

UKRAINIAN PRISM: FOREIGN POLICY

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UKRAINIAN PRISM:
TEN YEARS
OF EXPERTISE

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This publication is an analytical study that represents a systematic and comprehensive analysis of Ukrainian foreign policy in 2024. Forty-seven directions were analysed — from cooperation with key partners and international organisations to public diplomacy and building coalitions for Ukraine’s recovery. Four evaluation criteria — indicators based on the new research methodology model were applied. The experts have studied and assessed the activities of the President, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Parliament, and other governmental institutions of Ukraine involved in the development and implementation of the foreign policy of Ukraine. This research is the tenth annual study. Previous years’ analysis can be found prismua.org

The reference to the author and the analytical study is obligatory in the cases of complete or partial use of its materials.

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Dear colleagues,

The “Ukrainian Prism” team is honoured to present the tenth annual foreign policy analysis. Every year, dozens of experts scrutinise how Ukraine developed and implemented its foreign policy in almost 50 functional and geographical areas.

This analytical work is a significant contribution dedicated not only to analysing current foreign policy trends but also to forming the basis for a thorough study of the long-term foundations for shaping Ukrainian idea and interests in the international arena.

When we started our work in 2015, obviously, we could not have imagined the tragedies that would befall the Ukrainian state. Out of the ten cycles of the study, the last three issues have been based on an adapted methodology that allows us to understand the peculiarities of wartime diplomacy. Every year, we adjust the study structure, removing irrelevant and adding new priority areas. In 2024, Ukraine continued to refine its approaches to building relations with partners in the midst of a full-scale war and confrontation with the coalition of evil, to which Russia has also added Belarus, North Korea, and Iran.

Ukraine has managed not only to repel the advance of a much larger enemy but also to maintain international isolation of the aggressor state by initiating and introducing new sanctions, creating mechanisms of compensation for aggression, and moving towards establishing a special tribunal. 2024 also became a time to develop political and diplomatic tools to ensure a just and lasting peace. With the support of its partners, Ukraine has made significant progress on the content of the Peace Formula and is building an international coalition to support Ukraine's position. The foreign policy team continued the strategic movement towards EU membership by opening the negotiation process and conducting legislative screenings. The focus on completing the tasks set on the way to opening the clusters demonstrates confidence in Ukraine's readiness to start membership negotiations.

At the same time, in certain areas, Ukraine's foreign policy ambitions encountered internal and external obstacles in the decision-making process. In 2024, Ukraine's relations with its partners were subject to turbulence caused by election cycles in key countries and organisations. Against this backdrop, the effectiveness of Ukraine's foreign policy work in some areas has somewhat lost momentum. This was especially noticeable during the US election campaign, where the issue of assistance to Ukraine became a hostage to political struggle. However, even under such circumstances, Ukrainian politicians and diplomats have done a significant job keeping Ukraine on the agenda.

The overall evaluation of foreign policy implementation was maintained at B+, similar to the previous two years. This may indicate that Ukraine's foreign policy team has already gained positive diplomatic experience communicating with partners and finding ways to communicate productively with non-EU and non-NATO countries.

The fight of the Ukrainian people for freedom and independence continues. This means that our foreign policy should not only remain resilient and efficient but also demonstrate to our partners and the world our proactivity and values. The joint efforts of the state and society will undoubtedly lead to victory over the enemy.

Glory to Ukraine!

Glory to heroes!

Hennadiy Maksak,

Executive Director Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”

Methodology of Research

A

B-

C+

In the course of its own methodology development, the working group of the “Ukrainian Prism” carefully studied the experience of evaluation of the foreign policy of separate countries and international institutions done by other foreign analytical centres. Special attention was paid to the projects of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and the Czech Association for International Affairs (Asociace pro mezinárodní otázky, AMO), which reflect either peculiarities of particular member states in the EU foreign policy (ECFR) or internal aspects of the Czech Republic governing (AMO). None of these methodologies is multi-purposed, and their principles directly depend on the peculiarities of the object under research. That is why, after the methodological consultations with the ECFR experts, the working group of the “Ukrainian Prism” decided to develop their own methodology, taking into account Ukrainian conditions and some elements of the existing methodologies of Western colleagues. This methodology was applied in 2015–2021 and has been constantly improved.

However, the 2022 issue is special. Ukrainian foreign policy, as well as other spheres of the country’s life, are guided by war-time. Therefore, a methodology for evaluating the Ukrainian foreign policy in 2022 has been elaborated to consider the current foreign policy and security conditions. This methodology retains most of the indicators used for the analysis during previous years (political interest, activities, and results) but expands the empirical basis for the evaluation. Besides, the indicators of inter-institutional cooperation and strategic vision have been replaced with a new one — strategic communications, which have gained particular importance during the war.

As in previous years, the analysis focuses on the actions of the Ukrainian actors (representatives of the executive and legislative branches, the President and his Office, as well as individual actors involved) rather than the state of bilateral relations with the respective country.

Annually, the areas of Ukraine’s foreign policy under study are revised to some extent. In 2024, Mexico was added, as well as evaluations of Ukraine’s efforts in promoting the Peace Formula. Besides, the researchers abandoned the evaluation of Iran, as relations between the two states have been suspended. The three Baltic states were again analysed in one section.

Ukraine's foreign policy directions

For the evaluation of the foreign policy of Ukraine in 2024, 47 directions were selected and divided into the following thematic blocks:

- Cooperation with the G7 states (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the USA);
- European integration and relations with the EU;
- Euro-Atlantic integration;
- Bilateral relations (Australia, Azerbaijan, Brazil, China, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, India, Israel, Mexico, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Türkiye);
- Belligerent countries (Belarus, the Russian Federation);
- Regional cooperation (Indo-Pacific region, Baltic States, Middle East, Western Balkans, Northern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia);
- International organisations (OSCE, the United Nations, Council of Europe);
- Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;
- Building an international coalition for the recovery of Ukraine;
- Economic diplomacy;
- Energy diplomacy;
- Public diplomacy;
- Military diplomacy;
- Sanctions policy;
- Peace Formula
- Ukrainians abroad.

Evaluation indicators of Ukraine's foreign policy in particular directions:

Given the above, four assessment indicators for foreign policy implementation in each of these directions were developed:

- (1) Political interest or engagement of political actors in particular directions of the foreign policy.
- (2) Strategic communications for a specific direction.
- (3) Specific activities regarding a particular direction during the evaluated year.
- (4) Results and achievements regarding a particular direction during the evaluated year.

Each of the four key indicators shall be assessed using a five-point system, where 1 point is the minimum score, and 5 points is the highest possible score. Each point in the assessment of a relevant direction by a specific indicator is linked to the presence or absence of a certain condition, which can be documented. The regulatory and evidence basis required to calculate a score has been set for each indicator.

1. Political Interest / Engagement

The basis for analysis: speeches and interviews of the President, the Prime Minister and Vice Prime Ministers of Ukraine, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence and other relevant ministers, the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, statements of parliamentary factions, statements of political party leaders, interviews with the leadership of the Presidential Office, the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada and the Analytical Report to it, the Agenda of the Verkhovna Rada Foreign Affairs Committee and available parliamentary hearings on the topic, hearings of relevant Verkhovna Rada committees.

Points:

- 1 point** — lack of references to a foreign policy direction in official or unofficial statements, policy documents, and manifestos of the main political actors;

- 2 points**— the existence of an informal reference to a foreign policy direction that has not acquired the form of a political position, interviews, blogs, tweets, or articles in the media on the respective topics;
- 3 points**— there are individual official statements concerning events or certain aspects of activity regarding the direction under research among some political parties, mentioning in the speeches by the President, Prime Minister or Minister of Foreign Affairs;
- 4 points**— there are official positions of various political entities represented in the higher authorities, but they are not mutually agreed upon, mentioning in the Presidential Annual Address, inclusion to the Agenda of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, organisation of the parliamentary hearings and round tables;
- 5 points**— the existence of a political consensus on Ukraine’s activities in the chosen foreign policy direction, regular reference to the area under study, joint official statements, parliamentary hearings or thematic conferences.

2. Strategic Communications

The basis for the analysis: speeches by the President, the Prime Minister, and Vice Prime Ministers of Ukraine, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence and other relevant ministers to foreign audiences, major publications in foreign media, etc.

Points:

- 1 point** — interviews with high-ranking Ukrainian officials or the ambassador for the country’s media, ad hoc information;
- 2 points** — speeches by high-ranking officials (except for the President) to various target audiences;
- 3 points** — joint statements, special (targeted) information campaigns, setting up a visit of a representative of a country or organisation to the de-occupied territories (except for an ambassador accredited in Ukraine);
- 4 points** — all of the above and speeches by the President or other high-ranking officials at major international venues (conferences, public events),

speeches by the foreign country's top officials/organisations to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;

- 5 points** — all of the above and the President's speech in the parliament of the country concerned or at major international events (such as international organisations or meetings of initiatives chaired by the country under assessment, excluding non-governmental conferences).

4. Activities

The basis for the analysis: information and reports provided by the MFA of Ukraine and other ministries involved in the activities in this direction, statements and press releases of the Office of the President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Prime Minister of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, bilateral committees and working groups, publicly available information on activities in this direction.

Points:

- 1 point** — the de-facto absence of activities connected with the implementation of the relevant direction of the foreign policy, the absence of other forms of cooperation or official contacts; documented facts of the opposition of some institutions to others in policy-making or conflicts between Ukrainian authorities or different branches of power in the implementation of policy in a particular foreign policy direction, disruption of the work of coordinating bodies;
- 2 points** — individual non-systematic activities, which are not based on current strategic or operational documents for implementing a relevant direction of the foreign policy, maintaining dialogue exclusively through available diplomatic missions of Ukraine, absence of a Ukrainian ambassador in the respective country for more than half a year;
- 3 points** — non-systematic cooperation or contacts only in certain areas without systematic cooperation; meetings within multilateral formats or “on the side-lines” along with maintaining diplomatic, trade and economic relations; reactionary approach to the implementation of the relevant direction of foreign policy;

- 4 points** — visits of the MFA leadership, the parliament chairperson, prime minister of Ukraine to the respective country or organisation of visits of foreign representatives to Ukraine; operation of interdepartmental and other committees and working groups, joint military exercises, cooperation at the interdepartmental level;
- 5 points** — there are activities in all areas (financial and economic, political, military, humanitarian), joint international initiatives, visits at the level of heads of state and heads of international organisations, chairmanships in international organisations or initiatives, and holding joint bilateral or multilateral forums.

5. Results

The basis for the analysis: International agreements and memoranda signed for a relevant direction of the foreign policy, information on activities of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Office of the President of Ukraine, MFA of Ukraine, and other relevant ministries and institutions, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, statistics of trade and economic relations, information, and analytical materials on the results of the meetings, sittings, etc.; aid ratings, information from foreign partners.

Points:

- 1 point** — severance of diplomatic relations, withdrawal from an international organisation, termination of cooperation within an initiative's framework, open military aggression, or official support of the aggressor; trade, energy wars against Ukraine, obstruction of initiatives of international organisations aimed at supporting Ukraine;
- 2 points** — reducing the level of a diplomatic mission or existing discriminatory policy in the field of trade, lack of significant joint projects in the economic and energy field, lack of dynamics in political dialogue;
- 3 points** — slight positive dynamics at the level of political dialogue, economic contacts, and cooperation at the interdepartmental level; signing action plans for cooperation at the interdepartmental level, supporting political statements and sanctions regimes, but without significant initiatives to provide military, financial, and humanitarian assistance;

- 4 points** — active political dialogue, support for Ukraine in certain areas (for example, only humanitarian or only economical, without military), signing bilateral and multilateral agreements, implementing decisions to support Ukraine made during high-level visits, participating in international coalitions to support Ukraine;
- 5 points** — full support of Ukraine's position, provision of financial, political, and military support, allocation of aid (humanitarian, financial, or for reconstruction), large-scale projects in the economic, energy, and military fields, creation and operation of special coordinating bodies to implement foreign policy in a particular direction, voting in parliaments to support Ukraine.

***Note:**

In 2024, we analysed but did not score Ukraine's foreign policy regarding the Russian Federation and Belarus, as the full-fledged aggression did not allow us to use a standard methodology for assessment.

General scoring of a relevant direction of the foreign policy (direction's rating)

After giving points for all the indicators, a direction's general score will be identified by calculating the arithmetic mean value. The general score (rating) will be then reflected in the form of Latin letters (A, B, C, D, E) with arithmetic signs (+/-) depending on the obtained value.

RATING SCORE

	A	A-	
Indicator value	5	4,6-4,9	
<hr/>			
	B+	B	B-
	4,1-4,5	4	3,6-3,9
<hr/>			
	C+	C	C-
	3,1-3,5	3	2,6-2,9


Direction's rating

D+	D	D-
2,1-2,5	2	1,6-1,9

E+	E
1,1-1,5	1

Overall scoring of Ukraine's foreign policy implementation during the year (overall rating of Ukraine's foreign policy implementation for the relevant year)

The overall scoring of successful implementation will be calculated by obtaining the arithmetic mean value of the general scores in all the directions of foreign policy under the research. The overall rating will be calculated similarly to the assessment of relevant directions of foreign policy.



FOREIGN POLICY IN 2023

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	B+	B+	B+
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	B+	B	B+
ACTIVITIES	B+	B+	B+
RESULTS	B	B	B
TOTAL SCORE	B+	B+	B+

Political interest/engagement

For Ukraine, the year 2024 in foreign policy was built upon the foundations of wartime diplomacy started in 2022–2023.

In his directives to the heads of Ukraine's foreign diplomatic missions, formulated in his keynote speech "Wartime Diplomacy: Resilience, Weapons, Victory", the President outlined several priorities: lifting existing restrictions on the use of weapons in Russian territory; strengthening sanctions against Russia and its allies; securing long-term support from partners; supporting Ukrainians abroad; and promoting international backing for the Peace Formula. He emphasised Ukraine's integration into the EU and NATO as a key priority. Regarding regional cooperation, the head of state highlighted the importance of the Black Sea region, Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Pacific.

The President's public speeches and addresses to the Parliament serve as important indicators of Ukraine's foreign policy course. Notable examples include the President's presentation of the Victory Plan to the VRU (16.10) and his Annual Address (19.11). The Annual Address outlined Ukraine's foreign policy priorities: consolidating government communications to counter disinformation; holding Russia collectively accountable; ensuring strategic deterrence of Russia, cooperating with partners in arms production; enhancing energy security and cooperation; securing international support for Ukrainian communities; introducing multiple citizenship; developing international cultural partnerships; and reforming and strengthening the diplomatic service, etc.

The Government's Action Plan for 2024 further detailed these foreign and security policy priorities, with European integration as the top one. The plan also focused on Ukraine's NATO accession, sanctions mechanisms, and establishing new diplomatic missions abroad. The President, the Prime Minister and the VRU's Speaker (25.06) addressed the opening of EU negotiations with Ukraine in a joint statement to Ukrainians.

In 2024, political interest primarily focused on traditional areas of Ukraine's foreign policy, such as G7 and EU member-states. There was a notable increase in engagement with Latin America and Africa, while interest in the Indo-Pacific region declined, with the exception of India.

The core strategic objective remained to provide the Ukrainian Defence Forces with the necessary resources to maintain the front line, secure military equipment and ammunition, form international coalitions for capability development and Ukraine's reconstruction, and engage partners in specific aspects of the Peace Formula. In terms of military-technical and defence partnerships, Ukraine placed particular emphasis on strategic relations with G7, NATO, and EU members. Northern Europe featured prominently in regional contacts. Significant attention was also given to supporting Ukrainian communities abroad.

As in previous years, the President and Ministry of Foreign Affairs representatives showed the highest level of engagement. Notably, 2024 saw increased involvement from MPs, who expanded their focus beyond European partners to include Latin America and Asia. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and other relevant ministries showed considerably less engagement with international affairs compared to previous years.

Total score —

B+

Strategic communications

In 2024, Ukraine's strategic communications were aimed at actively engaging not only partners from the G7, EU, and NATO in assistance and solidarity with Ukraine. It was also about establishing or strengthening cooperation with states of the so-called Global South, especially in the context of building international support for a just and lasting peace. Depending on the country or region, communication focused on providing military support to Ukraine, maintaining or introducing new sanctions against Russia, macro-financial assistance, international accountability, and Ukraine's reconstruction.

Visits by the President of Ukraine to partner state capitals and his participation in joint events within international organisations were important for communication impact on foreign political forces and societies. These efforts

also included speeches at parliamentary plenary sessions, addresses to students and faculty at universities, and participation in international expert forums that received broad media coverage.

Compared to previous years, the number of countries where the President or the Foreign Minister addressed parliaments decreased significantly, but the number of interviews with leading global media and regional media in Africa and Latin America increased. Press tours were organised for media representatives from various countries of the Global South and Europe, with NGO involvement in organising some of them. The President, the Prime Minister, Vice-Prime Ministers, government team members and MPs were active in communicating with foreign media throughout the year.

In 2024, several previously launched communication initiatives were developed and continued, including the Peace Formula, military capability coalitions, and security guarantee agreements for Ukraine. These served as important tools for conveying Ukrainian interests and received widespread media coverage.

The first Global Peace Summit in Switzerland (15–16.06), preceded by intensive political and diplomatic consultations at various levels, became one of the main platforms for building international support for Ukraine. The summit and the signing of the final communiqué laid the groundwork for further active collaboration with partners on the thematic content of the nine points of the Peace Formula, as well as for communicating the provisions of the communiqué and the Peace Formula both in signatory countries and beyond.

Based on the previous year's Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine, in 2024, Ukraine actively concluded bilateral security guarantee agreements. Beyond the significant practical dimension of these agreements, their communication component played an important role. Ukraine included strategic issues of military support, long-term financial and material assistance, and support for Ukraine's NATO membership in almost every agreement. Parallel communications emphasising that security agreements are not a substitute for Alliance membership were also successful, as they presented Ukraine's clear position on future NATO membership.

Given Ukraine's close partnerships with the EU and NATO, the President and government team members participated in European Council meetings and EU thematic councils. This allowed the officials to directly convey facts about the

war and Ukraine's current need for international support. Regional initiatives that helped maintain international focus on Ukraine should also be highlighted. These include periodic North Europe-Ukraine and Southeast Europe-Ukraine summits, meetings in the Ukraine-Weimar+ format, and the Africa-Ukraine 2024 Agricultural Forum. The institutionalisation of the military capabilities' coalition within the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (Ramstein format) added communication value. Ukraine continued engaging foreign partners in the "Grain from Ukraine" initiative, the International Conference on Ukraine's Recovery, and the International Crimea Platform.

Parliamentary diplomacy was active in 2024. MPs effectively used the platforms of the Parliamentary Assemblies of the Council of Europe and NATO and developed groups for interparliamentary relations (friendship groups). The adopted statements and resolutions helped draw international partners' attention to Russia's war against Ukraine. The Verkhovna Rada leadership's visits to foreign countries and international organisations were accompanied by media contacts. The first Parliamentary Conference, "Ukraine — Latin America and the Caribbean: Cooperation for the Future" (30.11) became a significant communication platform. At the same time, communication capacities were negatively affected by the VRU Speaker's restrictions on foreign travel for MPs representing opposition political parties.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented its first Communication Strategy, "Ukraine — Latin America and the Caribbean" for 2024–2026. An important development at the beginning of the year was the launch of the Arabic-language version of the MFA website and an account on the X social network. The Ukrainian Institute (UI) continued its active work. Despite wartime challenges, the UI team carried out more than 180 cultural diplomacy projects in 61 countries, including in "new" countries, such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa, thus strengthening diplomatic and political communications.

Civil society organisations were active, organising online and offline campaigns supporting key initiatives, such as holding Russia accountable, securing prospects for EU and NATO membership, and expanding communications and expert diplomacy with the so-called Global South, particularly in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.

Total score —



Activities

In 2024, Ukraine conducted an active foreign policy both towards its key partners and new areas. While most contacts focused on securing international support against Russian aggression, Ukraine devoted considerable efforts to a bilateral agenda and expanding its geographical presence. At the same time, attention to different world regions remained somehow imbalanced.

In thematic areas of wartime diplomacy, foreign policy developers and implementers actively engaged in bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Maximising G7 members' assistance to Ukraine remained a priority. Ukraine prioritised deepening integration and cooperation with the EU, as well as intensifying dialogue with NATO.

President V. Zelenskyy remained highly active. In 2024, he paid two visits each to the USA, the UK, and Italy and four visits each to Germany and France. The President visited EU institutions in Brussels three times and led the Ukrainian delegation to the NATO Summit in Washington.

Additionally, bilateral and multilateral contacts at the highest level continued on the side-lines of UN General Assembly sessions, G7 summits, the Global Peace Summit for Ukraine, the NATO Summit, and the European Community Summit. For example, President Zelenskyy met Japanese Prime Minister F. Kishida twice (G7 Summit, UN GA) and Canadian Prime Minister J. Trudeau three times (G7 Summit, NATO Summit, UN GA).

Relations with the United States remained under constant attention throughout the year, with military assistance as the main focus. Ukrainian diplomats and the presidential team directed significant efforts towards unblocking financial and military aid. Ukraine agreed to launch joint inspections of the weapons the US supplied to its Defence Forces, with the first inspection taking place in January. President V. Zelenskyy visited the USA twice and held several telephone conversations with President J. Biden and presidential candidate D. Trump.

High-ranking officials from partner countries visited Ukraine, including Prime Ministers of the UK, Poland, and India — R. Sunak, D. Tusk, and N. Modi, respectively. In February, the President of the Italian Council of Ministers, G. Meloni, Canadian Prime Minister J. Trudeau, and European Commission President U. von der Leyen participated in events marking the second anniversary

of Russia's full-scale invasion. NATO Secretary General J. Stoltenberg visited Kyiv in April. December saw the first bilateral visits to Ukraine since the start of the full-fledged war by German Chancellor O. Scholz and the newly elected European Council President A. Costa, accompanied by EU Commissioners.

Securing military assistance for Ukraine was a priority task set for Ukrainian high officials and diplomatic corps in 2024. The Ukraine Defence Contact Group (Ramstein format), which brings together over 50 foreign partners, coordinated most military aid. The group held seven meetings during the year to address military assistance volume and types. Ukraine actively facilitated the creation and institutionalisation of eight military capability coalitions, each focusing on specific aspects of strengthening Ukraine's defence capabilities under foreign partner leadership. The number of countries that joined these coalitions reached 34.

Ukrainian diplomats actively promoted Ukrainian defence industry integration into European structures during the preparation of the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS), adopted in March 2024. They also sought alternative arms supply options due to depleting stockpiles in certain countries. This led to the emergence of the "Danish model", providing for direct investments and purchases from Ukrainian manufacturers.

The government continued expanding thematic forums geographically to support Ukraine's defence industry. Examples include the launch of the EU-Ukraine Defence Industries Forum in May, the NATO-Ukraine Defence Innovators Forum in June, and the second International Defence Industry Forum DFNC2 in October, alongside the German-Ukrainian Defence Industry Session. Ukrainian companies signed numerous agreements with foreign companies during these forums regarding the production of ammunition, electronic warfare equipment, aerial and naval drones, and Western weapons repair, among others. JSC Ukroboronprom opened its first foreign representative office in Washington, DC, in July, and the EU decided to open a Defence Innovation Office in Kyiv in September.

Sanctions pressure on Russia and attracting financial resources and investments remained important activity areas. The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions continued operating actively in 2024, formulating systematic proposals and specific recommendations for implementing and supporting sanctions policy. In May, the group presented its third comprehensive action plan to further strengthen sanctions pressure on Russia.

Within European partnership cooperation, Ukraine focused on forming regional approaches. Building long-term relations with Northern European and Baltic states held strategic importance for Ukraine at this stage. Ukraine held two Northern Europe-Ukraine summits with the President's participation in 2024. In November, Ukraine launched a new military cooperation format with the Northern Group, uniting 12 countries: Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and the UK. Ukraine maintained contacts with the Western Balkans in a multilateral format. During the Southeast Europe-Ukraine summit (28.02), President Zelenskyy met North Macedonia's President S. Pendarovski, Croatia's Prime Minister A. Plenković, Albania's Prime Minister E. Rama, and Montenegro's President J. Milatović.

Ukraine maintained a dynamic dialogue with neighbouring countries, though not always productively. There were constant active contacts with Moldova, Romania, the Czech Republic, and Poland. Dialogue proved more difficult with Hungary and Slovakia due to their position on energy cooperation with Russia and sanctions pressure. Foreign Minister A. Sybiha visited Moldova, Romania, and Poland during his first working visit after his appointment.

In European integration, the Ukrainian government team began pre-accession negotiations for EU membership. Ukraine formed its delegation for negotiations on the EU Accession Agreement in June. The government established an interagency working group for the negotiation process and 36 working (negotiation) groups in August. Ukrainian negotiators actively participated in the external screening of Ukrainian legislation for compliance with European law. The government prepared draft roadmaps as required by the negotiation framework.

NATO-Ukraine cooperation maintained high inter-institutional coordination. Officials regularly discussed the NATO bid at internal meetings with the President and relevant government members. The Commission on Coordination of Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine met in March to discuss the implementation of the adapted Annual National Programme (ANP) for 2024 and the NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine projects. The NATO-Ukraine Council emerged as an important new format serving as a platform for discussing bilateral relations and strengthening international support. Throughout the year, Ukraine initiated several NUC meetings in response to the Russian escalation.

In June, Berlin hosted the first ministerial-level meeting of the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine during the Ukraine Recovery Conference. It brought together representatives from 23 countries' governments and seven international financial organisations. The Steering Committee of the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform met in June and October. Prime Minister D. Shmyhal led a Ukrainian delegation to Tokyo in February for the joint Japanese-Ukrainian conference on economic development and reconstruction.

Ukraine devoted significant attention to establishing institutional and procedural prerequisites for the Peace Summit and implementing President Zelenskyy's Peace Formula. Domestically, coordinating the first summit organisation involved active joint work between the Presidential Office, relevant ministries, and the Verkhovna Rada. The first Global Peace Summit for Ukraine in June laid the foundations for thematic conferences, which, with the Summit's final communiqué, would form the international community's main peace proposal. Between August and November, nine thematic conferences took place with organisational support from states co-chairing the Peace Formula thematic groups.

Ukraine intensified political and diplomatic contacts with the so-called Global South regions and states while implementing the Peace Formula, primarily with major international actors like India and China. Indian Prime Minister N. Modi visited Ukraine for the first time since independence. President Zelenskyy also met Modi twice during major international events. Foreign Minister D. Kuleba visited India for the first time since 2017. Thus, 2024 marked a significant strengthening in Ukraine-India political relations. The President's visits to Saudi Arabia and Qatar played an important role in strengthening bilateral relations and encouraging regional partners to engage actively as mediators.

In relations with China, Ukraine focused on finding ways to neutralise Beijing's active role in promoting an alternative resolution model. The Foreign Ministers held three meetings during international events and visits to China.

The Middle East region had a prominent place in foreign policy activities primarily due to humanitarian projects, three Gulf countries' participation as mediators in negotiations with Russia, and business contacts. Apart from the President's visits, Foreign Minister A. Sybiha travelled to Cairo to present a bilateral cooperation roadmap and Syria after B. Assad's regime overthrow, jointly with the Agrarian Policy Minister. Ukraine continued implementing the

“Grain from Ukraine” humanitarian programme, which became a strategic tool for cooperation with Africa and the Middle East.

Parliamentary diplomacy beyond Europe intensified. MPs participated in the ASEAN Parliamentary Assembly meeting in Laos and visited several Latin American countries. Officials maintained high-level contacts. VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk attended Mexican President C. Sheinbaum’s inauguration and met the Senate Speaker, among others.

Ukraine maintained active engagement with Indo-Pacific countries at bilateral and multilateral levels. High-level meetings and consultations were held throughout the year with Singapore, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, the Philippines, and Vietnam. An interesting format of a five-party meeting with Indo-Pacific NATO partners — Australia, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and Japan — emerged on the sidelines of the NATO Summit. President V. Zelenskyy also paid the first bilateral visit to the Philippines (03.06), meeting President B. Marcos.

The MFA developed strategic approaches to the regions and strengthened its diplomatic presence. Officials visited several Latin American countries, particularly Brazil, maintaining active political dialogue to mitigate the Sino-Brazilian peace initiative’s consequences. Foreign Minister D. Kuleba conducted his fourth African tour in August, visiting Malawi, Zambia, and Mauritius for the first time in Ukraine’s history. Special Representative for the Middle East and Africa, M. Subkh, was highly active. Ukraine significantly strengthened its Sub-Saharan Africa diplomatic presence in 2024, opening embassies in the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mozambique, Botswana, Rwanda, and Mauritania, increasing its continental representation to 17 countries. The MFA discussed plans to increase Latin American and Caribbean diplomatic presence but opened no new diplomatic missions by year-end.

The G7, the EU, India, Poland, Türkiye, the Czech Republic, the Baltic and Northern European regions, the UN, the international coalition for Ukraine’s recovery, the Peace Formula, military diplomacy, public diplomacy, and sanctions policy scored the highest in terms of activities during the year.

Total score for the indicator —

B +

Results

Efforts to build a stable foundation for international cooperation yielded significant results. Relations with the G7 and the EU, which form the basis of Ukraine's current resilience and defence capability, confirmed their strategic status in 2024.

As of 31 December, Ukraine had signed 26 bilateral security agreements with the G7 countries and signatories of the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine, as well as an agreement with the EU. These bilateral documents provide for specific forms and areas of long-term support for Ukraine, mechanisms for consultations and assistance in the event of war escalation, and partner support for Ukraine's strategic political and security initiatives.

Significant results were achieved in providing financial and security assistance. According to NATO, in 2024, allies provided Ukraine with military assistance worth USD50bn, of which 60% came from European members of the Alliance and Canada.

In May, the EU authorised the use of windfall profits from frozen Russian assets towards Ukraine's defence needs through the European Peace Facility. By July, Ukraine had received the first tranche of EUR1.5bn, including EUR 400mn earmarked for the purchase of weapons from Ukrainian manufacturers. Thanks to the "Danish model" of support for the Ukrainian defence industry, the Armed Forces received weapons worth nearly EUR 538mn. Under the EU Military Assistance Mission to Ukraine (EUMAM), approximately 32,000 Ukrainian service personnel were trained across various areas.

The official launch of the EU's Ukraine Facility was critical for ensuring Ukraine's financial stability. The programme allows Ukraine to receive EU financial and technical assistance totalling EUR50bn over four years. Total international financial assistance to Ukraine for covering priority social and humanitarian expenditures in the state budget in 2024 amounted to USD 41.7bn. Ukraine received USD 5.4bn under the IMF's Extended Fund Facility programme. In addition to the EU and the IMF, support from the US, the World Bank, Japan, and Canada was also significant.

In May, the EU Council approved the Ukraine Facility Plan, which was developed by the Ukrainian government team together with European

partners. The plan identifies 69 reforms covering 15 areas and 10 investments. Implementation of these structural reforms will ensure progress on Ukraine's path towards EU membership. The Verkhovna Rada ratified the Framework Agreement between Ukraine and the EU on special mechanisms for allocating EU funding to Ukraine under the Ukraine Facility.

Although in 2024, Ukraine failed to persuade Western partners to transfer Russian assets frozen in Europe to Ukraine, significant positive progress was made in this direction. The EU and G7 countries agreed to provide Ukraine with up to EUR45bn in an extraordinary macro-financial assistance loan and corresponding bilateral loans from G7 partners through the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration initiative to increase Ukraine's budget revenues. Proceeds from immobilised Russian assets will be used to repay the loans provided.

In June, a new chapter in Ukraine's relations with the EU opened with the actual commencement of membership negotiations. Active bilateral cooperation allowed the European Commission to complete the screening of Cluster 1 "Fundamentals" in November.

At the sectoral level, the Agreement on the Carriage of Freight by Road (road freight transport liberalisation) and autonomous trade preferences for EU imports of goods originating from Ukraine were extended. Ukraine continued to benefit from the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, which enabled the delivery of more than 150,000 tonnes of humanitarian aid by year-end. The EU Council extended the temporary protection mechanism for Ukrainian citizens until March 2026.

During the year, the EU Council adopted three new sanctions packages against Russia: the 13th, 14th, and 15th. The process of adopting new sanctions packages slowed with the start of Hungary's presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 2024.

Although Ukraine was not invited to join the Alliance, the NATO Summit in Washington produced several positive results. In particular, the NATO-Ukraine Interoperability Roadmap was approved. Another key decision was the establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC). Additionally, the Washington summit established the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), which in December began to assume responsibility for coordinating the supply of military assistance to Ukraine by Allies and partners, training the Armed Forces, and formulating strategies and plans for the

further development of Ukraine's security and defence sector. However, by year-end, an adapted Annual National Programme for 2025 had not been presented.

In terms of building an international support coalition, the Ukrainian team's efforts to implement the Peace Formula yielded positive results. The first Global Peace Summit (15–16.06) in Switzerland gathered 101 participants representing foreign states and international organisations. The Summit's joint communiqué on the foundations of peace, which was based on the developed vision for addressing global issues, including nuclear and food security, and the release of prisoners and deportees, including children, was signed by 80 participants. However, the desire of Ukraine and its partners to ensure the maximum presence of foreign states and international organisations at the event affected the content of the summit's final document, which was limited to only a few points of the Peace Formula.

Important results were achieved on the bilateral track. Thanks to strengthened interparliamentary cooperation, Italy launched a joint project to rebuild Ukraine under the auspices of the Italian parliament. In 2024, the governments of Ukraine and France signed four agreements covering grants, energy, defence capabilities, and financial and technical support. During the February Conference on Economic Growth and Recovery in Japan, 56 documents were signed, including memoranda with the Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI) and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). During Indian Prime Minister N. Modi's visit to Kyiv, four agreements were signed in the fields of agriculture, pharmaceuticals, cultural cooperation, and Indian humanitarian aid. Ukraine signed a Memorandum on countering disinformation with Moldova and Romania, a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with the UAE, and a Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation with Albania.

The UAE and Qatar continued their efforts to secure the return of Ukrainian citizens from Russian captivity.

At the multilateral level, it is worth noting the adoption of the Strategy for the Development of Ukraine's Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean and the submission of draft free trade agreements to 10 CELAC countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, and Uruguay). However, despite plans announced at the beginning of the year, none of the five anticipated embassies have been opened in the region by the end of 2024. The Ukraine-Latin America Summit, announced in December 2023, did not take place either.

The Southeast Europe-Ukraine summit resulted in a declaration condemning Russian aggression and calling for increased military support for Ukraine and support for its European integration. In Copenhagen, a new cooperation format bringing together 12 countries — the Northern Group-Ukraine — was launched.

The fourth African tour of Ukraine's Minister of Foreign Affairs resulted in five international agreements signed with Malawi, Zambia, and Mauritius. A negative development was the severance of diplomatic relations with Ukraine by Mali and Niger, which, along with Burkina Faso, also addressed the UN Security Council President with accusations of Ukraine supporting terrorism.

The UN General Assembly adopted for the first time a resolution on “Safety and security of nuclear facilities of Ukraine, including the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant”, which emphasises the need for demilitarisation and de-occupation of the NPP due to Russia's non-compliance with IAEA governing body resolutions. The International Court of Justice ruled on the merits of Ukraine's case against Russia regarding the application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, finding that Russia had violated both international documents. At Ukraine's initiative, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe member states officially activated the Moscow Mechanism regarding Ukrainian civilian hostages held by Russia in occupied territories. An important achievement was the announcement of the first decisions on applications to the Register of Damage (RD4U) caused by Russia's aggression against Ukraine, established under the Council of Europe.

The total reach of the Foreign Ministry's communication campaigns in 2024 grew to over 1 billion, with the Ministry's team receiving 46 international creative awards. The Ukrainian Institute expanded its presence abroad, increasing the number of projects implemented in “traditional” countries while entering “new” markets (for example, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa). The draft law on multiple citizenship submitted by the President of Ukraine, which the Verkhovna Rada gave the first reading in December, had a significant impact on diaspora relations.

There were several foreign economic achievements. Notably, the updated Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine and Canada came into force. The government drafted a bill to ratify the FTA with Türkiye. The Verkhovna Rada ratified the

Political, Free Trade and Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine. Negotiations on modernising the Free Trade Agreement with European Free Trade Association member-states were completed.

According to the State Customs Service, Ukraine’s total trade turnover in 2024 reached nearly USD112.3bn, 13% up on the previous year. Exports of goods gained momentum, reaching USD 41.6bn, while imports totalled USD 70.7bn. In aggregate terms, the EU remains Ukraine’s main foreign trade partner, accounting for 60% of exports and 50% of imports.


The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Service of Ukraine on Food Safety and Consumer Protection actively sought new trade opportunities and secured access to 16 new foreign markets for Ukrainian exports. The expansion of the logistics capabilities of the Ukrainian sea corridor further facilitated this.

The top five trading partners (in goods) were China (USD16.75bn), Poland (USD 11.7bn), Germany (USD 8.2bn), Türkiye (USD 6.4bn), and Italy (USD 4.5bn). Ukraine imported most from China (USD 14.4bn), Poland (USD 6.97bn), Germany (USD 5.4bn), Türkiye (USD 4.24bn), and the United States (USD 3.5bn). The largest exports went to Poland (USD 4.7bn), Spain (USD 2.9bn), Germany (USD 2.8bn), China (USD 2.4bn), and Türkiye (USD 2.2bn).

In terms of results, the highest scores were awarded to European Integration, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, Northern Europe, the Baltic states, the Western Balkans, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, the UN, the International Coalition for Ukraine’s recovery, the Peace Formula, Military diplomacy, Economic diplomacy.

Total score for the indicator –

Total score –





G7 COUNTRIES

	2022	2023	2024
UNITED KINGDOM	A	A	A
ITALY	B+	A	A-
CANADA	A	A	B+
GERMANY	A	A-	A-
USA	A	A-	B+
FRANCE	A-	A	A-
JAPAN	A-	A	A

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	5	5
ACTIVITIES	5	5	5
RESULTS	5	5	5
TOTAL SCORE	A	A	A

Cooperation between the UK and Ukraine remained active throughout 2024, with the new British government continuing its support for Ukraine. The year 2024 was marked by the signing of the One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement, which will remain a cornerstone of bilateral relations.

Political interest/engagement

Interest in cooperation with the UK was evident both in constituent documents and statements from key institutions responsible for developing and implementing foreign policy. Among the main thematic shifts in Ukraine-British relations was a move away from the predominance of security issues, which were prominent throughout 2022 and 2023, towards prioritising general cooperation across a wide range of issues.

The President's Address to the Verkhovna Rada contained no direct mentions of cooperation with Great Britain. However, the UK, as one of Ukraine's key allies, is considered part of the international community supporting Ukraine in its struggle for sovereignty and democratic values.

The Government's Action Plan for 2024 identified three key areas for developing bilateral relations: defence cooperation (creating conditions for interoperability and training with Joint Expeditionary Forces), trade cooperation (extending the temporary trade liberalisation agreement), and joint efforts to counter disinformation.

President V. Zelenskyy's speech at the meeting with foreign diplomatic mission heads, entitled "Wartime Diplomacy: Resilience, Weapons, Victory", mentioned the UK as one of the world's security leaders and a defender of Ukraine. The President emphasised that bilateral documents signed with countries such as the UK, Germany, and France strengthen Ukraine, its soldiers and people. He also noted that these countries are truly global leaders in terms of security and Ukraine's defence.

Strategic communications

The year was marked by significant media activity by the Ukrainian leadership, primarily the Presidential Office. Throughout 2024, President Zelenskyy gave numerous interviews to British media, including Channel 4 News (20.01), The Guardian (31.05), the BBC (19.07, 21.07), and Sky News (29.11). The Foreign Minister gave an interview to the BBC (19.06), the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council spoke to The Telegraph (15.03), the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU was interviewed by The Guardian (24.07), and the Head of the Presidential Office spoke to The Telegraph (02.02, 04.12).

There were numerous contacts between the Ukrainian leadership and the royal family (particularly during the July visit), which held significant symbolic importance for bilateral relations.

More informal communication channels were also utilised: for example, the newly appointed Ambassador of Ukraine to the UK, General V. Zaluzhnyi, spoke at the Royal United Services Institute (21.07), which became a news event contextualising understanding of new warfare types and the vision for a new security system. Cultural diplomacy events and Ukrainian expert activity played important roles in communications. Experts actively provided commentary to British media on current events and participated in public events and informal briefings for British politicians.

MPs frequently appeared on key British television and radio channels to comment on current events, with L. Vasylenko, Y. Cherniev, I. Klympush-Tsintsadze, O. Goncharenko, and K. Rudyk being particularly active.

Activities

2024 was an active year for direct contacts and the conclusion of new security and economic agreements. The political year began with Ukraine's unilateral extension of visa-free travel for UK nationals (10.01).

During the year, President Zelenskyy visited the United Kingdom twice (18–19.07 and 10.10), meeting with the country's leadership and the royal family. Both visits received significant media attention and produced tangible results. Throughout the year, the President held telephone conversations with the British Prime Ministers (05.07, 28.11, 23.12).

Ukraine's Defence Minister R. Umerov was also active, making several visits to the UK (13.01, 13.10).

High-level British guests visited Ukraine, too, including Prime Minister R. Sunak (12.01), a parliamentary delegation (24.02), Secretary of State for Defence J. Healey (7.07, 18.12), and Foreign Secretary D. Lammy (11.09).

Throughout the year, the Ukrainian central executive initiated more than 15 calls and 45 face-to-face meetings with UK counterparts. As expected, the largest number of such meetings were conducted by the MFA and the MoD, but notable

activity also came from Ukraine's Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Energy, and Ministry of Culture and Information Policy.

Representatives from Ukraine's economic and energy sectors were also highly active. In particular, January saw the launch of the TechBridge project (16.01), aimed at developing the technology sectors of Ukraine and the UK.

In total, more than 20 meetings and visits at the executive level initiated by Ukraine took place throughout the year. Most active in this area were the MFA (05.02), the MoD (07.07, 19.07, 13.10), the Ministry of Economy (31.01, 08.11), and the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy (20.09). As expected, the main focus of all negotiations, beyond organising bilateral cooperation to counter Russian aggression, was the development of bilateral economic relations and people-to-people diplomacy.

A new Ambassador of Ukraine to the UK, General V. Zaluzhnyi, was appointed (endorsed by the President of Ukraine on 07.03, commenced duties on 09.05).

Results

Throughout 2024, cooperation between Ukraine and Great Britain developed consistently within a narrative of mutual understanding and progress. An important step was the signing of a security agreement providing for a 100-year partnership, annual additional assistance over 10 years, and automatic provision of weapons to Ukraine in the event of any aggression (12.01).

It is worth noting that more than half of the contacts, initiatives, and proposals in this area were initiated by Ukraine, displaying its active position.

The Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, the London Stock Exchange, and TheCityUK signed a Memorandum of Understanding to support the development of the Ukrainian market of financial and related professional services through the City-Ukraine Hub (24.01).

The VRU ratified the UK-Ukraine agreement on digital trade (24.04, entered into force on 01.09) and the agreement on gradual trade liberalisation (22.08).

In the area of defence cooperation, several agreements were signed aimed at strengthening Ukraine's defence industry. In accordance with previously signed agreements, a Mine Countermeasures Force Group was established in the Black

Sea (16.02). Ukraine's Minister for Strategic Industries O. Kamyshin, Defence Minister R. Umerov, and UK Minister of State for Trade Policy G. Hands signed a framework agreement on cooperation on defence and industrial issues (08.04). During a major government delegation visit to the UK, Ukraine and Great Britain signed an agreement on loan support for Ukraine's defence capabilities (19.07).

Exports of goods to the UK in 2024 totalled USD611.2m (+70.1% compared to 2023), while imports from the UK totalled USD 1.3bn (+16.4% compared to 2023). The key products of Ukrainian exports were agricultural products, processed foods, and metals. The total UK military aid to Ukraine in 2024 amounted to GBP 4.64bn.

Italy



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	4	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	5	5
ACTIVITIES	4	5	5
RESULTS	4	5	4
TOTAL SCORE	B+	A	A-

The Victory Plan, focus on NATO and EU membership, cooperation in the energy, security, and defence sectors were defining topics of cooperation with Italy in 2024. Italy confirmed that support for Ukraine was a priority for its G7 presidency. The security agreement was signed in February. Funds amounting to USD50bn, obtained through frozen Russian assets, were also unblocked.



Political interest/engagement

Ukrainian political interest in Italy was defined by preparations for the signing of a bilateral security guarantee agreement, the development of the Made in Ukraine economic platform, and Italy's discussions on defence, economic, humanitarian, and cultural support for Ukraine. President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyy, in communication with Italian partners, emphasised strengthening defence capabilities and rebuilding Ukraine, continuing military assistance to Ukraine, and the priorities of implementing the Peace Formula.

Through Italy, Ukraine advocated for the use of frozen Russian assets as early as 2024 in the context of its cooperation with the EU and Italy's G7 presidency. Prime Minister D. Shmyhal in an address to the Italian-Ukrainian business forum, called for investments in Ukraine (20.11).

Mechanisms of inter-parliamentary cooperation were updated and activated, allowing for bilateral visits of Ukrainian parliamentarians to Italy and vice versa (08–09.07, 30.09).

Strategic communications

Ukraine's strategic communications regarding Italy in 2024 focused on security and culture, as well as Ukraine's European integration. In particular, V. Zelenskyy welcomed the signing of the 10-year security agreement (24.02), which envisages maintaining the level of military assistance to Ukraine and cooperation in various defence sectors. Regular dialogue between President Zelenskyy and Italian Prime Minister G. Meloni was actively covered in the media and social networks.

President Zelenskyy spoke with seven leading Italian media outlets: Repubblica, Corriere della Sera, la Stampa, Sole 24 Ore, Tg1, and Skytg24, answering questions about Ukraine's Victory Plan (07.09).

First Lady O. Zelenska visited Italy (20–21.11), where she, together with the First Ladies of Serbia, Armenia, Lithuania, and the daughter of the President of Italy, took

part in a mass dedicated to 1,000 days of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. O. Zelenska spoke with Italian journalists from *Corriere della Sera* (20.11) and *RAI 1* (20.11).

Activities

Bilateral dialogue with Italian partners remained quite intensive throughout 2024. V. Zelenskyy personally visited Italy (11.10) to present Ukraine's Victory Plan. This visit was in response to a visit by the Italian side (24.02) to finalise and sign a bilateral security agreement. Additionally, the President of Ukraine visited Italy at the invitation of G. Meloni to participate in the G7 summit (12–14.06).

VRU Deputy Speaker O. Kondratiuk held a working meeting in Rome with the Vice President of the Chamber of Deputies, G. Mule (08.07), to brief him on the aspects of military and humanitarian cooperation with Ukraine.

The heads of the MFA, D. Kuleba and A. Sybiha, visited Italy to participate in the G7 ministerial meetings (17–19.04 and 25–26.11), while the Head of the Presidential Office of Ukraine, A. Yermak, was in Italy on the eve of the G7 summit (08.06), which contributed to the consolidation of efforts to support Ukraine's Victory Plan, Ukraine's membership in the EU and NATO, etc.

A telephone conversation also took place between the head of the OPU, A. Yermak, and the Minister of Economic Development of Italy, A. Urso (21.08), which secured consolidated Italian government support for Ukraine. The parties also discussed mechanisms for attracting Italian investments to strengthen Ukraine's defence industry.

