certainly not quietly, perhaps not even peacefully."¹

I have only one comment on this rather categorical formulation. I think that if the negotiating sides had chosen a more rational and better thought out approach when carrying out this historically unique act, and more comprehensively respected the prospective trends, the method and depth of the division, as well as the relations between the new international legal entities could have been more in harmony with the present principles of international coexistence and more in accordance with the geopolitical aspect than they are at present. However, I am also aware that a "more rational", "better thought out" and "more comprehensive" approach, by the main protagonists of the division, to the task they were given by history, would have been possible only if their conceptual starting points had been the same or close, and not so confrontational as was the case with V. Klaus and V. Mečiar. However, both were put into the position of chief negotiators of disintegration by free elections, and so by their Czech and Slovak fellow citizens, whose votes indirectly gave them the ap-

propriate mandates. At the same time, the decision of the voters was strongly determined by their different historical experiences.

It is clear that one of the main causes of the division of Czechoslovakia was the fact that, in the new geopolitical conditions, the disintegration elements among the political, social, historical, economic, cultural and other factors, already active in the Czech and Slovak environment, prevailed over the factors motivating integration. After the fall of communism and the break up of the Soviet Union, the disintegrative tendencies had such an intensive effect on the political scene, that they influenced a significant part of the Czech and Slovak political elites, which consequently lost interest in the continued existence of the common state. To put it briefly, independent Slovakia and the independent Czech Republic could originate because, from this point of view, relatively favorable geopolitical conditions were created for the break up of the common state. The Austrian journalists Karl Peter Schwarz concluded his book "The Czechs and Slovaks - the Long Road to a Peaceful Separation"², with the statement: "Czechoslovakia broke up because its basic idea lost its importance. Perhaps the break up could have been delayed, but an attempt to prevent it would have meant the end of democracy."³

I deliberately emphasized that the conditions for the break up of Czechoslovakia were relatively favorable, because not everybody perceived the new geopolitical situations as sufficiently favorable for the origin of the new states. Especially the older generation of citizens of the Czech Republic expressed fears that the young Czech Republic would not be strong enough to successfully resist increased German influence. The approach of this part of the Czech population to the newly forming geopolitical situation was expressed, for example, by the view expressed in the expert press at the time of discussion of the future of coexistence of the Czechs and Slovaks: "The idea that the Czech nation will live in a state without five million Slovaks, but with several million Sudeten Germans on its territory, is much less absurd than it was a year ago."⁴ In this case, reality confirmed the victory of the stronger and healthier current in Czech politics. The Slovak political scientist Svetoslav Bombik described the representatives of this political current as a "group of younger technocratically and managerially oriented politicians, who want to reconstruct the Czech Republic as a prosperous "Western" country as quickly as possible. They have a positive relationship to the influx of German capital, and are not very interested in the problems of cultural and national identity."⁵

In the Slovak political environment, the important factors influencing the balance of forces between supporters of independence and defenders of the common state, were above all the relationship to the Czechs, but especially the approach to solution of the problems of the Hungarian minority. The nationally oriented politicians perceived the new geopolitical conditions as an outstanding opportunity for a radical solution to the historically created bonds, without considering the influence of the geopolitical consequences on the newly arisen situation for the formation of the wider security and political environment in Central Europe, in which the new state would exist.

But approaching an answer to the required theme, I will make one further methodological comment. The expression "geopolitical consequences" generally evokes the idea of the political consequences of an event from the spatial point of view, or more precisely the point of view of "geographical space" of the interests or influence of world and European powers, or other interested states. Similar ideas are also involved, when we speak of the geopolitical consequences of the division of Czechoslovakia. However, these categories should not be used statically, but as factors, which develop and change over time, with the effect of other factors. They should be dealt with, in direct connection with the real period, and evaluated in the context of other political-economic and political-social characteristics of the specific international situation.

The division of Czechoslovakia had different geopolitical consequences in the situation of 1992, when the new states originated, to our evaluation today, after more than five years of independent existence, and a year after signing of the Founding Act on mutual relations, cooperation and security between NATO and the Russian Federation and almost a year after acceptance of the Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic security and cooperation by the highest representatives of the North Atlantic Council (8th July 1997). It will clearly have a different content after a few years, in the course of which, events could happen in the international field, which we expect, but also which no analyst could predict today. Only in the context of the specific international situation can we correctly and adequately evaluate the degree of influence of the geopolitical consequences on the shaping of the security situation, not only in the wider Central European and European context, but also for the states, whose origin evoked these consequences. Neither should we forget the subjective character of perceptions of this international category.

2. The Place of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic in Central Europe

The consequences of the division of Czechoslovakia will appear more clearly, if we clarify the position, which this state occupied in Central Europe. Poland has undoubtedly always had substantially greater geostrategic importance in this region. But the configuration of the unified state enabled use of the territory of Czechoslovakia as an important auxiliary military strategic space, which formed a conveniently compact transit territory both between Europe and Russia, and between the northern and southern parts of Central Europe, between the Baltic and the Balkans. If we often describe the Central European region as an uncertain area between two European powers - Germany and Russia - we can say the same about defining the west - east dimension of former Czechoslovakia, although its eastern border was with Ukraine, rather than directly with Russia.

According to the parameters by which the power of individual states are defined at present,⁶ Czechoslovakia belonged to the category of the medium si-

zed to smaller countries, since by number and perhaps also by quality of population, it had second place in the second ten European states. However, its international position and image were given especially by the spiritual or intellectual factors of power, its share in the shaping of European culture and its place in the history of the continent. Although, like the majority of post-communist countries, it was seriously affected by the consequences of the totalitarian regime, as a result of its pre-war democratic tradition and economic performance, it had the best pre-conditions for the successful achievement of a transformation in all areas of the life of society. In post-bipolar Europe, thanks to its name and the popularity of its post-revolutionary leaders, it had a leading position, and until the division was one of the countries which had dealt relatively successfully with its totalitarian past. The geostrategic value of Czechoslovakia did not lie in its military-strategic importance, but more in its possibilities in the diplomatic field. In the conditions of the post-confrontation phase of the European continent, this was a value which could not be overlooked.

Although, after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, it did not belong to any military or political alliance, its external security was not threatened by anybody. The internal political development in Czechoslovakia up to the 1992 election did not evoke any fears at home or abroad, and its internal situation showed adequate stability. The most significant features of the geopolitical situation in its surroundings, were, on one side the consequences of the break up of the Soviet Union, and on the other, the firm inclusion of uniting Germany in the framework of European integration. This entirely favorable security environment freed part of the political elites, desiring full involvement in high politics, of any fear of more serious negative geopolitical consequences of the possible break up of Czechoslovakia, and, at the same time, of adequate weapons in negotiations, which could lead in that direction.

I recall, that considerations of a new settlement of relations between the Czech and Slovak Republics, which was necessary in any case, also included discussion of the possible geopolitical consequences of any division of the federal state. However, they usually occurred only in the academic environment and in research centers. The leaders of the victorious political parties were so carried away by their electoral triumph, that any theoretical impulses, proposals or recommendations, which did not coincide with their ideological schemes, were rejected as the ballast of "research institute gossip", with which they did not intend to concern themselves, because it would only delay them on their roads to quick success.

The foreign policy experts of ODS suggested to society the idea that any regional cooperation is harmful for the Czech Republic, and must be rejected as utopian. They also applied this principle in relation to Slovakia. They considered the highest foreign policy priority of their party to be rapid integration into the EU and NATO without regard for the other Central European states, and as was later found, also without regard for Slovakia. J. Zieleniec, J. Schneider, M. Macek and B. Doležal defended this line at a press conference held in the

secretariat of ODS in Prague on 13th April 1992. At the same time, they started from the then widespread idea that the still existing Czechoslovakia was "for many reasons the best accepted in Western Europe".⁷ In relation to the fact that after the clear victory of HZDS, the Czech premier expected problems with implementing his version of reform in Slovakia and strengthening the exclusiveness of his position in Europe, he decided to jettison this encumbrance. Mary, including an American manager, investing in the Czech Republic at that time, praised him for "ridding himself of the weaker division".

With the approaching break up of Czechoslovakia, the uncritical idea of the extraordinarily successful Czech Republic, which could travel on the "road to Europe" fastest by itself, ever more intensively blinded the vision of some of its politicians. The following episode testifies to this: In answer to a question from a journalist from the *Hospodářské noviny*, whether the Czech Republic would be a member of the European Community within eight years, V. Klaus said in November 1992: "Undoubtedly. Let us say, five years are needed. Today, the Czech Republic is already comparable to the countries of the EC, for example, in the area of liberalization of foreign trade, and clearly soon it will be in the sphere of wages and in a tax system unburdened by ballast from history."⁸ The relationship of the Czech right to regional co-operation was expressed in the approach of its representatives to other participants in European co-operation. I will give one further example to illustrate this. In January 1993, in an interview for the French newspaper *Le Figaro*, V. Klaus declared: "Visegrád does not concern us. It is a process entirely artificially evoked by the Western countries."⁹

The view of the leading Czech politician started from ideas about the exclusive position of the Czech Republic among the Central European states. At the same time, it sufficiently convincingly demonstrated the relationship of the political elite, which participated in the division of Czechoslovakia, to the problems caused by the wider connections of this historic event and to its geopolitical consequences. The determining criterion of its political success was short term success, even at the price of unforeseeable negative consequences in the medium or long term.

3. The Geopolitical Consequences of the Break up of Czechoslovakia

For methodological reasons, I have divided the geopolitical consequences of the break up of Czechoslovakia into several groups, according to their spatial and temporal impact and form of effect. The first group should include the consequences, which immediately affected both states, which originated after the division of Czechoslovakia. From the point of view of the security situation in Central Europe, consequences, which could influence the situation in this region or in the whole of Europe in some way, will certainly have an important place. I provisionally labelled this group of problems as spatial. A further point of view for categorizing geopolitical consequences could be their influence on

participants in international relations. I had in mind, especially whether they influence the conditions for ensuring security and the possibilities for pursuing national interests directly or the effects mediated by their contribution to changes in the behavior of the participants in international relations, or other modifications of individual elements of the international environment.

In harmony with the comment about the need for a dynamic approach to evaluation of the effect of the geopolitical consequences, it is clearly appropriate that the geopolitical consequences of the break up of the federation should be assessed at a specific time. The variant is offered of dividing the consequences into acute – that is those which appeared at the time of the historic event and which marked the international situation permanently, and latent consequences – those which appear or could appear in connection with other international events or in certain specific conditions, which could occur in the development of international relations.

Perhaps a deeper and more comprehensive approach, than I have chosen, would be necessary for a thorough assessment of the influence of the geopolitical consequences of any international political phenomenon. However, I think that we can deal with a substantial part of the problem of the geopolitical consequences, although we assess them only from the point of view of their influence on the conditions for ensuring security and the possibilities for pursuit of national interests. Some may object that the questions concerning the conditions for ensuring security are really to a large extent included in the problem of pursuing national interests, in view of the fact that ensuring security is their highest priority. However, I think that emphasizing the aspects connected with ensuring security is not redundant. I consider this entirely justified, especially with regard for the fact that the international dimensions of the whole problem have especially great importance for ensuring security, while we assess the problem from a different point of view in the case of national interests.

The most significant acute geopolitical consequence of the division of Czechoslovakia was the origin of two significantly weaker sovereign entities in the space formerly occupied by the common state. Understandably, this fact mostly concerned the neighboring countries, but it also influenced their surroundings. If we start from the criteria of Hans Morgenthau, according to whom it is possible to evaluate the power of a state, its power potential was not diminished only by 1/3 (in the case of the Czech Republic) or by 2/3 (in the case of Slovakia), but actually to a much greater degree. The division of a compact unit, with a structure created over almost three quarters of a century (although with a brief historical interruption), stopped the operation of the synergic effect in a whole series of areas, especially in the sphere of defense and the economy. But also in the spiritual or intellectual areas of community life, especially in science and education, and undoubtedly also in culture, the division significantly marked the power parameters of both successor states. On the other hand, the division removed the influence of antagonistic opposing forces, which were

more than obvious in the area of politics, the state administration and parts of public opinion. However, this gain was clearly not great enough to balance the total geopolitical losses, caused to the weakened successor states.

If the territory of Czechoslovakia was relatively disadvantageous from the geopolitical point of view, the territories of the successor states offer even more complex conditions for defense. The Czechoslovak geostrategic space fell into two units – the Czecho-Moravian, also strategically including the part of the territory of Slovakia to the west of the Malé Karpaty (Záhorie), and the Slovak, lying within the Carpathian arc. As a result of the fact that, with small exceptions in some mountain areas, the Czecho-Moravian area is suitable for conducting extensive ground and air operations, so that it is more difficult to defend, it requires more forces and resources for its defense, or an intelligently thought out security policy, based on reliable international guarantees.

