Political Handbook & Regional Calendar 2006

EASTERN AFRICA

FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG

Dear Partners, Friends & Interested Reader,

Welcome 2006!

For some years the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Tanzania has been publishing an annual edition of the "Political Handbook and NGO-Calendar" with quite a lot of success.
Demands have come not only from Africa but also from overseas such as USA, Europe and even Japan. Some of them clearly pointed out the richness of information about Tanzania and the East-African Region.

Taking this into consideration, FES decided to expand the information in the "Political Handbook" to their Regional Project in Eastern Africa, comprising of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. The current edition of 2006 does not contain information about Sudan, but the next one will include information about Sudan as well.

Traditionally we have divided the now called "Political Handbook and Regional Calendar 2006 for Eastern Africa" in four sections:
The calendar, statistics, information on cross-cutting theme and other analysis of important issues, as well as, helpful information and management-tools on how to organize and carry out different social events.

For the present edition we have chosen information about the process of economic unification in the Region and the democratization process in Kenya and Uganda.

We wish good luck and success to all our friends in Eastern Africa.

Finally I would like to acknowledge with thanks the contribution of the following: Angela Ishengoma for the product co-ordination, Marianne Schreiber-Einloft for the revision, Eva Diehl for the revision of the statistics, and Lars-Christian Treusch for the layout and typesetting/design.

Me and all staff of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in the Regional offices wish you and your family a healthy, prosperous, successful and peaceful year 2006.

Reinhold Einloft
Resident Director FES Tanzania

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Calendar 2006

Overview 2006

January 2006						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
30	31					*1*
2	3	4	5	6	7	*8*
9	10	11	12	13	14	*15*
16	17	18	19	20	21	*22*
23	24	25	26	27	28	*29*

February 2006						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
		1	2	3	4	*5*
6	7	8	9	10	11	*12*
13	14	15	16	17	18	*19*
20	21	22	23	24	25	*26*
27	28					

March 2006						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
		1	2	3	4	*5*
6	7	8	9	10	11	*12*
13	14	15	16	17	18	*19*
20	21	22	23	24	25	*26*
27	28	29	30	31		

April 2006						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
					1	*2*
3	4	5	6	7	8	*9*
10	11	12	13	14	15	*16*
17	18	19	20	21	22	*23*
24	25	26	27	28	29	*30*

May 2006						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	*7*
8	9	10	11	12	13	*14*
15	16	17	18	19	20	*21*
22	23	24	25	26	27	*28*
29	30	31				

June 2006						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
			1	2	3	*4*
5	6	7	8	9	10	*11*
12	13	14	15	16	17	*18*
19	20	21	22	23	24	*25*
26	27	28	29	30		

July 2006						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
31					1	*2*
3	4	5	6	7	8	*9*
10	11	12	13	14	15	*16*
17	18	19	20	21	22	*23*
24	25	26	27	28	29	*30*

August 2006						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
	1	2	3	4	5	*6*
7	8	9	10	11	12	*13*
14	15	16	17	18	19	*20*
21	22	23	24	25	26	*27*
28	29	30	31			

September 2006						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
				1	2	*3*
4	5	6	7	8	9	*10*
11	12	13	14	15	16	*17*
18	19	20	21	22	23	*24*
25	26	27	28	29	30	

October 2006						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
30	31					*1*
2	3	4	5	6	7	*8*
9	10	11	12	13	14	*15*
16	17	18	19	20	21	*22*
23	24	25	26	27	28	*29*

November 2006						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
		1	2	3	4	*5*
6	7	8	9	10	11	*12*
13	14	15	16	17	18	*19*
20	21	22	23	24	25	*26*
27	28	29	30			

December 2006						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
				1	2	*3*
4	5	6	7	8	9	*10*
11	12	13	14	15	16	*17*
18	19	20	21	22	23	*24*
25	26	27	28	29	30	*31*

Overview 2007

January 2007

M	T	W	T	F	S	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	*7*
8	9	10	11	12	13	*14*
15	16	17	18	19	20	*21*
22	23	24	25	26	27	*28*
29	30	31				

February 2007

M	T	W	T	F	S	S
			1	2	3	*4*
5	6	7	8	9	10	*11*
12	13	14	15	16	17	*18*
19	20	21	22	23	24	*25*
26	27	28				

March 2007

M	T	W	T	F	S	S
			1	2	3	*4*
5	6	7	8	9	10	*11*
12	13	14	15	16	17	*18*
19	20	21	22	23	24	*25*
26	27	28	29	30	31	

April 2007

M	T	W	T	F	S	S
30						*1*
2	3	4	5	6	7	*8*
9	10	11	12	13	14	*15*
16	17	18	19	20	21	*22*
23	24	25	26	27	28	*29*

May 2007

M	T	W	T	F	S	S
	1	2	3	4	5	*6*
7	8	9	10	11	12	*13*
14	15	16	17	18	19	*20*
21	22	23	24	25	26	*27*
28	29	30	31			

June 2007

M	T	W	T	F	S	S
				1	2	*3*
4	5	6	7	8	9	*10*
11	12	13	14	15	16	*17*
18	19	20	21	22	23	*24*
25	26	27	28	29	30	

July 2007

M	T	W	T	F	S	S
30	31					*1*
2	3	4	5	6	7	*8*
9	10	11	12	13	14	*15*
16	17	18	19	20	21	*22*
23	24	25	26	27	28	*29*

August 2007

M	T	W	T	F	S	S
		1	2	3	4	*5*
6	7	8	9	10	11	*12*
13	14	15	16	17	18	*19*
20	21	22	23	24	25	*26*
27	28	29	30	31		

September 2007

M	T	W	T	F	S	S
					1	*2*
3	4	5	6	7	8	*9*
10	11	12	13	14	15	*16*
17	18	19	20	21	22	*23*
24	25	26	27	28	29	*30*

October 2007

M	T	W	T	F	S	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	*7*
8	9	10	11	12	13	*14*
15	16	17	18	19	20	*21*
22	23	24	25	26	27	*28*
29	30	31				

November 2007

M	T	W	T	F	S	S
			1	2	3	*4*
5	6	7	8	9	10	*11*
12	13	14	15	16	17	*18*
19	20	21	22	23	24	*25*
26	27	28	29	30		

December 2007

M	T	W	T	F	S	S
31					1	*2*
3	4	5	6	7	8	*9*
10	11	12	13	14	15	*16*
17	18	19	20	21	22	*23*
24	25	26	27	28	29	*30*

Dec. 2005 - Jan. 2006

Week 52 26th Dec. 2005 - 1st Jan. 2006

Monday 26	Tuesday 27	Wednesday 28
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 29	Friday 30	Saturday 31
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 1
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

January 2006

Week 1 2nd - 8th January 2006

Monday 2	Tuesday 3	Wednesday 4
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 5	Friday 6	Saturday 7
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 8
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

January 2006

Week 2 9th - 15th January 2006

Monday 9	Tuesday 10	Wednesday 11
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 12	Friday 13	Saturday 14
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 15
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

January 2006

Week 3 16th - 22nd January 2006

Monday 16
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Tuesday 17
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Wednesday 18
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Thursday 19
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Friday 20
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10
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14
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18
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Saturday 21
12
16
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Sunday 22
12
16
20

January 2006

Week 4 23rd - 29th January 2006

Monday 23	Tuesday 24	Wednesday 25
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 26	Friday 27	Saturday 28
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 29
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

Jan. - Feb. 2006

Week 5 30th Jan. - 5th Feb. 2006

Monday 30	Tuesday 31	Wednesday 1
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 2	Friday 3	Saturday 4 / Sunday 5
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

February 2006

Week 6 6th - 12th February 2006

Monday 6	Tuesday 7	Wednesday 8
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 9	Friday 10	Saturday 11
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 12
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

February 2006

Week 7 13th - 19th February 2006

Monday 13	Tuesday 14	Wednesday 15
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 16	Friday 17	Saturday 18
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 19
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

February 2006

Week 8 20th - 26th February 2006

Monday 20	Tuesday 21	Wednesday 22
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 23	Friday 24	Saturday 25
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 26
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

Feb. - March 2006

Week 9 27th Feb. - 5th March 2006

Monday 27	Tuesday 28	Wednesday 1
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 2	Friday 3	Saturday 4
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 5
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

March 2006

Week 10 6th - 12th March 2006

Monday 6	Tuesday 7	Wednesday 8
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 9	Friday 10	Saturday 11
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 12
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

March 2006

Week 11 13th - 19th March 2006

Monday 13	Tuesday 14	Wednesday 15
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 16	Friday 17	Saturday 18
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	**Sunday 19**
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

March 2006

Week 12 20th - 26th March 2006

Monday 20	Tuesday 21	Wednesday 22
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 23	Friday 24	Saturday 25
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 26
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

March -April 2006

Week 13 27th March - 2nd April 2006

Monday 27	Tuesday 28	Wednesday 29
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 30	Friday 31	Saturday 1
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 2
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

April 2006

Week 14 3rd - 9th April 2006

Monday 3	Tuesday 4	Wednesday 5
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 6	Friday 7	Saturday 8
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 9
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

April 2006

Week 15 10th - 16th April 2006

Monday 10	Tuesday 11	Wednesday 12
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 13	Friday 14	Saturday 15
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 16
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

April 2006

Week 16 — 17th - 23rd April 2006

Monday 17	Tuesday 18	Wednesday 19
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 20	Friday 21	Saturday 22
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 23
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

April 2006

Week 17 24th - 30th April 2006

Monday 24	Tuesday 25	Wednesday 26
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 27	Friday 28	Saturday 29
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 30
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

May 2006

Week 18 1st - 7th May 2006

Monday 1	Tuesday 2	Wednesday 3
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 4	Friday 5	Saturday 6
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 7
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

May 2006

Week 19 8th - 14th May 2006

Monday 8
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Tuesday 9
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Wednesday 10
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Thursday 11
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Friday 12
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Saturday 13
12
16
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Sunday 14
12
16
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May 2006

Week 20 — 15th - 21st May 2006

Monday 15	Tuesday 16	Wednesday 17
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 18	Friday 19	Saturday 20 / Sunday 21
8	8	Saturday 20
10	10	12
12	12	16
14	14	20
16	16	Sunday 21
18	18	12
20	20	16
		20

May 2006

Week 21 22nd - 28th May 2006

Monday 22	Tuesday 23	Wednesday 24
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 25	Friday 26	Saturday 27
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 28
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

May - June 2006

Week 22 29th May - 4th June 2006

Monday 29	Tuesday 30	Wednesday 31
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 1	Friday 2	Saturday 3
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 4
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

June 2006

Week 23 5th - 11th June 2006

Monday 5
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Tuesday 6
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Wednesday 7
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Thursday 8
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Friday 9
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18
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Saturday 10
12
16
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Sunday 11
12
16
20

June 2006

Week 24 12th - 18th June 2006

Monday 12	Tuesday 13	Wednesday 14
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 15	Friday 16	Saturday 17
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 18
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

June 2006

Week 25 19th - 25th June 2006

Monday 19
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Tuesday 20
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Wednesday 21
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Thursday 22
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Friday 23
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12
14
16
18
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Saturday 24
12
16
20

Sunday 25
12
16
20

June - July 2006

Week 26 26th June -2nd July 2006

Monday 26	Tuesday 27	Wednesday 28
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 29	Friday 30	Saturday 1
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 2
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

July 2006

Week 27 3rd - 9th July 2006

Monday 3	Tuesday 4	Wednesday 5
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 6	Friday 7	Saturday 8
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 9
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

July 2006

Week 28 — 10th - 16th July 2006

Monday 10	Tuesday 11	Wednesday 12
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 13	Friday 14	Saturday 15 / Sunday 16
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 16
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

July 2006

Week 29 17th - 23rd July 2006

Monday 17	Tuesday 18	Wednesday 19
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 20	Friday 21	Saturday 22
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 23
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

July 2006

Week 30

24th - 30th July 2006

Monday 24	Tuesday 25	Wednesday 26
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 27	Friday 28	Saturday 29
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 30
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

July - Aug. 2006

Week 31 31st July - 6th Aug. 2006

Monday 31	Tuesday 1	Wednesday 2
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 3	Friday 4	Saturday 5
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 6
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

August 2006

Week 32 7th - 13th August 2006

Monday 7	Tuesday 8	Wednesday 9
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 10	Friday 11	Saturday 12
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 13
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

August 2006

Week 33 14th - 20th August 2006

Monday 14
8
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Tuesday 15
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Wednesday 16
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Thursday 17
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Friday 18
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10
12
14
16
18
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Saturday 19
12
16
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Sunday 20
12
16
20

August 2006

Week 34 21st - 27th August 2006

Monday 21	Tuesday 22	Wednesday 23
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 24	Friday 25	Saturday 26
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 27
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

Aug. - Sept. 2006

Week 35 28th Aug. - 3rd Sept. 2006

Monday 28	Tuesday 29	Wednesday 30
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 31	Friday 1	Saturday 2
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 3
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

September 2006

Week 36 4th - 10 September 2006

Monday 4	Tuesday 5	Wednesday 6
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 7	Friday 8	Saturday 9
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 10
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

September 2006

Week 37 11th - 17th September 2006

Monday 11	Tuesday 12	Wednesday 13
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 14	Friday 15	Saturday 16
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 17
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

September 2006

Week 38 18t - 24th September 2006

Monday 18	Tuesday 19	Wednesday 20
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 21	Friday 22	Saturday 23
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 24
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

Sept. - Oct. 2006

Week 39 25th Sept. - 1st Oct. 2006

Monday 25	Tuesday 26	Wednesday 27
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 28	Friday 29	Saturday 30 / Sunday 1
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

October 2006

Week 40 2nd - 8th October 2006

Monday 2	Tuesday 3	Wednesday 4
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 5	Friday 6	Saturday 7 / Sunday 8
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 8
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

October 2006

Week 41 9th - 15th October 2006

Monday 9
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18
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Tuesday 10
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Wednesday 11
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Thursday 12
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Friday 13
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14
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18
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Saturday 14
12
16
20

Sunday 15
12
16
20

October 2006

Week 42 16th - 22nd October 2006

Monday 16	Tuesday 17	Wednesday 18
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 19	Friday 20	Saturday 21
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 22
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

October 2006

Week 43 23rd - 29th October 2006

Monday 23	Tuesday 24	Wednesday 25
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 26	Friday 27	Saturday 28
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 29
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

Oct. - Nov. 2006

Week 44 30th Oct. - 5th Nov. 2006

Monday 30	Tuesday 31	Wednesday 1
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 2	Friday 3	Saturday 4
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 5
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

November 2006

Week 45 6th - 12th November 2006

Monday 6
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8
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16
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18
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Tuesday 7
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8
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Wednesday 8
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Thursday 9
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Friday 10
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Saturday 11
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12
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16
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20

Sunday 12
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12
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16
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20

November 2006

Week 46 13th - 19th November 2006

Monday 13	Tuesday 14	Wednesday 15
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 16	Friday 17	Saturday 18
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 19
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

November 2006

Week 47 20th - 26th November 2006

Monday 20
8
10
12
14
16
18
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Tuesday 21
8
10
12
14
16
18
20

Wednesday 22
8
10
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14
16
18
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Thursday 23
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12
14
16
18
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Friday 24
8
10
12
14
16
18
20

Saturday 25
12
16
20

Sunday 26
12
16
20

Nov. - Dec. 2006

Week 48 27th November - 3rd December 2006

Monday 27	Tuesday 28	Wednesday 29
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 30	Friday 1	Saturday 2
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 3
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

December 2006

Week 49 4th - 10th December 2006

Monday 4	Tuesday 5	Wednesday 6
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 7	Friday 8	Saturday 9
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 10
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

December 2006

Week 50 11th - 17th December 2006

Monday 11	Tuesday 12	Wednesday 13
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 14	Friday 15	Saturday 16
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 17
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

December 2006

Week 51 18th - 24th December 2006

Monday 18	Tuesday 19	Wednesday 20
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 21	Friday 22	Saturday 23
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 24
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

December 2006

Week 52 25th - 31st December 2006

Monday 25	Tuesday 26	Wednesday 27
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 28	Friday 29	Saturday 30 / Sunday 31
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	12
16	16	16
18	18	20
20	20	

January 2007

Week 1 1st - 7th January 2007

Monday 1	Tuesday 2	Wednesday 3
8	8	8
10	10	10
12	12	12
14	14	14
16	16	16
18	18	18
20	20	20

Thursday 4	Friday 5	Saturday 6 / Sunday 7
8	8	12
10	10	16
12	12	20
14	14	Sunday 7
16	16	12
18	18	16
20	20	20

2

Basic facts and figures

Country-specific data				
	Ethiopia	**Kenya**	**Tanzania**	**Uganda**
Geography				
Total area	1,127,127 sq.km	582,650 sq.km	945,087 sq.km	236,040 sq.km
- Land Area	1,119,683 sq.km	569,250 sq.km	886,037 sq.km	199,710 sq.km
- Water Area	7,444 sq.km	13,400 sq.km	59,050 sq.km (includes the islands of Mafia, Pemba, Zanzibar)	36,330 sq.km
Total land boundaries	5,328 km	3,477 km	3,861 km	2,698 km
Coastline	0 km (landlocked)	536 km	1,424 km	0 km (landlocked)
Highest peak (in m)	Ras Dejen 4,620m	Mt. Kenya 5,199m	Kilimanjaro 5,895m	Margherita Peak Mt. Stanley 5,110m
Natural Resources	Small reserves of gold, platinum, copper, potash, natural gas, hydropower	Limestone, soda ash, salt, gemstones, fluorspar, zinc, diatomite, gypsum, wildlife, hydropower	Hydropower, tin, phosphates, iron ore, coal, diamonds, gemstones, gold, natural gas, nickel	Copper, cobalt, hydropower, limestone, salt, arable land
Land Use (in % of the total surface)				
Arable Land	10,71%	8,08%	4,52%	25,88%
Permanent Crops	0,75%	0,98%	1,08%	10,65%
Other	88.54% (2001)	90.94% (2001)	94.4% (2001)	63.67% (2001)
Irrigated Land	1,900 sq.km (1998 estimate)	670 sq.km (1998 estimate)	1.550 sq.km (1998 est.)	90 sq.km (1998 estimate)

Ethnicity, religion and language	Ethiopia	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Ethnic groups	Oromo 40%, Amhara and Tigre 32%, Sidamo 9%, Shankella 6%, Somali 6%, Afar 4%, Gurage 2%, other 1%	Kikuyu 22%, Luhya 14%, Luo 13%, Kalenjin 12%, Kamba 11%, Kisii 6%, Meru 6%, other African 15%, non-African (Asian, European, Arab) 1%	mainland: native African 99% (of which 95% are Bantu consisting of more than 130 tribes), other 1% (consisting of Asian, European, Arab); Zanzibar: Arab, native African, mixed Arab and native African	Baganda 17%, Ankole 8%, Basoga 8%, Iteso 8%, Bakiga 7%, Langi 6%, Rwanda 6%, Bagisu 5%, Acholi 4%, Lugbara 4%, Batoro 3%, Bunyoro 3%, Alur 2%, Bagwere 2%, Bakonjo 2%, Jopodhola 2%, Karamojong 2%, Rundi 2%, non-African (European, Asian, Arab) 1%, other 8%
Religions	Muslim 45-50%, Ethiopian Orthodox 35-40%, other 15-20%	Protestant 45%, Roman Catholic 33%, indigenous beliefs 10%, Muslim 10%, other 2% (a)	mainland: Christian 30%, Muslim 35%, indigenous beliefs 35%; Zanzibar: more than 99% Muslim	Roman Catholic 33%, Protestant 33%, Muslim 16%, indigenous beliefs 18%
Languages	Amharic, Tigrinya, Oromigna, Guaragigna, Somali, Arabic, other local languages, English (major foreign language taught in schools)	English (official), Swahili (official), numerous indigenous languages	Swahili (official), English (official, primary language of commerce, administration and higher education), Arabic (widely spoken in Zanzibar), many local languages	English (official national language), Ganda or Luganda (most widely used of the Niger-Congo languages), other Niger-Congo languages, Nilo-Saharan languages, Swahili, Arabic

(a) note: a large majority of Kenyans are Christians, but estimates for the percentage of the population that adheres to Islam or indigenous beliefs vary widely

Source: The CIA World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ke.html, retrieved Sept. 2005

Ethiopia: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/et.html

Kenya: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ke.html

Tanzania: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tz.html

Uganda: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ug.html

Demographic indicators					
	Year	**Ethiopia**	**Kenya**	**Tanzania**	**Uganda**
Total population (millions)	1975	34.1	13.5	16.0	10.8
	2003	73.8	32.7	36.9	26.9
	2015 (a)	97.2	44.2	45.6	41.9
Annual population growth rate (%)	1975-2003	2.8	3.2	3.0	3.3
	2003-2015 (a)	2.3	2.3	1.8	3.7
Urban population (% of total) (b)	1975	9.5	12.9	10.1	8.3
	2003	15.7	39.3	35.4	12.3
Population under age 15 (% of total)	2003	45.0	43.1	43.2	50.4
	2015 (a)	41.7	42.6	38.9	50.8
Population ages 65 and above (% of total)	2003	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.1
	2015 (a)	3.2	2.8	3.7	2.2
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	1970-75 (c)	6.8	8.0	6.8	7.1
	2000-05 (c)	5.9	5.0	5.0	7.1

(a) Data refer to medium-variant projections; (b) Because data are based on national definitions of what constitutes a city or metropolitan area, cross-country comparisons should be made with caution; (c) Data refer to estimates for the period specified.

Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2005.

Economic indicators						
		Year	**Ethiopia**	**Kenya**	**Tanzania**	**Uganda**
GDP	US$ billions	2003	6.7	14.4	10.3	6.3
	Purchasing power parity (PPP) US$ billions	2003	48.8 (a)	33.1	22.3	36.8 (a)
GDP per capita	US$	2003	97	450	287	249
	PPP US$	2003	711 (a)	1,037	621	1,457 (a)
GDP per capita - Annual growth rate		1975-2003	0.1 (b)	0.2	0.8 (b)	2.6 (b)
		1990-2003	2.0	-0.6	1.0	3.9
GDP per capita - Highest value during 1975-2003 (PPP US$) [Year of highest value]			752 [2002] (a),(b)	1,204 [1990]	621 [2003] (b)	1,457 [2003] (a),(b)
Average annual change in consumer price index (%)		1990-2003	4.0	12.6	16.2	7.9
		2002-03	17.8	9.8	3.5	7.8
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)		1990	12	31	37	19
		2003	37	29	27	26
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)		1990	8	26	13	7
		2003	17	25	18	12
Primary exports (% of merchandise exports)		1990	..	71	..	..
		2003	89	76	82	91

Continuation of Economic indicators

		Year	Ethiopia	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Manufactured exports (% of merchandise exports)		1990	..	29	..	..
		2003	11	24	18	9
High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports)		1990	..	4	..	..
		2003	(.)	4	2	8
Official development assistance (ODA) received (net disbursements) (c), (d)	Total (US$ millions)	2003	1,504.4	483.5	1,669.3	959.4
	Per capita (US$)	2003	21.9	15.2	46.5	38.0
	As % of GDP	1990	11.8	13.9	27.5	15.5
		2003	22.6	3.4	16.2	15.2
Net foreign direct investment flows (% of GDP) (e)		1990	0.1	0.7	0.0	0.0
		2003	0.9	0.6	2.4	3.1
Other private flows (% of GDP) (e),(f)		1990	-0.7	0.8	0.1	0.4
		2003	-0.1	0.8	0.2	0.1
Total debt service as % of GDP (c)		1990	2.7	9.2	4.2	3.4
		2003	1.4	4.0	0.9	1.3
Total debt service as % of exports of goods, services and net income from abroad		1990	37.6	28.6	31.3	78.6
		2003	7.3 (g),(h)	14.5	5.8 (g),(h)	7.8 (g),(h)

(a) Estimates are based on regression; (b) Data refer to a period shorter than that specified; (c) The denominator conventionally used when comparing official development assistance and total debt service to the size of the economy is GNI, not GDP. GDP is used here, however, to allow comparability throughout the table. With few exceptions the denominators produce similar results; (d) ODA receipts are total net ODA flows from DAC (Development Assistance Committee) countries as well as Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, other small donors, including Estonia, Israel, Latvia and Lithuania, and concessional lending from multilateral organizations; (e) A negative value indicates that the capital flowing out of the country exceeds that flowing in; (f) Other private flows combine non-debt-creating portfolio equity investment flows, portfolio debt flows and bank and trade-related lending; (g) Country included in the Debt Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs); (h) Completion reached under the HIPC Initiative.

Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2005.

Education indicators

		Year	Ethiopia	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Public expenditure on education	As % of GDP	1990	3.4%	6.7%	2.8%	1.5%
		2000-02 (a)	4.6%	7.0%	..	..
	As % of total government expenditure	1990	9.4%	17.0%	11.4%	11.5%
		2000-02 (a)	13.8%	22.1%	..	..
Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and above) (b)	Total	1990	28.6%	70.8%	62.9%	56.1%
	Total	2003	41.5% (e)	73.6%	69.4%	68.9% (e)
	Female	2003	33.8% (e)	70.2%	62.2%	59.2% (e)
	Male	2003	49.2% (e)	77.7%	77.5%	78.8% (e)

Continuation of Educational Indicators

	Year	Ethiopia	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganga
Youth literacy rate (% ages 15-24) (b)	1990	43.0%	89.3%	83.1%	70.1%
	2003	57.4% (e)	80.3%	78.4%	80.2% (e)
Net primary enrolment ratio (%) (c)	1990/91	23%	74%	50%	53%
	2002/03 (f)	51% (g)	67%	82% (i)	..
Net secondary enrolment ratio (%) (c), (d)	1990/91	..	..	..	..
	2002/03 (f)	18% (g), (h)	25% (h)	..	17% (h)
Children reaching grade 5 (% of grade 1 students)	1990/91	..	..	79%	.
	2001/02 (f)	62%	59%	88%	64%

(a) Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified.

(b) Data for 1990 refer to estimates produced by UNESCO Institute for Statistics based on data prior to 1990; data for 2003 refer to the national literacy estimates from censuses or surveys conducted between 2000 and 2004, unless otherwise noted. Due to differences in methodology and timeliness of underlying data, comparisons across countries and over time should be made with caution.

(c) The net enrolment ratio is the ratio of enrolled children of the official age for the education level indicated to the total population of that age.

(d) Enrolment ratios are based on the new International Standard Classification of Education, adopted in 1997 (UNESCO 1997), and so may not be strictly comparable with those for earlier years.

(e) Estimate produced by UNESCO Institute for Statistics in July 2002; (f) Data on net enrolment ratios refer to the 2002/03 school year, and data on children reaching grade 5 to the 2001/02 school year, unless otherwise specified. For details, see www.uis.unesco.org. Because data are from different sources, comparisons across countries should be made with caution.

(g) Data refer to the 2003/04 school year.

(h) Preliminary UNESCO Institute for Statistics estimate, subject to further revision.

(i) Data refer to the 2004/05 school year.

Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2005.

Health-related indicators

		Year	Ethiopia	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Health expenditure	Public (% of GDP)	2002	2.6%	2.2%	2.7%	2.1%
	Private (% of GDP)	2002	3.1%	2.7%	2.2%	5.3%
	Per capita (PPP US$)	2002	21 US$	70 US$	31 US$	77 US$
Life expectancy at birth (years)		1970-75	43.5	53.6	49.5	51.1
		2000-05	47.6	47.0	46.0	46.8
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)		1970	160	96	129	100
		2003	112	79	104	81
Under-five mortality rate (per 1000 live births)		1970	239	156	218	170
		2003	169	123	165	140
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)	reported	1985-2003	870	590	530	510
	adjusted	2000	850	1000	1500	880

Continuation of Health-related Indicators

		Year	Ethiopia	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Probability at birth of surviving to age 65 (% of cohort)	female	2000-05	40.7%	31.8%	35.8%	34.4%
	male	2000-05	36.6%	35.0%	33.4%	32.9%
One-year-olds fully immunized	against tuber-culosis	2003	76%	87%	91%	96%
	against measles	2003	52%	72%	97%	82%
Population with sustainable access to improved sanitation		1990	4%	42%	47%	43%
		2002	6%	48%	46%	41%
Population with sustainable access to an improved water source		1990	25%	45%	38%	44%
		2002	22%	62%	73%	56%
Population undernourished		1990/92 (a)	..	44%	37%	24%
		2000/02 (a)	46%	33%	44%	19%
HIV prevalence (% ages 15-49) (b)		2003	4.4 [2.8-6.7]	6.7 [4.7-9.7]	8.8 [6.4-11.9]	4.1 [2.8-6.6]
Malaria cases (per 100 000 people) (c)		2000	..	545	1 207	46
Tuberculosis cases (per 100 000 people) (d)		2003	507	821	476	621

(a) Data refer to the average for the years specified.

(b) Data refer to point and range estimates based on new estimation models developed by UNAIDS. Range estimates are presented in square brackets.

(c) Data refer to malaria cases reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) and may represent only a fraction of the true number in a country.

(d) Data refer to the prevalence of all forms of tuberculosis.

Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2005.

Notes

ETHIOPIAS TRADE IN GOODS WITH THE WORLD 2003



Main Trade Partners for Commodity Exports



Main Trade Partners for Commodity Imports

Source: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/ce/ceSnapshot.aspx?r=231



Main Trade Partners for Commodity Exports



Main Trade Partners for Commodity Imports

Source: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/ce/ceSnapshot.aspx?r=404

TANZANIA TRADE IN GOODS WITH THE WORLD 2004



Main Trade Partners for Commodity Exports



Main Trade Partners for Commodity Imports

Source: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/ce/ceSnapshot.aspx?r=834



Main Trade Partners for Commodity Exports



Main Trade Partners for Commodity Imports

Source: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/ce/ceSnapshot.aspx?r=800

3

The Region

On the agenda in the EAC

The future development of the East African Community: Fast Tracking Initiative for acceleration of political union

By: Prof. Otieno-Odek[1] - Kenya

Introduction

Article 5 (2) of the Treaty establishing the East African Community (EAC) states that the Partner States undertake to establish among themselves a Customs Union, a Common Market subsequently a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation in order to strengthen and regulate the industrial, commercial, infrastructural, cultural, social, political and other relations of the Partner States. Article 75 of the Treaty stipulates that the Customs Union was to be formed within four years of the coming into effect of the treaty. The Treaty was signed on 30th November 1999 and by implication, the Customs Union should have been formed in the year 2003. However, the Protocol establishing the Customs Union was signed on 2nd March 2004 and the Union was established in January 2005 when the Protocol came into effect.

The delay in concluding the Protocol establishing the Customs Union and its coming into effect behind schedule is a pointer that the progression towards the ultimate goal of political federation might be slow. Presently, the essential aspects of the Customs Union are yet to be finalized. For example, the list of products from Kenya that are eligible for duty free entry into Uganda and Tanzania are yet to be agreed upon.

Concerned about the slow progress of integration in East Africa, by a Communiqué issued on 28th August 2004, the Summit of the EAC resolved to expedite and compress the process of integration so that the ultimate goal of political federation is achieved through a fast track mechanism.[2] The Summit appointed a Committee of three persons (one from each Partner State) whose mandate was to examine how the fast track mechanism could be achieved.[3] One of the specific

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2 See Communique of 28th August 2004

3 The three persons appointed by the Summit were Hon. Amos Wako – Chairman from Republic of Kenya, Prof. Haidari Amani – Vice Chairman from United Republic of Tanzania and Dr. Ezra Suruma from the Republic of Uganda.

terms of reference of the Committee was to determine an appropriate mechanism and time frame for the realization of the Political Federation in the shortest time possible.[4] At the outset, we should ask the question whether there is need for a political federation in East Africa.

Justification for Political Federation in East Africa

In support of the goal for political federation, President Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania observes that "we have everything to gain in an East African Federation in terms of political stability, greater feeling in safety of numbers and as an economic entity better able to fight poverty." President Museveni of Uganda notes that "the balkanization of Africa into 53 mostly sub-optimal states has meant that Africa cannot have a large internal market under one political authority and the continent has no power to negotiate with the rest of the world. This balkanization must … be wound up." President Mwai Kibaki of Kenya opines that "regional integration is not a choice but a necessary strategy for sustainable development. On a cultural level, regional integration solidifies the unity of communities with personal ties and common history, language and culture"

The visionary purpose for the establishment of an East African Federation is the accelerated economic development for all the Partner States.

Several arguments can be made in support of a Federation of East Africa. The quest for peace, political stability and security as well as the federation acting as a catalyst to economic integration are the main rationale for federation. If the Partner States were to merge to form one large economic and political entity, issues of tribalism, religious and other socio-cultural problems will disappear. In separate smaller countries, the notion of tribalism and religious intolerance has proven difficult to dissipate. Under a Federation, people will identify themselves as East Africans. Reference to tribal associations will be marginalized. This is a major pillar for peace, stability and security and the Federation will provide a solution to any potential problems of internal disintegration. It will also remove the possibilities of individual Partner States fighting each other such as the case of Rwanda and Burundi. Political stability of the region will thus be entrenched.

The Federation of East Africa has the potential to serve as a catalyst for economic integration. Enhanced economic growth and integration can only take place in the region if there is political will and support. There must be an environment that enables the people to participate in accelerated economic development process. Effective economic integration must be buffeted by a political federation. A successful East African Federation would set the tempo and role model for integration in Africa.

4 The Committee had three Associate Members namely Prof. Sam Tulya Muhika from Uganda, Ms Margaret Chemengich from Kenya and Mr. Mohamed Fakih Mohamed from United Republic of Tanzania.

In economic terms, a Federation of East Africa will engender a stronger economy that would guarantee people better jobs, standards of living and a pride of belonging to an ideal state. This will make East Africa be part of a new, powerful and modernizing regional bloc. The Federation if properly managed will lead to improved social interaction, peaceful co-existence and harmony among the neighbours particularly border communities. The Federation will also be a building block to better governance, democratic and accountable institutions. It is anticipated that education and health services will have a positive impact if the Federation is created. Issues of food security and agricultural diversity will be utilized to benefit the people of East Africa and to strengthen the economy of the Partner States. The climatic differences between the Partner States will be harnessed as a tool for promoting food security in the region.

At a political level, the Federation will have a broad range of stakeholders who would provide a peaceful, stable, sustainable and prosperous foundation for political interaction. The people will enjoy greater freedom and democratic governance and a wider space with expanded opportunities for all. Federation would also pave way for the rule of law and a strong sense of constitutionalism to take root. With free movement of labour, capital and right of residence and the right of establishment, the Federation will create a conducive environment for realizing and harnessing individual potentials. These are the dividends of an East African Federation.

Building Blocks to EAC Political Federation

One of the key building blocks towards the Federation of East Africa is the existing political will at the Summit level towards the idea of federation. This political good will should urgently be harnessed and exploited to create the Federation of East Africa.

The EAC has already established two institutions as building blocks to political federation. These are the East African Court of Justice and the East African Legislative Assembly. In addition, there are Memorandums of Understanding guiding cooperation in Defence, Security and Foreign policy.

The East African Court of Justice was inaugurated in November 2001 and is composed of six Judges, two from each Partner State.[5] It has worked on the rules and procedures governing the operation of the Court.

The East African Legislative Assembly was inaugurated on 29th November 2001 and is composed of 32 members, nine from each of the Partner States and five ex-officio members.[6] As representatives of the people, the Assembly is an organ that links the peoples of East Africa to the Community.

5 See Articles 23 and 24 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community.

6 See Article 48 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community.

Another building block that has been established towards the Federation is the Customs Union and the Directorate of Customs.[7] The Directorate is established under the East African Community Customs Management and Coordination Act of 2005.[8] The success of the Directorate in implementing the EAC Customs Union will herald a strong foundation for the success of a political federation in East Africa.

The common language of Kiswahili is a building block as a medium for communication. It is imperative that the use of the language should be encouraged and promoted at all levels among the Partner States.

The Lake Victoria Commission with its headquarters at Kisumu in Kenya is a major building block in terms of poverty eradication and providing a foundation to the federation of East Africa. Under the Commission, it is anticipated that the lake would be managed as a single and indivisible resource to be equitably shared among the people of East Africa. The lake would be rationally managed with regard to protection and the conservation of environment. The fishing communities and other socio-economic actors in the Lake Victoria Basin will provide strong bedrock for socio-economic integration within the Federation of East Africa.

The convertibility of the EAC currencies which was operationalised in 1997 is an additional building block towards the federation of East Africa. The convergence of macro economic indicators which was agreed in 1998 and is on going is a block to be utilized as pillar in the political federation.

Drawbacks to the Momentum of EAC Political Federation

The momentum for the EAC political federation and integration efforts towards a single market and investment area has been slow. This has been occasioned by a number of hurdles and obstacles.

First, the overarching hurdle to a faster East African integration is the absence of a politically accountable authority at regional level. Lack of executive authority within the Secretariat and organs of the EA Community have greatly undermined the ability of the Secretariat to discharge its mandate.

Second, the Court and the Assembly have no defined roles to facilitate their positive contribution to the integration process. They are not autonomous and this limits their efficacy. The budget of the Court and the Assembly are technically determined by the Council. The scenario creates a governance and institutional system where junior technocrats in national treasury offices determine the financial position of the EAC. This becomes a constraint to governance and institutional independence of the organs.

7 See Article 75 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community. See also the Protocol Establishing the East African Community Customs Union.

8 See the East African Legislative Assembly Act No. 1 of 2005.

Third, the EAC and particularly the Secretariat is not self financing. Articles 132 and 133 of the Treaty stipulate that the Community Secretariat shall initiate the budget on the basis of agreed programmes and projects. In practice, technocrat delegates from the Partner States formulate such budges on the basis of Ministerial ceilings in the national budgets. The practical effect has been to curtail and cut back on the approved Community work programmes. Further, the Partner States have more often than not been in arrears with their contribution to the Community budget. Where donor funding is involved, procurement process and complex procedures have resulted into time wasting and changing priorities leading to occasional donor withdrawal of support midstream[9]. An example of this is in the Telecommunication Digital Project and the Concession of the EA Railway Network.

Fourth, there is lack of enforcement machinery and a sanction mechanism within the Community. Presently, collective decisions of the Community organs are left to the bureaucrats in the Partner States to implement. However, national interests at times prevail. Since there is lack of penalty for non-implementation and a Secretariat with no legal executive authority for enforcement, Community programmes remain unimplemented[10]. There is an apparent lack of commitment towards implementing agreed decisions. There is also an apparent resistance by the high level bureaucrats in government institutions and delays in ratification of Protocols. Frequent backtracking on decisions taken due to divided loyalty between state and regional pressure is common. Lack of roadmaps with implicit time frames for implementation of decisions taken is a further bottleneck. Even where road maps and timelines exist, they are observed more in breach than compliance.

Fifth, the lengthy decision making process within the Community is a drawback to faster political integration.[11] Despite Article 71 of the Treaty conferring the Secretariat the role of defining the regional requirements and best practices, the practice in most cases is that the Secretariat has become the forum where technocrats from Partner States negotiate to harmonize their national interests and positions to regional standards or requirements. This process has been time consuming leading to extensive use of resources with minimal returns. Frequent changes of personnel at the technocrat levels erode the benefit of institutional memory and continuity.

