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Dear Partners, Friends & Interested Readers,

Welcome 2007!

The East African Community is always in a process of change. The Customs Union is showing effects – slowly, sometimes hesitantly but still continuously. The Fast Tracking Initiative is starting to get a momentum through growing participation of the population. The regional parliament, the East African Legislative Assembly, succeeded in its first practical challenges and is modifying with regard to their experiences. Even the secretariat has been changed in terms of its personnel and is planning to relocate in a new building. For us, for FES it is a major challenge to support this process in different ways. To spread around relevant information about the ongoing process is one of our concerns.

Traditionally, the “Political Handbook and Regional Calendar for Eastern Africa” is divided into different sections. Besides the calendar, it includes facts and figures of the region, information on crosscutting themes and other analysis of important issues. A last chapter provides you with helpful information and management tools on how to organize and carry out different events.

The main theme this time deals with “Women’s Rights and Fights” and “Women in the Economy” with special emphasis to their involvement in the EAC-process. The topic is discussed in manifold ways. The conclusion is not as pessimistic as thought. Women are taking over an important part of the economy. Further on, we present to you an analysis about the “Peace Process” in Sudan and Ethiopia and the political developments after the elections in Tanzania and Uganda.

With this Regional Handbook, we hope to contribute to the process of exchanging ideas and opinions, as well as data and information between the different countries of the East African region including Ethiopia and Sudan.

I would like to emphasize that this edition emerged as a coherent and thematic well-balanced Regional Handbook. Therefore, I thank all my colleagues and authors who supplied us with their information and data to realize this handbook. My special thanks go to Angela Ishengoma for her long-term coordination and efficient work, Marianne Schreiber-Einloft for the tireless revision of the articles, Frederic Schmachtel and Joel Winkler for the revision of the statistics, Gabriele Gollnick and Charlotta Heck for further support and last but not least to Lars-Christian Treusch for his dedicated work regarding the layout.

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung staff in the regional offices wishes you and your family a healthy, prosperous, successful and peaceful year 2007.

Reinhold Einloft
Resident Director FES Tanzania

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Calendar 2007

Overview 2007

January 2007						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

February 2007						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28				

March 2007						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	

April 2007						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
30						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29

May 2007						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

June 2007						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	

July 2007						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
30	31					1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29

August 2007						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
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20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

September 2007						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

October 2007						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

November 2007						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

December 2007						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
31					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

Overview 2008

January 2008						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

February 2008						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29		

March 2008						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
31					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

April 2008						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30				

May 2008						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
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5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	

June 2008						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
30						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29

July 2008						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

August 2008						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	31

September 2008						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30					

October 2008						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

November 2008						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

December 2008						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
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December 2006

Week 52 December, 25th - 31st, 2006

DECEMBER 06

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January 2007

Week 1 January, 1st - 7th, 2007

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January 2007

Week 2 January, 8th - 14th, 2007

JANUARY

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January 2007

Week 3 January, 15th - 21st, 2007

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January 2007

Week 4 January, 22nd - 28th, 2007

JANUARY

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Jan. - Feb. 2007

Week 5 Jan., 29th - Feb., 4th, 2007

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February 2007

Week 6 February, 5th - 11th, 2007

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February 2007

Week 7 February, 12th - 18th, 2007

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February 2007

Week 8 February, 19th - 25th, 2007

FEBRUARY

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Feb. - March 2007

Week 9 Feb., 26th - March, 4th, 2007

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March 2007

Week 10 March, 5th - 11th, 2007

MARCH

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March 2007

Week 11 March, 12th - 18th, 2007

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March 2007

Week 12 March, 19th - 25th, 2007

MARCH

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March - April 2007

Week 13 March, 26th - April, 1st, 2007

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April 2007

Week 14 April, 2nd - 8th, 2007

APRIL

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April 2007

Week 15 April, 9th - 15st, 2007

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April 2007

Week 16 April, 16th - 22nd, 2007

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April 2007

Week 17 April, 23rd - 29th, 2007

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April - May 2007

Week 18 April 30th - May, 6th, 2007

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May 2007

Week 19 May, 7th - 13th, 2007

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May 2007

Week 20 May, 14th - 20th, 2007

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May 2007

Week 21 May, 21st - 27th, 2007

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May - June 2007

Week 22 May, 28th - June, 3rd, 2007

MAY - JUNE

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June 2007

Week 23 June, 4th - 10th, 2007

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June 2007

Week 24 June, 11th - 17st, 2007

JUNE

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June 2007

Week 25 June 18th - 24th, 2007

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Sunday 24

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June - July 2007

Week 26 June, 25th - July 1st, 2007

JUNE - JULY

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Tuesday 26

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Friday 29

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Saturday 30

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Sunday 1

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July 2007

Week 27 July, 2nd - 8th, 2007

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Tuesday 3

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July 2007

Week 28 July, 9th - 15th, 2007

JULY

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Tuesday 10

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July 2007

Week 29 July, 16th - 22nd, 2007

Monday 16

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Friday 20

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Saturday 21

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Sunday 22

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July 2007

Week 30 July, 23rd - 29th, 2007

JULY

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Sunday 29

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July - Aug. 2007

Week 31 July, 30th - Aug. 5th, 2007

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August 2007

Week 32 August, 6th - 12th, 2007

AUGUST

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Friday 10

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August 2007

Week 33 August, 13th - 19th, 2007

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August 2007

Week 34 August, 20th - 26th, 2007

AUGUST

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Tuesday 21

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Aug. - Sept. 2007

Week 35 Aug., 27th - Sept., 2nd, 2007

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September 2007

Week 36 September, 3rd - 9th, 2007

SEPTEMBER

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September 2007

Week 37 September, 10th - 16th, 2007

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September 2007

Week 38 September, 17th - 23rd, 2007

SEPTEMBER

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September 2007

Week 39 September 24th - 30th, 2007

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October 2007

Week 40 October, 1st - 7th, 2007

OCTOBER

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October 2007

Week 41 October, 8th - 14th, 2007

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October 2007

Week 42 October, 15th - 21st, 2007

OCTOBER

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October 2007

Week 43 October, 22nd - 28th, 2007

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Oct. - Nov. 2007

Week 44 Oct. 29th - Nov. 4th, 2007

OCT. - NOV.

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November 2007

Week 45 November, 5th - 11th, 2007

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November 2007

Week 46 November, 12th - 18th, 2007

NOVEMBER

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November 2007

Week 47 November, 19th - 25th, 2007

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Nov. - Dec. 2007

Week 48 Nov. 26th - Dec. 2nd, 2007

NOV. - DEC.

Monday 26

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December 2007

Week 49 December, 3rd - 9th, 2007

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December 2007

Week 50 December, 10th - 16th, 2007

DECEMBER

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December 2007

Week 51 December, 17th - 23rd, 2007

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December 2007

Week 52 December, 24th - 30th, 2007

DECEMBER

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Dec. 2007 - Jan. 2008

Week 1 Dec., 31st, 2007 - Jan., 6th, 2008

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
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Facts & Figures



Some Basic Facts & Figures

Country	Ethiopia	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Sudan
Geography					
Total area	1,127,127 sq.km	582,650 sq.km	945,087 sq.km	236,040 sq.km	2,505,810 sq.km
- Land Area	1,119,683 sq.km	569,250 sq.km	886,037 sq.km	199,710 sq.km	2,376 million sq.km
- Water Area	7,444 sq.km	13,400 sq.km	59,050 sq.km (includes the islands of Mafia, Pemba, Zanzibar)	36,330 sq.km	129,810 sq.km
Total land boundaries	5,328 km	3,477 km	3,861 km	2,698 km	7,687 km
Coastline	0 km (landlocked)	536 km	1,424 km	0 km (landlocked)	853 km
Highest peak (in m)	Ras Dejen 4,620m	Mt. Kenya 5,199m	Kilimanjaro 5,895m	Margherita Peak Mt. Stanley 5,110m	Kinyeti 3,187 m
Natural Resources	Small reserves of gold, platinum, copper, potash, natural gas, hydropower	Limestone, soda ash, salt, gemstones, fluor-spar, zinc, diatomite, gypsum, wildlife, hydropower	Hydropower, tin, phosphates, iron ore, coal, diamonds, gemstones, gold, natural gas, nickel	Copper, cobalt, hydropower, limestone, salt, arable land	Petroleum; small reserves of iron ore, copper, chromium ore, zinc, tungsten, mica, silver, gold, hydropower
Arable Land	10,01%	8,01%	4,23%	21,57%	6,78%
Permanent Crops	0,65%	0,97%	1,16%	8,92%	0,17%
Other	89.34% (2003)	91.02% (2003)	94.16% (2003)	63.51% (2003)	93.05% (2005)
Irrigated Land	2 900 sq.km (2003 estimate)	1 030 sq.km (2003 estimate)	1 840 sq.km (2003 estimate)	90 sq.km (2003 estimate)	18,630 sq.km (2003)

Ethnicity, religion and language	Ethiopia	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Sudan
Ethnic groups	Oromo 40%, Amhara and Tigre 32%, Sidamo 9%, Shankella 6%, Somali 6%, Afar 4%, Gurage 2%, other 1%	Kikuyu 22%, Luhya 14%, Luo 13%, Kalenjin 12%, Kamba 11%, Kisii 6%, Meru 6%, other African 15%, non-African (Asian, European, Arab) 1%	mainland: native African 99% (of which 95% are Bantu consisting of more than 130 tribes), other 1% (consisting of Asian, European, Arab); Zanzibar: Arab, native African, mixed Arab and native African	Baganda 17%, Ankole 8%, Basoga 8%, Iteso 8%, Bakiga 7%, Langi 6%, Rwanda 6%, Bagisu 5%, Acholi 4%, Lugbara 4%, Batoro 3%, Bunyoro 3%, Alur 2%, Bagwere 2%, Bakonjo 2%, Jopodhola 2%, Karamojong 2%, Rundi 2%, non-African (European, Asian, Arab) 1%, other 8%	In the North: arabic-islamic population (39%), nubian tribe (approx. 8%); in the East: Rasheida- and Beja-Tribes; in the West: normad Beggara-Tribes (in total 20%), Fur, Zaghawa i.a. and coloured Nuba population; in the Centre: coloured nilotic Tribes like Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk i.a. (approx. 30%). (b)
Religions	Muslim 45-50%, Ethiopian Orthodox 35-40%, Animist 12%, other 3-8%	Protestant 45%, Roman Catholic 33%, indigenous beliefs 10%, Muslim 10%, other 2% (a)	mainland: Christian 30%, Muslim 35%, indigenous beliefs 35%; Zanzibar: more than 99% Muslim	Roman Catholic 33%, Protestant 33%, Muslim 16%, indigenous beliefs 18%	Sunni Muslim 70% (in north), indigenous beliefs 25%, Christian 5% (mostly in south and Khartoum)
Languages	Amharic, Tigrinya, Oromigna, Guaragigna, Somali, Arabic, other local languages, English (major foreign language taught in schools)	English (official), Swahili (official), numerous indigenous languages	Swahili (official), English (official), primary language of commerce, administration and higher education), Arabic (widely spoken in Zanzibar), many local languages	English (official national language), Ganda or Luganda (most widely used of the Niger-Congo languages), other Niger-Congo languages, Nilo-Saharan languages, Swahili, Arabic	Arabic (official), Nubian, Ta Bedawie, diverse dialects of Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic, Sudanic languages, English

(a) note: a large majority of Kenyans are Christians, but estimates for the percentage of the population that adheres to Islam or indigenous beliefs vary widely

(b) the source use in this section (ethnicity in sudan) is <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Laender/Sudan.html> (not The CIA Factbook)

Source: The CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html> (not The CIA Factbook)

Ethiopia: <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/et.html>

Kenya: <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ke.html>

Tanzania: <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tz.html>

Uganda: <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ug.html>

Sudan: <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/su.html>

Demographic indicators

Country	Year	Ethiopia	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Sudan
Total population (millions)	1975	34.1	13.5	16.0	10.8	17.1
	2003	73.8	32.7	36.9	26.9	34.9
	2015 (a)	97.2	44.2	45.6	41.9	44.0
Annual population growth rate (%)	1975-2003	2.8	3.2	3.0	3.3	2.6
	2003-2015 (a)	2.3	2.3	1.8	3.7	1.9
Urban population (% of total) (b)	1975	9.5	12.9	10.1	8.3	18.9
	2003	15.7	39.3	35.4	12.3	38.9
Population under age 15 (% of total)	2003	45.0	43.1	43.2	50.4	39.7
	2015 (a)	41.7	42.6	38.9	50.8	35.6
Population ages 65 and above (% of total)	2003	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.1	2.8
	2015 (a)	3.2	2.8	3.7	2.2	4.3
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	1970-75 (c)	6.8	8.0	6.8	7.1	6.7
	2000-05 (c)	5.9	5.0	5.0	7.1	4.4

(a) Data refer to medium-variant projections; (b) Because data are based on national definitions of what constitutes a city or metropolitan area, cross-country comparisons should be made with caution; (c) Data refer to estimates for the period specified.

Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2005.

Notes for economic indicators (next page):

(a) Estimates are based on regression; (b) Data refer to a period shorter than that specified; (c) The denominator conventionally used when comparing official development assistance and total debt service to the size of the economy is GNI, not GDP. GDP is used here, however, to allow comparability throughout the table. With few exceptions the denominators produce similar results; (d) ODA receipts are total net ODA flows from DAC (Development Assistance Committee) countries as well as Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, other small donors, including Estonia, Israel, Latvia and Lithuania, and concessional lending from multilateral organizations; (e) A negative value indicates that the capital flowing out of the country exceeds that flowing in; (f) Other private flows combine non-debt-creating portfolio equity investment flows, portfolio debt flows and bank and trade-related lending; (g) Country included in the Debt Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC); (h) Completion reached under the HIPC Initiative; (i) Decision and completion points not yet reached under the HIPC Initiative; (j) Data refer to 2002.

Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2005.

Economic indicators

Country		Year	Ethiopia	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Sudan
GDP	US\$ billions	2003	6.7	14.4	10.3	6.3	17.8
	Purchasing power parity (PPP) US\$ billions	2003	48.8 (a)	33.1	22.3	36.8 (a)	64.1 (a)
GDP per capita	US\$	2003	97	450	287	249	530
	PPP US\$	2003	711 (a)	1,037	621	1,457 (a)	1,910 (a)
GDP per capita - Annual growth rate		1975-2003	0.1 (b)	0.2	0.8 (b)	2.6 (b)	1.1
		1990-2003	2.0	-0.6	1.0	3.9	3.3
GDP per capita - Highest value during 1975-2003 (PPP US\$) [Year of highest value]			752 [2002] (a),(b)	1,204 [1990]	621 [2003] (b)	1,457 [2003] (a),(b)	1,910 [2003] (a)
Average annual change in consumer price index (%)		1990-2003	4.0	12.6	16.2	7.9	63.6
		2002-03	17.8	9.8	3.5	7.8	..
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)		1990	12	31	37	19	..
		2003	37	29	27	26	12
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)		1990	8	26	13	7	..
		2003	17	25	18	12	16
Primary exports (% of merchandise exports)		1990	..	71
		2003	89	76	82	91	97 (j)
Manufactured exports (% of merchandise exports)		1990	..	29
		2003	37	24	18	9	3 (j)
High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports)		1990	..	4
		2003	(.)	4	2	8	7 (j)
Official development assistance (ODA) received (net disbursements) (c), (d)	Total (US\$ millions)	2003	1,504.4	483.5	1,669.3	959.4	621.3
	Per capita (US\$)	2003	21.9	15.2	46.5	38.0	18.5
	As % of GDP	1990	11.8	13.9	27.5	15.5	6.2
2003		22.6	3.4	16.2	15.2	3.5	
Net foreign direct investment flows (% of GDP) (e)		1990	0.1	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
		2003	0.9	0.6	2.4	3.1	7.6
Other private flows (% of GDP) (e),(f)		1990	-0.7	0.8	0.1	0.4	0.0
		2003	-0.1	0.8	0.2	0.1	0.0
Total debt service as % of GDP (c)		1990	2.7	9.2	4.2	3.4	0.4
		2003	1.4	4.0	0.9	1.3	0.2
Total debt service as % of exports of goods, services and net income from abroad		1990	37.6	28.6	31.3	78.6	4.8
		2003	7.3 (g),(h)	14.5	5.8 (g),(h)	7.8 (g),(h)	1.3 (g), (i)

Education indicators

Country		Year	Ethiopia	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Sudan
Public expenditure on education	As % of GDP	1990	3.4	6.7	2.8	1.5	6.0
		2000-02 (a)	4.6	7.0
	As % of total government expenditure	1990	9.4	17.0	11.4	11.5	2.8
		2000-02 (a)	13.8	22.1
Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and above) (b)	Total	1990	28.6	70.8	62.9	56.1	45.8
	Total	2003	41.5 (e)	73.6	69.4	68.9 (e)	59.0 (j)
	Female	2003	33.8 (e)	70.2	62.2	59.2 (e)	57.9
	Male	2003	49.2 (e)	77.7	77.5	78.8 (e)	54.9
Youth literacy rate (% ages 15-24) (b)		1990	43.0	89.3	83.1	70.1	65.0
		2003	57.4 (e)	80.3	78.4	80.2 (e)	74.6 (j)
Net primary enrolment ratio (%) (c)		1990/91	23	74	5	53	43
		2002/03 (f)	51 (g)	67	82 (i)	..	46 (h), (k)
Net secondary enrolment ratio (%) (c), (d)		1990/91
		2002/03 (f)	18 (g), (h)	25 (h)	..	17 (h)	..
Children reaching grade 5 (% of grade 1 students)		1990/91	79	..	94
		2001/02 (f)	62	59	88	64	84

(a) Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified.

(b) Data for 1990 refer to estimates produced by UNESCO Institute for Statistics based on data prior to 1990; data for 2003 refer to the national literacy estimates from censuses or surveys conducted between 2000 and 2004, unless otherwise noted. Due to differences in methodology and timeliness of underlying data, comparisons across countries and over time should be made with caution.

(c) The net enrolment ratio is the ratio of enrolled children of the official age for the education level indicated to the total population of that age.

(d) Enrolment ratios are based on the new International Standard Classification of Education, adopted in 1997 (UNESCO 1997), and so may not be strictly comparable with those for earlier years.

(e) Estimate produced by UNESCO Institute for Statistics in July 2002; (f) Data on net enrolment ratios refer to the 2002/03 school year, and data on children reaching grade 5 to the 2001/02 school year, unless otherwise specified. For details, see www.uis.unesco.org. Because data are from different sources, comparisons across countries should be made with caution.

(f) Data on net enrolment ratios refer to the 2002/03 school year, and data on children reaching grade 5 to the year 2001/02 school year, unless otherwise specified. Data for some countries may refer to national or UNESCO Institute for Statistics estimates. For details, see www.uis.unesco.org. Because data are from different sources, comparisons across countries should be made with caution.

(g) Data refer to the 2003/04 school year.

(h) Preliminary UNESCO Institute for Statistics estimate, subject to further revision.

(i) Data refer to the 2004/05 school year.

(j) Data refer to a year or period other than that specified, differ from the standard definition or refer to only part of a country

(k) Data refer to the 1999/2000 school year.

Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2005.

Health-related indicators

Country		Year	Ethio- pia	Kenya	Tanza- nia	Ugan- da	Sudan
Health expendi- ture	Public (% of GDP)	2002	2.6	2.2	2.7	2.1	1.0
	Private (% of GDP)	2002	3.1	2.7	2.2	5.3	3.9
	Per capita (PPP US\$)	2002	21	70	31	77	58
Life expectancy at birth (years)		1975-75	43.5	53.6	49.5	51.1	45.1
		2000-05	47.6	47.0	46.0	46.8	56.3
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)		1970	160	96	129	100	104
		2003	112	79	104	81	63
Under-five mortality rate (per 1000 live births)		1970	239	156	218	170	172
		2003	169	123	165	140	93
Maternal mor- tality ratio (per 100,000 live births)	reported	1985- 2003	870	590	530	510	550
	adjusted	2000	850	1000	1500	880	590
Probability at birth of surviv- ing to age 65 (% of cohort)	female	2000-05	40.7	31.8	35.8	34.4	55.4
	male	2000-05	36.6	35.0	33.4	32.9	49.6
One-year-olds fully immunized (%)	against tubercu- losis	2003	76	87	91	96	53
	against measles	2003	52	72	97	82	57
Population with sustainable access to improved sanitation (%)		1990	4	42	47	43	33
		2002	6	48	46	41	34
Population with sustainable access to an improved water source (%)		1990	25	45	38	44	64
		2002	22	62	73	56	69
Population undernourished (% of total)		1990/92 (a)	..	44	37	24	32
		2000/02 (a)	46	33	44	19	27
HIV prevalence (% ages 15-49) (b)		2003	4.4 [2.8- 6.7]	6.7 [4.7- 9.7]	8.8 [6.4- 11.9]	4.1 [2.8- 6.6]	2.3 [0.7- 7.2]
Malaria cases (per 100 000 people) (c)		2000	..	545	1 207	46	13,934
Tuberculosis cases (per 100 000 people) (d)		2003	507	821	476	621	355

(a) Data refer to the average for the years specified.

(b) Data refer to point and range estimates based on new estimation models developed by UNAIDS. Range estimates are presented in square brackets.

(c) Data refer to malaria cases reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) and may represent only a fraction of the true number in a country.

(d) Data refer to the prevalence of all forms of tuberculosis.


Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2005.

Evolution of Trade between the EU25 and Ethiopia 1999-2005

EU Imports from Ethiopia							
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total Imports (in mio Euro)	183,5	249,7	176,1	194,9	189,6	195,3	283,1
Agricultural Products (in percent of total Import)	78%	72%	50%	58%	62%	70%	73%
EU Exports to Ethiopia							
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total Exports (in mio Euro)	474,9	442,0	416,7	376,5	450,5	416,3	591,2
Agricultural Products (in percent of total Import)	12%	15%	9%	6%	17%	6%	5%
Trade Balance of EU Trade with Ethiopia							
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total Trade Balance (in mio Euro)	291,4	192,3	240,6	181,6	260,9	221,0	308,1
Export/Import ratio	259%	177%	237%	193%	238%	213%	209%

Source: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/128149.htm>

Figure 1.1



Ethiopia's Trade in Goods with the World 2003

Import		
Partner Title	Trade Value	Percentage
USA	\$384.386.976	14,31%
China	\$313.696.640	11,68%
Italy	\$245.918.224	9,16%
Japan	\$195.787.968	7,29%
India	\$175.521.408	6,53%
Other partners	\$1.370.624.656	51,03%
Total	\$2.685.935.872	100,00%
Export		
Partner Title	Trade Value	Percentage
Djibouti	\$99.414.608	19,39%
Germany	\$57.556.000	11,23%
Japan	\$43.722.748	8,53%
Saudi Arabia	\$35.419.344	6,91%
Italy	\$31.724.676	6,19%
Other partners	\$244.851.424	47,76%
Total	\$512.688.800	100,00%

Source: <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/ce/ceSnapshot.aspx?r=231>

Figure 1.2.1
Ethiopia's import partners





Figure 1.2.2
Ethiopia's export partners




Evolution of Trade between the EU25 and Kenya 1999-2005

EU Imports from Kenya							
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total Imports (in mio Euro)	847,0	844,1	938,7	864,7	808,6	873,3	952,0
Agricultural Products (in percent of total Import)	85%	88%	83%	89%	91%	90%	88%
EU Exports to Kenya							
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total Exports (in mio Euro)	902,3	939,5	1044,2	927,1	797,0	940,7	962,5
Agricultural Products (in percent of total Import)	5%	6%	5%	5%	5%	5%	5%
Trade Balance of EU Trade with Kenya							
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total Trade Balance (in mio Euro)	55,3	95,4	105,5	62,4	-11,6	67,4	10,5
Export/Import ratio	107%	111%	111%	107%	99%	108%	101%

Source: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/128149.htm>

Figure 2.1



Kenya Trade in Goods with the World 2004

Import		
Partner Title	Trade Value	Percentage
United Arab Emirates	\$502.423.293	11,00%
South Africa	\$446.183.489	9,78%
Saudi Arabia	\$410.715.732	9,00%
United Kingdom	\$404.789.331	8,87%
Japan	\$278.870.426	6,11%
Other partners	\$2.520.474.016	55,23%
Total	\$4.563.456.287	100,00%
Export		
Partner Title	Trade Value	Percentage
Uganda	\$470.441.637	17,53%
United Kingdom	\$282.060.770	10,51%
Areas, nes	\$245.358.821	9,14%
Netherlands	\$222.937.474	8,31%
Tanzania	\$213.635.520	7,96%
Other partners	\$1.248.771.971	46,54%
Total	\$2.683.206.193	100,00%

Source: <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/ce/ceSnapshot.aspx?r=404>

Figure 2.2.1
Kenyas import partners





Figure 2.2.2
Kenyas export partners



Evolution of Trade between the EU25 and Sudan 1999-2005

EU Imports from Sudan

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total Imports (in mio Euro)	193,0	263,0	310,6	269,4	235,2	254,1	176,3
Agricultural Products (in percent of total Import)	45%	37%	27%	34%	35%	39%	71%

EU Exports to Sudan


	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total Exports (in mio Euro)	496,3	455,5	632,0	561,3	669,5	850,3	1329,3
Agricultural Products (in percent of total Import)	12%	14%	10%	8%	6%	6%	7%

Trade Balance of EU Trade with Sudan

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total Trade Balance (in mio Euro)	303,3	192,5	321,4	291,9	434,3	596,2	1153,0
Export/Import ratio	257%	173%	204%	208%	285%	335%	754%

Source: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/128149.htm>

Figure 3.1



Sudan Trade in Goods with the World 2003

Import		
Partner Title	Trade Value	Percentage
United Kingdom	\$564.308.975	19,47%
Saudi Arabia	\$380.034.358	13,11%
China	\$310.066.382	10,70%
Egypt	\$186.989.872	6,45%
India	\$144.164.732	4,97%
Other partners	\$1.312.537.198	45,29%
Total	\$2.898.101.517	100,00%
Export		
Partner Title	Trade Value	Percentage
China	\$1.616.217.292	65,15%
Japan	\$214.927.747	8,66%
United Kingdom	\$177.660.429	7,16%
Saudia Arabia	\$124.765.002	5,03%
Egypt	\$41.903.439	1,69%
Other partners	\$305.161.298	12,30%
Total	\$2.480.635.207	100,00%

Source: <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/ce/ceSnapshot.aspx?r=736>

Figure 3.2.1
Sudans import partners





Figure 3.2.2
Sudans export partners



Evolution of Trade between the EU25 and Tanzania 1999-2005

EU Imports from Tanzania

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total Imports (in mio Euro)	246,2	421,3	420,2	442,0	623,0	677,2	318,8
Agricultural Products (in percent of total Import)	66%	64%	61%	57%	39%	34%	84%

EU Exports to Tanzania


	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total Exports (in mio Euro)	313,3	342,8	413,9	384,7	407,5	443,8	527,0
Agricultural Products (in percent of total Import)	6%	7%	5%	7%	6%	6%	6%

Trade Balance of EU Trade with Tanzania

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total Trade Balance (in mio Euro)	67,1	-78,5	-6,3	-57,3	-215,5	-233,4	208,2
Export/Import ratio	127%	81%	99%	87%	65%	66%	165%

Source: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/128149.htm>

Figure 4.1



Tanzania Trade in Goods with the World 2004

Import		
Partner Title	Trade Value	Percentage
South Africa	\$331.034.652	13,08%
India	\$216.438.883	8,55%
United Arab Emirates	\$184.921.676	7,31%
Japan	\$180.900.390	7,15%
China	\$171.727.139	6,78%
Other partners	\$1.446.163.595	57,13%
Total	\$2.531.186.335	100,00%
Export		
Partner Title	Trade Value	Percentage
United Kingdom	\$473.152.437	32,28%
South Africa	\$120.251.821	8,20%
India	\$104.177.881	7,11%
Kenya	\$90.049.614	6,14%
China	\$71.320.943	4,87%
Other partners	\$606.880.836	41,40%
Total	\$1.465.833.532	100,00%

Source: <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/ce/ceSnapshot.aspx?r=834>

Figure 4.2.1

Tanzania's import partners





Figure 4.2.2

Tanzania's export partners




Evolution of Trade between the EU25 and Uganda 1999-2005

EU Imports from Uganda							
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total Imports (in mio Euro)	322,8	285,6	266,5	280,0	253,5	262,6	301,0
Agricultural Products (in percent of total Import)	88%	83%	89%	85%	90%	87%	93%
EU Exports to Uganda							
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total Exports (in mio Euro)	174,8	200,4	196,1	203,1	211,9	222,8	259,8
Agricultural Products (in percent of total Import)	6%	10%	7%	6%	6%	6%	5%
Trade Balance of EU Trade with Uganda							
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total Trade Balance (in mio Euro)	-148,0	-85,2	-70,4	-76,9	-41,6	-39,8	-41,2
Export/Import ratio	54%	70%	74%	73%	84%	85%	86%

Source: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/128149.htm>

Figure 5.1



Uganda Trade in Goods with the World 2004

Import		
Partner Title	Trade Value	Percentage
Kenya	\$344.190.453	20,78%
South Africa	\$139.845.497	8,44%
Japan	\$121.669.885	7,34%
India	\$120.862.362	7,30%
USA	\$103.425.179	6,24%
Other Partners	\$826.591.411	49,90%
Total	\$1.656.584.787	100,00%
Export		
Partner Title	Trade Value	Percentage
Switzerland	\$108.842.842	17,02%
Kenya	\$76.723.050	12,00%
Netherlands	\$57.862.728	9,05%
United Arab Emirates	\$33.400.009	5,22%
United Kingdom	\$29.404.811	4,60%
Other Partners	\$333.239.961	52,11%
Total	\$639.473.401	100,00%

Source: <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/ce/ceSnapshot.aspx?r=800>

Figure 5.2.1
Uganda's import partners





Figure 5.2.2
Uganda's export partners



Extracts from: "East African Community Customs Union Tariff Liberalisation Impacts in Perspective" by Heinz-Michael Stahl, published by EAC 2005.

