



**POLITICAL WILL:
A SHORT INTRODUCTION**
CASE STUDY - BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA

Edited by
Dino Abazović
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FOREWORD

On the eve of the 20th anniversary of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, Bosnia and Herzegovina still faces an ongoing social, political and constitutional crisis. The last decade in particular has seen continuous political stalemate, with little progress in reforms.

Over the past years extensive research and analysis has been undertaken on the causes of the complex political reality in the country. National and international experts, journalists and scholars alike, all point to a common denominator, generally perceived as one of the key reasons for the stalemate: the lack of political will.

Despite the widespread and frequent use of the term “political will”, the under-lying concept remains vague, and an important correlation remains under-researched.

Political will is usually mentioned in reference to the center of power, and to political decision makers as the key actors in good governance. But the system of representative democracy, in its ideal form, is built upon the premise, and the promise, that those actors, i.e. the political elites, represent voters’ interests and implement their collective will.

Why does the Bosnian and Herzegovinian case seem to be so far from this ideal? Why is the relationship of accountability between decision makers and citizens so weak, and why does the political will not serve the good of society or the interests of its citizens?

It is with the aim of developing a solid understanding of what we mean when we speak of political will, both in general and in the particular context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that the idea of this publication was born.

As a political foundation, 'think tank' and platform for political dialogue, The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Bosnia and Herzegovina supports political research that aims at analyzing sociopolitical challenges. For its present publication, the FES supported a team of experts – under the guidance of Dino Abazovic and Asim Mujkic, both professors at the University of Sarajevo – to analyze in depth the concept of political will and its implications.

This publication addresses several questions. What is the essence of the concept of political will? What does the absence of political will mean and what does it tell us about the political structure, order and process itself? How can the concept be used to better describe the political reality in this country and subsequently help to change the political outcome?

The result is the present study, in which each author reflects on the topic from the perspective of their own discipline. Their collective insights on the phenomenon of political will give this book its substance.

In the first chapter, "Introduction to Political Will," Asim Mujkic undertakes an analysis of the existing definitions of the concept from the perspective of political philosophy. He approaches the term and its paradoxes by examining the components of political will. As the phenomenon of political will is usually only referred to in the context of its absence or negation, perhaps this very absence actually constitutes another form of political will? Central to his contribution is the clear distinction Mujkic draws between "a political will" and "the political

will." While the first is individual-based, fractionated, absent or present, the latter is "invisible," "hegemonic" and "doesn't have an alternative."

In chapter two, Jelena Brkic Smigoc explores the term political will from the perspective of the science of psychology. She introduces a number of concepts to illustrate the key variables that influence the political behavior of the individual in the context of a complex social structure. Which factors determine the political participation of citizens and of elites? What are the characteristics of political participation in transitional societies such as that of Bosnia and Herzegovina? Why is there such low political involvement and why is the cognitive schema of lack of belief in the possibility of change so persistent?

In the third chapter, Dino Abazovic analyses the appearance or – more precisely – the absence of political will in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Because of the paradox regarding the concept of political will, that is, that it is mainly highlighted when it is absent, he refers to more essential concepts for the Bosnian and Herzegovinian case, such as ideology, ethnicity and social capital. He places special focus on social capital when explaining the extremely low level of social trust and social inclusion in the country, both of which are key factors that hinder the political participation of citizens. Abazovic states that "extensive networks (...) are an indispensable element in creating a social milieu that requires and entails responsibility – and corresponding climate of active and resulting "political will."

Miroslav Zivanovic explores the close relation between political will and the outcome of public policy. Is political will the sine qua non for successful public policy? To approach this question, Zivanovic carefully analyzes the factors influencing political will, such as the behavior, role and relevance of individual actors and the general characteristics of the society itself. For Bosnia and Herzegovina, Zivanovic finds that "the

aggregated political will represents the totality of will of active and interested sociopolitical actors (...) on the one side, and political instinct of the passivized, resigned and excluded social groups and citizens on the other side.”

A detailed overview and analysis of documents in the scope of a bibliography is the final contribution in this publication, provided by Sasa Madacki and Nina Karac.

The FES would like to thank all the authors profusely for their extremely valuable contributions. We hope that their thoughts, ideas and insights offer readers a better understanding of the elements of political will and the causes of its existence or non-existence. Their joint effort shows how important it is not to be distracted by the complexity of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian case, but to take a look at the concrete developments in the country.

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ASIM MUJKIĆ

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL WILL

LOGICAL CONUNDRUMS

Political will remains one of the most intriguing concepts in the contemporary political theory. Little scholarly writing has dealt with the concept of political will. This in itself would not be problematic if the phenomenon were not as ubiquitous, and if it were not so commonly referred to in the course of everyday discussions about the problems of political community. Nearly any political conflict or standstill is attributed to „the lack of political will“. Let us just recall the key political issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina: „police reform“, „constitutional reform (2006“), implementation of „Sejdic-Finci“ ruling, implementation of „the road map“. All the discussions that cut deep into the flesh of the political community in Bosnia and Herzegovina unfailingly included „lack of political will „on the part of one political party or group or the other. The fascinating thing here is, on the one hand, how superficial such characterisations are: namely, it appears that it suffices to conclude that there is insufficient political will to solve a political problem, and, I would submit, in so doing political actors are subtly absolved of any individual responsibility, since their individual responsibility is dissipated between all those involved in discussions or negotiations; hence, „the

