

**POST-
COLD
WAR
DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE
MIDDLE EAST
AND
EUROPE**

by

GALI ODA TEALAKH

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


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Introduction

The Middle East, Europe and the Cold War:

Before starting the introduction I would like to point out that the major developments in the post-Cold War world happened precisely in Europe (including the USSR with its Asian parts) and the Middle East. Geographically the Middle East expanded to include the southern parts of the USSR, i.e. the Trans-Caucasian republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia on the one hand and the Central Asian republics on the other. This concept defined three circles where the radical post-Cold War shift had happened: The Arab World, Europe, and Central Asia. Thus this study dealt mainly with these regions consequently.

While both World Wars, the first and the second, were fought in defined geographical fields, the Cold War was global in its dimension in every respect and form. Even though it started in Europe, like any of the other two wars, it engulfed all continents, all seas and oceans, and the space. The expression "Cold War" is highly misleading. It did not indicate either the severity nor the magnitude of that unique war in the history of humanity. The term did not indicate the realm of loss inflicted on humanity through overt confrontation and covert combat through out half a century (1945-1990). After loosing control over conflicting interests, the US and the USSR began to view each other through the prism of antagonism. Oddly, Europe, the home of the Cold War remained divided but undisturbed, meanwhile fighting, suffering and distress

took place in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Political upheaval checked efforts to build economies, military expenditures consumed resources that could be used in development, thus creating fitting milieu for the growth of militarism, misery, inequality, and despotism in the Third World countries. Later the field of the Cold War was redefined as the "Third World countries". Then the Cold War in each camp took different appearance. In the West the concept of the Cold War developed in what later was labeled as "confronting communism" or simply "anti-communism". While in the East it was code-named "anti-colonialism" or "anti-imperialism".

From Eisenhower to Regan, in the West, and from Stalin to Gorbachev, in the East, the two camps developed highly aggressive platform of ideologies that strongly influenced their foreign policies. The result was exclusion of containment and co-existence and determination on confrontation and full defeat and total capitulation of the enemy. The two camps talked about 'peaceful coexistence' but acted otherwise. The only agreement (unsigned and undeclared) between the East and the West during the Cold War was the inclination to keep military confrontation limited logistically and geographically.¹ Yet both sides paid extra attention to prevent any military conflict from developing into full scale nuclear war. The origins of the "mutual destruction" policy, or the balance of power lie precisely here.

The end of the Cold War was as amazing and unpredicted as its genesis in Europe and the Middle East. Even though it had been said "It is 20 years too early to take a sober look at the mythologies

and realities of the Cold War".² Many facts remain indisputable product of the Cold War in Europe. Most important are the fall of the Berlin wall, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the birth of new hope of emancipation in East Europe. Yet the end of the Cold War besides bringing an end to bi-polarism, it created a fitting atmosphere for the advent of globalization of world economy, ecology, trade and many other issues. Globally the end of one of the longest wars in the human history, inspired fundamental changes in the pattern of international politics and managing chronic international conflicts. The Middle East was not an exception, the end of the Cold War brought an end to the prolonged Arab-Israeli conflict, and brought a unique opportunity for inter-Arab integration and regional cooperation.

The influence of these changes was obvious enough during the Gulf war of 1990/1991. Stunning shift in the geo-political map of the world occurred in a very short time. The map of today's Europe is completely different from that of the 1980s. The same thing can be said about the Middle East. The period that followed the WWII witnessed profound alteration in the geo-political map of the Middle East. The first modification occurred after the declaration of the state of Israel in 1948. In 1956 Israel for a short time had another one that included Gaza strip and Sinai peninsula. The union between Egypt and Syria in 1958 and the Arab union between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Kingdom of Iraq produce another map. As a result of the 1967 war Israel had a third map. The 1973 war compelled redrawing of a new regional

². Wallerstein, Immanuel, "Foes as Enemies", *Foreign Policy*, vol. 90, Spring 1993, p. 147.

¹. The Korean War and the Cuban missiles' crisis are the most evident instances.

map, which was succeeded by another map after the conclusion of the Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel in 1978. Yet the most fascinating and fundamental changes happened in the 1990s as a result of the Israeli-Palestinian and the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaties which were followed by Israeli redeployment in the West Bank and Gaza strip and withdrawal from the Jordanian occupied land and the demarcation, for the first time, of boundaries between Jordan and Israel. The unification of Yemen redrew another map of the Middle East. Furthermore the settlement of Halayeb between Egypt and Sudan will present a new map. Soon the region will witness another new map if the Israeli-Syrian negotiations will come to a positive conclusion. Instances in this respect are ample, however the subject remains taboo.

Attributing this shift to one field or one episode of human activities is iniquitous. The end of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Apartheid in South Africa, the disintegration of the USSR and the communist system, the emergence of giant econo-commercial blocs, absorbing Russia in West European institutions and organizations, and the triumph of peace in the Middle East are mere manifestations of a global change.

The dramatic developments have created a host of unanswered questions and a multitude of uncertainties. The Europeans were convinced of the strategic necessity to reach out and coordinate with the Middle East as a warranty of stability, and to take precautions against unpredicted shocks and sudden shifts. The new orientation emphasized mutual interests between Europe and the Middle East especially in the 1990s. Upheavals in East

Europe proved to be threatening to stability in Europe and the Middle East.

The magnitude is extremely vast, but some of the results of this global *perestroika* can be seen in the shift from internationalization to privatization. Meeting civic demands is no longer submissive to military satisfaction. The metaphor of "global village" became true in that moment when any single country became too small to solve its own problems, not excluding strong countries such as the US, Britain, Japan, Germany, or France. This situation opened the way for the United Nations to assume its proposed role.

The more we study the Cold War era, the more we become convinced of the deep links between the Middle East and Europe.

In 1968 Charles Yost wrote "After all, the cold war was born in Eastern Europe and will have eventually to be buried there".³ Nearly a quarter of a century later the prognostication was realized and the Cold War was entombed there as well. This study will endeavor to shed light on these changes with special emphasis on Euro-Middle Eastern relations.

³. Yost, Charles W., "World Order and American Responsibility", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 47, Nos. 1-4, (October 1968 - July 1969), p. 7.

The Arab World in Post-Cold War Environment

The International Setting

Global politics has changed rapidly since the year 1988. For the Middle East this year brought an end to the notorious and protracted Iran-Iraq war (1980/1988). Yet the region witnessed a highly notable event irregular neither to the Russian nor to the Soviet military behavior, that is to say the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan in the same year. And on the international arena, by the end of that year the US and the USSR have reached a number of important agreements. The first became known as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which undoubtedly paved the way for further developments embodied in the following agreement on the reduction of strategic weapons, known as Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).¹

For most observers these developments signaled the determination by the two super powers to reduce and finally destroy weapons of mass destruction, and at the end to limit and control resort to force in the international relations. Here lie the roots of the developments later referred to as the New World Order (NWO) which was promulgated during the Gulf 1990/1991 crisis. In his speech on September 11, 1990, George Bush, the president of the United States, tried successfully to combine the aims of his policy in the Persian Gulf with the birth of a new world order saying: "Clearly, no longer can a dictator count on East-West

confrontation to stymie concerted UN action against aggression. A new partnership of nations has begun. A historic period of cooperation. We stand to day at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward a historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, ..., a new world order can emerge, a new era freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony".²

In this speech the American president announced the end of the age of confrontation and division between East and West, and inauguration of partnership.

Nevertheless, this tendency, i.e. the international inclination to limit the use of force in international relations and politics, passed unnoticed by the Iraqi leadership, which cynically miscalculated. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was regarded as the major threat to the international law and order in a new era marked by rejuvenation of the UN's peacekeeping capacity long hindered by East-West confrontation or US-Soviet rivalry.

During Iran-Iraq war, Kuwait was one of the steady supporters of Iraq. Notwithstanding, by the end of that war, the Iraq-Kuwaiti crisis loomed in the horizon and took irreversible drastic course. At the beginning the motives behind the crisis were economic, but quickly were remodeled to take the form of historical claims.

The assurances and promulgations of the Iraqi leaderships of non-aggression or use of force among Arab countries, or by one Arab country against another, pacified not only decision makers in the Arab World but numbed the public opinion as well.

Pursuing old norms of political behavior, in a new international environment casted negative reflection on inter-Arab relations. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was completely out of the intra-Arab tradition and international norms. The aggression invoked a severe reaction by international coalition led by the United States and was sanctioned by the United Nations. The international efforts to eject Iraq from Kuwait manifested the enforcement of chapter VII of the UN Charter which remained inactive throughout the decades of the Cold War mainly due to East-West confrontation. The radical shift in the Soviet policy, and ultimately the collapse of the USSR, came as a mandatory factor to facilitate and encourage a new United Nations role in the world affairs.

By the end of the war of liberating Kuwait, Iraq's military power was mutilated and its economy was totally ruined. As indirect consequence the region in general, and Jordan in particular, witnessed the tragedy of a new and sudden influx of deportees, that further complicated the problem of refugees and dislocated. Moreover the region was on the verge of ecological disaster, and politically the Arab states encountered the possibility of the break up of Iraq as a sovereign state.

Evaluating Iraq's action against a neighboring Arab state, and Iraq's response to the international efforts aimed at convincing the Iraqi leadership to withdraw from Kuwait, the last Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev, wrote: "We took a series of initiatives, always leaving open to the Iraqi regime the possibility of retreat. But Saddam presumed that the world would not dare to act decisively".³ Moreover the Iraqi government disregarded unfriendly remark made by Edward Shevardnadze's, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, when he nervously warned at the peak

of the crisis that "the only language Saddam understood was that of force".⁴

Miscalculation is also obvious from the fact that the Iraqi officials did not read nor analyze the new objectives pursued by the Soviets, Iraq's purported "allies". Saddam Hussein and his minister of foreign affairs, Tariq Aziz, failed to detect the new tendency in the Soviet policy and failed to consider the reality or judge the dimension of the dispersion of the "eastern block".

The end of bi-polarism, or bi-sected world, was beyond the calculations of the narrow circle of decision making in Iraq, yet out of its sight. On the other side the US government was meticulously studying the Soviet behavior in light of the new developments in the Gulf, and realized that the Kremlin was not abandoning its new strategic commitment toward Washington.

The principle indicators in the Russian foreign policy were not a mystery, rather they were easy to monitor and predict at the eve of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Russia was on the verge of economic collapse. Demoralization and corruption engulfed not only the civil administration but the pillars of the Soviet regime: the Communist party, the Red Army, the security apparatus, trade unions, and the Comsomol. These and other factors were mostly behind Yeltsin's willingness to follow a favorable political course with the West, notably with the US.⁵

In this atmosphere the US moved decisively towards blocking Iraq and gathering the appropriate "international" forces, built global public consensus against Iraq, and prepared the public opinion within the United States to supporting the coalition and accepting the consequences. Every possible effort was spent to ensure the prevalence of favorable military circumstances to ensure victory and minimize loss, "the United States brought to bear a

force sized and trained to fight the Soviet Union in a global war, obtained the backing of almost every major military and financial power, and chose the time and place at which combat would begin in a theater ideally suited to air operations".⁶

The vigorous way in which the United States conducted the campaign led many observers to speculate that post-Cold War world is a "unipolar world" led by the US, the unchallenged superpower. Charles Krauthammer was eloquent in this respect when he said: "the immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States".⁷

The Gulf war was the first and most challenging test of the détente that marked the newly growing relations between the US and Russia. The United States action against Iraq was based on unyielding commitment to the security of the Gulf states on the one hand, and on correct assumption that the Soviet Union would sacrifice Iraq under the pressure of the economic burden and the propelling new global arrangements. That belief was drawn from the USSR's consent and backing of the US intention to proceed from within the UN against Iraq. The USSR accepted the principle of assembling international coalition against Iraq, nevertheless distanced itself from the international coalition and did not participate in the military operations. Later Moscow supported sanctions against Iraq and participated in marine maneuvers in the Gulf.

Jordan and the Iraq-Kuwaiti Conflict

The first confrontation (1961): Qasem's Adventure

The Hashemite Iraq did not contemplate any designs nor had any intention to assimilate Kuwait, and relations between the kingdom of Iraq and Kuwait, which was a British colony, were amicable. Under King Faisal Baghdad strongly supported the Kuwaiti people to gain their independence. The Kuwaitis in turn looked for the Hashemite monarch in Baghdad for all kinds of support and supply. Ambitions, however, surfaced and took aggressive and menacing proportions against Kuwait, and reflected negatively on Arab solidarity, only after the coup d'état of 1958, which put an end to the legal government of the Hashemite monarchy in the kingdom of Iraq, and brought to power a radical wing of the Ba'th party. After that date consecutive regimes in Baghdad targeted Kuwait under geo-strategic, political, and economic justifications, and coveted to absorb the Emirate within the territory of Iraq.

Before the completion of the withdrawal of the British forces from Kuwait in June 1961, Abdul-Karim Qasim, President of Iraq, claimed Kuwait as part of Iraq. This declaration necessitated the postponement of the departure of the British army and navy from Kuwait.⁸ In June 28, Sheikh Abdullah As-Salem As-Sabah called for urgent meeting of the Arab League to discuss the Iraqi claims. Jordan supported the Kuwaiti request, and a meeting of the council of the Arab League was set for July 17,

1961. Meanwhile, HM King Hussein commenced a hard mediating course to defuse the conflict.⁹

Iraq amassed considerable forces on the borders of Kuwait, and threatened to withdraw from the Arab League if Kuwait joined the organization. Jordan's diplomacy succeeded in convincing Iraq and Kuwait to abide by an Arab settlement. Kuwait acceded and approved the Jordanian proposal to replace the British troops with Arab forces. At this point the policy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan succeeded in gathering support for the admission of Kuwait to the Arab League and granting that country full membership in its council.¹⁰

On July 24, 1961 Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad As-Sabah, the Kuwaiti minister of finance, arrived in Amman and was received by HM King Hussein. Iraq repeatedly threatened to revoke its membership in the Arab League if Kuwait signed the solidarity pact. Jordan responded by signing an agreement proposed by a delegation of the Arab League to send troops to Kuwait in order to deter Iraq's drive and control its ambitions.¹¹ Considerable Jordanian forces were sent to Kuwait in mid September 1961.¹²

Iraq was crippled by the firmness of the Arab action, and the affairs began to calm down without military confrontation and without the withdrawal of Iraq from the Arab League. The Jordanian troops remained in Kuwait until January 1963. During this period, Kuwait was recognized as a sovereign state by Jordan and other Arab countries.

Jordan's Stand During the Second Iraq-Kuwaiti Conflict: Saddam's campaign

"All the Iraqi people, all the Arab states, together with the international community, must join together to bring an end to all the causes of Iraqi suffering and denial, both internally and externally. I stand firmly for the preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq". HM King Hussein I, address to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, September 25, 1995.

1 - The international scene

When the Iraqi forces entered Kuwait on August 2, 1990, James Baker, the US Secretary of State, and Edward Shevardnadze, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs were convening in Irkutsk.¹³ Hearing the news they returned to Moscow, on which Saddam relied for at least moral support. From the Kremlin both officials issued a joint statement condemning Iraq and demanded the urgent and unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait.¹⁴ Even the Soviet Union went further and declared prompt unilateral suspension on arms shipments to Iraq. This odd attitude in Soviet politics was the first manifestation of Gorbachev's "new thinking".

A month after the invasion of Kuwait, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev met in Helsinki to discuss mainly European affairs such as the reunification of Germany and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from central Europe, nevertheless the Gulf crisis surfaced strongly. The two leaders called for an Iraqi withdrawal

and announced their support to the resolutions of the Security Council. Shevardnadze strongly condemned Iraq and urged the United Nations to suppress the aggression, and revive the Military staff Committee of Security Council to deal with the crisis, and offered Soviet troops to this purpose.¹⁵

Meanwhile the Soviet Union kept open channels of communications with Iraq. Gorbachev dispatched Primakov,¹⁶ a personal friend of Saddam, to Iraq to advise Saddam to withdraw so far as the world would not accept anything less than complete withdrawal of the Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Primakov had two purposes: first, to secure the evacuation of the Soviet citizens and military personnel from Iraq; and second to persuade Saddam to withdraw under convenient and acceptable terms.

Primakov failed to persuade the Iraqis. Later he wrote in *Pravda* his impressions saying that in his first trip Tareq Aziz adamantly tried to convince him that Kuwait was an indispensable part of Iraq. However during the second trip Saddam showed signs of willingness to withdraw if the US troops would leave the region.¹⁷ After two visits to Baghdad, October 4-5 and October 28-30, Primakov himself became convinced that his friends in Baghdad discouraged him. He turned to justify his missions saying that the Soviet Union tried to influence the course of events, its efforts to evade the region the misery of war were perceived positively. He paid special effort to stress that the USSR as a superpower has its own line and policies which were demonstrated during the crisis.¹⁸

The Security Council delayed considering its resolution regarding the occupation of Kuwait in order to give Primakov's efforts a chance. By October 29 it was obvious that the only

success was an agreement with Iraq to allow the departure of 1,000 soviet

nationals from Iraq. Gorbachev at the same time was visiting France and called, without success, for an Arab conference. From Paris, Gorbachev warned Saddam saying that "if ...[Saddam Hussein] hopes to produce splits or cracks in the position of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, he is making a mistake".¹⁹

On February 18, 1991 Tareq Aziz arrived in Moscow through Iran. He met with Gorbachev who offered him a convenient peace plan. It seemed that Tareq Aziz was reluctant to accept or consider it. Then Gorbachev candidly tried to convince him saying that "the timing is crucial, if you cherish the lives of your countrymen and the fate of Iraq, you must act without delay".²⁰ The plan gave Saddam six weeks to withdraw from Kuwait, Soviet guarantee that Saddam and his regime would survive the predicament, no reparations of war would be exacted from Iraq. The Soviet leader asserted that other regional issues, mainly the Palestinian problem, would be addressed. When the plan later was cabled to the White House, Brent Scowcroft commented to Bush that the plan was designed to make things as easy as possible to Saddam. Nonetheless the plan was not rejected. The US demanded that the withdrawal should be finished within four days, the release of allied war prisoners, and the disclosure of minefields. The response was negotiable, even as it came was possible.²¹

If Saddam had a genuine desire to withdraw and save lives, dignity, and the whole country, he had the chance to put the superpowers on the bargaining table to settle the time span somewhere between six weeks and four days.

The Iraqi president turned cold shoulder to all attempts conducted by other prominent western leaders and politicians who visited Iraq trying to secure a way out of the worst scenario: the war. Saddam irresponsibly missed the rare opportunity to respond positively to Edward Heath, former UK Prime Minister who visited Baghdad in late October 1990, the Austrian President Kurt Waldheim who visited Iraq the same month. Furthermore Iraq did not take advantage of the visit of three UK members of parliament from the opposition Labor Party had visited Iraq in September. Other chances made by prominent Westerners and public opinion leaders, generally acting in an unofficial capacity were missed too.²²

King Fahd of Saudi Arabia was willing to consider an Iraqi compromise saying "if President Saddam were to reconsider the matter seriously he would find that it is in Iraq's interest, and in his interest personally, and in the interest of the Arab nation that he withdraw from Kuwait... and if something wrong was done we should not try to redress it by another wrong".²³

Iraq was relatively inactive politically and concentrated on war of psychology.²⁴ Latif Nassif Jasim, Saddam's Minister of Information and Culture was not realistic in most of his communications, but was clever in finding what fitted Saddam's unyielding tendency for challenge. Thus Jasim reinforced Saddam's paranoia.²⁵ Saddam's military defiance was based on deceit rather on real military power and modern technology. Moreover he wrongly evaluated the powers that confronted him. Yet he missed the golden opportunities offered to him by King Hussein, King Fahd and other Arab and world leaders.

The US responded resolutely militarily and diplomatically. This was the largest mobilization since the Vietnam war. Three

aircraft carriers "Independence", "Eisenhower" and "Saratoga" accompanied by other six vessels were commanded to the Gulf. On August 7, the US declared its intention to send ground units as part of a "multinational defense force" designed to forestall any Iraqi move against Saudi Arabia. By mid-September the United States' forces were estimated to be around 100,000. The Bush administration had adopted a contingency plan involving the use of 250,000 ground troops. The US put pressure on its NATO allies to send forces to the Gulf.²⁶

In a televised speech Bush declared that the aims of the United States' policy were:

1. the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait,
2. the restoration of the deposed Kuwaiti government,
3. the protection of the lives of US citizens held in Iraq and Kuwait, and
4. the establishment of regional security and stability in the Persian Gulf.²⁷

The fourth point was interpreted as an indicator to the existence of an American agenda in the region.

The UN Security Council met repeatedly following the crisis and passed five resolutions. Resolution 660 (August 2); called for the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces, and called for negotiated settlement. Resolution 661 (August 6); imposed compulsory sanctions against Iraq. Resolution 662 (August 9); declared the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait null and void, and demanded the abrogation of Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. Resolution 664 (August 18); demanded that Iraq permit and facilitate the departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third countries, without jeopardizing their safety. And Resolution

665 (August 25); called for full halt to inward and outward maritime shipping and ensure the strict implementation of mandatory economic sanctions.

As it appears clear, the UN Security Council did not abort Primakov's efforts by adopting any severe, humiliating or unacceptable resolutions until August 29. By that date it became clear that the efforts of all mediators who tried to convince Baghdad brought no result. Resolution 674 was passed by the UN Security Council on August 29. It condemned Hostage-taking and warned Iraq that it would be liable for financial compensation.