ORIGIN OF EAC PARTNER STATES' IMPORTS 2003

EAC partners' trade with	Kenya's imports		Tanzania's imports		Uganda's imports	
	USD millions	%	USD millions	%	USD millions	%
TOTAL	4,148.9	100	2,321.7	100	1,371.7	100
EAC	133.41	3.22	121.85	5.25	368.12	26.84
Kenya			115.43	4.97	357.33	26.05
Tanzania	47.13	1.14			10.79	0.79
Uganda	86.28	2.08	6.42	0.28		
COMESA						
Egypt	28.73	0.69	6.35	0.27	6.43	0.47
Ethiopia	2.05	0.05	0.83	0.04	0.06	0.00
Rwanda	0.25	0.01	0.05	0.00	0.54	0.04
Zambia	6.16	0.15	145.06	6.25	0.21	0.02
OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES						
South Africa	361.16	8.70	228.86	9.86	98.98	7.22
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES						
Australia	20.77	0.50	37.96	1.64	31.98	2.33
Japan	204.58	4.93	85.17	3.67	90.36	6.59
Switzerland	22.61	0.54	6.98	0.30	7.06	0.51
United States	216.48	5.22	72.71	3.13	78.13	5.70
EU	996.62	24.02	505.24	21.76	258.33	18.83
Belgium	83.75	2.02	31.45	1.35	23.09	1.68
France	112.24	2.71	63.79	2.75	15.67	1.14
Germany	174.60	4.21	91.45	3.94	39.15	2.85
Italy	90.71	2.19	55.72	2.40	23.33	1.70
Netherlands	105.01	2.53	47.36	2.04	25.02	1.82
United Kingdom	309.59	7.46	101.63	4.38	86.14	6.28
ASIA						
China P. R. Mainl.	265.88	6.41	210.60	9.07	70.25	5.12
India	242.11	5.84	176.17	7.59	102.16	7.45
Indonesia	31.07	0.75	77.78	3.35	4.69	0.34
Malaysia	20.07	0.48	29.09	1.25	42.06	3.07
Pakistan	93.95	2.26	23.34	1.01	18.29	1.33
MIDDLE EAST						
Bahrain	59.97	1.45	85.31	3.67	0.18	0.01
Saud Arabia	405.42	9.77	59.84	2.58	12.27	0.89
United Arab Emir.	556.76	13.42	122.87	5.29	80.42	5.86

SIGNIFICANCE OF INTRA – EAC IMPORTS – 2003

Total intra – EAC Imports (trade) 2003 (USD Millions)	623.4
Kenya's share in total intra –EAC imports (%)	21.4
Tanzania's share in total intra – EAC Imports (%)	19.5
Uganda's share in total intra –EAC Imports (%)	59.1
Share of intra – EAC imports in total imports (%)	7.9

ORIGIN OF EAC PARTNER STATES' IMPORTS (NATIONAL STATISTICS) MILLIONS OF US \$


Imports of originating in	Kenya %		Tanzania %		Uganda %	
EAC	28,6	0,8	82,8	4,6	368,1	26,8
Kenya			80,2		357,3	26,0
Tanzania	18,2		-		10,8	0,8
Uganda	10,3		2,6		-	
Non – EAC	3446,4	99,2	1715,3	95,4	1007,0	73,2
RSA	304,3	8,8	277,1	15,4	99,0	7,2
COMESA	125,4	3,6			32,3	2,3
COMESAFTA	94,9	2,7				
Egypt	59,3				6,4	0,5
World total	3475,0	100	1798,1	100	1375,1	100

Excluding Uganda Viz. Kenya, respectively

EAC PARTNER STATE'S EXPORT 2003, BY COUNTRY OF DESTINATION

EAC partners' trade with	Kenya's exports		Tanzania's exports		Uganda's exports	
	USD millions	%	USD millions	%	USD millions	%
TOTAL	2581,5	100	962	100	531,9	100
EAC	434,38	16,83	54,54	5,67	84,26	15,84
Kenya			44,73	4,65	78,43	14,75
Tanzania	109,55	4,24			5,83	1,1
Uganda	324,84	12,58	9,81	1,02		
COMESA						
Congo D.R.C	54,13	2,1	20,04	2,08	12,89	2,42
Egypt	118,78	4,6	2,11	0,22	2,67	0,5
Ethiopia	44,72	1,73	0,47	0,05	0,16	0,3
Rwanda	80,42	3,12	4,9	0,51	20,8	3,91
Zambia	21,17	0,82	21,39	2,22	0,25	0,05
OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES						
Somali	54,94	2,13	0,43	0,04	0,13	0,02
South Africa	10,46	0,41	20,92	2,17	29,63	5,57
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES						
Japan	22,38	0,87	89,8	9,33	10,01	1,88
United States	242,09	9,38	23,73	2,47	12,69	2,39
Switzerland	13,06	0,51	3,66	0,38	73,0	13,72
EU	840,17	32,55	301,78	31,37	146,25	27,5
Belgium	28,83	1,12	37,45	3,89	12,9	2,43
France	68,34	2,65	6,05	0,63	5,13	0,96
Germany	84,06	3,26	50,06	5,2	12,02	2,26
Netherlands	219,46	8,5	77,98	8,11	48,96	9,2
United Kingdom	322,1	12,48	50,45	5,24	33,88	6,37
ASIA						
India	36,18	1,4	95,25	9,9	1,13	0,21
Pakistan	120,95	5,03	8,79	0,91	0,22	0,04

Source: International Monetary Fund: Direction of Trade Statistics, December 2004



Note: The chart is referring to the BTI 2006, an assessment tool on democratic and economic reforms in the world, which is given out by the German “Bertelsmann Stiftung”.

The Management Index shows the extent to which committed leaders have been consistent and determined in pursuing democracy and a market economy.

The different pillars on international cooperation, consensus-building, resource efficiency and steering capability show the performance, capacity and accountability of political actors regarding those issues. Political actors are defined as government and political elites as well as NGOs in case of playing an important role in the transformation process of the respective country. Scores are ranging from 1 to 10.

Source: <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/16.0.html?&L=1>

3

The Region

3.1

On the agenda in the EAC

Towards a Regional Economic Bloc: Women and Cross-Border Trade in the Context of East African Community Customs Union

By: Kimani Francis, Kenya

Introduction

The re-establishment and re-launch of the East African community Treaty was a very noble and ambitious initiative, which intended to liberate the East African Countries i.e. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania from their economic woes. The Treaty for the establishment of the East African Community, which borrowed heavily from The EAC Development Strategy, 1997 – 2000, came into force on 7th July 2000.

The current EAC Treaty tried to avoid as much as possible the shortcomings associated with the earlier integration initiative and as a result took into account the ongoing globalization process, as exemplified by the intensification of competition brought about by the liberalization of international trade and financial market systems.

With a vision to create wealth, raise the living standards of all people of East Africa and enhance the international competitiveness of the region through increased production, trade and investments, the East African regional integration process was envisaged to be a progressive process, commencing with a Customs Union as the entry point to the Community. This would be followed up by a Common Market, then a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation. However movement from one level of economic integration to another would be through negotiated protocols, starting with that on the establishment of an EAC Customs Union.

The East African Community Customs Union

The establishment of the East African Community Customs Union Protocol is enshrined in Article 75(7) of the Treaty, which provides that:

“For purposes of this Article, the Partner States shall within a period of four years conclude the Protocol on the Establishment of a Customs Union”.

Though the conclusion of the Protocol on the Establishment of a Customs Union took longer than envisaged due

to unforeseen circumstances it was finalised and signed on 2nd March 2004. It was launched on December 2004 with its implementation starting in January 2005.

The objects of the East African Community Customs Union are to:

- Further liberalise intra-regional trade in goods on the basis of mutually beneficial trade agreements among the partner states;
- Promote efficiency in production within the Community;
- Enhance domestic, cross border and foreign investment in the Community; and
- Promote economic development and diversification in industrialisation in the Community.

These are the key pillars of the Customs Union that the member states were to build on to strengthen the regional trade and economies in order to fight biting poverty which has afflicted the East African Countries.

Implementation of the East African Customs Union has been going on since January 2005. As any other policy, its implementation has had different impact on men and women traders. However the effects on women cross border traders have been profound. This is because the main type of cross border trade practiced across the East African borders is the Informal Cross Border Trade (ICBT) which is conducted by small-scale quasi-professional traders, who use various means to move small quantities of goods across

national frontiers, to conduct trade. It has been established that the majority of these are women.

Previously disregarded, the cross border trade, with women being the majority participants, has increasingly been seen as a source of development and poverty alleviation within the East African region. Though Informal Cross-Border Trade is coming under the spotlight, little has been done to provide an enabling environment or to improve the welfare of small-scale traders. This is despite the introduction of the Customs Union, which has numerous opportunities for small scale women traders that can enable them eke out a living more efficiently and effectively through their cross border trade.

Opportunities Presented to the Small-Scale Women Traders by the EAC Customs Union

Based on a gender analysis of the various articles of the EAC Customs Union, which was conducted by Collaborative Centre for Gender and Development with support from Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Foundation (FES) various opportunities for cross border women traders have been flagged out. Taking advantage of these opportunities by women cross border traders would not only improve their economic status but would also contribute significantly to strengthening of the regional economies. Some of these opportunities include the following.

The Preamble to the EA Protocol notes that the formation of the Customs Union is intended to be progressive in

the course of the transitional period of five (5) years (See also article 11 (1)). The idea of progressive realization of the Union is aimed at a smooth transition especially for small-scale trade and industry in member countries that have fairly low levels of technology and expertise. The opportunity here is that small scale cross border traders will be able to “learn the game” of the new Customs Union over this period, and consider the trade commodities that are best suitable for them.

Articles 2 and 10 envisage the elimination of both tariff and non-tariff barriers, customs duties and other charges of equivalent effect in order to create the most favourable environment for regional trade. Small-scale women traders have in the past encountered numerous deficiencies and difficulties in raising the requisite tariffs and import duties. The creation of a tariff-free environment is therefore a significant opportunity for women.

Article 3 of the Protocol envisages trade liberalization, efficiency in production, enhanced domestic, cross-border and foreign investment and promotion of economic development and diversification. These objectives open up a very wide window of opportunities for small-scale women traders in terms of enhanced production and consumption of varied goods and services, quality and even the volume of production.

Article 4 specifically mentions about cooperation in training facilities and programmes on customs and trade.

Such training and technical know-how for women will go a long way towards enhancing the real and potential capabilities of small-scale women traders. This opening provision is therefore fundamental for women.

Article 4(2)(b) talks of a standard system of valuation of goods based on principles of equity, uniformity and simplicity. No one appreciates and deserves the exercise of the principles of equity, simplicity, uniformity and consistency more than the small-scale female trader. Guaranteeing and ensuring equity will encourage women to venture in trade more confidently. Also the simplification of application procedures will encourage more women to practise cross border trade.

Reducing the number and volume of documentation in respect to trade and the adoption of common standards of trade documentation and procedures as addressed by Article 6 is very positive for small scale women traders. Heavy documentation has scared away women traders or pushed them to use brokers who in many cases fleece women traders of money.

Article 7 obliges state parties to simplify, standardize and harmonize trade information and documentation. This will enable small scale women traders, majority of who have limited literacy levels, access trade information so as to make informed choices. They will also be in a position to clear their goods instead of using brokers due to simplified documentation.

Article 15 recognizes the National Treatment principle of non-discrimination. This technically means that the small-scale women traders from either country can criss-cross the EA territory with whatever wares or merchandise they have to sell or buy without any discrimination provided they comply with the customs requirements.

By **article 16**, Partner states are permitted to take anti-dumping measures in case there is potential or real injury to their domestic industries. The anti-dumping measures envisaged under the Protocol are intended to prevent dumping and to restore equilibrium in case the same occurs. Small-scale industries stand to gain, as they will be allowed to thrive and eventually be restored to equilibrium if dumping occurs, much to the advantage of small-scale traders in EA, majority of who are women.

The provision of subsidies by partner states is sanctioned by **article 17** provided the obligation of notification to other partner states is met. This is a major boost to small-scale women traders since they often find themselves in situations whereby they can hardly raise the necessary capital to start or sustain business thus hindering their participation in trade

Safeguard measures are allowed under the joint-provisions of **articles 19** and **36** (which is referred to as the 'Safeguard Clause' in trade terminology) to protect industries that are likely to suffer in case of a sudden surge of a product imported into a

partner state. Small-scale industries, which suffer most in such cases, are therefore cushioned. Women are the majority architects or proprietors of these small-scale (cottage) industries and therefore, the safeguard measures would come in most handy for small-scale women traders.

Under **article 21** the Protocol intends and supports free trade thus encouraging competition. Competition results in increased production and productivity, diversified production, better quality, trade specialization, aggressive marketing, increased profits, economies of scale and ultimately, lower prices. Thus, the practical benefits that will accrue to the small-scale female buyer or seller of a Union commodity cannot be gained.

Articles 24 and **41** provide a mechanism of dispute resolution on issues relating to rules of origin, dumping, subsidies and safeguard measures etc. indicated also as clear channel for advancing grievances within the region. This has not been clearly defined before and as such traders especially women traders will have a conduct to forward their trade grievances for redress. In the past women traders had been exploited in silence due to lack of clear path for complaints. It's such a welcome idea for women cross border traders.

The establishment of Export Promotion Schemes and Bond Schemes is to be encouraged under **articles 25** (see also **article 28** and **29** of the Protocol respectively. **article 29 (2)** goes further to provide that entry into

an EPZ shall allow total relief from payment of duty on imported goods to be used directly in the production of export goods. Small-scale women traders can take advantage of these provisions by forming closely-knit production outfits that would guarantee them access to external markets (with their huge gains) and at the same time attract the usual spill-over effects of export promotion schemes, like the development of local and micro-economies and provision of employment to locals.

Article 26 permits the draw-back of import duties upon exportation to external markets on such amounts and upon such conditions as may be prescribed by the competent authority. These will compliment women's trade gains accruing from the Export Promotion Schemes, Bond Schemes and the EPZ. However it should be ensured that the conditions to be set take gender considerations on board to ensure that both men and women, large scale and small-scale traders benefit.

Small-scale women traders should be encouraged to pay tax (i.e. duty and V.A.T) as provided for under the remission schemes to be established pursuant to **article 27** of the Protocol. They should pay tax with zeal and enthusiasm in order to, not only enable their governments to establish small-scale trade-conducive environments, but also sustain such environments in the interests of small-scale traders, for the eventual benefit of the Community as a whole.

Article 31 allows for the establishment of free-ports at seas, rivers, airports etc for the purpose of facilitating international trade and accelerating development. Under **sub-article 3**, goods entering a free port shall be granted total relief from payment of duty and other import levies except where the goods are removed from the free-port for home use. Who needs duty-exemption or tax relief much more than a small-scale female trader? They need to participate more in importation and exportation in order to take advantage of the free storage, warehousing, simplified customs procedures and supply chain centres services offered by the free-ports. This would lead to lowered production costs and therefore higher profits.

Article 32 gives the EA Council ample room to, from time to time and as circumstances may so require, approve the establishment of other special economic arrangements for purposes of the development of the economies of the partner states. 'Special' means, inter alia, a special group of people like small-scale women traders. 'Special' may also mean special circumstances like the circumstances of small-scale women traders, either individually or collectively. The best proactive action that these traders can take is to form formidable associations with more bargaining power(s) sufficient to canvass their case and convince the Council that they deserve preferential treatment like exemption of import goods from duty provided for under **article 33**.

The Protocol at **article 37** envisages the formation and continuation of trade linkages with other parts of the world and the world at large. The three partner states are members of the WTO and the ACP-EU trade arrangement. The WTO recognizes the role played by small-scale trade in the global economy and allows for the provision of preferential terms to small-scale traders, but in most cases, through their umbrella countries. The small-scale women trading groups should go a long way towards tapping such potential benefits.

Article 38 allows for the establishment of inter-linkages in various areas of cooperation. These include the critical governance areas of the environment and natural resources management, standardisation, sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures and intellectual property rights. From the perspective of the small-scale female trader, the Community's resolution to establish and maintain a clean and healthy environment, adherence to quality maintenance and sound sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures translates the EA customs union not only into a Cape of Good Hope but also a safe and conducive haven for meaningful trade.

By taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the protocol the small scale cross border woman trader will have ample room for expanding her trade ventures. She will be able to add value not only to her life but also to her family and the whole society at large. She will be able to trade alongside her male counterparts thus creating healthy

competition, which is favourable for trade enabling both men and women to earn a living from their toil.

Emergent challenges

Just like a coin that has two sides, in most cases, something good usually has its cons. The following are some of the challenges that may hinder women from fully taking advantage of the opportunities accruing from the Customs Union protocol.

One of the main challenges, taking cognizance of **article 3**, is how to ensure that the information on the customs union is available to stakeholders involved in cross border trade with the small scale cross border women traders being an integral component.

Another challenge in **article 7** is how to simplify, standardize and harmonize trade information and documentation in a language and through measures that are capable of being understood and accessed by the common masses.

Another related challenge is how small-scale traders will access the customs data bank to be established at the Secretariat pursuant to **sub-article 3 (b)**.

Competition as is being encouraged Under **article 21**, is a double-edged sword, which can also work against small-scale women traders, if they are not competitive enough, pushing them out of trade. The challenge in this case is to what extent competition will favour or on the other hand disadvantage women traders. As has

happened in other places uncontrolled competition invariably puts small-scale operators out of business rather easily than medium scale and large-scale traders.

Articles 25 (see also **article 29**) and **28** of the Protocol respectively encourage the establishment of Export Promotion Schemes and Bond Schemes. This may present a challenge in the sense that small-scale traders may not benefit from these schemes owing to the huge capital outlay required unless they are empowered financially through loans and credit facilities so that they can benefit from the EPZ arrangement.

While hailing **article 26** for permitting the draw-back of import duties upon exportation to external markets, the challenge is how to ensure that these draw-backs trickle down to the individual exporters, particularly small scale women traders. In this case therefore, the small-scale women traders should be encouraged to take advantage of existing and yet-to-be established export schemes. It is also important that these schemes be established as soon as possible.

Aggressive publicity and dissemination of the EAC Treaty, the Protocol, the Community's policies and other applicable laws and principles as provided for under **article 39** of the Protocol is very welcome. However the challenge is to ensure this is done in a language that is simple and accessible to small-scale women traders who form majority of those with limited or no education.

The fundamental challenge for the Customs Union is that of improving

the welfare of citizens and traders in particular, more so the small-scale women traders. In brief, the provisions and ideals of the Protocol should be applied to confer real economic benefit/change on the small-scale trader.

Challenges Faced by Women Traders in Post Customs Union Implementation

Though the East African Community Customs Union Protocol, Article 3, highlights that trade protocol shall promote efficiency in production, enhance domestic, cross border and foreign investment to promote economic development and diversification in industrialization in the partner states, women small scale traders continue to face myriad obstacles in cross border trade.

Based on a study and consultations held with women cross border traders by the Collaborative Centre for Gender and Development in the last quarter of 2005, it emerged that despite the fact that the Customs Union has been in implementation since January 2005 and presents a lot of benefits to the small-scale women traders, they continue to be trapped in a complex web of trade challenges that has adversely affected their trade activities.

Some of the challenges, in summary, that had been identified in post Customs Union implementation include the following.

- Women traders are lacking access to information related to trade, both domestic and regional. For

instance despite the fact that the EAC Customs Union have been in existence and operational for over one year women cross border traders are not aware of it.

- Majority of the women practicing cross border trade have low or zero literacy levels. They have therefore entirely depended on brokers/ agents to transact business and clear goods on their behalf. These brokers fleece women a lot of money since even after the new tax regimes have come into force most women continue to pay rates and charges previously charged before enforcement of the Customs Union. In addition most traders cannot be able to access information on the Customs Union since its written and presented in a technical language.
- The women traders, in some border points also face excessive harassment especially from the customs officials, police and municipal askaris.
- Limited market access: Some of the cross border traders especially in Namanga have no access to external market for some of their commodities e.g. Ushanga. They therefore depend on seasonal tourists for their sales, which affects their financial base.
- The women traders face challenges in accessing finance to initiate and even expand their businesses. It is difficult for them to access credits and loans from banks and micro-finance institutions since they don't have collateral.
- The shortage of foreign currency experienced in border points compound the situation for

this partially developed sector. Concern is that even in countries with adequate foreign currency supply, the many demanding processes of trading particularly penalize women, which negatively impact on the growth of their businesses.

- Lack of a market space is another obstacle that female traders face. Though they may be willing to engage in trade as a means of livelihood they don't have space where to operate from.
- Poor infrastructure, which then result in market distortion, is another obstacle. Due to poor infrastructure transporting of goods from the border points to other parts of the country become very high.
- Lack of standardization of their products is another obstacle faced by the cross border women traders. It is clear that they need support from institutions responsible for standards and quality control.
- Domestic responsibilities are another challenge. With the increasing number of female-headed households the women are torn between engaging in full time trade and the domestic chores.
- The parallel market- illicit cross border trade has been another major obstacle for women's advancement in cross border trade. It leads to tax evasion creating unhealthy competition, which greatly disadvantage small-scale women traders.

These barriers, among others, have greatly hampered and reduced trade

activities, not only among women but also amongst the East African countries, which have in turn affected adversely the economies of the regional countries.

As the East African Regional Integration moves to the phase of integration i.e. establishment of a common market it is important that women who constitute a majority of the East African population and small scale traders be put at the core of this process. This is because the three countries cannot achieve meaningful development if more than half of the integration beneficiaries are locked out of the integration processes.

Conclusion

Fundamentally, the negotiation and implementation of all the EAC integration processes i.e. Customs Union, Common Market, Monetary Union and Political Federation should ensure quantitative and qualitative participation of all actors (men and women), all sectors of the economy as well as governments. The business community in the mainstream and informal sectors, the civil society organizations, (including labour, CBOs/NGOs, Faith based institutions, cultural groups etc.) must be actively involved and gender perspectives should be integrated at all levels.

Some Recommendations

In order to maximise the gains from the Customs Union as well as the other East African Integration Processes and promote the social and economic empowerment of women, the three East African governments should embark on the following

- Programmes aimed at promoting men and women access to resources including information, technology, market space and equipment
- Gender sensitive education, skills and training for men and women to take advantage of new opportunities and openings presented by trade liberalisation.
- Gender sensitive and gender equality oriented modification of trade rules and other related policy areas.
- Programmes and policies to remove or offset the information bias that women face in relation to men in terms of credit, market intelligence, government services and technology.
- Supportive measures to boost women's access to credit and technical and marketing knowledge including any relevant information on trade.
- Grants and low interest loans to small enterprises disadvantaged by the customs union (as a result of the comparative advantage principle) and any other form of trade liberalisation.

To promote women's social and economic well being through the EAC Customs Union, the CSOs have a role to play, for instance in;

- Simplification and dissemination of information related to the EAC integration initiatives to men and women.
- Undertaking a gender impact assessment of all trade agreements

whether at the multilateral, regional national or bilateral level.

- Lobbying and advocacy to modify trade measures to limit the negative impact on disadvantaged groups.
- Undertaking a gender impact assessment of all trade agreements whether at the multilateral, regional national or bilateral level.
- Reforming/repealing laws that are injurious to women's short term and long-term trade interests.

In order to facilitate the process of gender mainstreaming in the member states, all the actors involved in the Customs Union as well as the regional trade fora should ensure that;

- Gender analysis and a gender perspective are incorporated in all policies, projects and programmes.
- Gender impact assessments of regional policy, programmes and project proposals are implemented at all stages from design and decision making through to implementation and evaluation.
- A coherent and effective policy framework and institutional process for gender mainstreaming is developed and implemented within the region.
- The development and functioning of strong independent/autonomous women's leadership and professional trade organisations supported by the member states.

Way Forward

As a way forward the importance of demystifying the economic policy initiatives within the East African region such as the East African Community and the East African Community Customs Union and other forthcoming initiatives to encourage more participation and input from the ordinary people, particularly women traders, cannot be overemphasised. It is an initiative that could provide opportunity to rebuild not only the East African region but also the continent. But conversely it could easily be used to marginalize the very people who are to benefit from its implementation.

By pertinently sensitising women cross border traders on the opportunities and challenges of the customs union, as well as the other integration initiatives, the region would not only be on an effective path towards integration but also it would ensure economic autonomy of all citizens of the three countries, which would contribute immensely to poverty reduction within the region, which clearly is the ultimate spirit and goal of the East African Community and the Customs Union. When this is achieved then significant strides would not only have been made towards enhancing the East African Regional economic development but also the achievement of Global Economic Targets such as Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These are the prospects and challenges.