Representatives of the Ministries of Energy of Ukraine and Italy were engaged in active communication with a view to implementing a new bilateral energy partnership launched in 2023, which contributed to the implementation of modern energy-efficient and carbon-free technologies and projects already in 2024.

In 2024, under the leadership and initiative of the Italian Embassy in Ukraine, the G7 Ambassadors Group held 30 meetings with the leadership of state

institutions and the government of Ukraine, civil society, and the media, as well as more than 20 coordination meetings. They contributed to the implementation of reforms in important institutions such as the Bureau of Economic Security, the Customs Service, and the Accounting Chamber, as well as the reform of procurement in the defence sector, and the strengthening of corporate governance of state-owned companies.

A completely new format of interparliamentary cooperation was the participation of Italian parliamentarians, together with parliamentarians from the G7 countries and Ukraine, in visits to the USA in the context of consultations with US Congress members (18.12).

Italy became one of the 40 countries that discussed achieving the EU REPower goal, a complete halt of Russian fuel imports to the EU, which was part of the implementation of the Energy Security clause of the Peace Formula.

To overcome pro-Russian narratives in television programmes and analytical articles of leading Italian channels, Ukrainian experts organised a series of round tables in Rome and Milan.

Results

With Italian assistance and within the framework of the G7 countries' activities, the Berlin Declaration was signed.

Ukraine signed a security cooperation agreement with Italy (24.02), registering specific amounts of financial support and military aid packages provided to Ukraine by Italy since the beginning of Russia's full-scale aggression, along with Italy's commitment to continue providing such assistance throughout the 10-year duration of the agreement. Italy supported the blocking of frozen Russian assets, which allowed for the allocation of USD50bn for Ukraine, and provided funding for the reconstruction of Ukraine in the amount of EUR 450mn during 2024.

Thanks to the strengthening of the interparliamentary diplomatic track, Italy began implementing a joint project for the reconstruction of Ukraine under the patronage of the Italian Parliament (09.07).

Italy's contribution to strengthening Ukraine's defence capabilities is significant as it provided air defence systems (SAMP/T) to protect Ukrainian skies.

In 2024, the defence companies Rheinmetall and Leonardo began to cooperate with Ukraine in the production of weapons for the needs of Ukraine.

Italy has strengthened its support for Ukraine, including in the energy sector, at various levels — intergovernmental, G7+, EU, as well as at the level of private companies.

Italy allocated EUR13mn to the Ukraine Energy Support Fund (30.12) and up to EUR 40mn to programmes to support temporarily displaced persons from Ukraine (10.04).

According to the State Customs Service of Ukraine, at the end of 2024, trade in goods between Ukraine and Italy amounted to USD4.5bn, which is 18% more than a year earlier. Exports of Ukrainian goods to Italy amounted to USD 1.9bn (+26%), and imports increased by 13% and amounted to USD 2.6bn.

Canada

B+

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	5	4
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	5	4
ACTIVITIES	5	5	5
RESULTS	5	5	5
TOTAL SCORE	A	A	B+

Although cooperation remained relatively high, there was a slight decline in Ukraine's political interest in Canada and a noticeable reduction in some areas of strategic communications. The established formats of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in various areas were developed and maintained at a steady level. Some successes included the signing of a security agreement and further steps in financial and military support for Ukraine in countering Russian aggression.

Political interest/engagement

In 2024, the Ukrainian political leadership maintained a consensus on the importance of relations with Canada. The strategic nature of the relationship and the focus on developing cooperation were reflected in strategic documents, individual speeches and addresses by Ukrainian officials. The vast majority of references, which were made on a regular basis, concerned the financial and military support that Canada continues to provide to Ukraine. They either acknowledged the contribution already made or referred to current and future steps to attract Canadian assistance and investment, particularly in the areas of defence, regional development, and technological cooperation. Additionally, Canada was repeatedly mentioned in the context of the introduction and enforcement of sanctions and other restrictive measures against Russia. There were also mentions of support for Ukrainian refugees and Canada's participation in the implementation of the Peace Formula.

Yet, the number of public references to Canada in the statements of Ukraine's top political leadership decreased compared to the previous year. While retaining its place in the speeches of Prime Minister D. Shmyhal and representatives of certain ministries, Canada was more often relegated to the background among other partner countries and appeared less regularly in the addresses of the President and the Verkhovna Rada leadership. Moreover, with the exception of a few cases, the issues of Ukraine-Canada relations did not appear on the agendas of relevant parliamentary committees.

Strategic communications

As in previous years, most of Ukraine's communication with Canada was conducted at the level of the top political leadership. V. Zelenskyy addressed Canada in the framework of multilateral forums and summits (the Peace Summit, meetings of the G7 and G20 leaders, etc.).

R. Stefanchuk addressed the participants of the International Security Forum in Halifax (22.11) and spoke to the Canadian media. The VRU delegation also visited Ottawa (18.04) and met local representatives. Other formats that were present in 2023 were not observed this year.

Activities

Activities aimed at developing Ukraine-Canada relations remained at a high level in 2024. There were frequent contacts between the two countries' top political leaders, with Ukrainian representatives visiting Canada and Canadian representatives visiting Ukraine. President Zelenskyy and Canadian Prime Minister J. Trudeau had regular telephone conversations and also met in person at the G7 summit (13.06), the NATO summit (11.07), and on the side-lines of the UN GA (25.09). Trudeau visited Ukraine (24.02) and took part in events marking the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion.

There was interaction at the level of governments. Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister M. Joly visited Kyiv (2–3.02), where she met Ukrainian authorities to discuss topical issues of bilateral cooperation. Ukrainian Foreign Minister D. Kuleba took part in the G7 ministerial meeting in Capri, Italy (17–19.04), where he held a bilateral meeting with M. Joly. Similar meetings were held by D. Kuleba's successor, A. Sybiha, during his visit to NATO HQ (3.12). In parallel, interagency cooperation was developing in various areas, with separate meetings being held between representatives of the Ministries of Defence, Energy, Culture, Interior, etc.

Interparliamentary cooperation was more active than last year. Two VRU delegations to Canada were formed (18.04, 01.11). Speaker R. Stefanchuk met the Speaker of the House of Commons of the Canadian Parliament, G. Fergus, at the NATO summit in Washington (9.07), at the G7 Parliamentary Summit in Verona, Italy (6.09), and during the visit of the Canadian parliamentary delegation to Kyiv (14.10). During his visit to Kyiv, G. Fergus addressed the Verkhovna Rada and gave a joint press conference to the Ukrainian media. R. Stefanchuk visited Canada to take part in the International Security Forum in Halifax (22.11) and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Montreal (25.11), where he met representatives of the Canadian government and parliament.

Results

One of the key outcomes of cooperation between Ukraine and Canada was the signing of the agreement on security cooperation and strategic partnership (24.02). Canada continued to participate in multilateral formats aimed at supporting Ukraine, including by joining the International Drone Coalition. Canada provided Ukraine with the NASAMS air defence system purchased from the US (24.11).

Canada continued to train Ukrainian military personnel within the framework of international missions and provide financial support. Over the year, Canada allocated about CAD 3bn for various purposes. The Canadian sanctions list against Russia was expanded by 163 entries.

Canada took part in the Peace Summit and contributed to the implementation of certain points of the Peace Formula. Under Canada's co-chairmanship, an international coalition to return Ukrainian children forcibly deported to Russia was launched in Kyiv (2.02), and a thematic conference on these issues was held in Montreal (30–31.10). In the area of food security, Canada supported Ukrainian agricultural infrastructure and facilitated the export of grain from Ukrainian ports. Agreements were reached on cooperation in the field of nuclear fuel. Ministers A. Sybiha and M. Joly signed an agreement on the mutual protection of classified information (3.12).

The ratification of the updated Free Trade Agreement signed in 2023, which entered into force on 1.07.2024, was completed. Nevertheless, the total trade turnover between the countries gradually decreased during the year and amounted to almost USD370mn. Compared to the previous year, there was a noticeable increase in Ukrainian exports (to USD 152mn) and a decrease in imports (to USD 217mn).

Germany

A-

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	5	5
ACTIVITIES	5	5	5
RESULTS	5	4	4
TOTAL SCORE	A	A-	A-

In 2024, Ukrainian-German relations were characterised by an unprecedented intensity of political dialogue and cooperation. Kyiv focused its efforts on expanding military assistance, attracting German investments into the national defence industry, and accelerating European integration processes. A security agreement was signed. The overall volume of aid from Germany reached EUR37bn, including EUR 8.1bn for air defence systems. Ukraine continues efforts to secure the transfer of Taurus long-range missiles. Economic interaction intensified with the launch of joint defence projects. Germany allocated significant funds to the restoration of the energy system and support for Ukraine.

Political interest/engagement

Germany remains a strategic partner of Ukraine in the areas of defence, finance, European integration, and development cooperation. Throughout the year, Ukrainian officials, including the President, the Prime Minister, and the Parliament leadership, regularly raised the issue of military support, arms supplies, and strengthening sanctions against Russia in their statements and speeches. Among political actors, there is a consensus regarding Ukraine's interests in cooperation with Germany.

During D. Shmyhal's working visit to Germany (December), attention was focused on attracting German investments into the domestic defence industry, including the production of drones and missiles. Ukraine also insists on expanding military assistance, lifting restrictions on the use of transferred weapons, as well as the supply of Taurus long-range missiles.

Germany plays a key role in supporting Ukraine's European integration. Kyiv is counting on its continued leadership in Ukraine's EU and NATO accession while recognising some scepticism in Germany regarding the idea of Ukraine's NATO membership and the need for further work in this direction.

Strategic communications

A key event was the historic address by President V. Zelenskyy to the Bundestag (11.06). This was the first in-person speech by the Ukrainian leader in the German Parliament. V. Zelenskyy stressed that Ukraine and Germany share a common responsibility for peace, security in Europe, and the international order.

At the beginning of the year, V. Zelenskyy gave an interview to ARD TV, in which he emphasised the importance of Germany's long-term support for Ukraine. He also delivered a speech at the Munich Security Conference (17.02).

On the occasion of Ukraine's Independence Day, Ambassador of Ukraine O. Makeiev and four members of the Bundestag — M. Roth, N. Roettgen, M. Faber and A. Hofreiter — published a joint article entitled "The Future of Europe Depends on the Victory of Ukraine". In it, the authors emphasise that Russia's war against Ukraine determines the future of the entire continent. They call on European

countries to formulate more clearly a common goal — the victory of Ukraine, which will mean victory over war as a phenomenon.

Amb. Makeiev actively communicated with the German media. He gave interviews to popular media outlets such as Deutschlandfunk, ZDF, ARD, and Phoenix Tagesgespräch, where he spoke about military assistance, Ukraine's needs, and international diplomacy.

Activities

In 2024, Ukrainian-German relations were characterised by an unprecedentedly high level of political dialogue and practical cooperation. President Zelenskyy paid several visits to Germany (16.02, 11.06, 06.09, 11.10), which included meetings at the highest level.

Thus, President Zelenskyy met German Federal President F.-W. Steinmeier and Federal Chancellor O. Scholz (16.02) to discuss and sign the agreement on cooperation in the field of security and long-term support between Ukraine and Germany.

Zelenskyy and Steinmeier discussed financial support for Ukraine and the reconstruction of Chernihiv Region (11.10).

Chancellor O. Scholz paid the first bilateral visit to Ukraine during the war (02.12). The President briefed the Chancellor on the Victory Plan as a bridge to holding a productive Peace Summit.

In December, against the backdrop of the political crisis in Germany, V. Zelenskyy also met the chairman of the Christian Democratic Union party and leader of the CDU/CSU opposition faction in the German Bundestag, F. Merz, who has a high chance of becoming the new German Chancellor following the parliamentary elections in February 2025.

Contacts at the level of the MFAs were intensive (A. Baerbock's visits to Kyiv in May and December, A. Sybiha's visit to Berlin in December, a meeting of Deputy Foreign Minister O. Mishchenko and State Secretary T. Bagger in November), as well as meetings of the Ministers of Defence, Economy and Culture.

The German-Ukrainian Defence Industry Session DFNC2 (23.10), organised by the Ministry of Strategic Industries, the MoD of Ukraine, the Federation of German Industries (BDI) and the German-Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, took place. In the military sector, Germany took the lead in strengthening Ukraine's air defence by providing IRIS-T and Patriot systems. Ukrainian military personnel were trained at the Hub North training centre.

The VII German-Ukrainian Business Forum in Berlin brought together 500 business representatives (17.12).

Results

In 2024, relations between Ukraine and Germany reached a new level, which was reflected in the strengthening of military cooperation and the expansion of economic partnership.

A historic security agreement was signed (16.02), which formalised Germany's intentions to provide military assistance to Ukraine. In 2024, Ukrainian defenders received weapons worth EUR8.1bn, including Patriot, IRIS-T, Gepard, and ammunition. Germany became a leader in providing Ukraine with air defence systems. Joint ventures with Rheinmetall, KMW, Flensburger Fahrzeugbau Gesellschaft were launched, and a memorandum with Helsing GmbH was signed.

The trade turnover between the countries in 2024 amounted to USD8.2bn (USD 5.4bn in imports and USD 2.8bn in exports). Germany provided EUR 235mn for the restoration of Ukraine's energy system and EUR 170mn in winter support. In October, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of Germany signed an agreement on cooperation in the fields of science, technology, innovation, and higher education.

Despite significant volumes of critical military assistance, Ukraine failed to reach an agreement on the provision of Taurus long-range missiles by Germany. Also, Berlin remained sceptical regarding Ukraine's accession to NATO.

USA

B+

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	4	4
ACTIVITIES	5	5	5
RESULTS	5	5	4
TOTAL SCORE	A	A-	B+

The US election campaign in 2024 was a key external factor influencing the development of Ukraine-US relations and Ukraine's activities in this area. Engagement with the US was at times improvised and fragmented, which hindered the formation of a comprehensive strategy for bilateral relations.

Political interest/engagement

In most speeches delivered on international platforms, such as the UN, the EU, and international non-governmental conferences, Ukrainian representatives at all levels identified cooperation with the United States as a priority and a strategic necessity for preserving Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity.

Throughout the year, officials repeatedly emphasised the strategic nature of the relationship, the indispensability of comprehensive military and macro-financial assistance, and the importance of supporting Ukraine's economic recovery and infrastructure reconstruction.

A key objective of Ukraine's diplomatic efforts towards the US, as outlined in the President's speech at the meeting of heads of foreign diplomatic missions (19.08), was to secure long-range missile systems and permission for their use deep within Russian territory. The importance of US cooperation was further underscored by the fact that the United States was one of the countries to receive a classified annex to Section 3 of Ukraine's Victory Plan, as noted by the President in his address to the Verkhovna Rada (16.10). However, in the President's Annual Address to the VRU (19.11), references to the United States were limited to partial mentions of cooperation in defence technology.

Strategic communications

Throughout 2024, Ukrainian politicians and officials actively engaged with US media. The President of Ukraine gave interviews to Fox News (23.02, 20.11), CNN (25.02), NBC (21.04), Reuters (21.06), The Philadelphia Inquirer (30.06), Bloomberg (04.07), and CBN (11.12). The Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke with CNN (20.02) and Voice of America (24.02), while the Head of the Presidential Office gave an interview to NPR (22.01) and wrote an article for The Hill (21.02).

From mid-summer, official communications also began incorporating outreach to the opposition represented by the Republican presidential campaign committee, which had previously been conducted primarily through diplomatic channels with all political forces. A significant development in this regard was a phone conversation between President V. Zelenskyy and then-US presidential candidate D. Trump (20.07).

The primary focus of communication throughout 2024 remained to secure continued US military and economic support despite the unpredictability and political complexity of the election cycle. Different messaging strategies were employed for different political audiences: discussions with the Democratic Party emphasised shared democratic values and US leadership, while engagements with the Republican Party highlighted opportunities for economic and resource-based cooperation. The work on Ukraine's Victory Plan exemplified these tailored approaches, as it involved discussions with representatives of both parties.

Additionally, Ukrainian parliamentary delegations conducted several "roadshows" in predominantly Republican states, and a "Cultural Troopers" tour was organised to sustain support and financial backing for Ukraine.

Activities

Key topics of engagement remained defence cooperation, Ukraine's economic recovery, investment, and reforms. In the second half of the year, the increasing prominence of the US domestic political agenda began influencing the bilateral relationship, requiring Ukraine to ensure bipartisan outreach in all diplomatic initiatives.

The President of Ukraine made two visits to the United States (9–13.07, 22–27.09) and held a series of phone conversations with President J. Biden and candidate D. Trump (20.07). The high-level engagement was also maintained by the Presidential Office, with Head of Office A. Yermak holding over a dozen discussions with White House representatives and US lawmakers.

During his visit to the US in late September, the President addressed the UN GA and held meetings with American officials and politicians, including the presidential candidates.

A significant step forward was the launch of a joint inspection of US-provided weapons, with the first inspection conducted on January 20 to enhance oversight of international assistance.

The US-Ukraine Partnership Forum took place in Washington (18.04), focusing on economic recovery, reconstruction, and the role of private investors.

Parliamentary diplomacy also intensified during the year. A Ukrainian parliamentary delegation visited Washington (19.05) to discuss authorisation for retaliatory strikes against Russian military targets using US-supplied weaponry and increasing the number of Ukrainian pilots trained on F-16 fighter jets. NATO accession was also on the agenda. Throughout the year, parliamentary delegations visited various US states, receiving positive responses.

Numerous meetings were held between Ukraine's Prosecutor-General's Office and the US Department of Justice on international legal issues, including maintaining sanctions, pressuring the Russian leadership through legal mechanisms, and prosecuting Russian war crimes. The Ministry of Digital Transformation was also active, engaging in discussions on economic and defence cooperation with the US.

Ukraine's Minister of Economy, Y. Svyrydenko, visited the US (04.12–05.12) to present investment projects and secure support for economic recovery, as well as to meet business associations.

The appointment of P. Pritzker as the US Special Representative for Ukraine's Economic Recovery intensified bilateral dialogue on domestic reforms, foreign investment, and joint projects with American businesses. In 2024, she visited Ukraine six times.

A high-level Ukrainian delegation, including representatives from the OPU, the MoD, the Ministry of Economy, and the General Staff of the AFU, visited the US (30.08–31.08) to discuss joint military training, defence technology projects, expanding Ukrainian exports to the US, and attracting investment for Ukraine's recovery.

Results

Despite the political instability typical of a US election cycle, Ukraine managed to maintain consistent engagement at multiple levels of the US executive branch throughout the year.

The key security milestone was the signing of the Framework Security Agreement between Ukraine and the United States (13.06). This document affirmed Ukraine's security as an integral part of Euro-Atlantic security, outlined commitments to expanding defence cooperation and trade ties, underscored the need for a just and lasting peace within Ukraine's internationally recognised borders, and reinforced efforts to hold Russia accountable for aggression and war crimes. The agreement also committed the US to assisting Ukraine in the event of future military threats.

The Main Inspectorate of Ukraine's MoD and the US DoD Office of Inspector General signed a Memorandum of Understanding (31.01).

The Ministry of Economy and the leading global stock exchange Nasdaq signed a Memorandum of Understanding to strengthen Ukraine's economy and capital markets (12.02).

At NATO headquarters, Ukraine's Foreign Minister A. Sybiha and US Secretary of State A. Blinken signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation to enhance Ukraine's energy resilience (03.12).

In 2024, the US provided Ukraine with assistance exceeding USD62bn. This included major aid packages approved by Congress and individual tranches announced by the presidential administration. Additionally, a Ukroboronprom representative office was opened in Washington, DC (9.07).

According to Ukraine's Customs Service, Ukrainian exports to the US in 2024 totalled USD874.9mn (+68.7% compared to 2023), while imports from the US amounted to USD 3,471.6mn (+21.3% compared to 2023). The key export categories were metals and metal products, agricultural goods, and machinery.

France



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	5	5
ACTIVITIES	5	5	5
RESULTS	4	5	4
TOTAL SCORE	A-	A	A-

Ukraine maintained close political relations with France and received military and diplomatic support from it. Strategic communications were effective due to the visits of President V. Zelenskyy and media presence. Numerous activities, including high-level meetings and parliamentary diplomacy, strengthened relations. Key results included signed agreements on financial, energy, and defence cooperation, significant humanitarian aid, and French investments in Ukraine.



Political interest/engagement

The French direction of Ukraine's foreign policy remained important in 2024. President V. Zelenskyy mentioned France in his addresses, particularly regarding the supply of Caesar artillery systems, defence packages and preparations for the signing of an agreement on security guarantees. In his speech to the National Assembly of France (07.06), he emphasised that Ukraine is deeply grateful to France for its unwavering support since the first hours of the Russian invasion. This included military assistance, in particular air defence systems, armoured vehicles and artillery, facilitation of Ukraine's diplomatic and economic efforts, as well as assistance provided by French people to Ukrainian refugees in the manifestation of solidarity at the societal level.

VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk, Vice-Prime Minister O. Stefanishyna, Defence Minister R. Umerov, and Foreign Ministers D. Kuleba and A. Sybiha periodically mentioned relations with France in their statements and speeches. The officials particularly noted diplomatic cooperation with France on the issues of Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO, as well as President E. Macron's initiative to deploy a European military contingent to Ukraine.

References to France in the Government's Action Plan for 2024 are limited to cooperation on disinformation issues.

The main focus of parliamentary cooperation was on involving France in supporting Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations, as well as on active discussion of the Peace Formula. The issues of military-political assistance, strengthening energy security, humanitarian demining, reforming public administration and rebuilding Ukraine were also raised separately.

Strategic communications

Ukraine's strategic communications in 2024 are characterised by high intensity, with President Zelenskyy playing a key role. Having paid four visits to Paris, he actively promoted narratives about the need to increase defence support, ensure security guarantees and intensify diplomatic efforts. An important communication signal was the invitation of V. Zelenskyy, instead of V. Putin, to the 80th anniversary of the Allied landings in Normandy (07.06), during which the President of Ukraine

addressed the French National Assembly on the war in Ukraine and Franco-Ukrainian cooperation.

In the context of promoting the issue of human rights protection at the level of public diplomacy, the speech of Ukrainian Nobel laureate O. Matviichuk at the Paris Peace Forum (11.11) was an important contribution to highlighting Russia's war crimes against Ukraine.

These efforts were supported by an active media campaign, which included interviews, press briefings and statements, contributing to the emergence of media publications on the war in Ukraine with mentions of President Zelenskyy's visits. In particular, the President gave interviews to French BFM TV and Le Monde (12.03) on the upcoming meeting with E. Macron in Kyiv and stopping the advance of Russian troops, as well as to representatives of the French media (01.08) regarding the use of Western weapons against Russian territory, the participation of Ukrainian and Russian athletes in the Olympic Games in Paris, the position of the USA and China, etc.

Activities

Throughout the year, Presidents Zelenskyy and Macron maintained constant contact, holding regular telephone conversations and meetings. The President of Ukraine paid four visits to France (16.02, 07.06, 10.10, 07.12). During his visit to Paris (07.06), the President was accompanied for negotiations by the Minister for Strategic Industries, O. Kamyshin, and the First Vice-Prime Minister — Minister of Economy Y. Svyrydenko. On another visit to Paris (07.12), V. Zelenskyy held talks with E. Macron and D. Trump. Bilateral interactions continued at international summits, such as the G7, NATO and the European Community, as well as the Global Peace Summit.

In parallel, the MFA, under the leadership of D. Kuleba and later A. Sybiha held more than 10 meetings with French colleagues, where they discussed military assistance (artillery, aviation, air defence), joint arms production, sanctions against Russia and European integration.

Parliamentary diplomacy played a significant role in strengthening bilateral ties. In March, a delegation from the National Assembly of France, headed by Y. Braun-Pivet, visited Ukraine, where they held meetings with

President V. Zelenskyy, Minister of Defence R. Umerov, Prosecutor-General A. Kostin and other key Ukrainian officials. The delegation also visited Odesa. The second visit was dedicated to participation in a meeting of the OECD Working Group on Bribery, where Ukraine presented a final report on the implementation of anti-corruption legislation.

Two important meetings of Franco-Ukrainian groups took place in the French Senate: a study visit of the VRU delegation, dedicated to cybersecurity and European integration issues, and a meeting with a delegation of Ukrainian mayors, during which issues of local self-governance and decentralised cooperation were discussed. French Foreign Minister J. Barrot also received a delegation of Ukrainian city mayors who attended the Congress of Mayors of France in Paris (21.11).

Throughout 2024, the Ukrainian Anne of Kyiv Brigade was trained and equipped in France at French expense and according to the French plan.

Results

Thanks to the efforts of Ukrainian diplomacy, political rapprochement between Ukraine and France emerged from the shadow of France's historical relations with Russia. France took part in the constituent meetings in preparation for the Peace Summit, which was held in Switzerland in January.

In addition to the agreement on security commitments (16.02), in 2024, the governments of Ukraine and France signed four other agreements (07.06): on grants, energy, strengthening of defence capabilities, financial and technical support.

The grant agreement provides EUR200mn in aid for the restoration of Ukraine's critical infrastructure. A representative office of the AFD Group in Ukraine was established to provide financial and technical support for business. Ukraine and France agreed on the terms of operation of the French Development Agency, the Society for the Promotion of Participation in Economic Cooperation (PROPARCO) and Expertise France. The agreement on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy was renewed for 20 years (09.06).

Separately, the two states agreed to cooperate in the defence industry. In particular, this includes the production of 155-mm ammunition and the creation of a maintenance centre for equipment in Ukraine. Ukraine and France contributed to the start and strengthening of cooperation between the defence companies of the two countries.

Ukraine also achieved results in ensuring humanitarian resilience and economic recovery in relations with France. As of 1 September 2024, the humanitarian aid amounted to almost EUR434mn, which made it possible to provide for the vital needs of the population affected by the war. Also, the Ukrainian civil sector and the Crisis and Support Centre (CDCS) of the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs put in place mechanisms for financing about 30 partner organisations to address critical needs by providing medical, psychological, and food assistance, demining territories. Also, thanks to diplomatic efforts, French telecommunications tycoon X. Niel invested EUR 1.5bn with the support of the IFC in the Ukrainian telecommunications sector (Lifecell, Volia).

According to the State Customs Service, trade turnover between Ukraine and France for 2024 amounted to USD2.36bn, compared to USD 2.2bn in 2023, of which imports amounted to USD 1.62bn and exports to USD 740mn.

Japan



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	4	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	5	5
ACTIVITIES	5	5	5
RESULTS	5	5	5
TOTAL SCORE	A-	A	A

In 2024, Ukraine strengthened the practical aspects of its partnership with Japan. The cooperation was characterised by a systematic approach, coordination between different levels of government, and institutional efficiency. Economic cooperation and reconstruction, security dialogue, and financial cooperation were prioritised based on the principle of “doing more and talking less”. Kyiv has overcome its passive approach by proposing new initiatives. At the same time, the model of relations remains predominantly focused on support for Ukraine in times of war and political instability.

Political interest/engagement

Ukraine has demonstrated a high political interest in cooperation with Japan. Ukraine's top officials have repeatedly mentioned Japan as the country's key partner in the Asia-Pacific region and the international arena. President V. Zelenskyy emphasised his vision for a "real partnership" with Japan and his aim to make the model of Japan-Ukraine relations "exemplary" (the President's speech at the meeting of heads of foreign diplomatic missions of Ukraine, 19.08). Summarising the outcomes of the G7 summit, the President noted that cooperation with Tokyo had reached a level that "not all European countries have" (13.06). In his daily address (07.01) on the occasion of the visit of the Japanese Foreign Minister to Kyiv, the President described Japan-Ukraine relations as "one of our greatest foreign policy achievements".

Ukraine's Foreign Minister A. Sybiha also declared that bilateral relations had reached the level of strategic partnership during a meeting with his Japanese counterpart T. Iwaya (16.11). Ukrainian MPs, including the VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk and the head of the VRU Committee on Foreign Affairs and Interparliamentary Cooperation O. Merezko also stressed the importance of developing bilateral partnerships.

In addition, Ukrainian politicians, including Prime Minister D. Shmyhal, Defence Minister R. Umerov, and First Vice-Prime Minister Y. Svyrydenko, unanimously emphasised Japan's leadership in defending international law and its strategic role in supporting Ukraine on international platforms.

The Government Action Plan (16.02) mentions Japan only once, in connection with the prevention of the use of "passports of the Russian Federation" and other documents issued in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine.

Strategic communications

Ukraine has consistently maintained a media presence in the Japanese information space. Ministers and the Ambassador of Ukraine regularly spoke at press conferences and gave interviews to leading Japanese media outlets, such as Asahi, Jiji Press, Kyodo News, NHK, Sankei, and Yomiuri. It is worth noting President Zelenskyy's interview with Kyodo News (01.12), in which he focused on issues important to the Japanese audience: possible ways to achieve peace and the participation of the North Korean military in the war against Ukraine. Social media were used, mainly the X platform, where the President and Ambassador S. Korsunsky were particularly active.

Ukraine communicated three main narratives. President V. Zelenskyy, Foreign Minister D. Kuleba and Deputy Foreign Minister A. Sybiha emphasised the importance of non-lethal defence cooperation. Prime Minister D. Shmyhal, First Vice-Prime Minister Y. Svyrydenko, and Ambassador S. Korsunsky primarily highlighted economic opportunities. The narrative on the value dimension of the partnership was promoted by highlighting the two countries' common challenges and Ukrainians' personal stories.

Activities

Ukraine's diplomatic relations with Japan have developed dynamically thanks to active political contacts, expanding economic cooperation, and deepening security and humanitarian initiatives.

President V. Zelenskyy met Japanese Prime Minister F. Kishida twice (at the G7 summit in June and at the UNGA in September) and had two phone conversations with Japanese government leaders: with F. Kishida in April and with newly-elected Prime Minister S. Ishiba in December.

Two Ukrainian working visits drove cooperation forward. A Ukrainian delegation headed by Prime Minister D. Shmyhal visited Tokyo to take part in

a joint Japan-Ukraine conference on economic development and reconstruction (19–20.02). During the visit, the delegation met Japanese officials to discuss post-war reconstruction and visa liberalisation. In December, a delegation led by First Vice-Prime Minister Y. Svyrydenko took part in business forums in Tokyo and Osaka (17–19.12). During the trip, the Coordination Council for Economic Cooperation resumed its work after a five-year break.

Energy Minister G. Galushchenko (26.04) and a delegation from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Economy (12.04) also paid visits to Japan.

Japanese officials who visited Ukraine included Foreign Ministers Y. Kamikawa (07.01) and T. Iwaya (16.11), Minister of Justice R. Koizumi (05.08), Minister of Education M. Moriyama (29.07), and the Senior Vice President of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) S. Hara (23.07). Inter-ministerial talks were also held on international platforms: Defence Minister R. Umerov met his Japanese counterpart G. Nakatani on the side-lines of the NATO meeting (17.10), and Foreign Ministers D. Kuleba and Y. Kamikawa met at the G7 ministerial meeting (18.04).

The high level of bilateral contacts is evidenced by the intensive dialogue with the Ambassador of Japan to Ukraine, including by President V. Zelenskyy, Deputy Heads of the Presidential Office O. Kuleba and I. Mudra, NSDC Secretary O. Lytvynenko, Defence Intelligence Chief K. Budanov, Prime Minister D. Shmyhal, First Vice-Prime Minister Y. Svyrydenko, Defence Minister R. Umerov, Internal Affairs Minister I. Klymenko, Finance Minister S. Marchenko, and First Deputy Foreign Minister E. Dzhaparova.

As far as parliamentary diplomacy is concerned, it is worth noting the meeting of the Verkhovna Rada group on interparliamentary relations with Japan with Ambassador of Japan M. Kuninori (16.09) and the meeting of VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk with the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Japanese Parliament F. Nukaga on the side-lines of the G7 parliamentary summit (05.09). In both cases, attention was focused on the development of inter-parliamentary relations, countering Russian aggression, and prospects for deepening cooperation in the defence, economic, and energy sectors.

Ukraine has successfully engaged Tokyo in promoting President Zelenskyy's Peace Formula at international platforms, such as the UN and G7. In July, Ukraine initiated the Ukraine + Indo-Pacific Four format, creating an additional platform for cooperation with Japan.

Interagency dialogue on humanitarian projects, educational programmes, and the protection of cultural heritage has intensified. Steps were taken to ensure Ukraine's participation in Expo 2025 in Osaka. Japan also agreed to host the Mine Action Conference in 2025, as suggested by Ukraine. The cultural dimension has expanded through regular exhibitions, festivals, film screenings, and presentations of Ukrainian culture with the support of government agencies and the diaspora, including Kraiany NGO.

Results

The year 2024 demonstrated the significance of Ukraine's special global partnership with Japan.

Financial and economic cooperation has been strengthened. As many as 56 documents were signed at the Conference for Promoting Economic Growth and Reconstruction in February, including memoranda with the Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI) and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, as well as a convention for the avoidance of double taxation. Japan became the second largest donor to the Ukrainian budget, offering long-term investments in infrastructure, energy, and logistics. Ukraine's accession to the Joint Crediting Mechanism provided access to Japanese green technologies for decarbonising the economy.

Despite Russian aggression, trade between Ukraine and Japan increased in 2024: imports grew by 4% while exports grew by 8%. This was the first growth in exports since 2021. The total trade turnover reached USD986mn (according to the Customs Service of Ukraine).

The Honorary Consulate of Ukraine was opened in Kobe (04.10).

Security cooperation has deepened. The bilateral security agreement (signed on 13.06) provides for cooperation in cybersecurity, infrastructure reconstruction, and the transfer of non-lethal equipment. An agreement on information security

(16.11) regulates the legal aspects of intelligence sharing. Cooperation on humanitarian demining is also important, with Japan financing the purchase of equipment and conducting training programmes for Ukrainian deminers.

The intensity of humanitarian and cultural cooperation has increased. Japan has provided hundreds of pieces of specialised machinery and equipment for medical, educational, and municipal institutions, as well as financed the printing of more than a million school textbooks and the installation of water purification systems.



EU INTEGRATION

	2022	2023	2024
EU INTEGRATION	A	A	A
EU	A	A	A

EU integration

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	5	5
ACTIVITIES	5	5	5
RESULTS	5	5	5
TOTAL SCORE	A	A	A

In 2024, Ukraine continued active preparation for membership negotiations with the EU. The procedure for external screening of Ukrainian legislation for compliance with European law was launched. The integration agenda included the implementation of the European Commission's recommendations, screening and roadmaps, and the implementation of the Association Agreement. Sectoral integration initiatives remained relevant. The First Intergovernmental Conference in Luxembourg in June effectively opened negotiations on Ukraine's membership in the EU.

Political interest/engagement

The strategic course towards EU membership was traditionally widely represented in the statements and comments of Ukraine's top political leadership. In addition to the political vector of European integration, the issues of technical progress in implementing Ukraine's commitments were actively discussed in the public domain.

A joint public address to Ukrainians by the President, the Prime Minister and the VRU Speaker (25.06) can be seen as evidence of a strong strategic interest in opening negotiations with the EU.

The Government Action Plan for 2024 also contains a separate section on Ukraine's integration into the EU. Vice-Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration O. Stefanishyna provided active political support for integration issues.

Strategic communications

Traditional, but no less effective, were the visits of the head of state and the government leadership to Brussels, their participation in meetings of the European Council, the European Parliament, and specialised ministerial meetings of the EU Council. Attention was also paid to communication with political groups represented in the EP.

In addition to bilateral initiatives, regional approaches also proved to be interesting communication platforms. In April, the High-Level Advisory Group of the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) was initiated to provide expert support for Ukraine's accession to the EU. In June, the Weimar Triangle + Ukraine format held its second meeting on European integration.

The Forum of National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine (7.06), which aimed to demonstrate to European partners the progress in implementing reforms to ensure the rights of national minorities in wartime, was an event worth mentioning.

Activities

In January, a kick-off meeting on the EU-Ukraine negotiations was held in Brussels, which launched the process of official screening of the compliance of Ukrainian legislation with EU law. From February to May, the first stage of the screening took place in the form of 32 explanatory sessions by the European Commission, which covered all negotiating chapters divided into six clusters. More than 80 government agencies were involved in the 32 delegations representing Ukraine.

In July, the EC launched the next stage of the screening process — bilateral meetings — where Ukraine was expected to report on the adaptation of Ukrainian legislation to EU law for each chapter. It is worth noting the role of simulation sessions organised by the Ukrainian side with the involvement of EU experts in preparation for bilateral EU-Ukraine negotiations. These meetings were used to simulate interactions between the two sides' negotiating teams to develop behavioural tactics and prepare for the negotiation process.

In parallel with the screening process, Ukraine started developing roadmaps on the rule of law and public administration reform, which will serve as indicators for the opening of the negotiating Cluster 1, Fundamentals.

The Government approved the Action Plan for the implementation of the European Commission's recommendations presented in Ukraine's Progress Report under the 2023 EU Enlargement Package (9.02). The document contained more than 350 measures to implement the EC's policy recommendations, as well as key recommendations on all negotiating chapters. In September, the Government Office submitted to the EC Ukraine's 2024 Enlargement Package Report, which contained information on the steps taken to implement reforms.

Attempts to institutionalise dialogue with EU members and candidate states aimed at consulting and providing expert support in preparing for negotiations with the EU were also positive. In this area, intergovernmental dialogues on Ukraine's integration into the EU (the Netherlands, Poland), intergovernmental consultations (Lithuania), and memoranda of cooperation in the field of European integration (Croatia) were launched. In 2024, Ukrainian delegations participated in the EU Negotiators' Forum in Serbia and Moldova.

The 9th meeting of the EU-Ukraine Association Council took place in Brussels (20.03). According to a government report, progress in fulfilling the obligations under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement was 88% in 2023.

The EU's strategic support was symbolically demonstrated during the first visit to Ukraine of the newly appointed European Commissioner for Enlargement, M. Kos and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, K. Kallas, as well as the President of the European Council A. Costa (01.12).

The Ukrainian delegation to participate in negotiations with the EU on the conclusion of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (21.06) was created by the presidential decree. Vice-Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine O. Stefanishyna was appointed chief negotiator.

In August, the CMU established an Interagency Working Group to support the negotiation process on Ukraine's accession to the EU and the adaptation of Ukrainian legislation to EU law. Also, 36 working (negotiation) groups were set up in accordance with 33 negotiating chapters and three areas of the EU negotiating framework. In November, the first meeting of the IWG was held with the participation of the heads of the 36 working groups at the level of deputy ministers and deputy heads of agencies. Each group was required to hold a constituent meeting and develop work plans for 2025.

Results

The First Intergovernmental Conference in Luxembourg (25.06) effectively opened negotiations on Ukraine's membership in the EU. In November, the EC completed the screening of Cluster 1, Fundamentals, which provided a good basis for the possible opening of Cluster 1 during the Polish presidency of the EU Council in the first half of 2025.

The report on Ukraine under the EU's 2024 Enlargement Package presented by the EC (30.10) contains a positive assessment of the country's annual progress in reforms on the path to EU membership.

At the sectoral level, in June, the Agreement on Liberalisation of Road Freight Transport (so-called transport visa-free regime) was extended for another year.

Autonomous trade preferences for EU imports of goods originating from Ukraine were extended. In October, the EU Council decided to grant Ukraine access to the EU public procurement market. In 2024, the EU's Solidarity Lanes initiative continued to operate smoothly.

The agreement between European and Ukrainian mobile operators on free/affordable roaming for Ukrainians in the EU was extended until July 2025.

An agreement between Ukraine and the EU on full participation in the EU's Creative Europe programme until 2027 was signed in Brussels (11.12).

Cooperation with the EU



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	5	5
ACTIVITIES	5	5	5
RESULTS	5	5	5
TOTAL SCORE	A	A	A

In 2024, the EU remained a key strategic partner, providing comprehensive support to Ukraine in countering Russian aggression. The EU Council approved three packages of restrictive measures in response to Russia’s continued aggression against Ukraine. Ukraine and the EU signed Joint Security Commitments. The efforts of Ukraine and European institutions were also focused on finding alternative ways to provide financial support to Ukraine. A breakthrough was the decision to provide Ukraine with EUR1.5bn for defence needs from windfall profits from frozen Russian assets. An important development was the EU’s approval of the Ukraine Facility instrument.



Political interest/engagement

At the highest level, the state leadership publicly articulated the need for continued comprehensive assistance from European institutions and member states to Ukraine. For example, in his speech at the European Council meeting (27.06), the President of Ukraine noted the strategic importance of cooperation with the EU in the following areas: security agreements, military support, sanctions against Russia, transfer of frozen Russian assets to Ukraine, energy security, and support for the Peace Formula. In his speeches at meetings and international platforms, President V. Zelenskyy regularly addressed the issue of cooperation between Ukraine and the EU.

The agenda of meetings and public statements of the President, Prime Minister, members of the government team and MPs with European partners included support for the Peace Formula and Victory Plan, use of funds from frozen Russian assets, strengthening sanctions against Russia, further defence support, ensuring the resilience of the Ukrainian economy and financial system, energy security of Ukraine, and protection of Ukrainians who found refuge in EU member states.

Strategic communications

During the year, Ukraine's political leadership held meetings with leaders of European political parties and groups that directly influence decision-making at the European Parliament level. For example, during his visit to Brussels in October, the President of Ukraine visited the EP, where he met the chairs and co-chairs of political groups.

V. Zelenskyy made important policy statements at European Council meetings, such as the presentation of the Victory Plan at a special meeting of the EU leaders' summit (17.10).

Representatives of the government team, who were invited to participate in meetings of the EC, EP and EU Council at the level of relevant ministers, were busy visiting and directly conveying the Ukrainian position. Formats such as the EU-Ukraine Defence Industries Forum (May, Brussels) helped Ukraine demonstrate its military-industrial potential and maintain EU interest in investing in Ukrainian weapons and ammunition production.

Activities

Active communication on a broad agenda allowed for about 100 high-level and highest-level events. Regular contacts continued at the level of the Government of Ukraine and the European Commission. The regular participation of Ukrainian ministers in EU Council meetings has become a tradition.

There were three noteworthy visits by the President of Ukraine to EU institutions in Brussels (27.06, 17.10, 18–19.12).

Ukrainian diplomats maintained close cooperation with the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as well as the relevant departments of the EEAS. Both J. Borrell and newly elected K. Kallas demonstrated a high priority for supporting Ukraine.

In the defence and security area, during the preparation of the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS), Ukraine actively promoted proposals for the fullest possible integration of its industry into the European one. The EU Defence Innovation Office opened in Kyiv in September. Among the new formats of bilateral cooperation, it is worth noting the launch of the EU-Ukraine Defence Industries Forum in Brussels in May.

The ninth meeting of the Human Rights Dialogue between Ukraine and the EU took place (25.04).

During the year, a number of European top officials visited Ukraine. Such visits are a symbolic manifestation of support for Ukraine and are designed to demonstrate the strategic nature of its relationship with the EU. The visit of EC President A. Costa, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy K. Kallas, and EU Enlargement Commissioner M. Kos (01.12) on the first day of their term was particularly symbolic. In total, there were seven visits by EU institution leaders to Ukraine.

Special mention should be made of Ukraine's efforts to launch the Ukraine Facility instrument within the EU budget for 2024–2027, amounting to EUR50bn. Since the beginning of 2024, work continued on mobilising support within the EU, given the previous blocking by Hungary. Since the decision to allocate the Ukraine Facility in February, Ukraine has been actively working on creating the preconditions for using the fund's financial resources.

Results

Both the previous and current composition of European institutions demonstrated a favourable attitude towards Ukraine throughout 2024.

The EU Council approved the launch of the EUR50bn Ukraine Facility for 2024–2027 (28.02). This EU programme, which came into force on 1.03, made it possible to attract the largest amount of external support to the state budget — EUR 16.2bn (40% of the total Western assistance). Ukraine signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the EU on bridge financing within the Ukraine Facility. Also, in March, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the Plan for the Ukraine Facility, which became the basis for the programme’s implementation. The Plan identifies 69 reforms covering 15 areas and 10 investments, broken down into 146 indicators.

Following the agreements of G7 leaders to provide Ukraine with additional financing of up to USD50bn (EUR 45bn) guaranteed by windfall profits from frozen Russian assets, in October, the EU Council allocated EUR 35bn in macro-financial assistance to Ukraine. Overall, the new package included two main components: a loan cooperation mechanism of EUR 45bn and an exceptional macro-financial assistance of EUR 18bn. This mechanism will start operating in 2025.

During the year, the EU Council adopted three new sanctions packages against Russia: the 13th, 14th, and 15th. The European Parliament adopted five resolutions (February, July, September, November, and December) in support of Ukraine. In May, the EU Council allowed the windfall profits from frozen Russian assets to be directed to Ukraine’s defence needs through the European Peace Facility (EPF). Already in July, Ukraine received the first tranche of EUR1.5bn, including EUR 400mn for the procurement of weapons and military equipment from Ukrainian manufacturers.

In June, Ukraine and the EU signed the Joint Security Commitments, providing for comprehensive support to Ukraine from the EU and member states. In 2024, within the framework of the EU Military Assistance Mission to Ukraine, about 32,000 Ukrainian military personnel were trained according to various profiles. Despite significant delays from the original schedule, by the end of 2024, the implementation of the EU initiative to provide Ukraine with 1mn artillery ammunition rounds was ensured.

A framework agreement on EU financing under the Ukraine Facility was signed in May. The EU Council adopted an implementing decision that positively assessed Ukraine's Plan for the Ukraine Facility. According to the Plan, the Ministry of Economy became the national coordinator of the Ukraine Facility, which ensured monitoring of the Plan's implementation and quarterly reporting to the European Commission.

In 2024, the EU became a full participant in the Register of Damages caused by Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Ukraine continued to be a beneficiary of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, which by the end of the year had allowed it to receive over 150,000 tonnes of humanitarian aid.

By the EU Council decision in June, the temporary protection mechanism for Ukrainian citizens was extended until March 2026.

Preferential conditions allowed Ukrainian producers to export to the EU goods worth USD25bn, representing a 6% increase compared to 2023.



NATO

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	4	4	5
ACTIVITIES	5	5	5
RESULTS	4	4	4
TOTAL SCORE	B+	B+	A-

Throughout the year, Ukraine managed to enhance the support of NATO and its member states in the fight against Russian aggression, as well as develop a dialogue on interoperability and defence innovation. While Ukraine failed to receive an invitation to join the Alliance, there was a constant active dialogue at the highest level throughout the year, both in the NUC format and at the level of individual ministries, and the President. Ukraine's strategic communications regarding its future membership in NATO have improved, no longer being ambiguous.

Political interest/engagement

Ukraine's membership in NATO, as a tool for ensuring security, and the interoperability of Ukrainian defence forces with NATO member states were among the top priorities of the Ukrainian government in 2024.

The President constantly referred to Ukraine's future membership in NATO in his speeches. In particular, during the meeting with ambassadors (19.08), he stated that every representative of Ukraine should work to strengthen the understanding that NATO will be complete only with Ukraine as a member. When presenting the Victory Plan to VRU (16.10), the President named Ukraine's invitation to NATO among the points of the plan. V. Zelenskyy put a particular emphasis on NATO in his speech on Diplomat's Day (22.12). Specifically, he noted that he expected further substantial progress in cooperation with NATO, expressing the understanding that the decision to invite Ukraine to join NATO was purely political. Besides, the President regularly mentioned NATO in his daily addresses.