Six, the functioning of the Ministers in charge of Community Affairs is a drawback to faster political federation in East Africa. The Ministers in charge of Community affairs in Uganda and Tanzania are also the Ministers

9 See Report of the Committee on Fast Tracking east African Federation at page 45 paragraph 212.

10 See Report of the Committee on Fast Tracking east African Federation at page 45 paragraph 214.

11 See Report of the Committee on Fast Tracking east African Federation at page 46 paragraph 215.

for Foreign Affairs whose mandate necessitate extensive international travel. They are not readily available to attend to and make quick decisions on Community affairs. [12]This has led to delay in making decisions for upto two years. The continued absence of such Ministers has led to usurpation of role by the technical staff to become policy makers. Lack of quorum at the Council has at times necessitated postponement of meetings in which key decisions could have been made.

Seven, political integration is further hampered by capacity constraints.[13] Effective federation requires expanding the professional cadre of staff at the Secretariat. Along with staff deficiency in terms of numbers, is the quality of staff to manage the expanding mandate. One man departments are a common feature at the EAC Secretariat.

Eight, political integration requires amendments to the national laws and constitutions of the Partner States. This is a herculean task. Experience from 1999 to date reveals that Community decisions requiring amendments to national laws remain outstanding for long periods of time. This is inappropriate and compromises the sustainability of decisions. Of concern is that the federation should be entrenched through among others, the institution of a referendum to establish the Federation of East Africa. The practical realization and carrying out of the referendum is a long shot. However, the three Partner States have some experience in conducting national referendum in the past. Kenya and Uganda have conducted constitutional referendums in the year 2005.

Ninth, the limited awareness on the benefits of federation among the peoples of East Africa is a hurdle to the integration process. Not all citizens of East Africa agree on the pace for integration and the benefits to be derived therefrom.

Ten, there are no strong regional institutions with personnel to back up the process of integration. There is need to build such institutions to enable the federation to be effective. In addition, the vision and mission of political federation need to be developed and agreed upon by the people of East Africa.

Eleven, there is concern with the sustainability of an East African Federation. There are fears that the mistakes and pitfalls of the past and imbalances that led to the collapse of the former EAC in 1977 have not been adequately addressed. There is need for a frank assessment of the commitment of all stakeholders at all levels of society to ensure that past mistakes are not repeated. The federation should be owned by the people and not imposed on them. The federation should not consist of players and spectators.

Twelve, a further concern relates to the trade and development imbalances and disparities among

12 See Report of the Committee on Fast Tracking east African Federation at page 46 paragraph 216.

13 See Report of the Committee on Fast Tracking east African Federation at page 46 paragraph 220.

the Partner States. The benefits of integration cannot be shared equally unless modalities are put in place to facilitate such an arrangement. The imbalances are manifested in differences and limited capacities in human resource development and differences in political ideology, the levels and capacities of the private sector, level of entrepreneurship and participation of the citizenry in matters of the Community. Information on the present and future benefits of the Community is also not equally accessible within the Partner States. Though some of the imbalances are historical in nature, they do give a cause of concern for the future of an East African Federation.

Thirteen, at a social and cultural level, fear has been raised that opening up borders through federation will lead to social emigration. People move with their lifestyles, ideas and values. This can generate social conflict and culture shocks. Differences in social beliefs, lifestyles and values, consumption and saving habits among the people of East Africa portend a basis for social conflict. However, it is anticipated that a federal attitude should prevail to reap benefits in social diversity.

Citizenry Expectations on Political Federation in East Africa

The people of East Africa are united in the quest for a political federation. The issue is how and when to create the federation. There are those who want federation like yesterday. Others prefer a cautious approach to ensure that the federation rests on a solid and firm foundation. Both sides agree that the federation should be people centered and should not emanate from the leaders. It should be a bottom-up rather than top-down approach.[14]

There are people in East Africa who fear federation. The fear arises from the notion that the process could be frustrated by the political leaders who fear to loose power by ceding sovereignty to the federation. This fear could result into the existing political elite misleading the people on the issues relating to the political federation.

There is also the fear that past mistakes and imbalances that led to the collapse of the former Community have not been adequately addressed. Despite the foregoing, the citizenry expect to reap dividends from a Federation of East Africa. These expectations are in social, economic and political realms.

At a social level, the people of East Africa look forward to improved social interaction, peaceful co-existence and harmony among neighbours. The expectation is that the federation shall unite markets, politics and economic benefits for all to be winners. It is anticipated that a powerful East African culture and civilization would evolve around the Kiswahili language as a unifying medium of communication.[15]

14 See consultations conducted by the Committee on Fast Tracking the East African Federation as reported in the Report of the Committee on Fast Tracking east African Federation at page 48 paragraph 223.

15 See Report of the Committee on Fast

At the economic level, the expectation of the citizenry is the acceleration of economic growth and the resultant benefit of uplifting the standards of living for all. It is anticipated that there shall be efficient management and utilization of resources and economies of scale which would generate wealth and create employment. The federation would stimulate development and sharing in the field of education, science and technology.

The ordinary citizens of East Africa do expect several immediate individual benefits from the federation. These are free movement of labour, the right to employment, right of residence and ownership of property anywhere in East Africa. They also expect non-discrimination in service provision and fee payment for example in terms of school fees, medical and hotel accommodation[16]. It is expected that there shall be standardization of education curricular, systems and mutual recognition of certificates.

To the business community, bigger markets for trade and investment are an opportunity offered by in the federation. It is expected that there shall be a reduction of business costs and freer movement of goods and services, price stability and elimination of non tariff barriers. For the landlocked Partner State, ease and/or free access to services at the ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam is an incentive to federation.

A common currency for East Africa is expected as a logical bonus in a Federation of East Africa.

Modalities for Fast Tracking the East African Federation

The Committee to fast track the East African Federation analyzed three options for fast-tracking the federation. These are:

(i) Compression of the current stages of integration to reduce the time frames for the creation of the Customs Union, Common Market and Monetary Union.
(ii) Overlapping and creating parallel stages of integration and the
(iii) Immediate establishment of an East African Federation.

Article 5 (2) of the EAC Treaty provides the sequence of integration to be the creation of a Customs Union, Common Market, Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation. The implication of this article is that the integration process is to proceed progressively in the prescribed successive stages.

When considering the option of compressing the stages of integration, the issue is whether the Partner States should reduce the time frames and periods involved in each of the successive stages. The question is whether the periods should be shortened and if so, by what time lines? It should be noted that each stage of integration is designed to consolidate

Tracking east African Federation at page 49 paragraphs 230 and 231.

16 See Report of the Committee on Fast Tracking east African Federation at page 51 paragraph 240.

and deepen the integration process. It is therefore difficult to proceed to the next stage of integration unless the current phase of integration is considered satisfactory and benefiting the Partner States across the board. If the time frame between the stages is reduced, the driving force for the integration process might find the pressure so overwhelming and there would be no time to monitor and review the implementation of programmes.

Noting that the Customs Union is the critical phase in the integration process, the Committee recommended that its time frame should not be compressed.[17] The other stages may be compressed to take less time. Presently, the time frame for completely making East Africa a Customs Union with a common internal and external tariff regime is 2010. East Africa is to be a fully fledged Customs Union five years after the Protocol establishing the Union came into being. This time frame is based on the period for elimination of the asymmetrical internal tariffs for products from Kenya entering Uganda and Tanzania.[18]

With respect to the Common Market, current implementation status in the EAC with respect to benchmarks shows that the critical policy harmonization and commonality will be finalized by the end of 2005. The issues that need closer attention in establishing a common market namely labour, right of residence and right of establishment are yet to be concluded, agreed upon and a Protocol signed.

The second option of overlapped and parallel process considers the possibility of overlapping some aspects of the four stages of integration. This does not involve changing the sequence of integration but the possibility of undertaking parallel activities at each stage. The rationale for not altering the sequence is that sequencing is designed to realize and consolidate gains from the integration process at each preceding stage. It is the benefits realized at each stage and how they are shared among the Partner States that will determine the speed of integration and bring about political support to the process. The Committee noted that while the four phases of EAC integration (Customs Union, Common Market, Monetary Union and Political Federation) are distinct, they should be allowed to intertwine and overlap. A comprehensive and planned approach in the form of negotiating templates may hasten the process to political federation.[19]

The third option for fast tracking involves the immediate establishment of an East African Federation. This would mean creating one nation, one federal government and one flag for the Partner States of the East African Community. Historically, political federation does not have to be preceded by the economic integration process. It does nonetheless require

17 See Report of the Committee on Fast Tracking east African Federation at page 71 paragraph 333 (i).

18 See the Internal and External Tariff structures as provided for in the Protocol establishing the EAC Customs Union.

19 See Report of the Committee on Fast Tracking east African Federation at page 65 paragraph 305.

that federal government mandate embraces federal executive authority, federal legislation and a federal court. The executive authority controls monetary and financial policies, defence and foreign affairs. The EAC organs namely the Summit, the Council and Sectoral Committees including the Secretariat share the executive powers. The Assembly and the Court are already in place. This means that the EAC has some institutional basis for advancing the process of transforming the Community into a Federal State. There are several advantages to be gained from immediate advancing to the Federation of East Africa.

First, the federation would accelerate the desired economic and monetary policies and hence a faster economic development process. Second, federation would avoid and minimize the current divided loyalty between the national and regional interests when negotiating and implementing integration processes. Third, the management of shared resources such as Lake Victoria is likely to be achieved faster with fewer resources from each member state than is the case through individual states. Fourth, federation will lead to the formation of a single military and security body. This will lead to decreased levels of political instability and greater regional security and thus create a good environment for investment. A peaceful environment not only ensures that the quality of life is improved but also enables sustainable development to be achieved faster and at a focused pace.

Whereas the option of immediate political federation is attractive, a cautious approach is necessary for the following reasons:

(a) Previous efforts under the defunct East African Common Services Organization (1961-1967) and the former Community (1967-1977) did not succeed.
(b) Non-cooperation between the Partner States between 1977 and 1993 created an environment of suspicion and mistrust among the peoples of East Africa.
(c) There is yet to be established a sound institutional and fiscal foundation for a sustainable political federation.
(d) Focusing on economic integration first will enable people to see the tangible benefits of integration and build support for political federation.
(e) There are limited organizational, infrastructural and logistical capacities to embark on political federation.
(f) The three Partner States have unique constitutional systems based on internal rather than regional concerns and these must first be harmonized before a political federation can be feasible and sustainable. The Partner states need to develop a shared political vision, mobilize broad public support for federation and marshall the political will to negotiate all issues involved in the establishment of a federal system of government.

Essentials for a Sustainable Political Federation in East Africa

The East African Community Partner States should not focus merely to establish a political federation but rather a sustainable political federation. To achieve this, the following conditions must be attained:

- Stronger economic integration
- Common political vision
- Similar political values
- Sustained political will and public support to integrate
- Similar identity and feeling of solidarity
- Provision of necessary financial resources to integrate
- Prioritization of the activities of integration
- Harmonization of national and regional policies supportive of federation
- Timely implementation of decisions of the Council and Summit
- Need to boost competitiveness of the economies of the Partner States
- Maintenance of regional peace and security
- Developing a common education, science and technology policy
- Forming a common negotiation body with respect to regional and multilateral trade issues

The Committee on Fast Tracking the EA Federation in its recommendation opted for the overlap and parallel approach while leaving the timeframe for the Customs Union of 5 years intact. It also recommended a consolidated and planned approach in form of negotiating templates in order to hasten the process towards federation. The Committee recommended three phases towards political federation namely:

(a) A Preparatory Phase
(b) A Transitional Phase focusing on the implementation of the recommended strategic areas
(c) A Consolidation Phase for the federation, leading to a fully fledged federation with its institutions including an elected executive organ, legislature and federal judiciary.

The Preparatory Phase should address the institutional framework and the financial inputs needed to manage the transitional phase. The transitional phase includes the implementation of the Customs Union, Common Market and Monetary Union. The successful positioning of these stages of integration will provide a strong foundation for the political federation. A significant aspect of the transitional phase is the need to sort out constitutional issues pertaining to the federation and these involves setting up the electoral system ready for election of the federal government.

Time Lines and Road Map for East African Customs Union

The finalization of the creation of the East African Customs Union has an agreed time line as follows:

(i) Ratification of the Customs Union Protocol - by 30th November 2004

(ii) Entry of Customs Union - 1st January 2005

(iii) Further harmonization of tax policies and tax incentives - 1st July 2005

(iv) Joint Trade Negotiations (EPA,WTO, COMESA, SAD C) - to be agreed upon

(v) Transit Cargo Vehicles to handle return goods - 1st July 2005

(vi) Opening of EA external entry/exit border points - On identification

(vii) Entry of Customs Service - 1st July 2007

(viii) Elimination of Non Tariff Barriers - Continuous

(ix) Elimination of inter-state border controls - January 2010

Road Map for a Fast Tracked East African Federation

The creation of an East African Federation is both simple and difficult. Simple because there is clear political will and commitment on the part of the top leadership of the Partner States for achieving the goal. Everyone in East Africa wants a political federation; from citizens to government officials, business communities and the civil society.

On the other hand, transforming the East African Community into a political federation is a difficult and delicate process due to entrenched national sovereignty which requires to be reduced. There is also the need for a sound socio-economic foundation to create a sustainable federation. The hang-over from failures in the previous efforts at federation are a factor to be taken into account. Appropriate incentive-compatible schemes must be put in place to implement the agreed decisions. The preparatory phase is critical in ensuring a smooth and effective implementation of the various milestones towards federation. Several administrative actions need to be implemented to pave way for an effective road map towards federation. These administrative measures include:

(i) Restructuring and strengthening the EAC Secretariat

(ii) Appointing a Constitutional Commission to examine the constitutional issues affecting federation.

(iii) Development of an Economic, Education, Science and Technology Strategy for the EAC.

(iv) Appointing Ministers responsible for EAC affairs.

(v) Appointing additional Deputy Secretary (s) General.

(vi) Appointing an Advisory Council to advice on the progress towards the EA Federation.

The Committee for the fast tracking of the East African Federation developed the following road map as indicative of the steps and progress toward the Federation of East Africa.

Preparatory Phase for the Transitional Period – December 2004 to December 2005.

1. Each Partner State to appoint a Minister for East African Affairs by January 2005 and to initiate the process for the appointment of the Constitutional Commission.
2. Appointment of additional Deputy Secretary General (s) by April 2005.
3. Ministers for East African Affairs to take residence in Arusha and each to be assigned specific portfolio within the EAC by June 2005.
4. Appointment of the Constitutional Commission by July 2005.
5. Appointment of the East African Federation Advisory Council by December 2005.

It is worth noting that none of the activities for the preparatory phase had been achieved by October 2005. This situation underscores the concern with non implementation of Council and Summit decisions.

Transitional Phase to Federation

The transitional phase has five main components. These are:

1. The establishment of the Customs Union
2. The creation of the Common Market and Free Movement of Persons
3. Inauguration of the Development Agenda of the Community
4. Creation of the Monetary Union and
5. Constitutional Preparation for the Federation of East Africa.

During the transitional phase, various activities are to be implemented. The holders of the East African passports are to be exempted from immigration requirements when traveling within East Africa. This was to be achieved by January 2005. By April 2005, discussions were to begin on the harmonization of the visa policy between East Africa and the rest of the world. By July 2005, completion of the implementation of the harmonized procedures on the issuance of entry/ work permits for the citizens of the Partner States of the EAC was to be done. By August 2005, East Africa was to be a single air space with a unified flight information region and establishment of a regional safety oversight agency. By December 2005, a Protocol to extend the jurisdiction of the EA Court of Justice to hear and determine appeals from national courts of the Partner States on commercial cases is to be concluded. A strategy for liberalization of tourism is to be agreed upon by December 2005. By June 2006, the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services and Right of Establishment and Residence is to be concluded. The said Protocol is to be ratified by December 2006 with the issuance of an East African Identity Card for citizens of the Community. By July 2007, the Protocol on the Common Market is to be concluded and ratified by the Partner States by December 2007.

The Development Agenda of the Community involves various sectors. These include setting up a Common Agriculture and Rural Development Policy and Strategy by June 2005. A study on the existing curricular of the Partner States with a view to harmonizing the curricular content, education structures and policies is also set to be attained by December 2005. An East African Information and Communication Technology (ICT) policy is to be in place by December 2005. The East African Submarine Cable System is to be rolled out by July 2007 and harmonization of commercial laws and registration of companies to be finalized by December 2007.

On the Monetary Union aspects, an East African Monetary Policy Coordinating Committee of the Central Banks of the Partner States was to be set up in January 2005. A Protocol on Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Tax Evasion was to be finalized by April 2005. By December 2005, a Regional Capital Markets Authority is to be set up. It is anticipated that by the end of 2009, there would be a single currency in East Africa.

The final phase towards the federation of East Africa involves constitutional issues. It was proposed that by July 2005, a Constitutional Commission would have been appointed and by December 2005, the East African Federation Advisory Council should have been in place. A preliminary draft of the Constitution of the Federation of East Africa is projected to be finalized by December 2007.

In 2008, the proposal is to have debates, consultations and sensitization on the preliminary Draft Constitution for the EA Federation. Constitutional Forums consisting of the members of the National Assemblies of the Partner States of EAC and the EA Legislative Assembly is to approve the preliminary draft with or without amendments. Arising out of the Constitutional Forums, the Constitution of the Federation of East Africa is to be finalized. In January 2009, the Constitution is to be approved by the Summit of the East African Community. By May/ June 2009, the Constitution is to be approved by the National Parliaments of the Partner States. In September 2009, a referendum should be held and between the months of October to December 2009, the President of the Transitional Federation is elected or identified and the Federal Parliament is elected.

Consolidation Phase January 2010 to March 2013

The final phase to the establishment of the East African Federation is the consolidation period. It is expected that in January 2010, the President of the Federation is to be sworn in and the Federation of East Africa is launched.

Between 2010 and 2012 the Transitional Federal Parliament is to be sworn in. Judges of the East African Supreme Court are to be sworn in over the same period. The constituencies are to be delineated and election laws enacted. A common defence is to be put in place with a

Federal Police and other Federal Institutions. Between January and March 2013, elections for the President and Federal Parliament are to be held and the Federation of East Africa established as One Country, One People under One Authority and God.

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EPAs Negotiations: Where Do We Stand After Fifteen Months And What Do We Do Next?

By Amanda Sunassee, Tanzania

Reconciling competing objectives

It is now fifteen months since Phase II of the Southern African Development Co-operation (SADC) and European Union (EU) Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) negotiations was launched in Windhoek, Namibia. What has been achieved and what remains to be achieved is still quite unclear and will remain so until 2006 when African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) and European Union (EU) will carry out a formal and comprehensive review of the EPAs for each country as set out in Article 37 (4) of the Cotonou Agreement. The debate to date remains highly polarized with some vocal Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) focusing solely on the adjustment cost; academics on fiscal adjustments and trade diversion; the EU on the potential 'dynamic gains' and ACP states on static losses. Insufficient attention is being paid to the variables in the equation, such as the degree of attention to supply-sider constraints, which lies behind the EPA approach – ultimately, success or failure in this area could be the difference between a "good EPA" and a "bad EPA". In the middle of the fury of ideas and positions, a few forward thinkers are trying to contribute on some more pragmatic issues and alternative scenarios, such as a "Generalized Special Preferences (GSP++)" option, or better Rules of Origin, or simply more effective access to European Development Fund (EDF) resources. However there are two certainties that remain in the EU Economic Partnership agreements with the ACP countries – one is that ACP countries will have to open their markets to EU products, which implies an unprecedented change from the EU ACP '25 years of cooperation'; the second is that the changes and potential adaptation for the EU are at worst nil, depending on how ACP countries will undertake Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff reduction vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

In this process, the ACP countries have the most to lose and also the most to gain depending on how, and in which region they negotiate and what they negotiate under the EPAs. This is one of the reasons behind some ACP countries' over-cautious approach to these negotiations (including Tanzania). Another contributing factor is the range of organizational and institutional capacity constraints, which prevent some Least Developed Countries (LDCs) from undertaking a comprehensive analysis and validation of their specific national negotiating interests. The poor linkage with the private sector in the national negotiation process has also revealed itself to be one of the biggest stumbling blocks in Tanzania's EPA negotiation process.