The greater part of the Slovak space is unsuitable for conducting extensive combined operations, and so more easily defensible. On the other hand, incidentally, the inhabited part of the territory, in the south, west and east, is relatively suitable for conducting military operations, although with limited offensive aims. The geostrategic heterogeneity of Slovakia is, therefore, to a large extent advantageous, but also partly disadvantageous. There is clear justification for asking whether the different geostrategic characters of the territories of the successor states, was one of the catalysts for the high degree of political will of their representatives to secure reliable international security guarantees for their countries.

Although in present-day conditions, the geostrategic and military-strategic aspects have largely lost the importance they had in the pre-nuclear age, and even in the period of bipolarity, they have not ceased to be important components of the geopolitical parameters of states and regions. However, a more substantial element of the new geopolitical position of the successor states is the fact that the problems, which burdened their relations with neighboring states got bigger after the division, and to a substantially larger extent than would correspond to their reduced parameters. For illustration, it is enough to mention the problem of the Sudeten Germans for the Czech Republic, and the problems of the Hungarian minority and the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros water works in Slovakia.

However, in the longer term and from the point of view of the effect on the situation in the Central European region, it is more important that after the division of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic has been geopolitically "shifted" further to the west, that is specifically into the German sphere, while Slovakia "slipped" to the east. The authors of the publication "Czech national interests" expressed this effect as follows: "Outwardly, the clearest features of the geopolitical situation of the new Czech state are the increased potential roles of the German factor in the political, economic and cultural development of the Czech Republic, and the geographical, and partly also geopolitical distance from the region of the former USSR and the Danube region."¹⁰

The results of this distancing of two nations, which used to form the core of a common state, but have now more or less turned their backs on each other, are clear after more than five years of the existence of independent republics. Slovakia was excluded from the group of Central European countries, with which it had always expected to be invited in the first wave, for negotiations about accession to the Treaty of Washington. Although it was still one of the associated states, which the EU formally invited to talks on becoming full members, it was the only one with which the accession procedure had not begun. Both facts could significantly influence the further development of the geopolitical position, not only of both successor states, but also of the whole region.

For reasons of time, I will not go into the detailed consequences of this situation and the secondary phenomena, which could develop directly from it. In this case, I would only like to point to the causal connection of these geopolitical consequences with others, which appeared before the year when Czechoslovakia broke up. The politicians who were present then, either did not foresee these new consequences, or they did not want to admit their negative effect. However, numerous analysts pointed to a similar risk resulting from the possible development after the break up of Czechoslovakia. Although the Czech Republic remained among the states, which were institutionally included in the integration process, it will still bear some of the negative consequences of the present position of Slovakia.

In the cited publication, we observed that the Czech Republic remains "in its historic position, as part of Central Europe, or if we do not include Germany, of East Central Europe. (...) One tendency in Czech policy aims and will aim at detaching the Czech Republic from East Central Europe and making it part of the democratic West, mainly with the support of Germany. However, this tendency should not be followed without connection, that is in an 'isolationist' way. Its geopolitical position predetermines that the Czech Republic cannot decide to free itself from its Central and Eastern European connections."¹¹ We concluded from this, that the Czech Republic had a serious geopolitical problem, the core of which lay in the need to harmonize three components, deriving from its geopolitical position: "... integration into the democratic West, of which an important part is democratic Germany, partnership (and not feudal subordination) towards Germany, and cooperation in the Central European space"¹² (author's emphasis)

I will not comment on how practical foreign policy reacted to the recommendations, formulated with the participation of about 15 research workers of the research institute of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic. However, the reality was that the policy continued, which had been set by the foreign policy experts of ODS and originally created by the Czech premier even before the division of Czechoslovakia. Especially in the first two to three years of the independent existence of the Czech state, his cabinet almost completely ignored the last of the above mentioned three components, that is cooperation in the Central European space.

Understandably, the greatest share of responsibility for the fact that Slovakia shifted from the Central European space much more to the east, than its new geopolitical position required, belongs to its political elite, above all its ruling coalition. I will leave aside a deeper analysis of the causes of this situation. However, in the first years of the independent existence of the Czech Republic, the political practice of the government of V. Klaus also made some contribution to this.

The new geopolitical position was significantly reflected, although indirectly, especially in the internal political development of Slovakia. It is possible to carry on theoretical arguments about whether this development was the result or the cause. But it is certain that the effort of the parties of the Slovak ruling coalition to emphasize their own identity and clearly distance themselves from the course of the federal authorities, was involuntarily marked by measures, both in the political and the economic fields, which were clearly asymmetrical, in comparison with the transformation policy, both of the former federal government and of the cabinet of V. Klaus in the independent Czech Republic. The original asymmetries and divergences, very clearly expressed in the conceptions of the main reform measures of the Czech and Slovak political representatives from the beginning, became ever deeper after the creation of the sovereign states. The shift of Slovakia to the east was also expressed in a further worsening of the political culture, sharpening of confrontation and deepening of polarization, not only between politicians, but in the whole society. A conflict between supporters of a civic society and a nation state came to a head.

The problem of the influence of the deepening asymmetry between the successor states deserves more space and deeper consideration. With the break up, two different conceptions of transformation began to be applied on the territory of former Czechoslovakia. Until recently, V. Klaus's conception was perceived in the world as an almost ideal model, while Mečiar's policy was considered "a third way" distancing the country from the Western democracies. Comparison of them was an important component of perceptions of the development in both successor states, in that, as a result of this confrontation, the marks which Slovakia received were sometimes worse than she really deserved. As a result of this, the importance of Poland and Hungary was optically raised, and their position in the foreign policy of the important countries of the EU and the USA was strengthened still further. At the same time, Central Europe as an aggregate whole lost in the Western approach to the post-communist countries, the position formerly attributed to these states in the process of European integration.

The asymmetry between the Czech Republic and Slovakia appeared not only in the philosophy of reform of society, but also in approaches to the contemporary world in general, in some areas of foreign policy, in relations to neighbors and to international organizations and elsewhere. The building of new statehoods and emphasizing of continuity with historic events, which are perceived differently in the two successor states, is understandably contributing to

the creation of the idea of two entirely different countries. Life is confirming that symbols also have great importance for perceptions of the policy of a state.

The already mentioned raising of the importance of the Hungarian factor in Slovak politics, undoubtedly also influenced Slovakia's failure to achieve her integration aims at the same speed as the other participants in the "Visegrád Group". Under the expression "Hungarian factor", I have in mind the whole complex of questions connected with Slovakia's relations with her southern neighbor, not only the minority problem, although this is a substantial part and the core of the problem. As a result of the small power potential of independent Slovakia, the inferiority complex and fear for the acquired independence deepened among the nationally oriented part of the Slovak political elite. This led to a doctrine of the defense of national interests, or to be more precise of national symbols, which still dominates as a result of the balance of forces in Slovak politics. Since this does not correspond to the conditions of present-day European development, it inevitably came into sharp confrontation not only with the conception of a more modern oriented policy in the domestic arena, but also with the European and world democratic political representatives.

As a result of the development which followed the division of Czechoslovakia, the compactness of the Central European space was also disturbed. The recent visit of V. Mečiar to Moscow and the statements of B. Yeltsin supporting HZDS in the approaching parliamentary elections, were interpreted by some commentators as the result of the long-term foreign policy course of Slovakia, directed away from the West. If we make a deeper evaluation of this diplomatic activity, two facts are clear from the example: 1) Slovak - Russian relations are really significantly better than the relations of Russia with any other state in Central Europe and perhaps also with other post-communist states; 2) the good friendly relations of Slovakia with Russia evoke ideas that, with bipolar vision, the relations of the other Central European countries with Russia are restrained and deliberately cool. A series of commentators also start from the prevailing thesis that the main reason for enlarging the North Atlantic Alliance is the Russian threat and therefore the policy of Slovakia not only does not respect this, but by friendliness towards Russia actually actively participated in increasing it.

However, the representatives of the leading countries of the Alliance are proceeding with the project of enlargement on the basis of a very different philosophy. By signing the Founding Act on mutual relations, co-operation and security between the North Atlantic Alliance and the Russian Federation,¹³ in which the highest value is placed on defining the aim and content of their partnership after the creation of the new geopolitical situation, they laid the foundations for a European security architecture for the new millennium. But together with the Madrid declaration, it must not remain a mere political declaration, but must become an important guide towards a common approach to building a European security architecture, and it will be necessary for not only the signatories to participate in fulfilling the agreements, but also ot-

her states, especially those which are endeavoring to join NATO. I do not want to evaluate the Russian policy of V. Mečiar as correct and call for it to be followed, but only to criticize the policy of the other states of Central Europe towards Russia, since up to now, it does not correspond to the interests of continental security.

I do this because the North Atlantic Alliance expects the candidate countries to actively participate in the wider aims of enlargement. The general secretary of NATO J. Solana specified this condition directly in relation to Russia: "I want to emphasize here that we want the countries we invite to have the same relations with Russia, which we want NATO and its members to have. We want to make a real effort to achieve solid, lasting and good relations with Russia."¹⁴ Russia, and also Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic should show dedication to contributing to building "a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, integrated and free, for the success of all its nations."¹⁵ If such a state is successfully achieved, its positive effect will undoubtedly be reflected in their mutual relations.

However, the effort of the European and American politicians to achieve such a development in Europe, and create a continent of peace and cooperation, in which all the states would feel equally secure, strikes, and clearly for some years will continue to strike, against the remnants of the past, of which the most difficult to overcome may be the tendency to evaluate international relations through the lens of bipolar vision. The tendency towards this way of perceiving European developments is also supported by objective problems, with which Russia and other post-communist countries are dealing only with extraordinary difficulty in their reform efforts. Pessimists start from the assumption that the division of Europe will not be avoided, and so it is necessary to follow a policy which will ensure that they will be on the right side.

On the basis of this philosophy, the present geopolitical position of Slovakia could have extraordinarily negative consequences for Central Europe. If we admit that Europe could develop according to a really pessimistic scenario, with a renewal of bipolarity and military-strategic confrontation, the greatest burden of consequences of such a situation would fall on the states along the line of division. For many Czechs and Slovaks, the situation could resemble the condition in which millions of German families lived before 1989.

I belong to the realistic optimists, and so I hope that the results of the division of Czechoslovakia will not lead to such an end. On the other hand, I do not exclude that the possibility that the present situation is not the worst state in which the relations of Slovakia to the other states of Central Europe could be. In other words, they could get even worse. This will happen if the politicians, and not only in Slovakia, but also especially in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland do not sufficiently respect the fragility of the present geopolitical situation in the region, when taking decisions. If they ignore this fact, they will assist a development resembling the pessimistic scenario described above.

4. Conclusion

The break up of Czechoslovakia was an organic part of the extensive process of general transformation of the European situation, involving not only the post-communist countries, but essentially the whole of Europe. Only in the course of this transformation are we gradually learning about the depth and extent of the basic changes and the immense difficulties and many sided demands for the harmonization of individual steps, as well as the mutual connections of often unexpected consequences in various spheres of the life of society. Not only the post-communist states are transforming, as is often simply supposed, but also the international organizations, and the whole system of international relations.

Why emphasize this, precisely in this context? It seems to me that many politicians do not give sufficient attention to the dynamics and the mutual connections of phenomena in this dramatically changing international environment. As a result, some of their judgements are precipitate and one-sided, because they often do not reflect on the influence of the changes, which are already occurring and do not sufficiently foresee the results of their decisions. Although many of them bear huge political responsibilities, they often did not have enough time to obtain the necessary factual and practical knowledge. Therefore, we should not be surprised that many of their decisions do not always fall into the context of the wider temporal and geopolitical connections. Some even start processes, which are in conflict with long-term global trends. One of them was also started by the method, by which Czechoslovakia was divided.

Convincing evidence of limited understanding of the character of the present stage of European development was also provided by the effort of some political representatives to one-sidedly use the short-term advantages of the position of their country for individualist actions, without regard for the longer-term interests and needs of the whole continent. This was a sort of national egoism and elitist separation, which is in sharp conflict with the trend towards interdependence and integration. A tendency to one-sidedness and little willingness to cooperate are characteristic features of numerous politicians in the post-communist countries. This was already stated years ago, by the authors of the international project "Security for Europe". The difficulty to overcome results of the totalitarian past also include a tendency to excessive confrontation, little willingness to achieve consensus and exaggerated mutual suspicion. I will venture to say that some of these characteristics were among the causes of the method of division of Czechoslovakia.

Today, we still see that some politicians, as if under the weight of everyday problems, are losing the ability to continue the effort to achieve the more distant aims, which almost everybody declared immediately after the fall of the Iron Curtain. One of the first of these is still the unification of the whole of Europe, although only a few are striving to achieve this goal today. In our Central European space, this vision has shrunk into a competition to achieve mem-

bership of the EU and NATO as soon as possible. By this, I do not want to cast doubt on the sense and usefulness of the effort of the post-communist countries to achieve full membership of integration groupings. Rather the opposite. But it should be understood more comprehensively, and as part of a wider orientation. What is undermining the European unification process is the one-sided, national egoist approach to these institutions, only as synonyms of military-security guarantees and economic prosperity.

