



Intraparty Candidate  
Nomination in Tanzania

**A Gender Analysis**



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# **Intraparty Candidate Nomination in Tanzania A Gender Analysis**

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# Abbreviations

ACT-Wazalendo	Alliance for Change and Transparency
BAWACHA	Baraza la Wanawake Chadema
CC	Central Committee
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CHADEMA	Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CUF	Civic United Front
EMBs	Election Management Bodies
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
GC	Governing Council
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
MP	Member of Parliament
NC	National Congress
NCCR-Mageuzi	National Convention for Construction and Reform
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NEC	National Electoral Commission
NEC	National Executive Committee
NLC	National Leadership Council
ORPP	Office of Registrar of Political Parties
TCD	Tanzania Centre for Democracy
TEMCO	Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee
TShs	Tanzanian Shillings
TUCTA	Trade Union Congress of Tanzania
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
UWT	Umoja wa Wanawake Tanzania (CCM)



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# Introduction

Studies on women underrepresentation in political leadership in Africa have underscored the role of national legal framework, the type of electoral system, a country's socio-economic, and cultural factors (IFES, 2017; Stockemer, 2011; Norris, 2006; IDEA, 2005). Other studies have examined competition between parties and why parties win or lose elections (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; Makulilo, 2007; Levitsky and Way, 2010; Raphael, 2010; Sulley, 2015a, 2015b; Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO), 1997, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016). Such studies have left the role of internal party processes on women representation understudied. In essence, intraparty politics and particularly the selection of candidates have largely been restricted to the domain of studies on advanced democracies (Duverger, 1954; Gallagher, 1988, Hazan and Rahat, 2010; von Berge and Poguntke, 2017).

Studying intraparty candidate selection is important because it affects in significant ways the composition of a country's legislature and policies resulting therefrom (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988). Summarizing the importance of candidate selection, Schattschneider (quoted in Hazan and Rahat, 2010: 8) posits:

*...nomination is the most important activity of the party... It has become the most distinguishing mark of modern political parties. If a party cannot make nominations, it ceases to be a party... The nature of the nomination process determines the nature of the party. He who can make nominations is the owner of the party. It is one of the best points at which to observe the distribution of power within a party.*

In performing their selection role, political parties in Africa generally and Tanzania in particular underrepresent women. For instance, of the 14,501 candidates who participated in the 2017 election in Kenya, only 1,259 (8.7 percent) were women (FIDA Kenya, 2018: 28). In South Africa, of the 2089 candidates who participated in the 2014 parliamentary elections, 827 (39.6 percent) were women (NEC South Africa, 2014: 27). In Tanzania, the underrepresentation of women candidates during elections is evident. Out of 11,933 candidates who contested for the 2015 presidential, parliamentary and council elections, only 904 (7.5 percent) were women (NEC, 2016: 43-45). Indeed, the percentage of women in Tanzania decreases from registered voters to nominated candidates to elected representatives. While women constituted 53 percent of all registered voters in 2015, they only constituted 7.5 percent of all nominated candidates and 5.4 percent of all elected candidates (National Electoral Commission (NEC, 2016: 72-75). Table 1 shows the percentage of nominated parliamentary candidates for all registered political parties since 2005. Although there is a consistent gain since 2005, the percentage of female candidates is still far from being equal to that of their male counterparts.

**Table 1: Nominated parliamentary candidates by gender 2005, 2010 and 2015**

YEAR	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	% FEMALE
2005	1,063	159	1,222	12.7
2010	845	191	1,036	18.4
2015	976	233	1,209	19.2

Source: National Electoral Commission Reports for the 2005, 2010 and 2015 General Elections in Tanzania.

The situation is not encouraging for individual parties, especially those with a higher probability of winning the election. To be specific, bigger<sup>1</sup> parties like the ruling Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the opposition party Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) nominate fewer women than relatively smaller parties.

**Table 2. Parliamentary candidate nomination in selected parties in 2015**

PARTY	NOMINATED CANDIDATES	GENDER		PERCENTAGE
		M	F	F %
ACT-W	203	173	30	14.7
CCM	264	240	24	9
CHADEMA	184	171	13	7
CUF	135	120	15	11
NCCR-M	27	21	6	23

Source: National Electoral Commission (NEC 2016 p. 46).

It is interesting to note that overall, nominated women have a high probability of winning. A gender analysis of the 2017 Kenya elections shows that most nominated women candidates were elected and that an increased number of elected women in 2017 as compared to elections in 2013 was directly attributed to an increase in women candidates.<sup>2</sup> Gauja and Cross (2015) make a similar observation in their study of Australian federal elections in which they reported that the percentage of women nominated by parties correlated closely with the percentage of women elected to parliament. In the 2015 parliamentary elections in Tanzania, 18 out of 24 CCM candidates and 6 out of 13 CHADEMA<sup>3</sup> candidates won. These women constituted 9 and 17 percent of all elected CCM and CHADEMA Members of Parliament (MPs) respectively<sup>4</sup>. In the previous elections, women candidates nominated by the ruling CCM performed even better. To be sure, all 7 CCM women parliamentary candidates won in 1995.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, 12 out of 13; 17 out of 19 and 19 out of 24 won the 2000, 2005 and 2010 elections correspondingly (NEC 1996; 2001; 2006 & 2011).