For the EU a very real and delicate challenge lies in reconciling their triple commitment – firstly, with the ACP countries, as per Article 34 of the Cotonou ("Economic and trade

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cooperation shall aim at fostering the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy, with due regard for their political choices and development priorities, thereby promoting their sustainable development and contributing to poverty eradication in the ACP Countries"); secondly, with their international obligation as a member of World Trade Organization (WTO) to ensure that they act consistently with WTO rules (in this case with article XXIV of the WTO, which requires the ACP to remove tariffs on substantially all trade and by so doing forestall any potential WTO challenge); thirdly, with the need to keep the European private sector reassured that the EU is doing everything possible to protect their interest in ACP regions, especially in the light of rapidly emerging competition from China, India and Brazil. This is a very tall order and with mutually incompatible objectives.

Where are we at in SADC EPA negotiations?

It is not surprising in the given context that the ACP Council of Ministers at the 81st session expressed "grave concerns that the negotiations have not proceeded in a satisfactory manner having failed to start addressing most issues of interest and concerns to the ACP regions, in particular the development dimension and regional integration priorities". In

fact the negotiations have not really started, despite Phase II supposedly being the substantive phase of these negotiations, so it is quite difficult to infer what will be the likely outcome: for this reason, the ACP statement may be a little premature. What is clear nevertheless is that the negotiations are running late: that does not mean that development dimensions and regional integration priorities will be cast aside, but it does mean that ACP and EU have less time at hand to discuss these issues.

At the SADC-EPA level both sides have now produced joint factual reports on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), and a draft EU proposal on chapter one SPS measures for the EU-SADC EPA is currently being worked on by each SADC-EPA member states. In the coming months SADC-EPA members need to identify the list of priority products for regional harmonization and priority products for exports from the SADC-EPA Group to EU. Similarly with respect to Rule of Origin (RoO), there is need for more in-depth and specific information regarding the specific hurdles to private sector exports to EU. The SADC secretariat has currently sent out a questionnaire on RoO to the regions, which needs to be completed by the private sector. As the negotiations advance, there is an increasing need to consult the private sector for specific information, which negotiators will need, to fine-tune the region's position. However given the weak private sector linkage to the current negotiations, there could be serious information gaps and poor feedback from the private sector to the negotiators and policy makers. The risk, which may result from the above situation, is that those countries, which are not fully prepared, will be adopting by default a regional position, which may not fully represent their interest. This is as important an issue as the type of asymmetry the EU will be granting to the region, or funding that will be made available to address supply side constraints. The power to address this fundamental issue of preparedness and participation of private sector in the EPA process lies with each member state.

What is in it for Tanzania?

Without going into the intricacies of the effect of the Trade Development Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) and the current configuration issue which is an important stumbling block in the current negotiations (and which is now well documented and understood), we will briefly look into the possible impact of an EPA on Tanzania. The impact of an EPA in Tanzania is likely to be far reaching because of the EU's predominant position as key export market for Tanzania.

The immediate gains for an LDC such as Tanzania in an EPA are less obvious to grasp, given the current Everything But Arms (EBA) Duty Free Quota Free (DFQF) scheme[a], from which Tanzania currently benefits. The lack of obvious quantifiable incentives for engaging in an EPA, compounded by the fact that the EU has stated that no additional resources would be

made available under the 9th EDF to assisting ACP countries address the adjustments cost of an EPA, has been a major stumbling block in the current negotiations. Having said this, there is still considerable scope for improved targeting of existing programmed EC resources to meet trade–related objectives, notably in relation to infrastructure, agriculture, procurement, customs and taxation.

In the short to medium term, there are real potential negative effects such as reduced tariff revenues, substantial diversion of trade from third countries[b] and possible surge in imports from cheaper European products could have a direct impact on the local manufacturing sector Tanzania, all of which can be successfully mitigated with appropriate flanking policies, transitional arrangements and well conceived asymmetric arrangements, couple with the required investments in productive sector. In the longer term, EPAs may induce dynamic gain from trade, but this will be contingent on how successful EPAs are able to consolidate and deepen the Regional Integration process in the ACP region. At the end of the day, given the trade composition of ACP countries towards the EU, ACP countries cannot afford to revert to a normal GSP or an EBA where they would place themselves beside other LDCs like Bangladesh and face an outright preference loss. The environment in which an LDC like Tanzania has to compete is drastically different from the early 1990's when Asian LDCs were attempting to integrate the global economy. Today besides having to face the big industrialized countries, there are a number of developing and possible other LDCs which constitute more potent competition - given their export basket, their competitiveness and cost structure. So maintaining preferences is an important strategy for ACP LDCs, but what may be more critical is improving upon these preferences and increasing their utilization rate, especially with respect to the EBA Preferential Agreement or establishing any future successor agreement such as GSP++. It is well documented that TBT and Non Tariff Barriers (NTB) (such as SPS regulations and RoO), significantly reduced the potential benefits of Preferential Market Access and reducing these barriers would improve the utilization rate of EU present and future preferences.

A number of key decisions which affect trade and exports of LDCs to the EU, take place outside the negotiation fora - for example ACP countries have no say in SPS regulations, which pertain to EU food security and consumer protection policy (let alone some barriers set up by non-state actors, notably powerful retailers and supermarkets). Similarly, discussion of RoO takes place in wider fora of the World Customs Organization (WCO) and in most cases, LDCs like Tanzania are only aware of the outcome of reforms after the event. Similarly, discussions on GSP, Commodity Action plans and FLEX often take place outside of the EPA negotiations and for that matter the WTO.

Although EPAs present no avenue for improved market access through

lower tariff quotas, they do however present an important opportunity **for 'face to face dialogue'** with one of the major economic powers to address a number of key issues, which have limited the export expansion of ACP countries to the EU – such as – SPS, RoO and Trade Facilitation issues, as well as levies on fish products. Given that Tanzania's biggest exports to the EU after gold (57% 2003) are fish (17.3%) and Tobacco, coffee and live plants, there are important dividends to reap in addressing SPS and RoO (especially processed fish). Commodities are also key exports for Tanzania, and so addressing issues such a volatility of commodity prices and support mechanism such as the FLEX should feature on Tanzania's negotiation position. The Services sector which has the potential of expanding growth, employment and attracting FDI, if well negotiated, under an EPA, may constitute a way of getting ahead of the 'Competition' and give ACP countries an edge vis a vis other non ACP LDC and DCs. Overall, the EPA negotiations are in unique opportunity for an LDC like Tanzania to bring these issues back on the table and attempt through the privileged negotiation channel afforded to them under the EPAs, to improve upon the current market access in the EU.

Negotiators need to move away from the quid pro quo approach to negotiations and should use the EPA to dialogue and improve market access and especially NTB with the EU. The EPA Negotiation forum and the Regional Preparatory Task Force afford ACP countries like Tanzania a unique opportunity for dialogue and discussions and should thus be used to push for removal of NTB and improved access to funding, as part of an overall strategy of 'getting ahead' and 'catching up' with other Developing and Newly Industrialised Countries (NIC). This is where the potential benefit of the EPAs is likely to lie. However this requires in-depth preparation and identification of needs from the ACP countries, which in practice proves to be very difficult to undertake, due to capacity constraint and more importantly institutional constraint. This greatly diminishes the possible gains from these negotiations. In Tanzania for example trade officials have undertaken preliminary work in seven key areas related to the EPAs and have been working on identifying their interests. However due to the weak linkage between government decision-making and the National Trade Negotiating Forum (called the National EPA Technical Team), coupled with constraints in human resources (ongoing concurrent negotiations) and institutional constraints – Tanzania's positions are not being validated and therefore are not being passed on to the regional negotiating table at SADC. The problem in many cases is not associated with weak technical staff but lies in the institutional set up.

Another important issue, which will serve as an important flanking instrument, is sequencing and phasing of tariff reduction schedules. Under the EPAs, Tanzania will be required to liberalise "substantially all trade" – to date there is no clear indication

of how much substantially all trade means and over what period this will be. However there are indications that the EU will provide flexibility, based on experience with other bilateral and multilateral agreements. The phasing of tariff reduction and the scope, which will be afforded to LDCs like Tanzania with respect to their list of sensitive products, will be critical in buffering possible shocks. If LDCs like Tanzania are given 20 years +[c] for liberalising specific sectors within their economies, as is currently being discussed, the shocks and adjustment may be minimal. Thus sequencing of tariff reductions and the preparation of positions to identify a 'Negotiable Basket' of products for which liberalisation is deferred until near the end of the transition period will be critical in assisting ACP countries mitigate the possible negative impact of EPAs[1]. However, this will depend on how far the country in this time-period is able to upgrade its productive infrastructure and transform its inherent supply side constraints and this inevitable means massive investment in productive infrastructure (both public and Private Sector), training and education, and technology transfer and diffusion.

Critical issues to be resolved

It is also important to note that the EPA negotiations will intensify liberalization since Tanzania is involved in several other international and regional liberalization initiatives and these other liberalization initiatives have their own tariff structures such as the East African Community (EAC) Common External Tariff (CET), which will have impact on whatever decision Tanzania takes in the context of an EPA. Given Tanzania's overlapping membership, there is an urgent need to revisit the feasibility and sustainability of a SADC-EU EPA (including Tanzania) and explore whether an EPA needs to go as far as being a Customs Union (CU) with a CET or whether a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) along the lines of the recent Euro – Mediterranean Agreement could suffice (the Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) recommends the latter approach, but it is against the spirit of EPAs as offers fewer benefits in terms of visibility to investors and reduced transaction costs). However the dilemma is whether a region such as SADC is ready for a CU (given the EAC current Teething problems) and if not what kind of institutional support will be needed to drive such a resource intensive process through. Purely as far as WTO requirements are concerned, an FTA between the EU and ACP regions should suffice to overcome the current non -WTO compatible Cotonou agreement.

As mentioned earlier, given that EPAs do not provide any real benefit in terms of market access or in terms of tariff reductions, the real benefits are less obvious to grasp. However the advantages will lie in eliminating NTBs, in finding innovative cummulation arrangement within RoO which can allow ACP countries to move up the value added chain, and in improvements to market access via harmonisation of standards and

1 IDS Briefing paper on EPA Reciprocity – Chris Stevens

opening up of services and particularly through finding innovative approaches to Mode 4. Aid for Trade is an issue which cannot be avoided given the tremendous challenge which lies ahead of addressing Tanzania's main supply side constraints in both public sector investments and private sector investment needed in the area of 'productive capacity'. This will require looking at both how to improve access to current EDF resources, especially resources available under EIB instruments but also how to mobilise more funds and how to ensure aid effectiveness of any new funds which may be made available.

The political and economic forces at play are very complex and will require both ACP countries and EU to move away from what has been up to now a tug of war, to accepting on both sides that all is not good or bad with an EPA and that there is an urgent need to also develop innovative alternatives[d] for those countries which are not in a position to enter into an EPA[e]. More importantly there is a need to acknowledge that the Cotonou agreement clearly states that such alternatives are possible and that successful negotiations with ACP countries will take various forms of which a classic EPA with a given region is only one.

The days of Lomé and Cotonou are long gone, with the waiver expiring in 2007 and the ongoing erosion of preferences, the ACP group is faced with new challenges. Unless they are able within the G90 to push for modification of the Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) rules, including Article XXIV of GATT 1994, the options are to work towards achieving an 'innovative GSP+[f]" arrangement or negotiating an EPA which will support the groups development objectives. ACP countries have major economic, political and social reforms to undertake which will undoubtedly require help from developed countries, through scaled up aid, improvement of aid effectiveness and further market opening in key agricultural areas. But as we have seen in the past, with Lomé and Cotonou, without the right internal factors in place (sound macroeconomic environment, social policies, institutions) such preferences and any future preferences will pass by unexploited. Development is something largely determined by poor countries[g] themselves and outsiders can play only a limited role.

(Endnotes)

a EBA preferences utilisation rate has up to now been low, due to stringent rules of RoO

b A few new countries such as South Africa, United Arab Emirates, Australia, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia have been gaining market share in Tanzanian imports, while the EU imports although a sizable share of Tanzania's overall imports has been on the decline.

c Some EU member states and the ACP member states have been pushing for such flexibility to be afforded to ACP countries given their current weak level of development and major persisting supply side constraints.

d Article 37(6) of Cotonou, states that the Community will assess the situation of non-LDC which, after consultation with the Community decide that they are not in a position to enter into economic partnership agreements and will examine all alternatives possibilities in order to provide these countries with a new framework for trade which is equivalent to their existing situation in conformity with the WTO. It is important to note that this article mentions non LDC and not LDCs - this limits the room for manoeuvre with respect to pushing at the negotiations 'alternatives' as being currently discussed.

e This position is not supported by the EC, given that it would entail more complex trading arrangements and possibly could lead to fragmentation. However the ACP region is a heterogeneous block, with countries as diverse as South Africa at one end of the spectrum and LDCs and war and diseases stricken countries at the other end, and this needs to be factored in the current negotiations and upcoming review.

f If the differentiation between developing countries inherent in GSP+ proves to be legal, this could be used for ACP countries. To qualify for GSP+ countries need to ratify 16 core human and labour rights under ILO and 7/11 conventions related to environment and governance principles, a well as pass the vulnerability rule which is linked to the value of their exports. A GSP ++ could according to work carried out by IDS Sussex, extend product coverage of the GSP+ so that it offers the ACP Cotonou Style access, To reduce uncertainty of the GSP, the GSP tariff could be bound into the WTO.

g How to help poor countries - Nancy Birdsall, Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian.

Notes

On the agenda in Tanzania

FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG TANZANIA



UN REFORM
Reforming the UN Security Council: The role of Tanzania

By: Amon Manyama, Tanzania

Introduction

This article is about the United Nations Reform, which began in 1997. The UN Security Council reform is part and parcel of the broad UN reform. The article reviews the role and position of the African Union and Tanzania in particular.

Background

President Franklin D Roosevelt first coined the name "United Nations" during the Second World War when 26 nations pledged to continue fighting together the Axis powers. In 1945 representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco to draw up the UN Charter, which has guided the UN work for 60 years.

Reforming the United Nations has been a priority for Secretary-General Kofi Annan, since his arrival in 1997. In the last eight years, the Secretary-General proposed and implemented numerous ideas and changes to bring the UN up to best international practices. This has included changes to work programmes, structures and systems, in headquarters locations and in the field. Priorities for change have included: budget and management reforms; an effective Human Rights mechanism; the creation of a Peace building commission; and setting up of a Democracy fund.

Responding further to the need for change, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed a series of sweeping reforms in areas of: management systems and structures, which include (i) Restructuring and Efficiency (ii) Peacekeeping and Peace building Operations (iii) Finance and Budget Reforms and Procurement (iv) Human Resources Management and enhancing Staff Security (v) Ethics and Internal Justice (vi) Human Rights (vii) Building alliances with civil society and the private sector

The key objectives of the reform are:

- Improvement of UN accountability;
- Removing overlapping programmes and mandates;
- Containing international terrorism

The importance of effective multilateralism and the unique role of the United Nations in development, security and human rights are reaffirmed in the Secretary-General's "In Larger Freedom" report submitted to the General Assembly in March 2005. That report includes broad proposals to accelerate management reform of the Secretariat to make it more flexible, transparent, accountable and equipped to deal with the needs and challenges of the 21st Century. These measures are part of a longer-term series of reforms launched in 1997 and reinforced in particular with three packages of change initiatives since then: namely, the Brahimi report on UN peace operations, the 2002

Agenda for Further Change and last year's overhaul of the staff security system.

The current phase of reform comes at a particularly crucial time for the UN. The UN Secretariat has faced an unprecedented series of organizational challenges, which have exposed flaws in the way it conducts its business. As a result, the UN is obliged to take real action now where it is in the Secretary-General's authority to do so directly, particularly in the critical areas of management, oversight and accountability. While the preparation for many of the steps predates the problems revealed over the past year, the initiatives also explicitly seek to address both the serious concerns expressed by UN staff in last year's Integrity Perception Survey, and the recommendations of the Independent Inquiry Committee led by Paul Volcker into the financial fiasco of the UN's Oil-for-Food Programme in Iraq. Also, the UN security council failed to back the US led war in Iraq and the peacekeeping sexual scandal in the DRC CONGO have recently sparked debate on the need for further reforms in the UN.

Much of the reform agenda has been implemented, recognizing, nevertheless that not all the reforms were accepted by Member States. Understanding that the organization needs to continue improving, the Secretary General has made clear that 2005, the occasion of the UN's 60th anniversary, is a year for "bold decisions".

The reform of the UN Security Council is important but it has not been seen as a priority by the Bush administration. The Bush administration does not think any proposal to expand the security council should be voted on at any stage and had made clear that it would vote against a move by Japan, Germany, Brazil and India – known as the G4 group – to join the UN's most powerful body. The US (white house) sees cleaning up the UN as a priority.

Reforming the UN Security Council

Position of the African Union (AU) "the EZULWINI consensus"
A widespread to support for enlarging the council to reflect the World today rather than after World War II when the United Nations was formed has been expressed in many forum. But all previous attempts have failed because of national and regional rivalries.

The Security Council currently has 15 members, 10 elected for two-year terms and five permanent members who have veto power. Issues relating to Africa conflicts occupy about 70 percent of Security Council agenda and time. To have Africa's representation on that council to be increased has been seen as a quantum leap forward.

Leaders from across Africa debated how best to secure their continent a greater role on the UN Security Council. The AU stands on a non-negotiable position – this was seen as an obstacle to the reform efforts! This position was abandoned – see "The EZULWINI CONSENSUS".

"The EZULWINI CONSENSUS"
On the Security Council, the African Union:

Recalling that in 1945, when the UN was being formed, most of Africa was not represented and that in 1963, when the first reform took place, Africa was represented but was not in a particularly strong position;

Convinced that Africa is now in a position to influence the proposed UN reforms by maintaining her unity of purpose;

Conscious of the fact that the Harare Declaration has made significant impact on the world community and has thus been fairly reflected in the proposed UN Security Council Reforms, adopted the following position:

1. Africa's goal is to be fully represented in all the decision-making organs of the UN, particularly in the Security Council, which is the principal decision-making organ of the UN in matters relating to international peace and security.
2. Full representation of Africa in the Security Council means:
    i. not less than two permanent seats with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership including the right of veto;
    ii. five non-permanent seats.
3. In that regard, even though Africa is opposed in principle to the veto, it is of the view that so long as it exists, and as a matter of common justice, it should be made available to all permanent members of the Security Council.
4. The African Union should be responsible for the selection of Africa's representatives in the Security Council.
5. The question of the criteria for the selection of African members of the Security Council should be a matter for the AU to determine, taking into consideration the representative nature and capacity of those chosen.

Source: "THE COMMON AFRICAN POSITION ON THE PROPOSED REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS "THE EZULWINI CONSENSUS" 7-8 MARCH 2005, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

The G4 had proposed a 25-member council adding six permanent seats without a veto and four non-permanent seats. The G4 members hoped to win four of the permanent seats with the other two earmarked for Africa. One of the non-permanent seats would have also been set aside for Africa. South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt, which were the leading African contenders for the permanent seats.