Poverty in EAC Partner States

Based on: Gordon Repinski and Heinz-Michael Stahl: *“Poverty and Poverty Reduction Strategies in the East African Community (EAC)”*, GTZ Tanzania 2005.

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EAC policies, projects and programmes intend to contribute implicitly and automatically to poverty reduction through their general focus on integration and economic growth. The belief that this focus will inevitably lead to poverty reduction in EAC countries is grounded in liberal economic textbook knowledge but cannot be substantiated empirically.

Kenya

Kenya has a more developed economy in terms of industrialization than Tanzania and Uganda, and its rural sector today only accounts for 25% of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Nevertheless, Kenyan per capita income has been steadily decreasing since the beginning of the 1990s. During the 1992 to 1997 period, the proportion of people living below the poverty line rose from 45% to 52,3% (50% in urban and 52,9% in rural areas). Kenya is also the country with the greatest disparities in income distribution. The public services system has eroded as a result of reduced aid flows from donor countries because of corruption in the 1990s.

Kenyans experience greater problems in accessing safe drinking water than

the population in the neighbouring countries, and education in schools is extremely expensive. Admittedly though, one of the first actions of the newly elected government was to introduce free primary education. 40% of salaries are swallowed by the bureaucracy; this bloated bureaucracy is extremely expensive and creates inequality.

Life expectancy in Kenya is 45,5 years. 22% of the population are illiterate (10% male, 34% female), the illiteracy rate is 10-15% higher among the rural than among the urban population.

In terms of the Human Development Index, Kenya has dropped from rank 136 in 1999 to rank 154 out of 177 countries total in 2005. This once again makes Kenya a LDC (Least Developed Country).

Tanzania

Tanzania is still one of the poorest countries in the world. Average per-capita income is at 280 \$ per annum which amounts to less than 1 \$ a day. In recent years, overall economic performance has improved through increasing growth rates and low inflation rates. Yet this has not produced the hoped-for trickle-down effect.

In 2005, 36% of the population were living below the poverty line, 3% less than in 1991. The poverty gap between inhabitants of rural and urban areas is considerable: 38.7% of the rural as compared to 24% of the urban population are poor.

Life expectancy is at 43 years. The overall illiteracy rate is 29% of which 20% are men and 36% are women. In rural areas, illiteracy is 20% higher than in cities. Since free primary

school education was introduced a short time ago, the number of children attending school has increased considerably. Nevertheless, the quality of teaching and the relationship between teachers and pupils are still far from satisfactory.

In terms of the Human Development Index, Tanzania has dropped from position 156 in 1999 to 164 in 2005 out of 177 countries total.

Tanzania has a high potential for development, natural and mineral resources as well as a low population density. The mining sector attracted the bulk of Tanzania's foreign direct investment inflows, without, however, tangible effects on employment and wealth creation. The state and bureaucracy of this former socialist country still act as controlling agents rather than as facilitators for a rather slow privatization of the economy.

Uganda

In the 1990s, Uganda was a shining example of economic recovery in Africa. Growth rates of 6% and low inflation rates led to an economic boom and rising per-capita income. Yet those high growth rates also had to be attributed to the low initial level of economic activity. After two dictatorships and a civil war, the country is now relatively stable, except for the northern border region close to Sudan. Nevertheless investors are still hesitant. Strong dependency on coffee exports has led to a slight increase in poverty. Production needs to be diversified.

In 2001, 36% of the population was categorized as poor, 39% of the rural and 10% of the urban population. The illiteracy rate is at 37%, 23% for men

and 49% for women. A proportion of two thirds of the population have not finished primary school education. In the countryside, the illiteracy rate is 28% higher than in cities.

Life expectancy is at 43 years. Surprisingly, the Human Development Index rank for Uganda rose from 158 in 1999 to 144 out of 177 in 2005.

While the three countries are hoping that integration, liberalization of their economies and increasing economic growth will result in a general reduction of poverty, a comparison between the countries reveals that the situation of the poorest has not improved much. The poverty gap between the rural and the urban population as well as the Kenyan and Tanzanian drop in the Human Development Index are particularly worrying.

Therefore, more decisive and targeted poverty reduction strategies have to be adopted and implemented aiming at improving the lamentable poverty situation in the EAC partner countries. A change of paradigms has to take place in EAC integration policies prioritising tangible integration benefits for the general public in line with the EAC Treaty's mandate for a people-centred integration agenda. The fight against poverty has to be made a cross-cutting issue and the supreme goal of all EAC organs and policies.

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UNDP Human Development Report 2004

UNDP Human Development Report 2005

Status and Problems of the Customs Union of the East African Community: The perception from the communities along the borders

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criminally reducing or abolishing trade barriers only among member countries joining together in an integration scheme. Integration is thus a form of partial trade liberalization. The intensity of integration ranges from loose forms of integration to complete economic and political integration. According to Viner the following are the main forms of integration and their characteristics in an ascending order:

1. Introduction

The theory of economic integration refers to the commercial policy of dis-

Table 1

Form	Key Characteristics
1. Preferential Trading Arrangements	Mutual reduction of tarrifs and other trade barriers among members
2. Free Trade Area	Eliminate tarrifs and other barriers among members (Zero Internal Tarrifs)
3. Customs Union	Zero Internal Tarrifs + Common External Tarrif
4. Common Market	Customs Union + Free Movement of labour and capital within the Common Market
5. Economic Union	Common Market, Harmonizing and even unifying taxation and monetary affairs (i.e. common currency).
6. Political Federation/Union	Economic Union and Political Union (one parliament one Head of State).

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The pre-1977 EAC had climbed the economic integration ladder almost to the top except the last stage of political federation. By the time of its collapse in 1977 some advances reached earlier, like in the area of monetary integration had already suffered some reversals and eventually disintegrated. However given the advances that were made in the past, the three Heads of State decided to make the establishment of a Customs Union the re-entry point to the second attempt for East African integration scheme.

2. Special features of the Customs Union:

As shown in the above table a Custom Union has two main features – the elimination of internal tariffs among the member states – that is the importation of goods across borders of member states duty free subject to certain rules of origin. The idea of the rules of origin is to make sure that only goods considered to be made in the partner states benefit from the removal of duties, the purpose being to promote the growth of production, trade, economic growth and development. This is one of the key objectives of having a Customs Union. The second policy instrument used to achieve this objective is having a common external tariff for all member countries. That is once imports from non-members enter any part of the Customs Union they are taxed at the same rate and only once. That means if say a car is imported through Mombasa it is taxed at the same rate it would be taxed if it was imported through Tanga or Dar es Salaam and if it was resold in Arusha, it would not be sub-

jected to another tax reaching the Namanga border on the Kenyan side.

One of the reasons for the collapse of the pre-1977 EAC was the big economic imbalance between Kenya and her two neighbours. This economic imbalance stems from the differences in the structure of the three economies with Kenya being more industrialized than the other two. It is this production structure which resulted in the trade imbalance between Kenya and the other two countries. Reintroducing the EAC without addressing the problem of the trade imbalance would doom the new EAC to yet another collapse sooner or later. The problem was addressed by introducing the principle of asymmetry whereby not all internal tariffs would be reduced to zero at a stroke, rather tariffs on Kenya imports from Tanzania and Uganda would enter to Kenya duty free while imports from Kenya to Uganda and Tanzania would be subjected to a declining import duty over five years. There would thus be a transitional period during which internal tariff would not be uniformly eliminated across the board.

3. Reactions of people living or working on borders:

While the EAC is for all people in the three countries, it is fair to assume that it would have a greater impact positively or negatively on the people living on the borders of the three countries at least in the early stages of its implementation. Although the borders have not been open for the free passing of people more trade will inevitably involve more people passing to and fro across countries.

The increases or reduction of flow of goods across borders is also likely to be felt on the border more quickly than in the interior of the individual countries. It is for this reason that the initial assessment of the impact of the provisions of the Customs Union can more readily be discerned by doing a study on villages and towns situated on the borders of the three countries. They have been on the fore front of initiating such studies as part and parcel of a call to analyze and disseminate the key issues relating to economic and political integration in East Africa. Recently the Foundation held a workshop in Kampala, Uganda on the theme *“From Customs Union to Economic Community in East Africa: Which Way Forward”*. The author of this brief note attended this workshop as one of the resource persons. Among the presentations made at the workshop were two papers by Ugandan authors which discussed the experience of the introduction of the Customs Union in the East African Community as seen by people in border towns in Uganda. These papers were contained two brief research reports made at two border towns of Mutukula (on the Uganda/Tanzania border) and the other at Busia (on the Kenya/Uganda border.)¹ These two research reports sought to find out what people of various backgrounds knew about the objectives of the East African Community in general and the Customs Union protocol in particular and to find out the source of this knowledge including whether this knowledge was gained through sensitization and other participatory for a such as public meetings, seminars and workshops. It is for this reason

that the interviewees were clustered into three groups: First were the officials working as customs, immigration and security officials at borders. By nature of their jobs these people were supposed to know the changes brought about by the EAC in general and the Customs Union in particular.

The second group of respondents included District and Sub-District government officials NGO officials and Religions Leaders. As the local leaders these were expected to know the changes envisaged so that they would in turn pass on this knowledge to the ordinary people individually and in group meetings. The third group of interviewees was randomly selected from ordinary citizen particularly those people involved in cross border activities like trade. This group of interviewees was expected to get their information and knowledge from the second group and occasionally from the first group.

Apart from assessing their knowledge on the EAC the researchers tried to get the interviewees to express their expectations, fears, suggestions and other feelings they had about the EAC and its organs, notably the Customs Union.

3.1 Key Findings Related to the Surveys

The following were the key findings from the two border towns. While there were some differences between the two towns, these were a matter of emphasis rather than substance. In short, the findings for both towns can be summed up as follows:

3.1.1 Knowledge and Understanding of EAC issues including the Customs Union. This is a function of one's exposure to information. For the first group of respondents general knowledge was good although when the word protocol was introduced even some people working with customs and immigration swore they did not know what the researcher was talking about. Even some top district officials said they had not received enough documentation. For the second and third group knowledge was generally poor because they had not been involved in sensitization meetings.

3.1.2 Removal/reduction of internal tariff and non tariff barriers: Generally people in Uganda are happy about this aspect of the Customs Union. They note with satisfaction that they can already observe that the cross-border flow of goods has improved. However this joy about increased trade flows is tainted with doubts about the extent to which this will result in equal benefits since Kenya and Tanzania are seen as being better off in terms of industrial output. The acceptance of the principle of asymmetry in the elimination of internal tariffs is seen as helping to a greater extent than Tanzania and Uganda to increase her exports to Kenya.

3.1.3 The common external tariff – The adoption of the CET under the Customs Union resulted in higher customs duties for Uganda given that as a land-locked land has to bear higher transport costs. The higher external tariffs therefore increased prices of imports even higher. All categories of people interviewed agreed that the

CET hurt Uganda. This dampened Uganda's enthusiasm for the Customs Union. Although people at the border note with satisfaction that the clearance of goods was now more rapid the increased external tariff and the bad state of the transportation system has made imported goods more expensive for Uganda given that it is landlocked and distant from the sea ports. In the negotiations for the Customs Union for revenue purposes Tanzania appeared to have sided with Kenya for a higher external tariff than that wanted by Uganda for revenue purposes. Kenya was in favour of the higher common external tariff to protect its industries. So Uganda reluctantly agreed with the other two.

3.1.4 Good will and flexibility. A surprising finding from the border town of Mutukula was that Tanzania officials at the border – customs officials, policemen etc. were very inflexible and generally less friendly and wanted to follow the regulations to the letter and were seen as being unsympathetic to the spirit of the East African Community and the Customs Union of togetherness and tolerance. Some people interviewed even suggested that the gains made by Uganda would be adversely affected by the less tolerant attitude of Tanzanians.

3.1.5. Challenges and Problems: The noted increased intolerance appears to be building mistrust among the people of the EAC. This is a challenge that needs to be addressed. To this may be added the differences in legal, fiscal and other socio-economic variables among the three states. For example as noted by people inter-

viewed in Mutukula prices in Uganda obviously were higher due to greater transportation problems that Uganda on the other hand faces internal taxes e.g. VAT appear to be higher in Tanzania. Harmonization of policies is needed to at least reduce if not eliminate these differences which lead to conflicts.

4. Conclusion

In Tanzania the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung carried out a bigger study about Tanzania and economic integration with other African countries. The study was on SADC but also touched on the EAC. It was found out in that study that while Tanzanians are ready to strengthen the economic aspects in EAC they do not seem to favour political federation. In the initial days of the Customs Union Tanzanian traders were frustrated by efforts by Kenyan traders trying to hamper the implementation of the Customs Union Protocol and the press carried daily headings about these complaints. It appears that these concerns have now been addressed as these complaints seem to have come to an end. Indeed there have been newspaper headings applauding the benefits that Tanzania has gained from the Customs Union. It was reported from the TRA (Tanzania Revenue Authority) border customs post at Halili on the Kenya – Tanzania border that exports to Kenya increased sharply after the

creation of the Customs Union while the flow of exports from Kenya to Tanzania decreased considerably².

More recently in Parliament the Minister for Finance Zakia Meghji acknowledged that Tanzania was happy with the negotiations that led to the creation of the Customs Union. However one needs to be more cautious because as the transition period when Tanzania will also have to fully reciprocate Kenya's removal of import duties on goods imported from Kenya draws near this benefit will decline or even disappear unless Tanzania begins to cultivate the necessary comparative advantage to export competitively to Kenya. Tanzania must keep in mind the transitory nature of the provisions on asymmetry.

¹See *“Practical Realities of Cross Border Communities: Successes and Challenges of the Customs Union Protocol (Mutukula Report by Musinguzi Denis Kituo cha Katiba Kampala Uganda, Mimeo, August 2005 and The Practical Realities involved in the Implementation of the East African Community and the Protocol on the Establishment of the Customs Union. Katiba, Kampala, Uganda, Mimeo 2005).*

²See, the first page of the *“Daily Times” of March 23, 2006.*

3.2

On the agenda in Ethiopia

Can Ethiopia Economic Recovery be Sustainable?

By: Mengesha Hailmeleket, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

The policies initiated and implemented by the government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to bring about rapid and sustainable economic development are gaining momentum. Ethiopia was able to register from 8.4 to 11 percent economic growth in the past three years. Hence the economy recorded a significant improvement, reversing the decline in GDP that was registered in 2002/3. The impressive economic growth registered over the last three years is the result of the government policy of ADLI (agriculture led industrialization) and rural centered strategy. This direction mainly focuses on the development of agriculture through the distribution of improved seeds, fertilizer and pesticide to farmers, provision of credit and improved extension service and construction of small irrigation schemes. In addition the private sector investment has shown 25 percent growth within the last three years according to the report

of the Ethiopian Investment Agency. Floriculture, although new line of investment in the country is now proving to be successful & Ethiopia has earned 20 million USD and has become one of the most preferable countries to produce a wide range of flowers. In addition the export of agricultural products like coffee and oil seeds have contributed greatly as the world price of these commodities was fetching good price in the international market.

Even though the overall performance of the macro-economy during the past three years was very encouraging, some argue it is due to favorable weather conditions. It has to be noted also that due to the variability in the growth rates of GDP, the gains made in good years tend to be lost in bad years. According to some economics analysts, it is worth emphasizing that one of the recurrent salient features of the Ethiopian economy over the last few decades is instability. This instability mainly emanated from the dominance of agriculture and the vulnerability of the sector to the vagaries of nature. And this instability coupled with the almost stagnant performance of the non-agriculture sector has led to a weak average growth, despite the sharp

yearly fluctuations. The vulnerability in growth rate is not however similar across the sectors. Unlike the agriculture sector, the growth rates of other sectors have been relatively stable; however despite the relative stability of other sectors, due to the dominance of agriculture in the economy, the variability in the growth rates of the agriculture sector has influenced the growth performance of the overall economy.

Similarly owing to the high population growth rate, the growth rate of GDP has not been high enough to improve the standard of living of the population. GDP per capita grew only 0.1 percent, on the average over the last four decades. Needless to say, this is too small a change for an economy that is at subsistence level to improve the living conditions of the population.

Another salient feature of the Ethiopian economy is that the

composition and the structure of the economy showed no appreciable changes over the years. Agriculture still contributes the largest share to total output and hence, the Ethiopian industrial sector has been stagnant over the years both in terms of its share in GDP and growth performance. Its share has not changed much from 10% marks ratio of GDP over the last four decades and its growth rate only moved within 3 to 7 percent range during the same period.

Taking the above mentioned factors, the backward and traditional agricultural production methods and the current land policy of the government where there is no tenancy security, it awaits to be seen whether or not the current economic development can be sustained and the country can be promoted to middle level countries in 15 years time as predicted by government.

Ethiopia between democratization and rollback

The 2005 election results brought changes to the Horn of Africa country

By: Hartmut Hess, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia

The May 2005 elections in Ethiopia brought big changes for the country. The most obvious: The final result of the general elections brought the

various opposition groups the first time round about 35 percent of the seats in the 547 members House of Peoples Representatives (HPR). Before opposition groups were represented in the Parliament with only twelve members. In most of the regional parliaments the opposition as well got the first time a remarkable number of seats. In the capital Addis Ababa, the biggest opposition group, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) defeated the ruling party, Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) completely. All seats

for the HPR and more than 90 percent of the seats for the Municipal Council were won by CUD.

But the opposition was not able to get advantage out of this election result. After months of dispute over the suspected fraud by the ruling party and claims against the manipulations of the votes in almost all parts of the country, opposition started to dispute internally if they should join or boycott parliament. CUD claimed to have won the elections and wanted to take over. The call for boycotting the parliament came after the ruling party changed the code of conduct and the rules and procedures of the HPR limiting the possible influence of the opposition to almost nil. Strong influences of Ethiopians living in USA or Europe lead the CUD to a position of all or nothing.

The frustration of the voters who gave their voices to the opposition just to vote for a change erupted in civil unrest in Addis Ababa and other parts of the country. Clashes between protesters and Federal police and other security forces in June and November resulted in more than 80 dead, hundreds of injured and thousands of people in jail. The whole leadership of the CUD and a huge group of journalists were put in prison and charged with treason and attempt of genocide. The unrest was controlled but the problems not solved.

After months of internal dispute between the imprisoned leadership and elected members and trials to come in dialogue with the ruling party, most of the opposition

parliamentarians one by one joined the HPR negotiating with the support of the donor community to reach more rights and possibilities in parliament - as it is normal in democratic countries. They want to achieve that the opposition will be represented in the standing committee's and the deputy speaker of the house should be nominated from the opposition.

The results of the elections obviously were taken by a lot of opposition groups as sign to resume fighting against the federal government under the leadership of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. In the Somali region of Ethiopia, in Oromia, Gambela and Amhara Region so called liberation forces or fronts have resorted to armed struggle against a government they call "Meles regime" taking the election result and the following disputes as signs of the weakness of the central power in the country. Some of these groups tried to form an Alliance of Democratic Forces fighting the EPRDF government with the support of huge groups of the Diaspora. They claim to fight for national autonomy as guaranteed in the Ethiopian constitution. The Ethiopian government on his turn accuses the enemy Eritrea to support the armed groups in Ethiopia logistically, with training, equipment and weapons.

The opening towards a pluralistic society in the country before the elections in 2005 was suddenly stopped through the result and the reaction of the government. A climate of distrust between each other comes up since a lot of people were

imprisoned without being charged of any crime.

Ethiopia is on the crossroad: More democratization in the country including more independency for the more then 80 different nationalities in the country. This bears the danger

of a significant power loss for the central government. The way back to centralization, as many of the leaders of EPRDF seem to propose might provoke an enforcement of the armed opposition in the peripheral zones of the country and as well in the central region of Oromia.

Notes

3.3

On the agenda in Kenya

Kenyan Women in Politics

By: Irene Oloo, Kenya

In its report to the 28th session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Kenya outlined various efforts that have been undertaken to provide for gender equality as one way of boosting national development. For instance the report outlined the fact that in Kenya, the law provided for and protected women's access to the political process.

However, despite this provision in law, the participation of women in the public sphere has been jeopardized by universal myths that a woman's place is in the private sphere.

Legally, Kenya has an electoral system that is based on universal suffrage; whereby, both men and women have the legal capacity to vote so long as they fulfill the minimum requirement as to age and citizenship. Elections in the country are guided by the Electoral Act and conducted by the Electoral Commission of Kenya. In Kenya, as in many other countries, voter registration is an important

component of the electoral process and it is at this initial stage that a large number of women start to be sidelined in their pursuit to participate in the electoral process. Voter registration is a complex and laborious task that requires a lot of skill and resources, which ECK have continuously raised concern over the amount of funds set aside by the government to ensure that the process is inclusive.

A study on attitudes and perceptions of women towards the electoral process by LKWV identified alarming statistics on the state of potential women voters. Out of a total 9,780,343 females of voting age and above only 4,830,003 are registered voters, an indication that 50.6% of eligible female voters do not participate in the electoral process. No wonder women are not in power. Besides the structural and legal reasons that are bottlenecks in the process of voter registration a major attitudinal reason was identified. Voters cited negative attitude as reason for not registering as voters. This negative attitude was described in terms of the inconsequential contribution a woman's vote will have on political affairs and a massive voter education and registration drive specifically targeting women voters be launched.

Elected Representatives According To Gender

GENDER	POPULATION (15YRS+)	NO: OF ELECTED PARLIAMEN-TARIANS	% OF ELECTED PARLIAMEN-TARIANS	NO: OF ELECTED COUNCILORS	% OF ELECTED COUNCILORS
MALE	8,842,002	201	95.7%	2043	95.5%
FEMALE	9,780,343	9	4.3%	97	4.5%
TOTAL	18,622,345	210	100 %	2140	100 %

(Source electoral commission of Kenya & CBS 2003 projected estimates for 2006)

The situation in Kenya is that the number of women in elective positions both in parliament and local council is not representative of the country's female population.

As shown above, women are grossly underrepresented. If Kenyan women, according to universal suffrage of one woman one vote, were to employ their numerical strength, they would occupy 106 seats out of 201 reserved for elected parliamentarians.

On the basis of the same assumption, women would occupy 1124 civic seats at the local government.

Working on the assumption that women will vote for their fellow women, there then exists a strong likelihood that women can put female candidates in elective leadership positions but only if they register more.

Although the electoral commission of Kenya has published rules and regulations to guide election campaigns in the country, violence as witnessed in the 2002 elections is still a major problem. For women aspirants' election violence and other forms of intimidation limit the

chances of competing on the same footing with men.

Campaigns in Kenya have seriously started and very few women politicians are hitting the campaign trail as serious contenders except as escorts of their male counterparts, rarely being heard orating on the podium but rather to be seen ornamentally decorating the male-dominated rallies. This is scary and may be translated by misogynist critics to mean that it reflects the lacklustre performance of women in parliament as well as national politics. We need therefore, as the talk on the new constitution/minimum reforms heats up, to also analyse the participation of women in Kenyan politics and what hinders them from fronting their agenda despite an increase in numbers in this parliament as well as talks of a guaranteed increase in participation under the proposed new constitution.

Since 1969 when Kenya had its first woman parliamentarian, the Ninth Parliament has the highest ever achieved level of representation by women in Kenyan history; with 18 women out of the 222 members

in parliament. This however, falls drastically short of the United Nations target of achieving 30% representations of women in politics by 2005. Highlights of the African Regional Congress of Women in Politics - 1995 concluded that such statistics, in Kenya as well as in Africa, are indicative of the "limited decision making roles given to women in this region, as well as the need to support girls' education and women's more active participation in politics." It is therefore of paramount importance to analyze the political scene for gender imbalances, identify the problems that hinder women's active participation in politics, and offer recommendations to help alleviate the dismembering of women from the National Assembly and their marginalisation from decision making roles once they enter into parliament. Only when women fight hard against these problems are they going to ascend to power and be able to articulate their grievances, as there is no shortcut to it.

Socorro Reyes, in her *Seeking Gender Balance: Women Strategies for Change*, offers two strategic objectives for women in power and decision-making: Ensuring women's "equal access to and full participation in power structures and decision making, and increasing women's capacity to participate in decision making and leadership."

In terms of contribution to motions in parliament of the 90.8% MPs who contributed, 94.4% of women MPs contributed to motions as compared to 90.5% of males. This shows that the level of the women's contribution

surpassed that of their male counterparts.

In terms of points of orders raised by MPs, female MPs were almost on the same level with their male counterparts with 61.7% and 69.7% respectively.

Despite their critically limited number in parliament, women parliamentarians have matched their male counterparts in activities in the house. It therefore calls one to wonder why, if the ability is the same, few females make it to august house.

Major problems that need expounding include the attitudinal, cultural and structural impediments that ostracize women especially in their quest for upward political mobility. These emanate out of our cultural backgrounds, which are patriarchal in nature and hence encompass numerous gender stereotypes. These would also explain why, despite the electorate in Kenya being more female than male, women do not elect their own to parliament to reflect the dominance.

Economic disparities, which favour men, are also inhibiting factors. The imbalance between the extensive work women do and the limited rewards means poverty for them thus they can't influence the masses for political clout. UNDP [United Nations Development Programme] reports, for example, indicate that women do 80% of agricultural work yet access only 5% of credit in loans. Political campaigns are really very expensive, and only the rich are able to afford them. How then can women get into parliament

if they do not have the money to oil their campaign machinery?

The non-democratization of political parties and lack of practical policies to address gender issues inhibits women's upward mobility in political parties, which sponsor candidates. The structure and agenda of Kenyan political parties need to be scrutinized for chances of improvement.

Legal hurdles also exist. The constitution and its reviewing process poses challenges for women seeking political office. The existing electoral laws also offer official and non-official detriments to women aspirants both formally and informally. Section 82(4) of the constitution of Kenya discriminates against woman in matters of adoption, marriage, divorce and inheritance of property at the time of death of a husband, economically crippling women.

Informally, minimal reforms have ensured that half of all nominations by political parties be given to women, but there is no political will to implement them as seen in the nominations of MPs in the last general election. The law may be there, but there is no clause to ensure implementation or penalties for failure to do so.

Women's access to technology and media also influences their political profile. The other problem is the non-identified roles and responsibilities for women in politics, and also their domestication which creates conflicts of balancing the private and the public. So much has politics interfered with the private lives of women who

choose to go into it that parliament has been referred to as the graveyard of marriages.

Faced with all of these obstacles, it seems impossible for women to surmount their problems as concerns their political agenda. However, examples from Uganda, Rwanda, South Africa and Sweden -- among many others -- show that there are strategies to cope and overcome gender-based incapacitation from politics.

Women just like men seek high calibre representation and aspiring women candidates should sell leadership skills to the electorate and not just their gender. Hon. Charity Ngilu says, "For women to succeed in political office, they must articulate, challenge and seek to influence the social, political and economic environment for the benefit of the people." To achieve this, they need to undertake coalition building; governance capacity building; economic empowerment of women, networking and development; cultural re-orientation and pushing political parties to formulate, implement and evaluate new policies on women's role in politics as well as allocating quotas to women's representation.

What women need are female role models in various positions of leadership so as to inspire them towards individual self-efficacy. A push for affirmative action should be stepped up with the political parties and legislatures reserving special seats for women, not because women cannot manage on their own but so as to provide the psychological impetus

badly needed that will eventually influence the formation of positive attitudes towards woman leadership even at the presidential level.