The above electoral statistics would mean that the more parties select women candidates, the higher the probability of increasing women in representative bodies such as legislatures. Indeed, Gauja and Cross (2015) emphasise that “if voters are not biased against women when casting their ballot, and political parties are the principal gatekeepers to legislative office, then increasing women’s representation in the legislature requires more women to contest the general election. This, of course, means more women in the candidate pool”. Given the centrality of candidate selection in determining the composition of representative bodies, it is imperative to examine the selection procedures of different political parties and how they impact gender equality and representation of women in political leadership.

<sup>1</sup>We measure parties as big or small using electoral performance in terms of share of votes and legislative seats.

<sup>2</sup>A Gender Analysis of the 2017 Kenya General Elections, 2018.

<sup>3</sup>The majority of CHADEMA women candidates lost, reflecting the overall party performance.

<sup>4</sup>The ratio for male candidates in the 2015 elections is: CCM 240 and CHADEMA 171 as shown in Table 2.

<sup>5</sup>The first multiparty elections held in Tanzania after the restoration of plural politics in 1992.

Against the above backdrop, this study examines candidate selection rules and practices of four purposively selected political parties in Tanzania. These are CCM, CHADEMA, the Civic United Front (CUF) and Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT Wazalendo). The reasons for choosing these parties are twofold. Firstly, each of them was represented in the national assembly after the 2015 parliamentary elections. Secondly, and as the 2015 election statistics indicated, they had nominated candidates in more than half of electoral constituencies across the country. Despite nominating many candidates, paradoxically the studied parties had nominated very few female candidates as shown in Table 2. Specifically, the study seeks to answer the following questions:

1. Which national legal and institutional frameworks promote gender equality in candidate nomination and which frameworks discourage gender equality?
2. How do political parties select candidates and how democratic and gender inclusive is the selection process?
3. Which specific factors encourage/discourage female participation and success in political party nomination?

This study finds that provisions related to gender equality and principles of non-discrimination receive greater attention in the national laws. There is however, weakness in the enforcement mechanisms to compel political parties' adherence to principles of democracy and gender equality in their internal processes. The Office of Registrar of Political Parties that regulates political parties is by design, institutionally weak.

Similarly, political parties commit to adhere to principles of gender equality and non-discrimination in their statutes. A major weakness across the four parties is a fundamental discrepancy between what is stated in the statutes and what parties actually do in practice. There are no guidelines and mechanisms on how political parties would ensure gender equality in their nomination of candidates. Furthermore, a centralised, non-democratic and male dominated candidate selection process is common across the four parties. The nomination of women, therefore, entirely depends on the political will of male dominated party organs, instead of structures which facilitate a gender equal nomination process.

The report is organized as follows: The first section provides an introduction, followed by the section which presents the study methodology and data collection techniques. The third section reviews the national legal and institutional frameworks in order to establish whether they promote or discourage gender equality in the intraparty candidate selection processes. The fourth section examines candidate nomination rules and practices, and how they affect the nomination of women candidates. The fifth and last section concludes and recommends the way forward.

## Study Methodology

The study's approach is mainly exploratory. This approach is chosen in order to gain an understanding of candidate selection methods from a gender perspective. Moreover, exploratory research facilitates the collection of data from both primary and secondary sources. The study deployed the review of documents as well as qualitative interviews as tools of data collection.

National legal frameworks, party laws, regulations and procedures are reviewed in order to examine whether they limit or enhance gender equality in the candidate nomination process within the parties. Electoral reports, election observation and media reports were used as important sources deemed capable of reflecting the practice of candidate nomination within parties.

Additionally, qualitative interviews<sup>6</sup> were conducted with relevant stakeholders. These included party leaders, representatives of party women wings, former aspirants, candidates and MPs who were selected to learn the actual processes of intraparty candidate selection and in particular women's experience in the process. Another important category of relevant stakeholders was civil society organisations (CSOs) and trade unions (TUs). Organisations engaging in women rights and gender were particularly relevant. Also, included were the Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) namely, the offices of National Electoral Commission (NEC) Office of Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP). While the first regulates electoral competitions between parties, the latter regulates the functioning of political parties including their internal practices.

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<sup>6</sup> A list of persons met is in Appendix 1.

# National legal and institutional framework

Political parties are institutions established by law, operating within the constraints of national legal frameworks. It is critical to examine how national laws and institutions encourage or discourage gender equality in intraparty candidate nomination processes. Important national laws that establish and regulate political parties include the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977; Zanzibar Constitution, 1984; The Political Parties Act, 1992 [The Political Parties (Amendments) Act, 2019]; The National Elections Act No. 1, (CAP 343) 1985 and National Election Regulations.