The geopolitical consequences of the origin of two independent states in the middle of Europe will be seen in context with further processes, which will effect the continent in future years. If the development in Europe is more complicated and if there is a stronger tendency to return to a division of the continent, the geopolitical consequences of the division of Czechoslovakia will appear more negative, both in relation to the conditions for ensuring security and pursuing national interests by both successor states, and in terms of the security environment of the whole region.

Notes

1. Wolf, K.: *After the Second and Last Time or the Peaceful Division of Czechoslovakia*, G plus G, Prague 1998, p. 91.
2. Schwartz, K.P.: *Czechs and Slovaks – the Long Road to a Peaceful Separation*, Bratislava 1994. 250 pages.
3. Idem, p.233.
4. *International Politics*, no.1/92, Prague 1992.
5. Valenta, J. and col.: *Do We Have National Interests?*, Prague 1992, p.85.
6. H. Morgenthau evaluates the power of a state according to the following criteria: 1. the material factors of power: a) the geopolitical position as the most stable factor in the power of a state; b) natural resources, measured as the ability to be self-sufficient; c) industrial capacity; d) military preparedness, actually an expression of the preceding factors, (the degree of military preparedness is given by the technological innovations in armaments, the quality of leadership, the quality and quantity of the armed forces); e) size of population; 2. spiritual or intellectual factors of power: f) the qualitative aspect of the population, expressed by its national character; g) quality of the government, especially the level of foreign policy (real ability of the government to use the material potential of the country in foreign policy, its ability to harmonize the potential and aims of foreign policy, and to secure the support of the domestic and international public for its foreign policy); h) the level of diplomacy (quality of personnel and ability to define national interests and pursue them in a practical foreign policy); i) the level of military personnel and j) national morale, which is an expression of the degree of resolve of the public to support the national interests. (According to Krejčí, O.: *National Interests and Geopolitics*, Prague 1993, pp. 123 and 124, and Krejčí, O.: *International Politics*, Prague 1997, p. 131 and following).

7. See the record of a press conference of ODS, held in its secretariat in Prague on 13th April 1992, on the strategy of the party in the area of foreign policy, in the presence of the deputy chairman of ODS J. Zieleniec and the foreign policy experts J. Schneider, M. Macek and B. Doležal. (In: Czech foreign policy, Data 4/1992, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague, April 1992, pp. 317 - 320.)
8. Hospodářské noviny (Economic News) year 3, No. 7, Prague, 6. 11. 1992, pp. 1, 2.
9. See Rudé právo, year 3, No. 7, Prague 9. 1. 1993 p. 8
10. Collective of authors: Czech National Interests, Prague 1993, p. 16.
11. Idem.
12. Idem, p.17.
13. The Founding Act on mutual relations, cooperation and security between the North Atlantic Alliance and the Russian Federation, Paris 27th May 1997. In: The Madrid Summit of NATO, volume of documents, published by the Czech Atlantic Commission, Prague 1997, pp. 79-90.
14. Mladá Fronta Dnes, Prague, 11. 2. 1997.
15. The Founding Act on mutual relations, cooperation and security between the North Atlantic Alliance and the Russian Federation, Paris 27th May 1997. In: cit. above, p. 79.

Discussion on the paper by Vladimír Leška

(THE GEOPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE BREAK UP OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA)

Elemir Nečež: I have two reservations towards the arguments of the speaker. The depiction of Slovak-Russian relations gave the impression that it is a matter of partnership between two equal sides, but in this case it is not. Whether we look at Russia with trust or distrust, we must admit that Russia has a conception of external and foreign security with a long tradition behind it. Slovak foreign policy is a collection of unconnected, confused steps, and it is difficult to observe any conception of foreign policy. It is also difficult to look only at the economic conception of policy towards Russia. To express myself more firmly, I have to say that at present, Slovakia simply has no foreign policy. The second reservation concerns our fear of the creation of a new dividing line in Europe. I am not sure that a geopolitical vacuum represents a better way of creating European security, than the simple enlargement of NATO, which will obviously mean a certain shifting of boundaries.

Vladimír Leška: On the first question or reservation, I did not speak of partnership between Slovakia and Russia. Rather, I expressed fear of trying to evaluate Slovakia's Russian policy, since it is a problem, which deserves more space. I only indicated that the activity of Slovakia or the initiatives of her premier towards Russia are evaluated just as I said. This, firstly, evokes the impression that Slovakia's policy towards Russia is sometimes perceived as partnership. I agree with the view that in the given situation, it is difficult to speak of partnership, because the two states are not comparable in a whole series of ways. I would also observe that this policy is perceived negatively, especially because the other states of Central Europe follow a more reserved policy towards Russia, showing a certain cool calculation, concerning especially economic relations. Naturally, I can best document this in the case of the Czech Republic. The Czechs also have no "Russian policy". This is also visible in the pages of specialist journals, such as *Mezinárodní politika*. The Czech experts devote much attention to this problem, and observe the fact that such a policy is missing from Czech foreign policy. The seriousness of the question lies in the fact that it is precisely Central European countries which should have such a clearly formulated policy. On the other hand, Polish - Russian relations deserve a positive critical evaluation. In the last year, they were the subject of grant supported research by the Institute of International Relations. The resulting publication entitled "Polish-Russian relations and their influence on the Central European region" is now being published. The research shows that in

spite of the depth of the historical controversies between Poland and Russia, the Polish political elite is well aware of the role of Russia in the European security system. The fact that Poland is becoming a member of NATO, enables this country to have normal relations with Russia, with historical memories not burdening the present, and Russian – Polish relations developing as political relations between two states, which do not have to carry the burden of the past. This flows logically from the fact that the position of Poland as a member of NATO will be much more stable in relation to Russia, and nobody will have to suspect Polish politicians of considering advantages at the expense of their allies in their policy towards Russia. I would also answer the second reservation in this direction. I did not formulate my lecture according to the view that the enlargement of NATO is a negative process. I only observed that during the enlargement of NATO, we must take into account not only the fears originally expressed by the candidate countries (with the Russian threat always in the background), but it is also necessary to see the wider philosophical dimension of the enlargement of NATO. This does not lie only in the fact that three countries will join the Alliance. The wider dimension lies in the fact that stability has moved to the east, and this shift contributes to the stability of the whole region. Thus, the acceptance of the first three members is only part of enlargement. Enlargement only became possible, when a relationship of partnership was established between NATO and Russia, and the Founding Act deals with that. Such an understanding of the enlargement of NATO, and the further improvement of relations between NATO and Russia is certainly not (as J. Solana said) an excessive concession to the Russian bear.

Jaroslav Kuča: The Czech Republic is Slovakia's greatest commercial partner. I would be interested to hear the speaker's view on whether it will be possible to preserve the customs union between Slovakia and the Czech Republic, after the Czech Republic joins the EU, and what destiny awaits the Visegrád Group.

Vladimír Leška: This question does not disturb only people in Slovakia, but also people in the Czech Republic. It is generally assumed that the new members of the EU will have to withdraw from treaties of a commercial character with countries which do not belong to the EU. This is not only a question of the customs union, but also of CEFTA and it does not concern only the Czech Republic, but also Poland and Hungary. However, I am convinced that the process of acceptance into the EU will not proceed so rapidly, that the construction of a frontier of Schengen character on the River Morava should already be considered. I think that talks on acceptance into the EU – although they already began – will continue at least until 2005, possibly until 2010. As a result, there will be enough time to solve these problems. Obviously, if the Czech Republic joins the EU, but Slovakia remains outside, it would lead to the negative scenario of the Czech Republic, as a member of the EU, having to do the sa-

me in relation to Slovakia, as Austria has done. That is, the Czechs would strengthen their external frontier, which would already be the frontier of the EU, and on the basis of this, all the advantages available up to now, such as lesser frontier contact and the customs union would probably be lost. However, in my view, the question of Slovakia will already be solved by the time the Czech Republic becomes a member of the EU. As Slovak representatives say, Slovakia fulfills the economic and legislative criteria for acceptance at least on the same level as the other countries, with which the EU is discussing integration. There are only deficiencies in the area of the political criteria imposed by the Copenhagen document. These are the sort of deficiencies which can be removed in a short time. If this happens, the acceptance processes should also begin with Slovakia. We meet, here, with two time dimensions, which may approach each other. In this context, I will observe one additional factor. We should approach such phenomena of international relations as a dynamic process. We sometimes speak of the acceptance of new members of NATO with regard to a single deadline. While we work towards this deadline, the situation may substantially change. It is not only the post-communist countries, which are undergoing a process of transformation, but also the international institutions. Thus, the process of transformation affects our considerations, but we cannot guess all the contexts of future development. It can easily happen that we do not guess development correctly. This happens especially in the case of our politicians, who have before them mainly immediate aims, that is not always the further, wider and deeper aims. Decisions are taken from this point of view, and after a few years they cause serious new problems, which are difficult for society to deal with.

Vladimír Kmec: One very serious axiom flows from the theoretical considerations I have heard in the context of various discussions in Slovakia. Slovakia, with her surroundings, should not get into the situation in which Slovakia's failure to be accepted into NATO is accepted as an anomaly, as the beginning of a process, in which Slovakia is creating the first differences in comparison with the three neighboring countries. The scenario, that we may not be accepted into the EU together with our neighbors, which were already included in the first group, increases the undoubted difference between Slovakia and the three neighboring states. I consider this a very important factor for the future development of Slovakia in the area of national security. If discussion develops from the relationship of our failure to integrate into NATO, with the argumentation that the zone of stability came close to Slovakia and this increased her security, in the case of the EU, we find many arguments which say the opposite.

Peter Barták: I would like to point out that my comment on the lecture of R. van den Akker can be connected with the discussion on this lecture. The emphasis on the need to go beyond national interests interested me. Collective defense already does not represent only a defense of given values, it is ne-

cessary to go beyond this territory. This is connected with the fact that, today, no state can provide itself with absolute security on its own – of course in certain circumstances with one exception. However, in general, there is no possibility of securing comprehensive and all-sided security and defense by applying one's own national interests at the expense of other states, but only by seeking compromise and partial concession of one's own national interests, while accepting other values. The theme of the lecture led me to the idea that after the division of Czechoslovakia into two states, they began to search for their own identity and definition of their own national interests. Even today, Slovakia has no precisely defined national interests, in the way that the USA or Germany has them, and I am not speaking only about national security or defense interests. Therefore, the stage of going beyond national interests is still only in front of us. If I will illustrate this problem on the example of the third question of the speaker, then for a large proportion of Slovaks, the acceptance of Slovakia into NATO is not compatible with the idea that a Slovak soldier should be present, let us say, in Holland or Turkey. The same hesitation appears towards the possibility of the existence of NATO bases on Slovak territory, although, paradoxically, they would actually represent help for Slovakia from the member states of NATO. With regard to the important geopolitical and geostrategic factors, I do not think that their importance would decrease. The end of bipolarity and the transition to multipolarity in connection with the end of the Cold War, is also bringing something of a return to the pre-nuclear period. That is a positive phenomenon, especially because nuclear weapons have disappeared from Central Europe, and one day may disappear from the whole of Europe. If we want to classify the possible escalation of war from non-military struggle to the ninth level – war with all resources and threat of the use of nuclear weapons – even the tenth level – war with all resources including nuclear. It is necessary to realize that at certain moments – in the sixties and seventies – the threat of nuclear war was entirely real, whether we consider the crises over Cuba, Euro-missiles or Berlin. This threat gradually diminished and today, the idea that there is a threat of nuclear war is not realistic. At present, it is considered the least real threat for Europe. This means that we are returning behind the existence of the horizon of nuclear weapons, to a period of consideration of factors, which were topical in the pre-nuclear period. Geopolitical and geostrategic factors also belong here.

Vladimir Leška: I said that geopolitical and geostrategic factors are less important than in the past, but not that the probability of conflict without the use of nuclear weapons, or danger below the level of conventional war is increasing. I spoke about these factors, because I am convinced that the military solution of international relations – especially in the European region – will be ever less frequently used. It will be ineffective and more expensive than solution by other non-military means. These non-military means, mainly economic, political and diplomatic are increasing in value. For example in the Balkans, mi-

litary means are still used to solve conflicts, however, not for the solution of conflicts between states, but within states. The first use of armed force in the Balkan war happened in the framework of a single state. If we admit the possibility of the military solution of the conflict in Kosovo, that will also be a problem in the framework of one state. That is, I spoke about the reduction in the importance of geopolitical and geostrategic elements in connection with the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

Vladimir Kmec: If we speak of geopolitics and recent trends, for geopolitics, the break up of Czechoslovakia meant a peaceful change of frontiers. Until then, we knew from history mainly about changes of frontiers, which happened on the bases of wars or military action. I would like to know, what importance the speaker ascribes to this element for the geopolitical trends of the 21st century. Does it have any importance?