lack of political will“ seems to be likened to a natural disaster or a contagion suddenly striking all the political actors. On the other hand, if the casual acceptance and use of the phrase – „political will“ – in the everyday discourse of media and politics were not obfuscating enough, what adds to the complexity of the problem is the fact that the phrase is usually accompanied by either „absence of“ or „lack of“. Therefore, it is not only that any attempt at making sense of the term is encumbered by the naturalized context in which it is used, the phrase is additionally „defined „by the absence, non-existence, which, in my view, serves to secure mystification: political will as a naturalized political concept which is „understood „only in its absence is propelled into the realm of „divine intervention“. How is it possible to discuss the absence of something which we know so very little - or nothing - about, but which is at the same time one of the most important concepts we rely on to describe (and thereby to understand) our political reality? There is always the danger that the concept will be quick to lend itself for the purpose of qualifying any „failure to implement“ a policy or any „failure to take political action“, etc. Thus, in logical terms, what we have at hand is the „understanding“ of political will by means of its negation: we only discuss political will once it is absent; therefore what we have at hand is something that we consider to be „the lack of“, or, in other words, there exists an „absence“ which essentially *shapes* our political community. It is at this point of absurdity that we may, perhaps unexpectedly, catch the first glimpses of the meaning of this concept. It is concealed in the verb „to shape „which suggests an active principle, albeit the „lack of „or „absence „do imply the opposite – „inaction“, „failure to act“. It appears that this „absence „gives rise to or produces a new quality of social and political relations; the absence of agreement (or failure to find common ground) between political actors regarding a policy creates a new state of the political community, a new form of interactions and interpretations, a new horizon of understanding, a new (dis)balance of political power that may significantly affect the

process of making political decisions, or new a procedural practice. This understanding leads to the conclusion that there is no such a thing as the „lack of political will“, or that the „state“ in the world of politics to which we tend to attach the superficial qualification of „absence of political will“ is effectively nothing else but just another manifestation of political will. With this we arrive at yet another point of apparent logical absurdity: since political will tends to emerge as the subject of discussion largely when it is „not there“, when it is „absent“, when it „does not exist“, this implies that short of conflict which reveals its absence, political will is always there, ever present, albeit never discussed in those exact terms (here and there, particularly during election time, we do refer to „will of voters“, „will of people“ – the expressions that may be understood as dimensions of political will.) The political will which normally does not find its way into our discussions may be likened to the air that we breathe (and, there it is again – the naturalizing discourse) but it is only once we start suffocating that we become aware of it i.e. once we establish that it is „absent“. This serves to confirm Hammergren’s position characterizing political will as „the sine qua non of policy success which is never defined except by its absence“ (Hammergren as quoted by Post et al., 2010: 654). It appears that, in the modern political community, political will largely remains invisible. This is perhaps the reason why political will has not been the subject of much research or studies. Naturally, asserting, like Hammergren does, that something is defined by its absence is an empty statement since the purpose of any definition is to provide explicit explanation of that which is implicit in a given notion. What is implicit in the notion „political will“?

DEFINING POLITICAL WILL

Lori Ann Post, Amber Raile and Eric Raile in their article *Defining Political Will* argue against the approach based on individual volition, preferring the concept of will as a political process which involves complexly aggregated preferences of a large number of political actors, and which is largely context-dependent. Considering that it is impossible, save for exceptional cases, to expect imposition of individual will on to a political community, the authors adopt the „aggregated approach“ and define political will as a „collective effort“ since a political community as such constitutes a collective. Understood this way, political will may (tentatively) be defined as „the extent of committed support among key decision makers for a particular policy solution to a particular problem“. Within that framework, the authors define the following components – subconceptual areas – of the proposed definition of political will: „1. A sufficient set of decision-makers; 2. with a common understanding of a particular problem on the common agenda; 3. is committed to supporting; 4. A commonly perceived, potentially effective policy solution. “ (Ibid, 659). Hence, the presence of political will is detected under the condition that all four areas are activated; in other words, provided that there is a sufficient set of decision makers who share understanding of a problem and who are fully committed to providing support, and provided that there is agreement on effectiveness of the policy; whilst the absence is detected in the event that one or all of the sub conceptual areas are not covered.

The attempt to define political will undertaken by the authors is significant, but it gives rise to several important issues. Firstly, what follows from the definition and its sub concepts is that the „presence“ of political will is all but irrelevant political phenomenon, as it implies that political activity is taking its regular course within the framework of modern representative democracy, in the conditions of meaningful and open public discussion in