The study observed that national legal framework enshrines general equality principles. Article 12 (1) (2) and 21 (1) (2) of both the United Republic of Tanzania constitution and the Zanzibar Constitution states categorically that every human being is equal before the law and that every citizen has the right to participate in public affairs including governance of the country. The Political Parties (Amendments) Act (2019) attempts to bring about gender parity and non-discrimination in political parties, albeit not explicitly. Section 6A (2) states, "... a political party shall be managed by adhering to the Constitution of the United Republic, the Constitution of Zanzibar, this Act, its constitution, principles of democracy, good-governance, non-discrimination, gender and social inclusion". Specific to candidate selection, subsection 5 states, "a political party shall promote ... *gender*, youth and social inclusion in the: (a) formulation and implementation of its policies; (b) *nomination of candidates for elections*; and (c) *election of its leaders* (emphasis added by author).

The above provisions require parties to ensure gender justice in the formulation and implementation of their policies. However, the legal framework does not compel political parties' adherence. There is so far no enforcement mechanism of these laws. Since the passing of the 2019 Political Parties (Amendments) Act, political parties have held internal leadership selections. However, male dominance is inherent in all four studied parties.

To be exact, all CCM and CHADEMA top six national leaders<sup>7</sup> are men while CUF and ACT-Wazalendo have one woman in their national leadership. Despite the requirement by the Political Parties Act that parties which do not adhere to national laws be deregistered, the ORPP has not done so for parties that have not ensured gender equality in their internal processes. Stakeholders<sup>8</sup> have called for amendments of the Act to elaborate further the 'gender and social inclusion' aspect. This may include, among other things, to compel political parties to ensure gender equality in the nomination of candidates and selection of party leaders.

<sup>7</sup> National party leadership is composed of top six leaders namely, Chairpersons, deputy chairpersons (Zanzibar and in mainland Tanzania), secretary generals and deputy secretary generals (Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania). All the four parties have those positions except for ACT- Wazalendo that has Main party leader and a chairperson at the same time.

<sup>8</sup> See 'Analysis of the Political Parties (Amendment) Act, 2018 by Twaweza East Africa, Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) , Tanganyika Law Society (TLS), Media Council of Tanzania (MCT), Waandishi wa Habari za Maendeleo Zanzibar (WAHAMAZA) and Centre for Strategic Litigation Submitted to The Parliamentary Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs on January 17, 2019.



Another problematic aspect of the legal system is reflected in the weaknesses of the mandated institutions in regulating intraparty processes. The Political Parties Act mandates the ORPP to monitor intraparty elections and nomination processes. Nonetheless, the Act does not clearly state what would be monitored, how and for which purposes. Moreover, the Act does not specify how the ORPP would compel parties to ensure gender equality in their internal practices. The Assistant Registrar of Political parties confirmed in an interview that the office of the Registrar does not have a specific mandate to compel parties to promote gender equality in party internal processes as a result, the Registrar's role remains to be advisory one. The office writes letters to remind political parties to adhere to principles of democracy such as equality in terms of gender.<sup>9</sup> Thus, the role of the Registrar is reduced to that of an observer than a regulator.

Other interviews<sup>10</sup> indicated that the Registrar's office is not legally enabled to effectively regulate political parties to ensure gender equality. The CCM Secretary-General argued that "the ORPP is just a clerk. He/ the office does not have capacity to monitor internal party processes. If all parties held national conferences at the same time, will the ORPP manage to monitor them all?"<sup>11</sup> Indeed, it is inconceivable for the ORPP, whose capacity in terms of staff is significantly low, to monitor internal party selection processes all over the country. The ORPP does not have structures and personnel across the country capable of performing the monitoring role of party processes.

Part of the ORPP's failure to compel parties' adherence to gender parity has to do with the weaknesses inherent in the design of the legal framework that establishes the office. Indeed, the president – who has hitherto always doubled as the chairperson of the ruling party – appoints the Registrar of political parties. Under such an arrangement, it is likely to be practically difficult for the Registrar to compel the president and his party's adherence to national laws. There are widespread complaints that the ORPP does not function as an impartial organ, but rather works in the interest of the ruling party against opposition parties.<sup>12</sup> Failure to task the ruling party compromises the ORPP's moral authority to task the other parties.

A specific legal instrument on women representation is the provision of special reserve seats. Article 66 (1(b) and 78 of the Tanzanian constitution as well as Section 86A of the Elections Act (1985) require at least 30 percent of all seats in the national parliament to be reserved for women. Equally, section 35(1 (c) of the Local Government (District Authorities) Act (1982) provides that one third (1/3) of district councilors be women. Special seats provision was meant to be a temporary special measure in dealing with the historical marginalisation of women in the country. Indeed, the provision has increased the number of women legislators substantially. As a matter of fact, the special reserve seats constitute the largest share of women legislators in the Tanzanian parliament. They apply to 113 out of 138 women MPs or about 82 percent of all women MPs since 2015 (NEC, 2016:68).

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<sup>9</sup> Interview with Sisty Nyahoza, Assistant Registrar of Political Parties 12th June 2020.

<sup>10</sup> See appendix 1 for a list of interviewed persons.

<sup>11</sup> Interview with Dr. Bashiru Kakurwa Ally, Secretary General, Chama cha Mapinduzi, CCM 6 July 2020.

<sup>12</sup> Interviews with opposition party officials and Civil Society Organisations.