Vladimir Leška: The cultivated separation of these two states is evidence that if politicians agree, they can divide states. However, I do not think that the separation was carried out in the best way. It was characterized by speed and an effort to realize short-term political interests. From the longer term point of view, this damaged both nations. However, the solution which the Czech and Slovak politicians used can clearly be mentioned as a positive example. But I am not sure that this solution can serve as an example for future relations in the process of globalization. The process of integration prevails, and efforts at further disintegration and fragmentation in the conditions of other states have proved to be rather ineffective and anachronistic, and will not correspond to the aims of the integration processes, which are based on the process of globalization. But what happened, happened, and I will not venture to guess, what would have happened if it had not. The book of the Slovak journalist Karol Wolf contains the formulation: "With the passage of time, the most steadfast Czechoslovak must recognize, that, if in 1992, the citizens had decided for the preservation of the common state, it would finally have broken up with a big bang, and certainly not quietly, and perhaps not even peacefully". It may be difficult to argue with this over the question of the actual break up, but I think that if the politicians had not been in different ideological camps, it could have been possible to agree on a more effective form of division and a more effective form of future coexistence between the two states. But since Mečiar represented one defined political pole in former Czechoslovakia and Klaus the other, these two poles could not agree on an effective form of future coexistence. This deep split was clearly necessary, but beyond that, we can speak only on the level of "if ...if". That "if" was given by the balance of forces, which originated from free elections, where the citizens decided. Although the politicians did not have a mandate for division of the state, thanks to the high number of votes, they got into the leading position and gained the necessary space. It could have been different, but "if" is not valid in history.

Peter Volten: I have a problem with the concept of geopolitics. It is rather an old-fashioned approach to the interpretation of phenomena. It is closely connected with military-security questions, and with the former Cold War. In the thinking of many people, geopolitics is still fixed as a value approach to security. In the thinking of the Dutch, French or Germans, geopolitics was traditionally associated with the factor of territory, but that has not been the most important factor for a long time. The Americans approach foreign policy mainly in strategic terms, or to put it better in geopolitical strategic terms. The further east you go in Europe, the more geopolitics is emphasized. It is based on fear of the loss of territory, that is the old classic approach to questions of security and defense. For Western Europe, which has created a community based on real security, the geopolitical factor of territory is entirely insignificant. The power of Germany does not lie in the fact that Germany has more territory after reunification, but in the economic and financial power of the state. The same is true of Holland, or let us mention Taiwan and Hong Kong. Their importance in the world does not lie in territory. Naturally views on these questions vary. For Poland, the problem appears differently today, because throughout Polish history, territory was always immensely important. Thus, there is a deep asymmetry in our thinking about security policy, connected with location and place in history. However, we must overcome old-fashioned ideas of security, based on geopolitics in favor of less military and more globalizing aspects: economic, financial and other factors, for which frontiers have no significance, and we are attempting to free ourselves from frontiers. In politics, especially in security politics, we still live with the consciousness of frontiers, but we should be aware that the significance of frontiers could also diminish here. If you speak with the general staff in Moscow, you still move in terms of geopolitics. Unfortunately, it is necessary to admit that globalization in security essentially does not exist. By definition, security is regional or local, and so we still find ourselves in a confused world, in spite of all the globalization efforts. We are still deeply rooted in European history and in the Cold War. But it should be clear to everybody that geopolitics is not as great a theme as it used to be.

Vladimir Leška: When I prepared my contribution, I had the greatest problems in dealing with especially this term. When a person starts with geopolitics, he is working with the theories which led to *Mein Kampf* and the consequences which flowed from it. However, today the term or category of "geopolitics", at least in our environment, is understood more as a geographical, spatial perception of certain activities of the powers, or interested states. In this sense geopolitical language can be used, for example, in the relationship of Slovakia to Hungary – Slovakia as a neighbor, which was territorially diminished, so that the possibilities for exerting influence by the diplomatic route were diminished, in comparison with the situation when Czechoslovakia existed. A second matter is that geopolitics evokes the impression that it should be about the spatial solution of problems. However, we should also add time and dynamic dimensions.

Gabriel Kopecký: Geopolitics should not be limited to territorial problems, but should be concerned with the global aspects of security and with global politics. Although we are a small country, we should also think and speak in the pan-European context, when using geopolitical terminology. If in the past, two hostile blocks – NATO and the Warsaw Pact – opposed each other, today the greatest problem is the uncertainty of NATO. There is uncertainty about what is the potential opponent, how strong it is, where it comes from, why it is coming. It is impossible to plan, if I do not know the opponent, his size and possibilities, and I cannot prepare a plan for reciprocal action, or for a flexible and adequate reaction.

Peter Ošváth: I would like to argue with the speaker over one question: the statement that where the division of Czechoslovakia was concerned, the winning political parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia had a mandate for the division of the republic, given to them by the election result. That was not the case. A political party gets a mandate to do that which is included in its program, submitted to the voters before the elections. If one of these two deciding political parties did not have the division of the common state in its program, then it did not have a mandate for it after winning the election. Where the correctness of this action is concerned – I will not argue about whether it was good or bad – too short a time has passed since the division for it to be possible to assess the positive or negative effects of that event. So far only six years have passed and the degree of historical correctness or incorrectness still cannot be assessed. However, in the matter of the mandate, it is necessary to say that neither political force had a mandate for the division. The program of ODS supported preservation of the federal state, while in Slovakia HZDS offered four variants, and the citizens would decide in a referendum, which variant the victorious political force would implement. I recall, that already in 1991, one Slovak politician presented the view that after integration into the European Community, Slovakia should have her own seat and own star. He suggested that they would make a joint effort to join Europe, but in the end they would have separate representation in it. Thus, he outlined a particular vision of the future integration of Slovakia. It is a paradox, that precisely the politician who produced this idea, is blamed by the so-called patriots for not supporting the independence of Slovakia. In this case, also, only history will show whether this idea was correct, and whether it was not better than the present action and thought. So far it can be stated that after the division of Czechoslovakia, the integration of Slovakia has slowed down in comparison with the Czech Republic, and so it is possible to argue about whether it would have been more advantageous if Czechoslovakia had proceeded jointly with integration, with the form of separation being chosen only on the threshold of integration.

Vladimir Leška: When using the word "mandate", I naturally had in mind, that of the representatives, who were elected to govern. They clearly did not get an explicit mandate for division, but since the representatives of the strongest po-

litical groups could not agree – Klaus wanted a firm federation and the Slovak side rejected this – they saw no alternative to division. There remains the paradox that the Slovak National Party, the only significant political force with separation in its program, fulfilled its election program, with only a few percent of the votes. The other less important parties did not have this point in their programs.

Milan Šmida

PROSPECTS OF COLLABORATION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC AS AN ASSOCIATED PARTNER OF THE WEU

In accordance with organizers' target, I shall try to draw attention to the evolution in the WEU and incite a dialogue about the potential represented by this international organization for the future arrangement of conditions on the European continent. In a limited time, I shall concentrate myself to the characteristic of basic approaches of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Defense to the occurring WEU adaptation, which would have to create conditions to realize one of long-term aims of the foreign and security policy of the SR and enable integration into this institution.

Based on my own experience I can confirm that in Slovakia in discussions about the security architecture and future arrangement of security conditions in Europe, no more detailed attention to the mission and possibilities of the WEU has been paid for a relatively long time.

Approaches to political and military aspects of the statute and position of an associated partner of the WEU were, in the 1994 to 1996 period, affected by a priority attention to changes in NATO and interests in preparation of decisions about the Alliance enlargement.

Also complicatedness and confusion of the WEU internal changes into an operable organism and the prevailing pessimism of some partners among member countries in the evaluation of the WEU prospectives had their effect on this state of affairs. A turnover began to occur in the second half of 1996. Notions about decreasing chances of the SR to become a member of the first group of NATO membership adepts can be certainly ranged among the reasons of the gradual turnover in approaches to the WEU and of differentiation of the security policy targets.

In the last year, due to defective analyses, even certain circles began to consider, for a short period, the SR membership in the WEU, in linkage with EU membership, as an alternative of NATO membership. Among the arguments, an opinion appeared about the fact, that meanwhile the Russian Federation decisively refuses the Alliance enlargement, the attitude to the eventual entry of new members to the WEU has not such a categorical form. From the viewpoint of the present problems, perhaps it is not necessary to deal in more details with further connections and circumstances of these opinions and interests, which are hidden behind them.

To make clear the present position of the Ministry of Defense it is more important that after the NAC session in Berlin we have managed to penetrate more deeply into the essence and the decisive tendencies in transatlantic rela-

tionships, to understand wider connections of forming the European security identity and to react early to the fact that relationships on the NATO-WEU-EU axis get a new dimension. The evolution and events in 1997 confirmed the assumption about the fact that discussions on the security architecture, also due to the real situation, have got practically a political dimension in the form of concrete actions, which had to verify functionality of the cooperative model of the European security. To support the statements I can say that in the Ministry of Defense, since the session of the WEU Council in Ostend, the evolution in the WEU has been very attentively followed and a great importance has been put on the preparation to the different negotiations of the Council and to their results. Above all, negotiations in Paris and in Erfurt, taking place in the last year, are concerned, when under the presidency of France and Germany, a shift occurred in the WEU in the field of institutionalization of WEU relations with the EU and NATO, in the development of WEU operation capacities, and in forming conditions for the associated partners to take part in peacemaking operations under the WEU leadership.

1. Approaches to Processes of the WEU Adaptation

The Slovak Republic, in accordance with its interests, is interested in increasing responsibility of Europeans for doings on the Continent, for its stability and security. In connection with the evolution in the past period, taking into consideration the results of the NATO summit taking place in Madrid in July and the session of the European Council taking place in Amsterdam in August, we think that it is necessary to consider the increasing interconnection of interests of the western countries and to respect further deepening of relationships on the EU-WEU-NATO axis, which modify importantly the starting conditions to formulate the integration strategy of adepts of membership in these western structures among countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

It seems that after extensive discussions, in spite of objections of more pro-atlantically oriented countries and some neutral countries, opinions have prevailed supporting strengthening of political integration linkages in European communities, by institutionalization of EU and WEU relationships. From the viewpoint of relationships evolution between the EU and WEU, i.e. in addition, to respect also the fact that the WEU becomes more and more an integrated part of evolution in the EU, and by its mission it tends:

- to support a common foreign and security policy of the EU with a defined defensive dimension,
- to a function which will enable to make accessible the corresponding military and operation potential for a common defensive policy.

In this sense, the tendency of gradual WEU reconstruction in a defensive EU component, of forming capacities to accomplish the tasks linked with treat-

ment of crisis situations, including peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, is important.

Based on this evolution we expect that measures will be accepted to strengthen mutual WEU and EU linkages, enabling:

- further development of collaboration of EU and WEU organs, tuning activities related with the action of chairmanship countries and the work of the secretariats,
- to delimit juridically the relationships between the corresponding EU organs and the WEU Planning Group, the WEU Situation Center and the WEU Satellite Center,
- to improve the consultation process coordination and that of decision making in crisis situations,
- to develop collaboration in the domain of armament within the framework of the Group for the WEU Armament (WEAG) in order to rationalize the European armament market.

We realize that works related with a common defensive EU policy and strengthening of institutional linkages between EU and WEU have been enabled by solving the objections of some member countries related with a need to respect the specific engagements resulting from their NATO membership (Denmark, Great Britain). This result can be considered as a success of collaboration of continental EU and WEU members, especially of France and Germany which were the WEU chairmanship countries in 1997, and at the same time certain shifts can be seen as to approaches of Great Britain in the relationship with the EU after elections in this country.

The evolution of relationships between NATO and WEU is not less important. We know that one of the important targets of NATO adaptation is to build up the ESDI, and the process would have to result in creation of effective military forces and the European military command, ready to act under the political control and leadership of the WEU. Providing capacities for NATO for operations under the WEU leadership is a key aspect of WEU operation capacities and ESDI practical application.

Realism and pragmatism with which discussions about the mission and relationships of both institutions can be observed. We are convinced that the process will result in the creation of effective military forces and European military command, ready to act under the WEU political control and leadership. The approval of the common NATO/WEU document on the coordination of training programs is considered by us to be an important impulse to develop WEU operation capacities. We expect that collaboration between the WEU and NATO in the next period will be oriented to:

- improvement of mechanisms and procedures of the crisis management, updating experience attained in operations and during trainings,

- forming capacities to react to various crisis situations and optimum application of the available military and defensive potential,
- define principles of making use of military forces of WEU countries in operations under a national or multinational command, the requirements for interoperability of the forces detached,
- enlargement and improvement of training and exercises
- development of intelligence capacities and versatile application of possibilities of the WEU Situation Center and the WEU Satellite Center;

Based on the results of the Council negotiations it is possible to deduce that the WEU, during 1997, has taken a long way of practical realization of the target aimed at gradual transformation of the WEU in a European political military body ready for a wide scale of actions of crisis management with making use of forces and potential of the WEU members at a national or multinational basis with support of NATO capacities.