The issue of future membership in NATO and cooperation with the Alliance was consistently raised by Foreign Minister D. Kuleba in his public speeches, namely during the Second Black Sea Security Conference of the International Crimea Platform (15.04) and at the annual meeting of Lithuanian diplomats (15.07). Newly appointed Foreign Minister A. Sybiha promptly identified future NATO membership as the best security guarantee for Ukraine, Europe, and the Euro-Atlantic region as a whole among his main priorities (6.09).

O. Stefanishyna, Vice-Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, paid considerable attention to practical dialogue and cooperation between Ukraine and the Alliance, as well as to the adaptation of standards and analysis of joint experiences, such as the opening of the JATEC Centre in Poland.

The Government's Action Plan for 2024 (16.02) included a separate section on deepening cooperation with NATO. It paid considerable attention to the implementation of NATO standards in the security and defence forces of Ukraine but did not mention the adapted Annual National Programme.

The issue of Ukraine's membership in NATO was raised by MPs in their questions to the candidate for the post of Foreign Minister during his confirmation by the VRU (5.09) and in their communications with partners from NATO member states.

Strategic communications

Compared to 2023, Ukraine's strategic communications on its future NATO membership have improved, no longer being ambiguous. The President and other senior officials clearly communicated to both domestic and foreign audiences that Ukraine's membership in the Alliance is the best security guarantee. When discussions about possible peace talks with Russia started at the end of the year, the Ukrainian leadership also made clear in all their speeches and interviews that NATO membership was not a subject of bargaining with Moscow.

Ukraine's future membership in NATO, as an important element of Euro-Atlantic security, was also discussed in public speeches by Ukrainian leaders, particularly in the speech of Foreign Minister A. Sybiha at the Warsaw Security Forum (1.10). In his remarks at the Munich Security Conference (17.02), Foreign Minister D. Kuleba called for the creation of a joint space for the EU and NATO defence industries.

Moreover, almost every security agreement signed by Ukraine in 2024 contained provisions on future NATO membership, and the statements on their signing emphasised that the agreements are not a substitute for future membership in the Alliance, which remains a key tool for ensuring security and deterrence.

MPs from Ukraine's Permanent Delegation to NATO PA were also actively involved in advocating for Ukraine's future membership in NATO and military assistance.

Activities

Throughout the year, regular internal meetings were held with the President, the Defence Minister and the Vice-Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine to coordinate the position before relevant meetings with NATO partners, adapt to NATO standards, improve interoperability and advocate for future membership in the Organisation. In particular, a meeting of the Commission on Coordination of Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine was held (14.03), chaired by Vice-Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic

Integration O. Stefanishyna. The meeting focused on the implementation of the adapted Annual National Programme (ANP) for 2024, the Ukrainian participation in meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Council, and the implementation of the NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine projects.

As for the foreign policy sphere, President V. Zelenskyy had regular meetings with the Secretary General of NATO. In particular, the Secretary General visited Kyiv (29.04). The President of Ukraine and the Secretary General also met in the US (25.09), where they discussed the issue of NATO membership and strengthening Ukrainian air defence.

The Ukrainian delegation headed by the President participated in the NATO Summit in Washington, DC (10–11.07). During the Summit, a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council at the level of heads of state was held.

Over the course of the year, Vice-Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration O. Stefanishyna met with NATO Secretary General J. Stoltenberg several times during her visits to Brussels (25.01, 28.05, 16.09), in particular, to discuss preparations for the Washington Summit and, following its results, to discuss the implementation of decisions on the support of Ukraine adopted at the Summit.

Besides, a number of meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Council were held at various levels during the year. In particular, a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council was initiated (19.04) by the President of Ukraine against the backdrop of massive Russian attacks on Ukraine. In his speech at the meeting, V. Zelenskyy stressed the need to strengthen Ukraine's air defence. The NATO-Ukraine Council held a meeting on the security situation in the Black Sea region (26.07) at the request of President Zelenskyy.

Defence Minister R. Umerov spoke at meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Council at the level of defence ministers (15.02, 13.06, etc.), where the key focus was on the implementation of defence reforms to support Ukraine's accession to NATO, security assistance and the current state of the war. Following a meeting of the NUC (15.02) at the level of defence ministers, a decision was made to establish JATEC, the first joint analysis, training and education centre between Ukraine and NATO. Its launch has been underway in Poland since March. At Ukraine's request, an extraordinary meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council was convened (28.03) with the participation of the Defence Minister. The main focus was on Russian massive

air strikes and the need to strengthen Ukraine's air defence. A meeting of NUC involving representatives of the military was held in Brussels (26.11) to discuss Russia's use of a new ballistic missile.

Ukraine's Foreign Minister D. Kuleba participated in a ministerial meeting of the NUC (3–4.04) in Brussels, which focused on increasing military assistance to Ukraine, strengthening its air defence, and enhancing the weapons production capacity.

A meeting of the NUC at the ambassadorial level was held in Brussels (28.05) with the participation of the Vice-Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine, O. Stefanishyna. Its key topics included Ukraine's security needs, expectations from the NATO Summit in Washington, and Ukraine's institutional development in the framework of the aANP.

Vice-Prime Minister–Minister for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine I. Vereshchuk participated in a meeting of the Political Committee of the NUC (15.04), where assistance to Ukraine was discussed. The Chiefs of Staff met in the NATO-Ukraine Council format (16.05) to discuss the situation on the battlefield and further support for Ukraine from NATO and its allies.

NATO representatives also regularly visited Ukraine. The first NATO military visit to Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion took place, led by the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Adm. R. Bauer (22.03), who met, in particular, with the Vice-Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine, O. Stefanishyna.

B. Ruge, NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy, visited Ukraine (25.02). S. Bray, NATO's Assistant Secretary General, also visited Ukraine (25.04) and met with Defence Minister R. Umerov and Vice-Prime Minister O. Stefanishyna. NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Operations, T. Goffus visited Kyiv (11.09) to participate in consultations on the next stages of the Interoperability Roadmap and to accelerate the launch of NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) initiative. Besides, he met with O. Stefanishyna. During a meeting between representatives of the Ministry of Veterans Affairs and NATO (13.08), the continuation of support for the implementation of a human-centred veteran policy was emphasised.

Deputy Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine T. Vysotskyi participated in a meeting of the NATO Food and Agricultural Planning Committee (16.04), where he spoke about the consequences for food security and supply chains resulting from Russian aggression.

Various events were also held in Ukraine jointly with NATO during the year. For example, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and NATO held a roundtable discussion in Lviv on good practices in building integrity within the MIA system (21.11). A delegation of the NATO International Staff, led by the Head of the Partnership East Section of the NATO Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, also met with the MIA leadership (15.10) to discuss the implementation of the adapted ANP for 2024 and NATO's continued support for Ukraine's law enforcement reforms.

The Ukrainian parliamentary delegation participated in the NATO PA in Bulgaria (24–27.05) and Lithuania (26.11). In addition, the NATO-Ukraine Interparliamentary Council meeting was held in the VRU (26.06).

In March, a joint conference on the Strategic Review of the Defence Procurement System of Ukraine was held in Luxembourg.

Brave1, NATO and the Defence Innovation Unit held the first-ever NATO-Ukraine Defence Innovators Forum (7.06), which brought together 400 participants in the field of defence technology and innovation from over 15 countries.

Results

During the year, Ukraine managed to strengthen support from NATO and its member states in the fight against Russian aggression, as well as to build a dialogue on interoperability and defence innovation. At the same time, Ukraine failed to change the position of some member states on the invitation to join the Alliance.

The NATO Summit in Washington, DC, approved the NATO-Ukraine Interoperability Roadmap. Other key decisions of the Summit included allocating EUR40 billion in funding for Ukraine in 2025, launching the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) mechanism to coordinate the provision of military equipment and training to the Ukrainian armed forces, and

establishing the JATEC. In addition, individual countries have pledged significant military assistance packages.

During the Summit in Washington, DC (11.07), the Ukraine Compact was signed. According to it, 22 NATO countries, the EU and Japan, pledged to provide Ukraine with weapons, ammunition and military training. In December, the NSATU was launched, demonstrating NATO's commitment to continued support for Kyiv regardless of political changes in individual member states. JATEC became operational in March.

NATO Headquarters in Brussels hosted the inaugural meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council Strategic Communications Committee (18.03).

Support for Ukraine's future NATO membership was included in all security agreements signed in 2024. In 2024, the NATO Representation in Kyiv returned to full operation. P. Turner, the new Head of Mission, was appointed, with his status raised to Senior Representative (17.07).

During the year, Ukraine introduced a host of reforms and practices in line with NATO standards. In particular, the MoD of Ukraine developed a new model of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process (17.09) and completed a series of courses on participatory governance aimed at improving the efficiency of decision-making and implementation in the ministry (16.09).

In its Declaration (27.05), the NATO PA called on Allied governments to allow Ukraine to use Western weapons against targets in the Russian Federation.

By the end of the year, the adapted Annual National Programme for 2025 had not been presented.



BILATERAL RELATIONS

	2022	2023	2024
AUSTRALIA	A	B+	B-
AZERBAIJAN	C-	C-	C+
BRAZIL	-	B	C+
GEORGIA	C	D+	D
ISRAEL	C-	C	D+
INDIA	C-	C	A-
CHINA	D+	D+	C
MEXICO	-	-	C-
MOLDOVA	B-	B+	B+
POLAND	A	B+	A-
ROMANIA	A	A-	B+
SLOVAKIA	A	A	B+
TÜRKIYE	B	B-	B
HUNGARY	D+	D+	B
CZECH REPUBLIC	A-	A	A-

Australia

B-

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	4	4
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	5	3
ACTIVITIES	5	4	4
RESULTS	5	4	4
TOTAL SCORE	A	B+	B-

Despite its distant geographical location, Australia remains one of Ukraine's important partners, with cooperation between the two countries consistently yielding positive results. However, Australia is less frequently referenced as a standalone focus of foreign policy and more commonly cited as part of broader coalitions and in the context of regional partnership development. The Ukrainian Embassy in Australia continues to play a vital role in fostering these bilateral relations.

Political interest/engagement

During the year, Ukraine's key political actors, namely the President, the Prime Minister, the MFA, and the MoD, were involved in bilateral relations with Australia. The Chairman of the VRU Committee on Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation, O. Merezhko, contributed by thanking Australia for its support following his meeting with the Australian Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs.

We can note a high level of Australian partners' engagement, particularly in the context of state visits to Ukraine, and a somewhat lower level of engagement of Ukrainian representatives, which, however, can be explained by the large number of tasks related to countering Russian aggression, which leaves key foreign policy actors less time on foreign trips.

Australia was not mentioned separately in the President's key speeches at the Ambassadorial, in his address to the Parliament, etc. Neither did the foreign ministers single out Australia in their speeches. The role of parliament remains significantly reduced, which affects the intensity of interparliamentary relations.

Strategic communications

Australia is present in the strategic communications of Ukrainian foreign policy actors, but often in passing, as one of the partner countries on whose support Ukraine relies. At the same time, Ukraine had joint briefings with representatives of the Australian government since the latter paid a number of state visits.

In an evening video address in April, President V. Zelenskyy thanked Australia for the newly announced aid package, emphasising the importance of strengthening Ukraine's air defence system. The President also spoke at a meeting

of leaders of NATO Asia-Pacific partners, which was attended by the Australian Minister of Defence, among others (July).

The Embassy of Ukraine in Australia has been consistently active in strategic communications, responding to unfavourable events in the country, expressing gratitude to the Australian government for its support, and conducting outreach and advocacy work.

Activities

In April, Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence R. Marles visited Ukraine and met the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence of Ukraine in Lviv. During the meeting, Marles announced an aid package of USD100mn for the purchase of man-portable air defence systems, drones, and auxiliary equipment.

In May, President V. Zelenskyy had a telephone conversation with Australian Prime Minister A. Albanese to discuss urgent defence needs, the upcoming Peace Summit, and the need to involve as many participants as possible.

In May, Ukraine's Defence Minister R. Umerov and his Australian counterpart discussed defence cooperation and the potential for joint ventures with the Australian defence industry.

In August, the Chairman of the VRU Committee on Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation, O. Merezko, met Australia's Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, S. Birmingham, to discuss, among other things, President Zelenskyy's Peace Formula, and the creation of a special international tribunal for the crime of Russian aggression against Ukraine.

In September, Foreign Ministers A. Sybiha and P. Wong had a telephone conversation followed by a meeting in New York during the UN General Assembly.

In December, Australian Foreign Minister P. Wong visited Ukraine, marking the first bilateral visit by an Australian Foreign Minister to the country in a decade. During this visit, the Ukrainian side presented a request for enhanced military support, demonstrating the existing vision for the development of bilateral cooperation.

In February, President Zelenskyy met Australian billionaire A. Forrest to discuss cooperation in Ukraine's reconstruction. In April, the President accepted credentials from the new Australian Ambassador to Ukraine, P. Lehmann.

Results

One of the main outcomes of Ukrainian diplomacy in bilateral relations with Australia was the reopening of the Australian Embassy in Kyiv in December.


Additionally, Foreign Minister P. Wong's visit to Ukraine resulted in Australia's allocation of EUR50mn, which will be channelled through the EBRD to rebuild Ukraine. In May, Australia announced a EUR 12mn contribution to the Energy Support Fund and the imposition of sanctions against entities involved in the supply of North Korean weapons to Moscow, and in February, it announced sanctions against individuals and entities associated with Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Ukraine also asked for coal, but Australia opted for a USD 31mn grant, of which USD 20mn was allocated to strengthen Ukraine's energy system and another USD 11mn towards humanitarian aid.

In March, Australia announced that it would join the International Drone Coalition to help Ukraine repel Russian armed aggression. In November, it joined the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children.

The Australian government announced the delivery of 14 highly manoeuvrable rigid-hull boats to strengthen Ukraine's maritime and coastal defence capability, and in December, Foreign Minister A. Sybiha confirmed the receipt of the boats, as well as 49 M1A1 Abrams tanks. In November, Australia provided Ukraine with JDAM-ER cruise missiles. In July, Australia announced USD250mn in military support, the largest aid package since Russia's full-scale invasion. This aid package was the third in 2024, following a USD 50mn aid package announced in February and a USD 100mn package announced in April.

Trade turnover in 2024 saw a modest increase, with imports reaching USD117mn — higher than the 2023 figures but still below those recorded in 2022. Meanwhile, exports to Australia experienced a slight decline, totalling USD 16mn for the year.

Azerbaijan



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	4	3	4
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	1	2	3
ACTIVITIES	3	3	3
RESULTS	3	3	3
TOTAL SCORE	C-	C-	C+

In 2024, Ukraine maintained a close bilateral dialogue with Azerbaijan, continuing to develop a partnership based on mutual support for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and economic cooperation. Communications were mostly aimed at expressing gratitude to Azerbaijan for the increased humanitarian assistance. Azerbaijan remained outside the Peace Formula processes.

Political interest/engagement

In 2024, the positive dynamics of top-level political interest continued, transforming into active dialogue. President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyy congratulated I. Aliyev on his re-election as a President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (07.02), emphasising the high importance of mutual support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both states within internationally recognised borders and praised Azerbaijan's solidarity with Ukraine in its fight against Russia.

During his meeting with Azerbaijani Ambassador to Ukraine S. Mardaliyev (08.03), Vice-Prime Minister and Minister for Communities, Territories, and Infrastructure Development of Ukraine O. Kubrakov said that the development of transport links between Ukraine and Azerbaijan is of exceptional importance and that strengthening transport cooperation can contribute to the development of the Europe-Asia international transport corridor.

During the opening of the Azerbaijan-Ukraine Friendship Alley in Kyiv (06.12), the chairman of the VRU Committee on Environmental Policy and Nature Management, O. Bondarenko, thanked Azerbaijan for implementing an important environmental project within the framework of bilateral relations.

Most political engagement focused on dialogue regarding current issues and expressing gratitude to the Azerbaijani leadership for the humanitarian aid provided.

In his speeches in the Verkhovna Rada and at ambassadorial meetings in 2024, the President of Ukraine did not mention Azerbaijan. Similarly, the Government's Action Plan for 2024 contained no references to Azerbaijan.

Strategic communications

Ukraine's communication strategy aimed to engage Azerbaijan as much as possible in discussing ways to cooperate in countering Russian aggression for the benefit of both sides and their regional partners. In his speech during the fourth summit of the International Crimea Platform (11.09), President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyy called on Azerbaijan's Muslim community to show leadership and help counter the injustice and abuse committed by Russia against the Crimean Tatar people. Zelenskyy said that Azerbaijan's voice should be heard in opposition to Russia's repressive policies against Muslims in Crimea.

During telephone conversations with the President of Azerbaijan (15.02 and 04.10) and his evening video address (09.11), President Zelenskyy expressed gratitude to the Azerbaijani leadership for assistance in the energy sector.

Zelenskyy called Aliyev (27.12) to express condolences to the people of Azerbaijan over the crash of an Azerbaijani Airlines passenger plane flying from Baku to Grozny on 25 December, which resulted in numerous fatalities and wished the injured a speedy recovery. In an address (28.12) after his conversation with Aliyev regarding the aftermath of the plane crash, Zelenskyy emphasised that Russia should be held responsible for the aircraft being targeted and called on all countries to pressure Russia to stop spreading misinformation about the crash.

Ukraine's Foreign Ministry welcomed the agreements reached between Azerbaijan and Armenia on the delimitation of their interstate border based on the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration (30.04).

At an event organised by the Azerbaijani Embassy in Kyiv on Azerbaijan's Independence Day (29.05), Deputy Foreign Minister Y. Perebyinis noted that Azerbaijan and Ukraine share identical or similar positions in the international arena, as well as on regional and global issues.

Activities

In 2024, contacts between Ukraine and Azerbaijan occurred mainly at the level of the presidents, foreign ministers, and embassies.

President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyy and President of Azerbaijan I. Aliyev met in Germany on the side-lines of the Munich Security Conference (17.02). V. Zelenskyy expressed gratitude for the humanitarian aid that Azerbaijan continued to provide to Ukraine. During the year, the presidents held three telephone conversations (15.02, 21.05, 04.10).

In a telephone conversation with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister J. Bayramov (13.05), Ukrainian Foreign Minister D. Kuleba expressed satisfaction with the current level of strategic partnership between the two countries. It was noted that relations between the two states continue to develop based on respect for the norms and principles of international law, particularly territorial integrity, and sovereignty. At the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Switzerland, Kuleba and Bayramov discussed the dynamics of the security and political situation in Europe and the South Caucasus, as well as topical issues on the agenda of Azerbaijani-Ukrainian cooperation (11.06).

During a telephone conversation with J. Bayramov (10.09), Ukraine's Foreign Minister A. Sybiha thanked Azerbaijan for the humanitarian aid provided and praised its support in restoring and rebuilding Irpin's infrastructure, as well as demining activities.

As part of the high-level week of the 79th session of the UN GA, the foreign ministers of Ukraine and Azerbaijan met (24.09) to discuss political, economic, energy, humanitarian, and other areas of cooperation between the two countries, as well as regional issues.

Deputy Foreign Minister Perebyinis met Azerbaijani Ambassador to Ukraine Mardaliyev (27.05) and stressed the importance of Azerbaijan's participation in implementing the Peace Formula, including participation in the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland and the International Conference on Ukraine's Recovery in Berlin. During the meeting, special attention was paid to cooperation within the Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM), which Azerbaijan chaired in 2024.

Deputy Foreign Ministers of Ukraine I. Borovets (16.04) and A. Sybiha (22.04) met the Azerbaijani Ambassador to discuss numerous bilateral cooperation issues. The parties paid special attention to cooperation within international organisations, including support for pro-Ukrainian initiatives and condemnation of Russia's war crimes, illegal deportation of Ukrainian children, as well as Azerbaijan's involvement in the Peace Formula, the International Crimea Platform, and the Global Peace Summit. At a meeting with Azerbaijani Ambassador S. Mardaliyev (26.11), Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine O. Mishchenko noted Azerbaijan's successful organisation of the 29th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP29) and praised its results. The parties paid special attention to intensifying bilateral contacts at the highest level, particularly between the foreign ministries. S. Mardaliyev, in turn, noted Azerbaijan's readiness to strengthen practical assistance to Ukraine further and enhance cooperation between Kyiv and Baku.

The Minister of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources of Ukraine, S. Grynychuk, met the Azerbaijani Ambassador S. Mardaliyev (24.09) to discuss cooperation in preparing joint initiatives for the 29th session of the COP29. A delegation from Ukraine, headed by Grynychuk and including representatives of relevant ministries and MPs, visited Baku to participate in COP29 (11–22.11).

During a meeting with Azerbaijani Ambassador S. Mardaliyev (14.12), VRU Deputy Speaker O. Kondratiuk thanked Azerbaijan for rehabilitating Ukrainian children affected by the war. They discussed the current state of bilateral relations and the establishment of close cooperation between the Verkhovna Rada and the Milli Majlis.

A delegation of 10 Ukrainian MPs monitored the early parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan (01.09).

During a meeting with Azerbaijani Ambassador S. Mardaliyev (03.07), Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights D. Lubinets thanked Azerbaijan for its humanitarian assistance during the war. They discussed various topics, including humanitarian issues, the specifics of Azerbaijan's assistance to Ukraine in demining, the protection of children's rights, and rehabilitation and psychological assistance to affected minors.

Results

President V. Zelenskyy appointed Y. Husyev as the new Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Azerbaijan (22.02).

Azerbaijan sent two batches of humanitarian aid to Ukraine (11.01, 20.02), including more than 670,000 metres of electrical cables and wires, as well as 26 power and distribution transformers.


A Ukrainian Cultural Centre was opened in Baku (09.11).

The Azerbaijan-Ukraine Friendship Alley was inaugurated in Kyiv with the assistance of the Azerbaijani Embassy in Ukraine and the Kyiv mayor's office (06.12).

Despite the invitation, Azerbaijan did not participate in the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland in June and did not join the Peace Summit Declaration. Azerbaijan traditionally did not vote for the UN GA resolution "Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol" (17.12).

According to the State Customs Service of Ukraine, in 2024, trade turnover between Ukraine and Azerbaijan increased by USD19.3mn (due to an increase in Ukrainian exports) compared to 2023 and amounted to USD 490.6mn. Ukraine exported goods to Azerbaijan worth USD 216.9mn and imported goods valued at USD 273.7mn.

Brazil



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	-	5	4
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	-	4	3
ACTIVITIES	-	4	4
RESULTS	-	3	3
TOTAL SCORE	-	B	C+

Despite some progress in 2024, the political dialogue between Ukraine and Brazil remained tense, and Brazil's support of Ukraine was limited. Brazil continued officially supporting Ukraine's territorial integrity. But Lula da Silva's government avoided condemning Russia's aggression and pushed for the China-Brazil peace plan that goes against Kyiv's interests. Ukraine was proactively trying to engage Brazil in international initiatives, including the Global Peace Summit. But Brazil's engagement remained limited. Economically, trade increased somewhat.

Political interest/engagement

In 2024, Ukraine's political interest in Brazil was limited to the effort of engaging Brazil in the Peace Formula and other topics related to the peace process. In his speech at the meeting of the European Council (19.12), President V. Zelenskyy highlighted the importance of Brazil, as a key player in the Global South, supporting Ukraine's territorial integrity and using its influence to put pressure on Russia.

At the G20 ministerial meeting at the UN (25.09), Ukraine's Foreign Minister A. Sybiha highlighted the ambitious agenda of Brazil's G20 presidency and called for Ukraine to be invited to the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro as another step towards international support for the Ukrainian Peace Formula. Despite these initiatives, dialogue with Brazil was complicated by its stance, which, as described by Ukrainian diplomats, was favourable to Russia geopolitically and economically.

The developments around the Chinese-Brazilian plan to resolve the war presented on August 2, which Zelenskyy called destructive and pro-Russian, were particularly critical for Ukraine. Kyiv's main criticism was that Ukraine was not informed about its preparation, while Russia received this information in advance.

Strategic communications

In 2024, a difficult dialogue at the official level and active work with public opinion through soft power tools marked Ukraine's strategic communications on Brazil. President Zelenskyy's targeted criticism of what is known as the Chinese-Brazilian peace plan in his speech at the UN GA (25.09) was one of the key points. This demonstrated Ukraine's principled stance whereby the initiatives that could be used to strengthen the international influence of third parties at the expense of Ukrainian interests are unacceptable.

Despite the difficulties in the political dialogue, intensified cooperation with the Brazilian media was an important step towards strengthening communications. The MFA of Ukraine organised two press tours for Latin American journalists (27.05–01.06, 09.09–14.09), which helped inform a wider audience in Brazil about the consequences of the Russian aggression. The participation of journalists from the top Brazilian media helped convey Ukraine's position to Brazilian society, which was especially important given the substantial influence of pro-Russian narratives in the country. The journalists had the opportunity to talk personally with President Zelenskyy, First Lady Zelenska, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other key officials. Such comprehensive communication allowed not only to ensure broader coverage of Ukraine-related topics in the Brazilian information space but also to create conditions for a deeper dialogue with the media and civil society.

The approval of the first 2024–2026 Ukraine-Latin America and the Caribbean Communication Strategy was an important step. It mentioned Brazil in the context of expanding contacts, the work of the Ukrainian diplomatic mission, and the role of the diaspora.

Activities

In 2024, Ukraine continued its political dialogue with Brazil, focusing on both bilateral relations and efforts to engage Brazil in international initiatives, including the Global Peace Summit and the implementation of the Peace Formula. Head of the OPU, A. Yermak, had two conversations with C. Amorim, Chief Advisor to the President of Brazil (8.01 and 16.03). The Presidential Office and Ukraine's MFA interacted proactively with Brazil's Embassy and had a series of meetings with Brazil's Ambassador N. de Andrade Mello Rapesta.

The expansion of dialogue between the MFAs of Ukraine and Brazil was driven by preparations for the Global Peace Summit and Brazil's presidency at G20. Ukraine's Foreign Minister and Deputy Ministers had a series of telephone conversations and personal meetings with their Brazilian counterparts. Deputy

Foreign Minister I. Borovets visited Brazil (10–12.06) for Ukrainian-Brazilian political consultations and meetings with representatives of the government and parliament.

Ukraine placed a strong focus on interparliamentary cooperation. The visit of a parliamentary delegation of the Brazilian National Congress to Ukraine (.08)8, which was the first such visit in the last thirteen years, was an important accomplishment. Brazilian MPs took part in the first parliamentary conference, “Ukraine — Latin America and the Caribbean: Cooperation for the Future” (29.11–1.12), which helped strengthen political contacts. On the part of Ukraine, A. Pushkarenko MP, co-chair of the interfaction parliamentary association Ukraine — Latin America and the Caribbean, visited Brazil (5–7.11) to strengthen parliamentary cooperation and engage Brazil in the implementation of point four of the Peace Formula on the release of prisoners.

Economic cooperation had a special place in Ukraine-Brazil relations in 2024. The talks between Vice-Prime Minister Y. Svyrydenko and Brazil’s Labour Minister L. Marinho (8.05) showed a willingness to expand Ukrainian exports and attract investment.

Ukrainian diplomats continued to work actively in Brazil, promoting cultural cooperation and expanding contacts with business and civil society.

Results

In 2024, there were both some positive signals in Ukraine-Brazil relations and significant challenges that continue to hinder their development. Brazil took part in international initiatives related to Ukraine, including meetings on the Peace Formula, such as the Davos meeting of advisers (14.01). However, its involvement remained limited: participation in the Global Peace Summit (15.06–16.06) was down to the ambassador level and in the status of an observer, and representation in working groups did not translate into concrete steps to support Ukrainian initiatives. At the same time, the promotion of what is known as the China-Brazil peace plan complicated the dialogue with Kyiv, as it created an alternative to the Ukrainian Peace Formula without taking into account Ukraine’s position.

Brazil maintained its official support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, as manifested in diplomatic statements and the participation of its representatives in symbolic events. At the same time, Brazil's government continued to avoid condemning Russian aggression, which was particularly noticeable when Brazil abstained from voting in the UN on resolutions on human rights in the temporarily occupied territory and the safety of nuclear facilities. In addition, the reaction to the Russian missile strike against the Okhmatdyt Children's hospital, while condemning the attack, did not directly blame Russia.

Despite strong interest from Kyiv, Brazil did not invite Ukraine to participate in G20 summits. At the same time, Ukraine's accession to the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty, initiated under Brazil's presidency of G20, was an important step in strengthening bilateral cooperation. However, the expected progress in the political dialogue, in particular in engaging Brazil in humanitarian initiatives, such as the exchange of prisoners of war and deported children, was not accomplished.

2024 saw a positive trend in economic cooperation. Trade turnover increased by 40% to USD301mn. Ukraine's exports increased 3.5 times to USD 36mn. However, the trade deficit remains substantial for Ukraine, pointing to the need for further trade diversification.

Georgia



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	4	3	2
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	3	2	2
ACTIVITIES	3	2	2
RESULTS	2	2	2
TOTAL SCORE	C	D+	D

During the year, Ukraine’s foreign policy towards Georgia was shaped by the political crisis between Georgia’s presidential administration and government. The parliamentary elections in Georgia, which ultimately scrapped the country’s European integration course, made the Ukrainian leadership sharply critical of maintaining a strategic partnership between the two countries. Following a steadily observed downward trend since 2022, bilateral relations hit their lowest level in the independent history of both countries.



Political interest/engagement

Ukraine's foreign policy towards Georgia in 2024, primarily at the level of the President and the MFA, was centred around protecting national interests. The Georgian government's undisguised anti-Ukrainian rhetoric and decisions that ran counter to the common European integration interests of both nations provoked Ukraine's response. Bilateral relations ultimately deteriorated during the preparation and holding of parliamentary elections in Georgia. As tensions escalated between Georgia's President S. Zourabichvili and the pro-Russian government, it was crucial for Ukraine to support the public interest of democratic development in both countries as a counterbalance to Russian aggression. In response to the Georgian President wishing Ukraine "liberation from occupation and peace" on Independence Day (24.08), Ukrainian President V. Zelenskyy thanked her for the support and stressed that "the friendly Georgian people, like Ukrainians, are aware that freedom and independence are worth fighting for". In a statement on the 16th anniversary of Russia's armed aggression against Georgia, the Ukrainian MFA issued a statement in support of Georgia's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and called on Russia to withdraw its troops from the sovereign territory of Georgia in accordance with the 2008 ceasefire agreement, and to revoke the recognition of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as so-called "independent states".

Ukrainian diplomacy's response to the destructive trends in bilateral relations has progressed as democratic freedoms in Georgia have been curtailed. Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed concern over the deterioration of the domestic political situation in Georgia (18.04) in connection with the Georgian Parliament's consideration of the draft law "On Transparency of Foreign Influence" and condemned Prime Minister I. Kobakhidze's comments on the threat of "Ukrainisation", which the draft law is allegedly aimed at countering. Commenting on the speech of the founder of the Georgian Dream party, B. Ivanishvili, in defence of the law on "foreign agents", Ukrainian MP O. Goncharenko said (29.04) that the EU and the US should immediately impose sanctions against him and his entourage. During the year, the Ukrainian MFA repeatedly responded to the Georgian Prime Minister's sharp attacks against

Ukraine. In its comments (30.05, 10.10), the MFA condemned Kobakhidze's statements and distorted assessments of events in Ukraine, including his unacceptable and outrageous statements about the Ukrainian state, the Revolution of Dignity, and the heroism and struggle of the Ukrainian people for freedom and independence against Russia.

In one of his evening addresses (4.12), President Zelenskyy condemned the Georgian authorities' crackdown on protests against the government's decision to postpone European integration. In this regard, Zelenskyy instructed the NSDC to come up with practical steps in response to the current political situation in Georgia.

Ex-President M. Saakashvili's case has traditionally been the focus of attention of the Ukrainian authorities under the supervision of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, D. Lubinets.

Strategic communications

In the face of a significant deterioration in bilateral relations in 2024, appeals to the international community and support for Georgian President S. Zourabichvili remained almost the only dimension of strategic communication at the highest state level. Ukrainian diplomacy used those strategic platforms that allowed it to engage S. Zourabichvili in supporting Ukraine's national interests in the face of Russian aggression and to support the Georgian people. In particular, during S. Zourabichvili's participation in the Global Peace Summit (15.06) and the Crimea Platform (12.09), Ukraine conveyed to Georgian society the importance of jointly confronting the Russian threat.

President Zelenskyy also spoke about the need to support democratic processes in Georgia. For example, at a joint press conference with European Parliament President R. Metsola in Kyiv (9.05), he said that EU enlargement should go beyond the list of states that already have candidate status and that Day of Europe would certainly come, including for Georgia. In an interview with leading media outlets in Northern Europe (30.10), Zelenskyy criticised the parliamentary elections in Georgia and noted that "Russia has won in Georgia today" by first "seizing a part of the country and then changing its policy and government". In an interview with

the US TV channel CBN (11.12), the President said that the West had not reacted decisively enough to the situation in Georgia and Russia's efforts to establish control over the country.

In his messages to the international community, the President mentioned Georgia as a country that, along with Ukraine and other neighbouring states, remains the object of Moscow's aggressive intentions and insisted on joining forces to jointly confront Russia under the banner of European integration (speech at the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2024 (11.06); speech in the Verkhovna Rada (16.10); address to the participants of the European Parliament's extraordinary plenary session, marking 1,000 days since Russia's full-scale aggression (19.11)). Introducing personal sanctions against individual Georgian officials (11.12), V. Zelenskyy called on Europe, the US, and other allies to "act in the same way — to act in principle".

Activities

Cooperation between the two countries' governments and parliaments shrank to a minimum as bilateral relations soured. Meanwhile, contacts between the presidents remained active. During a telephone conversation (15.05), President Zelenskyy thanked his Georgian counterpart for confirming her participation in the Global Peace Summit. During the summit (15.06), the two presidents discussed bilateral cooperation and shared security challenges, stressing that there is no alternative to European integration for Ukraine and Georgia. During their meeting in Paris (7.12), Zelenskyy expressed support and solidarity with the Georgian people who opposed the government's decision to suspend negotiations on EU accession until 2028.

The Ukrainian MFA criticised (31.10) the conduct of the 26 October parliamentary elections in Georgia and supported the conclusions of the OSCE/ODIHR international election observation mission, which recorded numerous violations. The Ukrainian MFA officially stated that the violations

identified by international observers should be investigated and called on the Georgian government not to follow Belarus' path to the loss of sovereignty and independence. The MFA also condemned the use of force against a peaceful protest in Tbilisi and expressed disappointment with the Georgian government's decision to suspend EU accession talks until 2028 (29.11, 2.12).

The MFA issued a statement (26.09) condemning as unacceptable the use of images of the horrific consequences of Russia's war against Ukraine in political advertising, in particular on the advertising banners of the ruling Georgian Dream party. The MFA called on the Georgian government, the Georgian Dream, and all interested parties to refrain from using the topic of the aggressive war against Ukraine and its citizens in political infighting in Georgia.

During a bilateral meeting with the Director of the Maritime Transport Agency under the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia, A. Akhvlediani (23.04), the head of Ukraine's Shipping Administration, Y. Ihnatenko, discussed the training and certification of seafarers of both countries, as well as the development of shipping along inland waterways.

After repeated appeals to the Georgian Ministry of Justice to allow personal visits to Saakashvili, the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, D. Lubinets, addressed the same unsuccessful request (1.04) to the Georgian Parliament.

Results


In 2024, relations between Ukraine and Georgia continued to deteriorate and took on the shape of a direct political confrontation. The President of Ukraine enacted (11.12) the NSDC's decision on personal sanctions against those members of the Georgian government who, in the President's words, "surrender Georgia to Putin". Thus, 10-year sanctions were imposed against the Georgian Dream party founder and former Prime Minister B. Ivanishvili, the current head of government I. Kobakhidze and 17 other people.

The appointment of Ukraine's new ambassador to Georgia, expected in 2023, did not take place. Instead, Foreign Minister A. Sybiha decided (9.09) to recall Chargé d'Affaires ad interim M. Kharyshyn.

The State Service of Maritime and Inland Water Transport and Shipping of Ukraine and the Maritime Transport Agency under the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia signed (23.04) an updated Memorandum of Understanding on mutual recognition of Seafarers' Diplomas/Certificates of Specialist Training issued in accordance with the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended.

According to the State Customs Service of Ukraine, the trade turnover between Ukraine and Georgia decreased from USD374.9mn in 2023 to USD 341.2mn in 2024, mainly due to a decrease in Georgian imports year-on-year. Ukraine exported goods and services to Georgia for USD 242.5mn, whereas a year earlier, they amounted to USD 236.6mn. In 2024, Ukraine imported goods and services from Georgia worth USD 98.7mn, compared to USD 138.4mn in 2023.

Israel



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	3	3	2
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	3	3	2
ACTIVITIES	3	4	3
RESULTS	2	2	2
TOTAL SCORE	C-	C	D+

Relations between Ukraine and Israel are going through a period of stagnation, exacerbated by the Russian-Ukrainian war, with Israel trying to maintain friendly relations with Russia, and the war in Gaza, which significantly affects Ukraine’s relations with Arab countries due to Israel becoming increasingly more “toxic”.



Political interest/engagement

An analysis of bilateral relations between Ukraine and Israel shows that the level of political interest was minimal in 2024. There were objective reasons for this, including the continuing conflict in the Middle East, and subjective reasons, such as Israel's balancing act between Ukraine and Russia and Ukraine's balancing act between Israel and the Arab states. Ukrainian officials rarely mentioned Israel in their speeches and statements. According to the available information, there were no significant public statements or speeches by the President, Prime Minister, Vice-Prime Ministers, Foreign Minister, Minister of Defence, or the Speaker that directly concerned Israel. There were only indirect mentions of Israel in some speeches on international platforms.

Similarly, no official statements by factions, political party leaders, or interviews with senior officials of the Presidential Office of Ukraine were found to mention Israel in 2024.

The Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada and the accompanying Analytical Report for 2024 did not contain any specific references to relations with Israel either.

The agenda of the VRU Committee on Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation in 2024 did not include any issues directly related to Israel.

In 2024, Ukrainian leaders mentioned Israel less often than in 2022–2023. This may have to do with the negative consequences of President V. Zelenskyy's unbalanced statement (7.10.2023) on unequivocal support for Israel on the Gaza issue, which was negatively perceived in the Arab world.

Strategic communications

In some of his speeches, the President of Ukraine mentioned Israel in the context of the Middle East crisis and the war in Gaza. In particular, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore (June), Zelenskyy said that Ukraine recognises the statehood of both Israel and Palestine. He emphasised Israel's right to self-defence and Ukraine's readiness to provide humanitarian aid to Gaza and to help end the conflict to stop civilian suffering.

During a meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud in Riyadh (27.02), President Zelenskyy discussed regional security issues, including the situation in Israel and Palestine, stressing the importance of peaceful conflict resolution.

Heads of diplomatic missions were also active to some extent. In November, Ukraine's Ambassador to Israel, Y. Korniychuk, welcomed Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister S. Haskel's initiative to hand Russian weapons seized from Hezbollah over to Ukraine. The Israeli side later denied this information. The Ukrainian press also discussed the deployment of an Israeli early warning system in Ukraine, which was allegedly in its final stage as of the end of 2024. The ambassadors' public statements were received controversially in both Israel and Ukraine and drew criticism.

Activities

Violations of the rights of Ukrainian refugees in Israel, the de facto introduction of a visa regime for Ukrainian citizens (new migration rules), and the issue of Hasidic pilgrimage to Ukraine for Rosh Hashanah were the subject of negotiations in 2024, both at the level of the MFA and during a telephone conversation between V. Zelenskyy and B. Netanyahu (28.08). The two leaders discussed, among other things, the Russian-Ukrainian war, Israel's participation in the first global summit on peace in Ukraine, the issue of Israeli pilgrims, and new migration rules for Ukrainian citizens.

There were several ministerial conversations at the level of the Foreign Ministries, which did not yield significant results. Over the phone, I. Katz and D. Kuleba discussed bilateral relations and regional security (June), while G. Sa'ar and A. Sybiha touched on the anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, regional threats, and Iran (December).

The only notable activity observed on the part of Israel has been carried out by the Agency for International Development Cooperation (MASHAV) at Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose head was scheduled to visit Ukraine in early 2025.

Results

No positive results were achieved in Ukrainian-Israeli relations in 2024, which continued to stagnate further, accompanied by a drop-in communication. Israel pays lip service to supporting Ukraine but does not take any steps which would prove this. The cooling of relations in 2024 is a logical result of disappointments amid high expectations in 2022–2023.

The activity of the Ukrainian Embassy in Israel in 2024 was noticeable but ineffective due to the Israeli government's policy. Apart from the deployment of an Israeli early warning system in Ukraine, which can be considered an achievement, no other positive trends were observed.

Trade between Ukraine and Israel totalled USD533.6mn in 2024. This is slightly more than in 2023 (USD 523mn), when Israel had a trade surplus. It is noteworthy that before the outbreak of a full-scale war, the trade turnover between the two countries was approximately USD 450mn.

India



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	3	3	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	2	2	5
ACTIVITIES	3	4	5
RESULTS	3	3	4
TOTAL SCORE	C-	C	A-

The first ever visit of India’s Prime Minister to Ukraine and the visit of Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs to India made 2024 a year of substantially stronger political relations between Ukraine and India. Ukraine demonstrated interest in cooperation with New Delhi at various levels, except the parliamentary level. Ukraine doubled its exports to India compared to 2023, however it was still below the level before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.



Political interest/engagement

In 2024, Ukraine's officials representing different levels of government articulated interest in strengthening relations with India and engaging it in the Peace Formula implementation on a wider scale. President Zelenskyy mentioned this repeatedly in his meetings with Prime Minister Modi (24.09 and 14.06), his telephone conversation with PM Modi (20.03), and the visit of India's Prime Minister to Ukraine (23/08), the first ever since Ukraine gained independence. In the joint statement following that visit, the parties expressed interest in taking bilateral relations to the next level, from comprehensive "to strategic partnership in the future." Illustrative of serious interest in bilateral dialogue and promotion of the Peace Formula, the President's Office officials contacted the Ambassador of India to Ukraine repeatedly.

O. Merezhko, Chair of the VRU Foreign Policy Committee, mentioned India critically in his interview (15.04). Among other things, he mentioned that Ukraine's VRU was trying to "establish contacts" with the Parliament of India, but "it has not managed much so far."

In his meeting with India's newly appointed Ambassador Shankar (16.08), President Zelenskyy invited India to join the communique of the first Peace Summit. President Zelenskyy did not mention India in his VRU address (19.11), but he highlighted in his address to Ukrainian diplomats (22.12) that "Ukraine's interests in relations with India had to be advanced" in 2025.

Ukraine's Foreign Minister D. Kuleba, in his interview for Ukrainian media (29.03) following the first official visit to India since 2017, said that there was "progress in bilateral relations".

Strategic communications

In 2024, Ukrainian top officials communicated proactively with Indian media. President V. Zelenskyy gave two interviews to Indian outlets following the visit of Narendra Modi (25.08). Among other things, V. Zelenskyy mentioned the idea that India could host the next Peace Summit in an interview with the Indian media.

Also, V. Zelenskyy gave an exclusive interview to the Times of India (28.10). Other interviews with major Indian media included interviews by Foreign Minister Kuleba during his visit to India (28–29.03), Prime Minister Shmyhal (26.01), Prosecutor General Kostin (6.09) and Ambassador Polishchuk (7.06, 22.08, 6.09, 9.09).

At the same time, the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Ukraine's Ambassador Polishchuk (15.07), following President Zelenskyy's comment about Prime Minister Modi's visit to Moscow during Russia's attack against the Ukrainian Okhmatdyt children's hospital.

During the visit of Prime Minister Modi to Ukraine (23.08), the leaders of Ukraine and India visited the Martyrology of Children killed during the full-scale Russia-Ukraine war created by the National Museum of Ukraine's History in World War II and commemorated them.

In January, Ukraine became a partner country in the Vibrant Gujarat Global Summit investment forum for the first time. Ukraine's First Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economy, Y. Svyrydenko, addressed the Summit attendees. Deputy Foreign Minister I. Borovets presented Ukraine at the Raisina Dialogue, the biggest regional security conference, for the first time (20–24.02).

Amb. Polishchuk delivered a lecture at the National Defence College in New Delhi (9.05).

Activities

India's Prime Minister N. Modi visited Ukraine for the first time (23.08). V. Zelenskyy had two meetings with Prime Minister Modi on the side-lines of major events (24.09 and 14.06) and a telephone conversation (20.03).

In 2024, Ukrainian top officials had a series of visits to India. During Foreign Minister Kuleba's visit (28–29.03), the first visit of this kind since 2017, an overview meeting of the Ukraine-India intergovernmental commission took place. Throughout 2024, Ukraine's and India's foreign ministers maintained communication, including telephone conversations (3.01 and 9.09), and met on the side-lines of major events (25.11).

Head of the OPU, A. Yermak, was in dialogue with A. K. Doval, National Security Advisor for the Prime Minister of India (telephone conversations on 15.03, 19.06 and 18.07). Among other things, they discussed ways to strengthen bilateral relations and a wider engagement of India in the implementation of President Zelenskyy's Peace Formula. This topic dominated the meeting of A. Yermak with India's Ambassador H. K. Jain (14.03), the meeting of Deputy Foreign Minister A. Sybiha with Ambassador Jain (23.04), and the meeting of the newly-appointed Ambassador Shankar with Deputy Head of the OPU I. Zhovkva (7.08).

Ukraine attended two major fora: The Vibrant Gujarat Global Summit and the Raisina Dialogue. The Vibrant Gujarat Global Summit hosted a Ukraine-India: Investment Opportunities for a Better Future workshop (12.01). On the side-lines, the Ukrainian delegation met with Chief Minister of Gujarat Bhupendrabhai Patel. Also, they had a series of meetings with Indian businesses.

Throughout 2024, a series of joint working group meetings took place: the 5th meeting of the working group on trade and economic cooperation (online, 15.05); the first online meeting of the working group on education cooperation (9.08); the third meeting of the working group on pharmaceuticals (online, 14.08); and the founding meeting of the working group on cultural cooperation (online, 20.08) that was initially postponed due to V. Zelenskyy's comment on Modi's visit to Moscow on the day of Russia's attack against the Okhmatdyt hospital (8.07). For the first time since 2013, the fourth round of Ukraine-India consultations for consular and legal issues took place (online, 6.02).

Ukrainian officials met repeatedly with India's Ambassador Jain. They included State Property Fund Chair V. Koval (8.02); NSDC Secretary O. Lytvynenko (20.06, 16.10); Strategic Industries Minister H. Smetanin (26.10), and Minister of Culture and Strategic Communication M. Tochytsky (4.11).

The official delegation of the Health Ministry and the State Service of Ukraine on Medicines and Drugs Control visited India (14–18.10). The delegation took part in the 9th International Conference of Drug Regulatory Authorities (ICDRA), organised by the Central Drug Standards Control Organisation of India (CDSCO) in cooperation with the World Health Organisation. On the side-lines of the conference, R. Isayenko, Chair of the State Service of Ukraine on Medicines and Drugs Control, met with R. Raghuvanshi, Director General of CDSCO, and his

deputies. During the meeting, the representatives of the two regulators discussed practical steps to implement the Memorandum of Understanding between the State Service of Ukraine on Medicines and Drugs Control and the Central Drug Standards Control Organisation of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare of the Government of India, signed on 23 August 2024 during the visit of India's Prime Minister to Ukraine. The delegation visited pharmaceutical companies.