There is a mixed assessment on the role of special seats in promoting women participation and representation in political parties and politics overall. On one hand, they are considered an important strategy to increase women representation in male-dominated and patriarchal societies such as Tanzania. On the other hand, special reserve seats discourage women from contesting directly elected seats. Those who support special seats argue that the seats are an important learning and capacity building opportunity for women to later contest for direct seats. Undeniably, most of the 25 elected women MPs in 2015 were previously special seats MPs. Notwithstanding this development, proponents of special seats recommend an amendment to the provision that would set a limit of one or two terms to encourage more women to contest for electoral posts.<sup>13</sup>

Critics of the special seats have argued that despite having increased women's numerical representation in parliament, their provision does not ensure women's substantial and long term representation (Makulilo, 2009; Guariso *et al* 2017; Edgell, 2018;). Drawing comparisons on the cases of Kenya and Uganda, Edgell (2018) demonstrates that women rarely exceed the minimum thresholds set by gender quotas and that quotas may have a ceiling effect on women's representation. She adds that for gender quotas to generate long-term representational outcomes, they must be designed to account for other characteristics of the electoral context that affect women's participation outside the quota mandate.

Guariso *et al* (2017) give three reasons against special reserve sets. First, many of the African states are de facto authoritarian regimes. In this context, gender quotas cannot influence policy (hence bring about substantive representation) unless they also apply to the highest ranks of executive power - which they do not in the case of Tanzania. An illustrative example for lack of women substantive representation is the government's directive to expel pregnant girls from school in Tanzania. The corresponding reaction of women representatives to stop the continuity of the discriminatory action was marginal. The pronouncement was indeed marginal because in a centralized party system such as Tanzania's, female special seats MPs who were elected through a PR party list hold stronger allegiance to their parties and leadership than to women issues (Lohmann, 2019). Second, in a patriarchal society, party and ethnic politics may crowd out gendered politics. Party and ethnic identities overshadow and displace gender identity. In ethnically divided societies, issues related to ethnicity take precedence over gender. The latter becomes a downgraded category in the political life of these societies.

Thus, women's marginalization is hardly addressed in mainstream politics in such societies. Third, a rights-based approach to women's empowerment may fail to alter the underlying social structures that produce women's inferiority and subjection. Hence, even if an alteration in formal proportional representation yields changes in the formal rules of the game, it may leave the situation largely unchanged for women on the ground. In fact, it reproduces the problem of women's subordination and marginalization. This partly explains the predicament of women under-representation in the constituencies in Tanzania as they are often compelled by party internal conditions to contest for special reserve seats leaving constituency posts an arena for male candidates' competition<sup>14</sup>. Stakeholder interviews<sup>15</sup> confirmed that special seats discourage many women from contesting direct seats because they feel that their positions are set aside in the special seats arrangement.<sup>16</sup> As such, special seats bring more women into office without threatening male dominance of the elected posts in Tanzania.

<sup>13</sup>Various interviews.

<sup>14</sup>As observed by most interviews.

<sup>15</sup>Interview with John Mnyika, Secretary General, CHADEMA; Zitto Zuberi Kabwe, Party Leader, ACT-Wazalendo; Savelina Silvanus Mwijage former Special Seats MP (CUF) and member of National Executive Committee (NEC) ACT-Wazalendo; Anatropia Theonest former candidate Segerea Constituency and Special Seats MP, CHADEMA.

<sup>16</sup>Various stakeholder interviews.



## Party rules and women representation

This section examines how party rules affect gender and women representation in candidate selection. It first demonstrates whether political parties adhere to national laws and principles of democracy, non-discrimination, gender and social inclusion in the formulation and implementation of their rules. Secondly, it examines how party rules of the four political parties encourage or discourage the selection of women candidates. Findings indicate that political parties adhere to national laws in the formulation of their constitutions, policies and principles. Indeed, parties commit themselves to adhere to principles of democracy, non-discrimination and gender equality in their constitutions, rules and regulations.<sup>17</sup>

In practice political parties neither adhere to national laws nor do they follow their own rules. As shown elsewhere in this report, political parties do not ensure gender equality in the candidate and leadership selection. They nominate and select more men than women. Furthermore, parties do not specify how the democratic principles of equality, participation, non-discrimination and respect for all would be realized.

The CCM Secretary General and the CHADEMA Director of Elections<sup>18</sup> confirmed that the main problem with party rules and principles is a fundamental discrepancy between what is stated in the constitutions and the implementation practice. Dr. Bashiru Ally (CCM) states that “there is a fundamental weakness in party belief system and once the belief system is weak, the mechanisms to ensure gender equality likely fail”.<sup>19</sup>

It was further noted by most party officials that although their parties subscribe to principles of democracy and gender equality, they fail to adhere to these principles in their internal functioning because of an inherent belief system in a society that upholds patriarchal thinking through reproducing the assumption that women are not electable.<sup>20</sup> To deal with this thinking, parties engage in capacity building to encourage more women to contest for leadership and electoral positions. Though capacity building is in fact a welcome and an important strategy, it will not help to bring about real change if the party structures and candidate selection procedures overall are not designed to ensure gender equality. The next subsections demonstrate that parties have significantly centralised candidate nominations in male-dominated structures. They have also designed unfriendly nomination rules that require women who are significantly disadvantaged by the patriarchal belief system to pay deposits and to demonstrate their ability<sup>21</sup> to win elections once nominated.