We assume that a special attention will be drawn furthermore to preparation of procedures enabling participation of associated members and observers in activities related with increasing operation capacities of the WEU, that the associated members will take part as full-right members at these programs and operations, where they will contribute by a concrete participation.

From the viewpoint of strategic interests of the Slovak Republic, in the context with the evolution in 1997 in relation with the WEU, then the following items would have to be considered:

- decisions of EU organs on the common defensive policy and the overall dynamics of tendencies showing at WEU integration into the EU as a defensive component, which will make accessible to the EU the required military and defensive potential for a wide scale of needs of collective defense and crisis management,
- decisions of WEU and NATO organs, which have enabled to create institutional bases for ESDI development and practical application of its potential, and so to clear the WEU position in the European security architecture,
- direction and dynamics of evolution in the field of WEU operation capacities; the key importance of the practical application of the CJTF concept for the development of the WEU operational performance,
- reality of the processes related with space enlargement for participation of the associated partners in the WEU activities, which finally decrease the differences between the statutes applied in the WEU and form conditions for a systematic preparation to accomplish military, defensive tasks and engagement of the countries endeavoring to become EU and WEU members,
- compatibility of transformations in the defensive and military field of NATO with a prospective WEU position and tasks.

The Slovak Republic has supported these internal WEU transformations and

has been ranged among the countries which emphasized the need to accept measures to enlarge the space for participation of the associated partners in the formation of a new position of the WEU in the European security architecture.

2. Conditions for Co-operation of the SR with the WEU

We appraise that the document on participation of the associated partners in operations, according to the Petersberg declaration (accepted by the Council on June 19, 1992). The document, approved at the session of the WEU Council of Ministers ("Practical Provisions on Incorporation of the Associated Partners in the Petersberg Operations") clears the principles and procedures of participation of the detached forces of WEU associated partners in accordance with their statute in the operations and tasks characterized by the Petersberg Declaration (further only "WEU operations").

The Slovak Republic, interested in supporting its position of an associated WEU partner, has detached for the case of participation in humanitarian WEU operations one mobile field hospital with a 6-month period, necessary to prepare it to be put in operation. This detachment of forces of the Slovak Republic Army was repeatedly confirmed to the WEU organs.

In considering the participation of the Slovak Republic and its armed forces in WEU operations, we take into consideration that the crisis management of the WEU depends on applying mechanisms of collaboration, exchange of information, consultations in organs of the Union, and on effective collaboration with NATO in cases of making use of the military potential of the Alliance. We are based on the fact that joining the operations provides the associated partners with the right to take part in negotiations of the work groups (political-military group, group of military delegates, group for co-operation).

We are ready to provide the necessary data on military forces and if necessary to complete the data on registered detached forces. In linkage with this document we expect that the competent WEU organs in the next period will:

- continue to elaborate principles for exchange of information, situation reports,
- examine provisions and the state of collaboration with the different associated partners in order to incite their interests in improvement of preparation of the forces designed for WEU operations,
- improve the conditions for preparation of the associated partners to take part in the planned operations,
- make more precise information on the mobility and logistics of the detached forces,
- at the same time we expect an appeal to meet national representatives in order to discuss the questions related with implementation of the approved document.

The notions from the preparation of decisions related with participation of the Slovak Republic in peacekeeping missions of the UNO confirm that systemization in the domain of crisis management lags behind the real needs. Experience from participation of units of the SR Army in peacemaking operations has not been hitherto sufficiently exploited and the statement concerns the political, legislative, institutional, organizational, and military sides of the crisis management.

From the viewpoint of activities of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, the highest difficulties in the preparation of decisions on participation in peacekeeping operations are caused by the following items:

- an intricate and complicated mechanism of forming a political consensus in questions related with realization of declared program targets of the Government of the Slovak Republic in the domain of military support of peacekeeping initiatives of international organization
- obsolete legislation in the domain of the crisis management,
- slow mechanism to form legal conditions for participation of members and units of the SR Army in peacekeeping operations,
- non-uniformity of competence repartition of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic in the preparation of decisions on participation of the Slovak Republic in peacekeeping operations,
- absence of legally defined function of the SR Army related with its participation in peacekeeping operations which appears in passivism of the General Headquarters of the Army of the SR in this field.

The cited state confirms acute need to incite a systematic solution of the problems of crisis management at the level of the executive, the central State administration, as well as within the field of action of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic. In addition to legislative, institutional, and organizational conditions, it will be suitable in this field to endeavor to form an integrate strategy of military participation in peacekeeping initiatives of international organizations (UNO, OSCE, NATO, WEU) and in accordance with this strategy to complete the programs of building up and modernization of the Slovak Army.

The cited evolutionary tendencies put qualitatively new requirements to approaches linked with interests of the Slovak Republic related with the WEU also in the military domain. In the interest of acceptance of the whole dynamics of this evolution, keeping the capacity of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic and of the SR Army to fulfill systematically the tasks in the preparation for integration of the Slovak Republic in Western structures, including the WEU, comparable with neighboring countries we assume that the following will be necessary to be accomplished:

1. In the military and defensive dimension of integration strategy, to accept the evolutionary tendencies suggesting strengthening of institutional linkages

on the EU-WEU-NATO axis and to respect unification of criteria and views at the whole readiness of adepts to become members in the different Western institutions.

2. Re-evaluate the approach to the requirements resulting from the preparation of the Slovak Republic for EU membership; to take measures enabling the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic to react adequately, in common with the other organs of the central State administration, to the tasks resulting from the Slovak Republic integration into the EU.

3. In conceptions and programs of modernization of the defense system and of the Slovak Army, to take into consideration the defined requirements of the NATO and WEU related with polyfunctionalism of the military force as the prerequisite for incorporation of the national defensive and military potential into the treatment of wider issues related with stability and security of European countries, integration of the Slovak Republic in Western structures (to consider the degree of practical application of the thesis as one of the key criteria of optimality of the transformations being performed within the field of activities of the competent Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic).

4. Based on the experience with preparation of decisions and planning of the SR Army forces in peacekeeping operations, to pay a particular attention to the development and standardization of the crisis management, to systemization of steps in forming its legislative, institutional, organizational, and military base.

5. To revise the detached forces to take part in multinational operations; to tune their structure and programs of development of interoperability with strategic targets of the Slovak Republic and prospective composition of the Slovak Army (forces of immediate reaction, forces of rapid reaction, main defensive forces) in order to increase its overall performance and capacity to operate in multinational groupings.

6. To perform steps which will improve the expert, technical readiness, and will deepen interoperability of the Slovak Army forces detached for WEU operations, including modernization of the mobile field hospital.

7. In planning the participation in international training activities and exercises, to respect the coordination of the NATO and WEU steps; to apply preferably the potential which is provided in relation with then practical mastering and applying the mechanism of the WEU crisis management to take part in CRISEX exercises

8. To pay an extraordinary attention to NATO experience related with introducing the CJTF concept and doctrine.

In accordance with the recommendations, the Slovak Republic will support the WEU effort to enlarge mutual information on the forces ready to take part in rescuing, humanitarian, and peacekeeping operations, and the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic will strengthen links with the WEU planning organs.

(PROSPECTS OF COLLABORATION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC AS AN ASSOCIATED PARTNER OF THE WEU)

Alexander Levčenko: Up to now, Ukrainian foreign and security policy were aimed at relations with NATO. I participated in creation of the principles of Ukrainian foreign policy from the point of view of the opposition political forces in the presidential elections. Therefore, I can imagine that in October 1999, the situation in Ukraine, with regard to the evaluation of security and foreign policy could change. If the opposition wins the presidential elections, security and foreign policy could change, precisely in relation to the WEU. Unfortunately, so far we have seen a lack of political will from Western European representatives, justified by lack of financial resources for the construction of a common European security and foreign policy. It is certainly difficult for Europeans to invest money in both the WEU and NATO. I pose the question, whether the future president of Ukraine will be successful, if he asks Slovakia for support in the following initiative: To ask NATO to reorient part of the resources assigned to the program Partnership for Peace, to the activity of the WEU in the framework of NATO. This would give countries such as Ukraine or Slovakia, which are not members of NATO, the opportunity to develop and increase their interoperability, in cooperation with the Western European Union. The new Ukrainian president would seek support for this initiative, especially from the neighboring states.

Milan Šmida: The Rhodes declaration, perhaps for the first time in the context of the WEU, clearly expressed the interest of the WEU in developing relations with third countries, and Ukraine and Russia are specifically mentioned there. After initial difficulties, the WEU will orient itself more and more to the real situation in Europe, and as a result of her position in Europe, Ukraine will certainly find herself in the center of specific policies. Where funding is concerned, the EU still does not have funds for this area. NATO, for example, redirected funds, which were intended for partnership cooperation. The Warsaw initiative, which had one of the most important places in American views of the directing of cooperation with partner countries, is changing its function, and in a short time, the programs of aid for the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary will end. The resources will probably be divided between other countries, and Ukraine will certainly be among the priorities in this division. Slovakia is interested in changes in Ukraine, and in stability there, so that she can pursue her national interests by appropriate means. Slovakia is equally interested in the interests of Ukraine being respected in European processes. Up to now, Slovakia has always supported the interests of Ukraine on the international scene.

Gabriel Kopecký: Whoever knows the mechanisms of the activity of NATO and the WEU, will know that many people sit at two desks. The same person works in NATO and in the Defense Planning Cell of the WEU, while some people from the Defense Planning Cell of the WEU also fulfill some function for NATO. At the same time, the WEU has practically no armed forces. All the forces and especially the resources belong to NATO. The WEU also has no infrastructure. Therefore, NATO offered the partner countries surplus funds for infrastructure, and today these funds are usable in the partner countries. It is only necessary to have high quality projects prepared and with their quality, persuade NATO that this infrastructure will really be used for the needs of NATO and the WEU. In other words, returned investment is involved. The Warsaw Initiative is different - it is a bilateral relationship between the USA and individual countries. NATO already is not extending its infrastructure by itself, only improving it, and it also needs forward bases, since the method of operations today, lies in rapid mobility, in the ability to get a certain number of people and equipment to the place where they will act. In Slovakia, by the way, a very bad translation for C.J.T.F. - Combined Joint Task Force appeared. These are three special expressions. "Combined" for them meant "international", that is more than two countries, "joint" meant more than two components of the armed forces: ground - air, ground - naval or air - naval. And "task force" for them is a group of forces for a specific named task. I would be pleased if Slovakia could adopt a more standardized terminology, because we have the problem with translation, that first we translate a term from English to Slovak, but then if we translate it back from Slovak to English, we get something completely different.

R. van den Akker: The problem you presented derives from lack of understanding. Yesterday, I tried to explain that NATO is endeavoring to develop the WEU and increase its abilities. We are trying to allow the WEU to make full use of the capacities of NATO, which are naturally greater than the WEU has on its own. The WEU does not have an aid program, comparable to NATO's Partnership for Peace. Thanks to PIP, NATO is able to give specific aid to the countries associated in PIP. In this way, Ukraine and Slovakia can also profit from PIP. By participating in PIP, a given country increases its ability to be more effective. From the point of view of membership, however, there is no difference between NATO and the WEU: It is possible to be in both organizations and use the advantages of membership of both.

Andrej Žiarovský (Political Committee of DU, Defense Section): According to what was said here, the WEU started building up its own operational forces and is placing greater emphasis on the solution of crisis situations. Has a date been set, by which the WEU will be able act independently?

Milan Šmida: So far, a decision has been taken to build up operational forces, but it always takes some time to implement decisions.

Elemir Necej: It is clear, that a separate way to the European security structures through the WEU is not possible, but there is still a possibility to be included in the structures of the WEU. One thing from the meetings in Paris, Erfurt and Rhodes is interesting: Our demonstration of the way to join in cooperation in the question of armaments. However, this cooperation is significantly influenced by the development of cooperation in the first pillar of the EU, because the producing companies and economic aspects will be involved there. For this reason, it could easily happen that our effort is entirely unrealizable, and depends on acceptance into the EU.