In Vienna, on the side-lines of the IAEA Board of Governors, Ukraine's Energy Minister G. Galushchenko discussed nuclear and radiation safety in Ukraine in the context of Russian military aggression with India's Permanent Representative to the IAEA S. Kumaran (23.11).

Ukraine's Embassy in India worked proactively with Indian businesses. Among other things, it organised a panel discussion on humanitarian demining as part of the international forum on mine safety and security, INFOMAS SYMPOSIUM (14.11), together with Horizon Group, a company that has opened an office in Ukraine. Ukraine's Ambassador to India attended the PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry event (12.03), the WTC Business and Industry Association (WTCBIA, 7.06), and other events.

Ukraine's Embassy worked on developing cultural cooperation. In October, Amb. Polishchuk opened the Fafila Lit Fest literary festival. In the first six months of 2024, the first Ukrainian-Indian school competition titled Ukraine — South Asia: Open Dialogs took place.

Results

Four documents were signed during the visit of Indian Prime Minister Modi to Kyiv. These included the Agreement on cooperation in the agriculture and food industry between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Republic of India; the Memorandum of Understanding between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of the Republic of India on Indian humanitarian grant assistance for highly effective community development projects (the signed memorandum creates conditions for the next five years to provide grant and humanitarian assistance for effective community development projects, including

reconstruction and restoration of Ukraine); the 2024–2028 Program of Cultural Cooperation between Ukraine’s Ministry of Culture and Information Policy and India’s Ministry of Culture; and the Memorandum of Understanding between the State Service of Ukraine on Medicines and Drugs Control and the Central Drug Standards Control Organisation of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India.

India’s Foreign Affairs Ministry Secretary represented India at the Peace Summit in Switzerland (16.06). However, India did not sign the joint communique.

India transferred 16 packages of humanitarian assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, including two packages in 2024.

In 2024, India remained one of Ukraine’s key non-EU export destinations, with exports worth USD991mn and imports worth USD 1.3bn. The key items in Ukraine’s exports to India were fats and seed oils, accounting for USD 720mn, and the key item of imports was pharmaceutical goods, accounting for USD 200.4mn.

China



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	2	3	3
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	2	1	3
ACTIVITIES	2	3	3
RESULTS	2	3	3
TOTAL SCORE	D+	D+	C

Despite the Ukrainian government's active efforts in the first half of 2024, it failed to engage China in the peace process initiated by Kyiv. The China-Brazil peace plan was unfavourable for bilateral relations, ignoring Ukraine's key security interests. The political dialogue at the level of foreign ministers can be considered a step forward. Throughout the year, China remained an important trade partner of Ukraine.



Political interest/engagement

In 2024, Ukraine's interest in China grew rapidly, given the China-Brazilian peace initiative to resolve the Russian-Ukrainian war. This topic, as well as China's influence on Russia and China's participation in the Peace Summit, were among the issues raised most often by the President and other high-ranking officials in their speeches. This interest was related to China's participation in the conflict resolution, not to the bilateral agenda.

In his speeches at the UN GA (25.09), the UN SC (24.09) and the European Council (19.12), as well as in his video addresses, the President emphasised China's role in restoring a just peace for Ukraine, calling for its stronger influence on Russia. One of his video addresses also called on China to be more proactive in influencing North Korea, which supplies Russia with soldiers (27.12).

The President mentioned the need to promote Ukraine's interests in relations with China in his speech on Diplomat's Day (22.12). The Government Action Plan for 2024 does not mention cooperation with China.

During the year, the President and other officials invited China to take part in the first and second Peace Summits. In April, Ukraine's Ambassador to China, P. Ryabikin, in a conversation with Li Hui, the Chinese Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs, stressed the importance of intensifying bilateral political dialogue at all levels and also invited China to participate in the Peace Summit.

The President dismissed Ukraine's ambassador to China (who had held the office for a year and a half only) in December 2024 without appointing a new one. Accepting the credentials from China's new Ambassador to Ukraine (December), Zelenskyy noted that Ukraine attaches great importance to the development of relations with China and hopes to strengthen exchanges and cooperation.

Strategic communications

In 2024, Ukrainian officials mentioned China in their speeches on numerous occasions, including in the context of China's participation in the Peace Summit and its support for Russia.

President Zelenskyy addressed high-ranking Chinese officials, inviting them to attend the Peace Summit, stressing that the involvement of global players such as China is important given their influence on Russia. In a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue press conference (Singapore, 02.06), the President said that he would like to meet the Chinese President, noting that there are currently no strong contacts with China due to the lack of willingness on the Chinese side.

During his visit to China (23–25.07) at their invitation, Foreign Minister D. Kuleba recorded a video message in Chinese, which was published on Chinese social media Weibo and DouYin. The Embassy of Ukraine in Beijing shared Ukrainian narratives on social media and during events that promoted Ukrainian culture. However, neither a shift in public opinion nor a change in the attitude of China's top leadership was observed.

Accepting the credentials from the new Chinese ambassador, V. Zelenskyy praised the dynamics of China-Ukraine relations and expressed hope for further strengthening of exchanges at all levels, deepening cooperation in areas such as economy and trade, as well as culture and people-to-people exchanges. His remarks were quoted by major Chinese media outlets, such as Xinhua and the Global Times.

MPs paid little attention to China in their speeches and meetings. There was a remarkable speech by the leadership of the VRU Committee on European Integration in the European Parliament (04.12), highlighting China's growing support for Russia in its war against Ukraine, including bypassing sanctions.

Throughout the year, Ukraine's MFA spokesperson invited China to join the Peace Summit and its interim sessions and Foreign Minister Wang Yi to visit Ukraine.

Activities

No direct contacts between President Zelenskyy and Chinese leader Xi Jinping took place in 2024. Nevertheless, after a long pause, bilateral political consultations took place at the level of deputy foreign ministers of Ukraine and China. A Ukrainian Foreign Minister visited China for the first time in 12 years.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister D. Kuleba met his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in Munich (17.02), where they agreed to maintain contacts at all levels and continue dialogue. During his visit to Guangzhou (24.07), Kuleba held another round of talks with Wang Yi, who assured him that a just peace in Ukraine was in China's strategic interests. After the visit, according to the President, a signal was sent that China supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and will not supply weapons to Russia.

In March, the Head of the OPU, A. Yermak, met the Chinese ambassador in Kyiv to discuss preparations for the Peace Summit. However, in late May, it became known that China would not participate in the event.

In June, Ukraine's First Deputy Foreign Minister A. Sybiha visited Beijing, where he met China's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and representatives of business circles. The parties agreed on the participation of business representatives in exhibitions in Ukraine and China. Subsequently, in his capacity as Foreign Minister, A. Sybiha and OPU head A. Yermak met the Chinese Foreign Minister on the sidelines of the UN GA in New York (26.09), where they discussed prospects for the development of bilateral relations and top-level contacts.

As part of the second round of shuttle diplomacy, Li Hui, the Chinese Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs, visited Ukraine (8.04) and held talks with A. Yermak, Vice-Prime Minister Y. Svrydenko and Foreign Minister D. Kuleba. During the meeting, the Ukrainian side spoke about the battlefield situation, the grain corridor, the return of prisoners of war and Ukrainian children deported by Russia.

The Ukrainian Embassy in Beijing was active in organising events to raise awareness of Ukrainian culture and politics among the Chinese population, such as the Ukrainian Film Festival, the Festival of Ukrainian Cities, traditional Christmas holidays, events covering the aftermath of the war, etc.

Results

In 2024, China traditionally abstained from voting on UNGA resolutions that directly condemned Russia's aggression. This includes resolutions calling for an immediate end to Russia's attacks on Ukraine's critical energy infrastructure. Overall, no documents on bilateral cooperation with China or peace efforts were finalised during the year.

In September, the President of Ukraine imposed additional sanctions on Chinese companies, including Hong Kong Himark Electron Model Limited and TKEM Trade Limited, as well as one individual.

In 2024, trade turnover between Ukraine and China reached USD16.8bn. According to the State Customs Service, China was Ukraine's largest import partner (USD 14.4bn). Ukraine mostly imported unmanned aerial vehicles, electrical equipment, components, communication, and data processing equipment, and exported iron ore, oilseeds, and grain crops.

Mexico



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	-	-	3
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	-	-	2
ACTIVITIES	-	-	3
RESULTS	-	-	3
TOTAL SCORE	-	-	C-

In 2024, Ukraine's key communication, activity and interest in Mexico were driven by the effort to garner support for the Ukrainian Peace Formula and international cooperation. The MFA and Ukraine's Embassy in Mexico, among others, stand out for their efforts to this end. Interparliamentary work ramped up somewhat, although not all of it was consistent and focused on Mexico specifically (instead, it targeted the LAC region).

Political interest/engagement

Ukraine's top-official interest in Mexico as a standalone political partner was less pronounced in 2024. Generally, Mexico was 'one of' when it came to cooperation or targeted actions with Latin America and the Caribbean. This is a continuation of the activities aimed at deeper cooperation with LAC, which was launched in 2023. The objective is to support Ukraine's stance internationally through the Global South countries as a counterweight to Russia.

These efforts were manifested in the invitation for Mexico to join the Global Peace Summit in June. The invitation started with official communication on behalf of the President's Office in early 2024, then through the MFA in May.

Ukrainian top officials thanked Mexico for its involvement in consultations on the Peace Formula in Davos earlier in 2024 (Head of OPU A. Yermak), as well as its participation in the Global Peace Summit and 'reaffirmation of its commitment to peace based on the UN Charter and the fundamental principles of international law' (Foreign Minister D. Kuleba). The importance of relations with Mexico for Ukraine was highlighted at the official level with the announced resumption of the work of the Embassy of Mexico in Kyiv and the presentation of letters of credence from Mexico's newly appointed ambassador.

Ukraine's interest focused on Mexico's support of the integrity of Ukraine's borders and a just punishment for Russia. In August, President Zelenskyy called on Mexico to support the norms of international law. Ukraine asked Mexico to arrest V. Putin in case he was coming to the inauguration of Mexico's newly elected President, C. Sheinbaum.

Little attention to trade and agricultural cooperation from Ukraine's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Agriculture Development and the Embassy of Mexico signals that deeper relations in this domain is not a priority for the time being.

Strategic communications

Given the interest in cooperation with more countries of the Global South, communication mechanisms of various official entities — including the government, parliament and partly the President — were used to enhance interaction and effect. The MFA was the most active, while statements and speeches by the President and representatives of the Verkhovna Rada were more sporadic.

The communication of the respective agencies, the work of the VRU representatives, and, to some extent, the think tank community all reflected the interest in LAC rather than in Mexico in particular. Ukrainian MPs communicated with Mexican officials and MPs directly at the level of I. Shynkarenko, MP, Head of the interparliamentary friendship group. This was shared on his personal social media accounts. CNN Mexico interviewed A. Pushkarenko, MP, during his visit to Mexico (11.11).

Apart from that, VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk communicated directly with the President of the Mexican Senate during his official visit to Mexico in October. He informed Mexican MPs about Russian attacks against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, thanked Mexico for supporting Ukraine in international organisations, and expressed hope for more initiative from Mexico about accomplishing just peace.

Foreign Minister D. Kuleba gave an interview to El Universal, a Mexican newspaper (20.03).

The activity of Ukraine's Embassy in Mexico focused on informing the Mexican government and society about Ukraine, the war, and Ukraine's global stance. Among other things, this work included publications in Spanish on the Embassy's official Facebook page, articles, and interviews by Amb. O. Dramaretska in Mexican media, participation in public events, etc.

Overall, 2024 was more about tactical steps and reactive communication of the Ukrainian state as a response to the news related to Mexico.

Activities

Direct Ukraine-Mexico cooperation was reflected in bilateral contacts between the ministers of foreign affairs at international fora and in work through embassies. There were few direct top official contacts. The efforts of the President's Office and Ukraine's MFA focused throughout 2024 on engaging Mexico in the Global Peace Summit and support for different elements of Ukraine's Peace Formula.

Official top-level contacts took place. VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk visited the inauguration of President Sheinbaum and met with the President of the Mexican Senate (1–2.10). Apart from that, A. Pushkarenko, Deputy Head of the VRU Committee on Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation, visited Mexico jointly with Ombudsman D. Lubinets as part of their Latin America tour. They had meetings at the Mexican Senate. The visit focused on encouraging closer cooperation on Ukraine's Peace Formula. VRU Deputy Speaker met with the leader of Mexico's parliamentary delegations at the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Geneva (26.03).

Ukraine's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Betsa, met with Mexico's Ambassador to Ukraine, A. Contreras González (18.11), to discuss the bilateral agenda, interaction within international organisations and interparliamentary cooperation.

In December, the Deputy Director of the Ukrainian Institute, A. Aliev, visited Mexico to establish cooperation with Mexican cultural institutions. The Spanish-language translation of *Ucrania en su historia y sus historias: Ensayos de intelectuales ucranianos*, a collection of essays, was presented in Mexico (11.12). The *Womanly Face of War* exhibition of Ukrainian posters was exhibited in Mexico (12.03).

Results

Ukraine approved its Strategy of Relations Development with Latin America and the Caribbean Countries in January, and a respective Communication Strategy was developed for the first time and focused on Mexico, among other LAC countries.

2024 can be qualified as a test year for some cooperation between Ukraine and Mexico that involved various actors of the political process. On the one hand,

communication between the two foreign ministers and the presence of Mexico's Foreign Minister at the Global Peace Summit, a resumed work of Mexico's Embassy in Kyiv, the first parliamentary conference Ukraine — Latin America and Caribbean Countries: Cooperation for The Future, and attendance of the Mexican President inauguration by the VRU Speaker can qualify as good results.

On the other hand, some of these results seem incomplete, so they do not have the effect Ukraine was looking for. Among other things, Mexico did not sign the joint communique following the Peace Summit. It does not offer clear support for Ukraine's initiatives in the international arena, and there is no contact between the presidents of Ukraine and Mexico.

According to Ukraine's Customs Service, Ukraine exported 150,000 tons of products to Mexico, which was more than what it imported from Mexico. Generally, the total weight of Ukraine-Mexico trade is not substantial for any of the two countries. Ukraine's total trade with Mexico grew in 2024 to USD298.4mn, including USD 249.5mn for exports and USD 48.9mn for imports, compared to USD 229.9mn in 2023.

Moldova

B+

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	4	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	3	3	5
ACTIVITIES	4	5	4
RESULTS	4	4	4
TOTAL SCORE	B-	B+	B+

Ukraine and Moldova are strengthening their partnership, focusing on joint European integration efforts, security, and countering Russian aggression. Relations are developing through bilateral meetings, international initiatives, and joint projects in energy and infrastructure. Moldova supports Ukraine with humanitarian aid, contributing to stability in the region.



Political interest/engagement

In 2024, the President of Ukraine repeatedly emphasised the importance of cooperation with Moldova, particularly in the context of the European integration of both countries. The President mentioned Moldova when he was introducing the new Foreign Minister (10.09) in the context of the importance of strengthening cooperation with neighbouring states, particularly in difficult political conditions. The speech emphasises the need for a delicate and persistent approach to protecting both Ukrainian and common interests with neighbours, including Moldova. In addition, the President's speech to the VRU on the Victory Plan (16.10) mentions Moldova as an important neighbouring state whose fate is closely linked to the Ukrainian struggle for independence and the security of the entire region. However, this country was not mentioned in the President's Annual Address to the VRU.

In one of his daily addresses (04.11), the President said that he congratulated M. Sandu on her victory in the presidential election, stressing that it is important for Moldova's further democratic development. The President also noted that Ukraine and Moldova are "friends on the path to integration", which symbolises not only close cooperation between the two countries but also common aspirations for integration into European structures.

Political engagement is also evident in the fact that the VRU Committee on Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation, at its meeting (30.10), considered possible scenarios for the development of Ukraine-Moldova relations in the context of the referendum and elections in Moldova.

In order to strengthen integration processes and cooperation between Ukraine and Moldova, the government plans to develop and approve a Strategy for the Development and Construction of Border Infrastructure with EU Member States and the Republic of Moldova by 2030. This is included in the Government's Action Plan for 2024. In addition, an agreement is planned to be reached between the two governments on the implementation of the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, which will help strengthen environmental safety and cooperation in this area. The Plan specifically focuses

on strengthening bilateral cooperation with Moldova in the field of environmental monitoring of transboundary environmental impacts and developing measures to prevent significant environmental threats that may arise from the planned activities.

In his public interview (13.12), Foreign Minister A. Sybiha commented on the issue of appointments of Ukrainian ambassadors, in particular, he stressed that candidates for some strategically important countries, such as Moldova, have already been selected. Sybiha noted that official appointments will be announced after the agrément is received, with some names expected to be known by the end of the year. However, the presidential decree on the appointment of the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the Republic of Moldova was not issued by the end of 2024.

Strategic communications

In his speech at a meeting of the European Council (19.12), President V. Zelenskyy outlined Ukraine's clear strategic position on Moldova's integration into European structures, seeing this as a guarantee of stability and prosperity for both Moldova and the entire region. The President highlighted the importance of involving all European countries, including Moldova, in EU activities in his speech at the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2024 (11.06). Ukraine's position on Moldova's integration into the EU was also reinforced in the President's address (04.11), in which he mentioned his conversation with President Sandu on her election victory.

In his speech at the 31st OSCE Ministerial Council (05.12), Foreign Minister Sybiha stressed that Russia is the greatest threat to collective security, noting that Moldova was becoming part of a hybrid war against Europe.

Ukraine's Ambassador-at-Large P. Rogovey spoke at the Moldova Security Forum 2024 (19.11), where he stressed the importance of a just and lasting peace for stability and security in the Black Sea region. In his interview (15.07), Rogovey said that Ukraine supports Moldova in negotiations on the settlement

of the Transnistrian conflict. The ambassador pointed out that Ukraine rejects a format of negotiations with Russia's involvement, as the most effective approach is a direct dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol: "Given the start of the negotiation process on Moldova and Ukraine's accession to the EU, the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict should become part of the European agenda, in particular in the security sector".

Moldova's Chargé d'Affaires ad interim N. Sirenko gave an interview to RFI (Radio France Internationale) (21.11), in which she said that relations between the two countries had significantly strengthened since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to her, Moldova has demonstrated its readiness for European integration by supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression and by choosing a European future in the referendum on EU accession.

Activities

In a trilateral meeting in Chisinau (05.07), the foreign ministers of Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania discussed the current security situation in the region and further prospects for cooperation. They stressed the importance of developing energy and transport infrastructure, including projects to connect electricity grids and gas pipelines. A joint statement was issued following the meeting.

Ukraine's Foreign Minister, D. Kuleba, met Moldova's Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, M. Popșoi, in Chisinau (05.07). In his statement following the meeting, Kuleba said that the start of negotiations on Ukraine's and Moldova's accession to the EU is a historic moment of great importance for both countries. It not only symbolises their common goal but also unites efforts to counter threats from Russia.

Ukraine's Foreign Minister A. Sybiha paid one of the first working visits to Moldova after his appointment (19.09), which was an important event in the context of bilateral relations. The main topics of the talks were the development of good neighbourly relations, infrastructure projects, strengthening security in the region, as well as joint counteraction to Russian disinformation and support for a peaceful resolution of the Transnistrian conflict while respecting Moldova's

sovereignty and territorial integrity. The meeting with his Moldovan counterpart, Popșoi, underlined the importance of coordinating actions on the path to a common European integration future.

Moldovan Foreign Minister Popșoi visited Ukraine (14.03), including the Hostomel community, which was heavily ruined under Russian occupation, and participated in the Black Sea Security Forum in Odesa (May).

Results

Ukraine views Moldova as an important partner, especially in the context of European integration. This is confirmed by the President's statements, discussions of bilateral relations in the Verkhovna Rada, and the inclusion of Moldova in government strategic plans. On international platforms, Ukraine consistently supported Moldova's European integration and emphasised common challenges, including security-related ones. Particular attention was paid to the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, where Ukraine advocates a format of negotiations without Russia's participation. Key diplomatic meetings were held at the level of foreign ministers, joint statements were signed, and important topics were discussed, including security, infrastructure, and counteraction to Russian influence. Ukrainian-Moldovan cooperation continues to deepen, as evidenced by active visits by officials from both countries.

Although Moldova does not provide military assistance to Ukraine, in 2024, it sent a new batch of humanitarian aid worth USD250,000 (MDL 4.9mn), including 19 power plants, blood transfusion equipment, etc.

Trade between the two countries totalled USD1.1bn in 2024. Of this amount, imports amounted to USD 150mn and exports to USD 945mn.

Poland

A-

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	4	4
ACTIVITIES	5	5	5
RESULTS	5	4	5
TOTAL SCORE	A	B+	A-

In 2024, Ukraine and Poland improved cooperation in the diplomatic and military sectors. Poland continues to be a key logistics hub for weapons supply to Ukraine and advocates for Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO in the international arena. Joint work was carried out to prepare for the opening of the first clusters within Poland's EU Council presidency in the first half of 2025, which demonstrates the states' readiness to unite efforts to strengthen regional security.

Political interest/engagement

Poland remained a constant focus of the attention of the Ukrainian state leadership, which demonstrated a high level of political interest and engagement in this direction. In his address on the occasion of the appointment of new Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Sybiha, the President of Ukraine noted the importance of cooperation with neighbouring states, particularly with Poland, taking into account all the complexities of the country's internal political processes, as well as the need for cooperation on defence support packages, sanctions, Ukraine's reconstruction, and support for communities abroad.

The Ukrainian Foreign Minister also repeatedly mentioned Poland in the context of military support, promotion of EU and NATO accession, as well as its participation in international initiatives and coalitions, particularly in the Czech initiative to purchase ammunition for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The Action Plan of the Government of Ukraine for 2024, which provides for international cooperation with Poland in a bilateral format, focuses on countering information threats, and fighting disinformation and Russian propaganda. In addition, one of the points is the modernisation of infrastructure at border crossing points under the 2015 bilateral agreement.

Strategic communications

In 2024, Ukraine actively used diplomatic tools to strengthen international support and partners' participation in capability coalitions, the Peace Formula Summit, and security guarantees agreements, with Poland as a key participant in these processes, being the focus of Ukrainian communications. The importance

of cooperation in military support and European integration issues with Poland was stated by the President of Ukraine during the UN SC meeting (24.09). The Minister of Foreign Affairs also spoke about this, emphasising that the states have a common enemy, and Europe's security depends on Ukraine's security. In particular, at a meeting with Foreign Minister R. Sikorski (10.05), A. Sybiha noted that Poland is a strategic partner and one of the leaders in military assistance to Ukraine.

Foreign Minister A. Sybiha participated in the Warsaw Security Forum (01.10), where he spoke about Ukraine's transatlantic future and the importance of providing security assistance.

Problematic issues in bilateral relations required separate communication, namely the blockade of the Ukrainian-Polish border by Polish farmers and the exhumation of victims of the Volyn tragedy, which was handled by both Kyiv and Ukraine's Embassy in Warsaw.

Activities

Zelenskyy visited Poland (08.07) to meet the Polish President, the Prime Minister, and the Ukrainian community, which facilitated bilateral contacts. Polish President A. Duda visited Ukraine on Independence Day (24.08), expressing support for its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Polish Prime Minister D. Tusk visited Kyiv, where he met the President of Ukraine and the Prime Minister and discussed cooperation in the energy sector, joint investments, and weapons and ammunition production (22.01). His second visit was to Lviv, where they discussed the joint fight against Russia (17.12).

Ukrainian Foreign Minister D. Kuleba held talks in Warsaw on increasing military supplies and providing air defence systems (22.02). First Deputy Foreign Minister A. Sybiha met the President of Poland and Polish leadership to discuss international military support for Ukraine, involvement of Polish business in reconstruction projects and expansion of trade and economic cooperation (09.05). Sybiha had his first telephone conversation as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine with his Polish counterpart Sikorski (06.09). Sikorski visited Lviv and confirmed intentions to help rebuild the city (12.09).

Within the framework of government consultations chaired by Ukrainian Prime Minister D. Shmyhal and Polish Prime Minister D. Tusk, Ukraine and Poland discussed the Peace Formula, military assistance, and sanctions policy, and held consultations at the level of Deputy Foreign Ministers (Warsaw, 28.03).

Polish Sejm Speaker S. Holownia visited Kyiv for negotiations on the defence of the country's airspace (19.06). The chairman of the Polish Sejm committee, P. Kowal, visited the Kharkiv Region, where they discussed Poland's readiness to participate in the reconstruction of the region (04.03).

A meeting of the foreign ministers of the Weimar Triangle (Poland, Germany, France), as well as Ukraine, Italy, Great Britain, and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, was held in Warsaw, where they discussed changes following the US presidential election and the formation of a new composition of the European Parliament (19.11).

The blockade of the Polish-Ukrainian border by Polish farmers was an openly problematic moment that created notable tension in relations. The problem was to resume the practice of issuing permits for cargo transport from Ukraine, as it was in pre-war times. The issue of exhumation of victims of the Volyn tragedy also arose sharply, but during the visit of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine O. Mishchenko to Poland (11–14.12), the first meeting of the Ukrainian-Polish working group under the auspices of the relevant ministries was held to resolve this issue.

Results

In 2024, Poland continued to be a strategic partner and one of Ukraine's closest allies in the EU in the context of military support, energy security, European integration, investment in Ukraine's reconstruction, trade development, and humanitarian aid.

During the President of Ukraine's visit to Poland (08.07), the states signed a security agreement on long-term cooperation, according to which they will further develop political, military, security, defence, and economic cooperation. The agreement emphasises that Poland supports Ukraine's initiative for a just and lasting peace — the Peace Formula — with a particular emphasis on energy security.

During a meeting in Warsaw, the Foreign Ministers of Poland and Ukraine, R. Sikorski and A. Sybiha, adopted a joint statement on the issue of exhumation of victims of the Volyn tragedy (26.11), in which Ukraine confirmed the absence of obstacles to conducting search and exhumation work on its territory, which had been the subject of a long-standing argument between the two countries.

Poland has actively provided armaments, financial, and humanitarian support since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, ranking first in terms of GDP spent among all countries in 2024. In total, 14bn zlotys (USD3.6bn) have been allocated to military aid to Ukraine.

One of the important documents confirming international unity, with Poland among them, is the Berlin Declaration, which confirms that states will continue to provide military, economic, and financial assistance to Ukraine, including by mobilising additional European funding.

During 2024, goods worth USD6.9bn were imported to Poland (USD 6.6bn in 2023), and USD 4.7bn were exported (similar to 2023).

Romania

B+

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	4	4
ACTIVITIES	5	5	4
RESULTS	5	5	5
TOTAL SCORE	A	A-	B+

In 2024, Ukraine and Romania deepened their cooperation in the political, security, economic, and humanitarian sectors. The main achievements were the conclusion of a security agreement, the transfer of the Patriot system to Ukraine, and support for Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO. Close, effective contacts at all levels have ensured a strategic partnership for stability in the region and support for Ukraine in confronting various challenges, especially in the war against Russia.



Political interest/engagement

The year 2024 was intense in terms of contacts between top officials of Ukraine and Romania. These contacts mostly took place at the level of the President, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ukraine's political interest is evidenced by a statement of the MFA (07.12) expressing solidarity with Romania against the backdrop of Russia's unprecedented hybrid attack against Romanian democracy during the first round of the presidential election (25.11).

The organisation of the first telephone conversation between Ukrainian Foreign Minister A. Sybiha and his newly appointed Romanian counterpart, E. Hurezeanu, immediately after the latter's appointment (31.12), demonstrated Ukraine's interest in strengthening the strategic partnership between the two countries.

President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyy mentioned Romania in his speech at a high-level meeting of the UN Security Council (24.10) in the context of Russian drones and missiles crossing into Romanian airspace. Also, during the presentation of new Foreign Minister A. Sybiha, the President stressed the need to focus more on relations with neighbours, among which he mentioned Romania (10.10).

Strategic communications

In the context of strategic communications, it is worth noting the activities of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Romania I. Prokopchuk. Throughout the year, he actively met representatives of the Romanian media and participated in numerous conferences and forums. Regional visits within Romania, meetings with officials, as well as with the head of the Save Romania Union party, E. Lasconi (02.08), demonstrate the effective implementation of strategic communications at the embassy level.

Interaction between Ukraine and Romania also focused on Ukraine's accession to the EU. At the invitation of Romanian Foreign Minister L. Odobescu, Vice-Prime Minister of Ukraine O. Stefanishyna attended the annual meeting of Romanian diplomats (25.07), where she stressed the key importance of Ukraine's accession to the EU and thanked Romania for military assistance, including the transfer of air defence systems.

Activities

During the year, there were many contacts at different levels and in different formats. The main topics of discussion were Black Sea cooperation, transit of weapons and humanitarian aid, border security, and logistics.

Among the high-level meetings in 2024, it is worth mentioning the meeting between Ukrainian Foreign Minister D. Kuleba and his Romanian counterpart L. Odobescu (02.04), during which they stressed the need to strengthen Ukraine's air defence. They also agreed to strengthen trilateral cooperation between Ukraine, Romania, and Moldova in response to Russia's attempts to destabilise the region. This meeting was preceded by a telephone conversation between Vice-Prime Minister O. Stefanishyna and Romanian Foreign Minister L. Odobescu (11.03), in which they discussed the implementation of amendments to Ukrainian legislation on the protection of national minority rights.

Important were the trilateral talks between Moldova's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Moldova M. Popsoi, Romania's Foreign Minister L. Odobescu, and Ukraine's Foreign Minister D. Kuleba, which took place in Chisinau (05.07). The talks were also attended by representatives of the ministries of energy and infrastructure of the three countries, as well as heads of centres for countering disinformation.

Of particular importance was the meeting between Interior Minister I. Klymenko and Romanian Deputy Prime Minister C. Predoiu in Bucharest (18.10). They discussed the experience of Ukrainian rescuers in difficult war conditions, cooperation in the field of civil protection, and the sending of Ukrainian State Emergency Service specialists to Romania to study the RO-Alert public warning system and conduct joint training.

Another important meeting was that of VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk with Romanian Senate President N. Ciuca in Washington (10.07). The parties discussed the urgent needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and permission to strike Russian military targets.

In the context of strengthening parliamentary diplomacy and establishing close cooperation between the Verkhovna Rada and the bicameral Parliament of Romania, Vice Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament O. Kondratiuk had an important meeting with Romanian Ambassador to Ukraine A. Victor Micula (12.03).

Kondratiuk appealed to her Romanian colleagues and called, in particular, for the Romanian Parliament to adopt a resolution on the non-recognition of the so-called presidential election in Russia, not only in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine but in general, since they are undemocratic.

Results

The most significant result of 2024 was the signing of the Security Cooperation Agreement by Presidents V. Zelenskyy and K. Iohannis in Washington (11.07). The agreement envisages cooperation to strengthen security in the Black Sea region, Romania's participation in the demining of the Black Sea, support through EU and NATO instruments, and training for Ukrainian pilots at the F-16 training centre in Romania.

Following trilateral talks (05.07), Ukraine, Moldova and Romania signed a memorandum on countering disinformation.

A meeting between the Ministers of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and Romania resulted in the signing of an agreement on cooperation in the field of prevention, limitation, and mitigation of the consequences of disasters (18.10). The document is aimed at cooperation in responding to natural disasters and was signed at a time when part of Romania was affected by floods.

Turnover in 2024 was USD3.47bn, or 1.5 times less than in 2023. This was due to an increase in Ukrainian exports through its own seaports instead of using the port of Constanta.

Slovakia

B+

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	5	5
ACTIVITIES	5	5	4
RESULTS	5	5	4
TOTAL SCORE	A	A	B+

Slovak-Ukrainian relations are characterised by controversial trends. While these relations are described as “the most meaningful since 1991” and practical cooperation is unprecedented, Slovak Prime Minister R. Fico’s confrontational rhetoric is significantly intoxicating the bilateral dialogue. Ukrainian officials had to respond to his anti-Ukrainian statements and officially criticise Slovakia’s policies, particularly where they run contrary to the EU’s energy policy. The change in Slovakia’s position on Ukraine’s NATO membership was a negative development.



Political interest/engagement

Political and media attention to Slovakia in 2024 was driven, on the one hand, by the intensity of bilateral dialogue and numerous top-level meetings and, on the other hand, by the need to respond to the confrontational rhetoric and the changed foreign policy course of the Fico government compared to the previous one. These concerns, first of all, strategic issues of support for Ukraine, in particular, the Slovak authorities' refusal to back Ukraine's NATO membership bid, as well as pressure on Kyiv to prevent the halting of Russian gas transit.

Ukraine's main focus was thus on crisis diplomacy and attempts to maintain working relations with the neighbour. The declared goals were to prevent the loss of Slovak support for countering Russian armed aggression, ensure Slovakia's participation in the implementation of the Peace Formula and support for Ukraine's EU membership aspirations, and try to convince the Slovak government to back Ukraine's NATO membership, deepen cooperation in the defence and military sector, and implement bilateral projects set out in the Roadmap for Joint Action between Ukraine and Slovakia.

Yet, the President's and Foreign Ministers' keynote speeches do not single out Slovakia, rather, they mention it in the context of European policy or relations with neighbours.

Strategic communications

Ukrainian officials' strategic communications concerning Slovakia were aimed at containing the escalation of the conflict and emphasising in crisis cases that despite the unfriendly steps and statements of the Slovak authorities, Ukrainian partners remain committed to constructive dialogue.

A. Sybiha visited Slovakia and other Western neighbours among the first in his new Foreign Minister role, which was supposed to send a signal on Ukraine's commitment to developing a good neighbourhood policy. President V. Zelenskyy described relations with Ukraine's neighbours as a priority: "We must not lose this neighbourhood, whatever it is." It appears to be a correct decision to emphasise that it is in Slovakia's interest to be in solidarity with Ukraine and support its

membership of NATO and for Slovak companies to take an active part in joint defence industry projects in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian MFA responded to Prime Minister Fico's confrontational statements about alleged Nazi soldiers fighting in Ukraine and his threats to cut off electricity supplies, among others. As Prime Minister Fico visited China and expressed support for Beijing's peace plan for Ukraine, it was pointed out that there was no alternative to the Ukrainian peace plan. Kyiv also criticised Fico's intention to attend the Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on 9 May 2025.

Activities

Amid a deterioration in Ukrainian-Slovak relations, the Ukrainian government has chosen a strategy of so-called "new pragmatism", a policy that focuses on the implementation of bilateral projects and a result-driven approach.

The intensity of the political dialogue in 2024 was the highest in the entire 30-year period of relations. There were two rounds of joint consultations between the governments of Ukraine and Slovakia (11.04 and 7.10), a visit by President Z. Caputova (10.05) and a working visit by Prime Minister Fico to Ukraine (24.01), meetings between Presidents V. Zelenskyy and P. Pellegrini on the side-lines of international summits, meetings between Ukrainian Minister of Economy Y. Svyrydenko and Deputy Prime Minister for EU Recovery Plan and Knowledge Economy P. Kmec, meetings of foreign ministers, including a working visit by Ukrainian Foreign Minister A. Sybiha to Slovakia (18.09), several phone conversations between the prime ministers, etc.

Numerous meetings were held to discuss support for Ukraine's peace plan and its EU membership, demining of Ukrainian territories, humanitarian support and reconstruction, and cooperation in defence procurement.

At the Peace Summit in Switzerland, Slovakia was represented by Minister of Foreign and European Affairs J. Blanar and at the Crimea Platform Summit by President P. Pellegrini (via video message).

The parties worked on eight bilateral documents, including the Agreement on Cooperation in Joint Border Crossing Point Control. The following three projects were identified as a priority: accelerating the reconstruction of the Mukachevo —

Velke Kapusany interconnector; expanding the Uzhhorod — Vysne Nemecke border crossing point to allow pedestrian passage, and continuing cooperation on expanding the capacity of the Malyy Bereznyy — Ubl'a border crossing point; and launching a new Kyiv — Bratislava railway passenger service.

Bilateral consultations were dominated by gas transit. The governments of Ukraine and Slovakia also agreed to set up a joint working group to share Ukraine's experience in diversifying nuclear fuel supplies to nuclear power plants with Slovakia, which is dependent on Russian nuclear fuel. A meeting of the Ukrainian-Slovak Mixed Commission on Economic, Industrial, Scientific and Technical Cooperation and the Ukrainian-Slovak Business Forum took place.

The first Ukrainian festival was held in Bratislava (7.09).

Results

It is important to note that despite Slovakia's position on not providing free lethal military assistance to Ukraine, commercial supplies of military equipment and ammunition continue. The Slovak government has funded a EUR750,000 project to supply Bozena 4+ demining systems (which it describes as non-lethal military assistance) and provided EUR 500,000 to rebuild Ukraine's energy infrastructure.

Hopes for Slovakia's accession to the G7 Declaration of Support for Ukraine (2023) and the conclusion of a bilateral security agreement did not materialise. At the EU level, Slovakia, despite its critical attitude, has always supported all resolutions concerning Ukraine.

In 2024, trade between Ukraine and Slovakia totalled USD2.9bn.

It was decided to reopen the consular office in Slovakia's Presov, which was closed in 2014.

Türkiye

B

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	4	4
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	3	3	3
ACTIVITIES	5	4	5
RESULTS	3	4	4
TOTAL SCORE	B	B-	B

In 2024, Ukraine's foreign policy towards Türkiye centred around defence cooperation, Türkiye's participation in post-war reconstruction projects in Ukraine, and the implementation of President V. Zelenskyy's Peace Formula, especially in the areas of food and humanitarian security.



Political interest/engagement

Türkiye remains an important partner of Ukraine in countering Russia's armed aggression, both militarily and diplomatically. However, there was a drop-in reference to Türkiye in Ukrainian leaders' official speeches, compared to previous years, and they focused primarily on the country's role in the implementation of the Ukrainian Peace Formula, post-war reconstruction, and assistance in protecting the rights of Muslims, including Crimean Tatars, in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. The appointment of former Ambassador to Türkiye A. Sybiha as Ukraine's new Foreign Minister and his choice of Türkiye for one of his first ministerial foreign trips were symbolic of bilateral relations. Yet, most policy speeches by the President or the Foreign Minister did not mention Türkiye among the priorities of Ukraine's foreign policy.

Strategic communications

Ukraine's presence in Türkiye's information space and expert community in 2024 was still limited. While this is largely due to Türkiye's control over the agenda and strategic communications, Ukraine also lacked initiative in promoting its narratives in the Turkish media space, both in the form of interviews with Ukrainian officials by traditional media and in working with new platforms and social media that allow interaction with different target audiences. Most of the existing communication formats can be described as cultural diplomacy.

Activities

The dynamics of political dialogue and economic diplomacy were maintained at a high-level thanks to Ukrainian officials' numerous visits to Türkiye.

In January, Minister of Communities, Territories, and Infrastructure Development O. Kubrakov took part in the Ukraine Recovery Forum in Istanbul. During his meetings with Turkish Minister of Trade O. Bolat and Minister of Transport and Infrastructure A. Uraloglu, the sides identified main priorities

for cooperation, such as expanding logistics and foreign trade, attracting private investment, and restoring Ukraine's energy, housing, critical and social infrastructure damaged by Russian aggression. A joint working group on reconstruction has been established to support the implementation of infrastructure projects.

In May, Naftogaz CEO O. Chernyshov met Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources A. Bayraktar to discuss ways to deepen cooperation with Turkish energy companies, storage of Turkish gas stock in Ukrainian underground storage facilities, and gas trading.

In late May, NSDC Secretary O. Lytvynenko paid an official visit to Ankara and Istanbul. In particular, he held talks with the Secretary General of Türkiye's National Security Council, the founders of the Baykar drone manufacturer, representatives of the security and defence sector, and experts to discuss the impact of Russian aggression against Ukraine on regional security.

Economic contacts and trade relations were developing actively. In July, the Ukrainian and Turkish delegations held talks in Ankara to discuss the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement and broader business contacts. The Ukrainian delegation was led by Deputy Minister of Economy and Trade Representative T. Kachka.

Ukraine's First Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Economy, Y. Svyrydenko, visited Türkiye in August. During the meetings with Türkiye's Trade Minister and other officials, the parties discussed finalising the ratification of the Free Trade Agreement, expanding cooperation between Ukrainian and Turkish businesses, strengthening control over sanctions against Russia, Türkiye's role in ensuring food security, as well as its participation in the implementation of the Ukrainian Peace Formula, ensuring the safety of navigation and demining of the Black Sea. During the visit to Istanbul, the Ukrainian delegation held meetings within the framework of the special working group to combat sanctions circumvention, and the Vice-Prime Minister met the leadership of the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK).

The launching ceremony of the Ivan Vyhovsky corvette took place in Istanbul (02.08) with the participation of Ukraine's First Lady O. Zelenska, Minister of Defence R. Umerov, Commander of the Ukrainian Navy Rear Admiral O. Neizhpapa, MP M. Dzhemilev and the leadership of the Turkish shipbuilding

company STM, which is implementing the project. As part of the visit, Navy Commander O. Neizhpapa met Turkish Minister of National Defence Y. Guler and Naval Forces Commander Admiral E. Tatlioglu. Separately, the Ministers of Defence of Ukraine and Türkiye met to discuss the development of defence cooperation, the strengthening of the capabilities of the Ukrainian Navy, and ensuring maritime security in the Black Sea region.

A strong signal to Türkiye about the importance for Ukraine of their bilateral relations was the official visit by Ukrainian Foreign Minister A. Sybiha in the first weeks after his appointment (21–22.10). In Ankara, he held talks with President R. T. Erdogan, Foreign Minister H. Fidan, National Defence Minister Y. Guler, and Trade Minister O. Bolat. The meetings focused on ways to achieve a “comprehensive peace” and expand bilateral cooperation in the political, economic, defence, industrial, cultural, and humanitarian sectors, as well as freedom of navigation and security in the Black Sea. In Istanbul, the Ukrainian minister visited the Saha Expo 2024 defence exhibition and met representatives of Turkish defence companies. He also met the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar communities and visited Istanbul University to discuss expanding academic cooperation and support for the study of the Ukrainian language in Türkiye.

Throughout the year, Türkiye hosted a number of cultural diplomacy events dedicated to countering Russian aggression, the release of prisoners of war, the return of deported children, protection of the rights of Crimean Tatars, the anniversary of the Holodomor, Vyshyvanka Day and promotion of Ukrainian culture, ranging from photo exhibitions to charity fairs and concerts.

Results

According to Ukraine’s Ambassador to Türkiye (2021–2024), V. Bodnar, “the main [achievement of Ukrainian diplomacy] is that Türkiye clearly maintains its position as a strategic partner, its political position on the need to end the war between Ukraine and Russia on the basis of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and that, despite all the vicissitudes of the war and attempts at mediation, Türkiye adheres to the position that the Russian occupation of Crimea is unacceptable.”

In 2024, Türkiye consistently supported a pro-Ukrainian position during votes at the UN and other international platforms; its Foreign Minister took part in the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland (although Türkiye wanted Russia invited as well); Türkiye was represented by a deputy minister at the Ukraine — Southeast Europe Summit; and the Turkish President delivered a video address to the Fourth Summit of the International Crimea Platform, stating that “our support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine is unwavering” and “international law mandates the return of Crimea to Ukraine”.

The greatest results were observed in the economic sector. In particular, according to the State Customs Service, trade between Ukraine and Türkiye continued to grow and reached USD6.45bn (USD 4.24bn in imports and USD 2.21bn in exports). According to the Ministry of Economy, this makes Türkiye the third largest market for Ukrainian exports after the EU and China. Turkish companies continued to invest heavily in Ukraine, accounting for 13.1% of the total number of foreign companies in 2024. Investments by companies such as Baykar (construction of a UAV production plant in Ukraine) and Onur Group (infrastructure projects) amount to hundreds of millions of US dollars.

In May, the Ukrainian government supported the ratification of the Free Trade Agreement with Türkiye, which was signed in February 2022, but the document is still pending ratification by the Verkhovna Rada. For its part, the Turkish Parliament ratified the Agreement in August 2024.

An important achievement of economic diplomacy was the extension of the so-called “transport visa-free regime” with Türkiye (29.02) at least until the end of the war, allowing Ukrainian carriers to carry out freight and transit transport without the need for special permits.

The problems of sanctions against Russia being circumvented and trade in dual-use goods through Türkiye remain significant, with Ukraine having limited leverage to influence Ankara’s position.

A Turkish translation of The Forest Song by Lesya Ukrainka has been published.

Hungary

B

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	2	3	4
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	2	2	4
ACTIVITIES	2	3	4
RESULTS	3	2	4
TOTAL SCORE	D+	D+	B

While tensions remain on a number of issues, such as Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration and the rights of the Hungarian national minority, the two sides have made certain progress in cooperation, particularly in the humanitarian sphere and cross-border logistics. At the same time, Hungary's position on military support for Ukraine and the EU sanction policy remains controversial, affecting the further development of relations.

Political interest/engagement

Compared to 2023, the interest in Hungary in both the government and the media shifted from an ad hoc response to the actions of Hungarian government representatives to a systematic approach to addressing complex issues such as Ukraine's European integration, national minorities (communities) and ensuring their rights. Considering Hungary's presidency in the EU Council in the second half of 2024, on the one hand, and Ukraine's active work towards European integration, on the other, improving relations and enhancing cooperation with Hungary was among the priorities for the Ukrainian foreign policy.

Ukrainian officials expressed interest in Hungary in the context of ensuring the rights of the Hungarian minority, developing trade and transport connections, infrastructure, energy, and humanitarian issues, as well as negotiating a bilateral cooperation agreement.

The President referred to Hungary indirectly when introducing the new Foreign Minister (10.09), stressing the need for more attention to relations with Ukraine's neighbours, including Hungary.

The Government Action Plan for 2024 does not mention Hungary.

Strategic communications

Following talks at the level of the MFA (30.09), Ukrainian Foreign Minister A. Sybiha and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary P. Sijjártó held a joint press conference, where A. Sybiha thanked Budapest for supporting EU sanctions against Russia and stressed Ukraine's desire to develop good neighbourly relations with Hungary.

During Hungarian Prime Minister V. Orban's visit to Ukraine (2.07), President V. Zelenskyy, in a joint statement, expressed gratitude to Hungary for its humanitarian assistance and support of the Peace Summit Communiqué and mentioned that in the context of Hungary's presidency, cooperation on European integration and support for Ukraine should be established at the EU level. Shortly after (8.07), V. Zelenskyy denied the possibility of Hungarian mediation between the official Kyiv and Moscow.

The President also spoke at the European Political Community Summit (7.11), held in Budapest on the occasion of the Hungarian presidency. In his speech, V. Zelenskyy called for unity to protect common interests.

At the end of the year, communications mainly focused on criticism of Hungarian initiatives. In particular, V. Zelenskyy criticised V. Orban for attempts at mediation in the war against Ukraine (17.12).

Activities

The year brought many meetings in various formats. Overall, the Ukrainian side maintained a course for peace and good neighbourly relations during meetings with the Hungarian side.

President V. Zelenskyy met with President of Hungary T. Sulyok at the summit of the Three Seas Initiative (11.04), where he invited Hungary to participate in the Global Peace Summit. The Hungarian side subsequently joined the joint communiqué of the Peace Summit.

The Ukrainian side also raised the security issue. During a telephone call (08.05) with Hungarian Prime Minister V. Orban, President V. Zelenskyy stressed Hungary's importance for common regional security. Hungarian Prime Minister V. Orban personally visited Kyiv for talks with V. Zelenskyy (2.07).