The US was careful not to act single-handedly but under the UN flag and jointly with a multinational force. The multinational force included troops from France, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and many West European countries besides contingents from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt and Syria and other Third World countries. Number of other countries contributed financially to the anti-Iraq coalition. Most prominent in this respect were Japan and West Germany.

2 - The regional scene

After the sudden Iraqi invasion of Kuwait two blocs had emerged in the Arab World. A vigilant analysis to the position and goals of both blocs would come to a conclusion that for either bloc the ultimate goal was withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. While one bloc propagated the ejection of Iraq from Kuwait by all means including the use of international forces, the other suggested a solution based on settlement within the Arab League.

Jordan was taken by surprise by the invasion of Kuwait, considering Saddam's assurances of respect and commitment to Arab fraternity and tradition of non-aggression. Further Jordan was

the most effected country by the ruinous consequences of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. As foreign monitors put it the position of "Jordan in particular was much aggravated by the refugee crisis caused by the displacement of hundreds of thousands of foreign workers from Kuwait and Iraq".²⁸ Jordan took in astronomical number of refugees from both countries. Jordan had to take in more than 300,000 Jordanian nationals who worked in Kuwait for decades and furnish them with all necessities of life. Besides more than 225,000 foreign nationals crossed from Iraq to Jordan.

Jordan tried to find a solution to the conflict without the loss of the market that consumed a quarter of its exports. The government of Jordan had no alternative thus strove to preserve its main source of oil. Nonetheless the government of Jordan stated its willingness to abide by the UN sanctions policy, but, under the pressure of the above mentioned concerns, sought to postpone their application for as long as possible. The embargo would cost Jordan nearly \$4,000 million during the first year.²⁹ Yet the perils that faced Jordan included a military threat emanating from Iraq's drive to strike against Israel and Israel's possible retaliation. Nevertheless Jordan remained, regardless of any consideration, committed to the restoration of the legal Kuwaiti government.

Syria had uncomfortable relations with the Gulf states since the Iran-Iraq war as a result of Syria's support to Iran against its main rival in the Arab World. Assad took the opportunity to improve relations not only with the Arab Gulf states, but with the United States and Europe in general.

Egypt and Iraq were members of the Arab Cooperation Council together with Jordan and Yemen. Nevertheless relations between the two countries were far from being agreeable. Iraq deported large numbers of Egyptian workers. Monitors warned that

the Kuwaiti crisis would produce serious domestic unrest in Egypt. Some reports warned that wide sector of the junior officers might turn against Mubarak for sending troops against Iraq.³⁰

Israel's fears flew from further geo-strategic changes in the region such as sudden Iraqi drive against Jordan. Yet another source of anxiety was an Iraqi chemical attack. As precautionary measures, gas masks were made available for the public in Israel, but not in the occupied territories.

3 - Jordan and the second confrontation (1991)

It is hard to find, anywhere in the Arab world, a homogeneous stand toward the second Gulf war. Lack of consensus mainly due to public opinion in every Arab country. Expressing that public opinion differs from one country to another. This simple fact depends on the degree of democracy, freedom, and respect of human rights granted for the citizens. Enjoying full constitutional rights, the Jordanians expressed their opinions willingly. Guaranteed by the constitution freedom of expression brought diversity to the public opinion.³¹ Thus Jordanians could go to the street and express themselves free from the imposition of an orthodox, or mainstream, opinion.

Five years have passed since Iraq was ejected from Kuwait. The true motives that induced Saddam to dispatch his troops to conquer Kuwait and sparked the second Gulf War still foggy and hasty evaluations which were published following Iraq's withdrawal were motivated mostly by preconceived beliefs, personal judgment, and by pure sympathy and antipathy rather than based facts. Yet published studies are incomplete and leave many gaps and questions unanswered.³² Unconvincing historic,

strategic, economic and other justifications were given, but further investigation remains a necessity.

Nevertheless the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was not, as wrongly assumed, the party that supported Iraq. Jordan was the party that was committed to reaching a reasonable and lasting solution which would meet the interest of the Kuwaiti people in particular and benefit of the Arab nation in general. Jordan as a democracy did not suppress its citizens who had full constitutional rights to express their opinions and feelings peacefully. Segments of the population demonstrated in favor of Kuwait as well as other segments who reflect in favor of Iraq. Regardless, the official policy of the government was highly balanced and sought the restoration of the Kuwaiti statehood. At the eve and during the conflict the government of Jordan was committed to the security and integrity of Kuwait and there was not a single anti-Kuwaiti or pro-Iraqi promulgation. As we will see soon, Jordan's political efforts were directed toward saving lives and treasure.³³

Regarding Kuwait, it is not far fetched to say that Jordan historically is one of the most committed Arab countries to the security and stability of that Emirate. In the early 1960's, Jordan, despite all internal and external difficulties, was the first Arab country to dispatch troops to defend Kuwait against Abdul-Karim Qasem's ambitions to annex that country. The Jordanian armed forces remained in Kuwait until January 1963, the time when the Jordanian government decided to bring them home.³⁴

It is obvious now for foreign as well as Arab observers that Jordan did not take the side of Iraq during his invasion of Kuwait in August 2, 1990. This conclusion is not derived from analysis but based on published official material. From letters sent by HM King Hussein I of the H. K. of Jordan directly after Saddam's incursion

in which he warned the Iraqi government of the ruinous consequences of the aggression on Arab as well as regional relations. His Majesty warned Saddam Hussein that Jordan is committed to the convention of the Arab League and the principle of illegal conquest of the land by force.³⁵

Also HRH Al-Hassan Bin Talal, the Crown Prince of Jordan, clearly stated that the Jordanian stand was very clear and delegated to strong rejection of the conquest of land by force, respect of the sovereignty of Kuwait, and continued recognition of the Emir's legal government.³⁶ Yet the government of Jordan voiced in every occasion its firm policy based on the principles of respect and equality among Arab states declared by the convention of the Arab League.³⁷

The Jordanian government and people adhered to principles of fraternity rather than economic interests. In the words of Crown Prince Al-Hassan Bin Talal "An examination of the history of the Middle East reveals that conflicts over resources, demography and ideology have traditionally been met militarily. Of all aspects of security, it has been the military dimension that has held precedence, at great human cost. It is becoming increasingly apparent that this military dimension of security is incapable of furnishing lasting solutions satisfactory of all".³⁸

These were the main pillars of the policy ensued by Jordan in order to avert military conflict in the region. In its proceedings the Jordanian government was motivated by His Majesty's letters to the Iraqi president, where he stated that Jordan was strictly compelled by the principle of the illegitimacy of acquiring land by force. Calling the attention of the Iraqi leader to the fact that the invasion of Kuwait would not meet the satisfaction of any and acceding with it would create a precedent that might encourage

others to follow in other regions. A case that surely would lead to instability in many areas, in time when the world community is heading toward solving conflicts not provoking them.³⁹

Jordan's official stand was in full consistency with article No. 4 of the declaration No. 3036 adopted by the Arab League on August 2, 1990, which says: "The matter [the Iraq-Kuwaiti conflict] should be laid in front of the leaders of the Arab countries in order to convene in an emergency meeting to discuss the invasion and to consider ways that lead to a lasting and acceptable solution through negotiations, satisfactory to both involved parties, taking into consideration the tradition of the Arab nation, the spirit of fraternity and solidarity".⁴⁰

Jordan's policy was based on vigilant calculations that an Arab solution should be given a chance, in favor of the Kuwaiti people. Meanwhile the outburst of a multi-national war would lead either to one or all the following consequences:

1. highly costly; for such a gathering of international forces will require high expenses, while driving Iraq out of Kuwait by Arab forces would be almost costless in human and financial resources, or at worst cut the costs to the minimum. This approach would also have assured Kuwait of Arab strong and lasting support, guarantee its security in the future, and eliminate once and for all Iraq's ambitions to conquer the emirate. A unified Arab stand against Iraq would work miraculously, because it is the only way to prevent Iraq from reclaiming any rights over Kuwait in the future,
- 2 in front of an Arab coalition, Iraq will find itself lacking the public support it sought by firing missiles⁴¹ on Israel to ignite public disorder and mutiny in the Arab

countries. If the Jordanian approach was adopted, Iraq would be cut off the Arab environment it aspired to stir and usually looked for to promote ideology,

3. by adopting this position, Jordan endeavored to realize a long lasting political solution to the Iraq-Kuwaiti discord to assure a firm and willful end to this prolonged conflict, the Jordanian government was well aware of the fact that force will fall short of securing the aspirations of Kuwaiti people and state. The Kuwaiti security can be realized and guaranteed by political means and agreements, rather by abrupt military operation. Political agreements would be more binding and longer lasting than a brusque and shock-natured military defeat.

The war was not only waged against Saddam's aggression but promises were promulgated of secure, stable, and non-violent Middle East. The promises faded away leaving behind higher degrees of suffering, violence, social inequity, dictatorship, and insecurity.

The Cold War and the Super-power Rivalry in the Middle East

The observer of the behavior of Russia and the US during the WWII would not concluded that they will turn to be antagonists and lead opposing camps after the end of the war. The first four years of the war were marked by strong sympathy toward the Soviet efforts against Nazi Germany. During the first two years the Soviets absorbed the German's onslaught due to generous American and British military support and supply. During the next two years the Soviets took the military initiative and began reversing their retreat. But remained heavily relying on strategic support and material supplies from their allies.

By the end of the war, the Soviet Union developed the assumption that the US was not an European power and showed readiness to cooperate with it and consider its interests. Through this diplomacy the Soviets aimed at splitting the allies and deal with each team separately. The Soviet amicable behavior led Dwight Eisenhower the US president to assure the Congress that nothing guided the Russian policy so much as the desire for friendship with the United States.⁴² The Soviet image in the American press during the war years was very much friendly. The People's Committee for Internal Affairs (*Narodny Komitet Vnutrennykh Del, NKVD*), the predecessor of the KGB, was interpreted in the American press as an equivalent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).⁴³ Even the Soviet citizens were seen as people "who look like Americans, dress like Americans and think like Americans".⁴⁴

By the end of the war, that image quickly faded away leaving a fertile land for hostility and rivalry. The victorious leaders: Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill declared Europe liberated, but the continent was torn and virtually divided. Some politicians blamed Roosevelt for putting confidence in the Soviet promises regarding East Europe. To pacify his ex-allies, Stalin pledged free elections in Eastern Europe. The promised "elections" brought communist parties to power in all Soviet controlled countries. Absorption of Eastern Europe by the Soviets was the substantial point that led to the Cold War, initially between Britain and the US on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other. The affairs quickly developed in the division of Europe, soon after in splitting the world into irreconcilable East and West.⁴⁵

The conflict over Eastern Europe took global dimensions. The US and the USSR supported opponents of each other in many parts of the world. The two powers lost control and the field of confrontation became global. The two powers encountered each other in China's civil war, and laid down the foundations for a new method of confrontation, i.e. war by proxy. The Korean war was another experience. Korea was torn apart as a result of an agreement between the USSR and US to accept the surrender of the Japanese troops. The Soviets and the Americans later ruled the territories to the north and the south of the thirty eighth parallel respectively, "North Korea and South Korea had become two separate nations, in fact if not in theory".⁴⁶

Vietnam was another case. At the beginning the country was divided along the sixteenth parallel. To the north of the line China was in charge, meanwhile Britain in the south. Later developments led the USSR and the US to get involved directly and openly substitute their allies in Vietnam. In 1956 Europe witnessed the

workers' mutiny in Poland, the Hungarian crisis was the first attempt by members of the socialist camp to take advantage of the Cold War atmosphere to gain autonomy and rid itself from the communist control. The uprising of 1968 in Czechoslovakia was another evidence of discontent in Eastern Europe.

What happened in the Middle East after the end of the World War II was a manifestation of deadly rivalry that engulfed the region in a new form and unprecedented vigor in the wake of Yalta conference in 1945. Self-determination was exceptionally important goal which influenced politics, motivated politicians, and inflamed aspirations in the Middle East, especially in the Arab World.⁴⁷ To gain a desired foot-hold in the Middle East in the heat of antagonism, the Soviet Union adopted a political course aimed at attracting states and the public opinion, and pledging to support the Arab aspirations. Both superpowers developed "attendant assumptions, concepts, institutions, and policies essential to 'fight' the Cold War".⁴⁸ The Soviet Union declared commitment to supporting Third-World countries. Peace, liberation, cooperation and progress were the motto of post-war Soviet policy.

The Soviet conduct of foreign policy was marked by insecurity and fear of foreign penetration. This continuously cautious conduct led to constrained contact with the world in general. The Russian authorities began to fear their own people when facing this question: "what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within".⁴⁹

The Truman Doctrine of 1947 was a manifestation of the American interest and the American intention to cripple the Soviet move in the region. Truman Doctrine was based on the fact that there was a Soviet and Communist threat to the American interests

in the Middle East and Greece. Since no other Western power was in position to assume the role of the defender of these threatened countries, it fell upon the US to play that role. This laid the foundations for a model policy that has been followed through the next four decades. That doctrine elicited a variety of American policy responses which were coupled with alarming signs pointing to the Soviet threat and the dangers of Communism in the Middle East and elsewhere.⁵⁰ The American policy in the Middle East came as a response to the Soviet penetration, mainly in the period that witnessed the retirement of the Anglo-French influence in the 1950s.⁵¹ President Jimmy Carter drew a clear image of the political situation that prevailed in the Middle East in the 1950s saying: "Europe's influence in the Middle East faded steadily after World War II and was practically eliminated by an aborted effort of France and Great Britain, with Israel's help, to seize the Suez Canal from Egypt in 1956. Soviet and American influence then increased, filling the political vacuum that was created".⁵²

The Truman Doctrine was followed a decade later with the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957. The Arab World and Israel were the focal point of the new doctrine. The Nixon Doctrine has formulated a policy to deal with the Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf and gave Iran and Saudi Arabia a special role in what later became known as the "two-pillar policy". This American policy based on the Nixon Doctrine was not ended with the Nixon administration, but was observed during the Ford administration. Carter administration endeavored to remove once and for all the core of rivalry in the Middle East by solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. This inclination was partly realized by the signing of the Camp David treaty between Egypt and Israel.

The Middle East was always considered an important region in the strategy of the East and the West. While designing their foreign policies, the superpowers gave special attention to conflicting interests in the Middle East. In the Arab World, the Arab Israeli conflict, furnished the USSR and the US with the needed atmosphere to split the Arab countries. The Soviet Union championed the radical (progressive) states. Other moderate Arab countries were branded as reactionary or pro-imperialist. Thus the Cold War became a crippling obstacle to the Arab unity, integration and cooperation by igniting inter "Arab Cold War". Yet it was the largest hindrance in front of peace. "The superpowers had similar and conflicting interests, and their policies often clashed, but they avoided direct conflict while their respective clients were involved in war".⁵³

After the Americans assumed leadership against the Soviet endeavors in the region, but remained prone toward Israel, the 1970s witnessed "a rekindling of interest, and new alignments were formed between the countries of Europe and some areas of the Middle East because of one major reason: oil".⁵⁴ The new European alignment was in favor of the Arabs, and was demonstrated during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, when all European countries refused permission to refuel American airplanes carrying supplies to Israel.⁵⁵

This situation prevailed in the Middle East until the death of Brezhnev (1982). This event started unusual rotation on the leadership in the Kremlin. Rare vacancy resulted from the death of two heirs of Brezhnev: Yuri Andropov (1984) and Konstantin Chernenko (1985). The strict command-control of the Soviet system was broken when Gorbachev assumed power in 1985.

The rules of the Cold War that shaped the US-USSR relations and governed the game in the Middle East began to vanish. *Perestroika* was launched in the Soviet Union. Its significance was not limited to Russia or Europe, but its vigor stormed the world and reached South Africa, South and Central America, Central Asia, and opened the door for new forces to reshape the Middle East.

Peace and Confidence Building Measurements in the Middle East

"We are fully aware that consolidating peace and stability is linked to the achievement of comprehensive economic and social development. We are also aware that peace and prosperity cannot prevail except in an atmosphere of justice, freedom, democracy, respect for human rights, and the supremacy of the law. Based on this firm conviction, we shall continue our diligent efforts to ingrain these concepts in our society until Jordan becomes an example of the commitment to these noble objectives". Address by HM King Hussein I to the Middle East and North Africa Economic summit, (October, 29, 1995).

Peace in the Middle East was inconceivable in a two-super power (bi-polar) world. The end of the Cold War created a suitable environment to put an end to, or at least control, ideological extremism and radicalism in the Middle East. It is true to say that signing the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in September 13, 1993 between the Palestinians and the Israelis was impossible during the division of the world in two camps. The same can be said regarding the creation of favorable conditions and possibilities that were culminated by signing peace treaty between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the state of Israel (October 26, 1994). These facts created a collective web of interests. Protection and promotion of vital interests demanded a serious approach to confidence building measurements (CBM). Confidence building after more than four decades of war and

isolation is not an easy task and needs vigilance, dedication, and sincere efforts.

Confidence building measures in the Middle East should be taken in its relative not absolute meaning. Confidence building measures between the Arab states and the state of Israel may start by emphasis of evading undesirable consequence. The majority among Arabs and Israelis are keenly anti war in the Middle East. This pro-peace majority, represented by its representatives or Members of the Parliaments, was behind the voting and sanctioning the peace treaties between Egypt and Israel, Jordan and Israel, and the Declaration of Principles (DoP) between the Israel and the PLO.

Trust crisis and lack of confidence between long warring parties made communications highly difficult but imperative and stand as a preventive step against downward retreat in the process of confidence building measurements and as a shield to protect what had been achieved. Old intentions and dormant motives which were built during the years of conflict and animosity should systematically be addressed by both preventive and confidence building measures.

During the Cold War, the leaders of the East and the West kept the way open for mutual understanding, trust, and confidence building measures. Both parties strove to avert war, hence each camp notified the other of his intention if either planned large scale maneuvers, especially in Central Europe or on the dividing line between the two Germanys before the unification of Germany. Revealing the purpose of maneuvers defused misunderstanding and further complications if something went wrong. Yet this practice played a constructive role in building confidence among politicians and the military on both sides. Despite hostile relations, the two

camps adhered to this practice without putting in jeopardy their strategic interests or that of their allies.

Confidence building, conflict management, and negotiations have many common elements. This fact makes expertise in one field vitally helpful to promote the other. Negotiations, conflict management, and confidence building measures are necessary supporters to achieve the desired results in conflict resolution. Usually involved parties proceed with conflict building measures overtly, but certain circumstances or controlling factors may demand limiting the procedure, at a certain stage, to a chosen category of the population in order to create a solid ground which will shield the whole conduct from total collapse. Different is the case in respect to conflict management and negotiations, where covert or secret negotiations and bargaining, mainly in early stages, will secure a margin for maneuvering and compromise away from the light of criticism and publicity that might lead to misunderstanding and complicate mediations. Progress, eventhough slow, is essential to depart from the zero-sum position toward confidence building.

Confidence building in the new peace era and at the eve of the third millennium should not be limited to Arab-Israeli affairs, similar activities should be directed toward confidence building among Arab states as well as Muslim states. Logically confidence building measures may differ from one case to the other. As Ben-Dor and Dewitt stated it "the country-by-country relationship of Egypt and Israel is qualitatively different from the existential struggle for the land of Israel/Palestine on a communal or ethnic basis".⁵⁶ Jordan from this point of view does not differ from Egypt, with one exception represented by the social, historical and geographical dimensions which bind Jordan and Palestine.

Confidence building measures will be more productive if implemented regionally. But this does not exclude the usefulness of the principles bi-laterally. Jordan sought to bring about joint Arab effort in all fields including development and investment as well as negotiations, conflict management, and confidence building efforts. All that was behind HRH Prince Al-Hassan call upon the Arab states when he said: "It is absolutely necessary, however, that joint Arab action should transcend the luxury of mere theorization because time is short and the impeding challenge will not give us any reprieve. You will undoubtedly agree that it is time we joined hands together, especially that the efforts and sacrifices required will benefit us all -- and in proportions that will repay many times over all costs and sacrifices. Joint Arab action is undeniably the most effective means of realizing our aspirations, not only on a state level, but throughout the Arab World".⁵⁷

Jordan's approach to Confidence Building

Jordan adopted a realistic approach to solving the Israeli-Palestinian question from the beginning. The late King Abdullah was assassinated for his candid efforts to bring the issue to a just and satisfactory end since its early stages. Under the leadership of HM King Hussein, Jordan continued and enhanced a moderate and pragmatic political course and won the confidence of both the Arabs (mainly the Palestinians) and the Israelis.