The G4 needed support from AU to push through their proposals for reforming the Security Council. The G4 and AU reached an agreement on a UN Security Council expansion reform plan. The Africa countries agreed to drop their insistence on a veto right for new permanent members, and agreed one of the new non-permanent seats should rotate among African, Latin American and Caribbean countries. Under the deal, Africa and G4 would have called for a total of 26 council members, which the US had indicated might be too many.

The Role of Tanzania in Reforming the UN Security Council

The President of the United Republic of Tanzania had earlier indicated that for Tanzania the priority is reduction of poverty rather than having a seat at the UN Security Council. In his speech to the General Assembly on 14th September 2005, he did not dwell on the Security Council reform. He argued the world leaders to fulfill the promises to fight unacceptable levels of poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals. He pinpointed the importance of scaling

up aid, particularly improving aid effectiveness, ensuring that the Doha trade round is truly development-oriented, need for embracing wider and deeper debt relief; and facilitating technology transfer. However, despite the fact that the President statement did not say much about the Security Council reform, the government of Tanzania had taken steps toward the reform.

On Wednesday, September 21, 2005, in his statement to the Summit, Hon. Abdulkader Shareef, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation noted that what have been agreed on Reforming the United Nations falls short of what nations had set out to accomplish. The Deputy Minister emphasized the achievability of Millennium Development Goals through adequate implementation of Goal 8 particularly trade and ODA support by developed countries.

Collective security. The position of the Government has been that development and security at national and international levels are two faces of the same coin. This was clearly demonstrated at the 2005 World Summit. Trillions of dollars are spent in armaments of total and mass destruction and very little on development. Tanzania argued other member states do not give up on the subject of disarmament and non-proliferation, and prepare for another effort to resume negotiations on these issues. In addition, Tanzania wanted the Summit also to address issues of small arms and light weapons and illicit brokering of arms, which, for example, has affected the Great Lakes region.

The views of the Tanzania's Government was made clear on Security Council reform that collective security cannot be enhanced without reform of the Security Council. Although the reform of the Security Council was deferred, the issue of expansion of the Security Council and reform of its working methods should remain on the agenda, and that negotiations on the issue should resume soon. The deputy minister said, "United Republic of Tanzania supports the Ezulwini Consensus on the reform of the Security Council". Africa is the only continent without a permanent seat and without a veto in the Security Council. The Summit was requested to heed Africa's demands to make the Security Council more, and not less representative, and more and not less legitimate.

In addition to reforming the Security Council, Tanzania position on terrorism in all its forms was clear. As a victim of terrorism in recent years, United Republic of Tanzania has a compelling reason to support a global anti-terrorism strategy. The deputy minister argued that the lack of an agreed definition should not delay an agreement on a comprehensive anti-terrorism convention. The Government of Tanzania also welcomed and supported the formation of a Human Rights Council and scaling up peacekeeping operations in Africa; issues which involve the Security Council on regular basis.

The outcome of the gathering of the Heads of State and Government at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 14 to 16 September 2005 is summarized below:

Security Council
The Heads of States reaffirmed that Member States have conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, acting on their behalf, as provided by the Charter of the United Nations.

Heads of State support early reform of the Security Council as an essential element of our overall effort to reform the United Nations, in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent, and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions. They commit themselves to continue their efforts to achieve a decision to this end and request the General Assembly to review progress on the reform set out above by the end of the year.

They recommended that the Security Council continue to adapt its working methods so as to increase the involvement of States not members of the Council in its work, as appropriate, enhance its accountability to the membership and increase the transparency of its work.

Use of force under the Charter
Heads of State reaffirmed that the Security Council has primary responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security. They also note the role of the General Assembly relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter.

Terrorism
The Heads of State encourage the Security Council to consider ways to strengthen its monitoring and enforcement role in counter-terrorism, including by consolidating State reporting requirements, taking into account and respecting the different mandates of its counter terrorism subsidiary bodies. They are committed to cooperating fully with the three competent subsidiary bodies in the fulfilment of their tasks, recognizing that many states continue to require assistance in implementing relevant Security Council resolutions.

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The Cotonou Process: The Non State Actors Task Force in Tanzania

By: National Authorizing Officer, Tanzania

1. Introduction

Article 4 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) which was signed in 2000 provides a legal framework to the Non State Actors to participate in the implementation of all matters related to the ACP-EU cooperation. The Agreement recognises the complementary role of and potential for contributions by Non State Actors to the development process. Both parties have committed to providing more space for the participation of Non Sate Actors in policy dialogue and development.

2. Who are the Non State Actors?

Non-State Actors, as described in the CPA, include:

- The private sector;
- Economic and social partners, including trade union organizations; and
- Civil society in all its diversity.

This means that participation in policy dialogue and national development processes is open to all kinds of actors such as the private sector, Community Based Organizations, women's groups, human rights associations, Non Governmental Organizations, farmers' cooperatives, trade unions, universities and research institutions, the media, grassroots organizations, etc.

3. How CPA recognises NSA as partner in development process?

The recognition of the NSA in the partnership is not automatic; it depends on the extent to which they address the needs of the population of their specific competencies. It also depends on whether they are organised and managed democratically and transparently. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement state categorically that NSAs should be involved where appropriate in:

- consultation on cooperation policies and strategies, on priorities for cooperation;
- the implementation of cooperation projects and programmes;
- be provided with financial resources to support local development processes;
- be provided with capacity-building support in critical areas in order to reinforce the capabilities of these actors, particularly as regards organization and representation, and the establishment of consultation mechanisms including channels of communication and dialogue, and to promote strategic alliances.

4. Commitment of Government of Tanzania

In recognition to this commitment, the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and European Commission Delegation in the United Republic of Tanzania, through the Country Strategy Paper[1] signed in March 2001 have set EURO 2.9 million to support Non State Actors to address their capacity needs. The Government is committed itself regarding the important role of Non State Actors in engaging in development processes with the aim of achieving transparency and participatory decision-making processes. The NSA involvement in policy dialogue have involved over time. They have participated in policy development forum including Public expenditure Review, preparation of Tanzania Assistance Strategy/Joint Assistance Strategy and MKUKUTA.

Despite the positive trend, NSAs involvement and engagement with government in these processes, the framework is still in its infancy stages. It has not been formally institutionalised. It has been on ad-hoc basis, not clearly defined. Some issues need to be addressed including: selection criteria for NSAS for participation in different forum; coordination between different NSA forum and information sharing.

5. Search for capacity building for Non State Actors

In October 2004, the Office of National Authorising Officer engaged two consultancies[2] to carry out mapping study with the objective of establishing what types of NSAs exist in Tanzania and what forms of engagement exist between them and the government regarding to policy dialogue and development processes. About 120 NSAs were consulted on needs and prioritise for potential interventions to strengthening their role in policy dialogue and development processes. The context for the consultation was set by presenting the study results and the main features of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement to the "Non-State Actors Consultation Workshop" which took place on the 8th and 9th February 2005 in Kunduchi Hotel. The workshop was attended by more than 100 NSAs, Senior Government Officials[3] and the EC-Delegation[4] in the United Republic of Tanzania.

The workshop participants identified and drafted a list of short-term needs, and one which has a longer term outlook served as basis/starting point for NSA Support Programme. The short term needs list include training NSAs on Cotonou Agreement; Translation into Kiswahili and dissemination of Cotonou related

1 Country Strategy Paper lay down the framework of EC –Tanzania co-operation,

2 One focusing on Civil society and the other for Private sector

3 Including the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury who is also the National Authorising Officer

4 Including the Head of Delegation

documents and Preparation of NSA database. The short term needs were to be implemented in order to prepare the ground for the bigger programme and keep the momentum of engagement between NSAs, the NAO and the EC until the bigger programme is operational[5]. The List of long-term needs included Institutional development, information management and exchange through establishment of a resource centre/Policy information centres for dissemination of information. These would be implemented when a NSA support programme is operational.

6. Formation of NSA Task force

The Kunduchi Workshop formed a Non State Actors Task force (NSA-TFG) as interface between NAO/EC and NSAs to oversee the implementation of short-term needs as well participate in the preparation of programme to support NSAs. The NSA-TFG would also be responsible for the wider consultation of NSAs throughout the programming process of the larger programme.

7. NSA-TFG Selection criteria

The NSA-TFG was selected on the basis of agreed criteria as follows;

- Task force size, member should not exceed 17;
- Composition of NSA –TFG should draw experts from NSAs, umbrella organizations/ platform/ networks;
- Representation should be by organizations not persons;
- Strong and competent organizations should be considered;
- Organizations should nominate strong and competent experts;
- Consider geographical coverage (mainland and Zanzibar);
- Task force members should be accountable to stakeholders;
- Task force will stay in the office for one year;
- Task Force should be inclusive as much as possible taking board gender balance and marginalized groups;

8. Selected Members of the NSA- TFG and its organization structure

The NSA Task Force is made up of 17 members drawn from; Tanzania Association of Non Governmental Association (TANGO); Tanzania Council for Social Development (TACOSODE); Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (TCCIA); Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA); Federation of Women Entrepreneurs in Tanzania (FAWETA), Confederation of Tanzania Industries (CTI); Zanzibar Cloves Producers Organization (ZACPO); Umoja wa Walemavu Zanzibar (UWZ); Zanzibar Teachers Union Congress (ZATUC); Mtandao wa vikundi vya Wakulima Tanzania (MVIWATA); Mwanza Non Governmental Organization

5 Most likely to be operational in the first semester of 2006.

Network (MNGON); Tanzania teachers Union (TTU); Masasi NGO Network (MANGONET) and Tanzania Federation of Disabled Peoples Organization (SHIVYAWATA).

The Task force is led by Chairperson assisted by Secretary. The NSA-TFG Manager was hired to ensure the overall management of the tasks. Three experts are co-opted to handle technical issues whenever need arises.

9. Roles and functions of NSA Task Force

The roles of NSA-TFG include:

- Participate in the further formulation of the programme to support NSA;
- participation in policy dialogue and development process (tri-partite meetings: NAO/EC/ NSA);
- Guarantee broad consultation with NSAs that are not members of the Task Force;
- Seek consultation from experts;
- Collect and feedback comments to programme partners (NAO and EC) on programme outline;
- Organise a Consolidation Seminar for the project proposal (in collaboration with NAO/EC);
- Coordinate the implementation of short-term priorities with NAO/EC; Organise NSA seminar to assess the performance of representative Task Force, and discuss its future role (in collaboration with NAO/EC) before the support programme is launched;
- Develop a database (directory of NSAs for all country, built on existing ones);
- Work out a modality that will strengthen relationship between NSA and Government structure from village to national level;

10. Performance of NSA-TFG

Since its inception, the NSA Task Force has been working in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance to prepare a Joint Assistance Strategy. It has also been working with NAO and EC to implement the short-term needs and finalize the financing proposal for the NSA support programme. A unique feature of this programme is its highly participative planning process. NSAs were consulted and involved in decision-making throughout the process, from the early exploratory work to the preparation of the final draft financing proposal which was sent to Brussels for further processes.

A first draft of the programme and financing proposal was prepared by the team of international consultants after the deliberations of the Kunduchi workshop. This draft was reviewed by the Task Force Group and was circulated among a bigger number of NSAs in the country through the regional consultation workshops.

Inputs from the consultations were synthesised by the international

consultants and a second draft prepared. The second draft was further reviewed by the TFG in a final programme planning workshop held in June 2005. Consensus was reached and the final draft was prepared by the international consultants.

A further review by the EU member states in Dar es Salaam was undertaken, and the TFG was required to clarify certain specific issues, especially on ownership, programme management and sustainability. Having sorted this out, the ONAO and the EU Delegation finalised the document for submission to Brussels during September 2005.

11. Way forward

The NSA-TFG will exist up to March 2006. It will be involved in preparation of stakeholders workshop to mark the beginning of implementation NSA support programme. Provide support to set up mechanism for implementation of bigger programme. It will also continue to provide feedback to their members and larger constituents.

Political Development and Electoral System in Tanzania.

By Omar S. Ilyas and Zitto Kabwe, Tanzania.

When we achieved our independence in 9th of December 1961, Tanzania (then Tanganyika) adopted a Westminster multi-party political system that ensured a parliament supremacy over the political process in our country.

Adoption of such kind of a political system was basically influenced by two things: by our relationship with the country of United Kingdom as an outgoing colonial power, and by the influence of British learned class of new leaders like Mwalimu Nyerere.

In 1965, a year after the creation of Tanzania as an independent United Republic of Tanganyika and the Islands of Zanzibar, Tanzania adopted a single party quasi parliamentary-presidential political system that existed until 1992.

The choice of electoral system as it is in most of democratic societies, in Tanzania has always been an important institution that invites a never ending debate.

In all democratic societies, be they developed or developing one, electoral systems have been used to translate citizens' votes into a number of representatives that a party or a group of political inclination can have in the various representative bodies such as nation parliaments.

The debate of electoral system is very important as it shapes the rule of the game under which democracy is supposed to be practiced. For any kind of political development to happen in a society like Tanzania, special care

should be emphasized over the issue of electoral system.

It is argued that the electoral system is one of the easiest political institutions to be manipulated for good and for bad.

The electoral system that a society adopts and uses has a direct impact on determining who and from which political group is elected and probably gain the authoritative power to run or influence the leading policy making organs of a country.

It is the electoral system that can lead to either a stronger legislative branch of governance with stronger and viable political groupings or weak legislative branch with a dominant single political group or party.

Since independence Tanzania has been holding regular elections to elect the President (before it was Prime Minister in both parties of the union), Members of Parliament, Councilors or Sheikhas' as in the case of Zanzibar, and the Village Leaders.

In Tanzania currently there are five types of members of parliament. There are, members elected from constituencies, women from special seats, ten members appointed by the president, five members from the Zanzibar House of Representatives, and the Attorney General.

Until recently, the electoral system in Tanzania has been that of "First-Past-The-Post" with the essence of winner takes it all, where most of the elected members in our legislature

and councils are elected directly from the established constituencies and local authorities.

With the re-adaptation of multi-party political system in 1992, the debate on which type of electoral system is viable for our country in a given period and situations, has been one of vocal and sometimes emotional nature.

This has been witnessed in various platforms, be it political parties, academic communities, civil society, social clubs, media houses, and even in our informal peoples' parliaments famously known as "maskanis" or camps.

In his book "10 Years After the Transition to Multi-Partysm", Hon Pius Msekwa, the Speaker of the National Assembly suggests the need of introducing some elements of the "Proportional Representative System" into the existing electoral system hence to have a mixed electoral system.

His argument mainly is based on the issue of empowering the newly established opposition parties together with easing the access to representative position by the historically marginalized groups of the society such as women, youth, and people with disabilities.

The "First-Past-The-Post" or "Winner Takes It All" electoral system has its advantages and disadvantages. One common advantage is that the voters have a chance to identify and where possible, force into accountability their constituent Members of Parliament and Councilors. However this depends much on the level of civic knowledge that the voters have and possibilities of working out the many legal and institutional impediments that hinder this becoming possible.

The disadvantage is that the system makes political parties concentrate much on the element of electability of the candidate rather than the capabilities one has for articulation of party policies.

It has also been argued that the "First-Past-The-Post" or "Winner Takes It All" hinders the growth of new parties due to the fact that it always plays to the advantage of the more established ones as they are the ones who determine other important rules of the game that work together with the electoral system.

A proportional representation has an advantage of pushing up the development of democracy in a given society as it forces parties as institutions to compete on policy platform with less dependence on candidates or leaders personalities.

In a proportional representative system voters elect parties and not a person from a list supposed to be prepared by a given party. It is the usefulness and vitality of party's policies that influences people to cast their votes which in turn translate into the number of members of parliament and councilors.

However, as the debate has established, this system has some disadvantages like the issue of lack of direct accountability of the Members of Parliament and Councilors to the electorate/people.

Opponents of this system have also cautioned the many democratic discrepancies that most of our political parties are still experiencing. Things like clientelist relationships between leaders of certain parties and their rank and file members are seen as the possible angles of manipulations within party systems that have to be fixed before adopting a fully fledge proportional representation electoral system in a developing democratic society like ours.

In the end, the parliament, by recommendation of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) government decided to adopt the proportional representation system only in connection with the election of women special seats.

Full introduction of some essence of Proportional Representative System into the long time existing "First-Past-The-Post" system hence a mixed system, would basically improve the number of the so called representatives of the marginalized groups in parliament.

The idea is that when this mixed system is adopted, the issue of women special seats which has recently faced some stiff opposition even among the cadres of gender activists' groups will be abolished and new mechanisms will be put into place which will automatically increase their number to reach or even surpass the targeted SADC margin of 30%.

However before this new system will bear the intended fruits, issues like which formula to be used to get a certain number of members of parliament to a given political party and which votes will be translated into seats of the legislature should be clearly discussed by all stakeholders.

The question of whether it is the popular or parliamentarians votes from either a "First- Past-the-Post" System or the Proportional Representative System will be translated into seats should be clearly addressed.

This is important in order to avoid the scenario where one system dominates the other hence the mixed system becomes somewhat meaningless.

Voters' registration process is another important element of country's electoral system. The Permanent National Voters' Register has been established by the Act of Law Number 13 of 2004.

This has been applauded as an important step towards development of a democratic system in our country and it was something that many opposition parties have been arguing for especially the main opposition party in Zanzibar, The Civic United Front (CUF).

However, even before the elections, a cry of fouls over the Zanzibar Permanent Voters' Register has surfaced. Some political parties claim that the register has been manipulated during and after the registration exercise.

The issue of simple majority versus absolute majority is another case of electoral system debate. Unlike before, the constitution of Tanzania now allows a candidate, whether presidential or parliamentary, to be announced as a winner of the election

only if he/she receives any kind of majority of the votes.

Opponents of this system argue that this allows for election of unpopular candidates who apart from party political base, might lack the necessary legitimacy to lead a country or a constituency effectively.

Another major debate surrounding the issue of the electoral system is the question of independent candidacy. Article 67(1)(b) of the constitution stipulates that the candidate for a parliamentary seat shall be a member of and proposed by a political party.

This provision of the constitution does infringe the right to be voted and to participate in electoral politics by many of the good citizens of Tanzania. In another way, it also forces people to join certain political groupings involuntarily.

The outcome of this is that we are now witnessing a problem of where for certain individuals political parties have turned into tools of clinging to power and not organized groups for interest articulation as traditionally supposed to be.

There are some people who argue that in a society like ours where we have a young democracy in progress, prohibition of independent candidacy is viable since political parties could become redundant.

However, all these can be analysed in a more constructive manner if there will be enough political will based on the ruling class confidence to call for the national dialogue that will include representatives of all social, political, and economic groupings in the country.

It is only when a competent and confident leader of high caliber decides to initiate such a popular engagement on the future of Tanzania that all the problems pertaining to electoral systems and the likes will effectively and peacefully be tackled for the better of the country and its ever generous citizens.