During his trip to Uzhhorod to meet with P. Sziijártó, Ukrainian Foreign Minister D. Kuleba emphasised the parties' mutual interest in developing good neighbourly relations and bilateral dialogue (29.01). One of the key topics was Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration and ensuring the rights of national minorities.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister A. Sybiha visited Budapest (30.09), where he spoke with his Hungarian counterpart, P. Sziijarto, about the development of bilateral relations and, in particular, the rights of national minorities in both countries.

The State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience held regular consultations with the Hungarian side on national minority issues. In particular, an online meeting (4.04) of high-level Ukrainian and Hungarian delegations was held to discuss ways to address the main issues concerning the

11 points put forward by Hungary. In this context, one of the main tasks was to develop a roadmap necessary for furthering the Ukrainian efforts on the way to accession to the EU.

At the same time, Ukraine made diplomatic efforts to overcome the Hungarian veto on key decisions within the EU. In particular, in the area of financial support, Kyiv worked with its partners to find mechanisms for decision-making without the need for unanimous approval by all member states, which eventually allowed the approval of new aid packages despite Budapest's opposition. In addition, Ukrainian diplomats actively worked to obtain funding, bypassing the blocked mechanisms, particularly by attracting bilateral support from allies.

Towards the end of the year, tensions in the energy sector escalated as the contract for the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine to the EU, particularly Hungary, was about to expire. The Ukrainian and Hungarian sides were in active contact regarding the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine, but the Hungarian side did not achieve any results.

Results

Despite rather cold relations with Hungary in 2024, cooperation between the two countries in certain areas improved to some extent. Although Hungary's position on providing weapons to Ukraine remained unchanged, and its position on EU membership was precarious, Hungary continued to support Ukraine on humanitarian issues and voted in favour of the UN GA resolution on the Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, which for the first time called Russia's war against Ukraine a war of aggression.

In 2024, Hungary repeatedly blocked the decision to allocate funds from the European Peace Facility for military support to Ukraine, insisting that military aid be excluded from joint EU support packages. Prior to that, Hungary opposed the additional sanctions on Russian gas (14.05), sanctions against Gazprombank (23.11) and sanctions preventing Rosatom from building a nuclear power plant in Paks (22.06).

In addition, Budapest consistently advocated for “peace talks” at any cost, which drew criticism from partner countries for effectively ignoring Russia’s aggressive actions. Hungary also maintains a staunch position against Ukraine’s membership in NATO, which creates obstacles to deepening bilateral cooperation and implementing strategic security initiatives.

Due to progress in resolving the issue of the rights of the Hungarian minority, Hungary lifted its veto on the start of negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Against this backdrop, the two sides also made progress on the issue of Ukrainians currently residing in Hungary: a bilingual Ukrainian-Hungarian school was opened in Budapest for the first time specifically for Ukrainian children (31.08).

There were developments in the trade and logistics sectors. In April, Ukraine and Hungary agreed to open a new “Velyka Palad — Nagyhódos” border crossing point and to allow empty trucks weighing more than 7.5 tonnes to cross another checkpoint, “Luzhanka — Beregsurány”. However, the trade turnover between the countries remained essentially unchanged at USD2.8 billion.

Czech Republic



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	5	4
ACTIVITIES	4	5	5
RESULTS	5	5	5
TOTAL SCORE	A-	A	A-

In 2024, Ukraine and the Czech Republic continued strengthening their strategic partnership, focusing on security, economic and humanitarian cooperation. The Czech Republic remains an important ally of Ukraine, actively supporting its defence capabilities through ammunition supplies, military training, and participation in international coalitions. Additionally, joint initiatives on infrastructure restoration, trade expansion and investment attraction demonstrate their shared commitment to long-term cooperation.



Political interest/engagement

In 2024, Ukraine demonstrated unwavering interest in developing relations with the Czech Republic, which was evident through numerous diplomatic contacts and coordination of strategic initiatives.

President V. Zelenskyy mentioned the opening of new Ukrainian consulates in the Czech Republic in his address at the meeting of heads of Ukrainian diplomatic missions abroad (19.08). During a working visit to Prague, VRU First Deputy Speaker O. Kornienko noted that the Czech Republic was one of the first countries to adopt a national programme for Ukraine's reconstruction, indicating a high level of political support (14.10). At the government level, at a meeting in March, representatives of Ukraine's MFA and the Czech government delegation emphasised the importance of the Czech reconstruction programme focusing on Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Lviv regions (13.03).

Strategic communications

The Czech audience, in general, and the Czech elite, in particular, were not targets of systematic strategic communications from Ukrainian authorities in 2024. In this context, only President Zelenskyy's address to participants of the conference "20 Years of Czechia in the EU: A Vision for an Enlarged Europe" can be noted, where he emphasised the importance of Ukraine's European integration (30.04). Ukrainian Ambassador to the Czech Republic V. Zvarych actively communicated with the Czech media and participated in public events, such as conferences, forums, and exhibitions.

The Czech Republic participated in the June Global Peace Summit in Switzerland (15–16.06) and the Parliamentary Summit of the International Crimea Platform in Latvia (24.10).

Among other aspects of strategic communications, it should be noted that Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs firmly rejected Czech President P. Pavel's comment about a "temporary compromise" regarding occupied territories and the possibility of agreeing that part of Ukraine's territory might remain under Russian control (24.09).

Activities

At the beginning of the year, Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine A. Sybiha and Czech Foreign Minister J. Lipavsky discussed the bilateral agenda and steps to develop defence cooperation, particularly the Czech initiative on ammunition (21.01). Thus, the parties set the agenda for cooperation development in 2024. Subsequently, President Zelenskyy and Czech Foreign Minister Lipavsky coordinated future high-level contacts in Kyiv when the latter took part in the Third International Food Security Summit “Grain from Ukraine” (24.10). During the NATO summit (11.07), President Zelenskyy and his Czech counterpart Pavel discussed the implementation of the Czech initiative on artillery ammunition supplies, as well as Ukraine’s European integration. In December, Zelenskyy spoke with Czech Prime Minister P. Fiala in Brussels about Ukraine’s current defence needs and further cooperation (19.12).

Defence cooperation remained an important aspect of relations between Ukraine and the Czech Republic in 2024. During intergovernmental consultations in Prague (16.07), Prime Ministers D. Shmyhal and P. Fiala confirmed joint plans to increase military support for Ukraine.

Bilateral cooperation also encompassed the economic and energy sectors. Prague hosted a meeting of the Ukrainian-Czech Commission on Economic Cooperation, the first since the full-scale invasion (12.07). It discussed issues of energy, critical infrastructure restoration, trade, and defence industry cooperation. The Czech Republic expressed readiness to expand investments in Ukraine’s energy security and support the modernisation of Ukrainian infrastructure.

Results

The year 2024 marked a period of substantial strengthening of cooperation between Ukraine and the Czech Republic in key areas of security, defence, economy, and recovery. The countries signed a bilateral security agreement (18.07), which includes the production of ammunition and drones, and equipment repair. Additionally, the Czech Republic joined the International

Drone Coalition for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, making an important contribution to strengthening the technological potential of the Ukrainian army.

In the defence sector, the Czech Republic continued to increase support through participation in the artillery and demining coalition within NATO, allocating EUR40mn for the training of Ukrainian bomb disposal experts. An important step was the signing of agreements between Czech companies Colt CZ and Sellier&Bellot regarding the transfer of Bren 2 rifle and ammunition production to Ukraine (16.07), as well as the establishment of a joint cartridge factory. This will ensure a long-term supply of critically important ammunition. In July, the Czech Republic committed to training 4,000 Ukrainian military personnel during the year, with the capacity to train up to 2,000 individuals simultaneously, demonstrating its active role in preparing Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers (08.07).

The Czech Republic also played an active role in capability coalitions within the Ramstein framework, particularly by initiating the creation of a coalition to provide financial support for its initiative on the procurement of 155mm ammunition. In addition, the Czech Republic announced contracts for the supply of 180,000 shells for the Ukrainian army, as well as plans to purchase 1.5mn shells by the end of 2025.

Ukraine's reconstruction became another key area of cooperation. Joint projects on restoring Ukraine's energy infrastructure were announced at the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2024 (11–12.07), including 1 GW capacity and infrastructure projects in Dnipro. The expected investment amounts to up to EUR700mn.

Furthermore, significant attention was paid to humanitarian initiatives. V. Valek and V. Liashko, the Ministers of Health of the Czech Republic and Ukraine, respectively, signed a memorandum on the treatment of Ukrainians in the Czech Republic and the integration of medical systems, which will improve Ukrainian citizens' access to medical services (16.07).

Economic cooperation remained intensive, with imports amounting to USD2.47bn and exports to USD 0.92bn, slightly lower than in 2023.



BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES

RUSSIA

BELARUS

Russia

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	n/d	n/d	n/d
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	n/d	n/d	n/d
ACTIVITIES	n/d	n/d	n/d
RESULTS	n/d	n/d	n/d

In 2024, Ukrainian-Russian relations remained at a critically low level as the active phase of the full-scale war continued. Russia showed no signs of readiness to de-escalate or compromise. Ukraine defended its territorial integrity, strengthened its status as an important centre of the anti-Russian coalition, and initiated the Global Peace Summit on Ukraine.

Political interest/engagement

In 2024, the Ukrainian leadership's political interest in issues related to Russia remained a priority and was limited to countering Russia's aggression and building global support for Ukraine in the war. In his speeches, including at the G7 summit (14.06) and the UN GA (24.09), President V. Zelenskyy stressed that peace in Europe is impossible without Russia's complete defeat and the establishment of an international tribunal to bring the Russian leadership to justice for its crimes. The main emphasis was on the pressure of the continuing sanctions and international isolation of Russia. The political consolidation of the government and the opposition around countering Russian aggression was maintained, as the defence of the country remains a national priority. The exchange of prisoners of war and the return of Ukrainian children remained a separate issue of political interest.

Strategic communications

The issue of countering Russia remained a central theme in official strategic documents and was the main topic of all public speeches and interviews by the state leadership both inside and outside Ukraine. The Ukrainian leadership actively used international platforms (UN, EU, NATO, etc.) to promote the idea of creating a new security system that would account for the real threat from Russia. In speeches at international events and during interviews, the main topic continued to be countering Russia and promoting the Ukrainian Peace Formula, which was initiated by Zelenskyy in the autumn of 2022. To implement this initiative, a meeting at the level of foreign and security policy advisers (Davos, 15.01) and the first Global Peace Summit (17.06) were held in Switzerland. The summit, which was attended by representatives of more than 90 countries and international organisations, adopted a joint communique on a future just peace for Ukraine.

Activities

In 2024, there were no direct political contacts between the governments of Ukraine and Russia whatsoever. Ukraine's activities related to Russia focused on expanding sanctions pressure, building international support for the confiscation of Russian assets abroad and their further use for the reconstruction of Ukraine, as well as intensifying the criminal prosecution of Russian officials in international courts.

The Ukraine-Russia diplomatic confrontation intensified, and attempts were made to reduce Russia's influence in international organisations (UN, OSCE, CoE, etc.).

Separate humanitarian channels were used, particularly for the exchange of prisoners and the return of deported children through the mediation of Türkiye, the Vatican, the UAE, and Qatar. Negotiations on the exchange of prisoners of war were actively pursued. Notably, a meeting between Ombudsmen D. Lubinets and T. Moskalkova took place in Belarus (8.11). Contacts between special services continued, usually with the involvement of intermediaries. Efforts were made to repatriate the bodies of deceased servicemen.

Results

In 2024, the process of countering Russian aggression and imposing restrictive measures on the capabilities of the Russian Federation and its citizens continued. The President of Ukraine signed 17 decrees imposing sanctions against Russia, its citizens, and companies. Additionally, the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) upheld 26 claims by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine. In total, sanctions were imposed on 759 individuals and 747 legal entities from Russia or associated with Russia.

Ukraine denounced five bilateral agreements and one protocol with Russia. Ukraine also withdrew from 20 agreements and other arrangements that were in force within the CIS.

The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Russian military officials S. Kobylash and V. Sokolov (5.03), as well as S. Shoigu and V. Gerasimov

(24.06), for missile attacks on energy infrastructure that caused large-scale destruction and significant civilian casualties.

In 2024, 11 prisoner exchanges took place, through which Ukraine recovered 1,358 of its citizens.

Throughout the year, the anti-Putin coalition remained active, with the continued implementation of economic and political sanctions by Ukraine's partners against Russia, the promotion of proposals to provide Ukraine with reliable security guarantees, and the continued provision of military assistance at both the bilateral level and through the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (Ramstein format).

In 2024, according to customs data, the total trade turnover between the two countries was approximately USD22.76mn. Ukraine's exports to Russia totalled USD 21.04mn, with imports from Russia at USD 1.71mn. However, bilateral trade is prohibited by law, and these figures reflect the finalising of paperwork for deliveries made before 24 February 2022.

Belarus

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	n/d	n/d	n/d
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	n/d	n/d	n/d
ACTIVITIES	n/d	n/a	n/d
RESULTS	n/d	n/d	n/d

In 2024, Ukrainian-Belarusian relations remained at an extremely low level. Belarus continued to support Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Although no direct attacks were registered from Belarusian territory, the threat from this direction persists. Diplomatic relations were effectively frozen: Ukraine did not appoint an ambassador to Belarus, designating an ambassador-at-large instead.

Political interest/engagement

In 2024, Ukraine's political interest focused on Belarus's dependence on Russia and its future democratisation, as well as on security issues, primarily in the context of the threat to Ukraine's northern border. The President and other Ukrainian officials rarely touched upon Belarusian issues in their speeches, mostly mentioning them in addresses to foreign audiences.

The interfunctional parliamentary association "For Democratic Belarus" issued regular public statements.

Strategic communications

Belarus appears in Ukraine's security documents, but its position has changed as it has transformed from a partner neighbour to a source of threat. The Ukrainian embassy in Minsk, operating with skeleton staffing, remained the main channel for communication with Lukashenka's regime.

Public statements of support for Belarusian democratic forces came mainly from parliamentary representatives (O. Dunda, O. Goncharenko, etc.) and individual advisers. Ambassador-at-Large for Belarus I. Kyzym (MFA) and several MPs communicated with Belarusian democratic forces in Ukraine and abroad and publicly demonstrated their support for Belarusian volunteers in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The most notable moment was President V. Zelenskyy's New Year's address (31.12), in which he expressed confidence that "the day will come when we will all say: 'Zhyve Belarus!' [Long Live Belarus, a patriotic slogan in Belarusian]". This was a public and symbolic act of solidarity with the Belarusian people fighting for their freedom. While Belarusian democratic forces and Ukrainian civil society welcomed the gesture, authorities in Minsk were furious. This marked the first open and direct manifestation of political solidarity with the Belarusian people by the Ukrainian authorities in recent years.

Activities

Ukraine's policy towards Belarus in 2024 remained strict and largely unchanged due to Belarus's complicity in Russia's aggression and the potential threat from the north. Ukraine's leadership periodically imposed sanctions and terminated agreements with Belarus.

During the year, Ukraine's MFA issued six statements regarding Belarus, particularly concerning unfriendly actions on the border due to the deployment of a significant contingent of Belarusian troops under the pretext of military exercises (25.08), and condemned another meeting between A. Lukashenka and a representative of the Russian occupying administration, D. Pushylin (22.09).

The Defence Forces completed the creation of a tiered border defence system in the north, which includes mobile firing groups and remote surveillance systems.

Interaction with Belarusian democratic forces improved, in particular through the appointment of former Ukrainian Ambassador to Belarus I. Kyzym as Ambassador-at-Large for Belarus. Although formal government contacts with the Belarusian opposition were not established, Kyzym became a key figure in informal communication with the Joint Transitional Cabinet and the Coordination Council. He was also involved in consultations with partners (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Sweden, and the Czech Republic) on coordinating a common policy towards Belarus.

Results

In 2024, Ukraine did not sever diplomatic ties with Belarus, but no new ambassador was appointed. Ukraine's diplomatic mission in Minsk is effectively inoperative, while contacts with the Lukashenka regime are maintained through technical channels. Former Ambassador of Ukraine to Belarus I. Kyzym, appointed as Ambassador-at-Large for Belarus, established a basic channel of communication with Belarusian democratic forces. However, no systematic state policy was developed in this area; without an institutional framework and strategic programme, his activities had limited impact and did not become a full-fledged policy tool regarding Belarus. This remains a weakness in Ukraine's foreign policy as of the end of 2024.

During the year, bilateral cooperation continued to decline, especially in terms of trade. In 2024, the total trade turnover between the two countries was about USD18mn. Ukraine's exports to Belarus amounted to USD 1.7mn, while imports from Belarus totalled USD 16.2mn.

Ukraine continued to impose sanctions on individual Belarusian citizens and companies.

In 2024, Ukraine continued the process of denouncing international agreements with Belarus, including both bilateral and multilateral agreements within the CIS. A total of 28 agreements related to various areas of interstate cooperation were terminated, including four bilateral agreements (on Interregional and border cooperation; on Mutual protection of state secrets; on Cooperation of border regions; and on Air traffic). Additionally, parliament has not yet passed the government draft law on the termination of the suspended free trade agreement with Belarus, which the Cabinet of Ministers initiated in December 2023.



REGIONAL COOPERATION

	2022	2023	2024
MIDDLE EAST	C+	B-	C+
BALTIC STATES	-	-	A
WESTERN BALKANS	C+	C	B
INDO-PACIFIC	B+	C+	B-
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN	C+	B+	B+
NORTHERN EUROPE	B+	A	A
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	B+	B+	B
CENTRAL ASIA	E+	C-	C

Middle East



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	3	4	4
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	3	3	3
ACTIVITIES	4	4	4
RESULTS	3	4	3
TOTAL SCORE	C+	B-	C+

Ukraine is actively seeking opportunities to strengthen cooperation with the Middle East, including through engagement in the peace process, support for humanitarian initiatives, and expansion of economic ties. Despite diplomatic efforts, the strategy of interaction with the region remains limited and targeted, focused on humanitarian issues and seeking support in negotiations with Russia, without a clear economic or strategic vision.

Political interest/engagement

Back in 2021, Ukraine identified the Middle East as one of the key areas of its foreign policy. However, with the exception of a few Gulf states, the Middle East has mostly been included in the general category of the so-called Global South, which has only complicated the formation of a coherent and proactive policy towards the region. Cooperation in this area began to take on a predominantly political and humanitarian character without a sufficient economic or strategic component.

The President of Ukraine has repeatedly emphasised the need to strengthen relations with countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. During a meeting with heads of foreign diplomatic missions (19.08), he emphasised the need to engage these countries in Ukraine's post-war reconstruction. In his address on the occasion of Africa Day (25.05), the President noted the importance of cooperation in food security, particularly through grain supplies to Egypt, Algeria, Libya, and Sudan, saying Ukraine is prepared to contribute to the construction of food hubs, restore educational exchanges and strengthen the energy independence of Arab African countries.

The Presidential Office also maintained contacts with countries in the region. During the Ministerial Conference on the Human Dimension of the Peace Formula in Montreal (31.10), the Head of the Presidential Office, A. Yermak, noted the UAE's contribution to humanitarian aid for Ukraine, particularly its role in facilitating the release of Ukrainian prisoners of war. In a conversation with a representative of the Qatari Foreign Ministry, Yermak thanked the country for facilitating the return of 42 Ukrainian children and their further rehabilitation in Qatar (31.10).

The Ukrainian parliament demonstrated interest in expanding cooperation with countries of the Global South, particularly with Arab states. During a meeting of heads of Ukraine's foreign diplomatic missions (20.08), VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk stressed the need to strengthen interparliamentary cooperation, including through new formats of regional collaboration.

At the diplomatic level, Ukraine continues to work to include Arab countries in its foreign policy agenda. During a meeting between the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary General of the Arab League (27.10), Kyiv voiced its interest in strengthening ties with the Arab world.

Despite numerous diplomatic initiatives and intensified contacts with individual states, Ukraine has not yet developed a comprehensive and consistent strategy for engagement with the Middle East. Its policy towards the region remains ad hoc, focused on certain humanitarian and political aspects, without a clear vision of economic cooperation or long-term partnership. Priority is given to the UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia which act as intermediaries, as well as to Egypt due to food security issues. In the last days of the year, Syria appeared on the agenda of Ukraine's foreign policy.

Strategic communications

An important event at the beginning of the year was the launch of the Arabic-language version of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry website and an account on the social network X. Despite limited content, with most messages on X being ceremonial, such as congratulations on the anniversary of diplomatic relations, the importance of establishing an Arabic-language platform for conveying Ukrainian narratives cannot be overestimated.

Ukraine's presence in the Middle Eastern media space was ad hoc. There were no major information or media campaigns. Interviews and columns by ambassadors in host country media were mostly informative and timed to important events. For example, an article by Ukraine's Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, A. Petrenko, for the Saudi English-language daily Arab News (07.06) discussed the importance of the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland. An article by Ukraine's Ambassador to Qatar, A. Kuzmenko, co-authored with Canadian

Ambassador I. Martin for The Peninsula (17.11), highlighted the importance of Qatar's efforts to bring Ukrainian children home. Leading Ukrainian experts frequently appeared on Arab channels, but there were no interviews with the President or other top officials.

It is worth noting the change in approaches to communication, or lack thereof, regarding the situation in the Gaza Strip. Communication problems on this sensitive issue in 2023 led to negative reactions from Arab countries. Therefore, in 2024, the MFA decided to refrain from commenting and limited itself to a statement condemning Iran's missile attack on Israel (02.10). Additionally, Ukraine expressed support for the actions of Israel's allies (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Jordan), which took preventive measures to mitigate the consequences of shelling on Israeli territory. At the same time, Ukraine stressed the importance of protecting its own sky from Russian attacks and called on its allies to resolutely and without hesitation protect the Ukrainian sky from Russian missile and drone strikes.

Activities

In 2024, Ukraine focused on expanding support for President Zelenskyy's Peace Formula among countries of the so-called Global South, paying particular attention to involving Middle Eastern states in the Peace Summit held in Switzerland (15–16.06). In this context, the President's visits to Saudi Arabia (27.02, 12.06) and Qatar (05.06) played an important role, helping to strengthen bilateral relations and encouraging regional partners to actively participate in the peace process organised by Ukraine and the West.

Relations with the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, remained a priority. Zelenskyy's visit to Riyadh (27.02) gave impetus to the resumption of bilateral relations, which had been complicated by Kyiv's position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During talks with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the parties discussed ways to implement the Peace Formula, including the return of civilian hostages and deportees from Russia, in which Riyadh could play a key role. Additionally, the parties agreed to expand trade and economic cooperation and strengthen partnership in digitalisation.

The humanitarian component of cooperation was reflected in aid from the region. In particular, Ukraine received 25 ambulances from the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (Saudi Arabia), marking a significant development. The dynamics of Ukraine's relations with Qatar were also reflected in financial and humanitarian support. President Zelenskyy had a telephone conversation with the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani (08.01), during which he thanked Qatar for its USD20mn contribution to the "Grain from Ukraine" programme.

As part of developing a diplomatic presence in the region, Ukraine opened its Embassy in Oman (23.10). During the ceremony, Foreign Minister A. Sybiha noted the potential for bilateral cooperation in trade, investment, energy, and technology and initiated the creation of a food hub in the Sultanate of Oman, which would allow Ukrainian producers to enter East African markets.

On the side-lines of the World Economic Forum in Davos (15.01), the Ukrainian delegation headed by Yermak met representatives of Arab states. They expressed gratitude to Bahraini representatives for participating in the Peace Summit and discussed food security and the "Grain from Ukraine" initiative. The return of deported Ukrainian children, humanitarian aid and Ukraine's reconstruction were discussed with the Deputy Secretary General of Qatar's National Security Council. Also, talks were held with a Libyan representative on political dialogue and food security. A separate meeting was held with Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister (16.01) to discuss intensifying bilateral relations, humanitarian issues and further cooperation within the forum.

Attention was paid to relations with Egypt. During his visit to Cairo (26.10), Sybiha held bilateral talks with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Immigration and Egyptian Expatriates Affairs. A roadmap for developing bilateral cooperation was presented, and Ukraine stated its readiness to resume the intergovernmental joint commission's work, intensify business council activities, and start negotiations on a preferential trade agreement.

The visit of Foreign Minister A. Sybiha and Minister of Agrarian Policy V. Koval to Syria (30.12) after the overthrow of the Assad regime was significant, as Ukraine confirmed its readiness to expand cooperation. The parties discussed establishing joint ventures, technology exchange, cybersecurity cooperation, and the possibility

of increasing Syrian exports to Ukraine. As part of the “Grain from Ukraine” humanitarian initiative, Syria has already received 500 tonnes of Ukrainian flour. The parties also discussed resuming education for Syrian students in Ukrainian universities and deepening diplomatic dialogue. Sybiha also visited Lebanon (31.12).

Important for conveying Ukraine’s position on key agenda items were visits by Ombudsman D. Lubinets to Qatar (19.02, 25.10), Special Representative for the Middle East and Africa M. Subkh to Tunisia (19.12) and Qatar (09.03), and Deputy Minister of Economy and Trade Representative of Ukraine T. Kachka to Lebanon (04.07). Notably, the activities of the MFA Special Representative for the Middle East and Africa in 2024 were mainly focused on Africa.

Ukraine’s efforts to engage regional countries in mine action are worth noting. Qatar and the UAE participated in the UMAC2024 international demining conference but did not support the final Call for Action.

Results

Ukraine’s focus on foreign policy priorities related to countering Russian aggression has significantly affected the effectiveness of cooperation with the Middle East. In 2024, this activity yielded fewer results compared to the previous year, indicating the need to adjust approaches to the region.

Ukraine and the UAE concluded negotiations and signed (26.04) the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement covering goods, services, investment, and digital trade. It is expected to add 0.1% to Ukraine’s real GDP growth. The diplomatic academies of Ukraine and Egypt signed a memorandum (26.10) laying the groundwork for the exchange of experience in diplomatic training.

The Global Peace Summit in Switzerland (15–16.06) was an important milestone in Ukraine’s diplomatic efforts. Qatar was among the signatories of the final communiqué, while Jordan and Iraq withdrew their signatures. Delegations from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE attended the summit but did not sign the document.

The UAE and Qatar continued their efforts to secure the return of Ukrainian citizens from Russian captivity. Thanks to Qatar’s mediation, 13 children abducted

by Russia were returned to Ukraine. The UAE became a key mediator in the return of Ukrainian prisoners of war. As of the end of 2024, 2,484 Ukrainian citizens had been returned home with the UAE's mediation.

It is worth highlighting the efforts taken by the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine and the MFA to evacuate Ukrainian citizens from Syria (31 Ukrainian citizens and three Syrian citizens) and Lebanon (217 Ukrainian citizens and 85 citizens of other states) due to the escalation of hostilities.

During the UN GA votes on resolutions concerning "Safety and Security of Nuclear Facilities of Ukraine" (11.07) and "Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine" (17.12), Qatar supported the former, while Syria voted against it. In the second vote, Middle Eastern countries abstained, while Syria and Morocco did not vote. The human rights resolution was the first in which the General Assembly referred to Russia's aggression as a "war of aggression against Ukraine".

According to the State Customs Service of Ukraine, the total trade turnover between Ukraine and the Middle East (excluding Türkiye, Iran, and Israel) in 2024 was USD5.5bn, up on the previous year's USD 3.7bn, with exports amounting to USD 4bn. Ukraine's main trading partners were Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Lebanon, and the UAE.

Baltic states



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	-	-	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	-	-	5
ACTIVITIES	-	-	5
RESULTS	-	-	5
TOTAL SCORE	-	-	A

In 2024, Ukraine and the Baltic states continued to develop an intensive partnership focused on security cooperation, European integration, and economic recovery. Political interaction remained stable, in particular through active diplomatic support, strategic communications, and new bilateral initiatives. Still, further deepening of relations will require the sides to improve the coordination of institutional cooperation and identify long-term priorities to strengthen mutual support.



Political interest/engagement

In 2024, Ukraine's bilateral relations with the Baltic states remained intense and consistent, reflecting a high level of political engagement. President V. Zelenskyy, Foreign Ministers and other high-ranking officials repeatedly stressed the importance of these relations for Ukraine's security and European integration. The focus has been on arms transfers and defence investments, cyber support, and assistance on the path to the EU and NATO.

Ukrainian MPs systematically initiated and paid visits to the Baltic states, covering a wide range of issues, from military support to culture. When the Lithuanian delegation visited Kyiv (20.12), VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk thanked Vilnius for support and raised the issue of deepening cooperation.

Strategic communications

In 2024, Ukraine's strategic communications with the Baltic states were characterised by a number of symbolic interactions. President V. Zelenskyy mentioned the Baltic states in his address to the extraordinary plenary session of the European Parliament, marking 1,000 days since Russia's full-scale invasion (19.11). In his address to Lithuanian ambassadors (15.07), Foreign Minister D. Kuleba not only highlighted the progress and priorities of bilateral cooperation but also listed initiatives which Ukraine seeks to further develop at the regional level, including the Northern Group-Ukraine cooperation format.

The 2024 Parliamentary Summit of the International Crimea Platform (24.10) hosted by Latvia brought together key international partners. At the event, President Zelenskyy delivered a statement together with the leaders of Latvia, Lithuania, and Croatia, stressing the importance of deoccupying Crimea and further consolidating international support. He addressed the Estonian Parliament (11.01), highlighting the historical bilateral ties and thanking Estonia for its comprehensive support. In a media statement made in Latvia in September, Zelenskyy expressed gratitude for Estonia's continued support and stressed the importance of joint actions to protect Ukraine's sovereignty and regional security.

Activities

Defence remained a key topic in Ukraine's relations with the Baltic region. President Zelenskyy visited Estonia (11.01), where he and Prime Minister K. Kallas discussed the creation of a coalition for the supply of artillery ammunition, the launch of the Tallinn Mechanism for Cyber Support, and the formation of an IT coalition. In Kyiv, President Zelenskyy received a delegation from the Estonian Parliament led by Speaker L. Hussar (26.03). Prime Minister D. Shmyhal held talks with the leaders of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania during his visit to the Baltic states (13.04), focusing on technical assistance, confiscation of Russian assets and enhanced restrictions on Russian goods. President Zelenskyy met Lithuanian Minister of National Defence L. Kasciunas, who was visiting Kyiv (13.08). The parties discussed Ukraine's priority defence needs and the development of the defence industry. The President also discussed the implementation of the bilateral security agreement with Latvian Prime Minister E. Silina (12.09).

The issues of European integration and post-war reconstruction remained important in relations with the region. M. Tsahkna and D. Kuleba, the Foreign Ministers of Estonia and Ukraine, met in Tallinn (12.01). The focus was on Ukraine's accession to the EU, the use of frozen Russian assets, Ukraine's path to NATO membership, and the Peace Formula. Deputy Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine V. Ionan took part in the Tallinn Digital Summit (08.12), stressing the importance of digital transformation as part of Ukraine's European path. President Zelenskyy held talks with the President of Estonia, A. Karis, in Kyiv (12.09), focusing on Ukraine's integration into the EU.

Cooperation also focused on the development and restoration of Ukraine's infrastructure. Ukraine's Ambassador of Ukraine, M. Kononenko, met the Estonian Minister of Infrastructure, V. Svet, to discuss transport cooperation (23.10). Deputy Minister for Communities and Territories Development T. Tkachenko held talks with his Estonian counterparts on the restoration of maritime infrastructure and water resources (28.12).

All Baltic states participated in the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland (15–16.06). The Foreign Ministers of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania visited Odesa (17.10), along with other representatives of the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8). All Baltic states have been major partners in individual capability coalitions within the Ramstein framework.

Results

Ukraine and Estonia signed a memorandum of cooperation in the defence industry (11.01) and concluded a bilateral security agreement, committing Estonia to allocate over EUR100mn to support Ukraine (27.06). These funds will be provided in the form of 0.25% of GDP annually in 2024–2027. In addition, Estonia provided Ukraine with a new military aid package worth EUR 20mn and handed over Mistral MANPADS to beef up Ukraine's air defence (11.06). Estonia also supported Ukraine through the signing of a memorandum between the Defence Ministries (20.11), a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in cyber defence (18.10), and participation in the Interflex training programme for the Ukrainian military under the UK guidance (29.01).

In January, Lithuania approved a EUR200mn package of long-term military assistance to Ukraine and transferred ammunition, generators, detonation systems, and M577 armoured personnel carriers (10.01). Lithuania also contributed to support efforts by signing a security agreement (27.06), a memorandum of cooperation in the defence sector (04.10), and a joint resolution on defence industry financing based on the Danish model (20.12). In addition, Lithuania declared its readiness to invest in the production of the Palianytsia drone-missile system (20.12), demonstrating support in high technology and defence. The two countries also agreed to jointly produce drones, ammunition, and electronic warfare equipment (04.10). As part of intergovernmental consultations, Lithuania pledged EUR 10mn to support Ukraine's defence industry.

Ukraine and Latvia signed a bilateral security agreement (11.04) and a healthcare agreement within its framework (05.06). Latvia supported Ukraine through the transfer of more than 1,000 drones of various types, demonstrating solidarity in the fight against Russian aggression.

Cyber defence cooperation with the region was fruitful. In 2024, the Tallinn Mechanism became a source of significant assistance to Ukraine, raising EUR200mn to protect civilian infrastructure. An IT coalition led by Estonia and Luxembourg raised EUR 500mn to ensure Ukraine's resilience in the information space. In August, Ukraine and Latvia signed a cyber security memorandum providing additional resources to strengthen Ukraine's digital infrastructure (25.08).

As part of infrastructure cooperation, Estonia donated equipment from Narva power plants to help restore Ukraine's energy sector (28.05) and provided EUR10mn in guarantees under the EU for Ukraine Fund to address urgent needs (03.04). Lithuania made a significant contribution through the transfer of equipment from Vilnius CHP-3 to Ukraine to help restore the power grid (15.07).

Economic cooperation with the Baltic states was slightly less active than in 2023. Imports of goods from Lithuania amounted to USD1.2bn, from Latvia USD 197mn, and from Estonia USD 122mn. Exports of goods to Lithuania totalled USD 595mn, to Latvia USD 304mn, and to Estonia USD 76mn. Overall, the results of 2024 demonstrate Ukraine's deep integration with the Baltic states, which covers a wide range of areas, including security, economy, technology, and international initiatives. This cooperation significantly strengthens Ukraine's resilience against modern challenges.

Western Balkans

B

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	3	3	4
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	4	2	3
ACTIVITIES	4	4	4
RESULTS	3	3	5
TOTAL SCORE	C+	C	B

Relations between Ukraine and the Western Balkan countries became more effective in 2024. Ukraine continues to develop its policy in the areas established after 2022: securing diplomatic support in countering Russian aggression, receiving military and technical assistance, cooperation on the path to European and Euro-Atlantic integration, and developing sectoral cooperation.

Political interest/engagement

President V. Zelenskyy and Foreign Minister D. Kuleba mentioned the Western Balkan countries in their official speeches in the context of countering Russian aggression, EU and NATO enlargement and Ukraine's accession, and deepening bilateral cooperation. At a meeting of the European Council (19.12), President Zelenskyy expressed his belief that security on the European continent can only be ensured through Ukraine and the Balkan states' accession to the EU and NATO. At a government meeting, Prime Minister D. Shmyhal noted the achievements in cooperation with the Western Balkans (13.09).

Among the countries in the region, Albania, North Macedonia, and Croatia remained Ukraine's priority countries, providing support in countering Russian aggression, as well as in Ukraine's aspirations to join the EU and NATO, and offering a platform for negotiations and consultations on countering Russian aggression, peaceful settlement, military assistance, and humanitarian aid. Albania also received additional attention due to its OSCE chairmanship.

Strategic communications

In 2024, Ukraine's strategic communications in the Western Balkans were ensured by President Zelenskyy, Prime Minister Shmyhal, Foreign Minister Kuleba, relevant ministers and ambassadors of Ukraine to the respective countries. The interaction took place within the framework of international events (the European Summit, the Munich Conference, the Crimea Platform, the Balkan-Ukrainian Defence Industries Forum, etc.) and in a bilateral format.

President V. Zelenskyy and Albanian Prime Minister E. Rama held a joint meeting with media representatives following the Ukraine-Southeast Europe summit in Tirana (28.02). V. Zelenskyy expressed gratitude to Albania for

supporting Ukraine and noted the threat posed by Moscow not only to Ukraine but also to other countries. However, there was a lack of communication with local media throughout the year.

Ukrainian Ambassador L. Dir addressed the meeting of the interparty parliamentary group of the Assembly of the Republic of North Macedonia in support of the International Crimea Platform, where she expressed special gratitude for the joint work at all possible levels and platforms to restore Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity (07.10).

Activities

Representatives of Ukrainian authorities at various levels met their counterparts from the Western Balkan countries to discuss assistance in repelling Russian aggression, strengthening Ukraine's defence capabilities, addressing humanitarian issues, and cooperation in the framework of EU and NATO accession.

As part of the development of bilateral relations, the President had a phone conversation with Albania Prime Minister Rama (19.01).

During the Ukraine-Southeast Europe Summit (28.02), Zelenskyy met North Macedonia President S. Pendarovski, Croatian Prime Minister A. Plenkovic, Albanian Prime Minister E. Rama, and Montenegrin President J. Milatovic. Zelenskyy presented the Albanian Prime Minister with the Order of Yaroslav the Wise, 1st class, for his significant contribution to strengthening interstate cooperation, supporting Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and promoting Ukraine in the world.

In the framework of the fourth summit of the European Political Community, Zelenskyy met Serbian President A. Vucic (18.07). The two discussed the development of bilateral relations and agreed on the implementation of previously concluded agreements, paying attention to security and political challenges in the region and at the global level.

During her visit to Serbia for the Mental Health Conference (13.05), First Lady O. Zelenska met President A. Vucic and First Lady T. Vucic to discuss cultural cooperation between the two countries. As part of Zelenska's visit, Ukrainian

Foreign Minister Kuleba met Serbian President A. Vucic and Foreign Minister M. Djuric in Belgrade (13.05). The Serbian officials expressed support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and discussed the development of bilateral cooperation and European integration.

On the side-lines of the Ukraine-Southeast Europe Summit (09.10), Ukrainian Foreign Minister A. Sybiha met his Croatian counterpart, G. Grlić-Radman. They discussed bilateral relations, strengthening Croatia's support for Ukraine in countering Russian aggression, expanding Croatia's participation in the implementation of the Peace Formula, and other matters.

Vice-Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine O. Stefanishyna met Montenegrin Foreign Minister F. Ivanovic and Prime Minister of North Macedonia Talat Xhaferi on the side-lines of the Munich Security Conference (16.02). Stefanishyna also met Serbian Minister for European Integration T. Miscevic on the sidelines of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Peace Formula (Montreal, 31.10). The main issues discussed were Russian aggression, Ukrainian prisoners of war, Ukraine's territorial integrity, and Ukraine's and the Western Balkan countries' preparations for EU accession. Ukraine expressed interest in Montenegro's experience, as the country is a leader in the Western Balkans in its progress towards EU membership.

In Davos, the Ukrainian delegation, with the participation of the Head of the Presidential Office, A. Yermak, held a number of meetings (15.01). In particular, they exchanged views with the State Secretary for Foreign Policy of the Office of the Prime Minister of Slovenia V. Volk, on the implementation of the Ukrainian Peace Formula and the possibility of involving as many countries as possible. The Ukrainian side praised Slovenia's participation in the "Grain from Ukraine" initiative. With A. Kozljak, advisor to the Bosnian member of the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Ukrainian delegation discussed the intensification of political dialogue between the two countries; with F. Tosevski, State Secretary of the MFA of North Macedonia, they discussed military support, the Peace Formula, support for Ukraine's integration into the EU and NATO, and the start of negotiations on a bilateral agreement between Ukraine and North Macedonia.

Ukraine and Montenegro held a meeting (30.08) to sign a bilateral security agreement. The document will help strengthen security in Europe and deepen cooperation between the two countries.

Government activities in education and sports have intensified. The head of the Ukrainian State Archive Service, A. Khromov, met the Director of the General Directorate of Archives of Albania (05–09.06). Acting Minister of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine R. Karandieieva and Croatian Ambassador to Ukraine A. Djamic discussed the preservation of Ukraine’s cultural heritage and cooperation within the framework of UNESCO (14.08). On the side-lines of the 18th Conference of Ministers of Sport of the Council of Europe (11.10), Minister of Youth and Sports of Ukraine M. Bidnyi met State Secretary of the Ministry of Sport of Croatia J. Pavic. Croatia’s Minister of Education, Science and Youth, R. Fuchs, paid an official visit to Ukraine (12.11).

On the initiative of the Embassy of Ukraine (08.05), an official ceremony was held to commemorate the soldiers who liberated Belgrade during World War Two, when thousands of Ukrainians fought and gave their lives in the ranks of the Red Army.

Results

President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyy and Prime Minister of Albania E. Rama signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Ukraine and Albania (28.02). According to the agreement, Ukraine and Albania will develop mutually beneficial cooperation in trade, economy, science and technology, culture, education, healthcare, media, tourism, and sports.

President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyy and Prime Minister of North Macedonia T. Khaferi signed a Joint Declaration on Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic Integration (28.02).

President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyy and Prime Minister of Croatia A. Plenkovic signed an agreement on long-term cooperation and support between the two countries (09.10). The main issues included the prospects for joint defence production and localisation of projects in Ukraine, strengthening cooperation in digital resilience and cybersecurity, and intelligence sharing. A separate block concerned support for humanitarian demining. Croatia has already allocated more than EUR10mn in this area and will continue to provide equipment and share knowledge. Croatia supports Ukraine on its path to the EU and NATO and is committed to continuing its efforts to implement the Peace Formula.

The Ukraine-Southeast Europe Summit (28.02) resulted in a declaration condemning Russia's aggression and calling for increased military support for Ukraine and support for Ukraine's European integration.

The achievements of individual ministries include the following. The Ministry of Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development of Ukraine and the Ministry of Transport and Maritime Affairs of Montenegro agreed to liberalise all freight traffic between the two countries from 1 June 2024. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine and the Ministry of Justice and Public Administration of Croatia (11.09), aimed at exchanging knowledge and experience in areas of mutual interest, including establishing, developing, and strengthening cooperation in the legal, judicial, administrative, and digital spheres. The State Archive Service of Ukraine and the General Directorate of Archives of Albania signed a cooperation agreement (05.06), which will help intensify professional ties between archival institutions of both parties, implement joint archival and humanitarian projects, exchange digital copies of archival documents on the national history of Ukraine and Albania, and other activities in the information sphere.

The government has supported a number of draft laws on the ratification of agreements on financing EU programmes for regional and cross-border development. The Danube Regional Programme (Interreg VI B) will help strengthen interregional relations for sustainable development. In the programme period for 2021–2027, it was decided to open access to competitions for potential partners from all regions of Ukraine.

In 2024, trade between Ukraine and the countries of the region increased and amounted to: with Albania — USD45.7mn (USD 40.7mn in 2023), Bosnia and Herzegovina — USD 50.9mn (USD 39.5mn in 2023), North Macedonia — USD 81.8mn (USD 93.5mn in 2023), Serbia — USD 345.5mn (USD 319mn in 2023), Slovenia — USD 328mn (USD 306mn in 2023), Croatia — USD 177mn (USD 169.5mn in 2023), Montenegro — USD 67mn (USD 16.4mn in 2023). Ukraine has a trade surplus only with Albania and North Macedonia.

Indo-Pacific **B-**

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	3	4	3
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	3	5	4
ACTIVITIES	4	5	4
RESULTS	3	3	4
TOTAL SCORE	B+	C+	B-

In 2025, Ukraine maintained the overall positive dynamics in its interaction with the countries of the Indo-Pacific. It maintained the most intensive dialogue with the countries that provide important financial and military support to Ukraine — Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan. High-level political dialogue with China resumed. Ukrainian diplomacy focused its main efforts on engaging the Indo-Pacific countries in supporting a just peace in Ukraine and the Global Peace Summit. North Korea's involvement in the war became part of Ukraine's multilateral and regional security agenda.

Political interest/engagement

Throughout 2024, Ukraine worked to actively engage the Indo-Pacific countries in the peace process. This included seeking their support for the Peace Formula, participation in the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland, and support for the joint communiqué following the Summit. Also, Ukraine focused its efforts on expanding the presence of the participant countries in the Second Peace Summit scheduled for the fall. In this context, President Zelenskyy repeatedly emphasised in his speeches and statements the need to strengthen Ukraine's communication and diplomatic efforts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to enlist the support of states from these regions in achieving just and sustainable peace in Ukraine.

At the Shangri-La Dialogue summit in Singapore (01.06), President Zelenskyy said that Ukraine needs support from Asian countries on its path to peace and their presence at the Global Peace Summit. He emphasised the importance of representation from all continents and the participation of all countries that respect international law and seek to restore a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace. Zelenskyy criticised China for supporting Russia, helping to disrupt the summit in Switzerland, and refusing to engage with Ukraine.

At the meeting with heads of Ukraine's diplomatic missions, titled *Wartime Diplomacy: Resilience, Weapons, Victory* (19.08), President V. Zelenskyy pointed to the need to strengthen Ukraine's diplomatic presence in Asia, given that Asia and the Pacific are the pivotal epicentre where the future of decades to come is decided.

President Zelenskyy repeatedly mentioned India and China, along with other countries of the Global South, in particular Brazil and Saudi Arabia, in the context of the need for their influence on Russia (see sections on India and China for more details on relations with them).

In his speech on *Diplomat's Day* (22.12), President Zelenskyy emphasised the need to promote Ukraine's interests in relations with China, India, and other Asian countries, to develop a real partnership with Japan, and to have more meaningful relations with South Korea.

Ukraine's President made efforts to draw the attention of the Indo-Pacific countries to North Korea's participation in the war against Ukraine and close military and technical cooperation with Russia, which poses security threats both

to Ukraine and to global security. During his annual speech to the Verkhovna Rada (16.10), President Zelenskyy emphasised, among other things, that other Indo-Pacific countries may decide that wars of aggression can be beneficial for them as well, and that North Korea is already in the coalition of criminals along with Vladimir Putin.

At the opening of the 20th annual Yalta European Strategy (13.09), President Zelenskyy pointed to the continued existence of supply chains that allow Russia to obtain critical components for the production of weapons, in particular from the US, Europe, and Taiwan.

Ukrainian MPs manifested their interest in the Indo-Pacific, too. They were especially interested in cooperation with Japan and ASEAN.

Strategic communications

Strategic communications became an important part of the interaction between the Ukrainian government and diplomatic missions on the ground, and Indo-Pacific countries. Ukrainian embassies worked proactively to outreach via their official websites, social media accounts, and local media. They held communication and cultural events to put the situation in Ukraine in the spotlight and sought support for the Peace Formula and the Global Peace Summit.

The participation of President Zelenskyy in the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore (1.06), the key security forum in Asia, was important in this context. He emphasised the importance of the “voice of the Asia-Pacific region” in supporting Ukraine and the participation of its countries in the Peace Summit. President Zelenskyy met with foreign media on the side-lines of the forum, where he tried to personally persuade Asian countries to join in supporting Ukraine.

For the first time, Ukraine officially participated in one of the top international conferences on geopolitics and geoeconomics in Asia, the Raisina Dialogue (20–24.02) in New Delhi, India. I. Borovets, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, spoke at the panel titled Back to the Future: A New Era of Conflict in Europe. A delegation of journalists from India’s top media accompanied India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi on his visit to Ukraine (23.08). They had a separate meeting with President Zelenskyy.