which the participants, once faced with the power of rational argument, are expected to arrive at agreement about a problem or a policy solution, with the rationality generated in this fashion ensuring commitment to acting in line with proposed policy solution. Such linear, aggregative and, one may safely say, „Enlightenment“ approach to political will, leaves little room for the „will“ itself, while politics assumes the form of „science“, a reason-based social process which subjugates individual wills, that strive towards a number of different ends, to the most rational conclusion. In BiH, for example, one comes across a common „pseudo-scholarly“ conclusion that the questionable rationality of a given provision of the Dayton Constitution effectively renders such provision unsustainable, and that, as such, it should be rescinded. Evidently, what keeps them in place is something other than a simple test of the rationality. In conjunction to this, we may conclude that such definition of political will implies its obliteration, as the „extent of committed support among key decision makers for a particular policy solution to a particular problem“- which is reached by way of rational agreement - may be likened to an agreement within a community of researchers regarding a method or a proven scientific fact where there is no room for volition as such. And, secondly, who are the decision-makers after all? Political actors? This is where we begin to lose the plot. Who are the political actors? Elected officials? Party leadership? Influential individuals or groups in the civil society? Lobbyists? Tycoons and oligarchs? Without underestimating the importance of the other actors, such as those coming from the civil society, the authors chose those actors that are in the position to adopt or implement a policy – the elected or appointed officials - but does that really fit the bill? Is it not the case that the true political decision makers come from the narrow ranks of political, economic and cultural (religious) elites, while the elected or appointed officials act as the implementors of the decisions that have been taken already? Hence, the decision-making process, even if all four subconceptual areas are covered, is hardly as straightforward and linear as depicted, simply because the subject of political will, as illustrated, is

not that as straightforward either – it is, rather, scattered and diffuse in character. Thirdly, as already suggested, aggregative approach is far too enlightened, or Kantian, i.e. the harmonisation of preferences based on the common understanding of a particular problem on the formal agenda is far too idealist and rational of an approach which relies on the subjugation of individual will to the general - rational – interpretation through open discussion based on arguments. Perhaps this is the point where examination of the concept of political will encounters the key aporia. Therefore, perhaps the problem with political will lays in its permanent recontextualisation within the rationalist framework, where political will is seen as the process of aggregation of individual and group preferences around one policy or the other without attempting to understand the horizon where the preferences or wants may be formed at all. Adopting this view leads to abandoning the contingent level of policies, which either group together or divide political actors, and moving on to the level of politics which, in my view, serves as a far more reliable guide in understanding and identifying the phenomenon of political will. This perspective may bring more clarity to the question why political will tends to conceal itself in the modern political community, or why is it that only in its „absence“ it draws attention to itself. From this point of view, there is no such thing as the „absence“ of political will; on the contrary, what is commonly described as the „lack of political will“ is nothing but just another manifestation or objectification of the will. In this regard, the key objection to the definition of political will is that it refrains from defining the „political“ and „the will“, which is what I intend to offer below.

The will, in psychological terms, includes „psychological processes related directly to deliberated (intentional, conscious) action“ (Filipović, 1984: 352)¹. Notwithstanding the complexity of the phenomenon, “two

1 Filipović, 1984: 352 „Psihičke procese neposrednije vezane uz smišljenu (namjernu, svjesnu) aktivnost“.

main phases may be distinguished: *motivation* (conception, awareness and valuing ideas and affective impulses directed towards a choice and designing the schema of future action, which are therefore understood as agents – “motives” for the realization of the action) and *decision* (an act of volition on the part of an active subject whereby the subject identifies with the dominant motivational schema of action, and mobilizes his/hers psycho-physical energies in order to realize it)² (Filipović, 1984: 352; italicized b A. M.). This understanding reveals inextricable intervowedeness of the sphere of „consciousness and ideas“ and the sphere of that which is of „psycho-physical and active“ nature, which leaves little room for drawing any clear distinctions or, in particular, for establishing any hierarchical structures that imply the relation of subordination and dominance following from rationalist interpretations. This understanding leaves the least room for the traditional metaphysical dualism of subject and object. Applying the power of reason, or deliberation, cannot be understood as a process in which we would be „mere spectators of a scene in which... contending desires struggle for mastery with ourselves as a prize“ (Strawson, 1999: 135). In other words, „we should consider that our desires and preferences are not, in general, something we just note in ourselves as alien occurrences. To a large extent they *are* we“ (Ibid., 135). However, this self-feeling which is manifested in the two aspects – motivation and decision-making – does not imply self-differentiated, wholesome actor, the subject as interpreted from the classic rationalist perspective. On the contrary, „motivated decision makers“ are themselves immersed into the perpetual flux of experience, and it is thorough the continued „volitional acts“ that they become individuated, recognisable, acquiring selfhood and capacity for

2 Filipović, 1984:352 „razlikovati dvije osnovne faze: motivacija (javljanje, osvještavanje i vrednovanje idejnih sadržaja i afektivnih pobuda koje su usmjerene prema izboru i oblikovanju sheme buduće aktivnosti te se doživljavaju kao pokretači – ‚motivi‘ njene realizacije) i odluka (bitno ‚voljni‘ čin kojim se aktivni subjekt identificira s nadmoćno motiviranom shemom aktivnosti i angažira svoje psihofizičke energije za njeno ostvarenje)“

self-objectifying perception. As William James said, „the self is a system of precepts (feelings and sensations) and concepts (memories, ideals, etc) (James, 1988: 237). It is in this act of self-objectification, which is achieved through volitional acts, that a form of self-creation unfolds, entitling us to inquire about the source of the creation, the process of creation which surpasses individual volitional acts which follow from the dialectics of motivation and decision-making to which the proposed psychological definition of will is largely limited. We need to enter the realm of philosophy.