Milan Šmida: That is a realistic assessment. Where our participation in potential joint programs in the area of the arms industry or participation in the shaping of joint armaments policies are concerned, we are still in the realm of wishes. At present, the WEU is discussing how to include observers from the associated countries in these programs. This means that so far these problems are only discussed among the ten full members of the WEU. At Rhodes, it was already said that the associate members, that is Turkey, Iceland and Norway, will have the possibility to participate in these programs. So far, we only have the possibility to participate in discussions about the contribution of partner countries to security programs in the framework of NATO. We have submitted proposals, which should support the development of the infrastructure of defense of the Slovak Republic, so that this infrastructure will be compatible in the event of Slovakia joining the system of collective defense. Up to now, we do not have a reply, but it is clear what we would need: modernization of air bases, communications systems, anti-aircraft defenses, management of air space etc. These are all great challenges for cooperation, but the countries accepted for membership of NATO have similar requirements at present, and the attention of the Alliance is logically concentrated mainly there. Finally, NATO also says openly that the new members will be given priority, where the problem of infrastructure is concerned. It is important for Slovakia to gain the potential, the technologies, and the intellectual potential in the area of the development of science, and that the Slovak scientific research institutions develop relations with similar institutions in the West. The Slovak Republic will undoubtedly use this possibility, in the interest of a certain differentiation in the process of partnership cooperation, and with regard for the aim of becoming a member of the Alliance.

Peter Barták: Slovakia still does not have a well prepared legislative and legal basis for the new processes connected with interest in membership and with the process of deepening, modernization and the collective way of providing security and defense. At first sight, it is logical that the state should, more deeply, and with the help of a wider range of experts, assess the fact that foreign troops will come onto the territory of the state, while Slovak troops will go to the territories of other states. Our legislation is contradictory. The Natio-

nal Council meets about five times a year, and it is, therefore, necessary to submit a proposal for the sending abroad of even one soldier, a long time in advance. In this, the National Council of the Slovak Republic differs from the government, which meets almost every week, and its discussion procedure is less complicated. In Slovakia, proposals for missions abroad are often submitted only later, which practically breaks the law, or the question is not solved at all. In contrast to this, acceptance of members of foreign armies, for example for training, is a very simple process in Slovakia. Why is the system still not changed in 1998? I am not sure that the idea of changing the situation exists at all, or whether there is a will to change anything in this area, so that we will be modern and on the level of the institutions, we have declared the aim of joining.

Milan Šmida: This concerns very sensitive questions, that is the revision or amendment of the Slovak Constitution, and moreover, change in the most sensitive area of the Constitution – the responsibilities and legal powers of particular institutions. We have prepared a proposal for amendments to the Constitution and proposed amendments to the constitutional law, to create the conditions for the solution of legislative deficiencies. But up to now, there is no political will to make these changes. In discussions with the Defense and Security Committee and the Foreign Policy Committee, I learnt from some members, not only that our proposals are not acceptable at present, but that our conditions may be made even stricter. We did a comparative analysis of this area of legislation in neighboring countries and in the developed democracies, and discovered various facts. For example, in Spain, every service journey of a soldier outside the territory of the Kingdom of Spain must be approved by the appropriate committee of Parliament.

THE ROLE OF THE OSCE IN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

There are several reasons why I am convinced that the OSCE will remain with us in the next century and that its role will even be enhanced. To my mind it is simply irreplaceable. If we did not inherit it from the Cold War period and did not change it into the main tool of preventive diplomacy in the post Cold-War era, it would have to be created anew. If not earlier, then certainly in connection with NATO enlargement with the aim of fully engaging in solving European security issues those nations staying outside NATO, and especially Russia.

1. The OSCE is doing a very good job, though the public and even politicians and diplomats do not know much about its activities and often ignore it.

To prove this point I would only mention some data on its long-term involvement in conflict areas. As of June 1998 there are thirteen long-term OSCE missions (four of them under different names) stationed in Macedonia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Moldova, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine and Tajikistan. The so-called Assistance Group in Chechnya is in fact also a mission. The conflict in Nagorno Karabakh is dealt with on the political level by the so-called Minsk Group of 12 member states, and on the spot by a special OSCE personal representative and his five assistants in the region, with the headquarters in Tbilisi. Since January 1997 there is "the OSCE presence in Albania". Apart from that there are special OSCE representatives in the Estonian Government Commission on Russian military pensioners, in the similar joint commission in Latvia and also in the Joint Committee on the Skrunda radar station in Latvia. Since 1995 "the Central Asia Liaison Office" in Tashkent takes special care of the five Central Asian member countries.

The importance of individual missions can be judged by financial resources allocated to them by the OSCE budget. Out of about 100 million US \$ for the whole 1998 regular budget about 35 % goes to Bosnia, 28 % to Croatia (the two missions 63 %!). 11 other missions spend only 11 %. All 13 missions spend 74 % of all OSCE financial resources.

At the present time the Bosnia and Croatia missions are the most numerous. The mission in Bosnia has 190 internationally seconded members, while at the height of its activity in 1996-97 it had 246 members. The mission in Croatia has 200 people but by October it will reach its authorized strength of 250. The other missions are much smaller: Skopje and Ukraine 4 people, Bela-

rus 5, Estonia, Chechnya and Nagorno Karabakh 6, Latvia 7, Moldova and Tajikistan 8, Albania 11, Georgia 17. Altogether in all the missions there are 437 seconded diplomats and all kinds of experts, mostly military.

2. The second reason for OSCE staying on the European stage in the next century is the fact that international relations are becoming more and more multilateral. Bilateral relations among states remain important, but basic issues are discussed and often solved at multilateral meetings or at their margins during private discussions between officials attending the numerous sessions of international organizations. At the same time important international issues are being discussed at bilateral meetings; during those meetings more time is often spent on consultations or co-ordination of positions of individual countries on broad multilateral issues than on strictly bilateral problems.

The OSCE today is, of course, much less visible than the UN, NATO or EU, but permanent bodies in Vienna give a chance to have political dialogue among 55 delegations on a broad range of issues any time of the day. It is actively used today and it can be expected that in the next century this kind of the OSCE activity will be further strengthened.

3. 90 % of recent OSCE activities deal with former Soviet republics and almost all the remaining 10 % of time and energy is devoted to the Balkans. It is a sure bet that such a situation will be with us far into the next century even if we take an optimistic view that there will be no catastrophic development in Russia. Even if we expect that in next decades Russia will basically remain democratic it will have to solve tremendous problems. In spite of its economic weakness it will certainly try to regain or keep the position of a great power and its nuclear weapons will make sure that the world will have to treat it accordingly.

I cannot imagine that Russia will join NATO, because in such a case the Alliance would simply become a kind of OSCE.

4. The existing international organizations dealing with security are here to stay well into the 21st century with very similar roles. There is nothing to replace the UN. The Council of Europe will undoubtedly take care of individual human rights also in coming years. It is to be expected that in some distant future the EU will implement its common foreign and defense policies and the WEU will become its military arm in one way or another.

To predict the exact future roles of NATO and the OSCE is much more complicated and needs much more complicated and needs much more imagination. Their future depends on many unpredictable circumstances but it is almost certain that the military aspects of international security will be less and less important, while political, economic, environmental, social and all kinds of non-military aspects will increase in weight. There will always be security risks and challenges in Europe, but I presume that there will not be military in strict sense of the word.

5. From the conclusion about the prevailing importance of non-military threats it seems logical that in the case of basically peaceful and democratic development in Europe in the course of the next decades, it should be vital to enhance the role of the organization dealing essentially with political issues, and it is the OSCE.

On the other hand even if those premises proved correct, the experience of the last several years, especially in former Yugoslavia, has taught us a tough lesson: In spite of all expectations after the political earthquake of 1989 a strong and effective military alliance will be needed on the continent as a kind of insurance against some unthinkable – today – probabilities.

It should be added that the OSCE is totally helpless when a conflict degenerates into war as Bosnia proved. It may be efficient in preventing some conflicts, to assist in finding a political solution to a problem or be useful in post-conflict rehabilitation. But certainly the OSCE alone is unable to stop a war. It is the political will of all its members that the OSCE limits itself to persuasion only, it cannot use any force or even enforcement; only the UN and NATO have a mandate to use armed forces.

6. It does not mean that such an organization "without teeth" can be discarded. Not all international disputes or conflicts can be solved by using weapons. There are situations when it is preferable to use the OSCE, not a military alliance. The Dayton accords asked NATO to do the military side of the job and the OSCE to take care of three civilian areas:

- monitoring elections,
- building democratic institutions and preventing violation of human rights, and
- arms control in the region.

Maybe in some distant future it could be done by one organization with different branches. It could be simpler and less expensive.

Provocatively speaking, in long-term perspective NATO may have to change so drastically that it may actually lose its basic role as a military alliance. I can even imagine some kind of merging of the two organizations in the distant future and the formation of a sort of collective security organization. By the way, there are projects for such an organization now worked out by the German Institute of War and Peace in Hamburg.

7. To illustrate a thesis that the OSCE is the most suitable organization to solve the problem in Albania in 1997. The OSCE has asked to co-ordinate activities of all international organizations. The mandate included "mediating between the political parties, particularly as regards the election law and monitoring elections". The OSCE proved its ability to react effectively to this crisis. It achieved its objective in very close co-operation with the Multi-National Protection Force led by Italy.

What is very interesting is the composition of this force because it shows a probable future pattern. America and Russia sent troops there. The force was led by the most interested nation, Italy, mainly because its Government and also the Parliament were afraid of a new wave of refugees from the country in total chaos. France and Spain participated as Mediterranean states, trying to prove that they can shoulder security responsibilities in the region. Greece took part as neighbor, Turkey could not miss the opportunity when Greece participated. Romanians sent their contingent because of their desire to prove their ability to get into NATO in the first wave. Austria had to provide some infrastructure for the head of the OSCE mission, Mr. Vranitzky. Denmark chaired the OSCE last year and had to set an example. So we can expect that for similar expeditions in future in fact only countries directly threatened by a particular conflict will form "a coalition of interested" and send their troops to pacify it; only they will be able to convince their Parliaments to give the necessary financial, personnel and material resources to defend their national interests, though under the banner of an international operation.

8. So far the OSCE and NATO co-operate closely as partners without any hierarchy. In spite of very important changes in both organizations after 1989 I dare to say that the OSCE has undergone much more profound changes than NATO; especially from a conference and a process to an international organization with permanent bodies and institutions. I am convinced that in coming years a really deep transformation in many ways is still waiting for NATO and that it will have to change much more than the OSCE. Its enlargement is only one reason for it. An excellent occasion to judge how the changes proceed will be a new strategic concept of the Alliance to be officially approved at the April 1999 summit. Co-operation and division of labor with the OSCE is an essential part of those discussions.

One of the problems which need to be addressed in the near future is growing overlapping of the activities of both organizations. NATO is now doing some things originally only the OSCE or UN were supposed to do. Until about 1995 peace-keeping or any "out of area" for NATO were impossible for NATO, political consultation were limited to East-West problems, but now many NATO bodies consult on almost anything under the sun. The membership of some NATO bodies – especially the Euroatlantic Partnership Council – has become closer to that of OSCE. One former head of a Western OSCE delegation in Vienna at arecent conference noted that the EPC is just the OSCE minus N+N nations and that some traditional OSCE ways and means of doing things have been taken over by NATO and in away also by the Council of Europe.

9. The existence of the OSCE into the 21st century is made sure by the fact that it is needed by the great powers as well by the small nations to safeguard their interests. The European integration does not mean the disappearance of independent small nations. I expect that they will continue to feel a need for

a political organization where all 55 members are much more equal than anywhere else, and certainly more than in the EU with prevailing economic criteria or NATO with key military factors. So if anyone would be crazy enough to try to abolish the OSCE, he would first have to overcome the resistance of small nations, the vast majority of its members.

10. Finally, there is one specific Czech reason why the OSCE will live for the foreseeable future. The former Czech Prime Minister and Foreign Minister who underestimated the OSCE are no longer in office and I hope politicians with their view of the OSCE will never lead the Czech Government or diplomacy again. The expected winner of the Czech parliamentary elections in two weeks – the Social Democrats – have a special paragraph about the OSCE in their election program.

Even the winner of the Czech elections will have a long way to go to catch up with Slovakia where the previous Foreign Minister, Mr. Pavol Hamžík, was a former head of the Slovak delegation to the OSCE in Vienna.

Discussion on the paper by Zdeněk Matějka

(THE ROLE OF THE OSCE IN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN THE 21ST CENTURY)

Elemír Nečež: Last year, an article by Prof. Matějka appeared in *Medzinárodná politika*. It criticized the Prague meeting on the economic aspect of the OSCE, or the approach, not only of the Czech government of Mr. Klaus and Mr. Zelenec, but also of the countries of the EU. A Russian proposal for a model of security for the 21st century is also known. Does the speaker think that, in spite of the indifferent attitude of some countries of the EU, the OSCE will be more successful in dealing with the problems of this area and influencing European security? And by what means?