For the first time since the full-scale invasion, President Zelenskyy gave an exclusive interview to the Japanese TV channel NHK (28.07). The visits of Japanese top officials to Ukraine were covered extensively (see the section on Japan for more details).

The Embassy of Ukraine in the Republic of Indonesia organised a visit of R. Chubarov, Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People and President of the World Congress of Crimean Tatars, and A. Rustemov, Mufti of the Spiritual Administration of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (16–20.12), to Indonesia. They had a number of meetings with the head of the Muhammadiyah Central Leadership, representatives of the government, Majlis, and Muslim organisations, gave public lectures at universities, and met with local media to discuss violations of the rights of the Crimean Tatar people and Muslims in the occupied Crimea, the release of political prisoners from Russian captivity, and support for the Crimean Tatar people and Ukraine in general.

Ukrainian government officials, diplomats and civil society were especially proactive in communicating about the involvement of North Korean troops in the war against Ukraine — including communication in South Korean media. President Zelenskyy gave an interview to the South Korean TV channel KBS. Ukraine's Ambassador to South Korea spoke with a range of top media outlets, including Donga Ilbo, Voice of America, Weekly Chosun, Shin Donga, Korea Economic Daily, Radio Free Asia and more. N. Gumenyuk, a Ukrainian journalist and the leader of The Reckoning Project, spoke at the International Forum organised by the Republic of Korea's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Also, she gave a number of interviews and spoke at the top universities in Seoul.

During their visits to the countries in the region, including India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and more, Ukrainian experts met with the local media and think tanks, and organised public events.

Activities

The Ukrainian government was working to actively engage with the Indo-Pacific countries both bilaterally and multilaterally, strengthening cooperation with the states that actively support Ukraine, as well as dialogue with those

that keep their distance from the Russia-Ukraine war.

President Zelenskyy visited Singapore to participate in the Shangri-La Dialogue security forum (01.06). He met Singapore President T. Shanmugaratnam and Prime Minister L. Wong; Indonesia's President P. Subianto, and Timor Leste President J. Ramos-Horta.

Also, President Zelenskyy had the first-ever in the history of bilateral relations visit to the Republic of the Philippines (03.06). During his visit there, he met with President F. Marcos Jr.

The visit of India's Prime Minister to Ukraine (23.08) for the first time since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1992 was a landmark event.

On the side-lines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland (16.01), President V. Zelenskyy met with Vietnam's Prime Minister P. Minh Tri and Singapore's President Shanmugaratnam. During the G7 summit in Italy, President Zelenskyy met with Japan's Prime Minister F. Kishida (13.06).

On the side-lines of the NATO summit in Washington, D.C., President Zelenskyy had a meeting for the first time in a five-country format with the leaders of NATO Asia-Pacific partners (11.07), including Republic of Korea President Seok-yeol, New Zealand Prime Minister Lacson, Japan Prime Minister Kishida, and Australia's Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Marles.

President Zelenskyy met with Japan's Prime Minister Kishida, Vietnam's President To Lam, and India's Prime Minister Modi on the side-lines of the UN GA (23–25.09).

Throughout 2024, President Zelenskyy had telephone conversations with the President of Indonesia, the Prime Minister of India (20.03), and the President of the Republic of Korea (29.10).

Japanese Foreign Minister T. Iwai made his first bilateral visit to Ukraine (16.11) after the new government was sworn in. In Ukraine, he met with the President, Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister. His predecessor, Foreign Minister Kamikawa, visited Ukraine earlier that year (07.01).

Ukrainian Foreign Minister D. Kuleba visited China (23–25.07), where he met with his counterpart, Wang Yi. Prior to that, the two ministers met on the side-lines of the Munich Security Conference (17.02). Minister Kuleba had a telephone conversation with India's Foreign Minister Jaishankar (16.08).

Two telephone conversations took place with Mongolia's Minister of Foreign

Affairs, B. Batmunkhiin (25.01, 01.05). In the conversations, the participants agreed to resume meetings of the intergovernmental commission and complete work on mutual visa-free regimes. Minister Batmunkhiin was invited to visit Ukraine. However, V. Putin's visit to Mongolia (2.09) overshadowed relations between Mongolia and Ukraine. In response, Ukraine's MFA announced a demarche to the Mongolian side during a meeting with the Director General of the Mongolian Foreign Ministry's Europe and Africa Department Battungalag, who arrived in Kyiv from Ulaanbaatar after Ukraine summoned her (12.09).

On the side-lines of the UN GA, Foreign Minister A. Sybiha met with Cambodia's Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation S. Chenda Sophea. Prior to that, while serving as Deputy Foreign Minister, A. Sybiha held an online meeting with Cambodia's State Secretary of the MFA, K. Phon Rattanak (27.06).

On the side-lines of the G7 ministerial meeting, A. Sybiha met with his counterparts from the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, and India (25.11). In Kyiv, he met with his Australian counterpart, P. Wong, who paid the first bilateral visit to Ukraine in a decade by an Australian foreign minister (18.12). She also met with Ukraine's Prime Minister D. Shmyhal.

Ukraine's Defence Minister R. Umerov visited the Republic of Korea (27.11), where he met with President Y. Seok-yol, National Security Advisor S. Won-sik, and Defence Minister K. Yong-hyun. He shared information on cooperation between Russia and the DPRK and discussed cooperation in response to common threats.

Deputy ministers of foreign affairs of Ukraine and Indonesia held political consultations (15.08). They exchanged views on the prospects for Ukraine's cooperation with ASEAN in the context of Ukraine's aspiration to become its Sectoral Dialogue Partner.

VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk met with Japan's House of Representatives Speaker F. Nukaga on the side-lines of the G7 Summit of the Heads of Parliament in Verona, Italy (05–07.09). A delegation of Ukrainian MPs took part in the ASEAN Interparliamentary Assembly (17–23.10) in Laos. On the side-lines of the Assembly, the MPs met with the parliamentary delegation of Timor-Leste, Singapore Parliament Speaker Hsien Kiang Peng, Malaysia Parliament Speaker J. bin Abdul, etc.

President Zelenskyy accepted credentials from the newly appointed ambassadors of four countries to Ukraine: Australia's P. Lehmann (22.04), Thailand's

U. Mongkolnavin (22.04), India's R. Shankar (16.08), and China's M. Shengkun (23.12). Meanwhile, the Embassies of Ukraine in Thailand and Malaysia remained without ambassadors, which affected the activity of bilateral relations.

Results

Japan is the second biggest supporter of Ukraine's budget. Australia is the biggest non-NATO military assistance donor.

The most significant results were achieved with Japan during 2024 (see the section on Japan). Ukraine and Japan signed a bilateral Agreement on Support for Ukraine and Cooperation between Ukraine and the Government of Japan at the G7 summit in Italy (13.06). It provides for long-term assistance from Japan in security and defence, humanitarian aid, recovery, and reconstruction. This is the first agreement based on the G7 joint declaration with an Indo-Pacific country rather than a NATO member. Also, Ukraine and Japan signed an intergovernmental agreement on information security (15.11), and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism of Japan announced the establishment of a coordination council for the reconstruction of Ukraine (17.12).

The total assistance provided by Australia to Ukraine is over USD1bn. Of this, USD 880mn is military aid. During her visit to Kyiv, Australian Foreign Minister P. Wong announced Australia's contribution of USD 6.39mn to the Energy Support Fund for Ukraine. Ukraine's Prime Minister D. Shmyhal thanked Australia for transferring EUR 50mn to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Foreign Ministers Sybiha and Wong agreed to resume full-fledged work of the Australian Embassy in Ukraine (18.12).

Ukraine and India signed four documents during the visit of the Republic of India's Prime Minister Modi to Ukraine (23.08) (see details in the section on India).

The VRU ratified the framework agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Republic of Korea on USD2.1bn loans from the Economic Development and Cooperation Fund (EDCF) for 2024–2029. During the visit of the Kyiv Oblast State (Military) Administration delegation to Seoul, it

signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Seoul (Republic of Korea) on transport infrastructure development (31.10).

The following Indo-Pacific countries participated in the Global Peace Summit (15–16.06) and signed the joint communiqué: Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Timor-Leste, the Philippines, and Japan. India, Indonesia, and Thailand participated in the Global Peace Summit but did not sign the communiqué.

Australia, Myanmar, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Timor-Leste, and the Republic of Korea voted in favour of the UN GA resolution on Safety and Security of Ukraine's Nuclear Facilities, including the Zaporizhzhia NPP (30.07). Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam abstained, and the DPRK voted against.

Australia, Bhutan, Japan, Myanmar, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea voted for the UNGA resolution on the Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (17.12). Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam abstained. China and DPRK voted against it.

Trade between Ukraine and the Indo-Pacific countries is as follows: USD16.75bn with China; USD 2.29bn with India; USD 985.94mn with Japan; USD 941mn with the Republic of Korea; USD 883.47mn with Vietnam; USD 752.47mn with Indonesia; USD 448.27mn with Thailand; USD 426.27mn with Malaysia; USD 390.7mn with Bangladesh; USD 352.54mn with Taiwan; USD 318mn with Pakistan; USD 133.54mn with Australia; USD 126.69mn with Hong Kong; USD 129.41mn with Singapore; USD 69.59mn with the Philippines; and USD 50mn with Myanmar.

Ukraine's trade increased substantially with China (almost 25%), Indonesia (over 50%), Thailand (45%) and Hong Kong (50%) compared to 2023. Its trade with Australia, Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Taiwan, Singapore, and Myanmar increased moderately. Its trade with Pakistan, India, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines decreased in 2024 compared to 2023.

Latin America and the Caribbean

B+

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	3	4	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	3	5	5
ACTIVITIES	4	5	4
RESULTS	3	3	3
TOTAL SCORE	C+	B+	B+

Latin America and the Caribbean (CELAC) remained among the top priorities of Ukraine's foreign policy. The main achievements of 2024 include the development of two important documents that define Ukraine's strategy in CELAC, the launch of systematic work with regional media through the organisation of visits of Latin American journalists to Ukraine, a "breakthrough" in interparliamentary communication with the legislative assemblies of Latin American countries through visits of Ukrainian parliamentarians to the region's countries, and the first interparliamentary conference held in Kyiv.

Political interest/engagement

The President of Ukraine defined 2024 as the year of intensified contacts with the CELAC states, so work in this area was discussed at the level of the Presidential Office, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Verkhovna Rada.

Important topics in the work with the region included humanitarian issues: the return of deported children and prisoners to Ukraine, as well as prospects for cooperation in the context of global food security. At a meeting with heads of Ukrainian foreign diplomatic missions (19.08), President V. Zelenskyy stressed the need to expand Ukraine's presence in Asia, Africa and the CELAC region and the priority of involving foreign countries in Ukraine's reconstruction.

The Government's Action Plan for 2024 outlined plans to open new diplomatic missions abroad, including embassies in Colombia, Panama, Guyana, Paraguay, and Uruguay. President Zelenskyy announced plans to open a Ukrainian embassy in Panama in 2025 (23.09), and Foreign Minister D. Kuleba shared (05.04) plans to open five new diplomatic missions in the CELAC region (in Colombia, Panama, Guyana, Uruguay, and Paraguay) in the near future.

The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry reported on the completion of the "Strategy for the Development of Relations between Ukraine and Latin America and the Caribbean", which defines Ukraine's guidelines for shaping the Latin American vector of foreign policy. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba stated (10.01) that the Strategy aims to bring political, trade, economic, cultural, humanitarian, and other areas of cooperation to a new qualitative level. In her interviews, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs I. Borovets also spoke about the need to restart communications with the CELAC region (for example, Ukrinform, 18.04).

During a meeting with representatives of Ukrainian business circles (03.10), Foreign Minister A. Sybiha stressed the importance of strengthening the economic component of Ukrainian embassies and spoke about new opportunities for exporters created by the opening of new diplomatic missions, particularly in Latin America.

Throughout the year, MPs from the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Cooperation constantly emphasised the deepening of cooperation with the countries of the region as one of the priorities of Ukraine's foreign policy in public speeches and comments to domestic and foreign media. A new interfactional parliamentary association, "Ukraine — Latin America and the Caribbean: Cooperation for the Future", was created in parliament (23.05).

Strategic communications

President Zelenskyy recorded a special video address to the Organisation of American States (OAS, 27.06), and Foreign Minister Kuleba addressed the 54th session of the OAS General Assembly by video link (28.06) on strengthening bilateral cooperation and joint actions to defend the UN Charter and the principles of international law.

Recognising the important role of communication with the countries of the region, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed and presented the first communication strategy, "Ukraine — Latin America and the Caribbean", for 2024–2026 (28.05). During its preparation, the Ministry hosted an expert discussion of Ukraine's key communication priorities in the CELAC countries (11.04).

In order to convey truthful information about Russian aggression and hoping to increase support, this year, Ukrainian authorities paid much attention to communicating with regional media, both through remote communication and in person during visits to Ukraine by Latin American journalists representing Central and South American countries and Spanish-language media in the United States. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry organised two press tours (June and September) for Latin American journalists from Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Guatemala, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay. During the trip, the journalists had the opportunity to communicate with the President,

the leadership of the Verkhovna Rada and ministries, as well as visit the sites of Russian crimes outside Kyiv. Deputy Foreign Minister I. Borovets met media representatives from Argentina, Colombia, and Brazil in Kyiv (23.05). During their visits to Latin American countries this year, Ukrainian officials and MPs also gave comments to regional media (in particular, CNN Brasil, Folha de São Paulo).

The creation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Spanish-language X (formerly Twitter) account in February played a certain role in enhancing communication with the region and expanding its presence in the Latin American information space. However, its content does not fully cover either the work of the MFA in various spheres and regions of the world or the work of Ukraine's diplomatic missions in CELAC.

Despite the high interest in increasing support from Latin American countries, the President of Ukraine, defending the national interests of the state, sharply criticised the President of Brazil, accusing him of trying to increase his own global influence at the expense of Ukraine through the so-called "Sino-Brazilian peace initiative" (speech at the 79th session of the UN GA). In an interview with Ukrinform (17.04), Deputy Foreign Minister I. Borovets stated that "Ukraine does not have many resources to deal with openly anti-Ukrainian countries", among which she mentioned Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. Therefore, Ukraine will not interact with them under the Strategy.

Activities

In 2024, there were active contacts at the level of the executive and members of parliament with various countries of the region. In general, we can note relatively stable dynamics of communications at the level of the foreign ministries of Ukraine and Central America, a somewhat slower pace with South America, with the exception of Argentina and Brazil, and no visible increase in contacts with English-speaking Caribbean countries.

In the framework of the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland, the President of Ukraine met the President of Argentina, J. Milei (15.06), who was awarded the Order of Freedom. During the meeting, Zelenskyy thanked Argentina for joining the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children. The parties

discussed bilateral cooperation, particularly in trade, and the need to continue international contacts at various levels. Zelenskyy met the Presidents of Panama, Paraguay, and OAS Secretary-General L. Almagro on the side-lines of the 79th session of the UN GA (September). The President of Ukraine had his first telephone conversation with Peruvian President D. Boluarte (06.06) and Argentine President J. Milei (27.12).

VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk attended the inauguration of Mexican President C. Sheinbaum (01.10). First Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Y. Svyrydenko represented Ukraine at the inauguration of the re-elected President of the Dominican Republic, L. Abinader, where she also had conversations with the Presidents of Guatemala and Suriname, the Prime Minister of Belize, and the Foreign Minister of Costa Rica (17.08).

Foreign Minister Kuleba had telephone conversations with Peruvian Foreign Minister J. González-Olaechea (30.01), Chilean Foreign Minister A. van Klaveren (31.01) and Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship D. Mondino (01.02). During the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland (15–16.06), Kuleba met the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Mexico.

On the side-lines of the Montreal conference, Foreign Minister A. Sybiha met Costa Rican Foreign Minister A. Tinoco (31.10). Sybiha also had a telephone conversation with Paraguayan Foreign Minister R. Ramirez Lezcano (16.10). Deputy Foreign Minister I. Borovets toured Latin American countries, including Peru (03–05.06), Costa Rica (05–08.06), and Brazil (10–12.06), where she met representatives of governments, parliaments, and the media. In Brazil, Ukrainian-Brazilian political consultations were held to intensify bilateral cooperation in various fields. Borovets held an online meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister of Panama V. A. Franco Sousa (24.05). Borovets also represented Ukraine at the 54th session of the OAS General Assembly (02.07) in Paraguay.

In May, a Ukrainian government delegation headed by Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Y. Svyrydenko paid a working visit to Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile. In April, she held a videoconference with the Vice President, Minister of Development, Industry, Trade and Services of Brazil, and in early May, with the Minister of Labour and Employment of Brazil.

Suriname, Guatemala, and Belize took part in this year's events organised by the global platform of the First Ladies and Gentlemen Summit.

The Head of the Presidential Office of Ukraine, A. Yermak, had telephone conversations with the General Secretary of the Presidency of Argentina (10.01) and the Special Advisor to the President of Brazil (08.01, 16.03). In May-June, a Ukrainian delegation headed by D. Gerasymchuk, Advisor-Commissioner of the President of Ukraine for Children's Rights and Rehabilitation, visited Argentina and Chile as part of the "Bring Kids Back UA" information campaign.

Ukraine, together with a number of Latin American countries, including Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Suriname, and Uruguay, signed a joint declaration on the elections in Venezuela (17.08).

Ukraine's MFA sent a note of protest to the Nicaraguan government over the "visit" of a Russian delegation from temporarily occupied Crimea (03.02).

During the year, Ukrainian parliamentary diplomacy with the countries of the region significantly intensified, both in the form of video conferences, personal meetings with Latin American colleagues who visited Ukraine, and at international forums. As of December, the Verkhovna Rada had 13 groups for interparliamentary relations with CELAC countries. Ukrainian MPs visited Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Mexico, Brazil, Panama, Belize, Costa Rica, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia.

A parliamentary conference "Ukraine — Latin America and the Caribbean: Cooperation for the Future" was held in Kyiv (30.11), attended by representatives of Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, El Salvador, Ecuador, Peru, and Costa Rica. Friendship groups were established in the parliaments of Costa Rica, Argentina, and Paraguay. For the first time in 13 years, a Brazilian parliamentary delegation visited Ukraine (08.08).

For the first time in the history of interparliamentary communication with the CELAC region, the Chairman of the VRU Committee on Foreign Affairs held videoconference meetings with the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade of the Costa Rican Parliament, L. Mendoza (12.08), and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Parliament of Trinidad and

Tobago and the Minister of Trade and Industry, P. Gopi Skoon (19.09). Meetings were also held in video format with the Chairmen of the Foreign Affairs and Religious Affairs Committees of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate of the National Congress of the Argentine Republic (03.04) and with the Chairmen of the Foreign Affairs Committees of the National Congress of Chile, respectively, of the Senate (08.05) and Chamber of Deputies (04.06).

In autumn, a delegation of the Ukrainian Institute made working trips to Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. During the year, think tank experts visited Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Argentina.

Results

The results of CELAC's participation in the Global Peace Summit were mixed. At the level of heads of state, the summit was attended by the leaders of Argentina, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Chile. Costa Rica was represented by the country's Vice President, while Mexico, Suriname, Uruguay, and Peru were represented by foreign ministers, and Brazil sent its ambassador to Switzerland to the summit. At the last minute, the President of Colombia decided against participation. The OAS Secretary General was present at the summit. As a result of the summit, all Latin American participating countries, except Brazil and Mexico, signed the Joint Communiqué. Subsequently, Antigua and Barbuda, Guyana, Panama, Paraguay, and the OAS also joined the Communiqué, which represents less than half of all countries in the CELAC region.

In June, Argentina joined the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, a coalition that coordinates military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. In April, it became known that a Ukrainian citizen had filed a lawsuit with an Argentine court against Russia for war crimes.

Negotiations on free trade agreements have been ongoing since the beginning of the year, and as of April, draft agreements were submitted to 10 CELAC countries (Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Honduras, Ecuador, Colombia, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile).

As in the previous year, in 2024, there was a gradual decrease in support from regional states during voting on UN General Assembly resolutions. In particular, the UN GA resolution on the safety and security of nuclear facilities of Ukraine, including the occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP (11.07), was supported by 19 countries of the region (six abstained, including Mexico and Brazil; six did not vote at all, and two countries — Cuba and Nicaragua — voted against). The vote on the UN GA resolution “Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol” (17.12) was indicative. It was supported by 16 states of the region (12 abstained, three did not vote, and two — Nicaragua and Cuba — voted against).

Despite the plans announced at the beginning of the year, by the end of 2024, none of the five planned embassies in the region had been opened. Also, the Ukraine-Latin America Summit, announced in December 2023, was not held by the end of 2024.

In 2024, there was a gradual increase in Ukraine’s trade turnover with CELAC states due to imports. According to the State Customs Service, Ukraine’s exports to the region are five times lower than imports, namely USD205.9mn against USD 1.1bn. There is a consistently negative balance with all former key trading partners of Ukraine. Yet, Ukraine has a positive trade balance with Guyana, Nicaragua, and almost all Caribbean island states, with the exception of Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago. It was agreed to establish cooperation at the level of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Ukraine and the Dominican Republic.

Northern Europe



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	4	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	5	5
ACTIVITIES	4	5	5
RESULTS	5	5	5
TOTAL SCORE	B+	A	A

Cooperation with the Nordic countries developed and gained momentum throughout the year, both in bilateral and multilateral formats. President V. Zelenskyy visited Sweden and Iceland, two Ukraine-Nordic summits took place, and representatives of the Nordic countries visited Ukraine. All countries in the region signed bilateral security agreements with Ukraine and provided military and non-military support.

Political interest/engagement

The development of cooperation with the Nordic countries was a priority at all levels, with Ukraine receiving assistance from its Northern European partners in many areas. President V. Zelenskyy noted that the Nordic countries are “our principled and resolute allies and the Ukraine-Northern Europe platform is one of our most effective multilateral formats” (28.10), thanked the Nordics in his annual Address to the VRU (19.11), and noted that cooperation with Northern Europe was gaining momentum (27.10).

Foreign Minister A. Sybiha mentioned the launch and deepening of new formats of multilateral cooperation, in particular with the Nordic 5 and Nordic Baltic 8, among the main outcomes of 2024.

Ukrainian officials frequently acknowledged the important role of the countries of the region — Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland — thanking them for “supporting Ukraine’s defence against Russian terror” (Zelenskyy, 01.06) and stressing that this support has been felt since the beginning of the war. Foreign Minister Sybiha acknowledged the “leadership and unwavering support for Ukraine in confronting Russian aggression” by the Nordic-Baltic Eight countries (13.12). His predecessor, D. Kuleba, stressed the need to strengthen the Nordic-Baltic-Ukraine cooperation format (15.07) and also recognised the importance of the Nordic-Baltic Eight countries establishing a high-level advisory group for Ukraine’s delegation to the EU accession negotiations (10.04).

Prime Minister D. Shmyhal gratefully accepted assistance to the energy sector, support for sanctions against Russia, and the use of frozen Russian assets for Ukraine’s defence and reconstruction (18.10).

The deputy head of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation, A. Pushkarenko, noted that each Ukraine-Nordic summit “brings concrete, practical results that strengthen our state” (30.10).

Strategic communications

President Zelenskyy gave an interview to leading Nordic media (30.10), in which he described the current situation and presented Ukraine's position on Russian aggression and prospects for ending the war. During his speech at the 76th session of the Nordic Council (29.10), Zelenskyy called for the establishment of "a truly lasting peace, not a temporary illusion".

The President stressed the priority of joint defence production with Sweden in his speech at the Society and Defence annual conference in Sweden (07.01). He urged Iceland to finance Ukrainian production of shells, long-range drones and missiles, and other weapons and to join the coalition of shelters initiated by Ukraine and Finland during a meeting with the Prime Minister of Iceland (28.10).

Two Ukraine-Nordic summits were held in Stockholm (31.05) and Reykjavik (28.10). In his speech at the Reykjavik summit, President Zelenskyy stressed that Russia's threats of escalation should not weaken our resolve: "Only determination — truly long-range — will put an end to the war".

Eight foreign ministers from the Nordic and Baltic states visited Odesa (16.10).

Activities

Visits and delegations were exchanged throughout the year, as were a number of events in multilateral formats. Contacts ranged from presidents and prime ministers to defence ministers and naval commanders (12.11).

In the multilateral format, President Zelenskyy attended the 76th session of the Nordic Council (29.10) and participated in the fourth Ukraine-Nordic Summit in Reykjavik (28.10). He also met the President of Finland in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (25.09), where he stressed Ukraine's need for air defence and discussed joint drone production.

Zelenskyy met Iceland's President A. Stubb in Kyiv (03.04) and Prime Minister B. Benediktsson (28.10) in Reykjavik. Together with Zelenskyy, Danish Prime Minister M. Frederiksen visited Ukrainian soldiers in a Kyiv hospital (19.11).

Prime Minister D. Shmyhal visited Helsinki (18.10) and took part in a conference organised by the Finnish government on the eighth point of the Peace Formula, which concerns environmental safety.

At the parliamentary level, the first visit of a Ukrainian parliamentary delegation to Norway since the start of the full-scale war took place (20.04). A group of friendship with Ukraine was established for the first time in the Norwegian Storting (26.04). During the year, several delegations from the Swedish Riksdag visited Kyiv, meeting representatives of civil society and Kyiv mayor V. Klitschko. VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk discussed military support for Ukraine with a delegation from the Norwegian Parliament's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence led by Committee Chair E. Søreide (24.01).

A meeting of the Nordic-Baltic Eight was held in Odesa with the participation of representatives of the Foreign Ministries of the eight countries that make up the group (16.10). Earlier, at a meeting on the Swedish island of Gotland (10.04), representatives of these countries agreed to assemble a group of experts to help support Ukraine on its path to the EU.

Interaction also took place at the level of other ministries. Defence Minister R. Umerov visited Stockholm (18.09) to participate in political and military consultations. Swedish Defence Minister P. Jonson visited Kyiv on the anniversary of Russia's full-scale aggression. Umerov also paid a working visit to Norway, where he met Norwegian Defence Minister B. Arild Gram and Prime Minister J. Gahr Støre (14–15.11).

Results

Northern European countries are among Ukraine's most loyal and principled partners in the war against Russia. Cooperation and support take place both in a bilateral format with each country individually and in a number of multilateral formats.

In 2024, bilateral security cooperation agreements were signed with all five Nordic countries in line with the G7 Declaration of Support for Ukraine. Sweden and

Norway have committed to long-term financial support for Ukraine with specific amounts. Iceland approved a long-term policy of support for Ukraine (30.04).

The Nordic countries are actively involved in the capability coalitions formed within the Ramstein format. For example, Sweden and Denmark participate in six coalitions, Norway is a co-leader in the maritime coalition, Iceland is a member of the mine action coalition, and Denmark is a member of the air capabilities coalition. Finland is a member of two coalitions — mine action and artillery. On a separate track, Ukraine and Finland have created a civil protection coalition to build a shelter system (19.10).

In Copenhagen, a new format of cooperation was launched — the Nordic Group-Ukraine (26.11), which brings together 12 countries: Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom. Following Defence Minister R. Umerov's visit to a number of European countries (24.11), Ukraine reached specific agreements with Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Lithuania on investing directly in Ukrainian arms production, training and equipping brigades, joint projects in the defence industry, and purchasing drones, air defence systems, and ammunition.

Thanks to the Danish model of support for the Ukrainian defence industry, in 2024, the Armed Forces of Ukraine received weapons worth almost EUR538mn. The sources of funding included the governments of Denmark (EUR 125mn through the Danish National Ukraine Fund), Sweden (EUR 20mn), Iceland (EUR 2.7mn) and interest from frozen Russian assets (EUR 390mn). The Danish delegation was among the largest at the DFNC2 International Defence Industry Forum held in Kyiv in October. Sweden and Finland did not impose specific restrictions on Ukraine's use of their weapons in Russian territory but stressed that weapons should be used in accordance with international law. Northern European countries provided military and non-military support to Ukraine throughout the year. Denmark provided two batches of F-16 fighters. Iceland and Sweden (14.03) joined the Czech initiative to purchase ammunition for Ukraine.

The Nordic-Baltic Eight countries have allocated a winter energy support package to Ukraine, which includes solar panels, generators, etc. (16.10). At the beginning of the year (01.04), the Swedish government allocated about SEK 40mn

(USD3.7mn) for humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Sweden is cooperating with Kyiv in the healthcare sector, particularly in the rehabilitation of Ukrainian soldiers and in restoring the energy sector.

At the end of the year, the prime ministers of the Baltic and Nordic countries and Poland agreed to increase aid to Ukraine at a regional summit in Sweden (27.11). The next day, the Norwegian parliament supported an increase in support for Ukraine from NOK 15bn to NOK 35bn (USD3.2bn) in 2025 (28.11).

In 2024, Ukraine's trade with the Nordic countries increased across all countries as follows: with Denmark to USD484.5mn (USD 467.7mn in 2023), with Iceland to USD 122.2mn (USD 119.3mn in 2023), with Norway to USD 453.5mn (USD 375.1mn in 2023), with Sweden to USD 1.1bn (USD 830.8mn in 2023), with Finland to USD 287mn (USD 238.2mn in 2023).

Sub-Saharan Africa

B

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	5	4
ACTIVITIES	4	4	4
RESULTS	3	3	3
TOTAL SCORE	B+	B+	B

Ukraine continued to maintain active contacts with the Sub-Saharan Africa region, as reflected by high-level Ukrainian representatives' visits to countries in the region. Expanding diplomatic presence became one of the priorities in 2024 and is expected to have a long-term positive impact on further efforts in the area. However, African countries' support for Ukraine in the international arena remains relatively low.

Political interest/engagement

Throughout 2024, there was a political consensus regarding the importance of developing dialogue with Sub-Saharan African countries, with particular emphasis on securing support for the Peace Formula and ensuring food security.

During a meeting with foreign and Ukrainian ambassadors (24.04), the President highlighted the importance of African states' participation in resolving global affairs, not only concerning food security issues but also creating a peaceful world, particularly through promoting Ukraine's Peace Formula. In his address at the meeting of heads of Ukrainian diplomatic missions abroad (19.08), he noted the importance of partnership with Africa, particularly for developing economic and security cooperation, as well as organising a Ukraine-Africa forum. During his speech on the occasion of Diplomat's Day (22.12), the President mentioned the Sahel among regions where the internal balance of power and sentiments are constantly changing, necessitating enhanced work by Ukrainian diplomats.

President Zelenskyy also mentioned the importance of cooperation with African countries during his speeches at the international level. In his address at the UN SC high-level meeting (24.09), he noted that Ukraine is working with African countries in preparation for the second Peace Summit to jointly end the war together with all who respect the UN Charter. In his speech at the UN GA (25.09), the President thanked African states for supporting the Peace Formula and rejecting the colonial past that some countries seek to impose instead of a normal, peaceful life.

The need to expand support among African countries to implement the Peace Formula and hold the Second Peace Summit, as well as the importance of the communication component in relations with Africa, was noted in Foreign Minister A. Sybiha's statement on Ukrainian diplomacy priorities (6.09). During

a press conference with his Estonian counterpart (3.06) and a speech at the annual meeting of Lithuanian diplomats (15.07), Foreign Minister D. Kuleba noted it was important to work in Africa together with international partners, particularly for holding the Global Peace Summit and countering Russian colonialism.

MPs' Interest in the Sub-Saharan Africa region was moderate but nonetheless present. For example, Ukrainian MP Z. Beleniuk, speaking at the international forum "The Power of Sports Diplomacy" (3.12), emphasised the importance of active work in diplomacy and sports with Global South countries, particularly Africa, to improve their perception of Ukraine and gain support in votes on international platforms. In an interview with *The Ukrainian Farmer* (April), the Board Chairwoman of the Assembly of Agrarian Chambers of Ukraine, O. Trofimtseva, said that Ukraine's accession to the EU would significantly facilitate work in African markets through integration into international chains.

Strategic communications

The President of Ukraine addressed African peoples on Africa Day (25.05), expressing his wish for Africa to remain a continent of peace and a voice that matters when global affairs are decided. Mentioning Ukraine's role in supporting food security, readiness to accept African students for studying and sharing reconstruction experience, particularly in the energy sector, V. Zelenskyy invited African states to join the Global Peace Summit.

Throughout the year, active communication with Africa continued, primarily through the promotion of the Ukrainian agenda in African media. Ukraine's Special Representative for the Middle East and Africa, M. Subkh, was quite active in developing dialogue with African countries and gave interviews to several leading African media outlets during his tour (10–18.04), particularly in Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Mozambique, and Rwanda.

Several times, the Special Representative met journalists from African countries who were the Special Representative met journalists from African countries visiting Ukraine on press tours. He held a meeting with journalists from South Africa (6.03) to discuss the situation at the front, the return of

prisoners of war and children, food security, support for peace in Ukraine, and economic cooperation. During a meeting with journalists from Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, and the Gambia (5.08), the Special Representative informed them about the Russian-Ukrainian war, prospects for cooperation with Africa, and called for support of Ukraine's international initiatives, emphasising the importance of countering Russian propaganda, and building equal relations. He also met journalists from 10 African countries on the 1,000th day of Russia's full-scale invasion (19.11). He called on African states to join Ukraine's initiatives, particularly the Second Global Peace Summit and the humanitarian programme "Grain from Ukraine", and emphasised the need to counter Russian propaganda.

Heads of Ukrainian diplomatic missions in Sub-Saharan Africa made efforts to maintain Ukraine's presence in local media. For example, Ukraine's Ambassador to South Africa and Botswana, L. Abravitova, during an interview with the national broadcaster BTV (June), emphasised the significance of opening the Embassy in Gaborone for developing bilateral cooperation, particularly in agriculture, digitalisation, education, etc. Her columns are regularly published in local media.

The MFA of Ukraine organised the "Together We Rise" event in Nairobi (2–3.03). The event was dedicated to the "Grain from Ukraine" programme and aimed to promote Ukrainian culture and support discussions on ways to ensure food security in the region. This contributes to plans to expand agricultural trade between Ukraine and Kenya, discussed during the Ukrainian delegation's visit (February), with a focus on cooperation through agricultural technologies.

Visits from Sub-Saharan African countries to de-occupied territories of Ukraine continued. Representatives of civil society, religious, and academic circles from South Africa visited Bucha (February) to learn about crimes committed by Russians during the occupation of the community and emphasised the importance of spreading the truth about these events.

A comment by a representative of Ukraine's Military Intelligence press service after the killing of Wagner PMC mercenaries in Mali regarding cooperation with Tuaregs was ill-received. It was also initially published on the Ukrainian Embassy in Senegal's page, but eventually deleted. Although Ukraine's Foreign Ministry said this would not affect relations with other African countries, this episode may negatively impact Ukraine's image in the region, which suffers from terrorism.

Activities

Throughout 2024, engagement with Africa was notably dynamic, marked by numerous high-level and top-level interactions.

President Zelenskyy held a series of telephone conversations, including with the heads of Angola (21.05 and 24.12), Ghana (9.05), Liberia (16.05), Malawi (15.05), Mozambique (22.05), and South Africa (12.02), and with the Prime Minister of Cape Verde (7.04). Within the framework of the World Economic Forum in Davos (January), Zelenskyy held meetings with the Presidents of Rwanda and Ghana, discussing support for the Peace Formula and consolidating support for Ukraine among African states, agricultural product exports, logistics hub development, education of African students in Ukraine, and expanding cooperation in other areas. The President also discussed food security, preparation for the Global Peace Summit, and bilateral cooperation development with the Ambassadors of Ghana and Uganda when they presented credentials (22.04).

Foreign Minister Kuleba undertook his fourth African tour (4–8.08), visiting Malawi, Zambia, and Mauritius for the first time in history. During these visits, he held talks with the leaders and foreign ministers of the three countries and met business representatives in Mauritius.

Telephone conversations were held at the foreign ministers' level: Kuleba spoke with counterparts from Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Namibia, South Africa, and Somalia, while Sybiha spoke with ministers from Botswana and Nigeria. They mainly focused on support for the Peace Formula and preparation for the Peace Summit, food security and agricultural supplies, logistics development, and expanding cooperation in digitalisation, IT, and education.

During the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland (15–16.06), Kuleba met Rwanda's Minister of Internal Affairs and the Secretary General of Benin's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, during which the parties discussed ways to promote the Peace Formula and develop relations in trade, education, digitalisation, and agriculture.

Ukraine's Special Representative for the Middle East and Africa, M. Subkh, was particularly active. He held a telephone conversation with the Deputy Foreign Minister of the DRC (14.09) and received a delegation from Ghana's parliament (19.09), which was the first visit of such level to Ukraine since the establishment

of diplomatic relations. Subkh took part in the official opening ceremony of the DRC Honorary Consulate in Uzhhorod (22.03), during which he spoke with the Secretary General of the DRC Foreign Ministry.

Subkh toured six Sub-Saharan African countries (10–18.04) and took part in the opening of embassies in the DRC, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mozambique, Botswana, and Rwanda. He held meetings with representatives of the foreign ministries of Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mozambique, Botswana, and Rwanda, the dean of the diplomatic corps and EU member country ambassadors in Ghana, and the Deputy Executive Secretary for Regional Integration of the Southern African Development Community. During the talks, the parties discussed the development of cross-sectoral dialogue and intensification of bilateral relations, African states' participation in the Peace Summit, overcoming the humanitarian and economic consequences of the global food crisis, and Ukraine's humanitarian initiative "Grain from Ukraine". Negotiations also touched on prospects for cooperation in the humanitarian sphere, particularly the possibility of cooperation between the Kigali Genocide Memorial and the Ukrainian National Holodomor-Genocide Museum.

The Special Representative visited Mozambique (4.06) as part of a delegation headed by the Deputy Head of the Presidential Office, M. Tochytskyi, with the participation of the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Agrarian and Land Policy, O. Haidu, and representatives of Ukrainian agriculture. The delegation held negotiations with Mozambique's Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, exchanging views on the prospects for bilateral cooperation in agriculture, investment attraction, innovation, and implementation of the "Grain from Ukraine" programme. The delegation also met Mozambique's Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade and took part in a roundtable and B2B meetings with business circles of both countries.

During a working visit to Namibia (13.06), Subkh met the Speaker of the National Assembly and the Acting Director of the Directorate of European Countries at the Ministry of International Relations and Cooperation, with whom he discussed the development of interparliamentary cooperation, food security, and achieving a just peace for Ukraine and the world.

At a meeting with a delegation of Kenyan pundits and economic experts in Kyiv (23.04), Subkh discussed prospects for cooperation in political and trade-economic

spheres, and thanked them for supporting Ukraine at the UN and countering Russian propaganda in Africa.

Throughout the year, intensive efforts were made to expand cooperation with African countries in the agricultural sector. The Ministry of Agrarian Policy held a roundtable, “Africa for Agricultural Exporters: Ways to Restore Lost Markets” (1.08), where they discussed expanding cooperation with African countries, particularly in irrigation, feed production, and plant protection. The recently established Ukrainian-African Trade Mission, which already has offices in Nigeria, Tanzania, and Kenya and serves as a platform for establishing business contacts, was also mentioned. A working meeting of government and business representatives (22.08) was held at Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry, chaired by Subkh and Acting Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food T. Vysotskyi, to discuss stepping up cooperation with African countries in the agro-industrial sector.

Ukraine continued implementing the humanitarian programme “Grain from Ukraine”. Wheat was delivered to Nigeria, split peas to Mauritania, Djibouti, Mozambique, and the DRC, and humanitarian cargo to Malawi. Within the initiative, sunflower oil was sent for the first time to the DRC, Mozambique, Djibouti, and Mauritania, and two shipments of wheat flour were sent as emergency food aid to Sudan (April).

A meeting of the Ukraine-Nigeria Business Council (13.02) was held with the participation of representatives from both countries’ foreign ministries, chambers of commerce, and embassies. Participants discussed the development of industry, infrastructure, education, renewable energy, the agricultural sector, and the Nazovni platform.

Results

In 2024, activities in the African direction yielded positive results, including in the context of support for Ukraine in the international arena. This has been achieved thanks to the systematic work of the Foreign Ministry and other involved parties over recent years, although the potential for cooperation with Sub-Saharan African states remains untapped.

Ukraine notably strengthened its diplomatic presence in Sub-Saharan Africa, opening embassies in the DRC (10.04), Côte d'Ivoire (11.04), Ghana (12.04), Mozambique (15.04), Botswana (16.04), Rwanda (18.04), and Mauritania (24.05), thus increasing its representation on the continent to 17 countries.

Ukraine's Ambassador to Nigeria, I. Kholostenko, delivered a letter from Foreign Minister D. Kuleba to the President of the ECOWAS Commission (27.03), confirming his accreditation as Ukraine's Representative to the organisation.

As a result of Kuleba's fourth African tour, five international accords were agreed. Of these, memoranda on political consultations with Malawi and Zambia and a visa-free agreement with Mauritius were signed, while agreements on avoiding double taxation and mutual promotion and protection of investments with Mauritius await signing.

A negative episode was Mali and Niger's severing of diplomatic relations with Ukraine (August), which, together with Burkina Faso, accused Ukraine of supporting terrorism in an address to the UN Security Council presidency (19.08).

The representation of Sub-Saharan African states at the Global Peace Summit was low, indicating a lack of consensus regarding support for Ukraine among countries in the region. Twelve countries from the region participated in the event: three at the presidential level (Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, Somalia), one at the prime ministerial level (Cape Verde), seven at the ministerial level (Benin, The Gambia, Ghana, Comoros, Liberia, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe), and one at the ambassadorial level (South Africa). Eleven participating countries, with the exception of South Africa, subscribed to the final communiqué. Later, Botswana, Zambia, Malawi, and Mauritius joined the communiqué as well, while Rwanda withdrew its signature.

According to Ukraine's Customs Service, the total trade turnover between Ukraine and Sub-Saharan African countries in 2024 amounted to USD740.6mn (0.66% of Ukraine's total trade), which is slightly higher than last year's figures. Exports amounted to USD 219.8mn, and imports to USD 520.8mn, indicating a persistent and significant negative trade balance with the region. The main trading partners included Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, South Africa, Ghana, and Cameroon.

Central Asia



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	1	3	3
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	1	2	3
ACTIVITIES	2	3	3
RESULTS	2	3	3
TOTAL SCORE	E+	C-	C

In 2024, Ukraine demonstrated a stable but low political interest in Central Asian countries, focusing on cooperation with Kazakhstan. The active involvement of media resources in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan helped to strengthen Ukraine's information presence, but Turkmenistan and Tajikistan lagged behind due to low levels of openness. Ukrainian diplomats organised numerous meetings and cultural events that laid the groundwork for expanding economic and humanitarian cooperation

Political interest/engagement

In 2024, Ukrainian diplomacy focused on intensifying relations with Central Asian countries in an effort to overcome the effects of the economic downturn and geopolitical challenges caused by Russia's war in Ukraine. Political interest in Central Asia remained stable, with positive trends occurring with positive trends in some areas. Kazakhstan continued to play a key role among the countries of the region through humanitarian aid and intensified political dialogue, which included a telephone conversation between the presidents (02.02).

Central Asia and individual countries of the region were mentioned in statements by representatives of the OPU, MFA, the VRUA, etc. However, the neutral stance adopted by most countries in the region regarding the war, coupled with limited support from international organisations, highlights the need to enhance communication with these governments.

Strategic communications

Strategic information campaigns were launched throughout the year to help countries in the region better understand the unfolding events in Ukraine. In 2024, President V. Zelenskyy gave his first interview to journalists from Central Asia (24.05). An advisor to the Head of the Presidential Office, M. Podolyak, analysed the consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine for other countries in an interview with Orda.kz (01.02).

Communication with the region was also carried out at the level of individual heads of parliamentary groups for interparliamentary relations. For example, MP S. Nagornyak gave an interview to Orda.kz (31.01) and a commentary to Dunyo (08.04).

Most efforts were directed at Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, where Ukraine's representatives were active at public events and in the media, but mostly at the level of embassy representatives. In particular, Ukraine's Charge d'Affaires ad interim in Kazakhstan, S. Pavlenko, gave interviews to the Kazakh editions of Forbes (24.04) and Exclusive (17.06). Ukraine's Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, V. Zhovtenko, took part in a prime-time live broadcast of the TV

programme “Evening of a Hard Day” (12.04) and commented on the victory plan in an interview with Radio Azattyk (21.10) and the Kyrgyz international TV channel TV15 (15.11). Ukraine’s Ambassador to Uzbekistan was interviewed by Gazeta.uz (27.02, 26.04, 19.11) and Anhor.uz (29.04). Turkmenistan and Tajikistan lagged behind due to the limited level of interaction caused by their domestic policies and low openness.

Activities

Important events took place in 2024, including business forums, high-level meetings, and cultural initiatives.

A telephone conversation took place between the presidents of Ukraine and Kazakhstan (02.02). Meetings were held with representatives of the Kazakh government, including between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan (24.09), and talks between the Charge d’Affaires ad interim of Ukraine and the Minister of Energy of Kazakhstan (21.05).

Relations with Kyrgyzstan were characterised by a steady dialogue at the level of the diplomatic mission with various state authorities and business circles. The Ambassador of Ukraine met the Kyrgyz Deputy Prime Minister (10.06). The active dialogue was also maintained with the MFA at the level of deputy minister and department directors (15 meetings in total). Despite the low volume of trade, Ukrainian businesses were interested in cooperation with Kyrgyzstan.

First Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine, A. Sybiha, met Uzbekistani Ambassador A. Kurmanov (29.04). Cultural and humanitarian events became an important aspect of the Ukrainian Embassy’s activities in Uzbekistan.

Sybiha also met Turkmenistan’s Ambassador to Ukraine, T. Atayev (07.05). Ukraine’s Embassy in Turkmenistan addressed the circumvention of international norms on trade in products from the occupied territories of Ukraine. There is no information on other activities at any level.

Contacts with Tajikistan included an online meeting between the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine, A. Sybiha and Deputy Foreign Minister of Tajikistan S. Ashurboyzoda Imomi (30.04). An important event was the discussion


of expanding cooperation on the side-lines of the UN GA between the Foreign Ministers of Ukraine and Tajikistan (26.09). Ukrainian diplomacy focused on restoring political dialogue, expanding trade and economic cooperation, and humanitarian projects.

Results

Trends in Central Asian countries' voting on important UN resolutions related to Ukraine in 2024 show certain stability in their cautious and mostly neutral positions. This can be seen as an attempt by the countries of the region to balance their international commitments with the influence of Russia, which traditionally has a significant political, economic, and cultural impact on Central Asia.

These countries' position on UN voting posed a problem. Most of their delegations abstained from voting on resolutions important for Ukraine. Turkmenistan did not vote on the UNGA resolution "Safety and security of nuclear facilities of Ukraine, including the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant" (11.07) and the updated resolution "Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol" (17.11). Uzbekistan did not take part in the voting on the updated resolution either, while all other countries abstained from voting on the mentioned resolutions.