Notes



THE CITIZEN
Thursday, 10 November, 2005

ZANZIBAR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS 2005			
ELECTION DATE	30-Oct-05		
RESULTS ANNOUNCED	1-Nov-05		
Source: Zanzibar Elec. Commission, November 2005.			
OVERALL VOTES			
REGISTERED VOTES	507.225	100%	
ACTUAL VOTES	460.581	90,8%	
REJECTED VOTES	9.613	2,1%	
VOTES BY PARTIES			
PARTY	*CONTESTANT*	*VOTES*	*PERCENTAGE*
Chama Cha Mapinduzi	Abeid amani Karume	239.832	53,2%
Civic United Front	Seif Sharif Hamad	207.773	46,1%
Jahazi Asilia	Haji Mussa Haji Kitole	2.110	0,5%
Democratic Party	Abdulla Ali Abdulla	509	0,1%
NRA	Simai Abdulrahman Abdulla	449	0,1%
Sauti ya Umma	Maryam Ahmed Omar	335	0,1%

Continuation of Zanzibar Election Results 2005			
50-House of Representatives			
CCM	30		
CUF	19		
OTHERS	0		
TOTAL	49		
*Results for one seat were nullified because of irregularities			

UNGUJA DISTRICTS						
KASKAZINI A	CCM	CUF	DP	JAHAZI ASILIA	NRA	Sauti ya Umma
	27,506 (63.3%)	14,481 (33.6%)	125 (0.3%)	783 (1.8%)	117 (0.3%)	78 (0.2%)
KASKAZINI B	CCM	CUF	DP	JAHAZI ASILIA	NRA	Sauti ya Umma
	24,412 (80.6%)	5,618 (18.6%)	51 (0.2%)	133 (0.4%)	32 (0.1%)	36 (0.1%)
KUSINI KATI	CCM	CUF	DP	JAHAZI ASILIA	NRA	Sauti ya Umma
	34,311 (85.1%)	5,714 (14.2%)	19 (0.0%)	228 (0.6%)	18 (0.0%)	15 (0.0%)
KUSINI	CCM	CUF	DP	JAHAZI ASILIA	NRA	Sauti ya Umma
	16,400 (86.9%)	2,402 (12.7%)	6 (0.0%)	37 (0.2%)	12 (0.1%)	7 (0.0%)
MAGHARIBI	CCM	CUF	DP	JAHAZI ASILIA	NRA	Sauti ya Umma
	50,935 (65.7%)	26,216 (33.8%)	55 (0.1%)	256 (0.3%)	47 (0.1%)	68 (0.1%)
MJINI	CCM	CUF	DP	JAHAZI ASILIA	NRA	Sauti ya Umma
	63,645 (65.4%)	32,973 (33.9%)	58 (0.1%)	523 (0.5%)	62 (0.1%)	67 (0.1%)
PEMBA DISTRICTS						
WETE	CCM	CUF	DP	JAHAZI ASILIA	NRA	Sauti ya Umma
	4,152 (9.9%)	37,499 (89.8%)	37 (0.1%)	23 (0.1%)	19 (0.0%)	14 (0.0%)
MICHEWENI	CCM	CUF	DP	JAHAZI ASILIA	NRA	Sauti ya Umma
	4,088 (12.5%)	28,498 (86.8%)	76 (0.2%)	61 (0.2%)	73 (0.2%)	22 (0.1%)
CHAKECHAKE	CCM	CUF	DP	JAHAZI ASILIA	NRA	Sauti ya Umma
	7,151 (20.4%)	27,713 (79.2%)	47 (0.1%)	39 (0.1%)	26 (0.1%)	12 (0.0%)
MKOANI	CCM	CUF	DP	JAHAZI ASILIA	NRA	Sauti ya Umma
	7,232 (21.3%)	26,619 (78.4%)	35 (0.1%)	27 (0.1%)	43 (0.1%)	16 (0.0%)

Source: Zanzibar Elec. Commission, November 2005

On the agenda in Kenya

KENYA'S CONSTITUTION REVIEW PROCESS DEBATE

By: Sylvia Nyaga, Kenya

The clamour for a new constitution in Kenya has now been on for over a decade. Whether or not the process is now on the home stretch as has been described by many is yet to be seen. The review was initially driven by specific concerns relating to governance including those of equal access to resources, absence of economic and social justice, lack of transparency and accountability and lack of respect for the rule of law. It was felt that these are issues that were best addressed through a new constitution. Propelled by the wave of constitutional reform and political change that has been sweeping across Africa over the years now the reform movement in Kenya has involved demand for a systematic and comprehensive review of the constitution. In the early 1990s there was especially pressure from secular and religious organizations, non-governmental organizations and political groups. After the 1992 elections, this pressure gained momentum upon realization that over and above multi-party democracy there was need for accountability by officials of government, decentralization of government functions and greater safeguard of civil and political rights.

Even with mass actions, violence and deaths, most initiatives for reform had not taken root by 1997 when the elections were due. Parliamentary political parties formed the Inter-Parties Parliamentary group (IPPG) and agreed to a number of reforms to be implemented before the General Election of 1997. These included the independence of the Electoral Commission and repeal of a number of laws restricting civil and political rights, which were seen as interim reforms to ensure fair elections. Enacted at the time was the Constitution of Kenya Review Act (1997), to provide for the institutions and process for the constitutional review after the elections.

The Review Act

The politics surrounding the review process has seen the substance of the Review Act put to question and led to its amendment several times since 1997 when it came into force. Initially, the Act was viewed as a government mechanism to the exclusion of other political parties and the civil society. The proposal for its amendment to allow for proportional representation was not implemented largely because parliamentary political parties disagreed on the process of nominating the commissioners. This disagreement created the first stalemate under the Review Act. Divisions over review was heightened and national religious organizations and the civil society appointed a People's Commission of Kenya (PCK) that proceeded to collect views from the public on constitutional issues. KANU, the ruling party then, and allied political parties established a Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) for the Constitution Review. The PSC introduced amendments

to the Review Act focusing on the appointment of Commissioners. Consequently the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) made up of 15 Commissioners was established in November 2000 whose membership was expanded to 27 following the merger with the PCK.

In spite of the politics that continued surrounding the review process, the CKRC was able to publish its report and a Draft Constitution Bill in September 2002. Following the publication of the draft, the law required that a national constitutional conference be convened to discuss and adopt with or without amendments the report and draft Bill prepared by CKRC. However, then president Daniel Arap Moi, dissolved parliament on the day that the national Constitutional Conference was to start its deliberations. The consequence was that the 2002 general elections were held before the country could get a new constitution.

With the election of a new government in 2002, it was the expectation of most Kenyans that the process would be completely independent from interference from the State and organs of government. Further there was great hope that the country would get a new constitution in a very short period, with talk being of delivering a new constitution either in 100 days or within six months after seizing power.. However this was not to be. Political intrigues and interference continued to bog down the process. They were dominated by squabbles within the ruling coalition NARC. The hottest item at the Constitutional Conference was the creation of the post of an Executive Prime Minister, a proposal that was being opposed by NAK members especially those from Kibaki's Democratic Party, but which the LDP members demanded vehemently, largely because the position of a Prime Minister had been part of the pre-election bargain as covered in the Memorandum of Understanding which the President had failed to execute. NAK fears that the creation of PM's post will undermine the President's authority by creating two centers of power. The tug of war thus raging between LDP members and DP adherents created divisions amongst the delegates and led to walkout during the National Constitutional Conference by a section of the delegates led by cabinet ministers.

Following the walkout the Draft was adopted by the remaining delegates and the Conference conducted in three phases beginning May 2003 was concluded in March 2004. However the review process was yet to hit more icebergs than most Kenyans anticipated. The Review process is indeed regarded as one of the key indicators of government commitment to fulfilling its election pledges. Its delay has sometimes been regarded as government instigated.

A case challenging the constitutionality of the review process filed by one Reverend Timothy Njoya and other applicants was heard and determined by the constitutional court. The pronouncement by the court that parts of the Review Act were unconstitutional in that it took away the primordial power of the

people to make their constitution was a big challenge to the conclusion of the process. Indeed, following this decree, it took the Parliament over 8 months to amend the Review Act. The infamous Consensus Act, which was Parliament's response to the ruling of the constitutional court whilst popular among the Members of Parliament at the time of enactment was not received well by the civil society who have time and again argued that the Act was unconstitutional in that it gives Parliament more than the required facilitative role.

Controversy continues over how the High Court judgement should be interpreted into law. One school of thought holds that because Section 47 of the Constitution does not empower Parliament to make a new Constitution and because the Constitution itself does not envisage its demise, this section must be amended to provide for a referendum and consequential promulgation of the new constitution by the President. The Consensus Act being mere subsidiary legislation cannot provide authority for the replacement of the current constitution. Indeed, one can argue that Kenya being a constitutional democracy, all powers exercised by the President ought to find basis in the Constitution of the day. The other school of thought is that since the power of the people to make the constitution is primordial, then it ought not be provided for in the constitution and so it is unnecessary to waste time amending Section 47.

In addition to creating divisions within the ruling coalition, NARC, the final leg of the review process has been marked with violence and loss of life. In July 2004, Kenyans took to the streets to put pressure on the government because it had failed to facilitate the process efficiently as to enable Kenya have a new constitution by June 2004 as it had promised. Again in July 2005, Kenyans were back in the streets, this time around protesting the intention of Parliament to amend the NCC (Bomas) Draft. Proposals for amendment were nevertheless passed forward to be incorporated into the Draft by the Attorney General.* While the people were to remain central to the Review process, it is debatable thus the extent to which the views of the ordinary Kenyan – often referred to as Wanjiku - has been incorporated in the draft. Some politicians have argued that Wanjiku cannot have all her demands and has to give on certain issues. This is saddening considering that the Review Act required that the Draft "faithfully reflect the views of the people."

The notion of peoples' sovereignty ought to be interpreted by having a process that is participatory, transparent and inclusive. The importance of this participation follows from the nature of the constitution as a tool for governance. It not only increases the people's knowledge of constitutional issues but it would upon enactment enable them to participate in its implementation, exercise their rights and fulfill their obligations under the constitution. It ensures the legitimacy of the new constitution.

*REMARK: The referendum was voted NO in November 2005.

Upon amendment of the NCC Draft by the Attorney General and a three months civil education to be conducted by the CKRC, the Draft needs to be ratified by the people at a referendum before the country can have a new constitution. There are a number of possibilities that could arise:

1. Dissatisfaction with the Draftsmanship

Skepticism has been expressed on the draftsmanship of the Attorney General with concern being that the Review Act does not allow for authentication of the Draft by Parliament before it is presented to the people for ratification at the referendum. It is suspected by some factions that the Attorney General may create nuances with some of the clauses. Should any party be dissatisfied with any clause as drafted by the Attorney General, the procedure is not clear and further delay could arise depending on the course of action chosen.

2. A "NAY" vote

Already there are politicians asking Kenyans not to endorse the Draft at the referendum. The Kenya Church is also on record as stating that they shall be asking their followers to give a nay vote because it is dissatisfied with the provisions relating to the Kadhi Courts. A "NAY" vote would mean that Kenyans remain with the current constitution. The time and finances spent in the review process will be lost.

3. Legal Hurdles both prior to and after the referendum

Legal hurdles may be faced particularly as relates to Section 47. The procedure of enactment of the new constitution may be challenged in court. LDP and KANU have already sought the courts intervention and are seeking for injunctions against the Attorney- General and the CKRC, orders which if granted will further delay the enactment of a new constitution.

4. A "YES" vote

The Review Act provides that should a simple majority of the voters (50% + 1) return a "YES" vote, then it shall be deemed that the Draft is acceptable and the President shall declare it to be the Constitution of Kenya. In addition to the earlier stated concern that the current Constitution does not provide for its demise and consequential replacement with a new one, there is also concern that should registered voters not turn up in big numbers for the vote, then the Constitution will be passed by only a small proportion of Kenyans.

A substantial part of the civil society is also dissatisfied with the process as it stands and specifically as relates to the amendment to the Bomas Draft. A section has gone to court seeking that the Attorney General be barred from making the proposed amendments. It remains to be seen what other steps they will take in the future. This also means that the new Constitution may fail to command the requisite legitimacy that it needs. It suffices to emphasis that the civil society fell back in its watchdog role once the National

Constitutional Conference was set up. While many organizations were represented at the Conference, the vigilance that was witnessed in the pre-2002 elections period was lost for some time. Even with the conclusion of the conference divisions amongst the civil society organizations was visible and continues to be felt to date. This can be partly attributed to the fact that former civil society heads are now part of government and also the fact that civil society has not been wholly non-partisan to the NAK-LDP wars. The Katiba Watch group that was formed to see that the Bomas Draft was protected and passed was a lone ranger for some time and most of the other civil society groups only joined in the lobby agenda when it was clear that Parliament had hijacked the process - a bit too late in the day.

Conclusion

It has been the expectation of a majority of Kenyans that a new Constitution will improve their lives. While this may not take place immediately upon promulgation, the Draft has so far safeguarded key values good governance, human rights, democracy and rule of law and it is hoped that these will not be watered down in the final drafting that is being undertaken by the Attorney General. This being the case the new constitution will definitely be an improved version of the current one. However those in power and institutions of governance must not only recognize that Kenya is a constitutional democracy but must also carry out all functions only according to the letter of the Constitution and other laws. It is only then that the value of the new Constitution can be seen.

While thus Kenya is making history by being one of the few countries to review the Constitution in peacetime, experience has been that extraneous factors will always impact on both the process and the final document. It needs to be emphasized over and over again that constitution making is about tolerance, consultation and consensus building. The process therefore must be acceptable to all, always ensuring that a balance is maintained between the legality of the process, its acceptability and the politics of the day. It is only then that the final document can command the necessary legitimacy as the supreme law of the land. The process involved in the midwifing of a new constitution is critical in entrenching that sense of legitimacy that the constitution requires. Proper formulation is therefore sine qua non for constitutionalism.

On the agenda in Uganda

UGANDA'S POLITICAL TRANSITION TO MULTI-PARTY POLITICS

By: Henry Kasacca, Uganda

Introduction

The last two decades, following events in Eastern Europe, have seen political transitions in Africa from authoritarian governments to democracies. The main challenge of these transitions has been to choose a political system that would most likely promote and sustain democracy. In Africa, while most states got independence, with a multi-party system of governance, many soon reverted to one party states and military dictatorships. In Uganda, the political systems enjoyed since independence have been: a mult- party system, a one party system, a military dictatorship and the movement system of governance. What is common among is that all these changes from one system to another, is violence and limited, if any, participation of the people.

Presently Uganda is in transition from the movement system of governance to a multi-party system of governance. It is the purpose of this article to look at this process. The transition, in this case, is understood as simply a process involving events, decisions and actions that will see that system of governance in Uganda change from movement to multi-party. Transitions are mild or tense, violent or peaceful, rapid or gradual, and in many cases, generally properly or poorly managed. In looking at Uganda's present transition, the approach taken is historical, descriptive and analytical. As a way of conclusion some observations are made.

Background

When the NRM government took power in 1986, after a protracted five-year bush war, it introduced the Movement political arrangement as a transitional arrangement. The argument was that, after decades of state inspired violence, the country needed some time to recover from all the crimes committed against it, the economic collapse, the break down of the rule of law, and lack of respect of Human Rights. The Movement arrangement was presented as an all inclusive and participatory arrangement in which leadership was to be based on individual merit rather than political parties. Political party activities were suspended. Globally, this is the time when political reforms were taking place towards democracy.

Part of the healing process of the country was to make a peoples' Constitution. Among the recommendations on political systems, the Movement, initially presented as a transitional arrangement, was presented as one of the political systems from which Ugandans could choose the other being a multi-party system and any other democratic system.

The issue of the Political System Uganda would adapt became so contentious and controversial that the Constituent Assembly failed to reach consensus. The matter was then to be put to a referendum in the fourth year of Parliament on

commencement of the constitution. During this period, political party activities were restricted.[1]

In the run up to the referendum political parties were still not allowed to participate as political parties, but individuals would campaign for a political system of their choice. The political parties boycotted the referendum on the grounds that a referendum on political system between the Movement and Multi-party political system was against their fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution[2]. They added that the movement was itself a party and such a referendum was to establish a one party state by another name.

On part the Movement / government, the referendum was necessary for the people to choose how they should be governed in accordance with the constitution[3]. The philosophy of the Movement was that not all types of democratic forms of governance are equally well adapted to further democracy under all kinds of socio-political conditions. The Movement system was presented as a homegrown system suitable for the unique circumstances in which Uganda found itself. The Movement system was also seen as democratic because its principles provided unlimited access to all persons to political offices, and to participate in politics to advance their interests. The participatory way of the Movement, through Local Councils, made it popular among the population, many of who were illiterate and could hardly follow the debate on fundamental freedoms and rights to associate advanced by those in favor of political parties

In June 2000, Ugandans voted in referendum on political systems and adopted the Movement system as the form of democracy in which politics would be organized in Uganda. This referendum did not out law political parties but they continued to be restricted in their activities by the constitution under article 269 until parliament made a law to regulate their activities under a movement system.

Calls for Change

The calls for multi-party politics have been made since the Movement was presented as a political system but significant calls that have lead to the present transition from Movement to multi-party politics can be traced to 2001, just a year after the referendum. While addressing a conference of the National Executive Committee of the Movement, as an invited guest for the swearing in ceremony of President Museveni, Col. Muammar Gadhafi said revolutionaries do not leave power through term limits but when revolutions and revolutionary programs are accomplished. He added that it's a big mistake to deny such revolutionary leaders like President Museveni, through elections, the

1 Article 269, The Constitution of Uganda, 1995.

2 Article 29(i) (e) Every person shall have the right to freedom of association which shall include freedom to form and join associations or unions, including trade unions and political and civic organizations.

3 Article 69 of constitution, states that people shall have the right to choose and adopt a political system of their choice through free and fair elections or referenda.

chance to transform their societies. In response President Museveni thanked Gadhafi and said his remarks were "very interesting" and food for thought for the Movement delegates.

These remarks did not just come and pass. Gadhafi was attacked strongly by opposition leaders and politicians in Uganda. The Uganda Peoples Congress prayed President Museveni would ignore the advice and hoped it was not him who requested Gadhafi to make those remarks. Hon. Eriya Kategaya, then First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, down played the advice. He said, "Libyans have ways of doing things and we have our own, I don't think that because we are friends we must do what they do"[4].

In the months that followed, the then Local Government Minister, Hon Jaberi Bidandi Ssali, called for the need to free political parties, transform the movement into a political party and begin the debate on President Museveni successor. He was soon to be followed by the then First Deputy Prime Minister, Hon. Kategaya and the then Third Deputy Prime Minister, the Late Hon. James Wapakhabulo.

As the debate was taking root, President Museveni observed that it had become a habit of leaders in the Movement to discuss the political parties in public ignoring the "right forums" where they should present their opinions. He reminded that Ugandans had made a ruling on political parties in June 2000 and thereby directed all leaders of the movement to stop discussing the issue of political parties in public forums. But the debate would not easily fizzle out. At about this time, calls were beginning to be made for a third term of President Museveni

At the Movement conference in December 2001, in Kyankwanzi, President Museveni proposed to the National Executive Committee to should request Parliament not to allow parties to open branches at district level until the Constitution Review Process was complete. The Constitutional Review Commission, instituted during presidential elections, had the issue of political parties as one of its terms of reference.

The Constitution required Parliament to make a law for the regulation of political parties under the Movement system. It was this law that the President wanted to be restrictive. When the law was made, Parliament allowed political parties to have branches at the district level. President Museveni vetoed this law and Parliament letter restricted political parties to their headquarters under the Political Parties and Organizations Act. Parties petitioned the constitutional court, which nullified these provisions.

The court ruled that the Movement had abandoned its principles of individual merit and all inclusiveness and was operating as a political party. This meant there was no justification for the limitations on political parties. Government maintained that the

4 The Monitor 16 May 2001

people of Uganda had adopted a Movement political system in the June 2000 referendum and those political party activities that interfere with the Movement system would not be allowed until the country changed formally to multi-party politics thorough referendum. The court ruling and government position presented a crisis like situation but it was ignored. Meanwhile, the Movement conference had reached consensus to open up political space but the debate had shifted to how the change would be effected

Because of increasing pressure for change, both domestic and foreign, the government and President Museveni and government conceded to change but advanced different reasons. First, for example was that the donors did not understand the Movement system well and secondly, Uganda needed to work with them on issues of trade and investment

The third reason was that there were people within the Movement, who felt they were being forced into the Movement and had resorted to sabotaging the programs of the movement. It was time they be left to get out of the movement and organize in their groups. Those who believed in the movement will pursue its programs under the NRM.