<sup>17</sup>Article 4 (1) (2) of CCM Constitution, 1977 [as revised in 2017]; Article 4.3.1 of CHADEMA Constitution, 2006 [as revised in 2019]; Article 4 (2) (i) (ii); Article 6 (4) of ACT-Wazalendo Constitution, 2015; Article 6 (1(a-c) of CUF Constitution 2014 Edition.

<sup>18</sup>Interview with Dr. Bashiru Ally Kakurwa, Secretary General, CCM and Gerald Munisi, Director of Election Strategy and Organisation, CHADEMA.

<sup>19</sup>Interview with Dr. Bashiru Kakurwa Ally, Secretary General, Chama cha Mapinduzi, CCM.

<sup>20</sup>Interviews with party officials.

<sup>21</sup>Capacity to win is measured by among other things acceptability by party leaders, nominating authorities, members, and voters. It would also mean capacity in terms of material and personal resources although this is not quite explicit in the nomination requirements of the four parties.

## ANATOMY OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND WOMEN REPRESENTATION

The four parties are structured largely in a similar way with national, regional, district as well as ward and local party organs. The analysis of the four parties generally shows that they are centrally managed. These parties vest key decision-making power in central organs, namely Central Committees (CC), National Executive Committees (NEC (for CCM and ACT-Wazalendo), Governing Council (GC) for CHADEMA<sup>22</sup>, National Leadership Council (NLC) for CUF<sup>23</sup>, and National Congresses (NC). With the exception of candidates for councillorship, central organs also make final nominations on presidential and parliamentary candidates.

As Schattschneider noted earlier, candidate nomination is one of the best reference points that indicate the distribution of power within a party. The analysis shows that there is a fusion between and among the central organs. All members of Central Committees are members of the National Executive Committees (NEC), Governing Council (GC) and National Leadership Council (NLC) while the National Congresses are composed of all members of the CC, NEC, GC, NLC, among others. The composition of these organs is also highly male-dominated. Although gender disaggregated data of party leaders from national to local levels is not readily available, the composition of national party leadership and central organs demonstrates the male-dominance of political parties. As noted earlier, all CHADEMA and CCM national leaders are men while CUF and ACT-Wazalendo have one woman each in their national leadership.

The male-dominance of party structures is further evidenced in the composition of central organs. Only 4 out of 24 CCM Central Committee delegates are women.<sup>24</sup> The constitution of CHADEMA 2019<sup>25</sup> specifies 7 women out of more than 60 members to form its Central Committee. In an interview with a CHADEMA official, the party currently has 42 active CC members, of which only 9 are women.<sup>26</sup> The CUF Constitution of 2014 provides for 68 delegates of National Council of Leaders<sup>27</sup>, with 19 guaranteed positions for women. The constitution of ACT-Wazalendo 2015 provides for 54 delegates of its Central Committee and there are only 5 specified women positions in the list. These are the chairperson and the Secretary General of the women wings as well as 3 appointees by the party leader.<sup>28</sup> National Congresses of the four parties, whose delegates come from local to national party levels, are also male-dominated.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>Baraza Kuu, CHADEMA.

<sup>23</sup>Baraza la Uongozi Taifa, CUF.

<sup>24</sup>See Article 103 (1(a-s) of CCM Constitution, 2017 for a list of delegates of central committee. Note that the constitution does not specify gender composition of the delegates neither does it indicate their gender proportion. If leadership positions are held by one gender, then all delegates of Central Committees are likely to be of the same gender.

<sup>25</sup>See Article 7.7.14 read together with Article 7.7.17 for a list of delegates of CHADEMA Central Committee.

<sup>26</sup>Interview with Elizabeth Donatus Massanja, National Coordinator, Baraza la Wanawake CHADEMA (BAWACHA), 13 June 2020.

<sup>27</sup>Baraza kuu la Uongozi Taifa. See Article 81(1(i-xii) of CUF 2014 Constitution.

<sup>28</sup>See Article 12 (i-xiv) of ACT-Wazalendo Constitution, 2015.

<sup>29</sup>Parties have specific provisions imposing a gender threshold on Party National Chairpersons' appointees and other appointed delegates to CCs, NECs and national Congresses. See the provisions of the following listed parties: CHADEMA see Article 7.7.11 (g) & 7.7.14 (q) CHADEMA Constitution of 2006 [as revised in 2019]; CCM see Article 108 (o) of CCM Constitution; CUF see Article 78 (1) (l) (m) (n) (o) and Article 81 (1) (viii) (ix) (x) of CUF Constitution of 1992 [as revised in 2014]; ACT-Wazalendo, see Article 29 (4) (iv) (v), (8) (ix), (12) (x) Constitution of 2015.