Despite the challenges of 2024, Ukraine retained its political and economic interest in the region. However, trade decreased significantly compared to the previous year. According to the State Customs Service, Ukraine's total trade turnover with the countries of the region in 2024 was USD877.5mn (compared to USD 1.2bn in 2023). In particular, trade with Kazakhstan amounted to USD 411.8mn (USD 530.8mn in 2023), with Kyrgyzstan to USD 34.8mn (USD 36.2mn in 2023), with Tajikistan to USD 14.9mn (USD 12.9mn in 2023), with Turkmenistan to USD 138.8mn (USD 267.5mn in 2023), and with Uzbekistan to USD 277.1mn (USD 335.9mn in 2023). Kazakhstan remains Ukraine's main trading partner, followed by Uzbekistan. The drop in trade in 2024 reflects both global economic challenges and the impact of the war on Ukraine's economic activity. Despite this, trade with Tajikistan is showing positive dynamics.



INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

	2022	2023	2024
UN	A	A	A
OSCE	C+	C+	C+
COUNCIL OF EUROPE	B+	B-	B

UN

A

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	5	5
ACTIVITIES	5	5	5
RESULTS	5	5	5
TOTAL SCORE	A	A	A

Throughout the year, Ukraine utilised the potential of the UN and its member organisations to respond politically and humanitarily to the consequences of Russian aggression. Ukraine continued to actively use platforms in New York and Geneva, promoting important resolutions and minimising Russia's influence within various UN agencies, as well as within the UN GA and the UN SC.

Political interest/engagement

The President rarely addressed the UN in his keynote speeches but consistently referred to the UN Charter and Russia's violations of it, emphasising the need to comply with this document. He paid considerable attention to this issue during his speech at the first plenary session of the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland (15.06), as well as in his speeches to the VRU. Ukraine's Foreign Ministers and other high-ranking officials regularly mentioned this in their speeches and comments too.

In his address to the UN Annual General Assembly (25.09), the President highlighted key agenda issues: nuclear security, food security, compliance with the UN Charter, the Peace Formula and the Peace Summit, a just peace for Ukraine, and bringing those responsible for war crimes to justice. During the plenary session of the Summit of the Future (23.09), the President stated that Ukraine supports efforts aimed at preserving the unity and security of all nations, as well as strict adherence to the UN Charter.

Measures aimed at reforming the UN Security Council were included in the Government's Action Plan for 2024 (16.02) but were included in the "Information Security" section and effectively reduced to conducting an international campaign to prove the illegitimacy of Russia's membership in the UN SC. Additionally, the sanctions section includes a task to prepare and submit a memorandum on the 8 January 2020 air incident (Ukraine, Canada, Sweden, and the UK v. Iran) to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Considerable attention was paid to UN reform and nuclear safety issues. During the G20 ministerial meeting at UN headquarters (25.09), Foreign Minister A. Sybiha stressed that it was unacceptable for a permanent member of the UN SC and nuclear power to threaten others with weapons of mass destruction.

The Ukrainian MFA issued statements on various UN agenda items and decisions of the UN system regarding Ukraine, particularly the ICJ's decision in the case against Russia (01.02) and the ICJ's decision on jurisdiction over Ukraine's claim under the Genocide Convention (05.02). The MFA also made several comments

regarding the report of the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry in Ukraine (18.03), Russia's veto of the UN Security Council's draft resolution that would have extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 Sanctions Committee on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (28.03), the UN Secretary-General's Annual Report on Children and Armed Conflict (14.06), and the 40th Periodic Report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (02.10), among others.

Strategic communications

In 2024, Ukraine continued using diplomatic channels and social media to promote its UN agenda. The UN and the importance of international support within its framework were repeatedly mentioned in speeches by Ukrainian officials at international platforms. The President spoke about the need to comply with the UN Charter during the plenary session of the Summit of the Future in New York (23.09), at the Crimea Platform Parliamentary Summit in Riga (24.10), and the Shangri-La Dialogue Summit in Singapore (02.06). Ukrainian communications paid considerable attention to limiting veto powers for UN permanent members and questioning the legitimacy of the Russian delegation's seat in the UN SC.

Ukraine actively used the UN platform to voice its position not only on the situation in Ukraine and Russian aggression but also aligned with joint statements on topical international issues. For example, Ukraine supported joint statements on the elections in Venezuela (02.09), on the humanitarian situation in Myanmar (15.07), and participated in an interactive dialogue on the human rights situation in Iran (01.11).

Additionally, Ukraine repeatedly secured support from other delegations to issue joint statements on Russia's actions. For example, before the UN SC meeting on "Multilateral cooperation in the interest of a more just, democratic and sustainable world order" convened by Russia (16.07), 52 member states and the EU issued a joint press statement condemning Russia's actions regarding the Zaporizhzhia NPP, the involvement of the DPRK, and other matters. Furthermore, 57 countries and the EU issued a joint media statement in response to Russia's

organisation of presidential elections in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine (15.03). Heads of delegations from 52 countries and the EU addressed the press on the 1000th day of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine (19.11). In Geneva, a joint statement was issued on behalf of 44 states condemning Russia's destruction of Ukraine's wetlands (07.06) under the Ramsar Convention.

Activities

In 2024, in addition to his traditional speech at the opening of the UN GA (25.09), President V. Zelenskyy spoke at a high-level meeting of the UN SC (24.09), where he emphasised the need to force Russia to peace as the sole aggressor in this war and the only violator of the UN Charter.

Ukraine's partners, who are members of the UN SC, consistently kept Ukrainian issues on the agenda and repeatedly convened special sessions where the Representative of Ukraine to the UN and invited Ukrainian representatives had the opportunity to speak.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister D. Kuleba met UN Secretary-General A. Guterres in New York (23.02) to thank the UN for its participation in discussing the Peace Formula and stress the importance of continued efforts to achieve peace in Ukraine. Foreign Minister A. Sybiha participated in a ministerial meeting of the UN SC convened by the British presidency and dedicated to 1,000 days of resistance by the Ukrainian people against full-scale Russian aggression (18.11). Deputy Foreign Minister I. Borovets took part in the UN Security Council's open debate on "Promoting conflict prevention — empowering all actors, including women and youth" (13.03).

Overall, Ukraine's Permanent Mission to the UN in New York was active across all areas in all UN committees and formats. The Mission delivered interventions at UN GA meetings on "Status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia" (04.06), "R2P and the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" (11.07), on the occasion of the International Day against Nuclear Tests (04.09), "Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the UN SC" (11.11), "Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and

disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance” (09.12), at the Informal Meeting of the UNGA Plenary on Human Security (02.04), and at the UNGA plenary meeting to hear the tenth report of the UN Mechanism for Syria (24.04).

As part of its work with the UN Security Council, the Ukrainian delegation participated in meetings on maintaining peace and security in Ukraine (11.04, 14.05, 07.06, 18.06, 28.08, 10.09, 21.10, 30.10, 27.11, 04.12, 16.12), “Threats to international peace and security” (20.05, 14.06, 09.07, 20.12), the open debate on “The impact of climate change and food insecurity on the maintenance of international peace and security” (13.02), protection of civilians in armed conflicts (22.05), “Strengthening the role of the African States in addressing global security and development challenges” (23.05), “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace: the new agenda for peace” (22.08), “Leadership for peace: united in respect of the UN Charter, in search of a secure future” (25.09), “Cybersecurity” (20.06), “Children and armed conflict” (26.06), “Preventing conflict-related sexual violence through demilitarisation and gender-responsive arms control” (23.04), “Non-proliferation/DPRK” (28.06), the situation in the DPRK (18.12), and in Arria Formula meetings on “Protection of civilians in armed conflict: prevent and respond to persons going missing across the globe” (12.06), and “Persons with disabilities in situations of armed conflict and related humanitarian crises” (06.12).

At an emergency meeting convened at Ukraine’s request, the UN Security Council addressed Russia’s use of an intermediate-range ballistic missile against the city of Dnipro, as well as security threats posed by DPRK troops assisting Russia in its aggression against Ukraine (27.11). Additionally, an extraordinary UN SC meeting was convened at Ukraine’s request by France and Ecuador following a Russian missile attack on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, including the Okhmatdyt hospital (10.07).

Ukrainian representatives also spoke at the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development — Climate Action (10.07), the High-level Forum on the Culture of Peace (02.08), the UN Women Executive Board session (10.09), the Working Group on the security of and in the use of information and communication technologies (02.12), the Policy Dialogue on “Addressing global food insecurity and famine risk” (29.04), the General Debate of the UN Committee

on Information (30.04), and the 19th session of the UN Forum on Forests (06.05), among others.

MPs M. Mezentseva and Y. Kravchuk participated in the “Parliamentarians as drivers for women’s empowerment” event at the 68th session of the Commission on the Status of Women at UN Headquarters in New York (12.03). Government Commissioner for Gender Policy K. Levchenko held a working meeting with a UN Women Executive Board delegation during their field visit to Ukraine (19–22.05).

UN Headquarters hosted events organised by the Ukrainian Mission together with partners from Ukraine’s governmental and non-governmental sectors, as well as international partners. For example, a briefing by Ukrainian human rights defenders (15.11) was organised jointly with the delegations of Lithuania, Norway, Canada, and Costa Rica to support this year’s draft UN GA resolution on “Human rights situation in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine” initiated by Ukraine. The headquarters also hosted an event on “Environmental security in war and armed conflict” (06.11), featuring speeches by the Environment Ministers of Ukraine and Finland, and representatives of the UN Environment Programme and the IAEA. Ukraine’s Energy Minister G. Galushchenko and UN Resident Coordinator in Ukraine M. Schmale delivered speeches at the event “Protecting critical energy infrastructure of Ukraine against the attacks of the Russian Federation during the war” (02.12),

The UN Human Rights Council considered the report of the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry in Ukraine (19.03), which provided additional evidence of serious violations and international crimes, including war crimes and potential crimes against humanity, committed by Russian authorities in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

The Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations in Geneva dealt with human rights protection, arms control, ecological security, migration, environment, and other issues within relevant UN organisations. The Mission to the International Organisations in Vienna, as in previous years, mainly focused on work within the OSCE and IAEA (see the relevant sections).

Cooperation with UNESCO was active, particularly in securing assistance to cultural heritage sites damaged by shelling.

Results

The traditional annual resolution on the situation of human rights in Crimea (17.12) received three more votes in favour this year than in 2023 (81 votes in favour, 14 against). This year's document contains a new provision condemning torture and other forms of ill-treatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war, including sexual violence, and calls on Russia to grant international humanitarian mandates, including to the ICRC, access to detention facilities, ensure adequate medical care, and facilitate full exchanges of all prisoners of war.

The UN GA also adopted for the first time a resolution on “Safety and security of nuclear facilities of Ukraine, including the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant” (11.07), emphasising the need to demilitarise and de-occupy the Zaporizhzhia NPP due to Russia's failure to comply with IAEA governing bodies' resolutions.

The UN Human Rights Council adopted an updated resolution on the “Situation of human rights in Ukraine stemming from the Russian aggression”, extending the mandate of the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry to investigate human rights violations in Ukraine resulting from Russian aggression (06.04). Throughout the year, 10 resolutions and decisions by international organisations in Geneva condemning Russian aggression and supporting Ukraine were adopted.


Various UN agencies were involved in addressing the consequences of Russian aggression and providing humanitarian assistance throughout the year. The Ukraine Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan and the Ukraine Situation: Regional Refugee Response Plan 2024 were presented in Geneva (15.01). The United Nations Environment Programme supported green recovery projects in Ukraine; UNDP actively restored civilian infrastructure, including water supply systems, residential buildings, and educational institutions; several mine action initiatives were launched, including those using innovative AI technologies; and a new Ukraine Community Recovery Fund project worth nearly USD5mn was launched in Mykolaiv and Kherson regions. The World Food Programme donated equipment to bakeries in Ukraine's frontline regions, and UNDP provided Odesa with gas-piston cogeneration units.

As of June, donors had provided an additional USD689mn for recovery efforts in Ukraine, bringing the total received by UN agencies in the country to USD 1.6bn. Most humanitarian projects were implemented jointly by UN programmes in Ukraine and partner countries. Germany provided an additional EUR 2.4mn to support Ukraine's green industrial recovery through municipality-driven cluster development under the UNIDO-Ukraine Green Industrial Recovery Programme 2024–2028 (31.10). UNDP and the Norwegian Government deepened their cooperation to restore Ukraine's energy infrastructure and create backup capacity for critical systems. With funding from Germany, the EU, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Finland and private donors, the UN World Food Programme transferred over USD 48.5mn to pensioners living in frontline areas. As part of the School Repairs in Ukraine project, 26 more schools in Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kyiv regions received renovation assistance funded by a EUR 28mn aid package from the EU and overseen by the UN Office for Project Services.

The Alliance for Gender-Responsive and Inclusive Recovery for Ukraine was announced at the Ukraine Recovery Conference (11–12.06), to be led by UN Women in Ukraine in cooperation with the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Cabinet of Ministers, ensuring gender equality and women's empowerment are central to Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction efforts (12.07).

The International Court of Justice ruled on the merits of Ukraine's case against Russia regarding the application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, finding that Russia had violated both international treaties (31.01). Additionally, the International Court of Justice ruled on Russia's preliminary objections to the Court's jurisdiction and the admissibility of Ukraine's claim under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (02.02).

OSCE



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	3	3	3
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	4	3	3
ACTIVITIES	4	4	4
RESULTS	3	3	3
TOTAL SCORE	C+	C+	C+

Ukraine's work with the OSCE continued amid restrictions imposed by Russia's membership of the organisation. The OSCE and its mechanisms remain the focus of the Ukrainian authorities, although they are not among their priorities. The parliamentary track has become more active.

Political interest/engagement

Understanding the limited possibilities of using OSCE mechanisms and structures, Ukrainian officials made little reference to this topic. The OSCE is not mentioned in the Government's Action Plan for 2024 or in any of the main foreign policy speeches of the President of Ukraine. At the same time, Ukrainian state, and local authorities actively continued cooperation with the OSCE Programme Office and within the framework of individual programmes aimed at assisting Ukraine and reforming certain areas, including gender equality, border security, migration, national minority rights, etc.

The OSCE and the use of its mechanisms to hold Russia accountable remained the focus of attention of the MFA and MPs who are members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. For example, Foreign Minister D. Kuleba said that the OSCE should become a platform for holding Russia accountable, not for dialogue with it (23.02).

Strategic communications

Ukraine's strategic communications regarding the OSCE were limited. Ukraine mostly used traditional methods of conveying its position through statements during the OSCE Permanent Council meetings in Vienna. Several times during the year, the Ukrainian delegation made emergency statements related to the most critical cases of violations committed by Russia, in particular, the statement on Russia's intensified missile attacks on against critical civilian infrastructure of Ukraine amidst Russia's ongoing war of aggression (22.03), the statement by the Ukrainian delegation on the Russian presidential election and Russia's violations of OSCE principles and commitments (21.03), the statement on the Russian Federation's malign activities and interference in the OSCE region (16.05), and the statement on the Russian missile attack on Ukraine, including on the Okhmatdyt children's hospital in Kyiv (08.07).

The Ukrainian MFA commented on certain OSCE decisions, for example, on the "Report on violations and abuses of international humanitarian and human rights law, war crimes and crimes against humanity, related to the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of Ukrainian civilians by the Russian Federation", which was published

under the Moscow Mechanism (25.04). The MFA emphasised that the report's findings could be used within national and international mechanisms to bring war criminals of the aggressor state to justice, as well as to contribute to the goals of President Zelenskyy's Peace Formula.

In addition, Ukrainian representatives drew attention to certain issues that could strengthen the OSCE role. At a joint briefing in Kyiv with the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Maltese Minister for Foreign Affairs, I. Borg (02.02), Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba called on the OSCE to address the issue of national minorities in the “prison of nations” — Russia.

In 2024, there were hardly any notable communications on media platforms, but the Mission in Vienna actively used its social media pages to communicate Ukraine's current activities and position. In 2024, there were fewer public diplomacy events, except for the screening of the film “Bucha” for representatives of OSCE missions in Vienna (20.11).

Activities

The Maltese Minister for Foreign Affairs and OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, I. Borg, visited Kyiv (02.02) to meet President Zelenskyy and Foreign Minister Kuleba. During the ministerial talks, Kuleba raised the issue of the release of civilian hostages from Russian captivity and the return of Ukrainian children from Russia.

Foreign Minister Kuleba spoke (online) at a special expanded meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council (23.02), where he called on the OSCE to use all existing means and create new mechanisms to counter sexual crimes committed by Russian occupiers and to release civilian hostages held by Russia. Kuleba also addressed the OSCE Annual Security Review Conference (26.06), the organisation's key political and security event, where he spoke in particular about the results of the Peace Summit, the need to implement the Peace Formula and punish Russia for war crimes.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister A. Sybiha took part in the 31st OSCE Ministerial Council in Malta (05–06.12). In his speech, he talked about Ukraine's daily struggle for existence in the face of Russian aggression and recalled the 30th anniversary

of the Budapest Memorandum. During the meeting, the Foreign Minister met the OSCE Officer-in-Charge/Acting Secretary-General, K. Fearon, to discuss priorities for further cooperation between Ukraine and the OSCE.

Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine I. Borovets met the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairpersonship — OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, Ambassador M. Peško (15.02). The parties discussed the possibilities of engaging the OSCE to address the priority needs of the Ukrainian government caused by Russia's full-scale invasion, including environmental and economic projects, as well as expert assistance in measuring Ukraine's European integration. Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine M. Betsa met the newly appointed Special Representative of the OSCE Chairpersonship — OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, Ambassador P. Mareš (18.12).

Ukrainian governmental and non-governmental delegations took part in the OSCE's Warsaw Human Dimension Conference (30.09–11.10). In addition to addressing the main sessions, representatives of the Ombudsperson's Office spoke at a side conference, "No Child Left Behind: The impact of Russia's war of aggression on children in Ukraine". Ukrainian civil society organisations also took part in a side conference on Russia's policy of enforced disappearances in Ukraine.

Deputy Energy Minister R. Andarak spoke online at the OSCE Security Committee (16.10) on protecting critical infrastructure and increasing resilience to attacks. The chair of Ukrhydroenergo's supervisory board, V. Gvozdi, spoke (online) at the annual Economic and Environmental Dimension Implementation Meeting (29.10), stressing Russia's deliberate use of water as a weapon and its transformation from a source of life into a weapon of war.

Ukrainian MPs — members of the OSCE PA were involved in active interparliamentary diplomacy. The President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, P. Kauma, addressed the VRU (06.02). The VRU also hosted a meeting of the Parliamentary Support Team for Ukraine, a special OSCE PA committee established in 2023. The meeting focused on the issue of Russia's responsibility, in particular, the work on establishing a special tribunal to investigate the crime of aggression, as well as ways to use frozen Russian assets for restoring Ukraine. Ukraine's delegation to the OSCE PA took part in its annual sessions, in particular in Bucharest (29.06) and Dublin (02–04.10). Ukrainian MPs also worked within the OSCE PA international observation mission to the US elections (November).

The Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the International Organisations in Vienna was quite active. The Ukrainian delegation regularly made statements on Russian aggression at meetings of the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna.

In 2024, the OSCE Support Programme for Ukraine, which was launched to circumvent Russia's blocking of all field missions related to Ukraine, continued to operate. In particular, in 2024, the OSCE implemented projects in Ukraine aimed at preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives, training Ukrainian rescuers to provide gender-sensitive humanitarian assistance, protecting the rights of persons in detention, improving the conflict management skills of Ukrainian civil servants, strengthening the capacity of the State Border Service of Ukraine, and training Ukrainian regulators on best practices in oversight of virtual assets and anti-money laundering tactics.

Results

On the initiative of Ukraine, the OSCE member states officially activated the Moscow Mechanism in February regarding Ukrainian civilian hostages held by Russia in temporarily occupied territories, which allowed the deployment of an international fact-finding mission to address a specific human rights issue in the OSCE region. The mission's report was published in April, documenting regular failures to comply with a number of obligations relating to civilian detainees under the Geneva Convention, extrajudicial killings of detained Ukrainian civilians by the Russian authorities, and the failure to properly investigate allegations of such killings, which may qualify as war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The OSCE Troika issued a joint statement (19.11) on the 1000th day since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, reaffirming its unwavering support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, as well as continued assistance through the office of the Special Representative — Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine and extra-budgetary support.

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution recognising Russia's actions as genocide of the Ukrainian people and the need to decolonise Russia, as well as calling for the swift launch of a mechanism to use frozen Russian assets for the benefit of Ukraine (29.06).

Council of Europe



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	4	4	4
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	4	4
ACTIVITIES	4	4	4
RESULTS	4	3	4
TOTAL SCORE	B+	B-	B

In 2024, the partnership between Ukraine and the Council of Europe was marked by high activity and strategically important achievements. The CoE provided comprehensive support to Ukraine, including through the adoption of resolutions condemning Russia’s crimes and through financial and technical assistance programmes. Particular attention was paid to systematic support for democratic reforms in Ukraine, such as justice reform, as well as monitoring the human rights situation in the occupied territories.



Political interest/engagement

In 2024, Ukraine and the Council of Europe interacted at regular meetings of the Committee of Ministers and PACE, as well as through meaningful dialogue in key areas, such as criminal justice, the judiciary, law enforcement, and legal remedies for war-affected people. Ukraine gradually supported the expansion of the Council of Europe's role as a crucial guarantor of legal standards and a valuable partner in the European integration process.

Throughout the year, there were numerous speeches, official statements, and interviews by high-ranking officials, including the President, the VRU Speaker and the Foreign Minister, who expressed Ukraine's active political position. The President's Annual Address to the VRU and the Internal Resilience Plan contained specific provisions on the importance of Council of Europe mechanisms for achieving Ukraine's foreign policy goals (19.11).

Ukrainian MPs on the official delegation to PACE actively promoted the Ukrainian agenda in relevant committees, initiated key issues for consideration, ensured effective representation of national interests, and commented on PACE proceedings for Ukrainian media.

Strategic communications

In 2024, Ukraine strengthened its strategic communication on the Council of Europe platform, actively using its tools to bolster international support. Several information campaigns were organised to draw attention to the humanitarian and human rights situation in Ukraine.

Ukraine's Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe, B. Tarasyuk, repeatedly drew member states' attention to the aggressor's gross violations of the Geneva Conventions and the Chemical Weapons Convention. In particular, he cited blatant evidence of Ukrainian prisoners of war being executed by Russian invaders and the use of grenades equipped with chloropicrin. With his assistance, numerous high-profile representative and cultural anti-war events took place at Council of Europe venues. In the Palace of Europe, VRU Chairman R. Stefanchuk,

together with PACE President T. Rousopoulos, Secretary General M. Pejčinović Burić and Ukrainian delegates inaugurated an exhibition of Maria Prymachenko's works "Maria's Dreams: A Journey Through Ukrainian Identity" dedicated to the struggle for independence, democracy, and the future in Europe (16.04).

Also significant were the regular speeches by senior officials of the Ukrainian delegation to PACE, who effectively communicated Ukraine's priorities to the international community.

Activities

In 2024, Ukraine systematically cooperated with the Council of Europe to fulfil its commitments, particularly within the framework of its main working bodies (the Council, PACE, the Committee of Ministers), as well as in the vast majority of intergovernmental expert committees and conventional monitoring mechanisms.

A historic visit to Strasbourg by VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk took place, the first in Ukraine's 29 years of Council of Europe membership (15.04).

There were numerous bilateral meetings between representatives of Ukraine and the CoE. Ukrainian officials met the new CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, M. O'Flaherty, during his first visit to Ukraine (23–25.04).

Considerable attention was paid to international advocacy of Ukraine's interests, particularly in countering Russian aggression. CoE Secretary General M. Pejčinović Burić issued a statement on the Council of Europe's readiness to play its role in bringing Russia to justice. During the spring session, PACE discussed support for Ukraine's recovery and a proposal to use frozen Russian state assets for this purpose. This important appeal was made to PACE members by VRU Speaker Stefanchuk (16.04).

The delay in establishing a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine is worth noting. As CoE Secretary General Pejčinović Burić remarked on the side-lines of the Conference of Ministers of Justice in Vilnius (05.09), this is due to efforts to create an indisputable legal framework.

Throughout the year, Ukraine actively participated in PACE's work, initiating new resolutions and supporting those related to the war. Ukraine remains on the PACE agenda, where calls are made to provide larger arms packages, close the sky,

and supply more air defence systems. In his inaugural speech as Secretary General of the Council of Europe, newly elected A. Berset stressed that Ukraine would remain a top priority for the Council of Europe (18.09), and at the EP summit, he reaffirmed the Council's commitment to Ukraine and shaping its democratic future.

On the side-lines of the 133rd Session of the CoE Committee of Ministers, Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister I. Borovets, and PACE President T. Rousopoulos discussed creating a comprehensive compensation mechanism for victims of Russian aggression, as well as the Council of Europe's role in its creation and further functioning (03.10).

PACE hosted an urgent procedure debate on the situation of children in Ukraine with the online participation of First Lady O. Zelenska, who called for intensifying efforts to return Ukrainian children (25.01).

Results

In 2024, through active diplomatic work, Ukraine ensured the integration of its key issues into the CoE agenda, which helped consolidate international support and increase sanctions pressure on Russia. The results of cooperation with the Council of Europe in 2024 demonstrate positive dynamics in implementing Ukraine's foreign policy goals but require further strengthening of coordination and institutional capacity.

PACE adopted numerous resolutions, including those authored by Ukrainian MPs, on the situation of Ukrainian children (25.01), support for Ukraine's reconstruction (16.04), the role of sanctions in countering the Russian Federation's war of aggression against Ukraine (27.06), countering the erasure of cultural identity in war and peace (27.06), legal and human rights aspects of the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine (27.06), an urgent appeal to Europe and its partners: envisioning immediate and long-term policy solutions in support of the displaced people of Ukraine (27.06), and propaganda and freedom of information in Europe (01.10). For the first time, PACE recommended seizing Russian state assets to support Ukraine's recovery (17.04). The PACE platform on the situation of Ukrainian children was officially launched (27.06).

An important achievement was the announcement of the first decisions on submitting applications to the Register of Damage (RD4U) caused by Russia's aggression against Ukraine, established under the Council of Europe's auspices (13.12).

At the Conference of the Council of Europe Ministers of Justice in Vilnius, the Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and human rights, democracy and the rule of law was signed (05.09).

Ukrainian diplomats and the government ensured the effective implementation of some Council of Europe recommendations, especially in justice and human rights. The Venice Commission's recommendations on judicial reform were implemented, as reported by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to European partners. Financial assistance was received under Council of Europe programmes to support internally displaced persons and develop democratic institutions.

At the PACE winter session (22–26.01.2024), Ukrainian MPs were elected to the following leadership positions: M. Mezentseva continued as Chair of the Committee on Equality and Non-Discrimination; O. Khomenko was re-elected as PACE Vice-President; O. Goncharenko became Chair of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, the first time a Ukrainian has held this position; L. Vasylenko was elected First Vice-Chair of the Legal Committee; and Y. Kravchuk joined the Committee on Rules of Procedure, Immunities and Institutional Affairs, which ensures proper application of the Assembly's rules of procedure.

Nuclear Non-proliferation



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	4	4	3
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	4	4	4
ACTIVITIES	4	4	4
RESULTS	3	4	3
TOTAL SCORE	B-	B-	C+

In 2024, Ukraine's foreign policy on non-proliferation was focused on two directions: the ineffectiveness of the Budapest Memorandum (and the desire to change the political assurances it provided to security guarantees from NATO) and nuclear safety issues in connection with Russia's occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

Political interest/engagement

Political interest in non-proliferation and nuclear safety issues during 2024 remained at the same level as in 2023. This subject is important for Ukraine but is mostly viewed in the context of foreign security policy. The Plan for Internal Resilience of Ukraine presented by the President (19.11) has no mentions of non-proliferation or nuclear safety. In his annual Address to the Parliament (19.11), the President also did not raise issues of non-proliferation and radiation safety.

During numerous interviews and press conferences, as well as speeches on international platforms, the President and representatives of the government and Presidential Office emphasised the ineffectiveness of the Budapest Memorandum, as well as nuclear and radiation safety, which had to do with Russia's seizure of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and attacks on critical energy infrastructure that pose a real global threat. At the same time, given that nuclear safety is one of the 10 points of President V. Zelenskyy's Peace Formula, the topic of non-proliferation was constantly mentioned in connection with the promotion of this initiative.

Strategic communications

In 2024, Ukraine featured in world media in connection with the President of Ukraine's remark, "NATO or nuclear weapons for Ukraine". At a press conference following the European Council meeting (17.10), Zelenskyy recalled the Budapest Memorandum, according to which Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons in exchange for guarantees of territorial integrity and sovereignty. He emphasised that the guarantors included not only Russia but also the United Kingdom and the United States, yet now Ukraine cannot trust any agreements. Zelenskyy said that Ukraine's survival is possible only through NATO membership or the return to nuclear status. Still, he stressed that Ukraine chooses NATO, not nuclear weapons. This statement stirred the media, which began to actively analyse the prospects of Ukraine restoring its nuclear status. On the same day, during a press conference with NATO Secretary General M. Rutte, President V. Zelenskyy followed up on his remark, saying that he did not mean creating nuclear weapons. On the contrary,

he stated that Ukraine consciously chose a non-nuclear path and is focused on joining NATO as a key security guarantee.

Soon after, Zelenskyy again mentioned the Budapest Memorandum in an interview with the Ukrainian TV channel TSN (18.10), in which he clarified his previous statements during the press conference at the European Council meeting. In the interview, the President suggested that perhaps nuclear weapons should have been exchanged not for the guarantees under the memorandum but for NATO and EU membership. The President also noted that if you look at countries where there are no wars, these are predominantly NATO member states or countries that possess nuclear weapons. At the same time, he once again emphasised that Ukraine sees joining NATO as the only possible option.

Nuclear safety was one of the key topics at the Peace Summit in Switzerland (15–16.06) with the participation of 100 delegations at the level of heads of state and government. During the thematic conference “Radiation and Nuclear Safety” (17.10) as part of the Peace Formula implementation, the Head of the Presidential Office, A. Yermak, said that nuclear and radiation safety had become one of the main political priorities in connection with Russia’s militarisation of peaceful nuclear energy. Energy Minister G. Galushchenko, in turn, focused on the challenges associated with the potentially catastrophic consequences of Russian missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian nuclear power plants.

Addressing the UN GA (25.09), President Zelenskyy devoted most of his speech to the threat of a nuclear catastrophe due to Russian shelling. He noted that a potential catastrophe could cause radiation pollution that would have no borders and stressed the importance of returning the Zaporizhzhia NPP under Ukraine’s control to ensure global nuclear safety.

Activities

In 2024, Ukraine actively cooperated with the IAEA regarding the security situation at the occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP and the risks arising from its seizure by Russian troops.

Ukraine participated in the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna and was represented by G. Galushchenko. The IAEA meeting in Vienna (7.03) adopted

a resolution, “Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine”, expressing concern about the situation at the ZNPP and calling for the immediate withdrawal of the Russian military and the return of the plant under Ukraine’s control. In addition, Ukraine convened the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna (12.12), which adopted a resolution, “Implications of Unstable Energy Infrastructure Critical to Safety and Security of Nuclear Power Plants”. It condemns attacks on substations that power Ukrainian NPPs due to the direct threat to nuclear safety.

IAEA Director General R. Grossi visited Ukraine twice in 2024. During his first visit, Grossi met Energy Minister Galushchenko (06.02) in Kyiv and visited the Zaporizhzhia NPP (07.02) to assess the plant’s operation, protection measures, and staff qualification levels. During his second visit, Grossi met Zelenskyy (03.09) to discuss the security situation and expand cooperation to prevent a nuclear accident. Grossi agreed with the President regarding the need for the IAEA to provide technical support and nuclear safety consultations on Ukraine’s plans to acquire equipment for the Khmelnytskyi NPP from the suspended Bulgarian project in Belene. After this, the IAEA Director General visited the ZNPP (04.09) to assess the damage to the cooling tower, which was damaged by a fire in early August, stating that this facility can no longer be used and will likely be demolished.

During the 68th IAEA General Conference in Vienna (16.09), Energy Minister Galushchenko called on the agency’s member countries to condemn Russian attacks on energy infrastructure and the occupation of the ZNPP. Galushchenko and Grossi also discussed (18.09) the expansion of IAEA monitoring missions to all high-voltage substations that are critical to the safe operation of Ukrainian NPPs. The Energy Minister held a series of meetings with Grossi throughout 2024: during official visits to the IAEA headquarters in Vienna (04.03, 21.11), at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting (12.12), and a trilateral meeting in Paris (18.10) with Grossi and F. Mondoloni, Director General for Political and Security Affairs at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The parties discussed cooperation to guarantee nuclear safety and the resilience of Ukraine’s energy system amid Russian attacks.

Continuing the Peace Summit, five thematic conferences were held throughout 2024, one of which was dedicated to radiation and nuclear safety (17.10). The meeting was attended by 70 countries and international organisations, with Ukraine represented by Presidential Office Head Yermak (online), Energy Minister Galushchenko, and others.

Zelenskyy presented the so-called Victory Plan to Parliament (16.10), which consists of five points and three secret annexes. The third point is non-nuclear deterrence, which involves deploying a comprehensive non-nuclear strategic package in Ukraine. This point has a secret annexe, which the leaders of the US, the UK, France, Italy, and Germany have already received. However, this point has not yet received support from partners.

Results

On balance, Ukraine's performance in the two key areas of nuclear safety and non-proliferation proved moderately effective.

The Peace Summit in Switzerland resulted in the signing of a Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework, which was supported by 80 countries and four organisations, providing a basis for starting the peace process. In the document, the parties agreed on the importance of protecting Ukrainian nuclear power plants under IAEA control.

The UN General Assembly adopted resolution 12614 (11.07) demanding that the Russian Federation immediately return full control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to Ukraine.

As part of its participation in the IAEA Board of Governors, Ukraine facilitated the adoption of two resolutions: "Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine" (07.03) and "Implications of Unstable Energy Infrastructure Critical to Safety and Security of Nuclear Power Plants" (12.12). They confirm international support for Ukraine and emphasise the need to return the ZNPP under its control.

In the effort to preserve the ZNPP and its nuclear safety, Ukraine managed to consolidate the majority of the world community, which condemns Russia's occupation actions as threatening global security. The return to a safe situation is considered inseparable from the return of the ZNPP under Ukraine's control.

International Coalition for Recovery



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	5	5
ACTIVITIES	5	5	5
RESULTS	5	5	5
TOTAL SCORE	A	A	A

Building a recovery coalition remains firmly among the government’s top priorities. In the third year of the full-scale war, the government has pivoted decisively toward practical recovery initiatives within the established coalition while simultaneously expanding and strengthening it. The year 2024 was largely characterised not only by the involvement of partner country governments in Ukraine’s recovery but also by intensified efforts to attract public sector investments to support reconstruction.



Political interest/engagement

Building an international recovery coalition continues to be a topic that unites key stakeholders in Ukrainian foreign policy. The subject was regularly addressed by President V. Zelenskyy, Foreign Minister A. Sybiha (and before him, his predecessor D. Kuleba, which demonstrates policy continuity), Prime Minister D. Shmyhal, First Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Y. Svyrydenko, as well as Vice-Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration O. Stefanishyna. Significant political involvement is also evidenced by the establishment of the position of Vice-Prime Minister for Recovery, which was assumed by O. Kuleba. It is also worth noting the involvement of MPs, particularly VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk, in garnering support for Ukraine's recovery.

Furthermore, during the annual meeting of Ukrainian ambassadors and in his speech on Diplomat's Day, the President instructed the Ukrainian diplomatic corps on the importance of strengthening international support in this direction.

Importantly, the Government's Action Plan for 2024 contained numerous references to recovery, particularly regarding cooperation with international partners to conduct the third assessment of damages caused to Ukraine by Russia's war (Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment RDNA3). Among other strategic documents that mention building international support for post-war reconstruction is the action plan for the implementation of the foreign policy strategy, which mentions engaging partners in recovery as one of the priority topics.

The year saw a significantly increased emphasis on promoting the idea of using frozen Russian assets among partners and attracting foreign direct investment for recovery, which indicates the formation of a vision and transition to practical steps of interaction within the coalition-building framework, as well as the involvement of non-governmental stakeholders in forming the recovery coalition.

Strategic communications

President Zelenskyy frequently addressed the topic of building a recovery coalition in his speeches at international venues. In particular, this was discussed during his speech at the annual Recovery Conference in Berlin (11–12.06), which is one of the main tools for building international support for reconstruction, as well as at the G7 summit (13–15.06), and before the European Council (19.12).

Importantly, strategic communications emphasised the significance that recovery has for achieving a just peace and the importance of outlining a clear plan. The Foreign Ministers also regularly addressed the topic of building support for Ukraine's post-war reconstruction: for example, D. Kuleba during the annual meeting of Lithuanian diplomats in July and A. Sybiha through official social media channels when communicating his appointment to the position.

Restrictions on officials travelling abroad continue to remain in place, which complicates the work of local government representatives and MPs at the respective levels of diplomacy. At the same time, systematic communications regarding the need to attract international support for post-war recovery are carried out at both interparliamentary and local levels.

Activities

In 2024, the EUR50bn EU Ukraine Facility programme became operational, aimed at promoting the recovery and development of the Ukrainian economy. Additionally, in October, the launch of additional support from the G7 was announced under the ERA initiative, amounting to USD 50bn, of which USD 20bn will be provided through interest from frozen Russian assets. Although this support is macro-financial and, as such, is not positioned as recovery-oriented, it will nevertheless contribute to building Ukraine's resilience and providing immediate relief. In addition to these programmes, the IMF and World Bank programmes are active, providing support to Ukraine through the efforts of a wide range of donors.

The 2024 Recovery Conference was held in Berlin (11–12.06). It is worth noting that in 2024, smaller recovery conferences were less popular, which may indicate that Ukrainian diplomacy decided not to disperse efforts. Nevertheless, in November, the IV International ReBuild Ukraine Exhibition and Conference were held in Warsaw, focusing on businesses interested in participating in Ukraine's reconstruction. In February, a reconstruction conference was held in Tokyo.

The Multi-Donor Coordination Platform continued to operate.

Local officials continued to actively work with the European Alliance of Cities and Regions for the Reconstruction of Ukraine, both at the level of individual communities and through larger associations, such as the Association of Ukrainian Cities.

An important stage in building an international recovery coalition was the launch of the public investment management reform, which aims to attract foreign direct investment in Ukraine's recovery according to the priorities defined in Ukraine's Plan for the Ukraine Facility. This signals Ukraine's expanded vision of the range of participants in the potential recovery coalition.

A number of multi-trust funds aimed at recovery in various sectors continue to operate in Ukraine. They are managed by international development partners, such as the World Bank, UN, EBRD, IMF, etc. The World Bank also continues to conduct annual assessments of damages caused to Ukraine by Russian aggression and accumulate funds to support recovery.

Results

The key results of the Recovery Conference were the attraction of EUR16bn and the conclusion of 110 international agreements to support Ukraine. The launch of the ERA programme under the auspices of the G7 was important as it initiated the use of income from frozen Russian assets. A major achievement was the launch of the Ukraine Facility programme, one of the largest aid programmes for Ukraine in history.

The continued development of coordination mechanisms remains crucial, enabling more effective management of the recovery process and preventing duplication of efforts. The number of special representatives for Ukraine's recovery, which partner countries began to appoint in 2023, increased to 19 in 2024. A format for their coordination was established to avoid duplication of efforts and ensure coherent work with the participation of Ukrainian high-ranking officials. For example, the coordination meeting in November was opened by Prime Minister D. Shmyhal.

Another result of the year was the expansion of activities in building a recovery coalition to include private sector partners and focusing attention on attracting investments and public-private partnerships for Ukraine's reconstruction.

Peace Formula

A-

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	-	-	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	-	-	4
ACTIVITIES	-	-	5
RESULTS	-	-	5
TOTAL SCORE	-	-	A-

The first Peace Summit in 2024 was the result of multilevel work on the Peace Formula. The topic was consistently present in speeches by the President and Foreign Ministry representatives. By incorporating issues of food, nuclear, and energy security, freedom of navigation, justice, and humanitarian concerns, Ukraine significantly expanded the number of engaged stakeholders. However, due to the complex geopolitical situation, Ukraine was unable to hold the second summit by the end of 2024. The Peace Formula became a communication tool for conveying the truth about the war, though its opportunities for use remain somewhat limited.

Political interest/engagement

The very title “President Zelenskyy’s Peace Formula” indicates the highest level of attention to this initiative. In the Address to the Verkhovna Rada, while presenting the Resilience Plan (19.11), the President noted that “the world is seeking new interaction formats, and Ukraine has proposed its own format — the Peace Formula, which united 100 countries and international organisations”.

Given the comprehensive approach to the issues embedded in the Peace Formula, a broad team from the Presidential Office, the Cabinet of Ministers, the Verkhovna Rada, and various departments and agencies was involved in its political support. The Peace Formula is defined in political messaging as a pathway to a just war conclusion and the formation of a reliable global security architecture.

From autumn onwards, Peace Formula implementation was supplemented by the Victory Plan, a document defining preconditions for potential negotiations with Russia.

Strategic communications

Reflecting the highest priority of Peace Formula promotion, the communication strategy involved the engagement of the top state leadership and the entire government team in advancing the initiative among partners and in the Global South. President V. Zelenskyy systematically highlighted the Peace Formula during public addresses, including at the UN GA meeting (25.09) and the high-level UN SC meeting (26.09). He was personally involved in presenting and promoting the Peace Formula during the Fourth Summit of First Ladies and Gentlemen (12.09), meetings with foreign and Ukrainian ambassadors (February, April, and August), and bilateral meetings with foreign state representatives. The President’s keynote speech at the first Global Peace Summit plenary session in Switzerland (15–16.06) was particularly crucial.

The Presidential Office Head actively communicated the Peace Formula at international forums and diplomatic meetings. A notable event was the meeting of the Foreign Minister and the Presidential Office Head with heads of diplomatic missions and G20 country representatives (15.10).

However, apart from contributing to Ukraine's positive image, the first Peace Summit in Switzerland (15.06) revealed limitations in further implementing President Zelenskyy's Peace Formula. First, summit participants struggled to understand mechanisms for Russia's potential involvement in the implementation of the Peace Formula. Second, some of Ukraine's strategic partners showed limited interest in holding a second summit by the end of 2024, the idea of which was on Ukraine's agenda. Third, some international partners perceived it as Zelenskyy's personal "brand" rather than a balanced, impartial plan.

In October, V. Zelenskyy presented the Victory Plan (16.10), designed to strengthen Ukraine's negotiating position during the Peace Formula implementation.

Activities

A key work element of promoting the Peace Formula was the clear institutional approach to engaging the international community. This included working with partners at embassy-level meetings, creating 10 thematic working groups with international co-chairs, security adviser meetings, and the formation of a joint organising committee together with the Swiss government. A. Yermak, as a Peace Formula development and implementation coordinator, personally reviewed working group reports and summit agenda formation.

Two meetings of country leaders' security and foreign policy advisers were held in Davos (January) and Kyiv (March), focusing on Peace Summit preparations. Ukraine sought Swiss government assistance in organising this large-scale event to ensure maximum international attention. Until June, Ukraine's representatives primarily focused on ensuring the maximum presence of foreign states and international organisations at the event.

The first Peace Summit laid the groundwork for subsequent thematic conferences, which, combined with the summit's final communiqué, aimed to develop a core peace proposal reflecting the international community's adherence to the UN Charter and international law.

Between August and November, nine thematic conferences were organised with co-hosting states: Energy Security (22.08, online), Food Security (04.09,

online), Restoring Justice (19.09, online), Preventing War Escalation (14.10, online), Radiation and Nuclear Safety (17.10, Paris), Environmental Security (19.10, Helsinki), UN Charter Implementation (24.10, Riga), Russian Troops Withdrawal (25.10, online), and Prisoner Release (30–31.10, Montreal).

The Foreign Ministry and Ukrainian diplomatic missions played a crucial advocacy role while promoting the Peace Formula. The special focus was on parliamentary diplomacy in the Global South.

An interesting related initiative was the International Expert Group on Clause 10 of the Peace Formula, established in late 2023 at the request of the Presidential Office. In 2024, the group held several meetings under the coordination of the Clingendael Institute (Netherlands). The group comprises 18 experts from various countries, including India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Japan.

Results

The inaugural Global Peace Summit (15–16.06) in Switzerland attracted an unprecedented 101 countries and international organisations from all continents and regions. At the same time, the desire of Ukraine and its partners to ensure the maximum presence of foreign states and international organisations at the event had a negative impact on the content of the final document of the summit, which only concerned a few clauses of the Peace Formula.

A Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework was issued, relying on the vision of ways for resolving global issues, such as nuclear security, food security, and the release of prisoners and deportees, including children. Eighty participants signed the document during the summit. Notably, the communiqué remains open for signing by countries and international organisations respecting UN Charter goals and principles. As of 24.09, the number of signatories had increased to 94.

Some Peace Formula provisions were incorporated into 27 security agreements with foreign partners in 2024.

Despite extensive work on thematic conferences for Peace Formula clauses 1–9 between August and November, the potential second Peace Summit was postponed due to global political developments.

Military diplomacy



	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	5	5
ACTIVITIES	5	5	5
RESULTS	5	4	5
TOTAL SCORE	A	A-	A

Addressing urgent defence needs and establishing mechanisms for sustainable partner support were on Ukraine's agenda throughout the year. A broad bilateral security treaty framework was established, a network of capability coalitions was developed and institutionalised, new financing models for Ukrainian arms production were launched, and implementation of the European Defence Industrial Strategy began. Issues with the sustainability of partner supplies remain.

Political interest/engagement

The priorities of military diplomacy at all levels in 2024 included introducing mechanisms for long-term support for Ukraine, attracting investment in the Ukrainian defence industry, securing security guarantees, and addressing short-term security needs. Short-term priorities included strengthening air defence, securing supplies of ammunition, weapons, and equipment, purchasing Ukrainian weapons for the Ukrainian military, lifting restrictions on Western weapons use, and training and arming Ukrainian forces. All Ukrainian officials involved in foreign relations in the military-political sphere contributed to promoting Ukrainian military diplomacy goals.

When setting tasks for Ukrainian diplomats (19.08), President V. Zelenskyy emphasised the need for long-range weapons to strike Russian territory, long-term cooperation, and investment in the Ukrainian defence industry. He also stressed that “NATO will only be complete with Ukraine as a member”. An invitation to NATO was the first item in Zelenskyy’s Victory Plan (16.10). Speaking at a European Council meeting (19.12), the President thanked Ukraine’s partners for investing in the country’s defence industry and providing military support.

When introducing new Foreign Minister A. Sybiha (10.09), the President said that supporting the frontline and joint defence production should be among the constant priorities of every Ukrainian diplomat. “The number one task for Ukrainian diplomacy — from ambassador to attaché — is ensuring Ukraine’s defence capability. Weapons, weapons, weapons.” The newly appointed Foreign Minister Sybiha echoed this sentiment, emphasising that Ukraine’s NATO membership would be the best security guarantee (06.09).

Foreign Minister D. Kuleba raised the issue of arms supplies in interviews with foreign media and during meetings with foreign counterparts. In the spirit of wartime diplomacy, he stated that “Ukraine’s allies should move from expressing condolences and promises of reconstruction assistance to preventing loss of life and state destruction” (24.04). Accelerating weapons supplies was also on the agenda, including during the meeting with EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy J. Borrell (11.07).

The Foreign Policy Strategy action plan for 2023–2024 approved by the Cabinet of Ministers included attracting foreign assistance to strengthen Ukraine’s defence capabilities and security, along with various Euro-Atlantic integration tasks.