Above all, the engendering of men in the society who support women's participation is an agenda that female politicians should work hard at.

It is for all the above reasons that the women of Kenya through the support of Friedrich Ebert Foundation developed a manifesto whose purpose is to specifically stipulate women's demands, which when met, will encourage and ensure women's advancement, involvement, and participation in leadership and good governance in Kenya.

The demands of this Women's Manifesto are meant for the executive, the judiciary, policy makers, political parties, politicians, parliament and the civil society. Their positive reaction to the demands will ensure the equal participation of women and men in the country's development processes. It is therefore something

for all Kenyans, not just women. The Manifesto recognises that equality between women and men, girls and boys is a matter of human rights and therefore a condition for social justice. It demonstrates the urgent need to remind the country of, and hold government accountable for its commitments to the Beijing PFA, CEDAW, the MDGs and all other international instruments that have mutually supporting indicators to help advance gender equality.

The changing political climate favours women in Kenya's future, but though increased democratization has opened space and opportunities for them, their positions in important decision-making levels in parliament is limited. It is thus important for one to analyze woman's active participation in the National Assembly vis-a-vis their potential capacity and identify the hurdles in this race for Bunge. This is the surest way to ensure "women's equal access to and full participation in power structures and decision making."

Young Peoples involvement in Politics and Government in Kenya

By: Kenneth Njiru, Kenya

The post independence or Uhuru¹ generation (i.e. those 43 years and under) constitutes 84% of the Kenyan population. This means that it is the

single most potent force on the Kenyan political scene today. Like never before, its fears, hopes, frustrations and aspirations are being felt, heard and seen. No leader, political party or government can ignore the Young generations of Kenyans today and survive.

If ever there was doubt about the power of young people in Kenyan politics, the 1992 general election

laid it to rest when the now infamous Youth for KANU² 1992 (YK92) delivered KANU and Moi against all odds. Characteristically of Kenyan old guard politics, on victory YK92 was disbanded and its leaders politically banished.

Faced with the challenge of a new, multi-ethnic political coalition, and appreciating the strength of the young people as demonstrated in the 1992 election, President Moi shifted the axis of the 2002 electoral contest from ethnicity to the politics of generational conflict. He anointed the young Uhuru Kenyatta as the KANU presidential candidate. The strategy backfired, KANU was humiliatingly defeated in the December 2002 elections. Nevertheless, the discourse of a generational change as a blueprint for more dynamic governance won the support of some youth movements. Following Moi's "generational" election, 70 % of the KANU parliamentarians are young representing a significant shift with the past.

During the 2002 general election young Kenyans overwhelmingly supported the National Rainbow coalition (NARC)³ not because they did not trust Uhuru as a Young person, but because he was largely perceived as a Moi's "project"⁴. They voted in President Mwai Kibaki at 72 years.

Unfortunately after delivering the Kibaki regime, they have found themselves largely locked out of his government generating the feeling that NARC is a government of the "old Guard" that fills employment openings

in government from the Civil Service "Graves". This has generated a lot of resentment amongst the young people with the Young Parliamentarians constantly demanding from the government a list and the reasons that those beyond the statutory retirement age of 55 years are still employed in the civil service. Performing an age audit is now a common practice for the younger generation on all presidential appointments.

Indeed, 70% of the members of Kenyan parliament and high jobs in the civil service sector and government secretaries, parastatal chiefs and directors are composed of the aged, 29% are the middle aged. This to the young Kenyans remains unacceptable and a betrayal of the trust they had in Kibaki and NARC.

The tide of agitation for young leadership in Kenya rises against a background of the burdens of unemployment, poverty, crime and general insecurity, corruption, prostitution, alcoholism, HIV/AIDS, drug abuse, tribalism, nepotism, breakdown in family life and values amongst others which disproportionately affect young Kenyans. Indeed, under the "Old Guard" leadership Kenya remains one of the most unequal societies in the world and with NARC doing little to redress this criminal imbalance.

Further, the NARC regime promised to ensure the creation of 500,000 jobs every year. Despite official assertions that it has done so, there is nothing to show for it. Young people continue to languish in poverty, isolated from the

mainstream economic activities and having no collateral to secure loans from banks.

Believing that KANU was about continuity and NARC change, the young have painfully discovered that they were wrong. Like KANU, old and conservative leaders who they perceive as being anti-real-change also drive NARC. Looking back, the young know now that we need a young generation of leaders for real-change to happen, and for the nation to be inspired anew.

“Leaders of tomorrow”

Needless to emphasise, the Kenyan political scene is still dominated by the pre-independence leaders who are still not ready to hand over the reins to the younger generation terming them “leaders of Tomorrow”. There exists deep mistrust between the old generation political leaders and the post-independence generation. The former generation view the latter as too young and confused to lead, while the young view the old leaders as too old, too greedy and selfish to recognize the need and aspirations of the youth. Thus, a key opposition leader openly referred to Uhuru Kenyatta despite being over 40 years of age, as a Katoto (A small child) another was quoted as having said that Uhuru had still not stopped suckling his mothers breasts in the run-up to the 2002 general election.

This has meant that successive generations have been locked out of the leadership equation by a pre-independence leadership that quickly

closes ranks as soon as it senses any attempt to assail its position. At times when young leadership has proved too forceful for the old, it has been physically eliminated as was both the late Tom Mboya and JM Kariuki.

A New Thinking

Young leaders are now arguing that they are running out of time. They make their case pointing out that by the time the next elections come in 2012, Kenyans born at independence in 1963 will be approaching 50, 5 years away from the statutory retirement age of 55. They ask whether that is the right time to hand over leadership to them? They want to make their contribution while they still can. They are pointing out that President Mwai Kibaki at the tender age of 29 became the KANU executive officer and joined the cabinet at 35 years old and has been in key leadership positions for the last 40 years. He now wants to leave when he is 81 after a second term attributing this to selfishness. Similarly at 28 years of age Simon Nyachae the FORD People Leader and a 2002 Presidential aspirant, was a District Commissioner. Of historical significance, there was a generation transition at independence with the old guard leadership in Kenya today, taking over in its mid 20's and early thirties.

Conscious of this precedent, and driven by the essence of their being politically conscious, young Kenyans are rising to the occasion with new ideas, energy and zeal to stake their claim on Leadership. They are

declaring from their political rostrums that they are no longer “leaders of tomorrow” but “leaders of today.”

Essential Challenges

In seeking to stake their claim, young Kenyans are faced with critical challenges. At the outset, political parties in Kenya today are undergoing the phase and crisis of institutionalisation. The young thus, are caught up in a political parties’ scenario, characterised by confusion, defections and counter defections. Personalities and not ideology drive political parties in Kenya. Looking deeper into them, they see exclusive political clubs owned by the wealthy, with party nominations for elective office going to the highest bidder. This has led young Kenyans to the extremes of seeking to establish “youth” parties to secure political space.

Notwithstanding this, within the mainstream parties there are young people who are attempting to establish Party Youth Leagues, but many are perceived as working solely in the interests of the party dons. The membership of the youth leagues, largely feel that the mainstream party (old Guard) do not take them seriously. Of historical note is the fact that the state of the Youth groups and leagues in Kenyan political parties has not changed much since independence. This point is forcefully brought home by their conditions today against the situation as captured by the Late Tom Mboya in his book: *The Challenge of Nationhood*⁵ in 1964. The Youth Leagues however, remain committed to ensuring the institutionalisation

and professionalisation of the parties which calls for persistence, engagement and constant dialogue with the party “owners”.

Young Kenyans in politics also face the challenge of ethnicity where membership of most political parties is dictated by ethnicity stemming from the founders of the parties or the individuals that fund it. This causes chaos, and a lot of despair for youth who find themselves barred from effective participation. The shift of loyalty, distrust, corruption and vertical solidarity determines who gets what within the political parties. They also lack of resources, which are in the hands of the older politicians and as such are forced to do their bidding that they may receive support. A lack of clear political party ideology and value systems that guide the operation of parties and the conduct of their membership is also a challenge to young Kenyans making it difficult for them to differentiate parties other than on the basis of community standing or the personality leading it. This provides basis for discrimination especially on age and gender. Patronage too, remains a major problem as senior party leaders jealously control the political space within which the youth can play. This means that in most cases the young leaders are limited to actions they sanction or they feel do not threaten their interests.

Allied to the question of Young Kenyans participation in politics is that of young women. Older women leaders have dominated the space since independence. The young

women are now increasingly fighting for their space with more and more declaring interest in elective offices in 2007.

Gender discrimination also negatively impacts on them within the parties with their participation being limited and their contribution unrecognised. The culture of violence, mud slinging and character assassination continues to disadvantage and discouraged many of them from fully engaging in politics as was captured by the Gender Monitoring Report of the 2002 General Elections⁶. Appended to these, are negative cultural stereotypes, which militate against women in general.

A number of initiatives to increasing young women's participation have been put into place. Organisations such as the Young Women Leadership Institute (YWLI) are working to ensure young women are trained, empowered and mainstreamed into the Kenyan political Arena. The Gender question has also become a key issue being addressed across the political divide.

What then are young Kenyans trying to do and if given the opportunity what would they do differently?

Young people Initiatives

In terms of past participation in politics, young Kenyans are rebelling against being bodyguards, cheering squads, stone throwers and foot soldiers, which has led to a credibility crisis. This has amounted to their being seen as hoodlums and hooligans or career protestors on hire by the moneyed older politicians who buy

them cheap brews and drugs to do their bidding. They are refusing to be divided along tribal lines and to follow tribal chief, seeking instead to crystallize ideas and policies as their touch light for future political action.

The young Kenyans are also fighting to discard status quo traditions and the culture of poverty. They envision the transformation of the lives and talents of the citizenry. In this regard there have been several initiatives aimed at consolidating their Agenda. A good example is the "Youth Manifesto"⁷. This document was the result of extensive deliberations between 1997 and the year 2002 by the youth and forms an important compendium of issues they think should be addressed in the new political dispensation. It is instructive to note that many youth hold that the NARC manifesto of 2002 heavily borrowed from this "Youth Manifesto."

Another example was in 2002 when *The National Vision Team* of young people came together under the auspices of the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and worked together to compile a proposal for a National Vision for Kenya. In 2003 it published Vision 2027 entitled, *The Promise of our Generation*⁸ and envisioned that: "In 2027, Kenya is a united nation with a confident and proud educated and healthy people infused with strong ethical values, living in a democratic, tolerant caring and economically just society with a progressive, prosperous competitive, dynamic, robust and resilient economy". It goes on "managing resources for the benefit of present and future generations of

Kenya and having taken place in the community of nations with pride, responsibility and contributing to uplifting the status of Africa our continent in the global community of nations.”

Young people within youth organizations are also currently working to ensure that they lift the level of consciousness amongst themselves as movements, associations’ party and youth leagues. For example the Youth Agenda is currently holding weekly outreach meetings starting with Nairobi, to come up with a young peoples charter ahead of the 2007 election.

On the question of the “New Constitution” despite the youth having participated effectively in the run up to the Bomas Conference⁹ they were officially represented by only one youth delegate. Young delegates representing other categories however managed to mainstream the intergenerational equity question throughout new draft” arguing for a society for all ages. After the Conference, young Kenyans were again left out as politicians across the political divide jostled for control of the process, only to be quickly enlisted during the recent referendum ensuring a resounding defeat for the Government backed Draft Constitution.

On Young People and Parliament

In the 2002 general election three (3) under 35 years MP’s and forty eight (48) under 45 years MP’s were elected. The Kenyan Parliament is thus dominated by the wazee

(old Guard) which gives them a disproportionate representation given their numbers. In an attempt to address the woes, performance and representation question in future the Young Parliamentarians Association (KYPA) was formed. The Association is committed to generational transition for positive and value driven political leadership in Kenya and beyond. Its mission is to “unite, empower and mainstream young leaders in politics”, as captured in its Strategic Plan¹⁰.

On voter registration

The voter registration is a thorny issue in Kenya today. It is largely believed that the KANU government in many ways manipulated the voter registers. The NARC government also stands accused by young people of scheming to disenfranchise them for fear of a vote against it given the demographic statistics.

A recent announcement by the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK)¹¹ drives this fact home. It states that over 5,000,000 young Kenyans do not have voters cards, of these 1.5 million have no identity cards required to register as a voter. It further points out that they will not be registered due to government under-funding of the ECK.

Also working to the detriment of the young people is that fact that majority of them are apathetic to the whole process, feeling that their voting does not make a difference. For those who vote, it is felt that they vote for the wrong reasons. They elect leaders from their ethnic groups even though

they do not merit, peer pressure and often pressure from one's family to vote for particular leader as a block also influences them. Then there is the large percentage of youth that watch at the periphery, as they are ignorant of the importance of being in a political party where crucial decisions about a nation are made. Of note is the fact that civic education has yet to be effectively carried out, more so because the ECK lacks sufficient funding from the government to carry it out.

In seeking to resolve the above, a number of young Kenyans initiatives are already up and running such as the *Vijana Tugutuke (a young peoples awakening) the Uraia*¹² initiatives to get more youth to register as voters. Such initiative have recorded registrations of over 5000 young Kenyans in one sitting and are keyed to visit all areas of this country.

On the questions of violence and democracy some young people due to the poverty levels, have been reduced to thinking about issues of bread and butter. This makes them vulnerable to bribery, which is an affront to democracy. This fact has meant that young Kenyans without money have been defeated at elections by those with the money through vote "buying". In almost all cases the rich are the "old" politicians who have amassed wealth in mostly through corruption. Further, against recent trends there is fear that Kenya is turning into a country in which individuals ascend to leadership on the basis of their wealth, kin, power relations or patronage. Leadership

thus emerges either by accident, default or prevailing massive political currents.

Given the above, young Kenyans run the risk losing faith in democracy. Many a young people out of frustration now talk of violence, openly stating that democracy is not working and that all is staked against them. As such then, they proclaim the only way out is arms which is a dangerous turn that has seen many African countries collapse into blood shed and civil war. In addressing the question of violence, organizations such as the Citizens Against Violence (CAVI)¹³ have in the past organized workshops for young political aspirants on the question of electoral violence, aimed at looking for consensus on what needs to be done by both the candidates and other members of the younger generation to ensure peaceful elections.

Participation: What is it translating to?

It cannot be denied that the continued participation of the young people is having a profound impact on the political scene. Such has meant that mainstream leaders have had to and indeed are increasingly being forced to talk to the young people.

Right from the government now conscious of the young people and is trying to appease them, to the political parties which are fighting to keep them under one wing or another, key players are angling for this critical vote. Indeed in many ways this participation has also come with uncertainty in terms of the traditional

voting block approach, for most of the young Kenyans are not locked into the traditional tribal and personality cult blocks.

On the part of the young leadership itself, continued engagement provides it with a platform on which its leadership skills and ability are being put to the test right from issues such as public speaking through to political organization. By pushing themselves to the forefront, young Kenyans are increasingly becoming more visible, audible and confident.

Out of this engagements, especially within the mainstream political parties the young are questioning their ability to influence the direction and actions the parties take as their “owners” hold onto them tightly. Like never before the young people are questioning whether it serves them to stay in the parties awaiting the obvious discrimination against them at the nomination stage. To address their fears regular formal and informal consultative meetings are being held across the young political divide and sooner than later it is expected that a new young political shift will crystallize.

Future Challenges

One thing cannot be disputed: The “Time is ripe for generation succession”.¹⁴ As the young generation we are no less sincere, sensitive, idealistic and capable of dedicated and efficient work than any other past age. If anything, we are even more keen and able to prove our worth as individuals, as we are freed from the

chains and restrictions, the taboos and the mind conditioning of the old traditional thinking and systems. We must now take our rightful place in the Kenyan society by assailing the violation of the natural process of change.

Needed is sharper focus, unity and a respect for other generations in this, we must be committed to social justice, narrowing the poor-rich divide and generally to bring about a true revolution, not just a change of guard at the top. To address the question of the ability of young people to sustain the “war” we must form peer support networks so that we each bring our strengths to the common pool for “in unity we stand”.

Those of us in political parties must understand that one of the critical needs of our time is the institutionalization of political parties. In this, we must ensure an ideological and policy approach to our politics. As such, we must ensure that we will hand over to the next generation political parties that are democratic.

As young leaders we must also shun violence and those that bid us to it. Initiatives that ensure that young people steer clear of violence must be started and sustained. A commendable effort is that of the Nairobi office of the German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung which organized youths to generate ‘a code of conduct for youths participating in politics’¹⁵

To ensure we achieve our desired ends as a generation, a new value system must be put into place which

will beget a new type of young leader. Instructive in this regard is the *Political Leadership Development Programme (PLDP)*¹⁶ targeted at young leaders and keyed to address the vacuum of value driven leadership in Kenya.

Greater organization skill amongst the young Kenyans is called for. These include critical skills that would enable them to put pressure on the government that it fulfils its constitutional mandates such as voter registration. Civic education initiatives will have to be organised and carried out, and during the election a young peoples “Get Out The Vote Campaign” will have to be in place to ensure that they become instruments of ensuring the change they want to see.

Finally, we must be careful about approaching our challenges based on short-term assessments. Leadership failure in Africa and Kenya in particular may not necessarily be pegged on advanced age but rather on the kind of ideas and vision those we have been given leadership positions possess. It is not only about age, it is about vision, it is new ideas that Kenya needs while appreciating that the young are usually the surveyors of the new and novel.

It has been said “The young do not know enough to be prudent, and therefore they attempt the impossible and achieve it, generation after generation”¹⁷ and that “Every Generation has to discover its mission out of relative obscurity, fulfill it or betray it”¹⁸. I pray that we will go down in history as Young Kenyans who not only knew what needed to be

done, but who had the moral courage and commitment to see it done. “YOTE YAWEZEKANA”¹⁹

END NOTES

1. Uhuru Generation Young Kenyans born after 1963 (independence)
2. KANU – Kenya African National Union
3. NARC – National Rainbow Coalition ruling party in Kenya
4. The Project – Reference given to Former President Moi’s choice - Uhuru Kenyatta
5. The Challenge of Nationhood by Tom Mboya Secretary General of KANU 1964 “looking back today one comes to the conclusion that the establishment of the youth-wing was done haphazardly and without planning for the future. At first the youth –wing members were to help rise the membership of the party, but although they were employed on this, no proper arrangements were made for their subsistence. As time went on, this part of their function was given up. Many of them worked full-time or just stayed at party offices throughout the day without specific work. It was not uncommon to find youth-wingers begging for money and food from different leaders. This part of our party’s history was its biggest weakness. It led to a demonstration of the youth-wingers and it cheapened their position. It got them a bad name and even the good ones were lumped together with the bad. When factions broke down the youth wingers were left without support and even leader got tired of their begging. The relations between the youth-wing and the party got out of hand. This situation was especially bad in the urban areas. The youth-wingers often played a decisive part in the organization of rallies, the election campaign and the public processions. They successfully reduced the threat of KADU and other opposition parties. But our report and records show that the party has never thought out the youth-wing problem sufficiently. The youth are not only important to the party, they are also important to the nation. Their enthusiasm and daring adventurous spirit is just what we need. But their energies must be channeled to useful and productive

- purposes.”
6. Gender Monitoring Report of the 2002 General Elections in Kenya May 2003
 7. The youth agenda driven “Youth Manifesto” titled Recreating our Republic The ambitions of a Generation. Published in 2002
 8. The Promise of our Generation – A proposal for a National Vision for Kenya published 2003 by the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)
 9. Bomas Conference held to discuss the Proposed draft constitution between 2003 and 2004
 10. Kenyan Young Parliamentarians Association Strategic plan 2005-2007 Published by: Young Parliamentarians Association; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; Youth Agenda and the International Republican Institute.
 11. Electoral Commission of Kenya article Sunday Nation August 13th 2006
 12. Uraia: A civil society civic education initiative on citizenship
 13. Citizens Against Violence (CAVI) Young Political Aspirants Workshop 16th November 2002 YMCA Nairobi
 14. “Time is ripe for generation succession” Mutahi Ngunyi Sunday Nation June 20th 2004 page 8
 15. German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung ‘a code of conduct for youths participating in politics’ [Challenge of Leadership: A code of conduct for youths participating in politics (Nairobi, 2000)].
 16. PLDP: This programme is the collaborative effort by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change 4C’s and the Youth Agenda.
 17. “The young do not know enough to be prudent, and therefore they attempt the impossible and achieve it, generation after generation” Pearls S. Buck
 18. “Every Generation has to discover its mission out of relative obscurity, fulfill it or betray it.” Frantz Fanon
 19. Yote Yawezekana: – All is possible – a slogan introduced by young people and adopted by the NARC coalition in the run up to the 2002 elections

Notes

3.4

On the agenda in Sudan

Civil Society Organizations in Sudan

By: Abdelrahim Belal, Sudan

Voluntarism is the essence and basic value of the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) that is traditionally deeply imbedded in the Sudanese society. This is part of a survival strategy and is reflected in the large number of CSOs which played and are still playing a crucial role in the development of the villages and rural areas, especially in northern Sudan.

Strong popular organisations are the trade and the farmers' unions, and the students and women organisations. As the establishment of these organisations was closely linked to the National Liberation Movement in the 1940s, they had a political bearing in their activities and thrust. These organisations have played a vital role in the societal upheavals that revived democracy following the totalitarian regimes in October 1964 and April 1985. Intermediate urban organizations sprouted in the 1970s in response to the social and environmental problems caused by perpetuated

irrational development policies which fuelled the civil war again in 1983. This has led to catastrophes and resulted in displacement, vagrancy and acute environmental problems in rural areas as well as in urban centres. Human rights and advocacy organisations emerged in the second half of the 1980s following the downfall of Nimeiri's oppressive regime.

During both military and democratic rule, the traditional mass and popular organizations, such as trade unions and associations of youth, women and students, though quite influential in many ways, did not succeed in fostering a peace based movement with a firm foundation and institutional sustainability in the Sudan. The CSOs were banned immediately after the Islamists' coup of 1989 (the Salvation regime: 1989 up to 2005) and were not allowed to resume their activities until the second half of the 1990s. Now, in 2006, about 3000 CSOs are registered at the national level, a considerable number of which are government affiliated organisations (GONGOs), and a larger number are registered at the states' level.

Totalitarian military regimes always regard the CSOs as a source of trouble and potential threat. Hence, they adopt several tactics to contain

CSOs; depending on the experience of the junta in power with public affairs, voluntary work and the CSO's. The present regime implemented one or more of the following strategies: exclusion and banning, containment, penetration, weakening, and creation of parallel government affiliated organizations (GONGOs).

The CSOs concerned with human rights in particular faced formidable obstacles in their awareness campaigns from the Islamist fundamentalism, as illustrated by the strong opposition to CEDAW from influential power centres of the present regime.

Furthermore, to curb the present tide of vibrant and dynamic CSOs, the government issued an extremely restrictive Presidential Decree on voluntary work in August 2005. The Decree generated wide and strong opposition within the CSO movement, media and public opinion, and even within Islamist CSOs. Nevertheless, this Decree was enacted by the Interim National Assembly in February 2006.

In the South, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), viewing itself as a military movement, has frequently and actively opposed the development of the civil society in the South, which was tolerated at best and repressed at worst.

However, civil society in the South has become increasingly active in recent years, in part because of a decline in opposition from the SPLM/A, and also because the advance of the peace process has served as a stimulus to people not willing to have their fate determined by a handful of movement leaders.

In short, the CSOs face immense difficulties from the government as a result of the war culture that prevails within the Sudanese society and was propagated through oral traditions.

Nonetheless -and in particular- women's organizations and networks that were formed during the late 1990s in the North, the Nuba Mountains and the South played an important role in popularizing a culture of peace. The most prominent among them is the Women's Peace Network: which is the network for empowerment of women in peace, consisting of the Civil Society Women's Network, the Nuba Mountains' Women Network, the National Alliance of Women, the National Committee for Women and the Southern Women Group for Peace. The Women's Solidarity Network was the organisation that submitted proposals to the Constitutional Review Commission and Civil Society Peace Initiative, which accorded importance to the peace protocols and the process of explaining them to the public.

These and other organizations, in addition to academic institutions, e.g. the Peace and Development Centre of the University of Juba, have succeeded in establishing dialogue opportunities for different groups with shared interest in the form of various seminars in which civil society activists, thinkers, politicians, researchers and journalists - men, women and youth - were given a forum to brain-storm about political enlightenment, popularization of peace culture, democratization and good governance.

These fora have taken place with success in spite of the fact that these groups are of different political,

religious, ethnic and regional affiliations. The meetings, the ensuing papers and newspaper articles have created interest and awareness at different levels. However, these efforts have a minor impact on the process

of peace building as the CSOs still have to develop a better coordination, a common strategy and a unified organizational structure.

Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

By: Abdelrahim Belal, Sudan

The CPA was signed on the 9th of January 2005 between two parties: the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), after years of difficult negotiations, bringing an end to a long and protracted civil war in South Sudan.

The CPA comprises six protocols: the Machakos framework protocol, of July 2002, that defines the precise role of religion in politics and governance and guarantees the right to self-determination for the South¹, and protocols on security arrangements, wealth sharing, power sharing, a protocol on the conflict areas of Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile state, and a separate protocol on the area of Abyei.

The agreement brought regional autonomy to the South and peace to Sudan after about 50 years of civil war in the South which started in 1955, ended in 1972, following

¹ The parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cessation of hostilities on 15 October 2002.

the signature of the Addis Ababa Agreement, and then erupted again in 1983. Despite initial reservations over the CPA, there is near unanimity on support of the agreement, with the exception of some factions within the Islamic Movement and some Southern militias.

Key among the strong points of the CPA is that it has brought an end to war and bloodshed, thus offering an opportunity to re-draw the power structure and wealth sharing, and achieve the much sought peace, justice and sustainable development. In addition to this, the Interim Constitution which encompasses the six CPA protocols has an excellent Bill of Rights embodied in it. Moreover, the CPA grants the South the right of self-determination through a referendum to be held after an interim period of six years, and initiated a South-South dialogue.

The agreement attempts to deal with the root causes of the conflict, especially those related to the highly centralised system of governance, through the establishment of state parliaments and devolving more powers to the states, thus achieving governance decentralization. However, as the CPA outlined wealth sharing only between the North and the South, it fell short of achieving

economic decentralisation in which the states and local governments could have a key role.

The two co-signatories have declared their full commitment towards implementation of the CPA, indicating their commitment to altering radically the political, economic and social landscape of the country. Finally, the CPA calls for bringing about fundamental changes in traditional power structures to accommodate the new alignment of power signalled by the stipulations above, these will primarily benefit the NCP and SPLM/A, but to a lesser extent other political forces as well.

In spite of its obvious strengths of offering unprecedented opportunities for the Sudanese people to attain a lasting peace, the CPA has also several weaknesses. Perhaps the most important weakness is that it leaves all the doors and windows wide open for a power struggle, not only between the two signatories, but also among the political factions all over the country, possibly by polarization along an Arab-Islamic axis as opposed to a national-secular one. This power struggle is probably the illegitimate child of the fact that the CPA is devoid of a strategy on how to build peace and avoid state failure. As the CPA is mainly an accord between the two warring parties, it neither considered other actors in the political sphere, nor did it attempt to deal with all the major issues of concern in the Sudan (Darfur and the East). Another major issue is that the CPA does not clearly spell out how the process of democratization should be put in place

and implemented in the Northern States, considering the power of the ruling NCP, at least during the first four years of the interim period. Given the fact that the CPA does not institute a regional layer of governance in the North, it enables the NCP to retain its grip on the whole system in the North, particularly by preparing itself for the general elections for Parliament and the Presidency. In view of this, the probability is that the North will continue to exist under the lop-sided fundamentalist *sharia* system², guaranteed by the majority the NCP has in both the executive and the legislative bodies. The CPA also stresses the need for reconciliation, but as this issue is left to the two signatories no progress has been made in this area.