Jordan was aware of the necessity of confidence building among Arab states to reach a unified realistic stand. During the extraordinary summit meeting of the Arab League in Amman on November 8-11, 1987, HM King Hussein tackled the most serious ruptures in the Arab relations: the boycott of Egypt as a result of the Camp David agreement, and the Syrian-Iraqi persistent

animosity. In an effort to reconcile Asad of Syria and Saddam of Iraq, Jordan's policy succeeded in bringing together the two leaders during the conference on November 9, 1987 in the presence of other Arab leaders.⁵⁸

Jordan's policy strove to create the atmosphere that would enhance inter-Arab cooperation and integration. Jordan paid unyielding and continuous efforts to attain this goal. In this respect HRH, Crown Prince Al-Hassan called upon the Arab countries to "create a suitable environment for regional cooperation. We must harmonize legislative structures and policies, promote regional capital markets, create specialized economic zones and trade hubs, and adopt international quality standards. Our long-term goal must be to liberalize and dismantle all barriers in the region, whether in terms of trade, investment, labor, capital or services. For freer trade in the region will contribute both to prosperity and to peace".⁵⁹

In the 1990s Jordan's political judgment and advice on how to resolve the Palestinian dispute further augmented trust in its leadership. Jordan declared that bilateral talks and diplomacy are the only choices to overcome violence and misunderstanding. Recognition of the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinians and at the same time Jordan's decision to support their decision boasted Palestinian confidence in the Jordanian policy.

Jordan's political success was based on combination of number of achievements. Continued economic achievements, security, moderate policy, and democracy are the pillars on which Jordan is building for the future. The same pillars enhance Jordan role in the emerging macro-Middle East, and assist in furthering regional peace relations.

Europe and the Middle East

“We are also fully aware that regional cooperation between the peoples of the Middle East must be in the framework of active and positive interaction with the world economy. If the countries of the region have taken advanced steps towards a partnership between Europe and the Middle East, this is due to the historic and cultural ties between our region and Europe”. His Majesty King Hussein I, address to the Middle East and North Africa Economic summit.

Preface

Relations between the Middle East and Europe date back to more than ten centuries. This period was enough to cast its influence on every aspect of the life of both regions: politically, culturally, socially, religiously, economically, geographically and to a far extent ethnically. During many centuries the Middle East and European peoples had been assembled together in famed empires: the Hellenistic, the Roman and the Byzantine. More recently Europeans and Middle Eastern peoples had been incarnated of Muslim states in Andalusia, Sessile, and the Ottoman Empire. In modern times the Russian expansion and the Anglo-French domination of the Middle East carried the ferment even further, socially, culturally, economically and militarily. One of the results we can see in the existence of

Euro-Middle Eastern communities with mixed education system, citizenship, multi-religiosity and multiculturalism. The Middle East is not any more the only place where mosques and churches are a routine episode of tolerance and coexistence, but Europe and the United States have started sharing this decorum.

These glorious episodes in the life and history of the two regions cannot be understood without realizing the role of each region in the destiny of the other, and its contribution to the outcome of these historic relations. Europe's expansion eastward, during the last three centuries, was impossible without a passage through the Middle East. The battle field of the Second World War was Europe as well as the Arab World - the heart of the Middle East. The Cold War stands as a veritable evidence that the two regions are inseparable and share common destiny. The division of the world throughout the Cold War was demonstrated most evidently in the division of Europe and the division of the Arab World in particular and the Middle East in two areas of influence. Europe and the Middle East were the most disputed areas throughout the Cold War era. The Middle East in particular as it was highly important to the Soviet security as a region that can effect its southern fringes, the region was second only to Western Europe in the American strategic priorities.

"Convenient" bi-polarism during the Cold War withdrew to a state of uni-polarity causing stunning shock that demolished military, political, ideological, and economic post-Second World War arrangements. The end of the Cold War brought the world to face a dramatic shift in multi-layered relations. Adjustment, or *perestroika*, of each region or country cannot be overlooked or

abandoned. The new balance of power: political, techno-military, or economic, has imposed new relations in a new atmosphere referred to diversely as the "new world order", or "post-Cold War" or "post-communist world". However the new world proved to be not safer than the bisected world, and requires higher degree of vigilance or at least equivalent to that demanded during the Cold War.

The new situation created uncertain state in many parts of the world, primarily in ex-communist countries and certainly in most of the Third World countries. This state of affairs was coupled with threatening misery in Eastern Europe including Russia as a result of ethnic strife and friction between 'new' (reformsit) and 'old' (conservative) political forces.⁶⁰

The attention of the world, in this transitional period which we call post-Cold War, is focused on a long list of dangers: nuclear proliferation, terrorism, drug smuggling,⁶¹ illegal immigration, ethnic conflicts, and multi-faced terrorism. In Eastern Europe, the prevailing situation resulted in the revival of nostalgia for the near past, and paved the ground for the return of coveting for power communist parties in East Europe. This list of new fatal challenges brought the world nearer to volatility and uncertainty during what can be described as a transitional period in Europe and the Middle East.

The political map of the world contained many unanswered questions, the most urgent of them is revolving around the map of Europe and the Middle East. The Middle East already witnessed drastic shift in its map following the fall of the Berlin wall. The alteration within the Middle East is signified by the inclusion of the

two Yemens in on state, the demarcation of the Jordanian-Israeli boundaries, the emergence of the Palestinian identity, the demarcation of the Saudi-Quatari and Saudi-UAE borders. Yet a macro Middle East is emerging after the emancipation of the Central Asian and Trans-Caucasian republics. Further more, a great transformation will accompany the revision of the Stalinist borders in Central Europe.

Shifting geostrategic map of Europe

New Euro-Middle Eastern arrangements are hampered by volatile situation in Central and Eastern Europe. Success in accommodating the aspirations of ex-Warsaw Pact members will be reflected positively on the Middle East. Still continued dispute or failure in that direction may guide Europe to rely fundamentally on relations with the Middle East.

Most Central and East European countries sought membership in the NATO and the EU mainly for two reasons: the first, to enhance its security and the second, to overcome its economic predicaments. These countries regarded Russia's resistance to its membership in the NATO as a confirmation of Russia's continued designs. Thus fears from the revival of Russia's ambitions became eminent. Promulgation's of some Russian officials, whether intentionally or not, contributed to these fears within these countries and within Western Europe as well. When General Minronov said that the "Cold War still goes on and only one definite stage of it is over"⁶², his phrase caused a wave of distrust and misgiving in the West. Yet suspicion is higher among ex-Warsaw Pact members. Aware of this situation, the Russian

leadership tried to pacify sensations. Boris Yeltsin signed a doctrine on November 2, 1993 stating that "the Russian Federation does not regard any state as an enemy".⁶³

Euro-American consideration of Russia's opposition to NATO's expansion eastward created an agreeable atmosphere for the emergence of radical and nationalistic tendencies in Russia waving the banner of security. But consideration of Russia's security concerns should not lead to acceptance of the existing Stalinist borders in Europe. Most European politicians regard maintaining the current boundaries in Europe means the perpetuation of the Stalinist post-WWII map of Europe⁶⁴. The end of the Cold War liquidated the importance of existing in Central and Eastern Europe "Stalinist" boundaries, in the mean time created a necessity for remapping the European continental confines.

Yet the US implicitly agrees to the expansion of the NATO but pays little effort in that direction trying to accommodate Russia in the new arrangements within a new Europe. The US position is in agreement with what Manfred Worner asserted in Tirana, the capital of Albania in 1993, that "The Alliance's task is not just to preserve the security of its members, but to help others to be more secure". But political developments in Russia and within the continent made it impossible to continue in this direction. The Russo-US rapprochement encouraged the revival of nostalgia for dominance over old spheres of influence in ex-Warsaw Pact countries. The enlargement of the NATO, from the European point of view, can be delayed for some time but not to be dismissed totally. Europe sees the enlargement of the NATO as an expansion of democracy eastward, and won't consent with ambiguity.

Expansion of the NATO will open the door for Slavic countries, notably Poland at the first stage, to be incorporated in a new system. How would Russia in this case rid itself from the historic attitude as the "elder brother" and protector of the "lesser brother" toward the Slavs. Yet to which extent would it abandon its sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe?

NATO's expansion will contribute to stability and control in Central and Eastern Europe. It will keep America, the largest member of the organization, as a balancing factor in European politics. Moreover the expansion will lead to better management of emerging conflicts in Europe.⁶⁵ The enlargement of the NATO could be regarded as the most reliable guarantor for future stable and controlled relations between Russia and Germany. Russia will be linked to other European countries through membership in the Partnership for Peace program, which was advanced during the NATO summit held in January 1994.

The enlargement of the NATO must have been an issue for debate among its members if Russia's reaction was postponed. Also enlargement could be a burden for countries applying for membership, because these countries would have to be able to meet expenditures and reach the NATO standards and obligations.

A multitude of European issues and politics indicated that a new European map is looming with modified boundaries and ultimately a "Greater Europe" including new regions. The natural geographical expansion of Europe is in the Middle East or in wider terms in the Mediterranean basin, but two questions should be answered before hand: the first; whether Europe is capable of expanding independently? And the second; would the European expansion suit the US strategy in the Middle East?

Geographic Proximity: Europe and the Middle East

Political and economic relations

After the end of the Cold War economic assistance to Third World countries including some Middle Eastern countries was not only impaired but also coupled with political limitations and qualifying factors. Tangible portion of this aid was redirected to other destinations. The reason as Poland's Prime Minister put it in a lecture delivered in Vienna in February 1993 is that Europeans are forced "to rethink the European order in an effort to find an answer to the question of how the vision of freedom, democracy, and prosperity... can be realized on a continental scale".⁶⁶ Rethinking Europe's order or priorities had direct effect on developing countries including the Arab World. Western countries in general exhibited willingness to see a multiparty systems, respect of human rights, and democracy were introduced in the political system of recipient countries. Politically speaking, multiparty system is a very important pillar of pluralism. But demanding the imposition of this system without considering the internal conditions of each society, its culture, stage of development, and the complex of tradition of these countries, may lead to chaos, corruption, civil strife dictatorship rather than promoting democracy.

Yet another obvious reason behind limiting aid to these countries lies in Europe's apprehension of disorder in Central and East Europe. A Czech official forthrightly put it saying that the people of Central and Eastern Europe would not hesitate to move westward in a massive immigration if the West won't assist these nations to overcome its difficulties.⁶⁷ Edward Shevardnadze, the Georgian president said that the Caucasus still in turmoil and praised the EU efforts to dampen the flames of conflict, but warned Europe to step up efforts to stabilize this region saying "peace in your own home is not possible without peace in your neighbor's".⁶⁸

Perceiving the eminent danger of disorder in Eastern Europe and the newly dependent states on western societies, the free world in general and Western Europe in particular was impelled to share the burden of rebuilding and assisting ex-communist countries on the expense of Third World countries. Of course, for these countries, there was no other readily available source but to cut off or at best reduce funds allocated to foreign aid in general. Reducing aid to third world countries was reflected negatively on recipient countries.

The West became more and more aware that alleviating the developing world suffering has been a major task, however many countries were singled out as "failed states", and instances are ample in Africa and Asia.

Observers attribute diminishing economic assistance to third world countries to both the emerging priorities imposed by post-Cold War developments in Eastern Europe and to West European security considerations. Nevertheless some analysts and observers

oil prices of the 1970s. Yet others see the reason behind declining aid to developing countries lies in the ability of recipient countries to respond to conditions and requirements sought by the industrial countries and other financial institutions, mainly the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which pursue stricter qualifying factors such as democracy, respect for human rights and demanding major structural reforms of recipient-country economies to dismantle the state sector and expand the scope for free enterprise.⁶⁹ Nevertheless some observers admit that the West resolved to this policy as a quick fix for problems facing the world such as "exploding populations, diminishing natural resources, struggling governments and ethnic rivalries".⁷⁰ Yet "massive abuses of human rights... are distressing enough, but the need to help those states is made more critical".⁷¹

Yet it should be noted that aid to the Middle Eastern countries was not altered before the end of the Cold War, despite the oil crisis of the 1970s, due to rivalry between the super-powers which created the pressure of bi-polarism. The use of oil as a political leverage was behind Europe's attitude during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Carter, the former President of the US described the situation as follow: "A nervous Europe's need for assured supplies of energy solidified an attitude that was more balanced toward the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and more attuned to the Palestinian dimension of the conflict in particular. All these trends were demonstrated quite vividly during the October 1973 war between Israel and its Arab neighbors, when none of the European countries would permit the United States to refuel its aircraft taking supplies to Israel during the latter days of the conflict. This was a

clear break with the United States and Israel, a show of unanimity by the Europeans on behalf of the Arab nations".⁷²

Relations Between the East and the West

The Helsinki Accords of 1975 brought an atmosphere of relief in Europe and the world. For the first time, since the WWII, tense East-West relations relaxed, and a ripe opportunity to expand social and cultural contacts between antagonists became conceivable. It can be called the first real thaw in the icy East-West relations in Europe. These connections brought with them uncalculated risks to the communist regimes. Even though limited, open-door policy between the communist East and the capitalist West proved the postulation that free democratic societies and individuals are culturally, socially and ideologically immune, while totalitarian societies, on every level, were inferior and weak.

The Helsinki Accords were not global nor sacred to the Soviet leadership. Disregarding the US and Canada's participation, the Soviets regarded these accords as an internal European proceedings detached from the super powers' behavior elsewhere. The USSR, by signing the Helsinki Accords in 1975, sought to split West European countries and project itself as "peacemaker in the political sphere and dealmaker in the economic sphere".⁷³

The Soviet coveted for the sanctity of their boundaries in Europe. The Helsinki Accords recognized the inviolability of existing at the time boundaries in Europe. Meanwhile the Soviets strove to continue the rivalry in the Third World countries to secure better share from its markets. The invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 proved the Soviet intention to disregard the Helsinki

Accords outside Europe and brought the relations between East and West Europe to the prelude of the 1950s. This invasion had its negative reverberations in Europe and "doomed the SALT II Treaty".⁷⁴ The NATO responded by declaring its intention to deploy a new generation of nuclear missiles in Europe.⁷⁵

West European leaders were convinced of the futility of military solution to East-West contention. Yet the military might remained under high consideration and was vigorously developed as a deterrence. Quality not size was the motif in the West, while the opposite dominated in the East. However soldiers and officers of either side did not cross the borders and did not engage in direct combat. Instead freedom, ideas of fascinating political pluralism, democracy, prosperity, and superior standards of life in the West penetrated the iron curtains and worked miraculously while Warsaw Pact soldiers were patrolling the boundaries. The attacking forces were pure civic and irresistible. The most notable achievements of the Helsinki Accords lied in the fact that they spurred "the development of human rights movements in Eastern Europe and the USSR, the Helsinki framework reflected desired goals rather than legislating concrete actions".⁷⁶

A suppressed battle within each society of Eastern Europe, started between the official (dogmatic) point of view and the new popular aspirations. All attempts to plant radical ideology in democratic societies failed to function so long as the prevailing atmosphere in these societies was pluralistic. The west was open to communist literature and propaganda but supporters and adherents were limited. Meanwhile East European societies were extremely vulnerable to external influences in every sphere of life despite "closed doors" policy.

The military in the west was used as a shield to give a chance to free societies to develop peacefully through out the Cold War era and reach a high level of productivity and competitiveness. While the case was different in East Europe, where the military was ruinously large to a degree that it became a burden on the one hand and turned to be a class for the privileged in a supposedly "classless society" on the other.

Peace movements began to gather momentum and show influence on East and West Europe to prevent a fresh return to the *inferno* of a new cold war. The new movement linked its efforts for peace with the intention to promote democracy and protect human rights. The east was suspicious of these movements and declared its confidence that intelligence sources stand behind these activities. But similar groups began to appear in Warsaw Pact countries. Dissident movement in Russia, Democratic Opposition, Association of Young Democrats and East-West Dialogue in Hungary, Charter 77 and Independent Peace Association in Czechoslovakia, Swords into Ploughs in East Germany, Solidarity and Freedom and Peace in Poland and many others in Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were the most significant by-product of the Helsinki Accords.⁷⁷

Activists of these groups in particular, and the movements itself, were treated as western surrogates in their countries. Yet peace groups in the west likewise were deemed as Soviet agents. However the literature of these groups softly but steadily influenced intellectuals as well as officials and modified their views towards many matters.⁷⁸ The "new thinking" of Gorbachev which produced the principles of *perestroika* and *glasnost* was not

isolated from the stream. These two principles revealed the underlying weakness of the USSR. It became obvious that the Soviet Union confronted hard choices with no alternatives: "reforms or death".⁷⁹ This was behind Gorbachev's conviction in the necessity of shifting from centrally planned economy, (brute-force economy) to free market economy based on competition or (brain-force economy). Fine-tuning the Soviet system was not designed to the destruction of the Soviet Union, rather it was devised to moderating the system and to prolong its life. Nevertheless the attempt led to the adoption of a new wave of politics that required new political language, new approach and new interpretation of the existing ideology, new ideals and values, and new direction.

Despite the fact that they did not seek capturing power, these groups extremely discomforted the remaining hard-liners who ruled in East Europe. Total collapse of a camp was not in sight, nonetheless the new "revolutionaries" voiced willingness to see reforms in their societies. By the end of the 1980s, reforms proved to be the only remedy to East European countries but very little was known about its magnitude.

Gorbachev's call for a 'Common European Home' had turned the Soviet policy from global tendencies toward a Europeanized orientation. Gorbachev realized that good terms with Western Europe and the US would bring better security arrangements, stability, economic opportunity, but not without a sacrifice. It was clear that unpopular leaders of Eastern Europe who depended completely on Russia will be part of the sacrifice.

It became clear after 1989 that the leadership in Moscow was ready to sacrifice, under the economic burdens, all the gains of 1944/45, i.e. the whole socialist camp besides integral and strategic sections of its own such as the Baltic republics, Central Asia and Trans-Caucasia, for the sake of profitable relations with the West. The aborted coup of 1991 was regarded in the West as the point of no return and geared high expectations for reforms and democracy in the West.⁸⁰ The G-7 leaders agreed to support moves towards the political and economic transformation in the Soviet Union and expressed their readiness to assist the integration of the USSR into the world economy.⁸¹ The West realized the need for securing "the most daring economic reforms ever undertaken anywhere".⁸² High consideration was given to saving deteriorating economic situation not only within Russia, but within the Newly Independent States (NIS) as well. The Boston Consulting Group forewarned the World Bank (WB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) on the condition of the Soviet economy saying that the republics, including Russia were fully interdependent and disintegration would lead to anarchy and production will suffer ruinously.⁸³

Domestic reforms in Russia were reinvigorated and cautiously Western money began to pour into Russia.⁸⁴ Russia's approval and willingness to speed up realignment was declared publicly by Andre Kozyrev, the Foreign Minister, in a speech at Columbia University in New York in September 1992. He declared: "We are for an alliance with the United States and the West. This is not an alliance directed against anybody, but one of like-minded people, sharing general values and working together for the good of the world".⁸⁵

G-7 leaders in their final communiqué of July 8, 1992 admitted the urgency of extending most-favored-nation treatment to include trade with the new states of the former Soviet Union and support for a phased strategy of cooperation between the Russian government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 1994 the G-7 finance ministers and central bankers disclosed that they had agreed to support plans for the improvement of Russia's social security system. They said that the decision had been taken to alleviate the social hardships of the transformational process in Russia. In December the same year the US advised the IMF to consider the social impact of the IMF backed policies in Russia's case.⁸⁶

East Europe: Aspirations realities

US and West European powerful media organs adored changes toward democracy and free market economy. The people in the Soviet Union and East Europe believed that once communism and centralism were dislodged, prosperity will prevail and Russia with the rest of the Warsaw Pact countries will be integrated in the European Union, which was regarded in Eastern Europe as a community of prosperous and affluent countries. The campaign boasted hopes, but no mention of the difficulties of transition from communism and centrally planned economy toward privatization and free market economy was made, yet "listeners in Communist countries were assured of Western help by implication rather than by detailed explication".⁸⁷ This created a strong impression afterwards notably among the Russians, and to a lesser degree among other Slavic countries, that they were misled. This

feeling of trickery was added to social discontent and exploited to its limits by political extremes of the right and the left among the peoples of these countries.

Zhirinovskii and the communists made good use of this desperate feeling among the Russians exhibited in their exceptional victory in the December 1995 parliamentary elections.

Russia showed many signs of willingness to adjust its direction or it may shift course completely. Writers and observers warned of such inclination saying: "New dangers await us. Post-Communist Russia gropes for a new foreign policy, without the hostile Leninist ideological impulse but also with an increasing willingness to assert national interests not identical to ours."⁸⁸ This disposition also can be stemmed from obvious popularity of radical policies of the right and left calling either for the revival of Tsarism or communism.

A New Thinking and a New World Order

A new era began in December 1988, when the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev launched his vision of a new thinking in a speech to the United Nations. In that speech he declared that the world was becoming increasingly interdependent; human interests more important than the interests of any particular class; there can be no victors in a nuclear war; security has to be based increasingly on political (civil) rather than military instruments; and security must be mutual, regional or global.⁸⁹ Gorbachev's "new thinking" was admired by the world leaders and received the highest evaluation every where. In the United States the new thinking of

the Soviet leader was regarded as bold and decisive pointed at ending "the bitter divisions of the Cold War and contributed to the remaking of a Europe whole and free. Gorbachev's ... "new thinking" in foreign affairs permitted the United States and the Soviet Union to move from confrontation to partnership in the search for peace across the globe".⁹⁰

The new thinking in the Soviet policy was obvious during the second Gulf crisis (1990). The Soviet Union followed a pragmatic diplomacy to maximize its gains in the Middle East and open new markets without renouncing its super-power status. The new coveted markets are those of the Gulf states, to which the Russians had limited or no access during the Cold War.