Like the other central organs, delegates form part of National Congresses by virtue of their leadership positions. Most of these positions are held by men. The remaining delegates' gender would therefore depend on who holds the leadership position specified in the parties' constitutions. Attempts to get the specific number and gender composition of national, regional and district party leaders were made during interviews. It was, however, difficult to receive the requested data. Some officials of the same party would give contrasting figures. To avoid guess work, the researcher decided to rely on the constitutional provisions. Attempts to get the leadership data of parties were also made with the Office of Registrar of Political Parties but unfortunately the office merely stores the data of national party leaders.<sup>30</sup>

The centralized decision-making, including candidate nomination processes, indicate lack of internal democracy within political parties that likely holds back women progress in leadership. Furthermore, male-dominance of the party structures and the rules they formulate in the process tend to set masculine standards and norms for candidate selection that often sideline women in the recruitment and selection process or forcing them to reject (male-style) politics altogether (IDEA, 2005). The next subsections examine selection requirements and processes to demonstrate how they limit women participation.

## CANDIDACY REQUIREMENTS

All four parties stipulate general eligibility requirements that all party members aspiring for electoral positions should meet. These are among others: membership, acceptability by members and voters, integrity, experience in leadership, meeting all the national and constitutional requirements, knowledge of and acceptance of party ideology, truthfulness, hard work and level of education.<sup>31</sup> Although both men and women must meet these general eligibility requirements, most party officials have argued that women must demonstrate more clearly than men their strengths and capacity to win, they must be known to party leaders, members and voters and they must have fully and actively participated in party activities.<sup>32</sup> This, according to the ACT-Wazalendo Party Leader, Mr. Zitto Zuber Kabwe, is because of a backward cultural thinking among most political parties that assume women are not electable.

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<sup>30</sup>Interview with Sisty Nyahoza, Assistant Registrar of Political Parties.

<sup>31</sup>See CCM Election regulations 2019 section 5-7; Article 10(1(iii)) of ACT-Wazalendo Constitution 2015; CUF 2014 Constitution; CUF Election Regulations, 2013 p. 1. Section 7.5 of CHADEMA Constitution 2016.

<sup>32</sup>Several interviews with party officials.

Apart from the above general eligibility requirements, members are required to deposit a certain amount of money for nomination forms. These deposits vary from one electoral position to the other as well as one political party to the other. CCM deposits range between 10,000 Tanzanian Shillings (TShs) for councilors, 100,000 TShs for MPs and 1,000,000 TShs for presidential candidates.<sup>33</sup> CHADEMA and ACT-Wazalendo charge 1,000,000 TShs for presidential candidates, 100,000 TShs and 20,000 TShs for MPs and councilors respectively.<sup>34</sup> CUF charges 10,000 TShs from aspiring councilors, 50,000<sup>35</sup> TShs for MP candidates (both direct constituency and special seats) and 500,000 TShs for presidential aspirants. Apart from depositing such amounts to parties, the electoral law in Tanzania requires nominated candidates to pay a nomination fee to the Electoral Commission.<sup>36</sup>

Previous studies have pointed out that party deposits in the candidate selection process work against women aspirants and candidates (Shayo, 2005; Makulilo, 2014; (Meena & Makulilo 2015). Interviews with political parties, most notably women wings, as well as activists and civic organisations have shown that deposits within parties are a constraint for many women who would wish to aspire for candidacy.<sup>37</sup> Even more challenging to most women are expenses related to campaign financing.<sup>38</sup> Women need both material and personal resources to finance their campaigns during internal nomination processes and during competition with candidates from other parties. Lack of funding is the main stumbling block for women to run for office.<sup>39</sup> A study by IDEA emphasizes that “high cost of election campaigning means that politics often does not afford equal opportunities for all to compete. Those who have financial means, moneyed networks, patrons and party support are disproportionately advantaged over those who do not, making the former more likely to compete for and win political office. This is all too apparent when considering the effects of political finance on women candidates and elections” (2014:301).

Lack of funds affects women because they are frequently economically disadvantaged and socially marginalized, living in abject poverty, less educated and often subjected to unpaid labour. For instance, Illesanmi (2018) remarks that women in Africa marginally participate in decision-making and are the most impoverished across the continent in comparison to their male counterparts. This point is reiterated by Odhiambo (in Anyango, Alupo, & Opoku, 2018) who asserts that the effects of family poverty and rural poverty mostly affect women and necessitates the need for their economic empowerment.

In particular, the lack of independent sources of income limit women from paying deposits as required by both party and national rules in Tanzania. In some households, male consent is an important factor for women’s ability to not only pay deposits but also for pursuing political motives such as participation in party and electoral processes. As correctly noted by Lohmann (2019: 7), “in many traditional African societies where the husband holds the power over the expenses of the household, women who would like to engage politically have to obtain not only the general support of their husbands but also their financial consent”.

<sup>33</sup>Section 11 (1) of Kanuni za Uteuzi wa Wagombea Uongozi Katika Vyombo vya Dola (toleo la 2019).

<sup>34</sup>Interviews with CHADEMA and ACT- Wazalendo officials.

<sup>35</sup>For women who would want to be considered for Special Seats, they will have to pay 100,000 Tanzanian shillings.

<sup>36</sup>Section 33 (1) of the Elections (Amendment) Act (No. 2) Act, 1992.

<sup>37</sup>Various Interviews with party women wings, party leaders and civic organisations.

<sup>38</sup>Interviews with party leaders, women wings, leaders of civic organisations and activists as shown in Appendix 1.

<sup>39</sup>As observed in all interviews.