The consequence of will is – recalling what Artur Schopenhauer claimed – the objectification of will, a state of created reality which is accompanied by self-feeling, of self-objectification by means of self-recognition, or integration of the self into the created state. This is how my will secures a sort of visibility – for myself and for the others – in the social network in form of power (according to the teaching of Friedrich Nietzsche). In contradiction to the largely Kantian rationalist interpretation within which the will is expected to subject itself to the orders of the mind, there is a different process at hand here. Rationality and will are interweaved, and it may even be asserted that since it constitutes only one of the elements of the Jamesian experiential flux, rationality serves as the means to objectify the will³. However, this understanding should not cause much disappointment to those of us who share sentiments about rationality, leading us to a hasty reductionist conclusion that anything which is objectified is necessarily

3 To support the claim, Arthur Schopenhauer states: „In all animal beings the will is the primary and substantial thing; the intellect, on the other hand, is something secondary and additional, in fact a mere tool in the service of the will, which is more or less complicated according to the requirements of the service. Just as a species of animals appears equipped with hoofs, claws, hands, wings, horns or teeth, according to the aims of its will, so it is furnished with a more or less developed brain, whose function is the intelligence requisite for its continued existence“. (Schopenhauer II, 1986: 180).

reduced to nothing but irrationality or voluntarism. There is nothing exclusively voluntaristic in will (unless the will belongs to a young child or a sociopath). Just the opposite. Crucially, objectification of the will, does not take place in the nature but in the polis. Hence, the possibilities for the objectification of will in the social and political community are considerably limited and essentially co-shaped by the „contending“ objectifications of will, which is the state described by the theorists of the social contract and called „state of nature“- or the state of unbridled expansion of the self-objectifying will. What this means is that application of reasoning co-determines the possibilities of objectification of the will, as it requires that it adheres to, more or less, widely-accepted and valid arguments, causing it to undergo modifications and to acknowledge certain boundaries; this, consequently, opens up new arenas for action into which meaning is imparted through self-objectification which now draws on a new set of arguments. Hence, in general, the separation of the will and the reason constitutes nothing but metaphysical dualism. The human will void of rationality is mere pathology (state of nature), just as much as rationality without the will is little but an apparition, an abstraction incapable of initiating anything („state of theory“). But, what would then be political will? In order to answer the question, we need to define the „political“.

The political, in broadest terms, constitutes the „centre of gravity“ in a political community. Political activity is essentially the matter of acting in the „common“ interest which constitutes the ultimate horizon, motivation and decision of the political will. In the spirit of Schmitt's teaching,

The political denotes a „field of association and disassociation“. Namely, the field or ambience in which people constitute orders within which they live together among themselves, and set themselves apart from others. It is at the same time the field in which decisions

are made about order and delimitation, as well as other questions of common interests, and in which there is contention for positions from which these decisions can be influenced. (Meier, 2010: 16).

The horizon of political community comprises the questions of the “general” and of the “common” interest which are objectified through the acts of will which may be - provided that it is related to decisions about the order or the other issues of the common interest, and provided that it unfolds in the form of contention for the positions where such decisions are made – regarded as political. Yet, more light should be thrown on the dimension of the „common“ which determines „what it is that may be wanted“, what it is that may serve as the subject of motivation and decision- making of the will. The horizon which defines the sphere of the common is enclosed, according to John Keane (Keane, 2010), by the oldest questions pertaining to the common life, which seem to coincide with emergence of surplus value, namely: ‘who gets what, when and how „It is within this horizon, and based on the answers to these questions that the space for associations and disassociation has opened, i.e. the political has been constituted. In other words, this age-old question, which is as old as civilisation itself, has eluded a definitive answer –each and every epoch in the development of human society made an attempt at answering it, and in so doing, it drew its own blueprint of the arena of the political by means of association and disassociation, inclusion and exclusion of individuals or groups in a given community. The political is not merely a dimension of human existence, rather it is an essential feature of the human being-in-the-world, which is reflected in Aristotle’s famous statement that man is a „political animal“ („zoon politikon“). As in the case of the will, man is inconceivable without the political, with the political being the differentia specifica of the human kind, in the sense that, as Aristotle suggested, without the political (unlike the will) man adds up to not more than a zoon, just another being inhabiting the nature and following its relentless

laws. It is the „politikon“ that denotes the immersion in the common, the community, the state, and that stands for an ontological horizon which allows for self-determination by means of designing our own laws and achieving individuality. For the purpose of better understanding of the „political“, one should examine the concept of the „common“⁴ – as the horizon of self-understanding and articulation of the initial principles of association and disassociation that rest at the very core of the political. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri point out that we all participate in the common.

By the „common we mean, first of all, the common wealth of the material world – air, water, the fruits of the soil and all natural bounty – which in classic European political texts is often claimed to be the inheritance of the humanity as a whole, to be shared together. We consider the common, and also more significantly those results of social production that are necessary for social interaction and further production, such as knowledges, languages, codes, information, affects, and so forth. This notion of the common does not position humanity separate from nature as either its exploiter or its custodian, but focuses rather on the practices of interaction, care and cohabitation in a common world, promoting the beneficial and limiting the detrimental forms of the common (Hardt, Negri, 2009: vii).