Gorbachev's new thinking paved the way for the fall of the Berlin Wall, and kindled hopes in East Europe. It is true to note here that the emancipation of Eastern Europe was not against the desire of Moscow, but was coupled with supportive Soviet attitude. "Gorbachev advised the communist leaders in Poland to co-opt Solidarity. He warned both Honecker [E. Germany] and Jakes [Czechoslovakia] of the consequences of resisting the stream of history; he kept Soviet troops in their barracks; and it was he who also advised Krenz [of E. Germany] to demolish the Berlin Wall".⁹¹

Whether voluntary or compulsory East Europe was put on unreversable course to join the process of "globalization" through "fragmentation". At this historic moment the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe saw the light of freedom and the end of despotism, they were ready for the sacrifice but they had no idea about its cost or dimension. They were eager for change. Soon they

realized that the quested objectives are difficult to attain. The reality emerged fatiguing and without cosmetics. These nations recognized that a "farewell to arms" was not replaced by economic opportunity or social prosperity. Death, need, drugs, corruption, devastation, and ethno-religious wars followed the collapse of the old despotic regimes. They needed western assistance to convert its military complexes and to reinvigorate its economy and liberate it through the hard process of privatization. A realistic approach, coupled with joint efforts by the international community to deal with problems facing these nations appeared imperative. West European countries were aware of the fact that needs far exceeded capabilities. The international community can afford limited assistance. Nevertheless it was to East European nations to devise a formula and be prepared to pay the price in a confused transitional period from totalitarianism to democracy - from state ownership to private property and free market enterprise.

Some of ex-socialist countries embraced hard but direct treatment for its burden. Exhausted by idle huge state holdings, the new democracies in East Europe considered "bankruptcy" as an entrance to "privatization". Poland was leading in this direction, and a set of regulations to deal with insolvent firms were activated based on "the two bankruptcy acts of 1934".⁹² Many other countries instituted a ministry for privatization and State Property Administration for the first time in their history to deal solely with the insolvent "socialist" firms.

European security and the Middle East

The Middle East is the source of many strategic materials for Europe and as well as many other parts of the world. Thus any violation of the security of either the producing or the consuming regions will have analogous influence and corresponding outcome on the other. Thus regional security cannot be attained through detached activity. Even military power cannot ensure security single-handedly. Security is the product of collective efforts in different fields, political, social, and economic, within a given country or a region. Thus national security cannot be guaranteed in isolation from its regional dimension.⁹³

Political, economic, social and cultural and other activities of any government have direct influence on its security, yet these activities may come directly as a response to security demands. After more than seventy years of conflict in the Middle East coupled with two ruthless World Wars and gruesome Cold War in this century, it became clear that security requires peace, political freedom, social stability and sustainable economic development. Security and peace are inseparable, and the disintegration of one leads to the erosion of the other. At present the most threatening factors to peace and security in the Europe (East and West) and the Middle East are unemployment, inflation, deprivation and poverty. Success in the field of peace making and peace building will be measured by the success achieved in treating these dilemmas especially on poverty alleviation front.

Freedom from suspicion, freedom from need and freedom from anxiety are prerequisites for national and regional security and peace. To reach this ground, the super-powers, in the zenith of

the Cold War, established direct hot lines for communication between the White House and the Kremlin to avoid the ruinous consequences of misconception and faulty lines.

During the heat of rivalry between the superpowers, the military was perceived, especially in third world countries, as the guarantor of classic or hard security. It is mostly because soft security, which lies in development, and social satisfaction was more difficult to attain "because of the complexity of the syndrome to be countered, 'soft security policy' is more diffuse than classical security policy. It is more difficult to sell to a public that wants a concrete calculation of the relationship between effort invested and security gained".⁹⁴ Thus armies in Asia, Africa and Latin America were brought up on the expenses of social welfare and socio-economic development. No doubt the army is needed to sanction or approve national security. And to far extent armies were able to limit or reduce the work of external factors but failed to eliminate them totally.⁹⁵ The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a "new world order", put an end to that situation. The new era, did not abolish the role of the army, but give emphasis to other necessities and priorities very important for external and internal security requisites and social peace. These necessities cannot be achieved by impeccable force. Practicing democracy, respecting human rights, tolerating pluralism, as well as social justice and equality are vital in this respect.

The European Union continues to expand and member states strive to establish harmony in its relations avoiding religious, ethnic, economic and commercial conflicts in order to safeguard a collective security.⁹⁶ It is true to say that the European experience

furnishes the Middle East with a ready instance that surely would serve and enhance multilateral interest and security specially after the Declaration of Principles (DOP) between Israel and the PLO and the ratification of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty by the parliaments of both countries. Nevertheless Middle Eastern countries continue to rely on classic and traditional instruments and organizations of security.

Security assumptions had changed profoundly since the end of the Cold War. The theory of mutual destruction which safeguarded stability and stood as a deterrence in front of both super-powers lost its value and ceased to apply in new world without Warsaw Pact Organization. Only NATO as a military bloc has survived the Cold War.

A drastic shift in the concept of European security measures happened directly after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany. This historic event coupled with the emancipation of Central and East European countries which found itself free but relatively without dependable armies. These countries sensed the old fears when they found themselves caught between the traditional powers of old Europe, i.e. Russia to the east and Germany to the west. Germany's integration in NATO stamped out its menacing character, but Russia still eruptive and preserved its historic peculiarity as an ambitious Eurasian military power despite alleged political reforms, market economy, and democracy. However it is true to say, even at this stage, that East and Central European countries' national security had improved if compared to its previous status, i.e. as members of the Warsaw Pact Organization.

Many of the security fears in Eastern and Central Europe flow from the uncertainty that inundates the process changes in its domestic policies on the one hand, and doubts that engulf Russia's unsettled internal affairs evident in the ebb and flood in Russia's tendency to assume the role of internal power. Moscow's opposition to ex-Warsaw Pact members to join NATO, and her consent and approval for these countries to join the EU create another source of anxiety to East and Central European capitals. The reason behind Russia's stand lies in her desire for the formation of all European security arrangement. But the apprehension of Eastern and Central European countries remain justified. Even within "all European security arrangement" influences and polarization will not cease, rather it may be enhanced around responsibilities and capabilities within a common European security arrangement.

After the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact Organization, Moscow adamantly wants the NATO to be substituted or transformed. From Russia's point of view, NATO should be converted to become the executive arm of an "all European organization" or international organization, the United Nations for instance, of which Russia is a member.⁹⁷

For the convenience of the East and Central European states, who found itself between temptation of privileges of NATO membership and intimidation on being victimized by regional arrangements, the Central European Initiative (CEI) as a regional cooperation system was invented. The CEI was founded in 1989 and in 1994 it combined ten countries with full membership status.⁹⁸ The primary Policy Document on the Pentagonal

Initiative stated in November 1989 that the initial goal of the Initiative was the contribution towards creating security and stability.⁹⁹

The type of settlement among the strong in Europe will cast its shadow on the smaller nations. And it remains true what the Austrian politician, Karl Renner, inscribed in 1902 saying; "Nature knows neither an equality of individuals nor an equality of nations; equality is a creation of law and its greatest benefit for those subject to it".¹⁰⁰

The Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty was the first document to establish the foundations for a collective security arrangement. The treaty banned alliances with third parties and called for cooperation against security threats of all kinds. The treaty called the two parties to commit themselves to establish a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East and to join efforts to make the region free from weapons of mass destruction. All parties agreed to combat terrorism and cross-border infiltration. So far the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty brought into being a necessary kernel for a wider regional arrangement.

NATO's expansion Eastward and Europe's anticipation

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization still committed to expanding eastward by adding some ex-Warsaw Pact countries to NATO's sixteen members. Expansion eastward is highly desired by the states and peoples of the Central and East European countries. NATO is not expanding randomly. The first stage will be the incorporation of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.¹ NATO officials adamantly support the idea of expansion. Speaking in the context of Central European issue, the Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Wörner, said in a NATO seminar in Warsaw in April 1992 "you are not left alone, neither today nor tomorrow".

But the East Europeans are downhearted because of Russia's opposition to this move. They do not hide their willingness to see members of the NATO pressuring Moscow to

¹. Territory and population of Central Europe:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Area (sq. Km.)</i>	<i>Population (millions)</i>
Poland	312,677	38.3
Czech Republic	78,864	10.4
Slovakia	49,035	5.2
Hungary	93,030	10.3
Total	533,606	64.2

comply while it is in need for western economic assistance.¹⁰¹ Post-Soviet Russian political terminology includes emblematic idioms such as “the near abroad” and “the far abroad”. “The near abroad” is invented to allude to ex-members of the USSR, while “the far abroad” means ex-members of the Warsaw Pact Organization. States of either circle, the near abroad or the far abroad, realized the fact that Russia has been defeated ideologically and economically, however remained powerful military nation with live historical ambitions.

Central and East European countries regard NATO membership as a political move that symbolizes its freedom of choice and true independence on the one hand, and as a shield against a sudden return of Russia on the other. The East and Central European countries found themselves in a political perplexity. While the EU member countries tend to push for the same goal, the US which in 1994 adopted the idea of NATO’s enlargement, a year later became interested more in its political implications rather than military purposes. Bill Clinton’s advisers counseled patience and caution.¹⁰² The US sought amicable relations with Russia instead of distressing a wounded giant. The expansion of the NATO is a new political game, while irritating Russia may lead to unforeseen consequences.

America’s predictions and calculations were not met with clashing Russian interests in the Balkans and the Caucasus.¹⁰³ Russo-American traditional discord was cloaked in Bosnia and Chechenia. In apparently tit for tat policy, Russia did not oppose NATO’s intervention in the Balkans, while the US underestimated Russia’s practices in Chechenia and North Caucasia. When this

equation misemployed, the US shifted toward the idea of NATO’s expansion, but with no intention to do any thing about it, knowing that the EU more enthusiastic in this respect.

Europe wants greater European presence in the NATO. Liking France and some other European countries to the organization would give the continent more margin to maneuver, reinvigorate the organization and relatively lessen its dependence on the United States.¹⁰⁴ Even though the idea is novice and to a certain degree resisted, a growing number among the European politicians and thinkers are motivated by establishing a defense alliance in the EU.¹⁰⁵ A new formula, “Maastricht II” aimed mostly at settling disputes and boosting unity is being softly drafted. It is exactly a “perestroika” within the EU to assist managing the new size of the Union.¹⁰⁶

The Europeans are facing a set of hurdles, the worst of which is not the monetary union, but the use of the military forces. The UK leads a team of member countries which assert that the use of armed forces should be based on “national decisions and should not, therefore, be subordinated to the influence of supranational institutions such as the EU Commission or the EU Parliament. Only a continued independence of the WEU would be able to guarantee that it could function as the instrument of national interests and of national defense policies”.¹⁰⁷

The UK-led group prefers a union with sacred national sovereignty, safeguarded home affairs management. While Germany wants the union to go beyond “the vaguely worded and unspecific Treaty of Maastricht protocol”.¹⁰⁸

Europe as a model for new inter-Arab Relations

Europe and the Middle East have many common issues besides economic interests. The Mediterranean sea is not a separating obstacle, it rather can be regarded as a unique unhindered marine route that can connect the Arab World with Europe. The European experience is admired in the Middle East. The European nations succeeded in surmounting religious, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and historic obstacles and form an organization that joined them, regulated their interests, and facilitated the attainment of their aspirations. The accumulating experience is needed in the Middle East not only to overcome existing barriers, but also to reach harmony and save the peace.¹⁰⁹

Schism among the Arab states which was culminated during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 gave impelling force for inter-Arab system. His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan during the Iraq-Kuwaiti crisis repeatedly called for cease-fire to be followed by inter-Arab dialogue. Jordan was one of the countries most affected by the Gulf War, thus the Jordanian viewpoint was highly regarded by the European Union as a direct result of the pragmatic policy of the country's leadership. The European model was regarded as fitting standard for post-war relations.

HRH Crown Prince Al-Hassan in many occasions called for the establishment in the Middle East of a forum similar to the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In his address to a seminar entitled "Building on Peace: Towards Regional Security and Economic Development in the Middle East", His Highness said:

"Jordan has long called for the establishment of a forum along the lines of the CSCE, or OSCE as it is now known. We believe that such a forum could provide low-key institutional procedures to discuss the various and inter-connected topics that bear on regional security and cooperation. A CSCME would provide a focus for a non-military perspective on security. It would help us to develop a common regional vision, founded on common goals and aspirations, and built on structures of inter-connections and mutual aid".¹¹⁰

Emerging realities in the Middle East and Europe

New Middle East

The traditional concept of the Middle East as the region that embraced the Arab World (the Asian part including Egypt), Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan became inaccurate after the disintegration of the USSR. To the new Middle East many ex-Soviet republics were incorporated. Thus the greater Middle East includes the Central Asian republics: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirgizstan,¹¹¹ and the three republics of Trans-Caucasia: Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. Even though the new Middle East open the door for wider cooperation and new markets, it incorporated many eruptive spots, such as the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia around Nagorno-Karabakh, and between the Georgians and the Abkhazians, and revived regional rivalry mostly between Turkey and Iran at this stage.¹¹² Yet the new members of the greater Middle East are integral elements of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Turkey and Iran expressed willingness to see the Newly Independent States (NIS) ended once and for all with its commitment to the Russian Federation through the CIS. Moreover the incorporation of the NIS in the Middle East

created a new ethnic situation where the Russian considerable minorities in these republics became for the first time in history residents of the Middle East. Albeit it is difficult to say that the destiny of the Russian ethnics has been settled because the "Russians have been unable, or unwilling, to integrate themselves into the Muslim societies in which they live".¹¹³

Retreat of radical ideologies

Political ideologies moved millions of peoples all over the globe. Communism was the most militant in the Third World countries during the East-West confrontation. The withdrawal of communism in East Europe opened a unique opportunity for the growth of religious, social, economic and other theories to influence and deal with the emerging situations. The Middle East was not an exception. But some circles tried to depict Islam as the new radical force not only in the Middle East but also in the US and Europe. Regarding Islam as such is fully inaccurate. Lack of dialogue is mostly the main reason behind this conception. His Royal Highness told participants of the tenth meeting of al-Bayt Foundation that "Islam has nothing to do with this fundamentalism because it is a religion that calls for tolerance and moderation, a view totally opposed to the popular one conceived by some authors in the West".¹¹⁴

Although alienation of Islam and suppression of Islamic minorities, or any religious minority, here and there won't lead to any end rather than hatred and violence. Muslims everywhere strive for recognition of their religious rights within the society. HRH Crown Prince Al-Hassan warned that

Islamophobia creates fertile ground for antagonism, thus "inter-faith dialogue must be intensified", while Islamophobia should be treated "as abhorrent as anti-semitism... Both must be opposed by resort to the law of the land".¹¹⁵

Politicizing religion comes as part of the endeavor to find a solution to a mundane predicament which has nothing to do with God. But the worst examples lie in attributing politics to God or *religionizing* politics. The first pattern would lead to justification of violence, while the second to despotism and lack of accountability. Religion and politics concede that human rights are the kernel of religious teachings and political practices. Thus violation of human rights is opposed by both religious and secular. Human rights go beyond religious practices and political freedom they are "universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. The International community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of states, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights".¹¹⁶

The six years that followed the disintegration of the USSR brought substantial geopolitical changes in the Middle East. Peace among the Arabs and the Israelis became a target to which the Arab countries and Israel strove to realize and preserve. The new regional atmosphere allowed mutual recognition of the Palestinian rights to establish their state and the right of Israel to exist. Moreover the collapse of the USSR added to the territory of

the Middle East. The newly independent states of Central Asia (Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and the trans-Caucasus republics (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) along with the Arab countries, Iran, Turkey, and Israel are forming a new macro-region, the Greater Middle East. The emerging formation enhanced the importance of the Middle East globally and in particular to Europe.

Yet the same period witnessed the inauguration of new relations between Israel as a member of the Middle East and number of the Arab countries.

It should be noted here that peace created regional facts, yet it activated internal radicalism and wars within (internal) replace wars without (external). The assassination of Anwar As-Sadat and the assassination of Isac Rabin are just instances. The later instance is more striking for it took place as a protest against peace with the Arabs and demonstrated a new current in the Israeli societal practices and politics.

In Europe the changes were as deep and fundamental as they were in the Middle East. Europe had a new geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geoethnic map of "Greater Europe". Most noticeable here is the new map of united Germany. The withdrawal of the USSR left Russia with a new map that shows the Russian Federation, but on the other sided a new geopolitical map manifested in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Another radical modification happened in the Balkans, where the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation brought to existence a multitude of micro-national states and the revival of

historical grievances that threatened the system of the European security.

The enlargement of the NATO eastward will eventually lead to redrawing of a new European military strategic map that would include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech republic. Meanwhile if the "partnership for peace" arrangement, which is designed to convene Russia in Europe, succeeded it surely would create another not only geo-strategic or military map, but a more fascinating geo-economic and geo-ethnic new maps.

New Relations between Europe and the Middle East

The world as a whole and Europe and the Middle East in particular faced rapid developments and increasing change at the eve of the third millennium. New Euro-Middle Eastern thinking and new relations are very necessary to tackle emerging predicaments and adjust for shifting international politics as well as economics. The balancing factors that granted that high cost stability during the vexatious Cold War years are not in effect any more.

Considering the vitality of each region to the other, Europe and the Middle East must go hand in hand to the third millennium. The European Union will be far more stable (strategically, politically, economically, and from security regards) if respect of human rights, democracy, and peace timed with economic prosperity and political stability in the Middle East. The two regions are not competing rather complementing each other, hence their integration at present time will protect both regions from unexpected development in the future.

The Middle East is not any more the land of war. The breakthrough in 1979 between Egypt and Israel; the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles; and the Jordanian-Israeli peace agreement restored to the Middle East its natural position as the land of peace, ethnic pluralism and fraternity, and paved the way for intra-regional cooperation and integration on the one hand and inter-regional cooperation on the other.

Regional Powers and Central Asia

Introduction

Russia's conquest of Central Asia began in the mid of the nineteenth century. First by the conquest of the basin of the Syr Daria river (1853-6), Bukhara (1868), Khiva (Khwarizm) (1873), Kokand (1876), and at last the Akhal Tekke Turkomans (1880-1882). After a fierce civil war among the Bolsheviks, the White Guards, and the Muslim elite who sought independence and cessation from Russia (1917-1924), Central Asia with the rest of the empire was delivered from the rule of the Tsars to that of the Commissars after heavy losses and great misery. The current boundaries of Central Asia were largely drawn during the 1920s and the 1930s. The demarcation of borders was motivated by clear intention of securing Soviet Russia's grip on a vital region to the new regime. Little heed was paid to the ethnic distribution.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia found that that old strategy fitted conveniently its new objectives if it wanted to find a pretext for the second "come back" to its previous colonies. Russia almost effortlessly can ignite dormant ethnic contest among divided nations utilizing the odd yet unsettled issue of international boundaries.

During the Soviet period Central Asia witnessed vigorous efforts in urbanization, industrialization and education, especially

after 1942, when most of Russia's European lands were occupied by the Nazi. The German occupation of the greater bulk of Russia's European land drove Russia's industries eastward to Central Asia. However by the end of the war these industries moved back to Russia's main land, and Central Asia retained its previous status as a supplier of raw materials, mostly gas, oil, gold and other minerals, besides fruits, food products and cotton. To make use of these sources Russia built a web of railways, network of transportation routs and airports that confined Central Asia to Russia in every sphere of life. On the other hand, Moscow depended on ethnic Russians in the region as the basis for the local administration, encouraged their settlement and facilitated their control over the economy in various ways. This delicate and manifold strategy which was implemented during Tsarist and Communist rules increased dependence on Russia and boasted the status of the Russian minorities in the region.

Culturally and linguistically the Central Asians derive their roots from Turkic origins, with the exception of the Tajiks who depict their language and culture from Persian sources, however they belong to the Sunni sect of Islam. Generally speaking, the Central Asians are mostly Sunny Muslims. Islam constitutes the major component in the cultural legacy of Central Asia, the peoples of the region succeeded in avoiding extremism and moderately managed to re-identify themselves as members of the Muslim World. The independence of the Central Asian and Caucasian republics renewed not only religious, ethnic and cultural ties with the rest of the Muslim countries, but also opened a new sphere of activities including economic, commercial, educational, and scientific. The new situation brought the historical cycle to a

fresh start. Rivalry among powers, regional and European, gathered momentum after the emancipation of the newly independent republics from Russia's grip.

The abolition of the Soviet Union has unsurpassed magnitude on world peace, stability and international relations. One of the consequences was the emergence of the Central Asian states on the arena of world politics. This fact by itself impelled regional reconsideration of existing strategies on the one hand and imposed powerful readjustment which could be interpreted as a regional *perestroika* on the other. The Central Asian republics turned to be of prime concern politically, ethnically, strategically and economically to regional powers: Turkey, Iran, Russia, China, Pakistan, the Arab countries, and Israel.

Prevalence of fanaticism and adherence to extremism by the new independent states (NIS) in Central Asia was one of the feared scenarios envisioned by wishful thinking at an early stage of the independence of these countries. Another famous scenario embodied in the revival of Pan-Turkism. Turkey, from the outset, was very cautious to promote openly Pan-Turkist indoctrination. Such policy would meet Iran's resistance, trigger Russia's protest and justify the renewal of Pan-Slavism.