Very few people in North Sudan, as yet, feel that the CPA is really owned by the Sudanese nation as a whole because it mainly addresses the issues pertaining to South Sudan, with little, if any, reference to those of North Sudan. Also, even though the government keeps reiterating its commitment to implement the CPA, Northern as well as Southern Sudanese, do not really see any strategy or programme to that end. On the contrary, the most obvious actions of the NCP seem to be totally directed towards continued and reinforced NCP domination in socio-political spheres, with the view of winning the coming general and presidential elections to strengthen its grip on power. This is partly demonstrated in the gross negligence of the government

² The CPA has adopted a dual system; the *sharia* (Islamic) law in the North, and a secular system in the South.

machinery at state and local levels, which largely remain powerless and starved of resources. The main tool of maintaining this status quo is the use of a fundamentalist version of political Islam, the NCP knows only too well that advocacy of an Islam of any other sort is unlikely.

There are a number of hurdles that are impeding the implementation of the CPA. Among these hurdles is the considerable delay in the establishment of the commissions prescribed in the CPA, the scepticism overshadowing the non-democratic and non-transparent selection of its members, and the overlooking of the existing ones like the Constitution Commission, the repercussion of which has transpired in the drafting of the constitution of the state of Khartoum. The commissions are very important mechanisms for the effective implementation of the CPA, as they are the perceived modality in changing the political set up to bring about the democratic state reform. The commissions are expected to change the power relations within the governmental agencies to end the monopoly of the NCP.

The following commissions and institutions have been established: The Assessment and Evaluation Commission, the National Petroleum Commission, the Cease-fire Political Commission, the Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission, the National Judicial Service Commission, and the *ad hoc* technical Border Committee. Those which are not yet established include the Human Rights Commission, the National Civil Service Commission

and the National Land Commission. The National Fund for Development and Rehabilitation has also not been established, in spite of its paramount significance in the war affected zones. Another hurdle is the stalemate on the issue of Abyei and its administration. Other hurdles are the distribution of the revenues from the oil, and the boundaries between the North and the South, although the Presidency Institution did hold meetings to resolve this issue but still protests from both sides of the Government of National Unity are forthcoming. Another hurdle is that in most of the systems engineered by the CPA, the Civil Society Organisation's are either not represented or else their representation is nominal.

The CPA can be considered as an appropriate political framework for constructive conflict transformation for the North-South conflict, although it is not inclusive regarding other conflicts (e.g. Darfur, the East) and stakeholders (opposition parties, militias, rebel movements, and civil society). By agreement on equitable sharing of power and wealth, the CPA has been a catalyst in encouraging other marginalised regions to intensify their armed struggle to achieve their long denied rights.

The CPA stipulates a complex system of internal and external political and military guarantees. The most important guarantee and mechanism to implement the CPA is the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), which was established in March 2005, with the following terms of reference: political support to the peace process and support to the implementation

of the CPA on governance, security, humanitarian assistance and development.

Political Parties and Movements in Sudan

By: Abdelrahim Belal, Sudan

Since June 1989, Sudan has been ruled by an Islamist military-oriented dictatorship which established the **National Congress Party (NCP)** with two interrelated objectives: to ensure the islamisation of Sudan and to prevent the signing of an impending peace agreement with the **Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)**, perceived as a betrayal to the Arab cause. Ideologically driven, the NCP has nevertheless always been pragmatic in the means to achieve its goals. Realizing that Sudan's generally traditional yet non-doctrinaire Moslems would never adhere to its Islamist project, the party relied on the military to gain and then to maintain its hold on power. Hence, the current regime is dominated by the military wing of the Islamic Movement. The current political environment does not allow for political parties and associations to develop - freely. All political parties were banned following the 1989 military coup. Since 2000, political 'associations' may be established only with the permission of the authorities. By August 2006, the adoption of a political parties' law is still pending.

After the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the **Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)** became the NCP's partner in the Government of National Unity. Since launching its rebellion in 1983, the SPLM/A's goal is to build a new, secular Sudan in which equitable wealth and power sharing prevail: New Sudan.

In the past, the SPLM/A has weathered internal splits, massive government offensives and damning international critiques of its human rights record. Having long directed its scarce material and human resources to the war front and given scant attention to political mobilisation, development, or public administration, with the attainment of peace the SPLM /A will have to transform itself. According to observers, this shift will not come easy as the movement is characterised by the lack of a coherent ideology, internal tribal differences, and a lack of democratic tradition in the past due to the former military environment.

While the SPLM/A is officially committed to the New Sudan project, it continues to have difficulties in the pursuit of nation-building even within the South. In the coming period, the SPLM is facing the dual challenge of building new institutions and administering

the South. The sudden death of its charismatic leader, Dr. Garang, has increased the challenges of the political transformation of the movement; the absence of a charismatic and symbolical leader has curbed the tide of the masses who were rushing to join the movement in northern Sudan.

The two main traditional parties are the **Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)**, founded in 1944, and the **Umma National Party**, founded in 1945. They evolved from the Mahdist /Ansar and the Khatimiya sects respectively, and have different historical backgrounds. Regardless of these historical differences they have several common characteristics. Both are religious, sectarian and Arab-Islamic in inclination. The leaders of the two sects are also leaders of the two political parties, and they have a hereditary system of leadership. The two parties were the core of the traditional alliance, composed of the merchants, top civil servants from the North and the centre and tribal leaders from outside the centre that has historically ruled Sudan.

The **Communist Party of the Sudan (CPS)**, 1946, is one of the oldest and deeply entrenched parties in Africa. Since its appearance in Sudan in 1946, the CPS used to control the trade unions and the students' organisations. Following the expulsion of the CPS representatives from the Parliament, some factions of the CPS participated in the military coup of 1969. The CPS staged its own coup in 1971, failed and experienced a severe backlash which resulted in the demise

of the party following the execution of most of its leaders. The CPS is now trying to rebuild its position though it is divided as regards its reform policies following the collapse of the Socialist Block.

In the aftermath of the 1989 Islamist coup, most of the opposition parties fled the country and established an umbrella organisation abroad, the **National Democratic Alliance (NDA)**, including the SPLM/A. The NDA is a loose and a fragmented alliance which lost its direction when its strongest member, the SPLM/A, in terms of armed struggle, signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005 and became a partner of the NCP.

Hassan Al-Turabi, a prominent constitutional expert and architect of the 1989 military coup, has been the undisputed leader of the Islamist movement in Sudan. In 1998 he crafted a new constitution to re-establish civilian rule. The constitution, among its provisions, limited the powers of the President and provided for free election of State Governors (wali's). In reaction the President, in December 1999, dissolved the parliament whose speaker was Al-Turabi. Thereupon Al-Turabi formed his **Popular Congress Party (PCP)** in July 2000, and signed an agreement with the SPLM/A calling for peace and democracy. Al-Turabi was then arrested, the PCP banned and party members faced harassment and extra-judicial detention. The PCP however, has been allowed to function to a certain extent, and its leader has come to the fore front with a controversial interpretation of

the sharia leading the conservative islamists to request for his trial.

The eastern **Beja Congress** was established in 1958. The non-Arab Moslem Beja tribes complain that they are being marginalized and their region is left to poverty and neglect. As a reaction to the Islamists coup, the Beja Congress was reactivated at the beginning of 1991, and two factions emerged. One faction opted for armed struggle operating from Eritrea and allied itself with the SPLM/A. The other group remained inside Sudan, denounced armed struggle and advocates dialogue and negotiations with the government.

In mid 2004 the armed faction of the Beja Congress allied with the **Free Lions** of the Arab Rashaida tribe. Their military attacks in the East increased and posed a serious threat to oil installations and gold mines. In 2004 also the Beja Congress entered into an alliance with the Darfur based **Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)**. Together with the Free Lions and other tribal groups in the region it formed the **Eastern Front** in March 2005.

In March 2003, a civil war erupted in Darfur between the Government and two Darfurian rebel movements; the **Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)** and the **Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)**. The two movements have the same goals, namely devolution of power and wealth and to overcome chronic underdevelopment, political, economic, and cultural marginalization in the united Sudan. It is to be noted that Darfurians are Moslems, but escalated armed conflicts with the Islamist Government subjected them to displacement, atrocities and unprecedented suffering.

The SLM has since split into two rivalling factions, of which one - lead by Minni Minnawi - has signed the Darfur Peace Agreement with the Sudanese government in May 2006. While the forces of the SLM-Minnawi have joined the government aligned militias in Darfur, the other rebel movements (SLM, JEM) have joined forces under the name of the **National Redemption Front**. All rebel movements lack political experience, legitimacy and democratic culture.

Sudanese Women: A New Chance, Many Challenges

By: Shams Eldin Daw Elbeit, Sudan

The Sudanese women movement is one of the oldest and well established in the African continent. As early as 1952, even before independence,

Sudanese women succeeded in forming the renewed "Sudanese Women Union". Soon after independence they obtained voting rights, acquired equal pay for equal work and sent their first woman representative to parliament (1965). But the political successes were not accompanied by substantial social benefits. Despite the relatively expanding opportunities in women education, the cultural, economic and social status of the vast majority

of women remained much the same for the half century following Independence.

This is the reason why the “Comprehensive Peace Agreement” (CPA), signed in January 2005 between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudanese People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), represents a new qualitative leap in the modern Sudanese history. Although it is true that this accord is in the first place a political understanding that ended the protracted civil strife between South and North of Sudan - which is a tremendous achievement in itself - it has also created a new situation and a new political framework. For the first time since independence it is possible now to address many issues that have often been brushed aside, neglected or not recognized. These issues include wealth and power sharing between the peoples of Sudan, democracy and Human rights including women's rights.

One of the most important fruits of the CPA is the Bill of Rights enshrined in National Interim Constitution (NIC). Though short of the original demands of the Sudanese women movement to have a separate chapter in the constitution for women rights, the new Bill of Rights provides for the protection, respect and promotion of human rights, and fundamental freedoms based on the principles of International treaties, covenants and conventions.

The Bill of Rights further commits the state to guarantee equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil, political, social, cultural and

economic rights, including the right to equal pay for equal work. Further it commits the state to promote women's rights through affirmative actions, to combat harmful customs and traditions which undermine the dignity and status of women and to provide maternity and child care and medical care for pregnant women.

Nonetheless this same constitution establishes Sharia (Islamic Law) as the source of nationally enacted legislation applicable to the states of Northern Sudan. Thus, besides dividing the country along religious lines, it confirms some of the existing laws and allows for the enacting of new laws, in personal and family matters, including marriage, divorce, inheritance, succession and affiliation, which violates women rights, based on the inferior status of women in Sharia Laws. The Personal Law (199) which sets the age of marriage with 10 years for girls, the Civil Procedures Act (1983), which discriminates against women in land ownership, the penal code (1991), which permits criminal responsibility towards children under 18, the Public Order Law in Khartoum State, which curtails the freedom of movement of women, are but a small part of an arsenal of oppressive and at least partly unconstitutional laws from pre CPA and NIC phase, which violate women rights as well as the rights and freedoms of the rest of the population.

For women in South Sudan, “the marginalized of the marginalized”, in the words of late Dr. John Garang, where over 20 years of violent conflicts and wars have caused the death of 1,5 million and the displacement of 4

million and left a destroyed physical structure and non functioning or non existing services, for those women the signing of CPA and dawn of peace is a fundamental achievement. It gave them reasons for hope and great expectations to access health, education, food, family welfare and indeed life itself. Making up 60% of the southern population, 88% of whom illiterate, (in comparison to 64% between men according to New Sudan Centre for Statistics and UNICEF), the successes southern women have scored, including a quota of 25% in the legislative and executive powers enshrined in the South Sudan Constitution (though not implemented), mark only the beginning of the huge task awaiting them in resettling displaced people and reconstructing or in most cases building from scratch: homes, roads, schools, water points and health facilities.

But the Comprehensive Peace Agreement proved to be incomprehensive for women in Darfur and East Sudan. At the time when the negotiators in Naivasha were putting their initials to the various agreements, a full fledged civil strife was raging on in Darfur, and another one threatened to break out in the East. The crisis in Darfur, which was described by many as “the worst humanitarian crisis in world” caused thousands of deaths and 2,5 million displaced, 90% of whom are women and children. They were the main victims of killings, burning of villages, abduction and rape. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signed in May 2006 between the Government

of Sudan and one fraction of one of the three rebel groups (SLA of Mini Minnawi), seems only to complicate the situation.

Civil wars are but only one challenge facing Sudanese women, because whether in the South or North, in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains or East Sudan, women are confronted with two other formidable social challenges: poverty and degrading tradition. In spite of relatively early and liberal labour legislation, which provide for equal pay for equal work and other related benefits, and despite the rising numbers of females in high educational institutions, indicators still show that poverty is rampant among women.

The large expenditure in civil wars and the severe implementation of the IMF’s structural adjustment measures and privatization policies pushed between 70 to 90% of the population (according to different sources), to standards of living below poverty line. Women are more susceptible to poverty than men, in particular rural women who make up nearly 80% of the labour force of agricultural sector impoverished by these measures.

Also, and as is the case in most sub-Saharan communities traditions and customs are particularly discriminating against women. The inferior status of women in Sharia has been mentioned earlier. Until today government officials are systematically attacking CEDAW convention as non-Islamic, and consequently intentionally delaying the ratification of the convention by the Sudanese

Government. Other customary laws in South, West and East Sudan deny women ownership of land, and membership or participation in native administration, allow for pre-arranged and female child marriages, inheritance of widows by relatives of the deceased husband and legitimize violence against women including female genital mutilation.

Nevertheless the CPA has opened political processes that had been closed, initiated a framework for democratization that, if pushed to its logical ends, can pave the way for a genuine women participation in the political and administrative systems, key in the pursuit of Sudanese women objectives. For the first time since independence women representation in the National Council approaches 20%, twice the peak rate of 10% it has reached in 50 years of independence: 84 women were selected for appointment in the current 450 strong council.

The last decade also witnessed a vibrant women activism in the Sudan. Though under strong pressure from the government throughout the 1990s, and even to the moment through the recently passed Voluntary Work Act (2006), Sudanese women have come together, founded NGOs, formed networks, initiated activities, and programmes and organized rallies to pressure for their rights, promote their cause or to protest oppressive laws or practices. Many women in civil society organizations are making use of the historical moment offered through the CPA to get involved in advocacy, lobbying, capacity building, research and documentation within the framework of an ambitious effort to mainstream gender concepts and equality and to achieve Sudanese women welfare. The bets seem to be on their side.

Notes

3.5

On the agenda in Tanzania

What's new in the Politics in Tanzania since the last elections

By: Max Mmuya, Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania

At the writing of this statement it is about seven months after the 2005 election and into Mr. Kikwete's term of office as the fourth term president of the United Republic of Tanzania. In that regard it may have been too early to make any definitive statement in respect of what is new in politics in Tanzania since the elections in 2005. More cautious institutions have in fact warned against making evaluation statements about, for example, the current regime, probably arising from the experience with previous such undertakings on Tanzania and elsewhere in the world. Such caution is founded on experience that, in respect of an incoming regime, the initial days are often characterized by the drive to put a show of innovation above and beyond what previous regimes may have strived to accomplish but only to relapse into the status quo in face of realities. In experience to run the huge machinery of government, unforeseen intervening difficulties, even if not

directly associated with the nature of the regime and its key officials, often moderate the zeal new regimes show at the start of a term in office. But this very valid caution expressed by some observers does not stop and perhaps should not stop others from making a statement of evaluation as is envisaged in this short statement. Such statements, albeit "premature", assist in establishing a threshold between an outgoing and an incoming regime as it does establish a basis of tracking the progress which the new regime may be making or otherwise in the course of its being in office. The above caution notwithstanding, there is a number of what may be judged as emphatic areas regarding what's new in politics in Tanzania after the elections in 2005. In that endeavor we are going to comment on four broad areas thus: Managerial Administrative, Internal Political Dynamics, Economic Policy and Foreign Policy

Managerial Administrative

The first aspect that may be judged as new in Tanzania's Politics since the last elections surrounds the President's captivating "signal tone" over the working modalities and style which he intended to distinguish his government from previous ones. This

is the “*Kasi Mpya, Nguvu Mpya na Ari Mpya*” literary: “*New Speed, New Energy, New Zeal.*”

As an instrument of public policy, the slogan has embodied several wishes that society had previously been looking for in its individual leaders and the government machinery generally. These are *timely* (speedy) attention to individual’s and the general public’s concerns, *effective and committed* (New Energy) resolution of the public’s problems, and *diagnostic and anticipatory* (New Zeal) attention to people’s problems. By itself, even before the actual steps to operationalize it were taken, the slogan was a standard setter. There was the perception among a number of constituencies that while the government machinery under President Mkapa may have been reconstituted after a fairly long span of time during which standard government operational rules were compromised, public perception still felt that actions taken to put order to the working of a government may have been far from being satisfactory. The government was judged as being sluggish or even lacking in a number of areas which needed energized thrust and credibility in its operations and, not surprising, the new call by an insider of previous administrations that further work was needed. The slogan along this line was judged as appropriate and brought in a new sense of hope of realizing what was lacking.

The novelty of this can be seen in terms of what appears to be a significant intervention and presentation of

new standards of work habits which should characterize government style and by extension allied agencies in society.

In a more concrete way, and as if the “pace-setter” is well meant, operationally the following actions, among others were and have been taken along the lines of the signal tone.

Government Reorganization

One of the immediate tasks of the new administration was to put together an organ that would spearhead the new work-style through the formation of a cabinet of ministers. Besides the criticism that the new cabinet was bigger in size and therefore more expensive to run than was previously the case under predecessor administration, the elements embodied in the “signal tone” seemed to rhyme with it. Most important was the innovation to create a separate ministry to attend to one of the critical problems surrounding the public in the country that is crime and general safety through the creation of a completely new Ministry of Public Safety and Security. The new ministry was suggestive of an innovative streamlining of ministerial sectors so as to inject relevant organs that would reflect issues of special attention than simply fit in officials in established portfolios that may not immediately respond to public needs. Secondly, previously acknowledged efficient and committed ministers were given strategic portfolios in which they would bring in their individual qualities and attributes to squarely address the public’s concerns. A speculation

that approximates this effort was the placement of such a candidate in the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development, a sector which was previously among the top list of public apprehension. Relatedly, the coordination role over day to day operations of the ministries and other state agencies was entrusted in the hands of an acclaimed workaholic and reputed meticulous supervisor, long time member of cabinet in previous administration, Edward Ngoyai Lowassa. This is not to suggest that nothing along this lines was considered by previous administration. Contrary to it, going back to the administration just before the current one, its president likened members of his cabinet to “Askari wa Miavuli” (Paratroopers) who ideally can be dropped at any operational site and with the urgency that such an operation required. However, with all the similarities, the effort of the current administration seemed more appealing by definition and fairly practicable. While one could not immediately appreciate how “Askari wa Mwavuli” operate, day to day life experience could lead one into seeing the means and ways on how the “Kasi Mpya, Nguvu Mpya na Ari Mpya” could be possible. With the deliberate choice of the type officials of the new government, fitting professionally and at least seemingly full of youthful energy, the call appears practicably novel.

Team Building

A novel strategy as a follow up to the sharpening of the tool of work, the cabinet, the president decided to forge *esprit de corps* among and

between members of the new “task force” and this was affected on at least three working sessions. First the president made individual on the spot instructional work with ministers at their work stations. Second the president also organized an instructional and consultation work with all the ministers before they actually assumed office. This was concluded with a full blown working retreat involving all Cabinet Ministers and allied senior officials of the Government. This was a novel strategy in so far that it may have facilitated *esprit de corps*, between individual officials and around a common agenda on the thrust and style of work of the new government organized around the “signal tune” “youthful” energy, “burning” zeal and “blazing” speed. Surely, while such efforts may have existed before, it was least so considered and so deliberately organized in contemporary times. One can only talk of such initiatives as characteristic of the late President Nyerere’s administration when he used to conduct such contacts throughout his term of office.

Internal Political Dynamics

The Second area is related to what may be referred to as internal political dynamics under which one may refer to changing alignment, new formations etc. after the elections as occasioned by the electoral process. There are two aspects under this subtitle: The Popularity of the President and dynamics within the Party, Chama cha Mapinduzi.

The Popularity of the President

Beginning with the Popularity of the president, one is inclined to reflect at conditions towards the run-up to the elections and isolate the factor of the popularity of the CCM Presidential candidate (now President) and comment on what impact that factor has had in Tanzania's contemporary internal politics. A visible development which immediately comes to mind is that during the run-up to the elections, the presidential candidate's popularity, may significantly have accounted for the popularity of his party as against that of the opponent parties. In a very significant way, candidates for the parliamentary and councilors' seats from the CCM who possibly would have lost to competitors from other parties were able to sale through on the basis of the party's popularity. The party's popularity was itself significantly boosted by the unique popular and personal attributes of the presidential candidate. This was especially visible in a number of constituencies where the CCM presidential candidate successfully bore a four angled burden of campaigning for himself and through that angle, for his party. Campaigning for his party, in a number of cases, sometimes in an almost rescue type of operation, meant campaigning for his party's parliamentary and councilor's candidates.

Secondly, after the elections, the now president elect was greeted by a previously unrecorded mass euphoria which was very expressive of the over 80% votes he collected in the elections. Such a percentage approximated only the over 90s percentage earnings his

predecessors often earned during the single party system where competition was very restricted. Such earnings are out of the normal under multiparty competitive elections in many parts of the world including during the elections in Tanzania in 1995 and 2000. The euphoria was expressed in salutations that came from a number of constituencies that included media organs, religious institutions, academics etc. In summary the euphoric acceptance of the president elect surpassed all that was previously known in this respect.

This phenomenon is new in Tanzania's era of competitive politics with probable significant political implications. Among the implications, on the positive side, popular acceptance of a leader(s) is a measure of legitimacy and therefore a resource for national integration, mobilization of citizen energies and action which in turn can lead into broad based development. Many countries, notably in the emerging democracies are lacking in this resource and the results are often ominous for the respective societies.

On its part, Tanzania has not really been strained by disintegration resulting from lack of legitimacy of its leaders before. However, previous to the 2005 elections, previous strong bonding structures, especially between the top leaderships and some specific units of the state were in very strained relationship with the general publics. It is possible that the popularity of the current administration may be corrective of the adverse trend that was emerging.

A critical challenge at this point is whether or not this popular support can be sustained over the next years! In other words, the administration will have to identify in very concrete terms the bonding “strap” between it and the public and nature them in order to maintain the links.

On the adverse side, extreme populism may result in moderated functioning of Good Governance practices. For example, oversight institutions such as the media, parliament, intellectuals, religious bodies etc. may find it constraining by the popularity of a leader to raise serious questions about the way the country may be running. The worse scenario is where these institutions which are key in the functioning of democracy decide to acquiesce with the regime disposition and tendencies even if they are wrong. Such positions may go to undermining the very regime they feel inclined to “supporting”. Still, the point under this section is that the degree of popularity of the president and the magnitude of the euphoria under which the public have accepted him is a new development in Tanzania’s politics and an input in the present times and if sustained it may serve as a healing drug to the forces of division that were likely to pull society further apart as a mobilization tool for wider development efforts.

Dynamics within the Party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM)

To the popularity of the presidential candidate and reinforced by it, is the factor of dynamics within the Party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM). There is no doubt that internal race

to the presidency within the CCM had taken significant shifts in the way this longtime party used to run its business. Two key issues immediately come to mind. These are the use of money and the crystallization of an extra constitutional votes mobilization organ, the *Wanamtandao*¹, literally, the Web(s) in the structure of the party. While these two features may have existed before, towards the elections in 2005 they grew in scale and in intensity with actors on both issues (money and space) competing to influence the course of the party after the elections.

This factor has led to some observers into presenting two accompanying scenarios in the development of the longtime party, Chama cha Mapinduzi. The first one is that while at all time, CCM will need funds for party activities especially during elections time, developments towards and after the elections suggest that CCM is increasingly shifting to reliance on altruistic goals of leadership in order to attract supporters to managing the party as a business entrepreneur that banks on mainly organization skills and money to secure votes and win support. Secondly, is the reliance on extra constitutional organs for what ought to be the task of formal ones in the execution of the party’s roles and functions. This, according to some observers does not only feed into the first scenario but points to radical shift of the parties social basis from

¹ *Wanamtandao*, literally members of the web were a group of individuals and sometimes institutions that rallied behind candidates during the primary nomination in the party, CCM, and onwards into the actual elections. President Kikwete’s members of the *Wanamtandao* are thought to have been well spread out and so cohesive as to be classified as a web (*Matandao* in the Kiswahili language)

a party of the ordinary Tanzanians to one that is steered by non ordinary Tanzanians.

As it can be assumed, it was the Web of the president that was more potent. What is not clear is how long this web will be active to influence decisions in the party especially after President Kikwete assumes the party's Chairmanship even earlier than was supposed to be, towards the end of June². But surely this is a new factor in the political dynamics of the CCM with potential reverberations countrywide.

Economic Policy

There is little that can be said under the economic front. This is the case because the policy framework has key determinants which Tanzania can hardly have influence on. These are the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and as often endorsed by a large sections of donor agencies.

However, after the entry of the new government, there are domestic efforts, initiated by the president to review contracts that are considered to be of least benefit to Tanzania.

The new government appears to win the support of some local constituencies, but arguably, they are of least effect in this drive. On the other side, because of the implications in

respect of possible gainers and losers in the conclusion of such efforts, there is potential for this exercise to relapse into tensions between the parties to the contracts and their allies both international and local. Thus far for example, only a *feeble calculated* voice has been heard from the business groups and the political and administrative elites in the party in office and the government. *Ex officio* or otherwise these officials may have been part to the contracts under (possible) review. In any case, in our estimate, while previously concerns had been raised in respect contracts that raised anxiety with regard to their efficacy in supporting the country's initiatives, there was little attention by the earlier administrations in at least showing some serious indication as to how they were going to handle them. The current move is definitely new and which may not only set a precedence on especially how to deal with the privatization agenda's and contracting but may lead to new dimensions into the political economy of Tanzania.

Foreign Policy

Less publicly perceived yet new and with significant potential in Tanzania politics ahead is what one can describe as the emergence of "Proactive Diplomacy" following the elections in 2005. After the elections, the newly elected president embarked on a regional and international familiarization tour to Uganda, Kenya, Botswana etc and as far away as Saudi Arabia, France and the United States of America. Whatever will be its spin-offs, the proactive diplomacy represents a new dimension in

² The CCM holds its Congress every five year to elect new party office bearers who include the party Chairman. The next such Congress at which a new Chairman would have been elected was due in 2007. But the current Chairman, former President Mkapa decided to retire from the Chairmanship prematurely thereby paving the way for the current president to assume that of-
fice.

Tanzania's politics whereby, instead of responding to invitations and or an event which characterized earlier administrations, the president

initiated the move and went out in order to reach out to neighbors and the outer world.