Zdeněk Matějka: The economic dimension is very strongly supported both by Russia and all the former socialist countries, and by the Americans, and only the EU makes a monopoly of the economic dimension, and claims that economic organizations can do that which derives from their economic dimension. However, the Albanian case showed that the OSCE is not concerned with specific aid or a specific solution, let us say to banking or other questions, but with the political system. This finally showed that the country was on the verge of collapse, as the Albanians had maintained in the framework of the OSCE for months. Then, when I heard that NATO was shocked by what had happened in Albania, I was shocked that the NATO countries represented in Vienna had not informed NATO of the reports, the Albanians had given at every meeting. The OSCE considers it a natural duty to observe whether the situation in, for example, Bulgaria or Uzbekistan, requires attention from international organizations. I criticize the EU for sabotaging the economic dimension. For example, they will not allow the use of even a penny from the OSCE budget for economic seminars, which must be funded by the organizing countries. And they do not express surprise over the fact that, for example Russia, Romania or Uzbekistan are not able to pay for seminars, although their themes would be very interesting. In contrast to this, also the seminars on the human dimension in Warsaw, are paid for from the OSCE budget. Since the principle of consensus applies there, money is not provided. If the fifteen EU countries refuse to contribute, finance simply does not come. The Americans, the Russians and others express their disagreement, but it is impossible to do anything, because consensus is considered sacred.

The Ukrainian delegation to the OSCE is very interested in, when the Yugoslav Federal Republic and Montenegro will again be able to become members of the OSCE, and what it is necessary to do to bring this about. In the case of

Yugoslavia, consensus is also necessary. Albania and the former Yugoslav republics are fanatically opposed to the entry of Yugoslavia. The Kosovo question and the question of violations of human rights in general are frequently used. These also sometimes serve as an excuse. All the former communist countries, including the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Ukraine support the admission of the Yugoslav Federal Republic to the OSCE, but the only Western country, which supports this step, is Greece. Thus the EU cannot accept a unified approach, and the USA is connected with the extremists against Belgrade. The question of when Yugoslavia will return to the OSCE is, therefore, a great unknown, but to discuss security in the Balkans without Yugoslavia is nonsense, just a waste of time.

The peace missions on the territory of the former USSR are another problem. At the Budapest Summit in December 1994, a decision was taken about peace missions from the (CSCE) OSCE in Nagorno Karabakh. Thousands of military and civilian observers were to be sent to this focus of tension, but the political will for this was lacking. It was said that the West did not want to send a single soldier to Nagorno Karabakh, it was afraid that they would come back in coffins. Naturally Russia was also against Western involvement in her (former) sphere of influence, and some cynics said that the West practically accepts this definition of spheres of influence and supports Russian control of that region. Moreover, Ukraine fanatically opposes "purely" Russian involvement in Nagorno Karabakh. Like many other successor states of the former USSR, especially the Baltic states, Ukraine desires the presence of OSCE peace keeping forces. However, Russia wants to operate alone in this area, or to demonstrate the international character of her peace keeping forces by cooperation with countries such as Byelorussia or Tajikistan. I am afraid that the West will do nothing against this project, or at most, will submit a few protests and formulate a few resolutions.

Peter Volten: In the theory of international relations, the situation in Europe is often designated the "regime". I have in mind, that the countries have certain common principles, rules and norms. It is possible to speak of converging expectations regarding the behavior of individual countries. Therefore, the establishment of a security regime was a great success for the OSCE. However, this regime is very vulnerable. The indefiniteness of its mandate and the behavior of, for example, Russia contribute to this. Arms control is a very important element of the activity of the OSCE. The OSCE never made this problem a priority for its attention, but there is now a clear need to revise the Treaty on Conventional Weapons from 1990. When the treaty was signed, the Warsaw Pact still existed along side NATO, the Soviet Union still existed, and Russia now justifiably requests revision of this treaty, so that we can achieve a new balance. Obviously, if NATO is enlarged in 1999, the armed forces of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland will automatically be added to the armed forces of NATO, and the Russian argument that the 1990 treaty must be re-

I see a serious paradox in this. We still say that it is necessary to sign a treaty about nuclear weapons. I think that a signature on a treaty does not mean anything in itself. For example, Ukraine voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons, but still admits that in the case of need, it would be no problem to gain access to them again and have them available. This means that if something was already discovered, and somebody possessed it, it is difficult to prevent him using it in the event of need. Therefore, a basic split is occurring here, and leading to a dead end between NATO and Russia. Is there a global factor, which could unite the efforts of these two groups?

Zdeněk Matějka: I would like to make the information more exact, by adding that Russia does not contribute to the voluntary funds of the OSCE. Russia naturally pays membership contributions, according to a certain scale. Russia does not contribute to the human rights voluntary funds, intended, for example, for Bosnia, for elections and other purposes.

Elena Chořková

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE AND NATO

The discussion about expansion NATO highlighted the complete national consensus in Russia against it, stimulated the process of formulating foreign policy priorities and their certain updating.

Russia is known to consider that the process of NATO expansion is counterproductive from the point of view of the new system of European security and that it will have a negative influence on the system of international relations as a whole.

A kind of "NATO- centrism", predominant at the moment in the approaches of the West, when the military alliance, generated by the Cold War – is put forward as a corner stone of the security structure in Europe, is, on the one hand, a certain aspiration to fix the results of the Cold War, and on the other, an attempt to fill the conceptual vacuum and to find the "simplest" answer to the real needs for the creation of a united and secure European space. This approach undoubtedly means a regress in European political development if to take into account the slogan about building "a united Europe from Atlantic to the Urals" which was proclaimed some time ago.

The logic of the Alliance's expansion leads to fragmentation of the security space in Europe, which would cause the appearance of several different areas: one group of states includes the members of NATO, another is composed of the candidates for membership of the Alliance, and a third group includes countries which are not members of NATO and don't aspire to join it. Such a situation produces a certain source of mistrust and tension in Europe, and there are real risks of moving towards new forms of military and political confrontation on the continent.

The NATO expansion is perceived in Russia as proof that our country continues to be regarded as the main potential opponent, belonging to another, non-European system of values, as an attempt by the West to rearrange its forces and means with the aim of using the politically and economically convenient moment to achieve a more favorable strategic position and to keep Russia out of the decision making mechanisms. Such an approach does not correspond to the interests of guaranteeing European security.

Russian foreign policy has to take into account that the practical realization of NATO expansion is a serious test for the Alliance itself. After the conclusion of the Founding Act with Russia, the Madrid Summit dealt mainly with internal problems. NATO is facing the most complicated problem in its whole history, as the expansion is connected with a serious moment of risk.

The scale of the financial costs, which should be paid by both the "old" and "new" members of NATO, even taking into account only the minimum and necessary expenses, is huge.

The indisputable fact is that the accession to NATO of the new members will mean an increase in defense spending. In a situation of budget deficits it is difficult, from the point of view of macroeconomic parameters, to find additional resources to finance defense, so the aspiration to strengthen security can result in increased risk to internal economic, social and political stability. In these conditions it is problematic to speak about NATO expansion as the basis for strengthening either stability or security.

In the political area joining NATO inevitably means a partial loss of sovereignty in the most essential sphere – the sphere of security. In this situation Russian diplomacy must take into account the obvious fact, that some problems can be discussed in Warsaw and Prague, and some others – from the point of view of real policy – can be more rationally discussed in Washington and Bonn, because the formal equality of the Alliance's members is not identical to their military and political weight. Subordination of the interest and decisions of Alliance will undoubtedly become clear, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will not have and cannot have real influence on decision-making. In the past, they had such an experience of European policy and it mean for them not only political frustrations, but also significant losses in the sphere of economic interests.

In this sense the value of the region for Russia is in a way reduced. The West becomes a constant factor for the bilateral relations with Russia and the CEE countries.

In this connection the contents and our bilateral relations will be determined to a considerable degree by the character of relations between Russia and NATO, which will be joined in the near future by a number of the CEE countries. First of all, they will depend on the possibility of reaching a reasonable compromise and removing the inevitable consequences of NATO expansion for European stability, secondly, there is a question, whether the process of, NATO expansion will not turn into constant destabilizing factor, if the first wave of expansion is followed by a second, third and further, and thirdly, what role will be played by the new members of the Alliance, and if their relations with Russia would be better or worse than those of the "old" members of NATO.

During the first years after end of the Cold War, the position of the CEE countries concerning Russia differed from the leading Western countries in a number of essential features. The diplomacy of these countries sometimes considered its role as one of warning the "naive" West against "excessive" trust in its relations with Russia, with the purpose of preventing any possibility of agreements between the leading countries of the West and Russia without participation of the CEE countries. The aspiration to play on "the geopolitical importance of region" and fear "of becoming second class members" of NATO pushed some countries of the region to, once again, play the card „of threats from the East“.

It wouldn't be an error to assume that, under the influence of the Western position, which did not desire confrontation with Russia, the policy of the CEE countries concerning Russia was partly changed.

However, there is the real risk in involving some CEE countries, sometimes against their own will, in the global game in the East of Europe. Within the framework of the American concept "of geopolitical pluralism" in the post-Soviet area, which excludes Russia's uniting role and counteracts integration in the frameworks of the CIS, Poland actually acts in the interests of the USA, which will undoubtedly have a destructive influence on the development of Russian-polish relations. Poland has already noticeably activated its policy concerning Belarus and Ukraine, using the role of regional leader, beginning first „a zone of influence“, which should mean the first place for its membership in the block. Furthermore, Poland is interested in Ukraine playing the role of buffer in future.

Hypertrophied Atlanticism, which became the most common feature of the postcommunist elites of the countries of the region, caused mainly by the German factor, in some ways has an effect on the approaches of the CEE countries to the European problems and therefore, in the future will not always play a constructive role in the formation of the European concept of security on the continent. Central European diplomacy has played a decisive role in the beginning of the process of NATO expansion, that has resulted in a kind of NATO-centrism, generating a potential for conflict which creates lines of division between new and rejected candidates.

For preservation and maintenance of the new balance on the continent consolidation of the authoritative role of Russia suits European interests. Central Europeans, more than others, need a period of understanding that in Europe there should be a more complex structure of security, which takes into account not only the presence of the NATO dimension, but also a specific understanding of the problems of security by Europeans, and which cannot be limited only by one organization.

In the relations of Russia with the countries of the region it is necessary, probably, to take lessons from pragmatic realism, based on an understanding that there is a definite, economical interdependence between Russia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It would be right to suggest that the steady interest both on the part of Russia, and on the part of the countries of Central Europe in mutually advantageous cooperation, development of trade and cooperation links will remain, in spite of the association of these countries to NATO. Realism in the evaluation of the potential, and content of Russian policy towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, allows the avoidance of disappointments in the excessive expectations of qualitative changes in these relations, and maintenance of accumulated positive experience. Realism also supposes a balanced account of both existing and possible limits, and adequate understanding of appearing opportunities.

In view of mutual interests, it seems promising to escalate efforts for coordi-

nation of co-operation in the triangle "the EU - Central Europe - Russia" not only concerning energy and raw materials, but also in the financial, technological sphere, and in developing infrastructure.

The development of bilateral relations taking into account the peculiarities of each of the CEE countries and their differentiation in the matters, concerning integration into Euro-Atlantic structures will remain the main direction in co-operation with them. Development of pragmatic relations on a bilateral basis with these countries (in the trade, finance and infrastructure) will become an important element strengthening stability, security and trust on the European continent.

Now I would like to emphasize from my point of view the main items, which Russia considers most important in our relations with NATO in future.

First. The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council may become a permanent body to take decisions on peace keeping forces involvement. The first sessions of this Council demonstrate that NATO officials prefer to discuss cooperation in Bosnia or plans for our participation in the framework of PIP or other tactical questions. There is a certain difference in assessing those development in the West and in Russia. In this country cooperation in Bosnia is not assessed as a new page in our relations. Politically our cooperation is based on the agreements which were achieved against the positions formulated by the Russian side. That's why our cooperation in Bosnia was and continues to be on the tactical level. In Russia we do not look at it as at a model for our future relations with NATO in such local conflicts.

Second. The Russia considers that the "coordination and consultation", which is written into the Founding Act, means more transparency. The Russian minister of Defense has offered to discuss a problem concerning dangerous military activity in Europe and transparency of developing military infrastructure. Dangerous military activity means the scale of military maneuvers and re-deployment of armed forces.

At present NATO is creating a new strategic concept and Russia is developing a new military doctrine. We offer to unite our efforts and coordinate their basic positions. But the USA rejects this idea referring to the 5-th Article of the Washington Treaty.

Third. As you know we are now continuing the negotiations on limitation of conventional forces in Europe. But policy makers cannot be happy with how they are going on, because these talks are aimed at supporting the idea of future NATO expansion. Our opponents are trying to impose the idea of NATO enlargement on us. The main topic of these negotiations is how they can combine the future NATO enlargement with the treaty on conventional armed forces. We should be concentrating now on real limitation of armed forces (about 50%). In spite of NATO enlargement we have to be shown that real material objective threat to Russia is lower now, than during the "Cold War" period. Every new member of NATO will make NATO reduce the total number to keep the fixed level.

It is important that NATO enlargement does not mean a military supremacy over Russia.

A serious cut in conventional arms is not likely to take place in the nearest and NATO is going to enlarge. So, it is very important to preserve a certain balance of forces.