Other observers envisioned the fragmentation of Central Asia to greater number of micro-states dominated and ruled by European-origin minorities. Even some analysts and thinkers denied that Central Asia will be influenced by Middle Eastern countries. This stream of thinking is originated in the assumption that the Central Asian republics "do not seek to fall right back under the tutelage of some distant capital... They see themselves as

no less civilized than their southern neighbors and reject notions that they need to learn from the latter".¹¹⁷

Few who envisioned the integration of Central Asia as a part of macro-Middle East or Greater Middle East. All these analyses, in various degrees, were based on the investigation of a powerful centrifugal movement which accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emanation of the US and the European Union as unopposed powers.

Today Central Asia is facing dual threat manifested in its intra-contradictions or what can be better described as regional conflicts on the one hand and conflicting interests of external powers competing to fill in the vacuum created by the abrogation of the Soviet Union on the other. Internal contradictions and strife remained inactive, meanwhile the regional powers exhibited geo-political, strategic, economic, and social activities. During this agreeable atmosphere Central Asia, as well as the Caucasus, experienced bi-polaristic influence represented by a secular model marketed by Turkey and the religious propagated by Iran.

Some observers, at an early stage, speculated that Islam would influence the political course of the new independent states of the southern rim of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Others judged in favor of secularism. The NIS in Central Asia followed neither model. But all these republics admitted that Islam is an important element in the life and identity of the Central Asian peoples. The Central Asian states realized that extremism whether religious, nationalistic, or ethnic would lead to violence, radicalism, and one-sided approach. As a result a moderate Islamo-national identity emerged creating a balanced state that will

guarantee further openness and if adhered to it will enhance, the most cherished elements for development and investment, social stability and political moderation.

At this stage it is evident that neither pure secular model nor the religious has made a breakthrough on the expense of the other. Obviously both players, Turkey and Iran, have realized the futility of dependence on religious or ethnic politics. Nevertheless competition to make further political, commercial, and geo-strategic gains. Both players are highly observant of the historic rules of the game, thus they avoided open rivalry or meddling with the military, the ultimate stage of the game.

Some writers evidently unaware of the regional religious and politico-cultural cross currents which strongly influence the life of the Central Asians. Thus they denied any role for Islam or nationalism in the political life of the Central Asian nations. They say that "it is more than true that the five Central Asian states have re-emerged on the scene as a result of the Soviet collapse rather than due to resurgent Islam or nationalism. Nationalistic intensity was not even at par with the Baltics who even shared Slavic affinity with the Russians"¹¹⁸. This category of writers snubbed many facts the least of which is that Russia in Asia is totally different in every respect from Russia in Europe. Yet such praetorian claims, which deny any role to nationalism or religion in the life of these peoples, reduce the Central Asian nations to merely heathen and uncivilized tribes. This judgment overlooked the glorious history of these nations, their contribution to India, Persia, Russia, and Turkey and the Arab World. During its expansion southward, Russia was met with organized nations with

rooted religious-cultural heritage. Russia was confronted for the first time throughout its drive in Asia with fierce resistance in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

It is true to say that Central Asia is vulnerable to conflict mostly as a result of power rivalry. However if local governments succeeded in containing their disputes, the region has the potential for peaceful development and economic prosperity. Ethnic tolerance among the Central Asians proved to be firmly implemented in their culture as well as religion. Feared Russian mass exodus from Central Asia as a result of fanaticism or "anti-Russian reprisals"¹¹⁹ proved to be illusionary and misleading.

Central Asian Security Demands

Confined by Russia from the north, China from the east, Afghanistan and Iran from the south, and the Caspian sea from the west, Central Asia occupies nearly four million square kilometers. This vast expanse of land is neither evenly developed nor evenly populated. It includes vast deserts and steppes¹²⁰ rich in minerals and raw materials, but scantily populated. Most of the region's population (fifty million) reside in two regions:

First: in the fertile Ferghana valley that passes across Kirgizstan, Tajikstan, and Uzbekstan. Tajikstan, the south-eastern most republic, represents a weak nexus and unstable part of the region as a result of the radiation of unrest in-coming from troubled Afghanistan. Targeted and penetrated by radical groups operating in Afghanistan, Tajikstan suffered from protracted civil war and sought Russian military assistance. While Uzbekstan, the strongest, most populated has territorial claims against both Kirgizstan and Tajikstan.¹²¹ Nevertheless existing understanding among states and among ethnic groups had unhappy precedence. In 1989, at the eve of the collapse of the USSR the fertile Ferghana valley witnessed mortal clashes

between the Uzbeks and the Meskhetian (Turks deported by Stalin in 1944 from their home land in the Caucasus) left scores dead and wounded. Yet in 1990 the same valley witnessed clashes between the Kirgiz and the Uzbeks in the region of Osh in Kirgizstan. The result of this ethnic conflict was 200 dead and over 1000 wounded.

Second: in the productive region of Semirechie¹²² and the northern provinces of Kazakhstan which are mostly populated by a large Russian minority that composes nearly 40 per cent of the Kazakh population.

Table 1: Central Asia area and population

Country	area (sq. km.)	population	size of the Russian minority
Kazakhstan	2,717,300	16,691,000	6,626,327
Kirgizstan	198,500	4,367,200	938,905
Tajikstan	143,100	5,248,000	386,992
Turkmenstan	488,000	3,622,100	334,658
Uzbekstan	447,400	20,322,300	172,737

Source: Tealakh, G. O., *Analytical Reading in the Agreement of the Commonwealth of Independent States*, (Arabic), (Center for International Studies, the Royal Scientific Society, Amman 1993), p. 103.

The newly independent republics of Central Asia: Uzbekstan, Turkmenstan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, and Tajikstan began to worry about security matters only after 1991. Before that date their security was part of Soviet Union's own. Today there are many factors that can destabilize the region's security, but in a wider framework components of destabilization can be classified into two categories: internal represented by ethnic strife and political repression, while the external can emanate from rivalry among world powers and the revival of historic ambitions.

The basic remedy for the internal threats lies in the capability of the Central Asian states to adopt and implement in its political life the principles of democracy, pluralism, and respect for human rights. Promotion of these principles will secure internal stability, dislodge social discontent, tranquilize minorities, and guarantee mutual economic interest and political harmony. Yet these measures will attract foreign investment. External factors are embodied in: first, how robust and successful democracy will proceed inside Russia proper. A new wave of Russian imperialism may emerge if ultra-nationalists, communists, or Pan-Slavists dominate the Kremlin;¹²³ second, how the Central Asian republics will conduct their intra-regional and international affairs; third, much of the region's security prerequisites depend on the capability of the regional states to limit their historic ambitions against each other, promote mutual respect and enhance cooperation; forth, how these states will satisfy social demands and deal with social aspirations, and respond to controlling factors of development and regional integration. Yet the region's security

depends to a far extent on how much Russia will concur with post-Soviet arrangements in Central Asia.

Russia suspects any international involvement in the affairs of Central Asia even after independence. The Kremlin identifies two main rivals in Central Asia; the US and Western Europe as international competitors, yet regionally a watchful eye is kept monitoring the activities of Turkey and Iran. Post-Soviet Russian politics will be designed in light of how international and regional powers will conduct its business in Central Asia.

China is another player that should be reckoned with when discussing Central Asian security. China has a considerable Muslim minority in its western most Sinkiang (Xinjiang) province which was conquered only in the second half of the nineteenth century. China may stir Central Asia in order to prevent or at least limit its influence on the Muslim population of Sinkiang.

Threats to Central Asian Security

The revival of Russia's imperialism represent a potential and most formidable threat to the security of the Central Asian nations. Russia has sensitive security concerns which rigidly shaped, in the past and at present, its foreign policy. Bordering Japan, China, the Middle East and Europe, Russia is keen to pre-empt any move by her historic rivals including those who form the near abroad "*blizhnee zarubezh'e*".¹²⁴ The Central Asian republics are susceptible to Russia's influence in every sphere of life: demographically, militarily, technologically, and economically. Russia can be singled out from other competitors for two main reasons: first, it dominated the region for more than a century and left its marks on every aspect of life; second, Russia has large minorities in each republic. This imbalance in power adds to the apprehensions of the Central Asians and gives Russia the sharp edge at any time if it chose to intervene.

There are other internal political powers who do not hesitate to declare their longing to regain Central Asia and encourage efforts in this direction. These powers are represented by intellectuals, politicians, and military circles who remained under the nostalgia of the Tsarist or communist past, and see much glory in it.¹²⁵ In this respect there is no difference between the ultra-right represented by the nationalist Vladymir Zhirinovskii, who aspire to push the Russian boundaries not to the confines of the USSR, but as far as the shores of the Persian Gulf and the Indian

ocean, and the ultra-left represented by the less glamorous spectrum of similar personalities who seek the restoration of the USSR. Ziuganov, the leader of the Communist party, declared his intention to restore the Soviet Union if he won the presidential elections of 1996. Zhirinovskii declared that "Pan-Turkism threatens Russia, since it has a large Turkic-speaking Muslim population and also a Persian-speaking one; that is a good inducement for Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey to move north... And Russia loses everything - the 'great the talented' Turkish nation is worth of living right in the center of the world, in the scented region, on the shores of six seas, the weak and powerless Russia, however, must perish. Is that foreseen in the history of humanity? No, that is not possible".¹²⁶ This expansionist, militant spirit secured to Zhirinovskii a considerable representation in the Russian *duma*. His rhetoric did not work well during the presidential elections, nonetheless it still moves a noteworthy stratum of the Russian population.

Even the Russian democrats, reformers and public opinion leaders pose threat to Central Asian security and stability when they declare that Russia should preserve its privileged status in the Central Asian markets. People from the media did not dither to say that the former Soviet republics are integral part of the Russian sphere and Russia's interests. Russian political commentators advised that ex-Soviet republics are not free to form alliances "either with each other or with third countries that have an anti-Russian orientation".¹²⁷ The idiom "anti-Russian orientation" is a fluid one and can be interpreted to fit any given situation.

Central Asia as well as Russia's democracy jointly face perilous tactical danger drifts from promulgations by Russian extremists and reformers, who find themselves obliged to court radicals and compelled to adopt the slogans of their opponents, whether the extreme left or right, to lead the public opinion. Rhetoric not ration and pragmatism still have great influence. These liberals are strongly motivated by the inclination not to be outflanked by ultra-nationalists or communists who manipulated the public opinion by asserting Russia's unchallenged rights in the near abroad or "*blizhnee zarubezh'e*". Andrei Kozyrev, former Russian minister of foreign affairs, a conceived reformer warned that Russia has every right to safeguard its geopolitical positions that took here centuries to conquer.¹²⁸

As a geographic term the near abroad simply involves the member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The term is soft and flexible and later, at its convenience, Russia may explicate it as the whole of the Warsaw Pact countries. Yeltsin frequently resolved to the strategy of using the CIS forces, which are mainly Russian troops, to guard peace and tranquillity in Central Asia as the case is in Tajikstan. In the Caucasus where Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia exhibit this policy through tense relations among the three republics on the one hand and among minorities and the majority. Georgia is emmersed in a suppressed war with the Abkhazians in the west and with the Ossetians in the north. In a skillful attempt to solicit international mandate to his plans and to grant international camouflage to any future Russian military involvement in the "near abroad", Yeltsin said: "the time has come for the authoritative international organizations, including the United Nations, to grant Russia special powers as

guarantor of peace and stability in this region".¹²⁹ On September 28, 1993 at the UN General Assembly, Kozyrev advanced this proposal and excluded any country or organization from assuming peacekeeping responsibilities in the "near abroad" when he asserted that "no other international organization or group of states can replace our peace-making efforts in this specifically post-Soviet space".¹³⁰ Through this proposal Russia pursued the following purposes: a) international implicit consent, b) international financing and compliance with Russia's role.

Russia insists that its sphere of obligations, interests, and responsibilities overflow beyond its present borders. The Chairman of the Russian parliamentary Committee on international affairs, Evgenii Ambartsumov, said in May 1992: "Russia is something larger than the Russian Federation in its present borders. Therefore, one must see its geopolitical interests more broadly than what is currently defined by the maps. That is our starting point as we develop our conception of mutual relations with 'our own foreign countries'".¹³¹

The Central Asian republics to a far extent depend on the world community and the new international relations to check and restrain Russia's allegations. These countries before hand realized the futility of seeking military assistance from regional powers to encounter Russia.

Turkey's New Role in Central Asia

Central Asia and the Caucasus are traditional fields of political intricacy for both Turkey and Iran. Turkey at the beginning emphasized ethnic, cultural, and economic ties. In the meantime Iran depended on geo-strategic location and religious affinity despite the fact that Iran is a *Shi'a* country and shares the *Shi'a* belief only with the Azerbaijanis who ethnically descend from Turkic origins. The only country with which Iran has ethnic kinship is Tajikistan. However Iran cannot claim spiritual mastery as the Tajiks are adherents of the *sunni* Islam.

No one denies the fact that competition is on its height, and will remain so between the two countries, Iran and Turkey. Through its good relations with the west, Turkey pushed for a regional development bank, and assisted in linking the Central Asian republics with the international institutions. The West backed the Turkish efforts in Central Asia, even showed little or no reservation to Turkey's drive aimed at reviving a Turkic speaking world.¹³²

The disintegration of the USSR was unprecedented in the imperial history. The drastic collapse of the Soviet Union and the East European socialist system provided Turkey with the opportunity to rearrange its strategy and define its identity in relation with the new emerging independent states in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Turkey broke the ring of isolation and insecurity

by consolidating its relations with the republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, with which it shares ethnic origins and linguistic affinity. During the last five years the Turkish strategic priorities were modified to the extent that "full membership in the European Union is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for achieving rapid economic development...".¹³³ The new Eurasian situation compensated Turkey with ample alternatives.

Turkey's role in the Middle East and Central Asia has been drastically changed. The new Turkish relations with Central Asia and the Arab World may compensate Europe's disinclination to admit Turkey as a full member of the European Union. Turkey's role will be more operative and constructive in Central Asia and the Caucasus if relations with the Arab World were developed and coordinated to meet regional economic prospects, geostrategic interests, and security aspirations. This position will add to Turkey's geostrategic prominence as a NATO member after the Cold War.

Turkey expects renewal of ties with the Turkic nations of Central Asia after detachment that lasted for more than a century. This long detachment led to "deterioration in the communication ties not only between Turkey and the Turkish communities and republics, but also between the later".¹³⁴ Renewal of ties between Central Asia and Turkey led some analysts to speak of the revival of Pan-Turkism and point out that Turkey aspires for expansion from the Adriatic sea to the borders of China through the Caucasus and Central Asia.¹³⁵ In this regard it is true to say that the end of the Cold War did not bring an end to escalation caused by ambitions.

The new accumulating situation in Central Asia and the Caucasus may instigate historical aspirations and the revival of dormant ambitions. Iran represents a geographic obstacle as well as ethnic and economic barrier hindering land communications between Turkey and Turania!³⁶ Historically the Turks of Anatolia and the Turkic states of Central Asia were disconnected by the Persian empire. The Ottoman Sultans were unable to assist the Emirs of Bukhara and Khovarizm (Khiva) against the Russian avalanche in the second half of the 19th century.

Today's Pan-Turkic ideas are a mixture of historical sentimentalism and modern realism. A true example of this propensity can be easily detected in the writings of contemporary Pan-Turkists who pointed out that "Turkey is facing an historic mission" and suggested that the Turkic peoples have to "develop an imperial vision... This has nothing to do with expansionism or adventurism. It means free movement of people, ideas and goods in the lands of the old Ottoman Empire".¹³⁷ Referring to the Ottoman ties the writer excluded the Central Asians who were not subjects of the Sultan.

Apparently the writer was unaware of the fact that the Ottoman empire did not include Central Asia within its possessions even during its zenith. Although the Sultan enjoyed spiritual and advisory authority rather than political dominance or military command. Nevertheless, economically, ethnically, and to a certain extent politically the ideas of Pan-Turkism are accepted and shared by growing number of Turkish and Central Asian intellectuals. The Turkish politicians dismiss calls for "neo-Ottomanism", avoid arrogant language and set rational goals in front of real regional and international competition. They are aware of the dimension of

super-power rivalry and largely aware of the rules and regulations in a modern and highly complexed world order. Experience in the new international relations taught that interests can bind nations together more efficient than brotherhood. West Europe is a luminous example.¹³⁸

For most of the Central Asian republics Turkey is "the star that shows the Turkic countries the way" as the Kirgiz president Askar Akaiev said.¹³⁹ This phrase signals complete deviation from the Tsarist and Soviet heritage that shaped present Turkestan.¹⁴⁰ Great Britain and Russia, precisely here had met for the first time in Asia to influence each other's position in Asia and Europe as well. Rivalry in Central Asia ironically was called "the Great Game" by British politicians. Playing this game Britain sought to protect India, its most precious colony. The case for Russia was wider and more sophisticated: first; the Tsars wanted to take possession of Central Asia to redirect the Indian trade northward through Russia to Europe.² Second; combating Great Britain in Asia would weaken her position in Europe. Third; Central Asia would be used as an advanced bastion for reaching the warm waters and block the sea communications between Europe and India. At present these consideration are mostly behind the thinking of many Russian political activists despite drastic alteration of strategies.¹⁴¹ Turkey was excluded and was barred

². India's traditional interests in Central Asia grew ceaselessly in post-Soviet period. India coordinated efforts with Iran to secure access to Central Asia. For this purpose a trilateral agreement between Iran, India, and Turkmenistan was concluded during a visit by Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, the Iranian President to India during the period April 17-19, 1995. India relentlessly endeavored to out maneuver Pakistan, its hostile neighbor, which hampered its political, economic and commercial direct contacts with Central Asia.

from playing any direct role in Central Asia's Great Game as a result of adversarial and tense relations that characterized the relations between Istanbul and Tehran. Nevertheless, the Sultan, as the supreme 'sunny' authority, enjoyed spiritual influence among the Bukharans and the Khivans. The Great Game abstracted activities on the Silk Road and the New Great Game may revive it. Pulse of life returned to the Silk Road only after the departure of Russia in 1990.

The role of Turkey at present is different. Turkey vigorously employed all means to be the leader that shows the Turkic countries the road. Suleiman Demirel, the Turkish president commented on the new Turkish-Central Asian relations saying "We are not in competition. No one can blame us if we embrace the cousins from whom we have been separated for the last 70 years".¹⁴²

The withdrawal of Russia from Central Asia revived geo-strategic, political, and economic ambitions in the region. The first players who started the "new great game" are regional powers, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. Uncharacteristically Russia inactive at this stage, and the rules are dictated by other regional players. Would it remain so? Surely not. Giant players: China, Russia, the United States, and the European Union¹⁴³ are closely watching each other and waiting for a suitable regional and international situation to interfere. Central Asia is not only a commercial cross roads but a dangerous political intersect. The Great Game was never a local one and it is going back vigorously to its nature as a "global game". The Cold War exemplified that global game exempted no country, small or large, adjacent or distant.

Despite linguistic problems, Turkey shouldered the burden of ethnicity and linguistic ties with the five Central Asian republics. Turkey disregarded linguistic differences resulting from seventy years of Soviet rule. All Central Asian republics use Cyrillic alphabet after the traditional Arabic which was banned in the Stalinist era. Yet there is another obstacle embodied in a "profound difference in dialect between the Turkish communities... within the former Soviet Union after 70 years, it was seen that there was a deterioration in the communication ties not only between Turkey and the Turkish communities and republics, but also between the latter".¹⁴⁴

Suleiman Demirel's visit to Central Asia in May 1992 was aimed at impressing the newly independent republics of a secular, democratic, and market-oriented model of state. He visited Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan in Central Asia and Azerbaijan in Trans-Caucasia.

Demirel successfully emphasized ethnic relationship to promote economic ties when he declared that Turkey is not in competition and should not be blamed for building intimate relations with the Central Asian states.¹⁴⁵

Earlier, in February 1992, James Baker, the US Secretary of State, visited Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Leading magazines reported that fear of fundamentalism spreading to Central Asia has encouraged Turkey in its bid for leading role in the region's politics.¹⁴⁶ The *Daily Telegraph* referred to Baker as urging the Turkomans to follow Turkey rather than Iran.¹⁴⁷

Turkey and the new Independent Republics Fields of Cooperation

Turkey exhibited unparalleled interest in every sphere of life in the republics of Central Asia and Azerbaijan. In this direction Ankara convened on March 24-26, 1996 the fourth Congress of the Turkish States and Communities for Friendship, Brotherhood and Co-operation. The Congress was organized by the Turkish States and Communities Foundation for Friendship, Brotherhood and Co-operation (TFFC). The Conference was attended by 700 participants that included 290 delegates from the newly independent states of Central Asia, Azerbaijan, the Russian Federation, and the Caucasus. A large number of Turkish officials headed by Suleiman Demirel, the President of the Turkish Republic, attended the Congress.¹⁴⁸ The Congress is not going to be an occasional activity rather it will be an institutional and regular mechanism. It exhibits Turkey's determination to revive contacts, clear obstacles and build solid and lasting connections among the Turkic states and communities. At the concluding session the Congress formed the following permanent committees: International Relations and Communications, Education-Culture-Science and Technology, Public Administration and Legal, Economic, Commercial and Financial Relations. The Congress called as well for the realization of the following effects:

1. The necessity of the establishment of a Eurasian Turkish Academy of Sciences,
2. Fund raising for Cultural Studies with the participation of all Turkish states and Communities to promote cultural activities and to open branch offices in all countries to develop projects.
3. Co-operation to celebrate the anniversaries of Turkish celebrities and significant events in Turkish history by all Turkish states and communities and to introduce them to the world public,
4. Establishment of a new organization called Eurasian States and Communities Organization for Economic and Technological Co-operation to give a direction and dynamism to economic and commercial relations between Turkey and Turkish states and communities,
5. To make good use of the experience of the Turkish Development Bank for an efficient distribution of resources between Turkish states and communities, and
6. Convening of the congress each year on 21st of March, with previously formed commissions and a pre-determined agenda.¹⁴⁹

To revive social ties, which surely will have a direct and positive significance on economy, language, and culture, Turkey encouraged tourism and facilitated communications with the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan. Turkey is the largest partner in the field of tourism with Turkmenistan. The Turkish Ministry of Tourism has signed a cooperation protocol with the

state tourism organization of Turkmenistan "Turkmen Siyahat" on March 16, 1996. The protocol is not designed to attract tourism only but included training projects for employees working in the sector of tourism and promoting relations and joint ventures in this sector. Special attention was paid for improving relations with foreign tourist organizations. Turkey and Turkmenistan's investments in the tourist sector totaled \$30 million in 1995. The Turkish "Emperyal" tourist company expressed enthusiasm to undertake the construction of a project that includes two hotels on the Turkmenistan part of the Silk Road with the cost of \$29.5 million.¹⁵⁰

Table 2: Turkish investment in Member Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States

(million US\$)

Russian Fed.	5,157,045,939	Kazakhstan	593,700,059
Azerbaijan	254,232,797	Ukraine	212,715,000
Turkmenistan	378,575,919	Belarus	316,635,000
Georgia	52,440,059	Kirgizstan	52,000,000
Latvia	46,476,236	Uzbekstan	39,366,821
Armenia	6,530,759		

Source: *TICA, Eurasian File*, November 1995, No. 44.