Recent Transformation in Tanzania's Political-Economic Trends

By: Wilman Kapenjama, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

The government of President Jakaya Kikwete for the seven months in power now has made considerable radical changes, not only to the eyes of the senior analysts but also the common citizens in urban, rural and working places are clearly observing and pronouncing the reforms. There is no doubt that as many people had high expectations with him during the election campaigns, indeed, their expectations are likely to be met. Soon after assuming power, Kikwete introduced a new style of leadership by convening the seminars with high government official (ministers, deputies, permanent secretaries etc.) in Arusha and Dar es Salaam to discuss openly on how the fourth government should achieve peoples' expectations. In this short paper, we are going to look at the governance style of Hon. Kikwete in terms of transparency and accountability, the economic reforms especially on the focus of the government in agricultural sector as an engine of the economy. There is also an emerging of strong democracy in the national parliament, where the MP from the

ruling party are becoming more powerful by questioning critical and controversial issues without being threatened by the party politics. This is new in Tanzanian political history although it happened in mid 1960s but latter disappeared in 1970s after party supremacy took place.

To start with the good governance aspect, for the first time in the country, the president through the parliament has offered more legal powers to the Anti Corruption Bureau and has recruited more staffs and opening offices in the entire districts all over country. In last leadership, Anti Corruption offices covered only few districts (less than a half of 130 districts). There is also an abolition of **Takrima law**. This was like a corruption in the form of gift or presents. On top of that, there is an increase of the budget by 50% from last regime on combating corruption. This is a new development in governance area. Also there is a new act on accountability for government officials from the high levels to local levels where even promotion now will base on the performance of the staff and not experience as it was. There is a motivation of salary increase by 5% for all government workers.

Secondly, the issue on economic development. The fourth government in Tanzania has taken seriously the agricultural sector by doing

the following: Agriculture allocated reasonable share; Financial Services to be improved – TIB capital to be increased by 50% to 50 billions; Subsidy Fertilizers Allocation to be increased from TSh 7 billions to 21 billions; Continued Improvement on Infrastructure including rural areas; Decentralization of budget implementation to district levels; Tax structure Reforms to protect local manufacturers. There is also an expansion of the land for irrigation as well as the formalization of the informal sector as championed by the learned professor **De Soto** from Peru who is taking an extensive study on formalizing the economy of Tanzania under the financial support from Norwegian Government. The mining industry has also been taken into considerations. The government is going to review all the contracts in mining and other investments so as to improve transparency and accountability on national/natural resources for public good.

Thirdly, the party reforms. For the first time the ruling political party CCM has made a radical change at the national secretariat. There is a new Party Secretary General, Hon. Yusufu Mkamba (old CCM-Nyerereist, an activist and propagandist; but flexible compatible to Kikwete philosophy. He has worked as well in the party from grass root levels from the district to national position just like Kikwete). There is Jack Mwambi-Deputy Secretary General also classmate of Kikwete at the University and worked in party at the district level, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Rose Migiro is new in politics of the party. A university lecturer,

a lawyer and charismatic woman highly respected in Tanzanian gender politics. The publicity and ideology secretary Hon. Agrey Mwanri is an MP from Kilimanjaro, a scholar with MA in Political Science, with a new generation outlook. The Treasurer of the Party is Hon. Rostam Azizi also MP (with Persian origin). At least is being criticized because he has been a party sponsor now a party treasurer which is incompatible because of conflict of interest. The secretary for planning is a woman from Zanzibar Ms. Kidawa Hamad (Pemba). There is also a change on other leadership positions like the secretary for Ethics and Discipline etc.

Another important development in Tanzanian politics is the emerging of democracy among the MPs in the House. The CCM MPs in the Parliament now have shown a strong democracy by criticizing the Ministers in implementing the government plans. Partly is because of the new Speaker of the House, Hon. Sitta who is strangling to build a new house outlook. Another reason is due to the president himself who seems to be happy with the new role of the House (refer the speech by President when opining the new building for the House). In the past regime, the CCM MPs were not allowed to criticize publicly the weakness of the government. If they did, they were warned by the party or they have not been nominated as candidates during next elections. This is a new scenario. There is also a change of CCM constitution to allow more democracy within the party and to add more decision meetings from local level to national level.

New ways to approaching Women's rights in rural communities: A case of Tunduru

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is committed to all endeavors which empower and improve the status of women, promote gender, free women from all forms of discrimination, and help them to recognize their rights.

Back in the year 1993 the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung supported the Women's Legal Aid Centre (WLAC) (by then known as SUWATA Legal Scheme for Women) to establish the first Paralegal Units in the country. The decision to establishing such units was reached after it was realized and felt that there were many poor women in rural communities who faced legal problems but had no access to counseling, guidance or legal aid services. Paralegal units are not randomly established but are strategically initiated in those areas where violations of human and women's legal rights are highly pronounced.

Paralegal units members have basic knowledge of existing laws particularly those laws safeguarding the interests of women and children in Tanzania. The first paralegal units in the country include: Tanga, Morogoro, Moshi, Arusha, Katesh, Mbeya, Kigoma, Mwanza, and Shinyanga. Established later are Dodoma, Mtwara, Lindi, Songea, Kibaha, Iringa, and Kiteto.

All paralegal units have been successful in dealing with women's rights issues in their respective rural communities basically because they are committed and are familiar with the traditions, attitudes, practices and taboos of those people they work with/assist.

In 2004 the Resident Director of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Tanzania Office) Mr. Reinhold Einloft paid a friendly visit to Tunduru. During his stay there he was informed that Tunduru was an extremely male dominated district, and that women were almost without voice.

With the above information, in 2005 the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung decided to initiate and try a different approach in collaboration with WLAC, by commissioning WLAC's experts to conduct two (2) legal awareness creation workshops (never happened before) for Tunduru rural women and some women groups leaders from urban. The main theme was "Legal and Human Rights in Tunduru". At the end of the two workshops the participants expressed a great need to have something established so as to assist Tunduru people in dealing/handling issues related to legal and human rights violation.

As a result, in April 2006 consultants from WLAC were engaged by FES to carry out a needs assessment.

Findings revealed the following:

- Lack of community awareness on legal and human right issues
- Low level of understanding of common issues especially by women

- The patriarchal system is dominant in Tunduru. Women are considered subordinate to men consequently they experience a lot of cruelty and violation of their rights. They do not participate fully in decision-making even in their own properties

- **Matrimonial problems**

The assessment revealed that more than 60% of people living in Tunduru district profess Islamic law which leads to polygamous marriages to be common in the district. This is due to community's misconception of Islamic knowledge as far as polygamous marriage is concerned. This type of marriage leads into a list of harms to women such as lack of conjugal rights, domestic abuse and fighting between the husband and wives, fighting among children of different wives and deprivation of children's basic rights due to lack of financial resources.

Divorce is at a very high degree in the district. During subsistence of marriage, couples may contribute towards acquisition of some properties. However in most situation and practice when a marriage is broken down, a woman is not given anything because it is assumed that she has no contribution to the wealth of the family.

- Inheritance is not equal. There are many disputes about this. The inheritance always goes to the family of the man.
- Child abuse and neglect. Many girls become early mothers because they do not go to school, hence many children born out of

wedlock. Some of the men deny being putative fathers of the said children therefore no maintenance is provided.

- Land disputes (very few women own land). At the village level only men own land.
- Illiteracy still prevails among the people. 89% of the respondents stated that, community's misconception of Islamic religion, patriarchal system, and traditional practice (Jando na Unyago) lead to high rate of illiteracy among the community.
- Rape, domestic violence and corruption. Many women and girls are vulnerable and subjected to human rights abuse.
- No fully access to institutions for justice.

General problems

1. Women position: Women in Tunduru have no voice due to the inferior position they occupy in their community. As a result they fear to talk/report matrimonial problems they face in the relevant authorities. Sometimes it becomes difficult for them due to distance and other logistical problems.
2. Remoteness: Tunduru is one of the districts of Ruvuma region located in the Southern part of Tanzania. However, it is not easily accessible due to its remoteness and logistical (transport) problems. Even within Tunduru itself, it is not easy to travel from one division to another/from the rural area to Tunduru township. As a result, this part is among others within the country which has been forgotten in relation to

legal and human rights services. There is no any lawyer available in this district.

What is the situation now?

After realizing the real situation through needs assessment process, a deliberate move to awareness raising and enabling Tunduru people access legal and human rights information was considered imperative. In cooperation with WLAC, a five days legal and human rights training workshop was conducted in June 2006.

Thirty (30) participants/trainees were strategically selected to include those in key positions such as women leaders, police, magistrate, religious leaders (Moslems and Christians), women teachers, councilors (especially women), party leaders (Chama Cha Mapinduzi & Civic United Front), community leaders, youth leaders,

NGO leaders etc. The training aimed to enable them to understand the existing laws so that they can deal with legal and human rights issues with gender in mind. There is no way that changes can take place without involving leaders particularly men who are in decision making positions. A mixture of different cadres to discussing and reaching conclusion is quite an ideal approach to different social problems. They are expected to bring about change and influence policies in favour of women's rights in Tunduru.

At the end of the training, participants indicated a great need to learn more about gender & human rights. A paralegal unit was established with four (4) unit leaders elected namely: the Chairperson, Secretary, Co-ordinator, and Treasurer.

The political empowerment of women

The case of Tanzania and the contribution of the Women's and Feminist Movements

By: Mary J. Mwingira,
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 and as amended in 1984 recognizes and values human rights, equality and dignity. Article 3 of the Constitution protects the freedom and rights of both women and men to realize their

full potential in education as well as in the participation in leadership at all levels.

Moreover, Tanzania is a signatory and has ratified the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (CEDAW), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Gender Declaration of 1997 and the SADC Gender Protocol on Acceleration of Gender Equality in member states 2005. As part of the African Union, Tanzania is also a signatory to the EU Gender Parity Resolution which is a commitment towards 50% gender equality in leadership positions.

Despite the positive rhetoric towards the increased participation of women

in leadership and in particular in political decisions making process, there are still some major barriers and constraints to be accomplished. The barriers are deeply rooted in the traditional power relations between women and men in all societies, cultures, religions and traditions. However, there is the challenge of changing the mindsets of the people with regard to the traditional sex-based division of labor and responsibility which has historically made people believe that political leadership is the domain of men. It is evident that the personal empowerment of women in the spheres of education and economy does not translate into their political empowerment. This indicates that there is a need to make concerted efforts to mobilize political will and also to take special strategic measures to ensure power balance between women and men in all the decision making processes.

2.0 AN ANALYSIS OF STEPS TAKEN IN THE SADC REGION.

I am taking the example of the SADC region to which Tanzania belongs because I believe there are many lessons to be learned by the East African region. The SADC Heads of

State committed in 1999 to ensure that by 2005 they achieve at least thirty percent (30%) of decision making should be assigned women. An audit undertaken in 2005 by Gender Links and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) has revealed that there are still many gaps. The audit has concentrated on top decision making positions namely the levels of parliaments, but also included the local government representation.

Table 1 below shows the changes of women representation in Parliaments since the Gender Declaration in 1997. From the Table we can see that in 1997 Tanzania had 16.3% female parliamentarians and was therefore on the fourth rank among the 12 SADC member states. Between today and 2005 before the election, a change of 5.1% emerged. Today 21.4% of the leadership positions are staffed by women which places Tanzania in the 4th position. However, when it comes to the efforts made to increase the number of female representatives, Tanzania was graded the 7th member state. On the other hand Mozambique and South Africa have surpassed the 30% SADC target. In addition, Mozambique is among the global top 10 countries.

Table 1: Women Representation in SADC since 1997

Country/election	1997		2005		Change
	No. of Women	Percentage	No. of Women	Percentage	
Angola	34/220	15.4	33/220	15.0	- 0.4
Botswana (1999:2004)	4/44	9	7/63	11.1	+ 2.1
Lesotho (2000)	4/80	5	14/120	11.7	+ 6.7
Malawi (1999:2004)	9/171	5.2	26/191	13.6	+ 8.8
Mauritius (2001)	5/65	7.6	12/70	17.1	+ 9.5
Mozambique (1999:2004)	71/250	28.4	90/250	36	+ 7.6
Namibia (1999:2004)	14/72	19.4	21/78	26.9	+ 7.5
South Africa (1999:2004)	111/400	27.8	131/400	32.8	+ 5.0
Swaziland	2/65	3.1	7/65	10.8	+ 7.1
Tanzania (2000)	45/275	16.3	63/295	21.4	+ 5.1
Zambia (2000)	16/158	10.1	19/158	12.0	+ 1.9
Zimbabwe (2000:2005)	21/150	14	20/150	16%	

Source: Audit of SADC declaration on gender 2005 (Gender Links and IDEA)

The audit report also came out with a Global Ranking (See table Two) of female parliamentarians and compared it with the SADC region. In this case Tanzania was 4th in the SADC.

Table 2: Global and Regional Ranking of Women Parliamentarians

Country	% Women in lower or single house	Global rank	SADC Rank
Mozambique	36%	7	1
South Africa	32.8%	13	2
Namibia	26.9%	21	3
Tanzania	21.4%	36	4
Mauritius	17.1%	54	5
Zimbabwe	16%	60	6
Angola	15.0%	63	7
Malawi	13.6%	67	8
Zambia	12.7%	69	9
DRC	12.0%	77	10
Lesotho	11.7%	78	11
Botswana	11.1%	82	12
Swaziland	10.8%	86	13

Source: Audit of the SADC Declaration on Gender and Decision Making 2005

3.0 THE ACHIEVEMENT OF 2006 IN TANZANIA ARE A RESULT OF CONSTANT STRUGGLES

The Women and Gender Development Policy of 2000 paragraph (42) stipulates that gender equality is the prerequisite for all development. The policy further recognizes that to achieve gender equality and the empowerment of women, it is necessary to involve all stakeholders namely the government, NGOs, religious organizations, civil society actors, the development partners and the community members, both women and men. It also emphasizes the critical role of major policy makers from family, community to the national level. Hence, the outcomes of the post election period since 2005, to appoint female ministers and deputy ministers in significant, principal and sector ministries is a result of many joint struggles but specifically that of

the Feminist Activists Movement and women organizations in the country. In fact the percentage of women in the cabinet has reached 25% with 6 female ministers and 9 deputy ministers.

Although the measure taken by the 4th phase government is not yet in accordance with SADC target, the encouraging thing is that women have been placed in ministries which are very significant for transformation and for enhancing gender equality. They include the Ministry of Education which is the key to the formation of girls and boys in all schools and vocational training institutions, the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs and Justice which coordinates the law making and law reform processes, the Ministry of Finance which is responsible for financial resources allocation, the Ministry responsible for Public Service, the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation responsible for Foreign Policy, and the Ministry for Gender and Community Development and Children. An analysis of this strategic positioning of female ministers shows the confidence of the 4th phase highest level leader, the president, in women's capacity. It is also an opportunity for the women to demonstrate the determination to "Walk the Talk" of gender transformation. It is also a challenge to the gender equality movement. Hence, all gender sensitive people are challenged to give the necessary support to these female leaders.

Furthermore, female deputy ministers have been allocated to the Ministries of Economic Planning and Empowerment, Higher Education Science and Technology, Land Housing and Human Settlements, Water, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Ministry of Infrastructure Development, Ministry of Local Government and Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. The challenging question is, will these female ministers execute their duties with a gender lens? Will they push the gender equality and equity agenda in all the ministries, the cabinet and influence programs and structures bearing in mind the cross – cutting nature of gender issues?

4.0 THE ROLE PLAYED BY WOMEN AND THE FEMINIST MOVEMENTS IN TANZANIA TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF WOMEN IN DECISION MAKING STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

Tanzanian NGOs and other civil society organizations who participated in the pre-Beijing Conference on Women and the conference in Beijing, have continued to take individual and also joint steps to advocate for women's political empowerment and the monitoring and implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action. The first activity after Beijing was the launching of the Platform to the then President of the United Republic of Tanzania Hon. Benjamin William Mkapa. Some of the organizations involved include the Tanzania Gender Networking Program (TGNP) and the FemAct Coalition, Tanzania Media Women Association (TAMWA) the Human Rights Associations and Groups like the Legal and Human Rights Centre, Women Legal Aid Clinic, SAHRINGON, Women Lawyers Association, Taaluma Women Group, Tanzania Ecumenical Dialogue Group, and TANGO. The type and level of involvement range from capacity building in assertiveness, civic education on the rights to vote with a gender lens and special lobby advocacy for the inclusion of women leaders in strategic positions and ministries.

The CSOs had a significant impact on the pushing of the SADC Gender Declaration and Protocol of 2005. They have volunteered time and resources to increase awareness and the degree of appreciation by leaders on the importance of having more

women in decision-making positions. One outstanding contribution to be mentioned here is the evaluation of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action conducted by TGNP and FemAct in 2004. The findings revealed that, on the political empowerment sphere, it was admitted that NGOs have still a lot of advocacy works to do. Out of 29 organizations interviewed in Dar es Salaam, only five of them included a focus and demanding political empowerment of women. Nonetheless the report also revealed some positive steps. In 1995, TGNP supported women candidates from various political parties to acquire the skills and resources to nominate. In the elections 2000, networks and coalitions lobbied for equal distribution of special seats for women. To increase the number of women's special seats in parliament, NGOs have also used special occasions, functions and especially the Gender Festivals and NGOs Forums to demand equal representation and the strategic positioning of women leaders in the parliament, government, central and local and in other institutions. NGOs are also actively engaging in the policy formulation processes demanding for fairer representation.

CONCLUSION

Despite the few achievements made, it is important to take note of the following as concluded by the SADC Gender Audit report:

- Decision – making is still a hostile terrain for women.
- Heads of State have still a big challenge to honor their commitment (SADC 30%, African Union 50%.) of gender equality in decision making positions.
- The topmost positions, namely the presidency, vice presidency, prime minister and speakers of parliament, are still regarded as men's rightful positions!
- Women's access to political decision making and high positions at all levels requires stronger political will and special measures.
- Though quotas and affirmative action is still necessary it should not be the permanent solution.
- To achieve higher participation at the national level, there is a need to concentrate at the local level and to continue to raise awareness.
- There is a need for new and alternative approaches. It is necessary to conduct a needs-based assessment and continuous civic education using the rights-based approach.
- It is also necessary to investigate, monitor and evaluate of the progress being made and to reveal the gender gaps in order to demand more action by decisions makers.

SUMMARY OF THE GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS 2005

Total number of people who registered	16,401,694
Number of people who voted	11,875,927
which is equal to	72.40% of people who registered
Votes that were spoiled	510,540
which is equal to	4.30% of total number of casted votes
Legal votes	11,365,477
which is equal to	95.70% of total number of casted votes

Following the elections, the results stood as follows:

Union President

PARTY	CANDIDATE	NUMBER OF VOTES	PERCENTAGE
Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)	Hon. Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete	9,123,952	80.28
Civic United Front (CUF)	Hon. Prof. Ibrahim Haruna Lipumba	1,327,125	11.68
CHADEMA	Hon. Freeman Aikaeli Mbowe	668,756	5.88
Tanzania Labour Party (TLP)	Hon. Augustine Lyatonga Mrema	84,901	0.75
NCCR-MAGEUZI	Hon. Dr. Edmund Sengondo Mvungi	55,819	0.49
Democratic Party (DP)	Hon. Rev. Christopher Mtikila	31,083	0.27
National League for Democracy (NLD)	Hon. Dr. Emmanuel John Makaidi	21,574	0.19
PPT - Maendeleo	Hon. Anna Claudia Senkoro	18,783	0.17
MAKINI	Hon. Prof. Leonard Kanangwe Shayo	17,070	0.15
SAU	Hon. Paul Henry Kyara	16,414	0.14

Source, National Electoral Commission, 20th of December 2005

COMPOSITION OF THE PARLIAMENT OF TANZANIA 2005

Category 1: Members from the constituencies	Total 232
Category 2: Members from the House of Representatives-ZAN	Total 5
Category 3: Presidential Nominees	Total 10
Category 4: The Attorney General	Total 1
Category 5: Women Special Seats (30%)	Total 75
Category 6: The Speaker (not necessary to be the MP)	Total 1

Expected Total number of MPs

323

324 (if the speaker comes outside)

ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE UNION PARLIAMENT 1995, 2000, AND 2005

PARTY	NUMBER OF SEATS WON			PROPORTION OF WOMEN SEATS			NOMINATED By President			TOTAL		
	1995	2000	2005	1995	2000	2005	1995	2000	2005	1995	2000	2005
CCM	186	198	206	28	40	58	9	10		224	248	274
CUF	24	18	19	4	4	11	1			28	22	30
TLP	-	4	1	-	1	-				-	5	1
UDP	3	3	1	1	1	-				4	4	1
CHADEMA	3	4	5	1	1	6				4	5	11
NCCR-M	16	1	-	3		-				19	1	-
TOTAL	232	228		37	47	75	10	10		267	285	322

5 Members of the House of Representatives ZAN and the Attorney General have to be added, so the total number of MPs in 2005 elections is 328.

ZANZIBAR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS 2005

OVERALL VOTES			
REGISTERED VOTES	507.225	100%	
ACTUAL VOTES	460.581	90,8%	
REJECTED VOTES	9.613	2,1%	
VOTES BY PARTIES			
PARTY	CONTESTANT	VOTES	PERCENTAGE
Chama Cha Mapinduzi	Abeid Amani Karume	239.832	53,2%
Civic United Front	Seif Sharif Hamad	207.773	46,1%
Jahazi Asilia	Haji Mussa Haji Kitole	2.110	0,5%
Democratic Party	Abdulla Ali Abdulla	509	0,1%
NRA	Simai Abdulrahman Abdulla	449	0,1%
Sauti ya Umma	Maryam Ahmed Omar	335	0,1%

Continuation of Zanzibar Election Results 2005

50-House of Representatives			
CCM	30		
CUF	19		
OTHERS	0		
TOTAL	49		
*Results for one seat were nullified because of irregularities			

UNGUJA DISTRICTS						
<i>KASKAZINI A</i>	CCM	CUF	DP	JAHAZI ASILIA	NRA	Sauti ya Umma
	27,506 (63.3%)	14,481 (33.6%)	125 (0.3%)	783 (1.8%)	117 (0.3%)	78 (0.2%)
<i>KASKAZINI B</i>	CCM	CUF	DP	JAHAZI ASILIA	NRA	Sauti ya Umma
	24,412 (80.6%)	5,618 (18.6%)	51 (0.2%)	133 (0.4%)	32 (0.1%)	36 (0.1%)
<i>KUSINI KATI</i>	CCM	CUF	DP	JAHAZI ASILIA	NRA	Sauti ya Umma
	34,311 (85.1%)	5,714 (14.2%)	19 (0.0%)	228 (0.6%)	18 (0.0%)	15 (0.0%)
<i>KUSINI</i>	CCM	CUF	DP	JAHAZI ASILIA	NRA	Sauti ya Umma
	16,400 (86.9%)	2,402 (12.7%)	6 (0.0%)	37 (0.2%)	12 (0.1%)	7 (0.0%)
<i>MAGHARIBI</i>	CCM	CUF	DP	JAHAZI ASILIA	NRA	Sauti ya Umma
	50,935 (65.7%)	26,216 (33.8%)	55 (0.1%)	256 (0.3%)	47 (0.1%)	68 (0.1%)
<i>MJINI</i>	CCM	CUF	DP	JAHAZI ASILIA	NRA	Sauti ya Umma
	63,645 (65.4%)	32,973 (33.9%)	58 (0.1%)	523 (0.5%)	62 (0.1%)	67 (0.1%)
PEMBA DISTRICTS						
<i>WETE</i>	CCM	CUF	DP	JAHAZI ASILIA	NRA	Sauti ya Umma
	4,152 (9.9%)	37,499 (89.8%)	37 (0.1%)	23 (0.1%)	19 (0.0%)	14 (0.0%)
<i>MICHEWENI</i>	CCM	CUF	DP	JAHAZI ASILIA	NRA	Sauti ya Umma
	4,088 (12.5%)	28,498 (86.8%)	76 (0.2%)	61 (0.2%)	73 (0.2%)	22 (0.1%)
<i>CHAKECHAKE</i>	CCM	CUF	DP	JAHAZI ASILIA	NRA	Sauti ya Umma
	7,151 (20.4%)	27,713 (79.2%)	47 (0.1%)	39 (0.1%)	26 (0.1%)	12 (0.0%)
<i>MKOANI</i>	CCM	CUF	DP	JAHAZI ASILIA	NRA	Sauti ya Umma
	7,232 (21.3%)	26,619 (78.4%)	35 (0.1%)	27 (0.1%)	43 (0.1%)	16 (0.0%)

Source: Zanzibar Elec. Commission, November 2005

3.6

On the agenda in Uganda

Women's experience in the transition from the movement system to multiparty system of governance

By: Jacqueline Asiiimwe-Mwesige¹,
Uganda

*"No one knows African governance, its strengths and weaknesses, better than those who are governed, but excluded from governance, and those who work in governing institutions in a disempowered way. That is why it is important that African women generate the strategies for increasing their effective participation, in decision making, in governance and in leadership"*²

INTRODUCTION:

Now that the February 2006 election fever is over, the 8th Parliament has been sworn in and a new Cabinet

¹ The author of this paper, Ms Jacqueline Asiiimwe-Mwesige is a lawyer by profession, a feminist activist and a member of Law and Advocacy for Women in Uganda (LAW-U) as well as the Uganda Association of Women Lawyers (FIDA-U).

² Dr. Amina Mama at the African Women and Governance Training Workshop organized by Abantu for Development, Entebbe, July 1994.

appointed, it is prudent to look back over the last three years to assess how Uganda's transition from the Movement System to Multi-party System went. It is critical to examine what was supposed to change, what actually changed, the role of women in that change, and the opportunities that women must seize in order to maximise the change.

The present paper is divided into three major sections. The first section provides a brief overview of the context in terms of describing what the Movement System was, what precipitated the change to Multi-party and the process for that change. The second section will examine in depth what women's and women's organisations experiences were in attempting to influence the change. The last section will probe into what opportunities present themselves in the newly adopted system of governance.

SECTION I: BACKGROUND

Few contemporary political and socioeconomic transitions on the African continent have been as dramatic or as contradictory as Uganda's.³ Since the time

³ J. Oloka-Onyango, Uganda's "Benevolent"

of independence in 1962, the democratization project seems to have eluded Ugandans again and again. Each passing phase of our political life seems to take us both two steps forward and one step back and thus we are a country in constant transition. During the period from independence to date Uganda has experienced not only civil strife, but also virtually every form of governance imaginable to the modern human kind multi-party democracy, one party dictatorship, military fascism, the recent current NRM government characterized as a 'no-party' system and now we have gone full circle to the beginning- to the multiparty system of governance.