The same applies to tactical nuclear forces. Our proposal to ban tactical nuclear weapon on the territory of NATO's new members was not accepted in the Paris Final Document. It is a very important political signal for us. The facts show that NATO is not only a system of collective security but is firstly a military alliance, because a collective security system does not need tactical nuclear weapons. All these facts help us to understand what NATO is today.

If the enlargement is going on, we have to consider the fact that our strategic forces will be vulnerable to conventional weapons. This makes the whole situation absolutely different. The connection between strategic nuclear forces and conventional forces is very important in this case.

Fourth. Another point which seems to be important is to make an agreement on a nuclear free zone in the Central Europe including former Warsaw Treaty members and ex-Soviet republics: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, trans-Caucasian republics and to sign a treaty banning nuclear weapon deployment in this zone. So far we have no positive response from the West. It is our concern.

Fifth. It is well known that the armed forces of the new NATO members use Russian military equipment. So, for increasing mutual trust and benefit it will be important that Russian enterprises take part in re-equipment of the new NATO members.

(RELATIONS BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE AND NATO)

Milan Šmida: Not all the arguments were always open to a dialogue. One of the arguments for the orientation of Russian foreign and security policy is that Russian foreign policy is a reflection of social consensus. This also applied to the reaction of the Russian Federation to the enlargement of NATO, which was understood as an act, which is not in harmony with the security interests of Russia, or threatens some of these interests. It is appropriate to ask whether similar arguments are also considered in the countries directly concerned with the process of the enlargement of NATO. Their decision to join NATO is also the result of social consensus. The percentage of people who support joining NATO varies between different countries. In some it is around 80%, in others around 60%. Foreign policy must react to this consensus, or level of support from civil society. If we look at these arguments through the prism of spheres of influence, then we can come to the conclusion that this is a flight from one sphere of influence to another. In the case of consensus in NATO, this should mean that the vote of a small country such as Luxembourg has the same weight as the vote of a large country such as France. For Slovakia as a small state, consensus is especially important for the future. I would like to hear what serious problem is needed in Europe, for Russia and NATO to achieve consensus over cooperation on the strategic level, concerning the European situation.

Chořková: It is necessary to look at the decision making mechanism. The Russian position is crystallizing on how Russia will take part in the decision making process. Russia officially starts from the view that the OSCE gives all its members an equal chance to influence the decision making processes. The consensus in Russian foreign and security policy is a more complex matter. I know of only three influential Russian politicians, who supported the enlargement of NATO, and so Russia expressed her official position towards enlargement in the doctrine on national security, published in December 1997. In the interest of the prevention of regional conflicts, the most useful solution is the creation of a reliable decision making mechanism. I see in this, the most effective possibilities for preventing new conflicts in Europe.

Peter Volten: It does not appear to me that the inclusion of Russia in strategic decision making in Europe was small. Russia is active in the OSCE, and communicates with the IMF, Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security

Council, participates in the activity of the permanent Russia - NATO Committee and the program Partnership for Peace, she owns nuclear weapons, etc. etc. In fact Russia has extremely extensive possibilities to participate in decision making on the most important strategic matters in the world. In Europe, the situation is stable, and an arms control regime has been successfully created. The military capacity of Russia has changed so dramatically, that if Russia wanted to undertake some unexpected military steps against her neighbors, she would not be capable of it. Although Russia possesses nuclear weapons, that is not enough for us to constantly speak of a destabilizing factor. The actual history of nuclear deterrence is the history of the ever more moderate interpretation of article no.5 of the Treaty of Washington. We live with the growing conviction that nuclear weapons ever more serve only as means of deterrence, and not as something to use in a possible conflict.

Alexander Levčenko: In general, nothing can be said against what Peter Volten says. But if NATO does not want to put nuclear weapons on the territory of the new member states, why does it not sign a document about this?

Peter Volten: As I already said, a security regime exists here - its meaning can be read in any textbook on international relations. That must be enough. NATO cannot be forced to sign, in relation to future development, which cannot be predicted. A declaration must be enough. It would be pointless for NATO to threaten the security regime by placing nuclear weapons on the territory of the new member states.



(REGIONAL PROCESSES AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY)

Vladimir Kmec: It is clear from the discussions, which the Center for Strategic Studies is carrying on with foreign partners – as it is from this lecture – that whatever organization Slovakia decides to join, it is necessary to convince the member of that organization of our contribution. In Slovakia, this is a little neglected, also in the theoretical area, and it is good when this idea is emphasized.

In Slovakia, about 1.85% of GDP is devoted to defense. At present, we can estimate the real requirement at 2.5%. I would like to know, what percentage of domestic product is devoted to defense in Holland, Belgium or other states, and how far this amount can be expected to increase or decrease after joining NATO.

Peter Vollen: In Holland, a little less than 2% of GDP is devoted to defense. In Belgium, as far as I know, the share of GDP for defense is falling. In 1993, it was 1.8%, in 1996 it was 1.6%. However, in this context, another important question arises: How much will the enlargement of NATO cost? The studies of the cost of enlargement of NATO, done up to now, especially in the USA, have produced estimates of the cost ranging from about 32 billion to 120 billion dollars. However, this estimate originally assumed enlargement by more than only three countries. The USA is willing to pay only part of these costs, the rest must be paid by Western Europe and by the newly accepted countries. However, this would mean increasing the defense budgets of these countries to as much as double, and in my view that is a very unreasonably and unrealistic demand by the USA. There is an alternative solution, which assumes closer cooperation between the entering countries, so that their budgets would not need to be increased, and the budgets of the member countries would be increased only slightly. The approach chosen by the Czech Republic and the steps taken to implement it in 1996 and 1997 look very promising. The defense budget will be slightly increased on paper, but will remain practically unchanged. The Czech Republic, which is endeavoring to present itself as a very disciplined candidate, did not succeed in increasing the defense budget according to the original plan, and that is also understandable. Now, when the Czech Republic is already practically in NATO, it need not act under pressure, and the Czech Republic is no longer trying to look as disciplined as it did before. Nobody can expect the Czechs to attempt more now than before. This is not a reproach, only a realistic assessment. It is impossible to expect a country undergoing economic transformation, to increase its defense budget in a situation where nobody can force it to do this.

Vladimir Kmec: The question of the cost of Slovakia joining NATO was much discussed in Slovakia, precisely in connection with the pre-referendum atmosphere. However, if we do not know some facts, and we cannot assume them with some degree of probability, if we do not know with which elements we want to get into NATO, the whole attempt at calculating costs resembles an exact sum of inexact numbers. In my view, the USA has the best information available, and their two institutions, which calculated the cost of the enlargement of NATO, at first produced figures in the range mentioned in the lecture. However, not long before the vote in Congress, the estimate was reduced. The entering countries – now the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary – will certainly gradually learn the reality. As the process of integration continues, the data on costs will become more exact.

Alexander Levčenko: I think that it is necessary to distinguish between joint defense and joint security. Although Ukraine does not have the opportunity to participate in joint European defense at present, she is prepared to contribute to joint European security. The views of the speakers on this question would interest me. From the point of view of NATO, how can Ukraine contribute to joint European security? For Ukraine, this assessment is important, so that she can develop her own defense, organize peace-keeping units and invest financial resources in an appropriate direction.

Peter Vollen: Everyone should be aware that the position of Ukraine is important especially from the strategic point of view. However, it is difficult for me to answer this question, it should first of all be answered by the Ukrainians themselves. The priority of NATO with regard to Ukraine is clear. It is above all good relations with Russia based on firm treaties and solid diplomatic guarantees. For a good security policy, the important thing is not only how many tanks you have, but also what ability you have in security diplomacy. If the security of Ukraine is to be put in order, I think there is much to do. The Ministry of Defense should aim at removing the remnants of the Soviet system in the armed forces, including Soviet organization and the Soviet mentality. There are about a million people in the Ukrainian armed forces, but only about 300,000 of these people in uniform are under the command of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. Double that number serve under, for example, the Ministry of the Interior or in frontier guard units. I think that Ukraine has six, seven or eight ministries, which can maintain armed people. Therefore, if Ukraine wants to achieve something substantial in the area of security policy, precisely this question must be solved, and all the armed forces, which are competing in the struggle for shares of financial resources, must be subordinated to one ministry – the Ministry of Defense. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian armed forces will participate in pan-European security actions in peace-keeping forces, and the area where Ukraine can supplement the Western armed forces is the Ukrainian engineering capacity. That is one specific example of how a country with enor-

mous problems can play a significant role in the international context. The majority of Western European countries do not have the capacity I mentioned. Only the former colonial countries, that is the European countries with a colonial heritage have it. Alexander Vicenko, a visiting researcher from Ukraine, who is also head of the Analytic Department of the National Security Council in Kiev, is working in our Center for European Security Studies at Groningen. I have one of his studies here, in which the enormous security problems of his country are reflected, and I can make it available to you.

Peter Barták: It might be good if the speaker would elaborate on one sentence from the introduction to the lecture, where he said that the enlargement of NATO breaks down the basic Cold War barrier between West and East into several smaller barriers, and that this represents a positive trend. A different explanation of the development after the end of the Cold War appears here. To be specific, the relationship between NATO and the three countries, which have now been accepted into NATO, is different from that with the countries which actively engaged in the integration process, but were not accepted, that is Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and others. In addition, there is also a different relationship between NATO and the countries which also showed an interest in entry, but not so actively, and yet another different barrier between NATO and the countries which did not show an interest in NATO at all. That is, a barrier arises between this last group of countries and the groups which showed less intensive, more intensive but unsuccessful, and more intensive and successful interest in integration. That is a series of small frontiers arises here, between individual groups of states, enabling good coexistence, rather than there being a basic dividing line.

Pieter van Duin: I was also interested in the first part of the lecture, in which a new division was practically spoken of, rather than the idea that NATO could simply overcome division. It was also said in the lecture, that an elementary political will for integration into NATO exists in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. However, I think that the speaker showed assumptions or premises derived from a sort of universalistic philosophy, in which Europe appears as a single universalistic unit. However, other theories exist - at present the most important is that of Huntington - showing that humanity and therefore also Europe, are not heading towards universalism, because another kind of cultural barrier exists between the West and the Orthodox East. Perhaps there is no reason for the universalistic philosophy to form the starting point for consideration of integration.

Peter Volten: Reacting to the question, I will attempt to explain the need for complementarity. If a certain country shows an interest in partnership in a security community, then, for me, the pre-condition is complete. Perhaps I should more correctly use the term "former non-Soviet" countries of the War-

time of the Madrid Summit, it was already late for NATO to object to the acceptance of Slovenia and Romania.

Pieter van Duin: You said that the Holy Alliance is an example of diplomatic coordination between entirely different political cultures. In the end, the USA also coordinated its military effort with the Soviet Union during the Second World War. However, this does not mean that at present or in the foreseeable future, some Eastern European countries will be able to build civil societies. I doubt the appropriate potential in countries such as Ukraine and Romania, that is the potential to create civil societies, so that they can become compatible with the countries of NATO or with the countries of Western Europe in general. I fully agree with Huntington on what he says about Eastern Europe, and I think that his theory also has a place in present day analytic consideration of integration. And one further comment. We are still speaking here about the efforts of some countries to integrate themselves into NATO, but we are not talking about the view on the integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in the Western countries. The inhabitants of the Western European countries are not very enthusiastic about the integration of the former countries of the Communist Bloc. Are the results of public opinion polls in, for example, Holland, known?

Peter Volten: Certainly, the opinion polls in the Western states are not very encouraging. About 60-70% of the respondents answer that they do not know or are not interested in the problem at all. In Great Britain, such people make up around 70-75%. Therefore, we cannot claim, that, for example, in the Netherlands the majority of people support, let us say, the integration of Bulgaria into NATO. I do not doubt that the building of civil societies in countries like Russia or Ukraine. However, this does not mean that I should accept Huntington's view as an unchangeable fact, in spite of the fact that the process of change in this part of Europe will be very slow. But change is happening. If you had asked me ten years ago, what I thought about the possibilities for change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, I would have been very pessimistic. Then dialogue did not exist, only a series of declarations. Today, dialogue exists, we have a whole series of conferences behind us. The starting points for theories on the form of the "clash of civilizations" are very different, and I do not think that such theories are functional. In the case of Ukraine, it is possible to see that politicians who formerly behaved in a very "eastern" way, are now behaving in a fully democratic way. There is no reason for the absence of optimism. Both Western and Eastern countries should endeavor to remove the dividing lines which still exist. When the European Commission in its Agenda 2000 selected Estonia as the only Baltic state capable of integration into the EU, it was certainly not their aim to claim that, for example, Lithuania or Latvia are backward. It was a result of the fact that foreign businessmen are willing to invest in Estonia to a greater degree than in Lithuania. Therefore, it is neces-

sary to minimize the differences between the associated countries as much as possible. This does not mean that countries like Slovakia or even Ukraine must feel excluded from the process of integration and lose hope of integration.

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