4 The Greeks did not distinguish between the “common” and the “political”. Meier writes that the Greeks used the term political to denote what is “appropriate to the polis”. “To the Greeks...the opposite of political was “private”, “personal”, and “self-interested” “political” meant same as “common” (koynos, xynos).” (Meier, 2010: 13). It is interesting that the further political development saw the disappearance of this particular dimension of the “common”, which is almost exclusively used in derogatory sense to denote something which is less valuable, of commoners, vulgar. We may submit that within the modern capitalist horizon the meaning of political has undergone an inversion as compared to how it was understood in the Ancient Greece – hence, our contemporaries understand the “private” (property) as the political, while the common (as “not-in-the-ownership-of-one-particular individual, appropriated) has been transformed into an opposition to the political, a sort of surplus.

Being the horizon of interactions, the common is primarily open, hence it is also open to appropriation - expropriation. The method of appropriation – the fair distribution for the advantage of all, or the violent, unjust distribution (by forceful means, by violent means) – constitutes the answer of each epoch in history to the question of what belongs to whom, how and where. The method of appropriation forged out of the interaction serves as the „impersonal“ model of dominance or power which structures or generates a political community in its own image. Appropriation of the common by violent means generates violent political communities in which the order tends to be, more or less, extensive process of legitimation of a given model of domination or power. Domination of private appropriation of the common (slavery, feudalism, capitalism) for the purpose of self-legitimation does not only generate specific ruling procedures (despotism, monarchy, parliamentary democracy), but the narratives of „naturalness“ (ideologies) that seek to represent the established order of the forced appropriation of the common as natural, or the only alternative, thereby obfuscating the memory of the common and the authentically political. The “memory”, truth be told, is from time to time brought back into life and used – particularly in times of upheaval, rebellion and revolutions – to undermine the models of appropriation of the common established by force. The Meaning of the remembrance of the common, according to Keane, is found in Mycenaean word *damos* referring to people as „the group of powerless people who once held land in common“ (Keane, 2010: xi). It is in this largely „revolutionary“ act of remembrance of the common in the form of demand for equality where the essence of the political will is revealed. In times of crisis, when the „old regime“ comes to its breaking point, it emerges as the active power which gives meaning to the political as the common. In this act of will, citizens achieve self-objectification, self-recognition, and self-determination - they recognise themselves as embodiment of the active principle; hence we can share Pierre Ronsavallon’s conclusion that „political will is “active

self-consciousness". (Rosanvallon, 2008: 308). In this sense, the political will emerges as „operating consciousness of historical necessity, a protagonist in the real and effective historical drama". (Negri, 319)

POLITICAL WILL BETWEEN THE POLITICAL AND THE POLITICS

The „remembrance of the political" as the motive, and, in particular, the largely revolutionary evocation of the political as the decision of the political will objectified through giving „meaning and form to the world in which individuals find it hard to orient themselves" (Rosanvallon, 2008: 308) has been a rare occurrence in the course of the human history; instead, it has been the political, understood by Sheldon Wollin as „the expression of the idea that a free society composed of diversities can nonetheless enjoy moments of communality when, through public deliberations, collective power is used to promote or protect the well-being of the collectivity", (Wollin, 1996: 31), which normal „surrenders its place to" *politics*. The Politics is then „legitimized and public contestation, primarily by organised and unequal social powers, over access to resources available to the public authorities of the collective". (Wollin, 1996: 31) Therefore, we can observe that the fragmentation of the political to the „organized and unequal social powers" following from the disputes concerning the appropriation of the „common" leads to the fragmentation of the political will itself. The internal conflicts - the conflicts between individual policies - shape and form the political community. An individual policy as a contender for objectification of the will of a political actor serves as the expression of his/her resolve to achieve the desired effect. Dissipation and antagonisms internal to political will, or, more precisely, the diverse fractions that constitute it, now call for its „aggregation". It is only now that we can return to the definition of „political will" provided by Post et al, namely, that it

is „the extent of committed support among key decision makers for a particular policy solution to a particular problem“ (Post a al., 2010:659). Attempts to create support are then, as the authors point out, made by means of the “common understanding of a particular problem which is on the agenda”, wherein the common calls on the mobilizing power of the original “common” that has slipped away. In the course of our everyday conversations we often call on this dimension that has „become lost“ when we criticise the politicians and use the proverbial criticism that their actions or decision-making are not driven by „the general interest“. And, indeed, it is effectively absent from the contemporary politics as the fragmented „political“ except in the form of a mere rhetorical figure. Generally, any reference of a particular political actor to the „common understanding“ for a particular policy is reduced to a mere *emulation of the political*, as, ultimately, it is but the objectification of the will of that particular political actor, and as such it is incarnated as *the usurpation of the political*. This process of usurpation of the common is the best illustrated by the textbook example of the transformation of Rousseau’s conception of the „general will“. Namely „the people who are largely unable to recognise their true will need guides, chefs. The sovereign does not rule by the authority of his own decision to rule, but because the sovereign has better insight into the hypostasized general will rather than the sum of individuals. It is the task of the sovereign to create fictional identity of morals and politics“⁵ (Kozielek as quoted by Molnar, 2002: 20). Thus, the task of an usurper, a sovereign, or „democratically elected“ actor of organised political power is to, by emulating the *political* articulated in one particular interpretation of the general interest, the common, or the general will, create the fictional identity of morals and politics, a kind of supstantiality,