Also important to note at this point is the interpretation of external pressure. The government has repeatedly said the calls for change from the donors or development partners are a direct interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. The government and President Museveni have maintained that Uganda as a sovereign state, must be respected, and through its Constitution the people shall decide on how they should be governed.

The government presented the external call for change as interference in the affair of Uganda and called upon the people of Uganda, basing on their past history, to decide whether to retain the Movement or have political parties. This has only changed lately within few months to the referendum. But the change of position on political parties by the leadership has not been followed with action to change the people's perception towards political parties.

Formalization of the change process

While the public debate on change stated as early as 2001, formalization of the transition process can be seen with the handing in of the Constitutional Review Commission report, in 2003. Government appointing a committee to consult the political parties and all political forces on the political future of the country followed this. Unfortunately these talks collapsed after the first meeting with the old political parties but another group, of mainly new political parties, participated in these talks and reached some agreements with government.

Government then prepared a white paper on the proposed constitutional and political reforms of the country and each movement Member of Parliament (MP) was allocated five

million Uganda shillings to sensitize the people ahead of the changes to come however the results of this sensitization exercise can hardly be evaluated.

According to the government political road map, after presenting the white paper it was to present to parliament the Constitution (Amendment) Bill by September 2004. This was the delayed by four months due to consultations by government on the various issues of the bill thereby delaying the transition and calling for a new political road map.

The Transition Process: A Critical Analysis

The first issue that can be observed in Uganda's political transition to multi-party politics is that the whole process has been mixed up with the succession process. The first calls were for opening up political space, transforming the Movement into a Political party, and start the debate on the succession of President Museveni. This debate took secondary position when President Museveni said the issue was not a third term but whether term limits were important. Therefore for all this time the country has been engaged in debating the more contentious issue of term limits ignoring the issue of political parties and preparing the population for change

Much as there is consensus among the political leaders for change to multi-party politics, there seems to be no agreement on the reasons for change. The opposition have called for multi-party politics first, because of their individual rights and freedom and secondly, because of the problems and contradictions within the movement. They argue that the movement abandoned its principles and as such seized to be what it claims to be. On its part, the movement has advanced the reasons that it is high time those who do not wish to belong to the movement are allowed to leave the movement. The other reason for change advanced by the movement is that the donors with whom Uganda needs to work with in matters of trade and investment have demanded a change.

The difference in the reasons for change has greatly affected the transition process because first it gives the impression that the Movement will remain even after those who do not believe in it have left. This understanding does not help prepare the population for change to multi-party politics.

The opposition still doubts President Museveni's commitment to change since his campaign for change started late and he has not, until just a few weeks, restrained his Presidential Adviser, Maj. Kakooza Mutale, who campaigns for retention of the Movement on the grounds that political parties are the cause of Uganda's problems. This sends conflicting signals to the population as to the rational for change

Another observation is that the transition process to multi-party politics is being done within the general constitution amendment process. This mixes up the issues. The change in political system did not require a constitution amendment because both the Movement and the multi-party system of governance are recognized in the constitution. This change would be effected by procedures laid down clearly in the constitution, either by resolution of parliament supported by two thirds of all district councils or through a referendum.

The only amendments of the Constitution, in line with the transition, would simply operationalise the change to a multi-party system. An example of such an amendment is the proposed constitutional amendment to recognize a leader of the opposition in parliament

Managing the transition within the general Constitutional amendment process has led to having more contentious issues, like the removal of term limits, over shadowing the transition to multi-party politics. As a result, no attention is being adequately paid to the issue of making political parties deliver democracy in Uganda. It is assumed that political parties would deliver democracy, and that the people will understand the change.

On top of shifting attention to contentious issues of the Constitutional Amendment Bill, handling the transition process within the general constitutional amendment, has delayed the transition road map. The transition road map was first presented in July 2004 but it was not adhered to. The delay in presenting the Constitutional Amendment Bill to parliament delayed the political transition

A critical observation of the new political road would reveal that it is prepared not in accordance with the sufficient time required for the various activities of the transition, like say passing laws, amending election laws, and conducting civic education to prepare the people, but with the focus on the general election next year. So many activities are to be done within a very short period. This may also affect the quality of next year's multi-party election.

When do we expect change to take effect? The constitution is silent about when change takes effect. This means there is no timetable to prepare for change in political system. Change appears to take effect when results of the referendum are declared or when the resolutions are passed by parliament. This position assumes that all the legal requirements are in place, which is not the case.

It is proposed in the Constitution (Amendment) Bill, 2005 that when change is made in the political system of governance, the change takes effect at the end of the term of the parliament during which change is made.[5] Ideally this would provide for time to prepare for multi-party

5 Amendment 31 of the constitution (Amendment) Bill, 2005

politics. Presently political parties operate full scale and restricting them may cause chaos. Therefore the country is already multi-party without the laws.

The present law, The Political Parties and Organizations Act 2003, under which political parties and organizations are operating, was made to regulate the activities of political parties and organizations when the Movement system of governance is in place[6].

Looking at the transition process, one of the most frequently asked question is; what will be the fate of registered political parties in the event that the movement system is retained in the fourth coming referendum? This dilemma can be answered from the position of the law. The law under which the political parties and organizations are registering and operating, the Political Parties and Organizations Act, 2003, was made to regulate the activities of political parties while the movement system is in place and not to regulate politics under a multi-party system.

The law that would regulate the conduct of political parties under a multi-party system is not in place. Though the present law on political parties overlaps, creating a multi-party situation, should the movement be retained, unless otherwise, political parties will have to be restricted not to interfere with the movement system in accordance with article 73 of the constitution? The political parties and organizations Act, 2003 does not reflect the situation on the ground and the political parties do not adhere many of its provisions. It would only be proper if the relevant laws were made before the introduction of multi-party politics.

With the enactment of the Political Parties and Organizations Act 2003, both new political parties and the old political parties have registered and many are still expected. Mergers are also expected as the parties go along the way. The question is whether the transition process as seen will lead to the emergence of a viable and effective opposition to compete for political power under the new political framework. This can be answered by a look at the mushrooming political parties.

Theoretically, a viable and effective opposition can be created or formed when: political parties can demonstrate some internal stability and coherence in its organization, political parties have adequate resources, both human, material and financial, the party has a coherent set of goals and objectives which serve as rallying points, an organizational structure that would draw a large membership and of course the party should have some general acceptance, approval and respect from the population.

6 Article 73 of constitution provides that subject to the provisions, of this constitution, but not withstanding article 29 and article 43 of the constitution, during the period when any of the political systems provided in this constitution has been adopted, organizations subscribing to other political systems may exist subject to such regulations as parliament shall by law prescribe.

It may be too early to judge the present political parties in regard to all these ideal factors for a viable opposition but some general observations can be made. Most of the political parties have inadequate resources both human and financial, they have no organizational structures and the old political parties have demonstrated high degree of internal instability and factions. These greatly hinder the efforts to create a viable and effective opposition.

It would be expected that the political parties use the transition period too, among other things, to establish structures that would enable them compete for power in a competitive multi-party election. Only FDC has embarked on a countrywide mobilization and establishment of structures, but still only at the district level. The NRM-O has also only established interim regional committees, which have also demonstrated internal incoherence. The old political parties, DP and UPC, are also only planning to release a program for countrywide revival of their branches.

The role of President Museveni as founder member and chairman of the movement needs to be examined to understand the pace and process of the transition to multi-party politics. When calls were being made, in 2001, to open up and free political parties, the President ordered all Movement leaders not to discuss the issue of political parties in public and the media but use the "right forum" of the Movement. This order to silence the debate on transition to multi-party politics affected the pace of transition. It did not take long for President Museveni to give way, but with different reasons. The president then embarked on convincing movement leaders on the need to change to multi-party politics.

Presently he is also campaigning nationwide for the introduction of multi-party politics in the forth coming referendum. Another important issue is that government and President Museveni, as leader of the country, started campaigning for change rather late. Much as the process has been delayed, the President was expected to sensitize the population about the change of political system in his nationwide tours. This did not take place. Therefore, his role in the whole process can be seen as both a facilitator and an obstacle.

In conclusion, whether the political transition to multi-party politics has started or is on course, is a matter of value judgment and empirical validation. It has been observed that the process as a whole has been delayed. The population has not been prepared for change. The issue of term limits and successor of President Museveni took center stage and has been confused with debate on the transition to multi-party politics.

Handling the political transition process with the general constitution amendment process has also delayed the transition. As observed above the present law, the Political Parties and Organizational Act, 2003 was made to regulate political parties under a movement system. The constitution

is only being amended to provide for a transition period yet the country is already having multi-party political activities.

The political road map is being prepared in less than six months to the next elections. This has created a rush to multi-party politics as the elections close in and no adequate attention has been paid to the transition process. It can therefore be observed, that despite the fact that calls for change were made early; there has hardly been any reasonable preparation by all political forces and stakeholders for the new political system.

Notes

4

Useful Tools

Internet and e-Mail

The Internet

This is a computer network that joins other networks together e.g. those of academic and government institutions, schools, libraries and corporations, making them seem to be just one network to the user, who sits in front of her / his computer at home, in the office or at an "internet cafe". The Internet provides access to informationstored in different computers all over the world and it also provides the opportunity to engage in discussions and to share ideas and research with people connected to the network.
To access the Internet you need a computer with the adequate software, a telephone-line and a modem (modem = contraction of modulator / demodulator) to link your computer with the telephone. You also need to subscribe to an "internet provider".

World Wide Web (www)

Through the Internet, you can access the www. This is the name given to the apparently seamless "web" of many geographically separate sources of information. The mass of data available is overwhelming. There is no guarantee that it is acurate, up-to-date or even meant to be helpful. Anyone with access to the internet can publish her / his own material and make it accessible on the web. Internet users must therefore approach websites witha very critical mind.
A web is distinguished by the prefix http:// in its address, which you should write on the top of the page of your "browser" software (e.g. Netscape, Internet Explorer, ...). Each website has a unique address, known as URL. The FES Tanzania address is **http://tanzania.fes-international.de**

Take care when writing the web addresses for they are sensitive to punctuation and spaces (there are no spaces in electronic addresses), and are normally written in lower case.

Search engines and websites

When you are looking for information you might already know the website to look in and its address. If you do not know where to look, then you will have to use a search engine. A search engine helps you find information. To access the search engine you write http:// and the name of the search engine, e.g. www.google.com OR www.altavista.com OR www.yahoo.com. These addresses open the websites of Google, Altavista and Yahoo. When you access a search engine, you will have to type some key words in the space provided. The search will be based on those words you chose as the most important ones. Here is the secret: what sort of key words should you use, and how to combine them?

1. Be specific!

The more specific your search is, the more likely you will find what you want. For exapmle if you want to know how many international treaties Tanzania has signed, you should write "Tanzania international treaties signatories" or you should even write "how many treaties Tanzania has signed?" You will be surprised at how often this works!

2. Use the symbol + to add

If you want to be sure that the pages you will find contain not only one or another word you typed, but all of them, you should use the symbol +. For instance, you want to find pages where there are references to President Mkapa togther with references to Mwalimu Nyerere. You should then type: +Mkapa+Nyerere. You can narrow down your search by adding more specific words.

3. Use the symbol - to substract

If you want all the pages related to those key words but not the ones referring to a specific subject, you can use the symbol -. Using the above example, you want to reference to President Mkapa and Nyerere, but do not want reference to Ujamaa, you can type: +Mkapa+Nyerere-Ujamaa.

4. Use quotation marks to keep expressions together

If you want to find references to a special combination of words, you will have to write those words in quotation marks. For example, if you type +President+Mkapa, you will git sites that make reference to those words thgether or separated. But if you write "President Mkapa", you will get only the reference where both of the words appear in that same order.

5. Combining all of it

Try to use the different signs to be specific. For example: +"President Mkapa"+"Mwalimu Nyerere"+development-"international cooperation". Here are the names of a few search engines:

- Google (www.google.com)
- Altavista (www.altavista.com)
- Yahoo
- Lycos
- AskJeeves
- HotBot
- InfoSeek
- MSN

You can also enter a search engine and search for specific search engines, for example, +"search engines"+Africa.
Some of the specific search engines for Africa are:

- Mosaique.com
- ClickAfrica.com
- Orientation Tanzania
- Woyaa.com
- Ananzi.com
- Zebra.co.za
- Siftthru.com
- Searchenginewatch.com
- Fishboo.com

E-Mail

This refers to electronic mail as opposed to airmail or surface mail (today popularly known as "snail mail"). You can send messages to anyone with an Internet account, and it can include not only text, but also pictures and spreadsheets. Incoming messages are stored in your mail-box on your internet provider until you access it. E-Mail is delivered very fast, in a matter of seconds or a few hours. This depends amongst other things on the amount of data being transferred and the quality of telephone lines and that of your modem. The cost of sending e-mail depends on the amount of data and therefore the length of time it takes to send it from your computer to the local server. It is relatively cheap: sending e-mail to the other side of the globe is not more expensive than sending one to a computer next door.
To send and receive e-mails you will need a dedicated program, such as Outlook Express, Microsoft Outlook, Eudora, Pegasus and others. You will have your own electronic address and will send your message to another address. If you have a connection to an internet provider you will receive an address which is composed of two parts: your-login-name + the symbol @ + the mane of the internet provider. FES Tanzania´s electronic address is **info@fes.or.tz**

Chatting and conferencing

The Internet provides the possibility of communicating directly with others "on-line". In other words the people chatting or holding conference are at their computer and are on the internet at the same time.

How to Buy Desktops for Your Business

By: Vipul Shah

Shopping for computers for business use, is a far different experience from shopping for a PC for your home. When you're buying a home system, you try to get the fastest, biggest, and best of everything, adding on features, peripherals, and software until you run out of cash and the bank will not lend you anymore. But when you're buying PCs for business, the question quickly becomes, how much can you live without? In other words, you want a desktop that has everything you need and nothing that you don't at a competitive price.

The basics

Most of the buying decision is a game of specifications, with processor, memory, and hard disk size being the most prominent. Don't fall into the trap of paying for too many megahertz. The latest Pentium 4 processors, which boast speeds in excess of 3GHz, are overkill for the vast majority of business applications. In fact, many business users will get by just fine with a slower Celeron chip, even though these (along with AMD processors) tend to be less popular in business. You're better off investing in extra memory and upgrading to 256MB or even 512MB of RAM.

Home PCs need expansive hard drives because they rapidly become cluttered with MP3s, digital photos, and home videos. But at work, a standard 40GB drive offers plenty of space for most users. Don't believe us? Look at it this way: you could prepare a different 10MB PowerPoint file every day (we know some managers who have tried), and you'd still have plenty of room after five years.

If you're working with video or large graphics files, however, you'll need a little more power in your system. In addition to lots of memory (512MB is a minimum for graphics applications), you'll want a larger hard drive, FireWire and USB 2.0 connectors, and a separate graphics card with its own memory as opposed to one integrated on the motherboard.

Necessary extras

Regardless of the applications you're running, there are a few features you'll want in any business PC. An integrated Ethernet adapter for networks is a must-have, and you'll be hard-pressed to find a desktop nowadays without one.

We also recommend opting for a TFT LCD monitor rather than a CRT monitor. These flat panel monitors are increasingly popular because they use only a small amount of desk space, display sharp images, and are easy on the eyes. The price on TFT monitors is relatively high because of limited production and rapidly increasing demand. If your budget doesn't allow it, opt for a good 17 - inch CRT display instead.

If your business needs upwards of 20 desktops, you should consider a managed PC such as the HP Compaq Evo, the Dell OptiPlex, or the IBM

NetVista. These desktops include several features designed to make them easier and less expensive to deploy and manage. They use similar hardware and software, which lasts for long periods of time, minimizing the need to upgrade. The components are designed so that you can swap them out quickly and easily. And they can be monitored and managed remotely using included software. Many managed PCs also come in small form-factor designs-perfect when space is tight.

Buying advice

As important as what you buy is how you buy it. The PC market changes at a blistering pace, so don't worry too much about model numbers. Instead, buy from a vendor you trust. The best thing you can do when purchasing multiple PCs is buy them all at once and get them from the same vendor. (If you can get servers, printers, and displays from the same source, all the better.) Even better, purchase identical desktop models. Not only will you get a discount, you'll have interchangeable components when something falls apart down the road.

Basic system maintenance

By Carl Vancil

One of the most common questions I have been asked has been, "Why is my computer so slow?" This has been followed closely by, "What can I do to speed up my computer?"

The answer can be as varied as the number of computers with the problem. The solutions can range from some simple maintenance to hardware repair/upgrades or even a combination. Here are some common things you can do to improve system performance.

1. Run a thorough scan disk

Errors in the files on your harddrive can reduce performance as can a hard drive that is developing physical errors. Scan disk will repair many of the file errors on your hard drive. Running the thorough scan disk will also check the hard drive for physical errors. Remember, depending on the size of your hard drive this can take a lot of time and you cannot do anything else at the same time. The best time to run scan disk is when you do not need to use the computer.

2. Delete temporary files from your hard drive

Temporary files are usually the files left over after installing a program and can be safely deleted.

3. Clean your internet browser cache

Cache files are those left over from your browsing experience. They mostly consist of images that your browser had to download in order to display on a web page you are viewing.

4. Defrag the files on your hard drive

Defrag arranges the files on your hard drive so that they can be accessed more efficiently. This has two advantages. One, your system operates more efficiently. Two, your hard drive will last longer because it will not have to work as hard to access files.

5. Perform a virus scan

Many viruses use so much of your system's resources that they will greatly degrade performance. Some will even crash your system completely. Make sure your virus definitions are up to date and run a complete virus scan of your system. This should be done weekly.

6. Check your system for spyware / adware

Many websites install spyware/ adware on your system without your knowledge. These can be as simple as cookies that track where you surf to actual programs that give others access to your computer. There are many utility programs that you can download to scan for these files.

7. Clean the dust out of your computer

It seems too simple but just having a dirty computer can slow it down. If there is an excessive buildup of dust inside your computer, it will cause a heat buildup. This heat buildup will degrade performance as well accelerate wear and tear on the parts inside your computer which can lead to the premature failure of a critical part. Remember to unplug your computer before opening the case. Also, remember to NOT bump any of the internal parts with the vacuum to prevent damage.

These steps are something that we can all try if our system is running slow. If these do not get the performance of your system back to where you think it should be then a few more things can be tried. Many utility programs will perform deep checks on your system's registry as well as look for missing shortcuts and even missing Windows files.

Another possibility is that there are too many programs starting when you turn on your computer. In Windows 98SE or XP (both home and pro) this is easy to check using the msconfig utility. From the 'run' command type 'msconfig' and hit the enter key. This will bring up the Windows Configuration Utility where you can check what is starting with Windows and it gives you the option of turning off the auto startup of many programs. In other versions of Windows (95, NT, 2000) it would be best to have someone with a good working knowledge of the Windows Registry service your computer.

If all this fails then you may need to reformat your hard drive or upgrade hardware. Remember too that you always have the option of taking your system in to a qualified service technician. Sometimes spending a little extra money will save you hours and hours of headaches or worse yet, the loss of data.

HOLDING A WORKSHOP, SEMINAR OR CONFERENCE

Planning and Budgeting

1. Develop the idea
Identify:
• The main objectives
• The target group
• The intended outcome
Write the outline.

2. Develop the program
Decide:
• Which topics
• The time frame
• The organisational style (conference, lectures, working groups)
• How much time is needed for the various elements, not forgetting recreation
• Who will act as resource persons
• Whether or not to seek media coverage of the event
Try to involve participants in developing the program.