One can say that each system of governance has been bitter-sweet experience to Ugandans with some forms being more bitter than sweet. Indeed many Ugandans question whether we have ever truly experienced a multiparty form of governance or whether what we have had (and may be in danger or reproducing) is many parties without democratic pluralism.⁴ The late Professor Mugaju calls Uganda's first attempt at multipartyism 'pseudo multiparty politics' and argues that:

The rise of political parties in the 1950's and 1960's did not automatically lead to the practice of multiparty democracy. In the first place, the political parties were more interested in issues that had nothing

Dictatorship (a paper available on the world wide web)

4 Sara Mukasa, Addressing Women's Demands in the Transition Process [A Paper Presented at the Launch of "Women's Demands to Political Parties and Political Organisations"], Oct 2004

*to do with democracy. The UNC was more interested in 'self governance now', with or without multipartyism. The main concern of DP what the Roman Catholics saw as decades of Protestant hegemony and to contain the spread of communism in Uganda. The UPC which started as an anti-Buganda platform was determined to gain power at any cost and the KY which represented the forces of neo-traditionalism did not conceal its hostility to any manifestation of multipartyism in Uganda. Despite democratic sloganeering, their [parties] prime inspiration was the pursuit of power as an end, rather than a means to an end.*⁵

Enter the Movement System:

Uganda's first experiment with multipartyism somehow turned into a one-party state under the first UPC government. This then gave birth to one of the most brutal military dictatorships on the African continent under the late Idi Amin. When the dictatorship was over thrown, Uganda tried the multiparty experiment again in 1980, this time maybe with worse results and with the culmination of five year bush war by the National Resistance Movement.

When it finally took power in 1986, the National Resistance Movement introduced a 'new' form of political governance called the 'No-Party' or 'Movement' system. The main tenets of the system were based on the fact that:

5 Justus Mugaju, An Historical Background to Uganda's No-Party Democracy, in No Party Democracy in Uganda, Myths and Realities (Eds: Justus Mugaju and J. Oloka Onyango). 2000 at pg 16 and 18

- Uganda had gone through a conflictual and turbulent history mainly caused by political party competition and therefore the country needed sufficient time to reconcile the people of Uganda, heal old wounds and bring about national unity.
- The Movement political system was one based on consensus rather than confrontation and would be closer to typically African values of solidarity, reconciliation, seeking general consensus of all and keeping peace and togetherness without fragmentation
- Parties in Africa tended to be based not on class interests and differences, but on ethnicity and religion and were thus sectarian in nature and not good for the country. In contrast the Movement system was all inclusive, elections would be carried out on 'individual merit' rather than party affiliation, and thus promote democracy more and avoid divisionism and other ills associated with multipartyism.⁶

On this basis, Uganda operated under the Movement system of governance from 1986 to 2005 July and during that period political parties existed in form but not in substance and were declared by the 1995 Constitution to be in abeyance during the existence of the Movement System. In July 2000 Uganda held a referendum to decide the system of governance they preferred and the main choice

⁶ John-Jean Barya, Political Parties, the Movement and the referendum on Political Systems in Uganda: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, *Supra* pg 29 to 31.

was between the Movement and Multi-partyism. Ugandans decided to retain the Movement System and thus parties were sent back to the freezer, so to speak. The referendum though did not pass without contest by the parties for the right to associate and indeed they chose to boycott the referendum arguing that the right to association was a fundamental human right which could not be granted and taken away whether at the wish of the people or the whims of government.

The Return to Multiparty System of Governance:

In July 2005, Ugandans voted in a second referendum to determine whether to return to multiparty governance or to retain the Movement system. This time round, almost overnight, President Yoweri Museveni became the 'chief campaigner' for a system he had abhorred for nearly three decades and indeed many wondered whether this was out of a paradigm shift or other pressures all together. The reasons he gave for urging Ugandans to vote the multiparty system were: (i) To get rid of opponents within the Movement system (*baleke bagende*), and (ii) to allow the Movement to cleanse itself and move on with those who were truly loyal to the Movement and (iii) Donor pressure to open up.

As Oloka writes,

What becomes very clear is that none of the reasons given for transition to a multiparty political system related to the belief that it was a better political system, even with

*all its imperfections. The President did not even have the courtesy to acknowledge the internal (non-Movement) which pushed for a return of political parties virtually from 1986. The lack of acknowledgement, and the president's utter contempt for political opposition makes it clear that President Museveni has not made the conversion to genuine multiparty competition.*⁷

And so in February 2006, Ugandans went to the polls under a multiparty system of Governance for the first time since 1986. Foundation for Human rights Initiative in its report on the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 2006 surmises that "The return to multipartyism was received with a lot of excitement but not much preparation or understanding. Most people were registered as members of one political party or the other without a clear understanding of what party membership entailed. The vast majority of Ugandans went to the polls and voted not out of party loyalty, but they voted for individuals, which is explained by the fact that most Ugandans still only understand the principle of individual merit."⁸

SECTION II: WHITHER UGANDAN WOMEN?

The participation of Ugandan women in the transition is a mixed bag

7 J. Oloka Onyango, The Socio-Political Context of the 2006 Elections, Presentation at the East African Law Society Symposium on Elections Law, Conduct and Dispute Resolution. Kampala, February 2th 2006

8 Foundation for Human rights Initiative (FHRI) Uganda, Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 2006: Counting the Gains, at pg vii

between inaction and some action. On the one hand there was active organising and engaging by a few women's rights organisations, and on the other there was passivity at best and complete apathy at worst. As one report states:

*Women were so oblivious....that they did not appreciate the issue of political transition as a direct concern of women. The absence of women's participation is orchestrated by the fact that almost 90% of respondents did not directly participate in the political transition debate and were not knowledgeable of the issues of debate, with the exception of what was reported in the media. To many respondents, the process just passed, with little or no interest in it.*⁹

However, those women who were more politically attuned were revolted by the acrimonious nature of the debate, as well as the sheer lack of interest in women's issues by the key players who were mostly men. As Tamale aptly states:

Regardless of what political system is in control of the state, and regardless of the lofty rhetoric, when Ugandan women lift the veil off the face of the state, they see nothing but deeply entrenched norms of male privilege and power embedded therein. We see a patriarchal state whose number one agenda is to sustain and defend such power; an institution by men and for men.

9 Maria Nassali and Edith Kibalama, Dissecting The Political Transition in Uganda: Women's Voices, March 2004 at pg 8 (research done under the auspices of Kituo Cha Katiba's Gender and Democratisation Programme)

Ugandan women are more interested in taking the state to task to account for its soft-peddling on actualising women's democratic rights as enshrined in the constitution. We are more interested, for example, in quick explanations from the state as to why it is meddling with the land co-ownership clause; why it is sitting on the domestic relations bill; why it is deferring the establishment of the Equal Opportunities Commission?

Ugandan women are acutely aware that the majority of men agitating for political power, whether clothed in movement or party colours, have traditional patriarchal mind-sets that readily justify women's subordination and exploitation. In rhetoric, they include issues of democracy and even gender equality in their political manifestos, but in practice they have come up with contradictory practices. Indeed, most do not practice democracy in their own homes and families. They are not willing to address issues of sex discrimination, domestic violence, sexual violence, gender equity and often dismiss out of hand all that women say.¹⁰

Women's Organising: What Did Those Who Were Active Do?

The following is only a brief list of the varied things that women's organisations did to participate in the transition process and is thus not an all inclusive list.

1. For starters, women submitted a memorandum to the Constitutional Review Commission (otherwise known as the Sempebwa Commission) on the need to lift the restrictions on party activities in Uganda and they also strongly urged that this should go hand in hand with a consistent civic education program in order to help ordinary people participate meaningfully in a multi party system.
2. After the Movement Meeting in Kyankwanzi, women along with other human rights organizations responded to the several recommendations made at that meeting. While applauding the decision to open up to multi-party politics, women urged that government show good faith and level the playing field through among others, repealing obnoxious legislation that made it impossible for parties to be equal players in politics.
3. In July 2003 women hosted a breakfast meeting with leaders of the main opposition parties to challenge them on their party gender agendas. Unsurprisingly, women found that very few of the parties had even addressed their minds to women's issues.
4. When the parties constituted their team to meet the government over talks on the

¹⁰ Sylvia Tamale, Gender Implications for Opening Up Political Parties in Uganda (available on the worldwide web)

transition, women challenged the parties on their lack of including women at the table when crucial decisions for the countries direction were being made.¹¹

5. Women consulted widely in 27 of the 56 districts of Uganda and put together a document dubbed “Women’s Demands to Political Parties and Organizations” The purpose of the document was to give voice to and highlight the needs and aspirations of Ugandan women as well as highlight the centrality of women to any meaningful process of governance in Uganda transitions to pluralism. The document also aimed at ensuring that

11 Regarding this process, I noted in one paper that I wrote that: “Once the talks between the government and the G7 started, again we (civil society and women parliamentarians) raised the concern over of the lack of women on the G7 team and to my great disappointment; an insider told me that when this point was made to the G7 they did not see the merit of the argument. They did not see the place or need to involve women in the talks. This is a clear manifestation of the politics of social exclusion, which should not characterize the transition process. We should in no way have allowed a process that excluded women and other marginalized and vulnerable groups from proceeding. Instead we looked on and again missed the chance to be proactive in demanding our rightful space. We must at all times remain vigilant in organizing and challenging patriarchal and undemocratic institutions and processes.” Jacqueline Asimwe, A Feminist Analysis of the Roadmap to Uganda’s Transition, Paper presented at a Joint meeting on the theme: “The Transition Road Map: What is in it for Women?” organized by Isis – WICCE and UWONET, Kampala 14th July 2004

those who wished to steer Uganda forward through the transition and beyond take on board these needs and aspirations both in principle and in practice. The document addressed eight (8) key areas which included true and meaningful democracy, integration of the principle of affirmative action, people-centred/people-focused development, commitment to obligations under international human rights instruments peace and security: environment, land and natural resources: law and administration of justice, and health and reproductive rights.

6. Women held round table meetings with each of the major political parties to discuss how parties will concretely address the issues raised in the document. We are yet to see what results this process will yield, but at least for now it provides an avenue for dialogue between political parties and organizations on the one hand, and women as a critical stakeholder in the democratisation process on the other.¹²
7. Women, again under UWONET appeared before the Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Committee and presented their views on the

12 See UWONET Report titled ‘Gender Balance in Electoral Systems : The Case For Proportional Representation’

White Paper where again, they defended the return to multi-party politics but with the caution that parties must ensure representation of women in key leadership positions within the party (and not just through women's wings) as well as ensuring that parties take cognizance of and address women's special needs and uphold and protect their rights.¹³

8. Women undertook research on and made a case for proportional representation as an electoral mode and made concrete recommendations for use in their dialogues with the various political parties and organisations as well as with the legislature for the purposes of promoting women's effective participation in governance.
9. Women conducted an in-depth analysis of the manifestoes of the major political parties to determine their gender compliance. These results were shared with the political parties just before elections and work continues post elections to ensure that the

parties make the necessary changes so as to make parties attractive for women to join.

10. There were many women and women's organizations that were involved in providing civic education as well as monitoring the transition process to ensure that women remained a central focus on Uganda's pathway to democracy. Other organisations were active in developing IEC materials, as well as skills training for women candidates to for the 2006 elections

Looking Ahead:

The enduring challenge for women is that many of the interventions were ad hoc, not many of their suggestions were taken on board either by government or the other political parties: and so in this new era it is important that women re-assess their strengths and capacities, and transform themselves into a force which would be politically risky to ignore. As Tamale advises:

We should embrace radical strategies in our struggles. We must reject the arguments that Africa or Uganda is not ready for radical feminism. What such arguments are saying in essence is that we are not ready for transformation. In fact, the majority of people that espouse the "women-should-take-it-nice-and-slow" line are those that have never directly experienced gender discrimination. As we embrace radical feminism,

13 See UWONET Report titled 'The Women's position paper on the government White Paper on the report of the Commission of Inquiry (Constitutional Review), The White Paper and Women's participation in the political transition in Uganda: Assessing the implications of the white paper on women's political participation in Uganda.'

*we should not completely discard the mainstream moderate methods that have dominated our struggle. Indeed, history has taught us that all successful social movements adopted a range of approaches in dismantling the structures of oppression that they were fighting. The undeniable benefit of the aggressive, radical method of advocating for women's rights in Africa is that it has strengthened the bargaining position of moderate feminists. The radicals provide a militant edge against which moderates' strategies and demands are regarded as "reasonable."*¹⁴

SECTION III: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN WITHIN THE NEW POLITICAL DISPENSATION

Many Ugandans are aware that while Uganda has gone through the business of elections under a multiparty system, a lot more needs to be done to consolidate that system. The consolidation should lead to the establishment of a viable democratic state. For the avoidance of doubt, the fundamental features of a democratic state include the following:

- The respect for and protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms as well as removal of all unnecessary restrictions to those rights beyond what is acceptable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society

¹⁴ Sylvia Tamale, FANNING THE FLAME OF FEMINISM IN UGANDA: Paper presented on the occasion of celebrating ACFODE's 18th Anniversary, November 17, 2003 at the International Conference Centre, Kampala.

- The space for citizens to exercise their sovereignty and power to determine who shall govern them and how they shall be governed without any undue political manipulation
- Responsible use and management of public power and resources evidenced by strong, efficient, transparent and accountable public institutions as well as the sound management of the socio-economic and political affairs of the state.
- Strong international collaboration and partnership for development¹⁵

It is absolutely imperative that women be part and parcel of the multiparty democracy consolidation process.

Suggestions for What Women Should Do:

On the whole, the ruling party needs to consciously learn to behave like a political party and shake any Movement stands that go against the grain of multiparty politics. The other parties need to consolidate themselves and their party positions throughout the country.

At Party Level Women Need To:

- Help parties move way from being 'boy's clubs' to making political parties work for women

¹⁵ Benson Ekwee, The Transition to Multi-party Democracy and Legal Changes: Impact on Civil Society Work Activism and Networking At Sub-National Level, Paper Presented at a Roundtable for District Networks in Eastern Uganda, Mbale July 13 2006

How?

- Confront the system of institutional incentives and disincentives at the level of the party that impact on women's effective involvement
- Encourage institutionalisation, transparency in decision making, building and documentation of rules so that everyone is clear about them making it easier for members to demand accountability
- Promote and encourage political behaviour and skills that enable both genders to participate effectively
- Ensure that issues such as internal functioning and culture need to address women's needs
- Revisit party policies to ensure that they are gender responsive. Already some great work has been done under the auspices of the International Republican Institute (IRI). IRI is currently running a Gender Mainstreaming Process Intervention with the major political parties in Uganda. Through party gender Mainstreaming Groups, IRI has been working to ensure that parties become more gender responsive and purposeful right from the level of their constitutive documents such as manifestoes and party constitutions, to programme documents and party activities. The highlights of the gender mainstreaming in each party are as follows:

*UYD/DP

Their gender working group proposed in its memorandum, a 40% representation of women at all

levels of leadership in the party and youth wing. In its memorandum, the DP explicitly aims at emancipation of women, combating sexism and promoting women and youth; as well as using gender sensitive language in its constitution and other party documents. Furthermore, the DP Gender Working Group proposes capacity building in gender for the party members and leadership alike, a nationwide gender unit and is re-thinking the establishment of a women's wing. Campaign messages and the vision of UYD have been reviewed and re-drafted in a more gender inclusive manner.

NRM-O

The memorandum of NRM includes a specific paragraph recognising women's part in the development of the country, and a commitment of the party to accord equal opportunities for women. It contains a specific objective to ensure gender responsiveness in structures, programmes, processes and activities of the party. The memorandum proposes a quota of 1/3 for women at all party levels, a recognition of the women's league to make it more sustainable, manageable and equipped with clear links to the mainstream as well as a clear rule against discrimination in the code of conduct. Furthermore, an action plan was developed which aims at inclusion of women in decision-making committees and a gender responsive party manifesto.

CP

The memorandum states the need for gender responsiveness and proposes amendments in that respect in the

preamble and in other articles as well as to add on a gender responsive slogan to the party emblem. It underlines that some traditional practices are discriminatory and proposes that CP promotes traditions which do not perpetuate gender imbalances and disparities. The memorandum proposes a separate goal for gender equity and equality, a change of the language with regard to gender responsiveness, a specific gender mainstreaming strategy that monitors and enhances gender within the party. Furthermore the group emphasises the need for continuous gender awareness measures and training in gender for the whole party. The action plan of CP focuses on gender awareness and training.

UPC

The memorandum explicitly recognises the importance of women to the development of the country and the need to ensure full participation of women as indispensable for democratic society. It proposes the amendment of the constitution in its principles where UPC states its commitments towards gender equity and equality as basic human rights and commits itself to enhance the role of women particularly in decision-making. It further proposes a specific goal on gender and the change of language to be gender inclusive. A quota of 1/3 at all levels is proposed in the structures of the party as well as improved incorporation of women and youth officials into the mainstream. The memorandum also proposes a review of the party election procedures and resource allocation in a gender responsive manner. The

code of conduct for the party should include prohibition of discrimination. The working group has furthermore started work on a gender analysis in preparation for the review of the party platform and plans to hold a sensitisation and capacity building events on gender at various party levels.^{16**}

Women should take advantage of the opportunities created by this process to further consolidate the gender agenda in their parties and help turn these proposals into concrete actions.

At Civil Society/ Women's Organisation Level

Women need to:

- Continue (or start) civic education on the multiparty system and how citizens can participate effectively within the system
- Work with all parties to increase their gender responsiveness
- Work with women politicians on ensuring passage of critical gender legislation

SECTION IV: CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that women have been instrumental to creating positive change in the ongoing transition to multiparty democracy in Uganda. Their efforts and energy are applauded.

However, women need to ensure

¹⁶ Final Report, 1st August to 27th September 2005: Gender Mainstreaming Process Intervention With Political Parties in Uganda (final Process Report, October 2005, available at IRI Offices in Kampala)

that now that the contest for political power is over (does it really end?), the country does not go back to business as usual. Women must contribute to consolidating multiparty democracy in Uganda which among other things means working towards enabling our society to be transformed in order to end discrimination and subordination of women, the poor and marginalized. Women's struggle must continue to ensure that democracy will have true meaning not only at state level, but also right from the home. And

women's struggle too must consist of repeatedly showing the connection between women's marginalization and economic and political stagnation.

Women **MUST** now develop a more sustained and protracted engagement with power and politics. There are no two ways about it.

To borrow the slogan of Makerere University: The Struggle Continues!

Notes

4

Useful Tools

Internet and e-Mail

The Internet

This is a computer network that joins other networks together e.g. those of academic and government institutions, schools, libraries and corporations, making them seem to be just one network to the user, who sits in front of her / his computer at home, in the office or at an “internet cafe”. The Internet provides access to information stored in different computers all over the world and it also provides the opportunity to engage in discussions and to share ideas and research with people connected to the network.

To access the Internet you need a computer with the adequate software, a telephone-line and a modem (modem = contraction of modulator / demodulator) to link your computer with the telephone. You also need to subscribe to an “internet provider”.

World Wide Web (www)

Through the Internet, you can access the www. This is the name given to the apparently seamless “web” of many geographically separate sources of information. The mass of data available is overwhelming. There is no guarantee that it is accurate, up-to-date or even meant to be helpful. Anyone with access to the internet can publish her / his own material and make it accessible on the web. Internet users must therefore approach websites with a very critical mind.

A web is distinguished by the prefix `http://` in its address, which you should write on the top of the page of your “browser” software (e.g. Netscape, Internet Explorer, ...). Each website has a unique address, known as URL. The FES Tanzania address is **`http://tanzania.fes-international.de`**

Take care when writing the web addresses for they are sensitive to

punctuation and spaces (there are no spaces in electronic addresses), and are normally written in lower case.

Search engines and websites

When you are looking for information you might already know the website to look in and its address. If you do not know where to look, then you will have to use a search engine. A search engine helps you find information. To access the search engine you write `http://` and the name of the search engine,

e.g. `www.google.com` OR `www.altavista.com` OR `www.yahoo.com`. These addresses open the websites of Google, Altavista and Yahoo. When you access a search engine, you will have to type some key words in the space provided. The search will be based on those words you chose as the most important ones. Here is the secret: what sort of key words should you use, and how to combine them?

1. *Be specific!*

The more specific your search is, the more likely you will find what you want. For example if you want to know how many international treaties Tanzania has signed, you should write “Tanzania international treaties signatories” or you should even write “how many treaties Tanzania has signed?” You will be surprised at how often this works!

2. *Use the symbol + to add*

If you want to be sure that the pages you will find contain not only one or another word you typed, but all of them, you should use the symbol +. For instance, you want to find pages where there are references to President Mkapa together with references to Mwalimu Nyerere. You should then type: `+Mkapa+Nyerere`. You can narrow down your search by adding more specific words.

3. *Use the symbol - to subtract*

If you want all the pages related to those key words but not the ones referring to a specific subject, you can use the symbol -. Using the above example, you want to reference to President Mkapa and Nyerere, but do not want reference to Ujamaa, you can type: +Mkapa+Nyerere-Ujamaa.

4. Use quotation marks to keep expressions together

If you want to find references to a special combination of words, you will have to write those words in quotation marks. For example, if you type +President+Mkapa, you will get sites that make reference to those words together or separated. But if you write "President Mkapa", you will get only the reference where both of the words appear in that same order.

5. Combining all of it

Try to use the different signs to be specific. For example:

+ "President Mkapa"
+ "Mwalimu Nyerere"
+ development

- "international cooperation".

Here are the names of a few search engines:

- Google (www.google.com)
- Altavista (www.altavista.com)
- Yahoo
- Lycos
- AskJeeves
- HotBot
- InfoSeek
- MSN

You can also enter a search engine and search for specific search engines, for example, + "search engines" + Africa.

Some of the specific search engines for Africa are:

- Mosaique.com
- ClickAfrica.com
- Orientation Tanzania
- Woyaa.com

- Ananzi.com
- Zebra.co.za
- Siftthru.com
- Searchenginewatch.com
- Fishboo.com

E-Mail

This refers to electronic mail as opposed to airmail or surface mail (today popularly known as "snail mail"). You can send messages to anyone with an Internet account, and it can include not only text, but also pictures and spreadsheets. Incoming messages are stored in your mail-box on your internet provider until you access it. E-Mail is delivered very fast, in a matter of seconds or a few hours. This depends amongst other things on the amount of data being transferred and the quality of telephone lines and that of your modem. The cost of sending e-mail depends on the amount of data and therefore the length of time it takes to send it from your computer to the local server. It is relatively cheap: sending e-mail to the other side of the globe is not more expensive than sending one to a computer next door.

To send and receive e-mails you will need a dedicated program, such as Outlook Express, Microsoft Outlook, Eudora, Pegasus and others. You will have your own electronic address and will send your message to another address. If you have a connection to an internet provider you will receive an address which is composed of two parts: your-login-name + the symbol @ + the name of the internet provider. FES Tanzania's electronic address is **info@fes.or.tz**

Chatting and conferencing

The Internet provides the possibility of communicating directly with others "on-line". In other words the people chatting or holding conference are at their computer and are on the internet at the same time.

How to Buy Desktops for Your Business

By: Vipul Shah, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Shopping for computers for business use, is a far different experience from shopping for a PC for your home. When you're buying a home system, you try to get the fastest, biggest, and best of everything, adding on features, peripherals, and software until you run out of cash and the bank will not lend you anymore. But when you're buying PCs for business, the question quickly becomes, how much can you live without? In other words, you want a desktop that has everything you need and nothing that you don't at a competitive price.

The basics

Most of the buying decision is a game of specifications, with processor, memory, and hard disk size being the most prominent. Don't fall into the trap of paying for too many megahertz. The latest Pentium 4 processors, which boast speeds in excess of 3GHz, are overkill for the vast majority of business applications. In fact, many business users will get by just fine with a slower Celeron chip, even though these (along with AMD processors) tend to be less popular in business. You're better off investing in extra memory and upgrading to 256MB or even 512MB of RAM.

Home PCs need expansive hard drives because they rapidly become cluttered with MP3s, digital photos, and home videos. But at work, a standard 40GB drive offers plenty of space for most users. Don't believe us? Look at it this way: you could prepare a different 10MB PowerPoint file every day (we know some managers who have tried), and you'd still have plenty of room after five years.

If you're working with video or large graphics files, however, you'll need a little more power in your system. In addition to lots of memory (512MB is a minimum for graphics applications), you'll want a larger hard drive, FireWire and USB 2.0 connectors, and a separate graphics card with its own memory as opposed to one integrated on the motherboard.

Necessary extras

Regardless of the applications you're running, there are a few features you'll want in any business PC. An integrated Ethernet adapter for networks is a must-have, and you'll be hard-pressed to find a desktop nowadays without one.

We also recommend opting for a TFT LCD monitor rather than a CRT monitor. These flat panel monitors are increasingly popular because they use only a small amount of desk space, display sharp images, and are easy on the eyes. The price on TFT monitors is relatively high because of limited production and rapidly increasing demand. If your budget doesn't allow it, opt for a good 17 -inch CRT display instead.

If your business needs upwards of 20 desktops, you should consider a managed PC such as the HP Compaq Evo, the Dell OptiPlex, or the IBM NetVista. These desktops include several features designed to make them easier and less expensive to deploy and manage. They use similar hardware and software, which lasts for long periods of time, minimizing the need to upgrade. The components are designed so that you can swap them out quickly and easily. And they can be monitored and managed remotely using included software. Many managed PCs also come in small form-factor designs-perfect when space is tight.

Buying advice

As important as what you buy is how you buy it. The PC market changes at a blistering pace, so don't worry too much about model numbers. Instead, buy from a vendor you trust. The best thing you can do when purchasing multiple PCs

is buy them all at once and get them from the same vendor. (If you can get servers, printers, and displays from the same source, all the better.) Even better, purchase identical desktop models. Not only will you get a discount, you'll have interchangeable components when something falls apart down the road.

Basic system maintenance

By Carl Vancil

One of the most common questions I have been asked has been, "Why is my computer so slow?" This has been followed closely by, "What can I do to speed up my computer?"

The answer can be as varied as the number of computers with the problem. The solutions can range from some simple maintenance to hardware repair/upgrades or even a combination. Here are some common things you can do to improve system performance.

1. Run a thorough scan disk

Errors in the files on your harddrive can reduce performance as can a hard drive that is developing physical errors. Scan disk will repair many of the file errors on your hard drive. Running the thorough scan disk will also check the hard drive for physical errors. Remember, depending on the size of your hard drive this can take a lot of time and you cannot do anything else at the same time. The best time to run scan disk is when you do not need to use the computer.

2. Delete temporary files from your hard drive

Temporary files are usually the files left over after installing a program and can be safely deleted.

3. Clean your internet browser cache

Cache files are those left over from your browsing experience. They mostly consist of images that your browser had to download in order to display on a web page you are viewing.

4. Defrag the files on your hard drive

Defrag arranges the files on your hard drive so that they can be accessed more efficiently. This has two advantages. One, your system operates more efficiently. Two, your hard drive will last longer because it will not have to work as hard to access files.

5. Perform a virus scan

Many viruses use so much of your system's resources that they will greatly degrade performance. Some will even crash your system completely. Make sure your virus definitions are up to date and run a complete virus scan of your system. This should be done weekly.

6. Check your system for spyware / adware

Many websites install spyware/adware on your system without your knowledge. These can be as simple as cookies that track where you surf to actual programs that give others access to your computer. There are many utility programs that you can download to scan for these files.

7. Clean the dust out of your computer

It seems too simple but just having a dirty computer can slow it down. If there is an excessive buildup of dust inside your computer, it will cause a heat buildup. This heat buildup will degrade performance as well accelerate wear and tear on the parts inside your computer which can lead to the premature failure of a critical part. Remember to unplug your computer before opening the case. Also, remember to NOT bump any of the internal parts with the vacuum to prevent damage.

These steps are something that we can all try if our system is running slow. If these do not get the performance of your system back to where you think it should

be then a few more things can be tried. Many utility programs will perform deep checks on your system's registry as well as look for missing shortcuts and even missing Windows files.