The Turkish Ministry of Education established a chain of centers for professional training in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan, and Kazakhstan. Management, teaching staff, and equipments will be provided by Turkey. The establishment of these centers came in accordance with the cooperation protocol signed between the Turkish Ministry of Education, the Foundation for the Promotion of Professional Training and Small Industry (FPPTSI), and the Turkish Confederation of Tradesmen and Craftsmen (TCTC). The main purpose was to improve qualification and performance of employees in different sectors of industry and services in these republics. Activities covered wide range of crafts ranging from hair-dressing and knitting to computing, oil and gas installations, electricity, and auto-motive works.¹⁵¹

Turkmenistan's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations released data informing that 54 Turkish companies are operating in the republic. The total number of foreign companies operating in the country as of June 1995 reached 221.³

³. The following table shows the countries and the number of companies involved in works in Turkmenistan:

Turkey	54	Suisse	9	Italy	3
Iran	27	Luxembourg	2	Austria	5
Afghanistan	20	Russia	20	USA	12
Germany	10	Argentina	3	Netherlands	2
England	5	Romania	2	Ukraine	2
Cyprus	4	Lebanon	2	Pakistan	2
China	4	Saudi Arabia	2	Syria	2
India	2				

Turkey's secular ideals and the ideology of *Kemalism*⁴ were promoted along side with economic, cultural, and other activities in all the Turkic republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Delegations from the Turkish republics were invited to the "Third International Symposium on Ataturk". This symposium is being organized every four years by the Ataturk Research Center at the Ataturk High Institute of Culture, Language and History.

Politically speaking the six Turkic republics, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Turkey, are paying efforts to build a system that guarantee special treatment and boast cooperation politically, economically and culturally. The Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan are bound to Russia through their membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Thus these countries endeavor watchfully to widen its relations without irritating other members of the CIS. The Third Turkish Republics Summit which had been convened in Pishkek, the capital of Kirgizstan, with the participation of the six presidents of these republics fell short of declaring political union. In stead the participants concentrated on promoting economic stabilization and cultural identity.

These republics are still attached in various degrees to several ideologies the most important of which are: secularism, ethno-nationalism (which coincide with Pan-Turkism), Islam and socialism. The last ideology is the least influencing at this stage. Ethno-nationalism stands as the moving power through out the six republics. Islam and secularism are not on antagonistic course in

⁴. Kemal Ataturk's principles are referred to in Turkey as *Kemalism*. The word "Ataturk" means the father of the Turks.

the newly independent republics. Harmony between Islamic revivalism and moderate secularism can draw the denominator for peaceful development and evasion of radicalism and extremism.

Nevertheless the five Central Asian republics are fully aware of the simmering boundary issues. Present borders are drawn by the Soviet authorities for strategic purposes. Dealing with the problem at this stage will jeopardize independence and destabilize the region. Azerbaijan and Armenia fought a bitter war around Nagorno-Karabakh. Yet Azerbaijan and Iran cannot ignore historical facts and possible contention around "Iranian Azerbaijan". This issue stranded relations between both *shi'a* republics, Iran and Azerbaijan.

The Iranian Role in Central Asia

The Republic of Iran has scored a number of achievements and took advantage of its geographical location and secured a strategic role for itself in Central Asia. To the land-locked new independent states (NIS) of Central Asia, Iran can substitute Russia geo-strategically and furnish them with an outlet to trade with the Middle East, Europe, the Far East, and other world markets by sea or railway. Iran's geostrategic position clearly exhibits that it can offer these republics a cheap and direct route for their oil and gas on to the European market.¹⁵² However it should be noted here that Iran directly borders Turkmenistan only in Central Asia, while the other republics can be contacted through this republic. Geo-strategically only Afghanistan's location surpasses that of Iran. Afghanistan borders three of the Central Asian republics: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, nevertheless limitations come from the fact that Afghanistan is a land locked country and to reach the warm waters good relations should be established with either Iran or Pakistan or both.

Iran, Pakistan and Turkey are embroiled in tough competition over the re-opening of historic trade routes with the Central Asian states. This competition led to the failure of a summit, held at Tehran in May 1992 among the leaders of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, aimed at reaching economic cooperation with

the republics of Central Asia.¹⁵³ Thus severe Iranian-Pakistani rivalry over supremacy in Kabul blocked settlement and prolonged the Afghani civil war. The upper hand in Central Asia will be to that country with more influence in Afghanistan. Control over Afghanistan will decide the route of the Central Asian trade, either through Iran to the Persian Gulf or through Pakistan to the Arabian sea and the Indian ocean. Turkey can reach Azerbaijan through Georgia or Armenia where Russia enjoys strong influence. Regarding Central Asia connections should be via Iran. The Turkish policy in this regard has succeeded to secure mutual understanding with both countries: Iran and Russia

Iran carefully connected the NIS in Central Asia as well as in the Caucasus to its railway network and signed with most of them trade agreements. Yet Iran has the advantage in two crucial fields over her competitors: financial surplus and technologic expertise in oil production and oil refining. In 1996 Tehran has signed with Kazakhstan an oil deal that permits Kazakhstan to deliver by ship, through the Caspian sea, crude oil which will be entered to Iran's domestic-delivery network in the north of the country. At the same time Iran will release Iranian oil, in the same quantity and quality, for Kazakhstan's customers from Iran's southern export terminals in the Gulf.¹⁵⁴ Iran also provided Kazakhstan with technical assistance to upgrade its Caspian port of Octi (Okhti). Kazakhstan's mild relations with Iran to a far extent broke its dependency on Russia for outlet to the world for its oil.

As early as 1992 Iran manifested willingness to cooperate with ex-Soviet republics. Gholam-Reza Aghazadeh, the Iranian oil minister, discussed energy cooperation with Central Asian and

Caucasian republics and offered these states Iranian experience in the field of transporting and marketing oil and natural gas. The minister said in a conference held at Tehran that "the republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, despite having vast energy resources, suffer from a lack of energy. They cannot even meet their own needs, because they do not have the technology to exploit the large oil, gas and coal reserves".¹⁵⁵ With Turkmenistan, its direct neighbor in Central Asia, Iran signed an ambitious agreement according to which Turkmenistan's oil and natural gas will reach the Gulf by pipeline (see tables 3 and 4). Turkmenistan discerned the geostrategic location of Iran for reaching the world markets. Hence the republic has concluded several agreements with its southern strong neighbor in different fields including transport, banking, trade and customs.¹⁵⁶

Table 3: Natural gas production in Turkmenistan

Year	Production (billion m3)	Annual change (%)
1990	81.90	-2.34
1991	78.64	-3.98
1992	56.06	-28.71
1993	60.91	8.65
1994	32.21	-5.48

Table 4: Distribution of gas reserves within the CIS


Country	Reserve (billion m3)	World share (%)
Russian Federation ¹⁵⁷	48138.18	34.14
Turkmenstan	2859.97	2.03
Uzbekstan	1868.89	1.33
Kazakhstan	1840.58	1.31
Ukraine	1132.66	0.80
Azerbaijan	118.65	0.08
Kirgizstan	5.00	0.00
Total	55963.93	39.69

Most observers predicted that Iran's efforts will be hampered by the lack of necessary infrastructure to serve and meet the demand of export. Some reported that "it would be at least ten years before the necessary infrastructure was in place" to serve the new plans.¹⁵⁸ Nevertheless on May 13, 1996 in relentless efforts to narrow the gap between capabilities and possibilities, Iran accommodated more than 1,500 officials from 45 countries to celebrate the inauguration of the well known but for centuries deserted "Silk Road".¹⁵⁹ The new Silk Road, or more precisely nowadays judging by the type of commodities transported one can say "the oil road", is a stretch of rail road (290 kms) expands from the Iranian city of Mashhad to Serakhs (Sarakhs) in Turkmenstan

(160 kms), from where it proceeds to Tedzhen in Turkmenstan. During the Cold War the significance of the project was obvious but abandoned for military-strategic considerations. The ceremony was attended by the presidents of Turkmenstan, Tajikstan, Uzbekstan, Kirghizstan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, Armenia, and Georgia.¹⁶⁰ The occasion despite its historical blend and historical glory, derives its significance at present from the fact that it connects the republics of Central Asia with Iran, the Trans-Caucasian republics, and Turkey. The merchandise is not Chinese silk any more but mostly oil and gas from Central Asia and Baku to the shores of the Persian Gulf at the Strait of Hormuz, from where it could be shipped to the West or to the East.

Evidently the losers are the other two regional rivals of Iran: Turkey and Russia. But beneficiaries, i.e. the Central Asian republics, responded by obvious inclination to take advantage of commercial and trade benefits. Iran obviously is very important partner for these republics, however Russia remains highly important mainly as a source of defense necessities, security and for other strategic concerns. Kazakhstan declared that it is ready to cooperate trilaterally with Iran and Turkmenstan on building an oil pipeline in Iran. Uzbekstan, the cultural cradle and most populous republic in Central Asia, which lies between Kazakhstan and Turkmenstan was over looked.

Uzbekstan is an oil producer but its economy depends on other minerals and agriculture. The country is the seventh largest gold producer and one of the largest cotton producers in the world. Cotton production in Uzbekstan reached 3,978,000 tons and



expected to surpass the four million tons in 1996. Moreover this country inherited the legacy of Bukhara and Khwarizm (Khiva), the glorious home of luminous sunni theological schools on the one hand and the only country with the potential to counter balancing Iran's influence on the other. Uzbekistan has the advantage of geographic location as the only country with land borders with the other four Central Asian republics. Uzbekistan has a large homogeneous population with relatively small Russian minority.

The Russo-Turkish Discord

Russo-Turkish relations historically are multi-layered and disputes are abundant not only in Europe but in Asia as well, where these controversies took indirect although in many instances violent exposure. Russia conveniently deployed the Kurdish leverage during the Cold War against Turkey. After the disintegration of the USSR, Russia inherited from the USSR deeply established relations with the Kurdish minority in Turkey. Kurdish powerful leftist circles in their plight for independent homeland shifted loyalty from the Soviet Union to Russia.

The end of the Cold War furnished Turkey with unprecedented opportunity in Central Asia and the Caucasus where Russia is highly respondent to any Turkish move. Turkey established balanced relations with the three Trans-Caucasian republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. Northward the Turkish influence exceeded the peaks of Kazbek and Elbruz¹⁶¹ to reach the Daghestanis, the Chechens, the Circassians, and the Kalmyks and other nations with which Turkey shares historical roots.

The Chechen revolt against Russia represented the most active anti-Russian domination in North Caucasia, was met with apparent sympathy among the largest Turkish political parties and population. In this respect distinction among secular and religious parties fades away. The Chechen revolt against Russia, despite

Turkey's disengagement was counter-balanced with fierce activity by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK, *Partia Kakaren Kurdistan*) against the Turkish government. In June 14, 1995 a group of armed Chechen rebels entered the Town of Budennovsk and attacked several buildings including a police station and the local headquarters of Federal Intelligence Service (FSB, *Federativnaia Sluzhba Besopasnosty*, successor of the KGB). Nearly fifty were killed including six police officers. The rebels seized hundreds of people including patients and the staff of a hospital as hostages. This incident was part of a campaign against Russia called for by Shamil Basaiev, a prominent aid for Dudaiev. Dudaiev rejected the campaign saying that none of the forces loyal to him have received orders to launch acts of terror on Russian territory.

Two days later, precisely on June 16, 1995, in apparent tit for tat action the PKK raided a Turkish security post in the province of Hakkari where fifteen soldiers and fourteen rebels were killed. Furthermore on June 21, 1995 heavy fighting had erupted between the Turkish army and rebels of the Kurdistan Workers' Party in south-eastern Turkey. Some forty six people were killed in the fighting. A second raid on Hakkari security post by the PKK had cost thirty four lives (13 Turkish troops and 21 rebels).

These incidents stand as indisputable instances that illustrate the parallel intensity in the fighting on either side. The Kurdish nationalists movement in Iraq, Syria, and Iran, are to various extent supportive of the Kurdish division in Turkey and "has greatly weakened Turkey's foreign-policy leverage with Russia, especially regarding its war against Chechenia. Russia in turn has used the 'Kurdish' card to influence its policy toward Chechenia. This

became especially clear in 1995".¹⁶² This suppressed rivalry did not interrupt growing econo-commercial relations between Turkey and Russia. The Turkish private sector investment in Russia exceeded five billion US\$ by the end of 1995,¹⁶³ yet the two countries plan to multiply trade volume to reach US\$ 10 billion by the year 2000.¹⁶⁴

Despite the fact that Turkey is unpleasant with the US-Russian accord, Turkey hopes to secure US pledge to impede Russia's recognition of the Kurdish Parliament in Exile (KPE). Russia frequently expressed leaning toward the Kurdish issue to influence and promote regional strategies. At the end of January 1995 the PKK held a conference at Moscow, which was the main reason behind a visit by Nahit Mentese, the Turkish Interior Minister, to Russia a week later. The visit was culminated by signing a protocol to prevent and fight terrorism and exchange intelligence data. In a precautionary statement the Russian interior minister announced that the PKK would remain a legal organization in Russia.¹⁶⁵

Turkey's stand against the Kurds and Russia's action against the Chechens were met with divergent policies and reaction on the international arena. Russia's policy in Chechenia was regarded as an internal matter, and the world consented to the use of sheer military force by Russia and regarded it as justifiable. Incompatible stand was adopted toward Turkey's policy toward the Kurds.¹⁶⁶ Turkey was accused of disregard to human rights despite constitutional changes and tendency toward a moderate policy regarding the Kurds. The Kurdish issue turned to be a chronic concern to consequent Turkish governments and stood as live determinant in formulating alliances and coalitions within the

Turkish state politics and parliament. The customs union agreement with the European Union was delayed in connection with the human rights issue. Russia's treatment of the Chechens, who have neither religious, cultural, linguistic nor ethnic affiliation to the Slavs, was not met with a corresponding opposition in the West.¹⁶⁷

Russia and Iran: Rapprochement or Readjustment?

Iran was one of the few non-communist countries that shared land boundaries with the Soviet Union. The others were Afghanistan, Turkey, Finland and Norway. But geostrategically Iran was the most important considering the fact that it bordered the Soviet Union in two non-Russian (non-Slavic) regions: Central Asia and the Caucasus. Under the Shah during the zenith of the cold war, Iran was tectonic part in the strategy of limiting the spread of communism in the Middle East. Europe and the US were extremely aware of that country's importance, hence Iran was treated in accordance. The Iranian prominence grew, militarily and economically in the Middle East as well.

Central Asia was one of the unstable regions in the USSR and most security breaks happened here during the rigid Stalin and Brezhnev eras. The population, mostly Muslims, differs in every respect from the Slavs. The region went through a severe experience to change its cultural heritage and uproot its religion. "Muslims in these countries [in Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan] had been deprived of religion and religious education for more than three generations".¹⁶⁸ During every political cross-roads and on every occasion the Central Asians expressed their

national aspirations. That happened during the Russian civil war (1917-1922), during the W.W.II, and finally at the early 1990s.

Russia also was highly observant of Iran's importance in the Middle East as well as on its southern flanks. The borders of the two countries meet where Russia's most important but most vulnerable possessions lie. Thus Moscow did not suppress its willingness to maintain good relations with Iran. This tendency in Russia's policy was demonstrated during the Shah's reign as well as after the Islamic revolution.

Following the second Gulf war (Iraq-Kuwaiti conflict), Iran and Russia charmed each other openly. For Russia the amicable political course with Iran was necessary to achieve several regional goals. First, Russia sought coordination with Iran to control and limit the Afghanistan's influence on Tajikistan, its unstable but strategically important neighbor for Russia's regional plans. Second, Iran and Russia found that reconciliation will support their efforts against the third regional competing power: Turkey. Third, Russo-Iranian rapprochement will secure to Russia the sharp edge in Azerbaijan, while minimizing Baku's national radiation from reaching the Iranian-Azeri population. Russia may seek Iran's (*shi'a*) assistance and influence to block support to the Chechens (*Sunni*) from the Middle East or the other Muslim countries.⁵

⁵. Turkey and Iran are vigilant of each other move in a very sensitive neighbor - Azerbaijan. When Turkey increased its stake in the Caspian Sea oil deal to become 6.75 per cent in the Western-led consortium, on April 12, 1995 after an accord was signed by officials from both countries. The announcement had angered Iranian officials, who had been negotiating an Iranian stake in the undertaking. The Iranian State news agency IRNA described the arrangement as "hostile". The US played an active role in blocking a similar deal (5%) with Iran. Iran responded by declaring that

Iran on its part feared Azeri ambition to revive the ethnically based greater Azerbaijan, that would include Azeri province in northern of Iran. Abulfaz Elchibey, former President of Azerbaijan, the first popularly elected president, and at present leader of the opposition Azerbaijani Popular Front, took the initiative and called for the formation of Greater Azerbaijan. Russia and Iran were alarmed. The Iranian response was immediate. Iran cut supplies of electricity to the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakhchivan on the ground of non-payment of debts.¹⁶⁹

Elchibey miscalculated and Iran's response was severe. The volume of the Azeri trade with Iran reached \$500 millions during the period between July 1992 and January 1993. Iran was the largest trade partner with Azerbaijan at this early period, even larger than Turkey. Negotiations were going on to reach an agreement according to which Azerbaijan was to deliver 100,000 barrels of oil per day to Iranian refineries.¹⁷⁰ Azerbaijan's new political leadership strove to restore and maintain decent relations with Iran. The Azeri Oil Company firmly demanded Western Consortium in January 1993 that the country's oil delivery route should go through Iran.¹⁷¹ Precarious relations with Russia and bad relations with Armenia, its regional adversary, were influencing factors on daily life and on Azerbaijan's international relations. Azerbaijan candidly adhered to realism not nationalism in its relations with Iran, and carefully abandoned claims for greater Azerbaijan which would include considerable portion from

"the Caspian coastal states cannot unilaterally exploit its resources because the oil fields are interconnected". *Keesing's Record of World Events*, vol. 41, No. 4, (April 1995), p. 40514, 40527.

the Iranian population and land. Nevertheless the bells rang in Iran's back yard as a result of uncalculated policies of Elchibey.

By complaisance with Russia, Iran strove to break Washington's policy of containment, while Russia is eager to have its share from the Iranian resourceful projects at a time when the West distances it self from Iran and criminate it as terrorist-supporting country. Moscow and Tehran pledged to join efforts and direct their efforts toward stability in the Balkans, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Caucasus. Both countries are grateful for the new accumulating joint policies. Iran's defense was hampered by the embargo imposed by the West as the country accused of terrorism, found the Russian arms market very essential. While Iran is considered by Russia as a necessary market for the sale of strategic goods on the one hand, and as a leverage against the West on the other.

During his visit to Moscow in the spring of 1996 the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Akbar Velayati, and his Russian counterpart Yevgeni Primakov, announced that their countries are interested in maintaining stability on their joint borders. Primakov openly declared that Iran's weight and influence in Tajikstan would be helpful in extending cease fire there, while her predominance in Afghanistan would obstruct penetration to that country from Afghanistan.

The Russo-Iranian rapprochement is evident in the republic of Tajikstan. Tajikstan, as mentioned earlier, ethnically belongs to Persia. However Russia is patrolling the boundaries of this country, yet Iran commenced broadcasting television programs to Tajikstan.