5 Kozielek as quoted by Molnar, 2002: 20) „narodu, koji je u svojoj većini nesposoban da spozna svoju instinsku volju, potrebni su guides, chefs. Vođa ne vlada snagom vlastite odluke, nego zato što ima bolji uvid u hipostaziranu opštu volju nego zbir individua. Zadatak vođe je da stvori fiktivni identitet morala i politike“

or the political itself as the reflection of, or even better, synonymous with the „true will“ of the people. Paradoxically, this practice of bringing the common, the political into play results in the general depoliticization. Whilst pollicisation denotes a form of political subjectivation accompanied by the self-awareness and the objectified will, depoliticization constitutes the negation of it, in the sense best described by Benjamin Constant who asserts: „Lost in the multitude, the individual almost never perceives the influence he exercises. His will never leave its mark on the whole“ (Constant as quoted by Ronsavallon 2008:310). Depoliticizing demobilizes as „the process by which people who had previously been politically mobilized or who were in the process of being mobilized, become silenced, marginalized and excluded from the public realm with a view to „impose homogeneity onto existing, heterogeneous social spaces“ (Ganon, 2006: xviii, 7). The author describes this process of demobilisation as the process which comprises, on one hand, generation of the hegemonic political will of the „usurping“ elite, and, on the other hand, silencing, marginalising and, ultimately, excluding the political will of the others – the contending elites and the citizens alike. The process operates simultaneously through social and state institutions, and through an array of ideological apparatuses that transmit the hegemonic order of political will. The will which fashions political community in its own image constitutes the fundamental horizon from whence all individual conflicts between particular political wills over particular policies emerge. The conflicts of fractionated political elites, as I have asserted already, do not add up to more than an imitation of the political – what they are essentially doing is decanting political will on which the elite keeps a firm grip from one fraction to the other in front of demobilised, fragmented audience – citizenry in general. Then the issue, as suggested at the beginning of the text, is not why there is or why there is not political will to make one political decision or the other – the issue is that the political will becomes monopolised, and as a result of that, the political community becomes largely demobilized.

Hence, even the most fervent supporters of parliamentary democracy will admit that it is undergoing a crisis, losing legitimacy, and that it is, ultimately, impotent. Rosanvallon asserts:

The impotence is therefore systemic and not a consequence of deficient political will or flawed leadership. In the new age – an age of problematic democracy – citizens no longer think of conquering power in order to exercise it. Their implicit goal is rather to constrain and limit power... The appropriation of power is no longer the ideal; what people think they want now is to make power transparent enough to permit total control. Transparency thus replaces the exercise of responsibility as the end of politics. (...) Little by little, a veritable ideology of transparency has emerged as the new democratic ideal, in place of the old, which was to create through politics a society in which people could live together in a shared world. Transparency, rather than truth or the general interest, has become the paramount virtue in an uncertain world.

(Rosanvallon, 2008: 258).

Demand for transparency rather than responsibility of the political elite represents the triumph of its political will, accepted by the demobilized citizenry - and not just that. If this demobilization is the result of the fragmentation and the complex institutional and procedural mechanisms which have a paralyzing effect on the political will of the citizenry, if the expression of the will is allowed only periodically under controlled conditions when the time comes to cast a vote, then the hegemonic political will is ultimately objectified as alienation. In line with Constant's assertion, and in keeping with Marx's insights, Terry Eagleton states that social reality „should be recognized as the work of our own hands. Not to see it as this – to regard it as something natural or inexplicable, independent of our own activity – is what Marx calls alienation“. (Eagleton, 2014) Demand for transparency shows that the

reality created by hegemonic political will is accepted as something which is natural and inevitable, something that exists independently of what we do and that has no alternative; and that all that remains of politics is confined to elites clashing about particular policies for which there is or there is not political will, and that only in case that the rules of transparency govern the entire process of negotiation or conflict. Hence, the concerns about presence or absence of political will for a specific policy fill up newspaper pages in order to: a) avoid making any essential political changes; b) disguise the only will that matters – *the will of the ruling class* which – having appropriated the mechanisms for objectification of will, having appropriated the common – is the only will which has subjectivity, the coherent self-awareness. In the modern democratic system the process does not employ brute force, police state methods (even if such methods are not excluded), but rather the „tacit consent“ (Locke) expressed through giving up the will in favour of „an agent which re-presents the people and wills on its account“ (Žižek, 2009: 135). Slavoj Žižek writes that Walter Lipman

Coined the term „manufacturing consent“. (...) the mystery is that, knowing this, we continue to play the game. We act as if we are free to choose, while silently not only accepting but even demanding that an invisible injunction (inscribed in the very form of our commitment to „free speech“) tells us what to do and to think. (...) Trotsky was thus right in his basic reproach to parliamentary democracy, which was not that it gives too much power to the uneducated classes, but, paradoxically, *that is passivizes the masses, leaving the initiative with the apparatus of state power.* (Žižek, 2009: 135).