Another possibility is that there are too many programs starting when you turn on your computer. In Windows 98SE or XP (both home and pro) this is easy to check using the msconfig utility. From the 'run' command type 'msconfig' and hit the enter key. This will bring up the Windows Configuration Utility where you can check what is starting with Windows and it gives you the option of turning off the auto startup of many programs. In other versions of Windows (95, NT, 2000) it would be best to have someone with a good working knowledge of the Windows Registry service your computer.

If all this fails then you may need to reformat your hard drive or upgrade hardware. Remember too that you always have the option of taking your system in to a qualified service technician. Sometimes spending a little extra money will save you hours and hours of headaches or worse yet, the loss of data.

HOLDING A WORKSHOP, SEMINAR OR CONFERENCE

Planning and Budgeting

1. Develop the idea

Identify:

- The main objectives
- The target group
- The intended outcome

Write the outline.

2. Develop the program

Decide:

- Which topics

- The time frame
- The organisational style (conference, lectures, working groups)
- How much time is needed for the various elements, not forgetting recreation
- Who will act as resource persons
- Whether or not to seek media coverage of the event

Try to involve participants in developing the program.

3. Calculate the budget

- Preparatory meetings
- Hall charges
- Catering

- Refreshments during sessions
- Accommodation
- Travel
- Stationery
- Secretariat/organising team
- Reception (if necessary)

4. Income and expenditure

Record all income - donations, participants' fees etc.

Record all expenditure, remembering to keep receipts for each item

Organising

1. A checklist

- Book the venue & accommodation
- Hold preparatory meetings
- Prepare PR (public relations) activities if relevant
- Make agreements with resource persons
- Prepare the invitations
 - State the objectives clearly
 - Give information about the program, venue, dates, resource persons and participants
 - If participants have to do homework beforehand, make this clear
 - Explain financial and other conditions clearly
- Make the necessary travel arrangements
- Hold a joint session with all resource persons
- Prepare the necessary materials, forms, documents
 - Stationery
 - Registration forms
 - Claims forms for allowances
 - Printed program
 - Papers and teaching materials
 - Workshop documentation

2. Terms of reference for resource persons

- Discuss subject, objectives and duration of their input

- Explain how these fit in to the overall objectives and program for the workshop
 - Discuss the desired method of presentation
 - Give information about the venue and the facilities / equipment provided for the workshop
 - Request a written paper and or hand-outs if they are considered necessary
 - State the terms of payment for the persons services
- Try to hold preparatory meetings with resource persons.

Implementing

1. Arrival

Organisers should be in place well before the participants

- Check the venue and the technical facilities needed
- Give resource persons a final briefing
- Prepare for the registration of participants
- Display the program and other documents, if relevant

2. Registration

3. Welcome

Explain:

- Subject of the meeting
- Who are the organisers and sponsors
- Objectives
- Logic and timing of program
- Methodological approach
- Expected outcome

4. Holding the sessions

- Handle transport claims etc. during tea breaks only

5. Departure

Collect all that is necessary before people leave

- Signed registration forms/list of participants

- Signed allowance claims
- Original detailed invoices and receipts for venue, food, drinks, accommodation, travel, stationery etc.

6. After the event

As soon as possible take care of

- Accounting
- Report writing
- Any other follow-ups needed

Notes

8 TIPS ON HOW TO SUCCESSFULLY CHAIR A CONFERENCE

1

It is the conference chairperson's responsibility to see that the atmosphere during the discussion is always friendly, communicative and fair.

2

The conference chairperson introduces the topic in an objective and informative way. He/she formulates the discussion goals for each item on the agenda. During a discussion, he/she must not initially express his/her own opinion or assessment as this would bias the discussion.

3

The chairperson speaks as little as possible in order to give maximum time to the conference participants. Conference chairmanship principally entails raising questions and giving the word to different speakers.

4

Questions from the chairperson should always be designed to stimulate dialogue and consequently should never be answered by the chairperson himself/herself.

5

Preference should be given to open questions (W-questions: who, why, where, when, etc.) and information questions. Closed questions (which can only be answered with a "yes" or "no") can be fatal to a discussion.

6

Should a discussion peter out it is up to the chairperson to get it moving again by means of (open) questions, thought-provoking remarks and a summary of the proceedings so far.

7

The chairperson should make interim summaries to emphasize the thread of the discussion. At the close, the chairperson gives a general summary and his/her evaluation as to which of the goals formulated at the outset have or have not been achieved.

8

At the end of the conference, it is also up to the chairperson to formulate and delegate tasks to individual participants. Nobody ought to leave the conference without precisely knowing:

- a. what has been achieved in today's discussion,
- b. what is my specific assignment until the next conference/meeting,
- c. where and when is the next conference/meeting?

HOLDING EFFECTIVE INTERNAL MEETINGS AND PLANNING SESSIONS

Starting the meeting

1. Who is chairing the meeting?
(It is best to have agreed on this in advance.)
2. Who is going to write the minutes?
3. If the agenda has not been prepared in advance, then the chairman, (you), should collect the issues that need to be discussed from the participants. They should be written up on a board or a flipchart, so that everyone can see them. Remember the issues that might have cropped up at the previous meeting.
4. In collaboration with the participants decide how much time it will take to discuss each issue. Confirm at what time the meeting has to close. Ask if anyone has to leave early.

5. Then ask participants which issues they wish to concentrate on at the meeting and which ones can be postponed (if necessary). After that ask which issue should be dealt with first, second, third and so on. This should not take more than five minutes!

During the meeting

1. Follow the agreed agenda, discussing the issues in turn. The chairperson or moderator must see to it that the agreed time frame is adhered to. If this proves difficult, then the group must be asked to decide whether to continue the discussion of the issue

in question and therefore extend the meeting, or whether to stop the discussion and continue it at an agreed time.

2. Never move on to the next issue before making a decision on the one being discussed.

Closing the meeting

1. Quickly repeat the decisions that have been made.
2. Decide when and how the minutes will be distributed.
3. Decide who will chair the next meeting.
4. Close the meeting at the agreed time.



Source: Bridging the Gap: A Guide to Monitoring and Evaluating Development Projects by Bernard Beugnot & Jonathan Hampshire

PROJECT OUTLINES

Should be short, clear and promising.


Those who really know what they want can usually do with 2-3 objectives. Be as concrete as possible.

Who takes interest in this project? Who shall be involved? Who profits from the project and how?

Detailed list of expected expenditures (personnel material, travel, etc.)

Do you foresee any prohibitive difficulties or problems?

Any workshops about maintenance and organisation of the project?



Explain briefly aims, general objectives, former projects!

Convince the reader of the need for this project! Explain the idea of the project and how you want to fulfill the objectives, describe the Impact!

Do you need to contact other persons to fulfill your objectives? Specify their capacities or know-how!

Be precise about the venue, duration, methodology!

Which further impact does it have?

By whom? List names.

✓ Practical advice

- use white, clean sheets of A4 - paper
- present your project in a typewritten version if possible
- write on one side of the paper
- make sure you have a clear structure
- attach a covering letter

QUALITIES OF A MODERATOR

The Moderator

Moderation technique can best be used in groups of up to 15 participants. How to be a good moderator is not something to be learned quickly and easily, but is a matter of guided experiences, self reflection and continuous learning. A moderator's tasks are to:

- help the group to know and appreciate their own knowledge and strengths
- help the discussion process to be coherent and resultoriented
- be expert at guidance as far as the "how" of the discussion process is concerned, and not the "what"
- visualise and thus document the steps of the discussion process and its immediate results
- ask the right questions and break deadlocks

Usually two people can fulfil these tasks easier than one...

The ideal Moderator is a person who is...

- regarded as neutral by all participants
- therefore an outsider to the discussion group and
- able to use visualisation techniques, such as pinboards, flipcharts and blackboards

How to prepare a Moderation

- The issue, the main objective, and the quality of the intended results have to be very clear
- Be aware of the participants' composition, background, knowledge, interests and potential conflicts
- Determine the duration of the process, the facilities available and their limitations
- Identify clear-cut objectives and goals for every session, what methods to use and the amount of time needed
- Make sure that sufficient visualisation materials are available.

THE MODERATION METHOD

The typical steps in moderating a discussion

1. OPENING

- Warm-up with participants (explain your role, make them know each other).
- Discuss and agree on time-frame and organisational matters.
- Collect the expectations of participants.
- Discuss and agree on expectations that shall/can be objectives for the workshop.
- Agree on methodology.
- How will minutes be taken?

2. COLLECT ISSUES/SUBJECTS

- Phrase the guiding question carefully and in a very focused manner and visualise it!
- Collect all answers/ideas of participants, without discussing them first!
- Visualise answers/ideas as they come.
- Group them into clusters and give a name/title to each cluster.

3. SELECT ISSUES/SUBJECTS

- Phrase a guiding question carefully and write it down visibly.
- Allow participants to prioritise clusters according to their individual preferences.
- The agenda will then be determined by the number of “votes” per cluster, going through as many clusters as time or workshop-concept allows.
- In doing this, every participant gets the same number of “votes” which he can use on the clusters as he wishes. (One way of doing this is to hand out little markers of some sort to every participant so that they can all jot down their preferences at the same time.) If possible avoid “voting” by raised hands.

4. WORK ON THE ISSUE AND FIND A WAY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM

- Find a method of how to discuss or “solve” the prioritised subject/s.
- The method has to depend on the kind of issue at hand and the intended results.

5. PLAN ACTION/DETERMINE THE FOLLOW-UPS

- Visualise the activities regarded necessary by the group.
- Write down who will be in charge and by when different tasks need to be done.

6. CLOSING

- Find out, whether participants' expectations have been fulfilled,
- Whether they are satisfied with the process and the result.

Always come up with a result!
Always pin down which task is assigned to whom!
Always ascertain if you have addressed the needs and expectations of the participants!

THE STRUCTURE OF YOUR SPEECH

The aim of a discursive is to convince the listeners of the correctness of the speaker's opinion on the subject in question. Such speeches should not last longer than 30 minutes.

How do you most effectively structure such a speech?

AUDIENCE RELATED INTRODUCTION (max. 1 minute)

- Create the right atmosphere for the speech by referring to the audience, the venue, the occasion, etc.

SUBJECT-RELATED OPENING REMARKS (max. 3 minutes)

- Begin with a provocative proposition, a rhetorical question, a current event, etc.

PREVIEW THE MAIN POINTS OF YOUR SPEECH (max. 1 minute)

MAIN BODY (max. 20 minutes)

- Discuss the current situation/the facts/the problem.
- Discuss a variety of possible solutions.
- Discuss the pros and cons of these solutions.
- Present your own evaluation.
- Prove the accuracy of your assessment.

SUBJECT-RELATED CONCLUSION (max. 4 minutes)

- Summarise the main argument in a maximum of three points.

AUDIENCE RELATED CONCLUSION (max. 1 minute)

- Close your speech by, for instance, thanking the audience for their attention.

Source: H. Hess: Party Work in Social Democratic Parties

ARGUMENTATION TECHNIQUES

Good argumentation techniques are always beneficial. Your chances to win others over are higher if you can:

- present effective arguments and
- refute your opponent's arguments.

PRACTICAL TIPS

- Try to understand the position of your counterpart first, then react to it.
- If your counterpart's argumentation is weak, repeat your own good arguments.

- If you are interrupted, insist on the right to finish what you were saying.
- Anticipate your counterpart's arguments by including them in your own argumentation.
- Use the persuasive power of examples. Ask your counterpart to provide concrete examples of how to apply his theories.
- Expose generalisation and inaccuracies.
- Stick to the facts of the issue.
- If somebody evades the issue, return to the subject.

Source: C. Schulte, 1997, *Talking Politics (and being understood)*: Kampala, Fountain Publishers



Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere during an interview with the German magazine "Der Überblick" in Hamburg in April 1999.

HOW TO USE BLACKBOARDS AND FLIPCHARTS

Blackboard

Useful in gatherings of up to 25 people.

+ It is easy to write information & easy to correct it.

- Information is wiped off, it disappears and it is hard for participants to retrieve.

TIP If the chalk squeaks - this always makes participants uncomfortable - break the chalk and continue writing using the broken end.

Flipchart

Useful in gatherings of up to 35 people.

+ Sheets can be prepared in advance. Information can be displayed for a long period by removing sheets from the flipchart and posting them on the wall.

TIP Useful for a wide range of information e.g. displaying the day's agenda, important overviews, central statements, flowcharts, participants' contributions.



- Do not write down too much: concentrate on key issues only.
- Give the audience time to copy the contents of the presentation OR give it to them as a hand out afterwards. If you intend to distribute a handout, tell the participants so. Otherwise it is likely that they will spend time making unnecessary notes.
- Do not talk with your back turned to participants (e.g. while writing on the blackboard or flipchart).
- Do not stand in front of your presentation - the participants will get irritated at not being able to read what is written.

THE CHECK LIST FOR GOOD IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIVITIES

1. Important: plan step by step. What should be done first?
2. Consider all improbabilities, and plan alternatives.
3. Fix deadlines for you and for your partner.
4. Follow-up the results before the deadline.
5. Keep an eye on the indicators to be achieved.
6. Hire assistants, delegate, mobilize people.
7. For seminars & workshops, check everything in advance on loco.
8. Take care of the documentation (dates of receipts, use of materials, tasks of people involved ...)
9. Support partners in the learning process. Sell the idea "on-the-job learning".

10. Take care of the financial settlement and reporting as soon as possible.

11. Evaluate with the partners the achievement of objectives and indicators. Write recommendations. File documents. Release important papers. Inform other related institutions.

12. Write a reminder for following-up the results sometime later. Document it.

13. Keep your colleagues informed and updated.

Source: Workshop Report Management Skills for Decision-Makers - August 1999

TWELVE STEPS TOWARDS CONFLICT RESOLUTION

1. Understanding the conflict

- its type
- its sources
- its intensity
- its impact

2. Identifying the parties to the conflict

- whether bilateral or multilateral conflict

3. Identifying the issues involved

4. Determining the method of resolution

- Conflict prevention: Preventive diplomacy
 - Conflict resolution: Negotiation
 - Direct negotiation between the conflicting parties.
 - Assisted negotiation: Use of a third party.
- Mediation/Facilitation
Conciliation
Good offices
Arbitration

5. Determining the mechanism of resolution

- The actors/agents
 - States
 - NGOs
 - Individuals: Eminent personalities
 - Inter-governmental organizations

6. Determining the venue and dates for negotiation

7. Negotiating rules of procedure

8. Setting the agenda

9. Launching the substantive negotiations

10. Reaching a compromise agreement

11. Implementing the negotiated settlement

12. Guaranteeing and monitoring the implementation of the agreement

TIME MANAGEMENT - SELF MANAGEMENT

Most people bristle at the idea of becoming a slave to time: "The Swiss have clocks, but we have time", said a wise old man in Bhutan. A certain degree of time and self-management is nonetheless necessary if you wish to be effective and to achieve your goals.

Many people rely on their memory as their management tool, but most find that at some point their memory lets them down. "Sorry, I forgot" is not an uncommon statement. This is not necessarily a catastrophe, but in some instances forgetting can have unfortunate consequences. You might lose an important contract, you might lose your job, you might even lose your husband/wife to-be!

RULE 1: Write things down - use a diary and a calendar, (e.g. the FES diary/ calendar)

- Keep a "things to do" list.
- Enter all your appointments and deadlines, putting in a reminder maybe a week before the deadline falls.

- Review your appointments and deadlines regularly, informing those implicated in good time if you want to change them.

- Plan your week: Make the "things to do" list, get an overview over your appointments and deadlines.

- Plan your day.

- At the end of each day and at the end of each week make a review. Did you do all that you had planned to do? Did you meet your deadlines? Did you attend the scheduled meetings? Were you late? Why?

RULE 2: Be realistic about what you can manage to do

- Do not get overloaded: you have to be realistic about what you can overcome in the given amount of time.

- Prioritise: decide what are the most important issues.

- Say no, if the task is beyond what you are capable of doing.

- Remember to make time for your private life - family, friends, hobbies and your own relaxation. This is where you renew your energy.

WHAT IS PUBLIC RELATIONS?

Public Relations (PR) is about relations between an organization - be it a business enterprise, a political party or an NGO - and the public. Such relations exist, whether we want them to or not. It is therefore wise to consider what image you wish the public to have of your organization and to work consciously on the promotion of that image.

An organization manifests itself to the public in many ways. It can be through its propagated political aims, the behaviour of its representatives and members, its public statements and activities, the

atmosphere at its public meetings and press conferences, its transparency and its accountability.

The traditional "tools" of a public relations officer are:

- press conferences • publications • leaflets • posters • press releases • public events

These tools must be used carefully. A public meeting held without being well prepared or a badly designed and written publication may do more harm than good!

PREPARING AND RUNNING A PRESS CONFERENCE

A press conference is an event to which members of the press are invited for a briefing by the host organisation or personality. The briefing is followed by an opportunity for the journalists to ask questions.

Often press conferences are held when the subject matter is intricate and further questions from journalists are expected and desired.

If the information/news to be given at the press conference is not sufficiently interesting, relevant or “meaty” for the invited media’s readers/viewers, then it is likely that the journalists will not show up.

Preparation

- Are the objectives clear and is the topic well defined?
- Which media are to be invited? Remember, TV & radio may have special needs.
- Is the time/date well chosen and convenient for journalists? Does it allow them to meet their deadlines? Does it coincide with other important events?
- Who will chair the conference?
- Who will act as the organisation’s spokesperson/s?
- Is the opening statement well prepared?
- Are the major arguments well supported in the written handouts?
- Check the venue: make sure that there are enough chairs, tables and lights.
- Have handouts ready, e.g. press release. You might prepare a press

folder that includes the most important statements, a report and background material.

Invitation

- The headline must clearly indicate the host organisation, the name of the person responsible and how to contact him/her.
- State the subject matter clearly. (Who did/does what, when, where, why and how.)
- Provide information about the speakers.
- Provide details about the venue, time and date.
- Send out/deliver the invitation at least a week in advance.
- Send out a reminder one or two days before the event.

Running it

- Ask journalists to note their names and which media institution they represent on a prepared list. This is useful information for making follow-ups.
- Make the written handouts available for journalists when they arrive.
- The chairperson opens the conference and introduces the speakers and subject.
- The key presenter makes his/her statement clearly and concisely, and relates them to the handouts.
- The chairperson moderates the question and answer session.
- Answers must be brief, clear and concise. It is good to give practical

examples to illustrate the message you want to give.

- Speakers must remain relaxed,

friendly and forthcoming even when provoked.

A PRESS RELEASE

This is one of the most useful mediums through which an organization can make itself and its views known to the public. The contents might be:

- Statements on pertaining issues.
- Reports on activities or events you have organized.
- Announcements of forthcoming events.
- Reactions to statements made by others.

PROS AND CONS

Issuing a press release is a relatively cheap way of creating awareness about one's stand. However, badly written press releases and those dealing with unimportant issues will annoy the recipients and may create negative feelings towards your organization.

HOW TO WRITE IT

- The headline must state clearly the name of the organization issuing the release and the subject matter.
- State the most important themes first.
- Make clear why you are issuing the press release at this particular point in time.
- The journalist must be able to pick out relevant information easily and quickly.
- Use a typewriter or word processor, double-space and use only one side of the page.
- Give information about how to contact the person responsible: name, address, telephone, e-mail address.

PARTICIPATORY IMPACT MONITORING AND EVALUATION

By Constanze Pfeiffer, Freiburg, Germany

1. WHY IS IT SO IMPORTANT?

It is not only important to implement activities but also to learn about the perceptions of and the consequences for those people involved in the interventions. Through participatory impact monitoring and evaluation you find out if your project is still on track or if things need to be changed. More importantly, you learn not only what people think about your activities but if your work has initiated any changes, and if so what kind of changes.

2. WHAT ARE THE KEY TERMS?

What is Monitoring?

Monitoring is a repeated observation, reflection and correction of activities. It allows us to observe change in order to get a better picture of what is happening. There are two main types of Monitoring:

1. Monitoring of activities: Involves the observation of activities with regard to the intended project activities, for example workshops or production of training materials.
2. Monitoring of impacts: Impact Monitoring is done to find out whether a project initiated changes, which contribute to achieve the project's objective. Impact Monitoring is crucial since it investigates further than monitoring of activities what has been achieved.

Monitoring should include those people, who are involved in the project, because they know their situation and problems best. Since people may be biased because they are too close to the project, outsiders can additionally come in.

What is Impact?

Impact means mid- and long-term changes attributed to a certain factor or intervention. Impact can be positive or negative, intended or unintended, planned and unplanned.

What is Evaluation?

Evaluation is based on the information discovered during monitoring. Data from monitoring formats are summarized, compared, analysed and interpreted. Evaluation can be internal or external. This means evaluation is done either by a member of your organisation or by an independent person who is an outsider to your organisation. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. During internal evaluation the evaluator can use his/her insider knowledge and avoid misunderstandings, however, this might lead to biased reports. External evaluators are more neutral but they need to backstop results with all people involved, in order to make sure that there are no misunderstandings.

What are Indicators?

Indicators are “pointers”, “signs” or “markers” which are “related to” certain changes and which can be felt, seen and questioned.

Quantitative Indicators:

They use measuring or counting (e.g. number of people that took part in the training) and give us exact numbers

Qualitative Indicators:

They describe in words only (e.g. participants of the training find the trainings useful and apply their knowledge accordingly) and therefore give us descriptions about opinions, experiences etc.

It tells you what needs to be covered. First, you should be clear about your objectives and your expected impact; then decide on appropriate methods, the interview partners and those who will collect information. One example: A monitoring matrix focusing on a women's rights project.

3. WHAT TO CONSIDER WHEN MONITORING AND EVALUATING?

When planning monitoring and evaluation, a matrix is a very helpful tool.

Broad objectives	Training of paralegals
Expected impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Communities will access information of their rights and if needed claim their rights
Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Number of trainings conducted• Number of participants trained• Cases recorded by paralegals at community level• Clients feel satisfied with paralegals <u>and</u> use their services
Methods	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Interviews/Focus group discussions• Records
Who can give information?	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Paralegals• Communities
Who can collect information?	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Paralegals• Project management unit

4. WHAT TOOLS TO USE IN ORDER TO LEARN ABOUT CHANGES?

divided by sex and age) and comparing them over time.

There are two types of methods: quantitative and qualitative ones. It is highly recommended to use a combination of both methods.

4.1 Quantitative methods

Statistics

Record keeping is very helpful to track down changes by collecting numbers (e.g. number of the participants of a workshop

Questionnaires

Questionnaires consist of open (describing in own words) and closed questions (choosing given answers/categories) focusing on a specific topic. They start with information on the interview partner (e.g. sex, age, economic and educational status) before proceeding with questions related to the addressed topic.

4.2 Participatory qualitative methods

Introduction

In order to learn from local people about their conditions, experiences and problems, a set of participatory data collection methods named “Participatory Rural Appraisal” (PRA) was developed. Up to now, new methods are still being added to the list of participatory data collection methods. PRA can therefore be understood as a growing tool-box of participatory methods. PRA is based on several very important principles:

- Learn from the locals at the site, face-to-face in the local context
- Be relaxed and not rushed, listen and do not lecture
- Use the different PRA methods in a flexible and innovative way
- Use several methods and compare their results in order to look at findings from different angles

Gender perspectives

During planning- and implementation stage, Gender aspects need to be covered in order to learn about different perceptions of women and men (e.g. additionally broken down by social and age group). Depending on the cultural setting, the discussions should take place in either single-sex or mixed groups.

Tools

Most of the PRA methods use visualisation techniques which allow for visualising conditions, problems and experiences of local people. Useful tools are:

Qualitative interviews

Qualitative interviews play a key role in the PRA approach. There are several ways of conducting an interview with systematically or randomly selected:

- Groups of women and/or men
- Individuals

Interviews rely heavily on questions. That

is why questions:

- Need to be clear, simple and relevant
- Need to consider the target group (e.g. gender sensitive)

Focus group discussions

Group discussions often provide a useful addition to the information gathered in one-to-one interviews. Instead of interviews, discussions are held with groups on various topics, e.g. whether the project has led to any changes and if so what kind of changes.

Before/after comparison

This method compares situations and conditions before the beginning of a project with the current situation. In this context, it is important to find out whether the situation has changed since the project began and if so, why.

Case studies

Case studies of individual women and men in the target group provide information on their lives and on changes that resulted from the project.


Observations

The intention is to observe the lives of the target group and to gain a better understanding of their perspectives, experiences and problems.

Diagrams

Often, some people in the target group are illiterate, and it has therefore proved useful to illustrate certain aspects by using visualisation techniques. Hereby, diagrams are a helpful tool. During meetings with the participants, processes are initiated that enable them to discuss certain issues and to illustrate these by using diagrams. For example, to obtain information on specific consequences of an intervention or action, so-called flow charts can be used.

Example : Fighting in the family



Ranking techniques

Ranking techniques can help to reveal certain aspects of the target group's problems and preferences and what criteria apply to their choice. The aim is to discuss various aspects and to rank their importance. Hereby, participants assign values (e.g. 5 = most important, 1 = least important). The aspects to be assessed when using ranking technique are best collected during brainstorming sessions or interviews held beforehand.

Role exchange

Here, men analyse the situation of women and vice versa. This method can serve to open people's eyes on both sides. A change of view often enables men to perceive for the first time how live is for women and vice versa.

Source:

Germann, Dorsi & Gohl, Eberhard (1995): Participatory Impact Monitoring. Eschborn: Gate/GTZ.

Juliane Osterhaus & Constanze Pfeiffer (2003): Monitoring-Guidelines for partner organisations of the GTZ sector project 'Strengthening Women's Rights'. Eschborn: GTZ.

Notes

Notes

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The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung¹, or FES, was founded in 1925 as a political legacy of Germany's first democratically elected President, Friedrich Ebert, who died in that year. Ebert, a Social Democrat of humble origins, had risen to hold the highest office in his country despite considerable opposition from his political adversaries. He assumed the burden of the presidency in a country which was crisis ridden following its defeat in World War I. His own personal experience led him to propose the establishment of a foundation with a threefold aim:

- to further a democratic, pluralistic political culture by means of political education for all classes of society.
- to facilitate access to higher education for gifted young people by providing scholarships.
- to contribute to international understanding and co-operation in order to avert a fresh outbreak of war and violent conflicts wherever possible.

Today, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is a political non-profit making, public-interest institution committed to the principles and basic values of social democracy in its educational and policy-oriented work.

Development Co-operation

In the Foundation's offices in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Oceania approximately 80 German staff and 600 local nationals are involved in projects in the fields of economic and social development, socio-political education and information, the media and communication and in providing advisory services.

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung sees its activities in the developing countries as a contribution to:

- the improvement of political and social framework conditions
- the democratisation of social structure
- enhancement of developing countries' position in the International Trade arrangements
- the empowerment of women and the promotion of gender
- the strengthening of free trade unions
- the improvement of communication and media structures
- regional and international media co-operation
- regional co-operation between states and interest groups
- the resolution of the North-South conflict

This calendar is intended to provide not only an individual tool for purposes of time planning but also a day-to-day handbook for quick reference on issues that may be of interest to the people in Eastern Africa and to those who are politically active.

¹ Stiftung is the German word for „foundation“

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WILLY BRANDT:

„International co-operation is far too important to be left to governments alone.“