Iran's broadcasting activities can be regarded in agreement with the protocol signed between Tajikstan and Iran during a visit to Tehran by Rahman Nabiyeu, the president of Tajikstan. During this visit a treaty covering cultural, commercial, banking, and scientific affairs was signed.¹⁷²

Russo-Iranian diplomatic and economic initiatives improved on the expense of the West's sliding relations with Iran. The outcome of favorable relations between the two countries were culminated by Moscow's agreement to develop Iran's Caspian Sea oil reserves. Moreover the two countries reached an agreement according to which joint venture authorizing Iran to manufacture civilian aircrafts to the Russian aviation industry, and contracts involving the supply of Russian tanks, submarines, and missiles to Iran. Russia also declared commitment to its agreement to build a nuclear reactor at Bushehr in the south of Iran.

The United States and the West in general manifested tolerance toward the improvement in Sino-Russian cooperation and agreement on trade, space technology, and energy. Nevertheless the Russo-Iranian agreement regarding the construction of a nuclear power station brought negative reaction. The West opposed the deal out of safety concerns, yet it is clear that the West regarded the agreement as a serious proliferation of nuclear technology, and called on Russia to share the West's "interest in keeping Iran's civil programme clearly separated from any nuclear weapons plans".¹⁷³

Communications: From a Silk Road to a Pipeline

Oil and gas will be in the core of world interest in the 21st century as the case was in the 20th. Science did not yet discover alternative fuel. Renewable energy resources remain inconvenient for commercial use. This understanding is behind Russia's political and military drive to establish strong and lasting bonds with the CIS members. The main difference between liberals and hard-liners in Russia is that if the latter were in power they would redouble the effort to control the CIS. Liberals and hard-liners agree on the necessity to maintain proximity to the Middle East. Russia would not hesitate to cooperate with oil producers in the Middle East, or with members of the OPEC, to fix higher prices for the oil. In this regard the United States and Europe struggle to keep the oil as a merchandise and an economic issue but not a strategic leverage.

Central Asia and Azerbaijan have a huge reserve of oil and gas. The main source of security behind the foreign investment in the region is derived from Russia's adherence to democratic principles and rapprochement with the West. The nature of the political system in these republics is ignored by investing companies to the extent that some experts judged that "Turkish and Western expectations appear to have been born of ignorance".¹⁷⁴ Regardless, Turkey is one of the largest and most important trade partners with Russia, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia. Russia is the fourth large importer to Turkey. With Uzbekistan, the most populated republic, Turkey is one of the biggest investors especially in the textile industry. Yet Turkey successfully established bilateral joint ventures with autonomous republics in

the Russian Federation such as Tatarstan and Bashkiria (Bashkiristan or Bashkirston).¹⁷⁵

Many observers are pessimistic about current Russo-Western rapprochement and see evidence that Russia has plans to restore its traditional power. There are a number of factors that increase Russia's wary and encourage tendencies for restoration of previous status in world politics. Russia is very sensitive to local wars near its borders. Despite common understanding and apparent need for western investment, Russian officials frequently promulgated open opposition to US policies especially toward Iraq.

Moreover there is a list of issues irritant to Russia. The most obvious is the expansion of NATO eastward. Other issues causing great political discomfort in Russia include allegations of discrimination against Russian citizens living in the "near abroad", whose number exceeded 25 millions. The former Soviet satellites are still of great concern to Russia according to Russian military doctrine known as "The Basic Principles in the Field of Security".¹⁷⁶ Within the CIS relations this doctrine seems to be in consistency with the CIS agreement of 1991. The document emphasized activity in three fields; first, establishment of mobile forces to conduct operations in any region where a threat may rise; second, provide security for the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), possibly by deploying Russian troops on their territories; and third, station troops outside of Russia, either together with units of another state or as exclusively Russian formations at their own separate bases.¹⁷⁷

The war in Chechenia has been prolonged for the benefit of Russia. Nagorno-Karabakh and Chechenia are merely alternative

instruments to achieve certain goals and produce certain pressure.¹⁷⁸ Instability in the Caucasus can furnish a pretext for the implementation of the "Basic principles in the Field of Security" mentioned above. Chronic adversarial relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan blocked the development of a pipeline from Baku to the Black sea across Armenia and Georgia. Russia strives to be the gate for exporting the Azeri and Central Asian oil, thus endeavors to direct pipeline building and oil exporting routs through its main lands to the West.

Russia is the power to be reckoned with within the CIS. Even when conflict erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan, both members of the CIS, efforts were paid to avoid antagonizing Russia. Economically speaking, Russia at present is the most active player in defining the direction of the new pipeline web. Russia directed a considerable portion of its diplomacy to determine the route by which gas and oil will be exported from Central Asia and the Caucasus. Thus "the Russians are pursuing a policy of military basing in the Caucasus aimed at placing Moscow in a position of exclusive control over all future pipelines in the region".¹⁷⁹

Russia's present security is a delicate mixture of military and economic considerations. Congenial political course with the West in the Caucasus and Central Asia would secure to Russia the realization of its plans: presence and influence with less rivalry and antagonism. If interests diverge in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia may not hesitate to resort to classic politics of instigating boundary or ethnic conflicts, or it may resort to pressing the West in the Middle East or else where.

Russia's New Policy in Central Asia

At present Russia successfully suppressed its ambitions towards Central Asia and Trans-Caucasia. Nevertheless official promulgations reveal the true state of affairs. Boris Yeltsin in June 28, 1994 candidly said that no one and no thing can relieve Russia of its political and moral responsibility for the fate of the countries and peoples which for centuries went hand in hand with Russia. Russia carefully weighs the accumulating international relations after the disintegration of the USSR and conducts its policy in light of insisting priorities not strategies.

The change was inevitable and the choice was extraordinary arduous. During the process of the collapse of the USSR, Russia was looking far ahead to design profitable and convenient relations with the United States and the European Union. Advisers in the Kremlin and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended that Russia unbuckle ties with the republics of Central Asia. As a result Russia would, first; rid itself from the burden of direct responsibility in an embroiled region in a swiftly shifting world, while her interests there won't be harmed on the short run. Second; Russia would rid itself from being a colonial power, modernize its political system and refresh its Western identity for the second time in its modern history.¹⁸⁰ Surely these advisors were aware of the

fact that Russia's interests and Russia's influence in Central Asia will not be jeopardized for many reasons:

Russia has a powerful minority in each of these republics, which can be used as a leverage at any time,

1. the ruling elite are more or less friendly toward Russia and in times of troubles with their neighbors they will turn to Russia for support,
2. lack of experience in the field of managing new international relations and emerging burdens and sudden ups and downs, yet implementing democracy and pluralism in Central Asian with its initial unusual nature would obstruct the region's countries and keep them lingering behind Russia, and adhere to its guidance and council,
3. technological, linguistic, security, administration, and cultural infrastructure of these republics to a far extension are similar to Russia's own and would not fit easily for new modification without Russian assistance,
4. deferred disputes among the states of the region will keep them vulnerable for Russian interference.¹⁸¹ Nagorno-Karabakh, the state of affairs in Tajikistan are just illustrations of this strategy. Marshal Yevgenii Shaposhnikov, Supreme commander of the military of the Commonwealth of Independent States, warned regional as well as world powers that foreign intervention in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could lead to the third world war.¹⁸²

5. education system, linguistic ties (the Russian language is the *lingua franca*), administration, ecological problems, customs, communication systems, security and military requirements will keep Russia involved and guarantee for her an advantageous position,
6. the Central Asian republics are already bound directly to Russia through a regional strategic agreement. The agreement of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was an embodiment of Russia's desire to be present in all the republics. The CIS agreement included, beside many other important military, cultural, security, social, economic clauses, a pronouncement condoning the establishment of a "Euro-Asian" market among the ex-Soviet members. Russia ought to be the leading military and economic power in the new regional organization.¹⁸³ The birth of the CIS was not given serious consideration in world politics, and was not weighed in light of its actual political, strategic and regional military bonds. It was born during the noisy period of the collapse of the USSR, and instead many observers regarded it innocently as a "shaky structure which replaced the Soviet Union".^{??} Nevertheless guided by analysis of Russia's historical ambitions and contemporary strategy, one may conclude that Russia is not departing, and the CIS agreement in this regard has a special importance.

At this stage of international *perestroika*, Russia wanted to evade any commitment to "backward" Central Asian republics, which could only make the course of her economic reforms more

difficult. Russia for all the above considerations succeeded in harmonizing a Euro-Asian accent in conducting its foreign policy.

Footnotes:

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- ¹. Walker, Martin, *The Cold War and the Making of the Modern World*, (London, Vintage 1994), pp. 291-4, 307-9, 316-8.
 - ². George Bush, the President of the US, speech on September 11, 1990, *US Department of State Dispatch*, vol. 1, No. 3, September, 17, 1991. At that day Bush had nearly one year in office but fascinated with the idea of New World Order, he missed American domestic affairs. As some observers noted he drove Saddam out but the later pulled him down. Vide a very illuminating article by Wieck, Paul R., in the *Christian Science Monitor*, December 9, 1991, p. 18, col. 2.
 - ³. *The Guardian*, February 29, 1992, p. 3.
 - ⁴. Atkinson, Rick, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War*, (Boston, New York 1993), p. 349.
 - ⁵. Freedman, Robert O. (ed.), *Israel Under Rabin*, (Boulder, Colorado 1995), p. 24.
 - ⁶. Cohen, Eliot A., "A Revolution in Warfare", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, No. 2, (March/April 1996), p.40.
 - ⁷. Krauthammet, Charles, "The Unipolar Moment", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 70, No. 1, (1990-1991), p. 23.
 - ⁸. *Al-Manar*, Arabic daily newspaper, June 20, 27, 1961.
 - ⁹. *Al-Manar*, June 28, 29, 1961.
 - ¹⁰. *Al-Manar*, July 2-17, 1961.
 - ¹¹. *Al-Manar*, July 24 - August 27, 1961. Despite Kuwait's denial, there were several indications in the media that Jordan already had sent troops to Kuwait. See *Al-Manar*, July 2, 1961.
 - ¹². *Al-Manar*, July 14-18, 1961.
 - ¹³. Irkutsk is the capital of Irkutsk Oblast (province), the territory of which is 768,000 sq. km and a population less than three millions by the end of 1995.
 - ¹⁴. TASS, August 2, 1990, as in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, (FBIS), *Daily Report* (SOV) 90, 150, August 3, 1990, p. 3.
 - ¹⁵. Speech of the Soviet Foreign Minister, E. Shevardnadze at the UN, TASS, Sept. 25, 1990, as in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, (FBIS), SOV 90, 187, Sept. 26, 1990, p. 4.

¹⁶. Later became Yeltsin's Minister of Foreign Affairs.

¹⁷. Primakov, Ye., "The war which might not have been", *Pravda*, February 27, 1991, pp. 1, 7.

¹⁸. Primakov's TV interview, October, 31, 1990, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, SOV 90, 212, November 1, 1990, p. 9.

¹⁹. *Keesing's Record of World Events*, vol. 36, No. 10, 1990, p. 37758.

²⁰. Atkinson, Rick, *Crusade, The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War*, (Boston, NY 1993), p. 347.

²¹. The heaviest machine can cross Kuwait in less than six hours from its southern most point to the Iraqi territory.

²². *Keesing's Record of World Events*, vol. 36, No. 10, 1990, p. 37759.

²³. Ibid.

²⁴. Vide Brown, L. C., "Patterns Forged in Time: Middle Eastern Mind-Sets and the Gulf War", pp. 3-21; and "The Defining Moment of Saddam's Life: A Political Psychology Perspective on the Leadership and Decision Making of Saddam Hussein During the Gulf Crisis", pp. 49-65, all in Renshon, Stanley (ed.), *The Political Psychology of the Gulf War, Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict*, (Pittsburgh and London 1993).

²⁵. Just after the invasion of Kuwait, the Minister of Information and Culture circulated a pamphlet according to which "the United States, Iran, and Israel were involved in a secret conspiracy to overthrow the Iraqi government and eliminate Saddam. The document cites the Irangate documents as proving that this conspiracy was orchestrated by Vice President George Bush. When, despite the best efforts of this group, Iraq prevailed in the Iran-Iraq War, the conspiracy shifted from military warfare to economic warfare. Saddam's other archenemy, Margaret Thatcher, joined George Bush in plotting Iraq's economic destruction. They planned for an economic embargo. Thus the invasion of Kuwait was seized upon by George Bush and Margaret Thatcher as a convenient excuse to implement an embargo they had already agreed upon. In pursuing the economic destruction of Iraq, they recruited the Gulf states as their agents. Kuwait's economic aggression against Iraq was, according to this theory, in the service of this conspiracy. Moreover, because Kuwait's economic aggression was an act of warfare, Saddam's invasion of Kuwait was defensive and a justifiable response to Kuwait's economic aggression, which he saw as in the service of the overall goals of the conspiracy". If there was a conspiracy, Saddam behaved in favor of the conspirators. Jerrold M. Post, "The Defining Moment of Saddam's Life: A Political Psychology Perspective on the Leadership and Decision Making of Saddam Hussein

During the Gulf Crisis", in Renshon, Stanley A. (ed.), *The political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, publics, and the Process of Conflict*, (Pittsburgh, PA, 1993), p. 64.

²⁶. Atkinson, Rick, *Crusade, The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War*, (Boston, NY 1993), p. 97-104; and *Keesing's Record of World Events*, vol. 36, No. 7-8, 1990, p. 37638.

²⁷. *Keesing's Record of World Events*, vol. 36, No. 7-8, 1990, p. 37638.

²⁸. *Keesing's Record of World Events*, vol. 36, No. 9, 1990, p. 37694.

²⁹. *Keesing's Record of World Events*, vol. 36, No. 7-8, 1990, p. 37637.

³⁰. *Keesing's Record of World Events*, vol. 36, No. 7-8, 1990, p. 37636.

³¹. The Jordanian Constitution guaranteed personal freedom (Chapter II, article 7), yet it stated that "the government guarantee freedom of expression, and every Jordanian has the right to express his/her opinion vocally, in writing, through photography or by any other means of expression" (Chapter II, article 15, No. 1).

³². Vide *The Guardian*, Thursday, January, 11, 1996, p. 8.

³³. See HRH Crown Prince Al-Hassan's speech to the meeting of the Council of European Ministers in Amman, August 16, 1990 in *Al-Kitabul-Abiadh: Al-Urdun wa-Azmatul-Khalij (1 b 1990 - 1 thar 1991)*, (The White Book: Jordan and the Gulf Crisis, August 1990 - March 1991), pp. 69-72; and HRH's speech to the Jordanian Society - University of Oxford, November 22, 1990, pp. 63-65; also address by Jordan's Minister of Foreign Affairs to the UN General Assembly, September 24, 1990, pp. 49-59.

³⁴. *Falastin* (Palestine), Arabic daily newspaper, January 11, 1963, p. 1.

³⁵. Vide HM's letter to the Iraqi president dated September 22, 1990, document #7, in *Al-Kitabul-Abiadh: Al-Urdun wa-Azmatul-Khalij (1 b 1990 - 1 thar 1991)*, (The White Book: Jordan and the Gulf Crisis, August 1990 - March 1991), (Amman 1991), pp. 73-82.

³⁶. HRH's speech in a meeting of the Ministers of the European Council in Amman, August 16, 1990.

³⁷. Speech delivered by Vice-Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in front of the Council of the Arab League, August 3, 1990.

³⁸. Talal, Hassan Bin, *The Future of the Middle East, Vision for the 21st Century*, (Adamantine Press, UK 1992), p. 50.

³⁹. *Al-Kitabul-Abiadh: Al-Urdun wa-Azmatul-Khalij (1 b 1990 - 1 thar 1991)*, (The White Book: Jordan and the Gulf Crisis, August 1990 - March 1991), p. 78.

⁴⁰. *Al-Kitabul-Abiadh: Al-Urdun wa-Azmatul-Khalij (Ab 1990 - Athar 1991)*, (The White Book: Jordan and the Gulf Crisis, August 1990 - March 1991), (The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Amman - 1991), p. 32

⁴¹. The missiles had insignificant military effect and brought limited damage to civilian property. For more details see Atkinson, Rick, *Crusade, The Untold Story of the Gulf War*, (Boston, NY 1993), pp. 80-93, 116-8, 130-4, 142-4, 172-4, 277-85; and Freedman, Robert O. (ed.), *Israel Under Rabin*, (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford 1995), pp. 23-4, 74-5, 111-3, 125-6.

⁴². Mayers, David, *The Ambassadors and America's Soviet Policy*, (New York, Oxford 1995), pp. 193-200; and Howe and Coser, *The American Communist Party*, (NY 1962), p. 433.

⁴³. The Russian term means Peoples Committee for Internal Affairs, which is the predecessor of the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Besopasnosti* (KGB) (Committee for the State Security). This comparison was initiated by *Fortune* magazine, which ran in 1943 an opinion poll showing that 81% of the respondents favored equal partnership with the Soviets. See Swenberg, W. A., *Luce and His Empire*, (NY 1972), pp. 211, 214.

⁴⁴. *Life*, March 29, 1943.

⁴⁵. Some observers interpreted the Soviet position as defensive in East Europe and accused the US of excessive hostility that led to the Cold War. See Alperowitz, Gar, *Atomic Diplomacy*, (New York 1965); and Kolko, Gabriel and Joyce, *The Limits of Power*, (New York 1972).

⁴⁶. Ray, James Lee, *Global Politics*, (Boston 1992), p. 49.

⁴⁷. The Arabs fought side by side with the allies during the WWI, but the Sykes-Picot agreement hindered the realization of their goals.

⁴⁸. Reich, Bernard; and Gotowicki, Stephen H., "The United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East", in Goldberg, David H.; and Marantz, Paul, *The Decline of the Soviet Union and the Transformation of the Middle East*, (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford 1994), p. 212.

⁴⁹. Walker, Martin, *The Cold War: A History*, (New York 1993), p. 39.

⁵⁰. The origins of the Cold War are well documented in Kuniholm, Bruce R., *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*, (Princeton, NJ, 1980); and Walker, Martin, *The Cold War and the Making of the Modern World*, (London, 1994).

⁵¹. Goldberg, David; Marantz, Paul, *The Decline of the Soviet Union and the Transformation of the Middle East*, (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford 1994), p. 212.

⁵². Carter, Jimmy, *The Blood of Abraham: Insights into the Middle East*, (Boston 1985), p. 15.

⁵³. Goldberg, David; Marantz, Paul, *The Decline of the Soviet Union and the Transformation of the Middle East*, (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford 1994), p. 212.

⁵⁴. Carter, Jimmy, *The Blood of Abraham: Insights into the Middle East*, (Boston 1985), p. 15.

⁵⁵. Carter, *The Blood of Abraham*, p. 15-16.

⁵⁶. Ben-Dor, Gabriel; Dewitt, David B., *Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East*, (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford, 1994), p. 7.

⁵⁷. HRH, Crown Prince Al-Hassan Bin Talal, address to the First Cultural Season of the League of Arab States, Tunisia, May 8, 1981.

⁵⁸. *Keessing's Record of World Events*, 1988, vol. XXXIV, No. 2, p. 35736.

⁵⁹. HRH Crown Prince Hassan at the opening plenary session of the Middle East and North Africa economic summit, (October 29, 1995).

⁶⁰. Paradoxically the communists now are playing the role of the conservatives so far as they resist the new arrangements and strive for the revival of the old order in one form or another.

⁶¹. A new network of illegal business is flourishing concentrating on smuggling human spare-parts.

⁶². Zhilin, Alexander, "Ia ne militarist i ne konservator", *Moskovskie Novosti*, February 4-11, 1996, p. 14, as quoted in Staar, Richard, "Moscow's Plans to Restore its Power", *Orbis*, vol. 40, No. 3, Summer 1996, p. 375.

⁶³. *Krasnaya Zvezda* (The Red Star), November 19, 1993. Quoted in Staar, "Moscow's Plans...", *Orbis*, vol. 40, No. 3, Summer 1996, p. 375.

⁶⁴. Vide Theo van den Doel, *Central Europe: The New Allies? The road from Visegrad to Brussels*, (Boulder, Colorado 1994).

⁶⁵. Goble, Paul A., "NATO Between Enlargement and Degeneration", in *Prism*, vol. 1, No. 22, October 20, 1995.

⁶⁶. *Aussen Politik*, vol. 44, No. 4, p. 326.

⁶⁷. From an article by Philip Boule Jircore, "Prague... Budapest... Warsaw: East Europe and the German Wave" in the *Novel Observatoire*, translated in *ar-Rai*, Feb. 13, 1996, p. 33.

⁶⁸. *Jordan Times*, April, 23, 1996, p. 4.

⁶⁹. Rodman, Peter W., *More Precious than Peace: the Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World*, (NY 1994), p. 65-67.

⁷⁰. Kaplan, Robert D., "For the 3rd World, Western democracy is a nightmare", *Jordan Times*, January 8, 1996, p. 6; and Chase, Robert S.; Hill, Emily B.; Kennedy, Paul, "Pivotal States and the U.S. Strategy", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, No. 1, January/February 1996, pp. 33ff.

⁷¹. *Foreign Policy*, vol. 89, Winter 1992-1993, p. 3.

⁷². Carter, Jimmy, *The Blood of Abraham: Insights into the Middle East*, (Boston 1985), p. 15-16.

⁷³. Feffer, John, *Beyond Détente: Soviet Foreign Policy and US Options*, (NY 1990), p. 67.

⁷⁴. Rodman, Peter W., *More Precious than Peace: the Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World*, (NY 1994), p.125. Also Mayers, David, *The Ambassadors and America's Soviet Policy*, (New York, Oxford 1995), pp. 225-237.