Modern representative democracy, as the transparent system of government characterised by the apparent multitude of irreconcilable fractions existing within the bounds of the political elites that engage in conflicts about particular policies and decisions serves as the screen

concealing, as Chantal Mouffe asserts, „the survival of invisible power and of oligarchies“, such democracy has de-mobilizing effect since it discredits an individual citizen as „the protagonist of political life, the renewed vigour of particular interests, the limited scope for democratic participation“. (Mouffe, 2005: 93).

CONCLUSION: BEYOND POLITICAL WILLS AND WONTS

In order to propose a plausible conclusion of this brief introduction to the problem of political will, I need to introduce a distinction between „a political will“ and „the Political Will“. The distinction is more easily accommodated by the English language which has the (in) definite articles at its disposal. Thus I am introducing the distinction between the observable, mundane, „present-absent“, contradictory, fractionated political will (a political will), which is dependent on context and contingent circumstances, and it is related to particular policies aimed at addressing particular problems; and the political will. The latter is invisible, hegemonic, „natural“, „it does not have an alternative“, and it sets out the very context (politics/political) within which the former – the presence or absence of which we comment on in our everyday conversations - may be manifested. The latter is the *sucus* of the political, and it constitutes a form of the appropriation of the common and its resources; it is objectified in the practices and in the institutions of the political community whilst „remaining hidden“ as the agent of the political which is in the possession of social resources, of the common, and, consequently, which is in the possession of the political itself as the source of generation of its own power. In the light of this, the initially proposed definition of political will may be reconstructed as follows: „political will is the extent of committed support among key decision makers for a particular policy solution to a particular problem

(Post et al., 2010: 659) within the limits of what may (be permitted to) emerge as a subject of contention which is dictated by hegemonic political will, i.e. by the relations between its key actors, members of ruling class of a political community. Political will at the level of policies resides in the observable public sphere, and it plays the game of I-am-there-I-am-not, so that the Political Will may remain concealed⁶ as the will of the true power centres located at the top of the ruling class structure which becomes objectified, and which creates the community in its own image. Hence political will does not make frequent appearances as a subject of examination. It is not particularly productive to try and examine it in the realm of its contingent manifestations, reflected by adoption or failure to adopt particular policies, which is difficult to capture, and which fits Hegel's description of „bad infinity“. Instead, examination of the Political Will would necessitate a recourse to examination of the class issue; but, alas, after the “fall of communism”, the class issue has morphed into a “cultural issue” – it has been transmuted into a new form of the bad infinity informed by essentialized and, at times, orientalist understanding of cultural identities.

When they define political will as the „extent of committed support among key decision makers “what the authors do is they draw the dividing line between the Political Will and a political will. Namely, the definition implicitly places the realm of a political will exclusively into the

6 This act of concealment should not be understood as a premeditated crime committed by a band of “bad guys” even if it consequently benefits ruling class, i.e. if it renders its rule unquestionable or “natural”. Roland Barthes warns that the structure of the modern political community puts the ruling class, bourgeoisie, in the position in which it undergoes the “ex-nominating operation”, the operation to remove its name. Barthes points out that it is important to understand this class as the social class that does not want to be named. Its worldview and its values are not specific to it, they are in fact universal, civilisation, humanist values and worldview. Namely, “the flight from the name “bourgeoisie” is not therefore an illusory, accidental, secondary, natural or insignificant phenomenon: it is the bourgeoisie ideology itself, the process through which bourgeoisie transforms the reality of the world into the image of the world, history into nature”(Barthes, 1991: 140).

hands of political elite. It acknowledges the narrow circles of political, economic, religious and cultural elites as the only relevant or true political decision-makers. Consequently, it is implicit that the mechanism of the Political Will rests on the systemic de-mobilising, de-politicizing, and, if you will, „emptying“ the demos of power or will, so that the „political people“ may only be considered political in the honorary sense of the term⁷. Why? Because a citizen is no longer capable of self-recognition in the manufactured socio-political environment. This environment appears as an alienated constellation, foreign or threatening. An individual citizen does not see that there exists option for meaningful participation, except on the day of elections when – led by ideology and pseudopatriotism – he or she – in nationalistic stupor – decides to delegate his/hers own will, or to entrust the Leviathan of the Political Will with it. Is this the kind of situation that Kant captured so well in his famous remark about „self-imposed immaturity“- the citizens do not seem to know what to make of the will that they have (they would perhaps rather not have it at all, to get rid of it as soon as they can) or is there something else at play – perhaps the issues will be resolved by some next revolution.

7 Is it not the case that elections are normally depicted as the time when, in democratic societies, political will, clad in “festive attire”, is truly given over to the people. There is something profoundly hypocritical about these tinselled, quasipatriotic festivities. Žižek remarks that “the (true) throne is empty”, that the decision is now really theirs (in the hands of citizens – A. M.) This is why in in “free elections” there is always a minimal aspect of politeness: those in power politely pretend that they do not really hold power, and ask us to decide freely if we want to give them power – in a way which mirrors the logic of a gesture meant to be refused.” (Žižek, 2009:135).