## SCREENING, VOTING AND FINAL NOMINATION

Another area that limits women candidacy is found in the actual selection process. After aspirants have expressed interests, taken and filled nomination forms and paid deposits, political parties proceed with screening and nomination processes.

The screening and nomination of presidential candidates is the responsibility of national organs in all the four parties. Given the centralization of power in the other two national organs, the voting of presidential candidates by National Congresses is mainly to rubber stamp decisions made by central organs. Similarly, all parties give powers to regional party organs to make final nomination of councillors. Some differences are observed in the four parties as far as the nomination of parliamentary candidates is concerned.

Starting with CCM, all parliamentary aspirants are discussed by political committees at constituencies, districts and regional levels. These committees forward their recommendations to the Central Committee. In the next step, the CC evaluates and shortlists not more than three names of aspirants to be voted for by the constituency (for Zanzibar) or district (for mainland Tanzania) congresses.<sup>40</sup> The three aspirants with their votes are forwarded back to the CC for evaluation after which the CC forwards its recommendations to the National Executive Committee for final nomination. Under normal circumstances, NEC nominates the candidate with most votes.<sup>41</sup> However, the National Executive Committee makes final nominations of parliamentary candidates irrespective of their vote share.<sup>42</sup> The recent 2020 CCM selections have demonstrated a slight difference from the past experience. All aspirants are voted for at district and constituency congresses before the screening and final nomination by central organs.

Centralized candidate selection process is also common in the other three parties albeit with a slight difference. Although central organs make final nominations of parliamentary candidates, they do so after all candidates have been evaluated, screened and voted for at lower party levels (district and regional organs). For MP/House of Representatives position aspirants within CUF, screening is done at constituency and district level and the party central committee. The final nomination is done by the party National Leadership Council<sup>43</sup>, an equivalent of NEC of CCM but with fewer delegates. As opposed to the other three parties, CUF Constitution is specific in the gender distribution of its National Leadership Council. As noted above, CUF constitution provides for 19 women out of 69 delegates, which is about 28 percent of all delegates. CUF's Administration and Coordination officer confirmed in an interview that National Leadership Council has 75 delegates and women make 30 percent of the delegates<sup>44</sup>.

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<sup>40</sup>Section 12 (iv) of Kanuni za Uteuzi wa Wagombea Uongozi Katika Vyombo vya Dola (toleo la 2019).

<sup>41</sup>Section 16 (1) of the new 2019 CCM Regulations requires candidates to get an absolute majority (more than fifty percent votes to win. In the past, the rule was only a simple majority. It would be interesting to follow up what this change would mean for women in the 2020 elections and whether the rule would be followed.

<sup>42</sup>Section 16(1) of Kanuni za Uteuzi wa Wagombea Uongozi Katika Vyombo vya Dola (toleo la 2019).

<sup>43</sup>Baraza Kuu la Uongozi, CUF.

<sup>44</sup>For a list of delegates to Baraza la Uongozi Taifa CUF see Article 81(1(i-xiii) CUF Constitution, 2014.

A similar arrangement is found in CHADEMA and ACT-Wazalendo with an exception that Central Committees make the final nomination of parliamentary candidates. After screening of aspirants by respective party organs at constituency, district and regional organs, all aspirants and their votes are forwarded to national organs and Central Committees which make final endorsement.<sup>45</sup> While CHADEMA has about 60 CC delegates, ACT-Wazalendo has about 54.<sup>46</sup> As can be seen, the final nominating authorities of the two parties are not only too exclusive in terms of the number but are also likely to be gender imbalanced. This is because most delegates to the nominating authorities are national party leaders/officials, who are mostly men.

Selection procedures described above have three important implications for women. Firstly, they confirm the significant level of centralized candidate selection in which national organs have excessive control in determining the candidates. Secondly and following from this, the selection of women candidates significantly depends on the political will of central organs, namely the Central Committees, National Executive Committees, Governing Council and National Leadership Council. Voting at lower levels is not decisive and is only meant to provide preferences of lower party organs and to assist central and final nominating authorities to make decisions.<sup>47</sup> Practice indicates that party central organs have replaced candidates contrary to the will of party members expressed in the constituency/district congresses. For instance, CCM replaced winners in a number of constituencies in the 2010 elections.<sup>48</sup> Nonetheless, some of the replacements seemed to have favored women candidates in Iringa Urban and Handeni Rural constituencies. CHADEMA replaced a woman candidate in Moshi Vijijini constituency. Thirdly, selection procedures of the studied parties change from time to time. CCM has for instance, allowed delegates at lower levels to vote for all candidates for the 2020 elections before screening and final nomination. Whether women will fare better under the new procedures<sup>49</sup> remains to be seen. It is therefore imperative to observe the selection processes and to conduct a gender analysis during and after nominations of candidates for the 2020 elections. Similarly, it would be interesting to underscore the extent to which parties follow or bend their own rules and what that means for women. It is important that parties design gender responsive selection procedures and structures so as to ultimately attain gender equity in intraparty candidate selection.

<sup>45</sup>Article 7.7.16 (q) of CHADEMA Constitution, 2019 and Article 29 (13) (xvii) of ACT Constitution of 2015.