⁷⁵. Kaldor, Mary, "Who Killed the Cold War", *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July/August 1995, pp. 57ff.

⁷⁶. Feffer, John, *Beyond Détente: Soviet Foreign Policy and US Options*, (NY 1990), p. 67.

⁷⁷. Forward by Moynihan, Daniel Patrick in Korey, William, *The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki Process, and American Foreign Policy*, pp. xiii-xxxvi; and pp. 98-100, 268-272, 413-5.

⁷⁸. Goldberg, David H.; Marantz, Paul, *The Decline of the Soviet Union and the Transformation of the Middle East*, (Boulder, Colorado 1994), pp. 36-44; Holloway, David, "Gorbachev's New Thinking", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 68, No. 1, (1989); and the *Newsweek*, (September 9, 1991), pp. 6-24.

⁷⁹. Bradley, Bill, "Eurasia Letter: A Misguided Russian Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 101, Winter 1995/1996, p. 82.

⁸⁰. Ferdinand, Peter, "Russia and Russians after Communism: Western or Eurasian?", *The World Today*, December 1992, p. 225.

⁸¹. *Keesing's Record of World Events*, September 1991, p. 38416.

⁸². *Time*, January 13, 1992, p. 6, also *Newsweek*, September 13, 1993, pp. 16-17.

⁸³. *Keesing's Record of World Events*, September 1991, p. 38416.

⁸⁴. Ferdinand, Peter, "Russia and Russians after Communism: Western or Eurasian?", *The World Today*, December 1992, p. 225.

⁸⁵. "Opasnaia opasnost' v nomenklaturnom revanshe", *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, October 8, 1992, p. 5, quoted in Ferdinand, Peter, "Russia and Russians after Communism: Western or Eurasian?", *The World Today*, December 1992, p. 225. Kozyrev's words will be better understood on the background of the aims of the Soviet foreign policy as listed in the 1977 Soviet Constitution (Article 28): "ensuring international conditions favorable for building communism in the USSR, safeguarding the state interests of the Soviet Union, consolidating the positions of the world socialism, supporting the struggle of peoples for national liberation and social progress, preventing wars of aggression, achieving universal and complete disarmament, and consistently implementing the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems". This comparison will determine the distance between Russia's stand now and then.

⁸⁶. *Keesing's Record of World Events*, February 1994, pp. 39783 and 39889.

⁸⁷. Frazer, Graham; Lancelle, George, *Zhirinovskiy: the Little Black Book*, (London, Penguin Books 1994), p. 77.

⁸⁸. Rodman, Peter W., *More Precious than Peace, the Cold War and the struggle for the Third World*, (NY, London 1994), p. 10; excellent remarks and findings in this direction in Gebhardt Weiss's article "The Russian Federation Between Imperial Temptation and Legitimate Pursuit of Interests: Remarks on Western Criticism of Russian Foreign and Security Policy" in *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, 1-30/1995, pp. 59-60.

⁸⁹. The main ideas of the speech is outlined in Holloway, D., "Gorbachev's New Thinking", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 68, No. 1, (1989), p. 66.

⁹⁰. US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 2, No. 52, December 30, 1991.

⁹¹. Howard, Michael, "The Springtime of Nations", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 69, No. 1, (1989/1990), p. 23.

⁹². The two bankruptcy acts of 1934 dealt with "the liquidation cases" and the other with the "legal framework for financial restructuring". Mizsei, Kalman, *Bankruptcy and the Post-Communist Economies of East Central Europe*, (New York, Prague, Budapest, Institute for East-West Studies 1993), pp.12-13.

⁹³. It is very proper to denote here that the rise of nationalism in Eastern Europe, after the dispersion of the Warsaw Pact Organization, was coupled with vigorous integration of West Europe. The danger of nationalism in Eastern Europe flows from the exclusionist nature of these societies. Each of the East European nations identify itself by a number of "criterion" most important of which are the linguistic, religious, ethnic,

and cultural principles. Thus any minority which fails to combine all these standards will find itself subject to linguistic, religious, ethnic, or cultural discrimination. For more about nationalism in East Europe vide Conversi, Daniele, "Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as Boundary Maintenance and Creation" in *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics*, vol. 1, No. 1, (Spring 1995), pp. 73ff; Vayrynen, Raimo, in Iivonen, Jyrki (ed.), *The Future of the Nation State in Europe*, (Hants, England 1993), pp. 159ff; Kedourie, Elie, *Nationalism*, (London 1960), pp. 70ff.

⁹⁴. *Politik und Gesellschaft, International Politics and Society*, No. 1, 1996, p. 107.

⁹⁵. Internally the army appeared unfit to deal with ethnic traumas, religious controversies, social injustices, or economic inequalities. It is these malpractices and factors that mostly expose internal security to outsiders. Internal national security is guaranteed to a far extent by equal opportunity which will breed confidence and devotion. Economic prosperity and welfare, social common consent and common coherence would create exceptionally effective social shield against covert forces that seek to destroy security from within.

⁹⁶. Europe faces grudging differences around the rules and criteria of the Monetary Union. This issue, i.e. the European Monetary Union (EMU), stands as the focal point for disputes among the EU members, and the European countries can be classified into four categories according to its stand from the EMU: The first category includes the EMU enthusiasts or possible members (Germany and France); the second includes those who can join but prefer to stand on Europe's sidelines for multitude of political and economic considerations, such as Conservative Britain and Denmark; the third embraces those who want to join but cannot, such as Italy, Spain and Portugal; and the fourth category is represented by those who do not qualify and do not want to join such as Greece. For more details vide the *Foreign Report*, No. 2404, June 20, 1996, pp. 1-2.

⁹⁷. Vide *Nezavisimaa Gazetta*, May-August 1993. Also very useful ideas in Keohane, Robert; Nye, Joseph; and Hoffmann, Stanley, *After the Cold War International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe: 1989-1991*, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press 1993), and Kegley, Charles Jr., "Cold War Myths and the New International realities: Reconsidering Theoretical Premises", in *Osterreichische Zeitschrift Fur Politikwissenschaft*, 22, No. 2.

⁹⁸. Full members of the CEI were: a) from West Europe: Austria and Italy; b) from the former Soviet bloc: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria, and Romania manifested interest in joining the CEI but they need the consensus of existing members to be admitted, thus they remained for the time being out side the Initiative.

⁹⁹. The Central European Initiative formerly was called "the Pentagonal group", for more information about this regional 'Initiative', see Neuhold, Hanspeter (ed.), *The*

Pentagonal / Hexagonal Experiment: New Forms of Cooperation in a Changing Europe, (The Laxenburg Papers, LP 10 (Wien, Wilhelm Braumüller 1991).

¹⁰⁰. Renner, Karl, quoted in Görtner, Heinz, *State, Nation, and Security in Central Europe: Democratic States without Nations*, (Osterreichisches Institut für Internationale Politik [Austrian Institute for International Affairs], June 1995), p. 28.

¹⁰¹. The US and the EU while hoping that liberalization of the Russian economy would lead to political liberalization and democracy. The world wants to see Russia guided by economic interest not geographical expansionism. The new terminology of Russia's political language: the "near abroad" and the "far abroad" demonstrate the existence of Russia's traditional policy adopted during the "Great Game" and the "Eastern Question" eras. Russia's political and economic success in a Post-Cold War milieu pre-require modification of its political culture. New Russia needs to rid itself from Tsarist despotism and Communist totalitarianism. To attract the "near abroad" (ex-Soviet republics), where here direct interests lie, Russia has to patronize voluntary integration rather than hegemony.

¹⁰². *Foreign Report*, (February 8th 1995), No. 2386, p. 2-3.

¹⁰³. In the Middle East the situation was totally different. The super-powers' competition in the region was replaced by cooperation mainly after Madrid conference of October 1991. In a later stage, Russia, busy with home problems, willfully abandoned its role in the peace making.

¹⁰⁴. *Foreign Report*, (February 8th 1995), No. 2386, p. 3.

¹⁰⁵. Hannes, Michael, "The Reflection Group of the European Union", *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 47, No. 1, 1996, pp. 40ff.

¹⁰⁶. Hannes, Michael, "The Reflection Group of the European Union", *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 47, No. 1, 1996, pp. 34.

¹⁰⁷. Hannes, Michael, "The Reflection Group of the European Union", *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 47, No. 1, 1996, pp. 40.

¹⁰⁸. Hannes, Michael, "The Reflection Group of the European Union", *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 47, No. 1, 1996, pp. 41.

¹⁰⁹. أنظر غالي عوده (مترجم) في مقدمة لـ "بريطانيا وروسيا وألمانيا في الشرق الأوسط - شبكة حديد بغداد"، الندوة، (جمعية الشؤون الدولية، عمان) المجلد الثالث، العدد ٣/٢ (كانون الأول ١٩٩١)، ص. ٦٣.

¹¹⁰. HRH Crown Prince Al-Hassan, address to a seminar entitled "Building on Peace: Towards Regional Security and Economic Development in the Middle East", Amman, September 9, 1995.

¹¹¹. Politicians, geographers, and economists still involved in debating whether Kazakhstan is part of the new macro-Middle East or not.

¹¹². India also strives to have a role and secure its interests in Central Asia. For India's position vide, *The Muslim*, December 15, 1992.

¹¹³. *The Economist*, August 8, 1992, p. 54.

¹¹⁴. *Jordan Times*, July 6-7, 1995.

¹¹⁵. HRH Crown Prince Al-Hassan, Sermon at Christ Church Cathedral, Oxford. *Jordan Times*, June 5, 1995.

¹¹⁶. United Nations, *Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action*, June 25, 1993, part I, paragraph 5.

¹¹⁷. Pipes, Daniel, "What leverage in Central Asia", *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 8, 1993.

¹¹⁸. Stobdan, P., "International Aspects of the Conflict Situation in Central Asia", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. XVI, No. 3, June 1993, p. 266.

¹¹⁹. ¹¹⁹. Stobdan, P., "International Aspects of the Conflict Situation in Central Asia", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. XVI, No. 3, June 1993, p. 279.

¹²⁰. The Karakum desert in Turkmenistan and the Kyzylkum in Uzbekistan. The great Kazakh steppe expands from western-central Kazakhstan to the northern borders of Uzbekistan.

¹²¹. Tajikistan did not exist before the Russian conquest of Bukhara (present Uzbekistan) in 1868. Before that date most of Tajikistan was part of Bukhara, and known in historical literature as little Bukhara or Eastern Bukhara. The number of ethnic Uzbeks in Tajikistan reached 1,197,841, i.e. (24%) of the population. For detailed ethnic composition of Central Asia, vide *Central Asia Monitor*, No. 3, (1992), pp. 39-40.

¹²². Semirechie (seven rivers) is the region that extends from Pishkek, the Kirgiz capital, and stretches northward to the Altai province in the Russian Federation along the Chinese borders including Almaty and eastern Kazakhstan.

¹²³. One of the political advantages in present Russia is the lack of enthusiasm to shed blood or spend treasure on restoring the empire, at least in this phase of Russia's perestroika or readjustment. Nevertheless this is not a rule in Russia's history rather an exception.

¹²⁴. The "near abroad" is a new geo-political term invented by Russian politicians to refer to the countries which were part of the Soviet Union.

¹²⁵. Ironically, the advocates of Russia's historic "mission" today, few years ago they were "internationalists" communists or members of the comsomol.

¹²⁶. *Die Zeit*, January 14, 1994, as quoted in Frazer, Graham and Lancelle, George, *Zhirinovskiy: the little black book*, (London 1994), p. 48.

¹²⁷. Andranik Migranian, a Russian commentator (ethnically Armenian as his name indicates), quoted in Motyl, Alexander J., *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism*, (NY 1993), pp. 122-3.

¹²⁸. Kozyrev, Andrei quoted in *News Briefs*, (Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty), October 4-8, 1993, p. 7; and *New York Times*, January 25, 1994, p. 6.

¹²⁹. ITAR-TASS, December 8, 1993 as quoted in Crow, Suzanne, "Russia Asserts Its Strategic Agenda", *Research Report*, (Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty), vol. 20, No. 50, December 17, 1993, p. 2.

¹³⁰. Crow, Suzanne, "Russia Asserts Its Strategic Agenda", *Research Report*, (Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty), vol. 20, No. 50, December 17, 1993, p. 2.

¹³¹. Bumer, Boris, "The Gathering Storm", *Orbis*, vol. 37, No. 1, (Winter 1993), p. 91.

¹³². *The Times*, "Turkey courts Central Asia republics", May 5, 1992, see also *the Washington Post*, "Power Competition in Central Asia", February 14, 1992; and *The Wall Street Journal*, "Baker is Wooing Central Asian Republics", February 14, 1992.

¹³³. Onis, Ziya, "Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era: in Search of Identity", *Middle East Journal*, vol. 49, No. 1, (Winter 1995), p. 48.

¹³⁴. Avşar, Zakir, "Communication between the Turkish Republics", *Eurasian Studies*, vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 1996, p. 101.

¹³⁵. *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, August/September 1992, p. 17.

¹³⁶. In May 1996 Iran invited ten heads of state among whom was Suleiman Demirel, the Turkish president to inaugurate the resumption of communications via Central Asia through the Silk Road. Other invitees were the presidents of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Armenia, and Georgia.

¹³⁷. Chengiz Candar, as quoted in *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, August/September 1992, p. 17.

¹³⁸. See Gali Oda (tr.), "Britain, Russia and Germany in the Middle East - Baghdad Railway", *An-Nadwah*, (A Bulletin Published by the World Affairs Council - Amman), vol. III, Nos. 2&3, December 1991, p. 63.

¹³⁹. As quoted in *The Economist*, December 26, 1992 - January 8, 1993, p. 80. There are some thinkers who deny the idea that Turkey, Iran, or Pakistan can exert any

influence in Central Asia and Azerbaijan "because Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan all suffer from severe limitations. Not one of them has the cultural, economic, or military means to carve out a large sphere of influence". For further discussion of this idea vide a very interesting article by Pipes, Daniel, "What leverage in Central Asia", *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 8, 1993. Pipes established his judgment on the notion that "Turkey is not only geographically remote from Central Asia, but it enjoys few historical or cultural ties to that region [i.e. Central Asia and Azerbaijan]". Regarding Iran the writer maintained that this lacks means of influence because "its international isolation much reduces that country's attraction for states just emerging from three generations of colonialism and political quarantine... its severe, unrelenting Islamic order puts off peoples accustomed to secularism". Pakistan, from his point of view, has different hindrances so far as this country "suffers from perpetual instability and wrenching poverty, and so can neither project power nor serve as a convincing model for others to emulate".

¹⁴⁰. Turkestan; the homeland of the Turks بلاد الترك is commonly used in the Russian and political and historical literature.

¹⁴¹. Frazer, Graham and Lancelle, George, *Zhirinovsky: the little black book*, (London 1994).

¹⁴². Suleiman Demirel, during a visit to Central Asia, May 1992 as quoted in *The Times*, "Turkey courts Central Asia republics", May 5, 1992.

¹⁴³. India, South Korea, the Arab countries and Israel can be added to this list.

¹⁴⁴. Avsar, Zakir B., "Communication Between the Turkish Republics", *Eurasian Studies*, Spring 1996, vol. 3, No. 1, p. 101.

¹⁴⁵. *The Times*, "Turkey courts Central Asia republics", May 5, 1992.

¹⁴⁶. *Times*, February 17, 1992.

¹⁴⁷. *The Daily Telegraph*, February 22, 1992.

¹⁴⁸. Besides the President the list of attendants included the following dignitaries: three Ministers of State; Ali Talip Ozdemir, Ayvaz Gokdemir, Ibrahim Yasar Dedelek, Minister of National Education, Minister of Culture, Minister of Agriculture, Chairman of the Nationalist Movement Party, Chairman of the Turkish States and Communities Foundation for Friendship, Brotherhood and Co-operation (TFFC) Aslan Turkesh, Chairman of the Turkmenistan Parliament Sahaf Muratov, Deputy Prime Minister of Azerbaijan Elci Efendiyaf, Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Hakki Atun, Head of the Kirgiz delegation Asan Gornicev, Head of the Kazakh delegation ismailev and Head of the Uzbek delegation Nuramli Kabul.

¹⁴⁹. *Eurasian File, Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TICA)*, No. 54, April 1996, p. 3.

¹⁵⁰. *Eurasian File, Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TICA)*, No. 54, April 1996, p. 2.

¹⁵¹. *TICA*, No. 45, November 1995, p. 2.

¹⁵². *Financial Times*, September 3, 1992.

¹⁵³. *Financial Times*, May 14, 1992; for earlier episodes of the competition see *Newsweek*, February 3, 1992.

¹⁵⁴. *Foreign Report*, No. 2401, May 30, 1996, p. 4. On May 12, 1996 President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani of Iran and Nursultan Nazarbayev signed an agreement on laying a pipeline to carry Kazakhstan's crude oil through Iran directly to the Gulf. Kazakhstan's president considered Iran as the most suitable route for export of his country's oil and gas. See *The Guardian*, *The Herald Tribune*, and the *Jordan Times*, May 13, 1996.

¹⁵⁵. As quoted in the *Financial Times*, September 3, 1992.

¹⁵⁶. *Financial Times*, May 14, 1992.

¹⁵⁷. Russia is the largest producer of gas in the world while Turkmenistan ranks number 11 on world scale.

¹⁵⁸. *Financial Times*, September 3, 1992.

¹⁵⁹. The Silk Road project was considered in 1992, see *The Financial Times*, May 14, 1992.

¹⁶⁰. *Jordan Times*, Tuesday, May 14, 1996; and *Al-Ra'i*, Tuesday, May 14, 1996.

¹⁶¹. Both names, Kazbek and Elbruz, originally were names given by early Arab geographers to the highest peaks in the Caucasus. Kazbek is a distortion from *Kazi Bek* which means 'judge' in Arabic, while Elbrus (Arabic *al-Buruz*) means the lofty peak.

¹⁶². Olson, Robert, "The Kurdish Question and Chechnia: Turkish and Russian Foreign Policies since the Gulf War", *Middle East Policy*, vol. IV, No. 3, March 1996, p. 106.

¹⁶³. *TICA*, No. 44, November 1995.

¹⁶⁴. *Middle East Policy*, vol. IV, No. 3, March 1996, p. 107.

¹⁶⁵. *Hurriet* (Liberty), a Turkish daily newspaper, January 25, 1995.

¹⁶⁶. For excellent discussion of the Kurdish question see Robert Olson, "The Kurdish Question four years on: The Policies of Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq", *Middle East Policy*, vol. 3, No. 3, (1994), pp. 136 ff.

¹⁶⁷. The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Turkey*, 2nd quarter 1995, pp. 4-5.

¹⁶⁸. Hiro, Dilip, *Between Muhammad and Marx*, (Glasgo 1995), p. 279.

¹⁶⁹. *Keessing's Record of World Events*, May 1995, p. 40567.

¹⁷⁰. Central Asia and Azerbaijan in World Affairs News letter, No. 2, December 1, 1992, p. 6.

¹⁷¹. *Sunday Times*, January 22, 1993.

¹⁷². *Turkish Daily News*, September 2, 1992.

¹⁷³. *Eastern Europe Monitor*, vol. 3, No. 6, June 1996, p. 10.

¹⁷⁴. Robins, Philip, "Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey's Policy Toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States", *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 47, No. 4, Autumn 1993, p. 595.

¹⁷⁵. *TICA*,

¹⁷⁶. Staar, Richard F., "Moscow's Plans to Restore its Power", *Orbis*, vol. 40, No. 3, Summer 1996, pp. 375-6.

¹⁷⁷. Staar, "Moscow's Plans...", *Orbis*, vol. 40, No. 3, Summer 1996, p. 376.

¹⁷⁸. Sneider, Daniel, "Russia Vies to Halt Lengthy Karabakh War", *Christian Science Monitor*, November 19, 1993.

¹⁷⁹. Cohen, Ariel, "The 'New Great Game': Pipeline Politics in Eurasia", *Eurasian Studies*, vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 1996, p. 4.

¹⁸⁰. First Westernization of Russia took place at the time of Peter the Great in the eighteenth century. Russia, as an European power, derives its might from Asia, though the source of power, i.e. Asia, frequently casts undesired shadow on Russia's European roots. This fact impels Russia to renew its image as an European power by "westernizing" itself. During westernizing itself, Moscow consciously maintains its interests and advantages in Asia. This conclusion was mostly on the mind of decision makers in the Kremlin when they recommended substituting the USSR with a relatively loose "Agreement of the Commonwealth of Independent States" which included all the Soviet republics except the Baltic States.

¹⁸¹. There are a number of explosive issues that might easily trigger local wars. The most acute among these issues is the boundary question.

¹⁸². BBC World Service, 14 April 1993, as quoted in Hiro, Dilip, *Between Marx and Muhammed*, (London 1994), p. 73.

¹⁸³. For more about the CIS agreement see Gali Oda, *Qira'a Tahliliyah fi Ittifaqiyat Komonwelth ad-Dual al-Mustaqillah*, (Analytical Reading in the Agreement of the Commonwealth of Independent States), (Center for International Studies, the Royal Scientific Society 1993), pp. 83ff. Euro-Asian market is suggested in clause No. 7, pp. 86-7.

¹⁸⁴. Steele, Jonathan, "Fear and Folly in Moscow", *The Guardian*, February 21, 1992.