3. Calculate the budget
• Preparatory meetings
• Hall charges
• Catering
• Refreshments during sessions
• Accommodation
• Travel
• Stationery
• Secretariat/organising team
• Reception (if necessary)

4. Income and expenditure
Record all income - donations, participants' fees etc.
Record all expenditure, remembering to keep receipts for each item

Organising

1. A checklist
• Book the venue & accommodation
• Hold preparatory meetings
• Prepare PR (public relations) activities if relevant
• Make agreements with resource persons
• Prepare the invitations
-State the objectives clearly
-Give information about the program, venue, dates, resource persons and participants
-If participants have to do homework beforehand, make this clear
-Explain financial and other conditions clearly
• Make the necessary travel arrangements
• Hold a joint session with all resource persons
• Prepare the necessary materials, forms, documents
-Stationery
-Registration forms
-Claims forms for allowances
-Printed program
-Papers and teaching materials
-Workshop documentation

2.Terms of reference for resource persons
• Discuss subject, objectives and duration of their input
• Explain how these fit in to the overall objectives and program for the workshop
• Discuss the desired method of presentation
• Give information about the venue and the facilities / equipment provided for the workshop
• Request a written paper and or hand-outs if they are considered

necessary
• State the terms of payment for the persons services
Try to hold preparatory meetings with resource persons.

Implementing

1. Arrival
Organisers should be in place well before the participants
• Check the venue and the technical facilities needed
• Give resource persons a final briefing
• Prepare for the registration of participants
• Display the program and other documents, if relevant

2. Registration

3.Welcome
Explain:
• Subject of the meeting
• Who are the organisers and sponsors
• Objectives
• Logic and timing of program
• Methodological approach
• Expected outcome

4. Holding the sessions
• Handle transport claims
etc. during tea breaks only

5. Departure
Collect all that is necessary before people leave
• Signed registration forms/list of participants
• Signed allowance claims
• Original detailed invoices and receipts for venue, food, drinks, accommodation, travel, stationery etc.



6. After the event
As soon as possible take care of
• Accounting
• Report writing
• Any other follow-ups needed

Source:Bridging the Gap: A Guide to Monitoring and Evaluating Development Projectsby Bernard Broughton & Jonathan Hampshire

8 TIPS ON HOW TO SUCCESSFULLY CHAIR A CONFERENCE

1

It is the conference chairperson's responsibility to see that the atmosphere during the discussion is always friendly, communicative and fair.

2

The conference chairperson introduces the topic in an objective and informative way. He/she formulates the discussion goals for each item on the agenda. During a discussion, he/she must not initially express his/her own opinion or assessment as this would bias the discussion.

3

The chairperson speaks as little as possible in order to give maximum time to the conference participants. Conference chairmanship principally entails raising questions and giving the word to different speakers.

4

Questions from the chairperson should always be designed to stimulate dialogue and consequently should never be answered by the chairperson himself/herself.

5

Preference should be given to open questions (W-questions: who, why, where, when, etc.) and information questions. Closed questions (which can only be answered with a "yes" or "no") can be fatal to a discussion.

6

Should a discussion peter out it is up to the chairperson to get it moving again by means of (open) questions, thought-provoking remarks and a summary of the proceedings so far.

7

The chairperson should make interim summaries to emphasize the thread of the discussion. At the close, the chairperson gives a general summary and his/her evaluation as to which of the goals formulated at the outset have or have not been achieved.

8

At the end of the conference, it is also up to the chairperson to formulate and delegate tasks to individual participants. Nobody ought to leave the conference without precisely knowing:
a. what has been achieved in today's discussion,
b. what is my specific assignment until the next conference/meeting,
c. where and when is the next conference/meeting?

Source: Schulte, Carla (1997) Talking Politics (and being understood), Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

HOLDING EFFECTIVE INTERNAL MEETINGS AND PLANNING SESSIONS

Starting the meeting

1.Who is chairing the meeting? (It is best to have agreed on this in advance.)

2. Who is going to write the minutes?

3. If the agenda has not been prepared in advance, then the chairman, (you), should collect the issues that need to be discussed from the participants. They should be written up on a board or a flipchart, so that everyone can see them. Remember the issues that might have cropped up at the previous meeting.

4. In collaboration with the participants decide how much time it will take to discuss each issue. Confirm at what time the meeting has to close. Ask if anyone has to leave early.

5. Then ask participants which issues they wish to concentrate on at the meeting and which ones can be postponed (if necessary). After that ask which issue should be dealt with first, second, third and so on. This should not take more than five minutes!

During the meeting

1. Follow the agreed agenda, discussing the issues in turn. The chairperson or moderator must see to it that the agreed time frame is adhered to. If this proves difficult, then the group must be asked to decide whether to continue the discussion of the issue in question and therefore extend the meeting, or whether to stop the discussion and continue it at an agreed time.

2. Never move on to the next issue before making a decision on the one being discussed.

Closing the meeting

1.Quickly repeat the decisions that have been made.

2. Decide when and how the minutes will be distributed.

3. Decide who will chair the next meeting.

4. Close the meeting at the agreed time.

Source: Bridging the Gap: A Guide to Monitoring and Evaluating Development Projects by Bernard Broughton & Jonathan Hampshire

PROJECT OUTLINES



✓ **Practical advice**

- **use white, clean sheets of A4 - paper**
- **present your project in a typewritten version if possible**
- **write on one side of the paper**
- **make sure you have a clear structure**
- **attach a covering letter**

QUALITIES OF A MODERATOR

The Moderator

Moderation technique can best be used in groups of up to 15 participants. How to be a good moderator is not something to be learned quickly and easily, but is a matter of guided experiences, self reflection and continuous learning. A moderator's tasks are to:

• help the group to know and appreciate their own knowledge and strengths

• help the discussion process to be coherent and resultoriented

• be expert at guidance as far as the "how" of the discussion process is concerned, and not the "what"

• visualise and thus document the steps of the discussion process and its immediate results

• ask the right questions and break deadlocks

Usually two people can fulfil these tasks easier than one...

The ideal Moderator is a person who is...

• regarded as neutral by all participants

• therefore an outsider to the discussion group and

• able to use visualisation techniques, such as pinboards, flipcharts and blackboards

How to prepare a Moderation

• The issue, the main objective, and the quality of the intended results have to be very clear

• Be aware of the participants' composition, background, knowledge, interests and potential conflicts

• Determine the duration of the process, the facilities available and their limitations

• Identify clear-cut objectives and goals for every session, what methods to use and the amount of time needed

• Make sure that sufficient visualisation materials are available.

THE MODERATION METHOD

The typical steps in moderating a discussion

1. OPENING

- Warm-up with participants (explain your role, make them know each other).
- Discuss and agree on time-frame and organisational matters.
- Collect the expectations of participants.
- Discuss and agree on expectations that shall/can be objectives for the workshop.
- Agree on methodology.
- How will minutes be taken?

2. COLLECT ISSUES/SUBJECTS

- Phrase the guiding question carefully and in a very focused manner and visualise it!
- Collect all answers/ideas of participants, without discussing them first!
- Visualise answers/ideas as they come.
- Group them into clusters and give a name/title to each cluster.

3. SELECT ISSUES/SUBJECTS

- Phrase a guiding question carefully and write it down visibly.
- Allow participants to prioritise clusters according to their individual preferences.
- The agenda will then be determined by the number of "votes" per cluster, going through as many clusters as time or workshop-concept allows.
- In doing this, every participant gets the same number of "votes" which he can use on the clusters as he wishes. (One way of doing this is to hand out little markers of some sort to every participant so that they can all jot down their preferences at the same time.) If possible avoid "voting" by raised hands.

4. WORK ON THE ISSUE AND FIND A WAY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM

- Find a method of how to discuss or "solve" the prioritised subject/s.
- The method has to depend on the kind of issue at hand and the intended results.

5. PLAN ACTION/DETERMINE THE FOLLOW-UPS

- Visualise the activities regarded necessary by the group.
- Write down who will be in charge and by when different tasks need to be done.

6. CLOSING

- Find out, whether participants' expectations have been fulfilled,
- Whether they are satisfied with the process and the result.

Always come up with a result!
Always pin down which task is assigned to whom!
Always ascertain if you have addressed the needs and expectations of the participants!

THE STRUCTURE OF YOUR SPEECH

The aim of a discursive is to convince the listeners of the correctness of the speaker's opinion on the subject in question. Such speeches should not last longer than 30 minutes.

How do you most effectively structure such a speech?

AUDIENCE RELATED INTRODUCTION (max. 1 minute)

• Create the right atmosphere for the speech by referring to the audience, the venue, the occasion, etc.

SUBJECT-RELATED OPENING REMARKS (max. 3 minutes)

• Begin with a provocative proposition, a rhetorical question, a current event, etc.

PREVIEW THE MAIN POINTS OF YOUR SPEECH (max. 1 minute)

MAIN BODY (max. 20 minutes)

• Discuss the current situation/the facts/the problem.
• Discuss a variety of possible solutions.
• Discuss the pros and cons of these solutions.
• Present your own evaluation.
• Prove the accuracy of your assessment.

SUBJECT-RELATED CONCLUSION (max. 4 minutes)

• Summarise the main argument in a maximum of three points.

AUDIENCE RELATED CONCLUSION (max. 1 minute)

• Close your speech by, for instance, thanking the audience for their attention.

Source: H. Hess: Party Work in Social Democratic Parties

ARGUMENTATION TECHNIQUES

Good argumentation techniques are always beneficial. Your chances to win others over are higher if you can:

• present effective arguments and
• refute your opponent's arguments.

PRACTICAL TIPS

• Try to understand the position of your counterpart first, then react to it.
• If your counterpart's argumentation is weak, repeat your own good arguments.
• If you are interrupted, insist on the right to finish what you were saying.

• Anticipate your counterpart's arguments by including them in your own argumentation.
• Use the persuasive power of examples. Ask your counterpart to provide concrete examples of how to apply his theories.
• Expose generalisation and inaccuracies.
• Stick to the facts of the issue.
• If somebody evades the issue, return to the subject.

Source: C. Schulte, 1997,Talking Politics (and being understood): Kampala, Fountain Publishers

Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere during an interview with the German magazine "Der Überblick" in Hamburg in April 1999.

HOW TO USE BLACKBOARDS AND FLIPCHARTS

Blackboard

Useful in gatherings of up to 25 people.
+ It is easy to write information & easy to correct it.
- Information is wiped off, it disappears and it is hard for participants to retrieve.

TIP If the chalk squeaks - this always makes participants uncomfortable - break the chalk and continue writing using the broken end.

Flipchart

Useful in gatherings of up to 35 people.
+ Sheets can be prepared in advance. Information can be displayed for a long period by removing sheets from the flipchart and posting them on the wall.
TIP Useful for a wide range of information e.g. displaying the day's agenda, important overviews, central statements, flowcharts, participants' contributions.



General rules

• Do not write down too much: concentrate on key issues only.
• Give the audience time to copy the contents of the presentation OR give it to them as a hand out afterwards. If you intend to distribute a handout, tell the participants so. Otherwise it is likely that they will spend time making unnecessary notes.
• Do not talk with your back turned to participants (e.g. while writing on the blackboard or flipchart).
• Do not stand in front of your presentation - the participants will get irritated at not being able to read what is written.

THE CHECK LIST FOR GOOD IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIVITIES

1. Important: plan step by step.What should be done first?

2. Consider all improbabilities, and plan alternatives.

3. Fix deadlines for you and for your partner.

4. Follow-up the results before the deadline.

5. Keep an eye on the indicators to be achieved.

6. Hire assistants, delegate, mobilize people.

7. For seminars & workshops, check everything in advance on loco.

8. Take care of the documentation (dates of receipts, use of materials, tasks of people involved ...)

9. Support partners in the learning process. Sell the idea “on-the-job learning”.

10. Take care of the financial settlement and reporting as soon as possible.

11. Evaluate with the partners the achievement of objectives and indicators. Write recommendations. File documents. Release important papers. Inform other related institutions.

12. Write a reminder for following-up the results sometime later. Document it.

13. Keep your colleagues informed and updated.

Source:Workshop Report Management Skills for Decision-Makers - August 1999

TWELVE STEPS TOWARDS CONFLICT RESOLUTION

By Dr M. O. Maundi, Centre for Foreign Relations

1. Understanding the conflict
• its type
• its sources
• its intensity
• its impact

2. Identifying the parties to the conflict
• whether bilateral or multilateral conflict

3. Identifying the issues involved

4. Determining the method of resolution
• Conflict prevention: Preventive diplomacy
• Conflict resolution: Negotiation
- Direct negotiation between the conflicting parties.
- Assisted negotiation: Use of a third party.
Mediation/Facilitation
Conciliation
Good offices
Arbitration

5. Determining the mechanism of resolution
• The actors/agents
- States
- NGOs
- Individuals: Eminent personalities
- Inter-governmental organizations

6. Determining the venue and dates for negotiation

7. Negotiating rules of procedure

8. Setting the agenda

9. Launching the substantive negotiations

10. Reaching a compromise agreement

11. Implementing the negotiated settlement

12. Guaranteeing and monitoring the implementation of the agreement

TIME MANAGEMENT - SELF MANAGEMENT

Most people bristle at the idea of becoming a slave to time: "The Swiss have clocks, but we have time", said a wise old man in Bhutan. A certain degree of time and self- management is nonetheless necessary if you wish to be effective and to achieve your goals.

Many people rely on their memory as their management tool, but most find that at some point their memory lets them down. "Sorry, I forgot" is not an uncommon statement. This is not necessarily a catastrophe, but in some instances forgetting can have unfortunate consequences. You might lose an important contract, you might lose your job, you might even lose your husband/wife to-be!

RULE 1: Write things down - use a diary and a calendar, (e.g. the FES diary/calendar)

- Keep a "things to do" list.
- Enter all your appointments and deadlines, putting in a reminder maybe a week before the deadline falls.
- Review your appointments and deadlines regularly, informing those implicated in good time if you want to change them.
- Plan your week: Make the "things to do" list, get an overview over your appointments and deadlines.
- Plan your day.
- At the end of each day and at the end of each week make a review. Did you do all that you had planned to do? Did you meet your deadlines? Did you attend the scheduled meetings? Were you late? Why?

RULE 2: Be realistic about what you can manage to do

- Do not get overloaded: you have to be realistic about what you can overcome in the given amount of time.
- Prioritise: decide what are the most important issues.
- Say no, if the task is beyond what you are capable of doing.
- Remember to make time for your private life - family, friends, hobbies and your own relaxation. This is where you renew your energy.

WHAT IS PUBLIC RELATIONS?

Public Relations (PR) is about relations between an organization - be it a business enterprise, a political party or an NGO - and the public. Such relations exist, whether we want them to or not. It is therefore wise to consider what image you wish the public to have of your organization and to work consciously on the promotion of that image.

An organization manifests itself to the public in many ways. It can be through its propagated political aims, the behaviour of its representatives and members, its public statements and activities, the atmosphere

at its public meetings and press conferences, its transparency and its accountability.

The traditional "tools" of a public relations officer are:
• press conferences • publications • leaflets • posters • press releases • public events

These tools must be used carefully. A public meeting held without being well prepared or a badly designed and written publication may do more harm than good!

PREPARING AND RUNNING A PRESS CONFERENCE

A press conference is an event to which members of the press are invited for a briefing by the host organisation or personality. The briefing is followed by an opportunity for the journalists to ask questions.
Often press conferences are held when the subject matter is intricate and further questions from journalists are expected and desired.
If the information/news to be given at the press conference is not sufficiently interesting, relevant or "meaty" for the invited media's readers/viewers, then it is likely that the journalists will not show up.

Preparation

• Are the objectives clear and is the topic well defined?
• Which media are to be invited? Remember,TV & radio may have special needs.
• Is the time/date well chosen and convenient for journalists? Does it allow them to meet their deadlines? Does it coincide with other important events?
• Who will chair the conference?
• Who will act as the organisation's spokesperson/s?
• Is the opening statement well prepared?
• Are the major arguments well supported in the written handouts?
• Check the venue: make sure that there are enough chairs, tables and lights.
• Have handouts ready, e.g. press release.You might prepare a press folder that includes the most important statements, a report and background material.

Invitation

• The headline must clearly indicate the host organisation, the name of the person responsible and how to contact him/her.
• State the subject matter clearly. (Who did/does what, when, where, why and how.)
• Provide information about the speakers.
• Provide details about the venue, time and date.
• Send out/deliver the invitation at

least a week in advance.
• Send out a reminder one or two days before the event.

Running it

• Ask journalists to note their names and which media institution they represent on a prepared list. This is useful information for making follow-ups.
• Make the written handouts available for journalists when they arrive.
• The chairperson opens the conference and introduces the speakers and subject.
• The key presenter makes his/her statement clearly and concisely, and relates them to the handouts.
• The chairperson moderates the question and answer session.
• Answers must be brief, clear and concise. It is good to give practical examples to illustrate the message you want to give.
• Speakers must remain relaxed, friendly and forthcoming even when provoked.

A PRESS RELEASE

This is one of the most useful mediums through which an organization can make itself and its views known to the public. The contents might be:
• Statements on pertaining issues.
• Reports on activities or events you have organized.
• Announcements of forthcoming events.
• Reactions to statements made by others.

PROS AND CONS

Issuing a press release is a relatively cheap way of creating awareness about one's stand. However, badly written press releases and those dealing with unimportant issues will annoy the recipients and may create negative feelings towards your organization.

HOW TO WRITE IT

• The headline must state clearly the name of the organization issuing the release and the subject matter.
• State the most important themes first.
• Make clear why you are issuing the press release at this particular point in time.
• The journalist must be able to pick out relevant information easily and quickly.
• Use a typewriter or word processor, double-space and use only one side of the page.
• Give information about how to contact the person responsible: name, address, telephone, e-mail address.

Notes

Editorial

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NB: Articles which carry an author's name do not necessarily reflect the view of FES. All facts and figures in this Calendar are correct to the best of our knowledge. However, FES bears no responsibility for oversights, mistakes or omissions.

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung[1], or FES, was founded in 1925 as a political legacy of Germany´s first democratically elected President, Friedrich Ebert, who died in that year. Ebert, a Social Democrat of humble origins, had risen to hold the highest office in his country dispite considerable opposition from his political adversaries. He assumed the burden of the presidency in a country which was crisis ridden following its defeat in World War I. His own personal experience led him to propose the establishment of a foundation with a threefold aim:

- to further a democratic, pluralistic political culture by means of political education for all classes of society.
- to facilitate access to higher education for gifted young people by providing scholarships.
- to contribute to international understanding and co-operation in order to avert a fresh outbreak of war and violent conflicts wherever possible.

Today, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is a political non-profit making, public-interest institution committed to the principles and basic values of social democracy in its educational and policy-oriented work.

Development Co-operation

In the Foundation´s offices in Africa, Asia, Laitn America and Oceania approximately 80 German staff and 600 local nationals are involved in projects in the fields of economic and social development, socio-political education and information, the media and communication and in providing advisory services.

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung sees its activities in the developing countries as a contribution to:

- the improvement of political and social frameworl conditions
- the democratisation of social structure
- enhancement of developing countries´position in the International Trade arrangements
- the empowerment of women and the promotion of gender
- the strenghening of free trade unions
- the improvement of communication and media structures
- regional and international media co-operation
- regional co-operation between states and interest groups
- the resolution of the North-South conflict

This calendar is intended to provide not only an individual tool for purposes of time planning but also a day-to-day handbook for quick reference on issues that may be of interest to the people in Eastern Africa and to those who are politically active.

1 Stiftung is the German word for „foundation"

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North-South Dialogue: Julius Nyerere, former President of the United Republic of Tanzania and Willy Brandt, former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Willy Brandt:
„International co-operation is far too important to be left to governments alone."