Strategic communications

President Zelenskyy addressed the issues of weapons, long-range capabilities, and permission to strike Russian territory with Western weapons on numerous occasions. These included an address to YES forum participants in Kyiv (13.09) and a speech at the DFNC2 International Defence Industries Forum (01.10), where he encouraged investment.

Ukrainian leaders regularly communicated with foreign media to convey Ukraine’s position and needs to relevant audiences. Early in the year, when the US Congress was blocking aid to Ukraine, Zelenskyy recorded an interview with Fox News during a frontline visit (23.02). He also spoke with other American, Northern European, German (29.01), and British (30.11) media outlets.

Foreign Minister Kuleba regularly engaged with foreign media (for example, CNN on 04.09), emphasising the need to increase European defence production to support Ukraine (The Guardian, 24.04).

The EU-Ukraine Defence Industries Forum was held for the first time in Brussels (06.05), representing the first concrete step in implementing the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS), which includes Ukraine.

Activities

In 2024, Ukraine continued its 2023 policy of attracting foreign investment in the Ukrainian defence industry and joint production while also initiating partner purchases of Ukrainian defence products for use in repelling Russian aggression.

During the first half of the year, the agenda focused on concluding bilateral security treaties within the G7 Declaration framework, with special attention to the US treaty. Seven meetings in the Ramstein format also took place throughout the year.

For the second time, Kyiv hosted the International Defence Industries Forum DFNC2 (01.10), organised by the Ministry of Strategic Industries, the MoD, and the MFA. The forum attracted over 750 participants from 30 countries, bringing together 168 foreign and 115 Ukrainian defence companies and associations. Approximately 120 B2B meetings took place during the event.

Early in the year, a significant delay in the US Congress vote on Ukraine aid allocation necessitated substantial diplomatic efforts to resolve the issue.

During Defence Minister R. Umerov's Copenhagen visit, a new cooperation format was launched between Ukraine and the Nordic Group, which unites 12 countries: Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom (22.11). These countries provide the largest military support to Ukraine in Europe.

Ukraine initiated NATO-Ukraine Council meetings several times throughout the year in response to Russian escalation, including on 28.03 and 28.08 following Russian air strikes, and on 26.11 after Russia launched an experimental intermediate-range ballistic missile.

Ukraine also convened an emergency UN Security Council meeting following a Russian attack (08.07) that targeted the Okhmatdyt hospital and other Kyiv medical facilities.

Results

During the year, 27 security agreements were signed in support of Ukraine pursuant to the G7 Declaration (26 with individual countries and one on mutual security commitments with the EU), plus an Agreement on Long-term Cooperation and Support with Croatia that includes security support, although Croatia did not join the G7 Declaration.

The number of countries joining the eight capability coalitions formed under the Ramstein format reached 34. Bilateral agreement signatories committed to either leading or participating in one or more coalitions. In cooperation with Ukraine, the capability coalitions agreed on support plans through 2027, which were approved in the first week of 2025.

The NATO Representation in Ukraine returned to Kyiv, with P. Turner appointed as its head in September 2024. The EU Defence Innovation Office was established in Kyiv in September to implement the EU Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS).

To prevent potential assistance interruptions resulting from possible US policy changes following the presidential election, the Alliance launched the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) at the Washington Summit. By late December, it began assuming responsibility for coordinating military equipment supply and training by Allies and partners, as well as providing logistical support to Ukraine.

As a result of the DFNC2 forum, Ukrainian companies signed numerous agreements with foreign companies to develop the production of ammunition, electronic warfare equipment, air and sea drones, and Western weapons repair capabilities. Thanks to the “Danish model” of defence industry support, the Ukrainian Armed Forces received weapons worth nearly EUR538mn in 2024.

European countries continued training Ukrainian soldiers, with the EUMAM military assistance mission extended for another two years (08.11).

As part of Operation Interstorm, UK instructors trained 200 Ukrainian aviators who received basic flight, ground, and language training before transitioning to F-16 multi-role aircraft. Ukrainian pilots began training at the European F-16 Training Centre in Romania in the autumn of 2024.

In mid-November, responding to the deployment of thousands of North Korean soldiers to Russia to support the Ukraine invasion, the Biden administration lifted restrictions on using long-range weapons against Russian territory. Subsequently, media reported US and British long-range missiles being used against targets in Russia’s Bryansk and Kursk regions. As a result of active work at all levels by Ukraine, in April, the US Congress approved funds for military assistance (for more on military assistance from individual countries, see the relevant sections).

Economic diplomacy

A-

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	4	4
ACTIVITIES	5	5	5
RESULTS	4	5	5
TOTAL SCORE	A-	A-	A-

In 2024, despite a stable political consensus, economic diplomacy was overshadowed by military diplomacy for objective reasons. Despite the overall effectiveness of strategic communications, interaction with Ukrainians abroad was weak. The authorities focused on attracting macro-financial assistance, promoting national foreign trade interests, strengthening sanctions policy, and confiscating Russian assets. Foreign trade indicators show a recovery compared to the previous year.

Political interest/engagement

In 2024, economic diplomacy was represented by a dedicated track of the Ukrainian government's international activities. For objective reasons, however, it was overshadowed by military diplomacy. The newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Sybiha set two priorities for economic diplomacy: effective attraction of macro-financial and long-term support for Ukraine and opening of new markets to ensure long-term economic growth, which were complemented by efforts to strengthen sanctions against Russia and implementation of the tasks set for Ukraine by the European integration vector of development.

Within their remits, the President of Ukraine, the VRU Speaker, the Prime Minister, the First Vice-Prime Minister — Minister of Economy, the Vice-Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration — the Minister of Justice, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs were coherent in promoting Ukraine's economic interests. The quintessence of economic diplomacy in 2024 was reflected in the statements made by the President, the Speaker, and the Prime Minister at an official event on the Day of Diplomatic Service. They talked about the need to impound Russian assets to support Ukraine, mount sanctions pressure on the aggressor, increase international assistance to rebuild destroyed housing and infrastructure and raise finance, investment, and technology for Ukraine's development.

Strategic communications

Economic diplomacy is mentioned among the priorities in all the main strategic foreign policy documents adopted before the war: The National Security Strategy of Ukraine, the Economic Security Strategy of Ukraine, the Strategy of Foreign Policy Activities of Ukraine, and the National Economic Strategy. They prioritise activities aimed at increasing exports, attracting foreign investment, lending, participation in international economic organisations, and free trade agreements. However, the mentioned documents do not reflect the challenges posed by Russia's full-scale armed aggression: macro-financial and humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, extension of sanctions, confiscation of Russian assets, etc.

The issue of economic diplomacy is constantly present in the communications of the President, the Speaker, the Prime Minister, the Vice-Prime Ministers, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The key messages of economic diplomacy are broadcast through various channels. In addition to the traditional formats (international forums, Ukraine Recovery Conference, Advantage Ukraine, United24, Nazovni, etc.), the format of direct interviews with the President was actively used in 2024 to reach various foreign audiences. The MFA continued the practice of engaging honorary ambassadors to promote national interests, with Nova Post acting as such in the field of economic diplomacy. Meetings within the framework of the international platform Nazovni, led by the MFA, remained one of the main channels of communication with Ukrainian exporters.

Information exchange with Ukrainians abroad, in particular in terms of protecting and heeding their economic interests, is still on the periphery of strategic communications, which contradicts the stated goals of encouraging the return of forced migrants to Ukraine.

Activities

As before, foreign economic tasks are coordinated and implemented by the Main Department for Foreign Policy and European Integration of the Office of the President of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation, the Department of Economic Diplomacy of the MFA, the Department of Foreign Economic Activity and Trade Protection of the Ministry of Economy, the Investment Promotion Office, the Entrepreneurship and Export Promotion Office, the Export Credit Agency, and the foreign diplomatic corps. Several of the mentioned institutions provided practical support to Ukrainian businesses in entering foreign markets, in particular through the Nazovni platform.

This year, the traditional Ukraine Recovery Conference took place in Berlin (11–12.06), covering four areas: the business dimension, the human dimension, the local and regional dimension, and European integration. The next such conference is scheduled to be held in Rome on 10–11 July 2025. In addition, the Japan-Ukraine Conference on Promoting Economic Growth and Reconstruction was held in Tokyo (19–20.02).

The EU-Ukraine Intergovernmental Conference (25.06) marked the formal start of negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU. Cooperation with partners continued in the format of regional summits. The fourth Ukraine-Northern Europe summit and the third Ukraine-South-Eastern Europe event took place. Numerous bilateral and multilateral conferences on Ukraine's economic recovery and reconstruction were held throughout the year, including the VII German-Ukrainian Business Forum (11.12, Berlin), attended by more than 500 business representatives from both countries. Embassies were also active in promoting Ukraine's economic interests and businesses, including through regional business forums, such as the Economic Forum on Ukraine's Reconstruction in Hamburg, organised by the local Consulate General of Ukraine and the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce (3.09).

The Made in Ukraine Business Forum (11.10), organised by UNDP Ukraine in partnership with the Ministry of Economy, the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Kyiv Mohyla Business School with financial support from the Government of Japan, was held in Kyiv to introduce entrepreneurs to the Made in Ukraine policy launched in February. Ukrainian companies actively participated in international economic forums and exhibitions.

Ukraine continued its "diplomatic offensive" on the African continent by increasing its presence to 20 embassies. A course was taken to strengthen and develop relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, with the aim of expanding economic cooperation. The international working group on Russian sanctions was active.

The Ministry of National Unity was established to help forced migrants return to Ukraine, and the Create Ukraine pilot project was launched.

Results

The EU-Ukraine partnership received an unprecedented boost, with the start of negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU marking another historic milestone on this path.

In 2024, Ukraine received the largest financial support from the EU in the amount of EUR16.2bn (out of a total of USD 41.7bn), while EUR 30.6bn of budget support is also envisaged in 2025. The EU remains Ukraine's main foreign trade partner, accounting for 60% of exports and 50% of imports. The main consumers of Ukrainian products are Poland (USD 4.7bn), Spain (USD 2.9bn), and Germany (USD 2.8bn). The main importers are China (USD 14.4bn), Poland (USD 7bn), and Germany (USD 5.4bn).

In terms of foreign trade, the updated Free Trade Agreement between Canada and Ukraine (CUFTA) came into force on 1 July. The VRU ratified the Political, Free Trade and Strategic Partnership Agreement between Ukraine and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (22.08). Negotiations on the modernisation of the Free Trade Agreement with the EFTA states were completed (2.12). In addition, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the draft law on ratification of the Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine and Türkiye (7.05).

According to the State Customs Service, Ukraine's total trade in 2024 reached almost USD112.3bn. This is 13% more than in the previous year. Exports of goods are gaining momentum, reaching USD 41.6bn. Imports totalled USD 70.7bn. Three commodity groups account for 78% of Ukraine's exports, namely agricultural products and food (USD 24.6bn), metallurgical products (USD 4.4bn), and machinery, equipment, and vehicles (USD 3.5bn). In 2024, the MFA and the State Service of Ukraine for Food Safety and Consumer Protection opened 16 new foreign markets for Ukrainian exports.

In 2024, the State Register of Sanctions was launched, with more than 30,000 sanction actions taken by the end of the year, targeting 10,504 individuals and 7,411 legal entities. International partners continued to expand sanctions against Russia, with the EU adopting the 13th, 14th and 15th sanctions packages. The G7 decided to issue a USD50bn loan out of frozen Russian assets. Ukraine received the first tranche of USD 1bn out of the planned USD 20bn that the US is prepared to allocate by using frozen Russian assets.

Energy diplomacy

B+

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	4	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	4	5
ACTIVITIES	4	4	4
RESULTS	4	4	4
TOTAL SCORE	B+	B	B+

In 2024, Ukraine received unprecedented assistance from its partners in the field of energy security, a result of previous years' efforts and the glaring reality of genocidal Russian attacks. However, certain destructive internal processes, combined with the exhaustion of external support, are intensifying challenges for energy diplomacy in the coming year, particularly in the context of sanctions policy and securing financial and technical assistance for developing new distributed generation.

Political interest/engagement

The destruction of approximately 9 GW of generating capacity due to massive Russian attacks against Ukraine's energy sector in the spring of 2024 compelled all Ukrainian political figures to work on obtaining technical and financial assistance, as well as additional air and missile defence systems to protect critical energy infrastructure.

The President of Ukraine consistently raised issues of assistance in protecting and restoring the energy sector during bilateral contacts with partner state leaders. This included advocating for additional sanctions against Russian hydrocarbon exports and the nuclear industry and asserting Ukraine's right to halt Russian gas transit. The Prime Minister, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Energy, and Verkhovna Rada members reinforced these advocacy efforts for assistance and additional sanctions through their respective diplomatic channels.

Strategic communications

In 2024, strategic communications in energy security primarily focused on protecting Ukraine's critical infrastructure from Russian attacks, a shift from previous years' emphasis on energy supply diversification, reforms, and green energy. During numerous visits to EU and North American partner states, the President drew attention to Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure, calling for assistance in defending against drones and missiles with modern air and missile defence systems.

Destroyed energy infrastructure facilities became standard agenda items during US and European officials' visits to Ukraine and were prominently displayed at several significant international events to attract global attention.

Systematic communications were also conducted by the Vice-Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, particularly during EU accession negotiation meetings in Brussels and Kyiv.

Activities

The year 2024 was a period of strategic document coordination with partners in the energy sector. Extensive work was conducted with the European Commission on several key strategies, including the Energy Strategy of Ukraine until 2050, the Low Carbon Development Strategy until 2050, the Energy and Climate Action Plan until 2030, the Distributed Generation Development Strategy until 2035, and the National Renewable Energy Action Plan until 2030.

The Ukrainian government actively collaborated with partner countries to develop assistance mechanisms for domestic energy sector restoration and development. The international Ukraine Recovery Conference in June established sector support goals and tools. Key financial commitments were secured, including EUR50bn in financial assistance through the EU's Ukraine Facility, including loans and grants for energy development, and USD 50n in loans from the G7.

The Ministry of Energy systematically collaborated with the Energy Security Project and Energy Community to secure the supply of equipment to damaged energy facilities, utilising funding from the Ukraine Energy Support Fund and USAID.

Results

Ukraine received unprecedented partner assistance to arrange the most extensive repair campaign in its energy sector in its independent history. Provided equipment and air defence systems minimised damage from Russian attacks on energy infrastructure in the latter half of 2024, enabling winter heating season

preparation and energy generation decentralisation. Nearly all funds provided by partner states under the Ukraine Energy Support Fund (approximately EUR1bn) were utilised, along with dismantled equipment from European power plants and contributions from the US and other G7 countries.

Strategic document development laid the groundwork for Ukraine Facility funding, which will be a crucial support instrument for the energy sector in 2025.

Ukraine demonstrated resilience in politically challenging Russian gas transit, strengthening international sanctions' impact on the Russian energy sector, and more effective oil refinery targeting.

However, several scandals around interference in the corporate governance of state-owned energy companies, refusal from gradual energy market liberalisation, and reduced transparency create negative preconditions for future progress. Ukraine's continued Russian oil transit provides arguments for Russia sympathisers in the West to resist further energy sector sanctions (against LNG supplies, the nuclear industry).

Public diplomacy

A-

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	5	5
ACTIVITIES	5	5	5
RESULTS	4	4	4
TOTAL SCORE	A-	A-	A-

2024 was marked by intense political interest in public diplomacy and strengthened strategic communication. The Ukrainian Institute continues building up its work, expanding the network of partnerships and entering new regions. Important steps were made to develop Ukrainian studies. The shortage of funding remains the greatest domestic barrier in this field.

Political interest/engagement

Political interest in public diplomacy remained high in 2024.

President Zelenskyy focused proactively on public diplomacy. In his Annual Address to the VRU (19.11), he spoke about the recognition and attractiveness of Ukraine in the world, the need for information consolidation and events in all regions of the world to consistently support Ukrainian content and cultural products. President Zelenskyy highlighted the role of cultural diplomacy in actively promoting Ukrainian narratives abroad, including through building long-term partnerships. He spoke about supporting translations of Ukrainian authors and the development of Ukrainian studies. Therefore, cultural diplomacy has made it one of the points on Ukraine's Internal Resilience Plan. In his address on the Day of Diplomats (22.12), President Zelenskyy referred to soft power as 'heart-to-heart diplomacy'.

Foreign Minister A. Sybiha had been actively interested in public diplomacy even before his appointment, so his focus on it has only increased ever since taking up his current post. He emphasised (22.12) the importance of keeping Ukraine present 'not only in the decisions of politicians but also in the hearts of millions of people', stressing the important contribution of public diplomats to this effort. In addition, Minister A. Sybiha highlighted the need to proactively engage the think tank community and businesses in designing foreign policy, building a 'global Ukrainian space' and strengthening Ukraine's communication capabilities abroad (6.09).

Even when they did not refer to public diplomacy specifically, Ukraine's top officials often mentioned the foreign policy tasks that are accomplished using public diplomacy tools, among other things. For example, on the Day of Diplomats

(22.12), VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk spoke about further expanding the network of friends and partners of Ukraine in the world, and Prime Minister D. Shmyhal spoke about strengthening Ukraine's stance in the world.

The Government's Action Plan for 2024 mentioned the image of Ukraine and efforts to improve it.

First Lady O. Zelenska proactively works in public diplomacy, too.

Strategic communications

The President of Ukraine and other top officials gave numerous interviews and delivered speeches to foreign audiences (see the respective country sections) to convey messages that are important to Ukraine and to spread Ukrainian narratives.

Ukraine presented its first Ukraine-Latin America and the Caribbean Communication Strategy (28.05) to expand Ukraine's geographical presence, strengthen cultural exchange, strengthen, and promote Ukraine's image in the region, and improve the perception of Ukraine. Ukraine's embassies in Sub-Saharan Africa had a strategic session to discuss cultural, humanitarian and communication projects in the region. Foreign Minister A. Sybiha focused on strengthening the MFA's communication team.

Ukrainian experts, academics, and cultural figures comment for media, disseminate Ukrainian narratives through social media posts, podcasts, expert blogs, speeches at conferences, roundtables, festivals, etc.

Public diplomacy is featured in a number of agreements on security cooperation and long-term support, for example, with Germany (16.02), the Czech Republic (18.07), and Slovenia (18.07). Among other things, the agreements focus on countering Russian disinformation and developing joint educational and training programmes for strategic communications and public diplomacy professionals.

On the Day of Diplomats (22.12), Honorary Ambassadors of Ukraine were awarded in the key areas of public diplomacy.

Activities

First Lady O. Zelenska continues her work on the Ukrainian Bookshelf, Ukrainian-Language Audio Guides, the Global Coalition of Ukrainian Studies, and the Summit of First Ladies and Gentlemen (12.09). Representatives of the Spouses of Ukrainian Diplomats Association are engaged in public diplomacy, too.

Throughout 2024, the MFA team and its partners implemented hundreds of public diplomacy projects and over twenty digital partnerships and held ten global and regional communication campaigns to promote the Peace Formula, advocate for support for Ukraine in the world, spread knowledge about Ukraine and strengthen positive perception of Ukraine. The audiences for these campaigns included Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Caribbean, among others.

The key state institution in charge of cultural diplomacy, the Ukrainian Institute, continues to work proactively despite wartime difficulties. In 2024, the Ukrainian Institute team implemented more than 180 cultural diplomacy projects — 50% up from 2023 — in 61 countries, including countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The Ukraine: History of Civil Society course was launched on Coursera, and a series of video lectures called Kaleidoscope of (Hi)stories — Art from Ukraine was launched on YouTube. The fourth Ukrainian Cultural Diplomacy Month was held. The Fifth International Forum on Cultural Diplomacy took place in Kyiv (8.10).

Jointly with its partners — including the Foundation of the President of Ukraine for Support of Education, Science and Sports, the National Office of the Crimean Platform, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine — the Ukrainian Institute worked actively to launch the Global Coalition of Ukrainian Studies. The Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytskyi Ukrainian Studies Support Programme for research, educational, cultural institutions, and think tanks abroad continues to operate. At the fourth summit of the international Crimean Platform, a cultural programme was presented to demonstrate the consequences of Russian aggression. The Ukrainian Institute team continued conducting empirical research. Its results are used to plan and implement the Ukrainian Institute's activities internationally.

Ukrainian cultural products were presented at book, film, and music festivals. The voices of Ukrainian scholars are increasingly heard at major international conferences, and new courses with a focus on Ukraine are introduced at universities abroad. Public diplomacy is increasingly a topic of discussion at expert and academic events in Ukraine (e.g., the Ukrainian Diplomatic Triangle: Bridging Official, Parliamentary and Public Diplomacy roundtable (29.11), a workshop on teaching cultural diplomacy at the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine (28.11), the international conference Ukraine-Latin America: Public Diplomacy on the Road to Mutual Understanding (13–14.12)). The MFA held the Voice of Ukraine. Strategic Communications and Soft Power end-of-year event (13.12).

Ukrainian diplomatic institutions abroad, representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora and Ukrainians living abroad temporarily; artists, experts and academics worked proactively in public diplomacy. Ukrainian narratives are being delivered to foreign audiences at organised events to spread knowledge about Ukraine, improve the perception of Ukraine, and convey the scale of Russian crimes. The practice of advocacy tours of Ukrainian top officials and experts continued and the regions covered by these tours expanded. Press tours where international journalists — from Africa and Latin America, among other regions — continued, too.

Results

In 2024, the total reach of the MFA's communication campaigns grew to over one billion, and the MFA's team received 46 international creative awards.

The Ukrainian Institute expanded its presence abroad, increasing the number of projects in the countries where it had already been present and entering new countries, such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa. In addition, the Ukrainian Institute joined On the Move, a platform that provides information on international cultural mobility, with 78 organisations and institutions from 29 European countries. The Ukrainian Institute's participation in On the Move expands the possibilities of cultural exchange between Ukrainian artists and foreign partners. During the Month of Cultural Diplomacy of Ukraine, 425 articles

on Ukraine were updated on Wikipedia, and 1260 new articles were created in 66 language sections covering 50 countries.

The shortage of funding remains the key problem for public diplomacy. In the mid- to long-term prospects, this could affect the consistency and efficiency of this segment. Expanding international institutional presence with sustainable financial support from the state remains an open question. While the interest in Ukrainian studies is high and growing, and there is demand for Ukrainian expertise, Ukrainian voices at international platforms often come from representatives of foreign rather than Ukrainian institutions. This is primarily due to the fact that most Ukrainian universities are unable to send their representatives abroad using state funding. The ban on travelling abroad for men remains a problem. This tends to prevent them from attending specialised events, academic mobility programmes and more. As a result of security challenges, some universities set up restrictions for Western academics to enter Ukraine and participate in professional activities.

In 2024, Ukraine ranked 46th in the Global Soft Power Index of 193 countries, down from 44 in 2023. It slid down in the reputation ranking the most while improving its ranking in education and science.

Sanctions policy

A

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	5	5	5
ACTIVITIES	5	5	5
RESULTS	5	4	4
TOTAL SCORE	A	A-	A-

Ukraine and its partners were proactively engaged in sustaining the international momentum while keeping up the pressure of sanctions on Russia. 2024 has been a year of closing Russian schemes to bypass international sanctions. 2024 has proven to be a year of shaping actions that will increase the strategic price that Russia will pay for its war of aggression against Ukraine in 2025. Yet, political shifting in Europe and the US will present a formidable challenge in terms of preserving the achievement of 2023–2024. On the downside, there is still very little demonstrable progress achieved on the sanctions with the countries of the Global South.

Political interest/engagement

Consolidating the framework of the existing sanctions and amplifying it to increase the economic price that Russia pays for its war of aggression remained a lasting priority of Ukraine's foreign policy in 2024.

Head of the Office of the President, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, as well as other agencies, including the National Corruption Prevention Agency, security agencies, etc., continued active engagement with their respective counterparts in line with this priority outlined by the President.

In his address to VRU (16.10), President Zelenskyy presented the Victory Plan, point 4, whereof refers to strategic economic potential and specifically talks about sanctions and a holistic approach towards ramping up economic pressure on Russia. Ukraine has proven to successfully convey to its partners the need to dramatically increase and broaden the sanctions against Russia in light of its continuing hostility.

This strategic signalling was effectively translated into practical decisions of a ground-breaking nature. It has to be admitted that Ukraine has shown higher levels of inter-governmental engagement and institutional resilience when it comes to coordinating state policies on sanctions. The Cabinet of Ministers Plan for 2024 encompasses a chapter specifically dedicated to the issues of sanctions policy.

Strategic communications

Ukraine's leadership, including the President, Head of the OPU, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and other high-ranking officials, actively advocated for stronger sanctions against Russia through targeted diplomacy and strategic public communication. Their speeches, statements, and diplomatic engagements emphasised sanctions as a crucial tool for pressuring Russia to end the war and establish a just and lasting peace. High-level efforts prioritised strengthening the sanctions regime, closing loopholes, and imposing secondary sanctions on enablers. Notably, President Zelenskyy underscored these priorities in key

addresses at the Munich Security Conference (February), UN Security Council (September), European Political Community Summit (November), European Parliament (November), and European Council (December), among others.

Sanctions-related narratives also featured prominently in joint statements and communiqués following bilateral visits of Ukrainian officials, reinforcing the consistent push for stricter measures.

The Yermak-McFaul International Working Group continued its work to step up pressure on Russia’s military and political leadership, as well as other countries that support aggression against Ukraine. In May, the Group presented a new action plan on further strengthening sanctions pressure on Russia — Action Plan 3.0. The document contained specific steps aimed at significantly undermining Russia’s economic and military potential to stop its aggression in Ukraine sooner. Specifically, the Group proposed finalisation of the procedures for the confiscation of the frozen assets of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, enforcement of the current oil price cap and the suppression of the shadow fleet of tankers.

Regular meetings by the President’s Head of the Office with the leaders of diplomatic institutions of EU member-states and the Sanctions Coalition continued to be an instrument of international communication.

Activities

Kyiv has demonstrated a consistent and creative multi-track approach to preserve a strategic focus of the partner states on inflicting greater economic damage to Russia and further curbing its ability to wage a war of aggression against Ukraine.

In 2024, Ukraine intensified its efforts to implement stricter and more consistent sanctions against Russia by formalising these measures through bilateral and multilateral agreements during high-level meetings and summits. The Ukrainian government prioritised aligning sanctions with international partners to maximise their effectiveness against the aggressor state. This strategy included coordinating enforcement efforts, particularly in critical economic

sectors, as a key aspect of developing and executing the national sanctions policy. During the NATO Summit in Washington D. C. (11.11), Ukraine, along with 25 countries, signed the Ukraine Compact, which inter alia refers to the importance of imposing economic and other costs on Russia.

Ukraine has held a proven track record of effective national actions implemented in 2024 to lead the partners in taking the sanctions framework to higher levels. According to the State Register of Sanctions, more than 17 thousand entities are currently sanctioned, of which more than 13 thousand are from the Russian Federation. In 2024, 18 presidential decrees were issued, sanctioning legal entities and individuals implicated in enabling Russian aggression. The biggest list was adopted by a decree in June and included 779 legal entities and individuals.

Ukraine's MFA work had been deliberately geared towards maintaining the cohesion of the sanctions coalition and building momentum for further expansion of the sanctions' framework. This was the uncontested priority of all major external communication done by the MFA and the Ministers.

There was a stronger degree of coordination and synchronisation in the adoption of new sanctions between the US, EU, and G7 countries. Ukraine managed to effectively prop up the sanction's issues to the top of the agenda during Italian chairmanship in the G7. The G7 summit in Italy (June) was crucial to mobilise the key partners to ramp up the sanctions and avoid giving Russia and its war machine a breathing space.

Yermak-McFaul Group was spearheading the effort to craft timely concept papers with specific proposals on how to strengthen sanctions against Russia. The leadership of the President's Office was instrumental in motivating the Sanctions Coalition to finalise the decision on the use of finances generated from immobilised Russian assets to support Ukraine's struggle against Russia.

President Zelenskyy carefully calibrated messages critical of partners' passiveness in adopting more stringent measures to restrict the export of sensitive dual-use technologies and equipment that Russia later used in missile and drone production. Specifically, the President underscored this in his address after the most brutal attacks against Ukraine in November. Zelenskyy further stressed the urgent need for enhanced export controls to prevent sanctions evasion and said

that Russia's supply chain relies on over 170,000 individual components from firms in China, Europe, and the United States.

Ukraine tried to address the imbalances in the Sanctions coalition and the apparent lack of political will among countries of the Global South to join the restrictive measures against Russia. The need to introduce additional sanctions against Russia was part of the agenda at the Davos meeting (January) within the Peace Formula framework on the level of national security advisors.

The First Global Peace Summit in Switzerland (15.06) was also instrumentalised as an effective platform to build momentum to sustain and enhance the sanctions pressure.

Results

In 2024, the international sanctions coalition continued its consistent steps to build up pressure on Russia and increase the strategic price of a continued war of aggression against Ukraine. The EU, jointly with G7 and members of the sanctions coalition, put in place comprehensive measures focusing on companies and individuals from the Russian military-industrial complex, which, among others, manufacture missiles, drones, anti-aircraft missile systems, military vehicles, high-tech components for weapons, and other military equipment; companies and individuals involved in the shipping of DPRK and Islamic Republic of Iran's armaments to Russia; new vessels from Russia's shadow fleet engaged in high-risk shipping practices when transporting Russian oil or petroleum products, in arms deliveries, grain theft, or supporting the Russian energy sector.

The State Sanctions Registry created by the Decree of President Zelenskyy (29.01) was an important development that promised to have a lasting impact to further influence foreign companies that stayed in the Russian market. The registry provides public access to updated verified information about entities and individuals subjected to sanctions.

Ukraine has proven to effectively use its diplomatic toolkit to create momentum and initiate practical deliverables from the G7 summits in 2024.

Particularly impactful was the G7 meeting in September that paved the way for the first-ever joint guidance for industry on preventing evasion of export control and sanctions imposed on Russia (“Joint Guidance”) adopted by the G7 Sub-Working Group on Export Control Enforcement. The stated goal of the Joint Guidance is to assist the industry in identifying Russia’s evolving evasion tactics and in complying with multilateral export controls and sanctions.

There was a notable push forward in terms of introducing more stringent measures to punish third-country companies and the countries that help Russia bypass sanctions. For the first time, the new sanctions listings included Chinese persons and entities facilitating the circumvention of Russia-related sanctions and enabling the supply of sensitive drone components and microelectronic components to the Russian military industry. Yet, the impact of those measures remained limited as the key national agencies remained reluctant to enforce the full spectrum of sanctions, which was visible both in the EU and beyond, specifically in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

Concerted work of the OPU, MFA and other relevant agencies gathered the momentum that ultimately pushed the partners beyond their comfort zone and enabled the EU to adopt the 13th (February), 14th (June) and 15th (December) packages. However, some EU member-states have reached a self-imposed ceiling in terms of new sanctions introduction and their impact on their respective national economies.

Ukraine has effectively integrated the sanctions provisions in all of the 27 intergovernmental agreements with the partners on security cooperation and security guarantees, which forms a robust infrastructure to prove against any political contingencies at later stages that might include pushes for unjustified and premature sanctions relief to Russia.

The Council of EU extended its restrictive measures against Belarus (June, December) due to its continuous involvement in Russia’s continued aggression against Ukraine. Restrictive measures were imposed on various members of the judiciary, the heads and deputy heads of various correctional institutions, and business owners and entities such as Vlate Logistik LLC and Ruzekspeditsiya LLC that benefitted from the Lukashenko regime.

Ukrainians abroad

B+

	2022	2023	2024
POLITICAL INTEREST	5	5	5
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS	4	4	4
ACTIVITIES	4	5	5
RESULTS	4	4	4
TOTAL SCORE	B+	B+	B+

Ukraine declared the Ukrainian diaspora as one of the important foreign policy focuses in 2024. The government put an accent on the need to institutionalise cooperation with the diaspora. This was manifested in the plans to establish the Ministry of National Unity and in the work towards establishing the institution of multiple citizenship, engaging the diaspora in garnering international support for Ukraine. Challenges remain in implementing the new mechanisms of interaction. Among other things, these include the implementation of digital services for Ukrainians abroad and ensuring efficient coordination between government bodies and Ukrainian citizens abroad.

Political interest/engagement

2024 was marked by an increase in political interest in the topic of Ukrainians abroad, aimed at strengthening Ukraine's international position, advocating its interests, and countering Russian influence. This was in line with the strategic objective of maintaining ties with the Ukrainian diaspora and refugees in the context of war and geopolitical challenges. Throughout 2024, Ukraine's leadership emphasised the importance of the Ukrainian diaspora as part of the global Ukrainian space, highlighting the need for an institutional approach to interaction with them. The key priorities included maintaining close ties with Ukraine, expanding diplomatic and consular presence in European countries with major Ukrainian communities, and digital transformation of consular services.

In his speech at the meeting with Ukrainian diplomats titled *Wartime Diplomacy: Resilience, Weapons, Victory* (19.08), President Zelenskyy highlighted the need to create a dedicated public institution to support the global Ukrainian community and protect its rights. In his annual address to the VRU (19.11), President Zelenskyy presented Ukraine's Internal Resilience Plan where integration of Ukrainians abroad into the national development, including through multiple citizenship, is an important component.

Foreign Minister A. Sybiha reiterated the importance of consistent integration of the Ukrainian diaspora into Ukraine's political, economic, and information space. The Government's Action Plan for 2024 stated that new diplomatic missions and consulates would be established to protect the rights and interests of Ukrainian citizens abroad.

Strategic communications

The key communication activities with Ukrainians abroad in 2024 included meetings of Ukraine's top officials with the diaspora during official visits, interaction with diaspora media, and communication via social media of diplomatic missions.

During his visits to Portugal (28.05), Poland (08.07), the USA (24.09), and Hungary (07.11), President Zelenskyy met with Ukrainian communities and expressed gratitude for their active support. VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk thanked Ukrainians in Canada for their contribution to supporting Ukraine and called for the unification of the global Ukrainian community (24.11). In October, Foreign Minister Sybiha met in Ankara with the Crimean Tatar community in Türkiye and thanked them for their support of Ukraine's sovereignty.

Cooperation with the Ukrainian World Congress, the key coordinating organisation for Ukrainian communities, remains the main channel of communication with the diaspora. Foreign Minister Sybiha met with a UWC delegation (13.09). He highlighted the strategic nature of the partnership between the state and the diaspora. The meeting focused especially on the establishment of Ukrainian schools abroad and support of Ukrainian identity among refugee children. O. Chernyshov, Minister of National Unity of Ukraine, discussed cooperation and building efficient communication with the Ukrainian diaspora with A. Shevchenko, Head of the UWC Mission to Ukraine (26.12).

At the same time, the April 2024 decision to restrict consular services for Ukrainian men who have not updated their military documents caused a strong public outcry due to the lack of proper communication with citizens. This created a challenge for strategic communications with Ukrainians abroad and confirmed that the government needs to be more open in its interaction with citizens abroad.

The debate around the draft law on multiple citizenship was a standalone area of communication. While the diaspora supported it, it also triggered concern over insufficient mechanisms for enforcement, national security, and the need to design it in a way that helps maintain connections with millions of Ukrainians across the world.

Therefore, strategic communication focused on deepening cooperation with the diaspora, engaging it in lobbying for Ukraine's interests, and involving it in building a global Ukrainian space.

Activities

In 2024, Ukraine continued to actively cooperate with Ukrainians abroad for international advocacy and preservation of their national identity. The main partners remained the Ukrainian World Congress, its regional chapters and Ukraine's diplomatic missions, which jointly organised cultural events and actions to support Ukraine in countering Russian aggression. Meetings of UWC representatives (including UWC President P. Grod) with the leadership of the MFA and President V. Zelenskyy confirmed the importance of engaging the diaspora in promoting the Peace Formula and Ukraine's integration into NATO and the EU, and other international initiatives of Ukraine.

A series of events aimed at strengthening public diplomacy took place. These included the International Cultural Diplomacy Forum (08.10), where Foreign Minister Sybiha announced a shift in the Ukrainian Institute's priorities towards supporting the unity of Ukrainians abroad. In an effort to implement this objective, representatives of the Ukrainian Institute visited the Prosvita Ukrainian Cultural Society in Buenos Aires in late October.

As instructed by President Zelenskyy, Ukraine's MFA, along with other entities, is finalising the strategy of creating a global Ukrainian space to facilitate cooperation between the Ukrainian authorities and the Ukrainian community globally.

The 58th meeting of the National Commission on Ukrainians Abroad, led by Deputy Foreign Minister M. Betsa, served as another impetus to institutional cooperation with the Ukrainian diaspora.

The Diaspora and the Global Ukrainian Communities: Strong Partners in the Recovery of Ukraine, a conference hosted in Berlin (19–20.04), was a landmark event that integrated the Ukrainian diaspora into the process of Ukraine's post-war reconstruction. The Alliance of Ukrainian Organisations, Open Platform e.V., CRISP e.V. and other organisations held the conference with the support of Ukrainian ministries. An important accomplishment was to engage 120 organisations and government representatives that included the preparation of analytical material for the Ukraine Recovery Conference, formalising cooperation between the government and diaspora in this area.

In an important step towards digitising services for Ukrainians abroad, the government passed a resolution to launch the e-Consul system to streamline access to consular services. However, it is expected to be fully operational in 2025.

Overall, 2024 saw Ukraine's proactive interaction with Ukrainians abroad, the strengthening of cultural and education initiatives, and important legislative changes that will define Ukraine's long-term policy towards the Ukrainian diaspora.

Results

Consolidating the Ukrainian community worldwide amidst Russia's aggression became a priority of Ukraine's foreign policy. The expansion of formats of cooperation with diaspora organisations reflected this.

Ukrainians abroad proved capable of influencing decision-making in their countries of residence — by mobilising efforts to support the Global Peace Summit, among other things. Proactive engagement of the diaspora in diplomatic initiatives, such as the call to state leaders to join the summit — for example, the call to Argentina President Javier Milei — illustrated its significant role in building the international coalition in support of Ukraine.

In October, the Main Intelligence Directorate of MoD and the Ukrainian World Congress signed a Memorandum of Cooperation to support Ukrainian war prisoners, their families, and other victims of Russian aggression. This initiative is another example of how diaspora organisations are engaged in practical help to Ukraine. This expands the range of their engagement in humanitarian support and protection of the rights of Ukrainians across the world.

Following the reorganisation of the Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory, the Ministry of National Unity was established (December). It was expected to have a role in coordinating work with Ukrainians abroad and to work on preserving the national and cultural identity of Ukrainians abroad and building the preconditions for encouraging Ukrainians to return to Ukraine. However, the provision on the Ministry was not approved by the end of 2024, which left its scope of functions and future role in Ukraine's policy on Ukrainians abroad undefined.

Sponsored by President Zelenskyy, the draft law on multiple citizenship passed the first reading in the VRU (December). It had a serious influence on the diaspora. It allows Ukrainians to have citizenship of other countries, which is an important move in the context of the legal status of Ukrainians abroad and preserving their ties to their country of origin.

In language policy, Ukraine set a new A1-C2 state language standard for the Ukrainian Language as a foreign language. This was a key accomplishment that set up the foundation for spreading the Ukrainian language to foreign communities. The implementation of the First Lady's Ukrainian-language audio guide initiative for museums, including museums in Mexico and Argentina, was another important accomplishment. Among other things, it meets the needs of Ukrainian communities in these countries.

Despite this progress, however, challenges remain in place over the implementation of the new decisions and ensuring efficient coordination between government entities and Ukrainian communities abroad.

Table of the 2024 Scores for the Foreign Policy of Ukraine

№	Foreign Policy Directions	2002	2023	2024	Political interest/ involvement	Strategic c ommunications	Activities	Results	Score
G7 COUNTRIES									
1	United Kingdom	A	A	A	5	5	5	5	5.0
2	Italy	B+	A	A-	5	5	5	4	4.8
3	Canada	A	A	B+	4	4	5	5	4.5
4	Germany	A	A-	A-	5	5	5	4	4.8
5	USA	A	A-	B+	5	4	5	4	4.5
6	France	A-	A	A-	5	5	5	4	4.8
7	Japan	A-	A	A	5	5	5	5	5.0
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION									
8	European Integration	A	A	A	5	5	5	5	5.0
9	European Union	A	A	A	5	5	5	5	5.0
10	Euro-Atlantic Integration	B+	B+	A-	5	5	5	4	4.8
BILATERAL RELATIONS									
11	Australia	A	B+	B-	4	3	4	4	3.8
12	Azerbaijan	C-	C-	C+	4	3	3	3	3.3
13	Brazil	-	B	C+	4	3	4	3	3.5
14	Georgia	C	D+	D	2	2	2	2	2.0
15	Israel	C-	C	D+	2	2	3	2	2.3
16	India	C-	C	A-	5	5	5	4	4.8
17	China	D+	D+	C	3	3	3	3	3.0
18	Mexico	-	-	C-	3	2	3	3	2.8
19	Moldova	B-	B+	B+	5	5	4	4	4.5
20	Poland	A	B+	A-	5	4	5	5	4.8
21	Romania	A	A-	B+	5	4	4	5	4.5
22	Slovakia	A	A	B+	5	5	4	4	4.5
23	Türkiye	B	B-	B	4	3	5	4	4.0
24	Hungary	D+	D+	B	4	4	4	4	4.0
25	Czech Republic	A-	A	A-	5	4	5	5	4.8

No	Foreign Policy Directions	2002	2023	2024	Political interest/ involvement	Strategic c ommunicatons	Activities	Results	Score
BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES									
26	Belarus	n/d	n/d	n/d					n/d
27	Russia	n/d	n/d	n/d					n/d
REGIONAL COOPERATION									
28	Middle East	C+	B-	C+	4	3	4	3	3.5
29	Baltic States	-	-	A	5	5	5	5	5.0
30	Western Balkans	C+	C	B	4	3	4	5	4.0
31	Indo-Pacific Region	B+	C+	B-	3	4	4	4	3.8
32	Latin America and the Caribbean	C+	B+	B+	5	5	4	3	4.3
33	Northern Europe	B+	A	A	5	5	5	5	5.0
34	Sub-Saharan Africa	B+	B+	B	5	4	4	3	4.0
35	Central Asia	E+	C-	C	3	3	3	3	3.0
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS									
36	OSCE	C+	C+	C+	3	3	4	3	3.3
37	United Nations	A	A	A	5	5	5	5	5.0
38	Council of Europe	B+	B-	B	4	4	4	4	4.0
39	Building an International Coalition for the Recovery of Ukraine	A	A	A	5	5	5	5	5.0
40	Peace Formula	-	-	A-	5	4	5	5	4.8
41	Sanctionas Policy	A	A-	A-	5	5	5	4	4.8
42	Military Diplomacy	A	A-	A	5	5	5	5	5.0
43	Economic Diplomacy	A-	A-	A-	5	4	5	5	4.8
44	Energy Diplomacy	B+	B	B+	5	5	4	4	4.0
45	Public Diplomacy	A-	A-	A-	5	5	5	4	4.8
46	Nuclear Non-proliferation	B-	B-	C+	3	4	4	3	3.5
47	Ukrainians Abroad	B+	B+	B+	5	4	5	4	4.5
	TOTAL	B+	B+	B+	4.33	4.11	4.38	4.04	4.23

AFU	Armed Forces of Ukraine
ANP	Annual National Program
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CELAC	The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CMU	Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
CoE	Council of Europe
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU	European Union
ECFR	European Council on Foreign Relations
G7	Group of Seven
GUAM	Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development “Georgia — Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova”
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JATEC	NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICJ	International Court of Justice
LACB	Latin America and the Caribbean
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs

List of Abbreviations

MoD	Ministry of Defence
MPs	Members of Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NATO PA	NATO Parliamentary Assembly
n/d	not defined
NPP	Nuclear Power Plant
NSDC	National Security and Defence Council
OPU	Office of the President of Ukraine
OSCE PA	Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PACE	Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
PM	Prime Minister
RD4U	Register of Damage for Ukraine
UN GA	United Nations General Assembly
UN SC	United Nations Security Council
VRU	Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
UWC	Ukrainian World Congress
ZNPP	Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

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Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”



The Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” is a network-based nongovernmental analytical centre, the goal of which is to participate in providing democratic ground for the developing and implementation of foreign and security policies by government authorities of Ukraine, implementation of international and nationwide projects and programs, directed at improvement of foreign policy analysis and expertise, enhancement of expert community participation in a decision-making process in the spheres of foreign policy, international relations, public diplomacy.

The activities of the “Ukrainian Prism” are:

- provision of sustainable collaboration between the expert community and the bodies of the executive and legislative power of Ukraine, which are involved in the development and implementation of the foreign policy of Ukraine;
- research on foreign policy, diplomatic service, international relations and security, development and publication of respective recommendations;
- assistance to the state authorities of Ukraine in spreading reliable information about Ukraine abroad and creation of public diplomacy channels.
- facilitating improvement of legislation, which regulates foreign and security policy of Ukraine, the basics of diplomatic service and public diplomacy.
- informational, organisational and consulting support of public authorities, civil society organisations, educational establishments and other subjects of foreign policy and security issues.

The Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” is officially registered as a nongovernmental organisation in 2015, while analytical work and research have been carried out within the network of foreign policy experts “Ukrainian Prism” since 2012.

At present, the organisation united more than 20 experts in the sphere of foreign policy, international relations, and international security, as well as associated experts from different analytical and academic institutions in Ukraine and abroad. “Ukrainian Prism” operates from two offices — in Kyiv and Brussels.

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
(FES) — Foundation
for Social Democracy

Friedrich
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The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is the oldest political foundation in Germany with a rich tradition in social democracy dating back to its foundation in 1925. The foundation owes its formation and its mission to the political legacy of its namesake Friedrich Ebert, the first democratically elected President of Germany. The work of our political foundation focuses on the core ideas and values of social democracy — freedom, justice and solidarity. This connects us to social democracy and free trade unions. As a non-profit institution, we organise our work autonomously and independently.

Our goals

We promote:

- a free society based on the values of solidarity, which offers all its citizens the same opportunities to participate in all spheres of political, economic, social and cultural life, regardless of their origin, sex or religion;
- a lively and strong democracy; sustainable economic growth with decent work for all;
- a welfare state that provides more education and improved healthcare, but at the same time combats poverty and provides protection against the challenges citizens are facing;
- a country that is responsible for peace and social progress in Europe and in the world.

What we do

We support and strengthen social democracy in particular by means of:

- Political educational work to strengthen civil society. Our political education programs in Germany motivate, enable, inform and qualify citizens to successfully engage in political, trade union and civil spheres. We improve citizens' participation in social discussions and decision-making processes.
- Think Tanks: We develop strategies on the core issues of economic, social and educational policies as well as on key issues that advance democracy. At the crossroad where think tanks, academia and political practitioners meet, we create a public discourse for a just and sustainable economic and social order on a national, European and worldwide level.

- **International Cooperation:** With our international network of offices in more than 100 countries, we support a policy for peaceful cooperation and human rights, promote the establishment and consolidation of democratic, social and constitutional structures and are pioneers for free trade unions and a strong civil society. We are actively involved in promoting a social, democratic and competitive Europe in the European integration process.
- **Support for talented young people with scholarship programs,** in particular for students and doctoral candidates from low-income families or with a migrant background. This is our contribution to increasing educational democracy.
- **The collective memory of social democracy:** Our archive, library and contemporary history projects keep the historical roots of social democracy and the trade unions alive and provide support for sociopolitical and historical research.

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