<sup>46</sup>These figures as stated earlier may not be precise. They are based on author's calculation of constitutional provisions on delegates to central organs. The actual figures are also likely to change from time to time.

<sup>47</sup>here is an important note in the 2019 CCM Regulations that voting at constituencies and districts are not meant to determine winners but only an indication of most preferred candidates by lower organs of the party (CCM Regulations 2019 p. 35).

<sup>48</sup>See MwanaHalsi, 18th August, 2010; Mwananchi, 20th September, 2010; TEMCO, 2011; TEMCO, 2016.

<sup>49</sup>Note that in the past, all candidates were voted for at the constituency and district conferences before being screened and nominated by central organs. Only three names of candidates with most votes were forwarded to national organs for consideration. As noted above, it is important to see the implication of the changes in CCM procedures for women.

# Conclusion and way forward

As a point of departure to analyse women representation in politics, this study focused on the internal processes of political parties, laws and institutions governing these processes, and how they impact the political visibility and representation of women in Tanzania. Generally, the analysis shows that there is weakness in the national legal and institutional framework in compelling parties to be gender responsive in their internal processes. Indeed, the Office of the Registrar of political parties can be termed as a dog that cannot bite given its weakness in regulating parties. Similarly, a review of party statutes shows that political parties subscribe to principles of human dignity, equality, justice, democracy, transparency and accountability on paper.

Party laws emphasize inclusive politics and non-discrimination on the basis of sex, race, ethnicity, religion, ideology, cultural background, socioeconomic status or physical disability. However, none of the studied parties has been able to internalize them adequately and comprehensively in their functioning. Neither have they formulated and institutionalized gender responsive nomination procedures in the candidate recruitment and selection processes despite committing to promote gender equality in their respective statutes. Moreover, a practice of opaque and centralized nomination procedures<sup>50</sup> is found to be an organizing principle and common practice in all the four parties.

Besides the weaknesses noted in the national and party legal frameworks, the study disclosed other major obstacles to women visibility as candidates and leaders. These are entrenched patriarchal belief system that discriminate women, unfriendly political environment, low levels of education, limited leadership experience and lack of financial capacity. These obstacles affect women more than men because of the belief system that emphasises male-dominance in all spheres of life.

It is evident from the observations made that existing decision-making structures and current intraparty selection procedures disadvantage women and are not gender responsive – leading to a situation in which women are by and large discouraged to vie for political positions. In order to nominate more women and get them elected into direct constituency seats, it is important for parties to design gender-responsive selection procedures such as legislated and or voluntary candidate and leadership quotas. In addition to engaging in capacity building programmes for women, parties need to look at and reform their internal structures and nomination procedures which are a main hindrance for women participation in the country's politics. Similarly, national laws and institutions should be reformed in order to effectively compel political parties' adherence to principles of gender equality and democracy. Concrete recommendations on such actions and reforms will be considered in a related policy brief.

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<sup>50</sup>By opaque nomination procedures we mean non-transparent nomination procedures and absence of explicit rules demanding gender equality in the intraparty candidate nomination.

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## APPENDIX 1: PERSONS MET

S/N	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANISATION
1	Zitto Zuberi Kabwe	Party Leader	ACT-Wazalendo
2	Dorothy Semu	Vice Chairperson (Mainland)	ACT-Wazalendo
3	Savelina Silvanus Mwijage	NEC Member, ACT-Wazalendo & former Special Seat Member of Parliament, CUF	ACT-Wazalendo
4	Mwanaharusi Bunduki	Deputy Secretary General (Women Wing)	ACT-Wazalendo
5	Shani Khalfan Beleko	Former Councillor candidate and as aspirant for councillorship in 2020	ACT-Wazalendo
6	Bashiru Ally Kakurwa	Secretary General	CCM
7	Queen M. Mlozi	Secretary General, UWT	CCM
8	John Mnyika	Secretary General	CHADEMA
9	Reginald Munisi	Director of Election Strategy and Organisation	CHADEMA
10	Tumaini Makene	Head, Information and Communication	
11	Elizabeth Masanja	Coordinator, BAWACHA	CHADEMA
12	Anatropia Theonest	Special Seats MP and former Candidate (Segerea)	CHADEMA
13	Martha Mtio	Ward Councillor, Kawe	CHADEMA
14	Magdalena Sakaya	Deputy Secretary General and Former MP	CUF
15	Anna Paul Ryoba	Executive Secretary, Women Wing	CUF
16	Yusuph Mohamed Mbungiro	Administration and Coordination	CUF
17	Martin Bernard Mung'ong'o	Head of Elections and Campaigns	NCCR-Mageuzi
18	Ester Corneli Komba	Deputy Secretary General, Women Wing	NCCR-Mageuzi
19	Sisty Nyahoza	Assistant Registrar of Political Parties	ORPP
20	Fausta Mahenge	Legal Officer National Electoral Commission	NEC
21	Said Wamba	Acting General Secretary, TUCTA	TUCTA
22	Fatma Amani Karume	Advocate of the High Court of Tanzania & Partner at IMMMA Advocates	IMMMA Advocates
23	Daniel Loya	Executive Director, Tanzania Centre for Democracy	TCD