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POLITICAL WILL FOR POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR

Majority of contemporary authors observe political will through the prism of functioning of political systems and public policies and through the analysis of institutional mechanisms and their human potential to implement political will. Nevertheless, political will can be examined from a different perspective. Already in the 1920's, Lippmann (1922:xiv) emphasised that "to talk of politics without reference to human beings ... is just the deepest error in our political thinking". Putting the emphasis on the state of political thought and approach pursued by numerous political analysts of that age in explaining politics, political thinking and functioning of political processes, Lippmann underlined that the interpretation of these processes disregarded the characteristics of the most important actor in all of these political processes. Personality of an individual, a core concept in the psychological science, has been used for centuries in an attempt to identify psychological processes and traits which activate, direct and guide behaviour of an individual⁸. Personality traits, as well as all other personal qualities of an individual are developed and expressed through the dynamic interaction with the social and cultural environment. Understood as stable complex systems

8 Although masculine form of pronouns will be used hereafter when referring to an individual, it refers to both male and female individuals.

composed of numerous hierarchical organisational traits and mechanisms, we have a proactive role in choosing and changing the situations we encounter (Larsen, Buss, 2007). In the process of interaction and adaptation to the environment, there is a conflict between requirements of a situation and our attempts to maintain psychologically pleasing and congruent states of our personality, such as homeostasis, psychological hedonism, state of congruence and cognitive consistency⁹. People tend to adjust both to the inner environment (intrapsychological, e.g. feeling of satisfaction attributable to personal achievement) and the outer environment reflected in either the requirements of the physical environment (e.g. depriving conditions) or the requirements of the social environment (e.g. belonging, conformism, obedience). Such observation offers a two-fold perspective that, on one side, puts emphasis on the considerable consistency and stability of the personality and on the other, indicates its “plasticity” and extraordinary adaptability to diverse survival conditions. This gap between consistency and potential for adaptability is bridged by means of motivational processes. Motivation is used to explain certain behaviour or absence thereof, as well as variability, irregularity, inconsistency and unpredictability in behaviour. Given its interventionist nature, a dynamic process assists us to adjust to the requirements of the environment and achieve our objectives, affecting us in a fashion that we endeavour to reduce the probability of uncomfortable/negative outcomes and increase the probability of positive outcomes which guarantee our benefit (Beck, 2003;

9 Psychological hedonism is the main motivational presumption in Beck’s (2003) depiction of motivation, according to which, a person undertakes certain activities that are expected to result in desired outcomes and avoids those activities that are expected to have unpleasant or negative outcomes. On the other hand, people feel the discomfort and dissonance when aware that some aspect of their behavior is discrepant with their notion of themselves. In that sense, people are motivated to reduce such dissonance due to their aspiration to achieve cognitive consistency by “either changing their behavior or justifying their past behavior, bringing it into line with positive view of themselves” (Aronson et al. 2005:212).

Reeve, 2010). Motivation is a process which helps us resolve the “state of dissonance” which is, we could say, our permanent state of being.

Will, the term used in the title of this book and this text, is not entirely equivalent to the term of motivation. Nonetheless, considering that volitional behaviour originates both from motivation (being understood as the behaviour encouraged by a *motive* or *need*; Petz, 1992) and cognition (defined as a *commitment* of actors to achieve certain objectives, *conscious engagement* of psycho-physical energy to achieve an objective; Filipović, 1984, as cited by Mujkić, the text above), for the purpose of this text which will examine political will through the needs which drive an individual to be politically active and through cognitive structuring and understanding of the role of an individual in the political space (for the reason that an active individual, by an act of volition, identifies himself with the dominant motivational schema of action, and mobilizes his/hers psycho-physical energies in order to realize it; Filipović, 1984, as cited by Mujkić, the text above), it seems entirely justified to use and understand these terms as near synonyms or even synonyms¹⁰.

In order to understand how and what drives some people to be politically active and not the others and the background of this “adapted” behaviour of these two groups, I will aim in this text to explore this issue from a psychological perspective. I will offer an overview of the role

10 Although some authors want to make a clear distinction between will and related terms such as motivation and cognitive control (Heckhausen, 2007 as cited by Brass et al. 2013), will and motivation, as well as cognitive control, are to a great degree used as related terms in the context of explanation of the functioning of the system of self-regulation, considering that they are also very close by their nature. Certain motivational theories (Reeve, 2010), in addition to the existential needs, also identify emotions and cognitions as basic human needs and motivators of human behaviour, whereby cognitive and motivational characteristics of will largely match definitions of motivation. For further information of psychological understanding of motivation and will and their similarities and differences, see Reeve (2010).

and relevance of political will/motivation in the interaction with other relevant characteristics of personality (such as individual's personality traits, value system, as well as all mental mechanisms and processes) for understanding of political behaviour of an individual. On the other hand, I will draw attention to the importance and relevance of interaction of the aforesaid elements for occurrence of political will/motivation of an individual.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE OF WILL

The concept of will was "borrowed" by psychologists from the philosophical debate on the nature of human will and its functioning. In psychodynamic theory, it was considered to be one of the key determinants in formation and development of personality. As a driving force behind the psyche, it is manifested either creatively or destructively depending on the individual's attitude towards himself and life (Rank 1941, as cited by Müller). Its creative manifestation means that the will mobilises, directs and gives purpose to a certain activity indicating psychological development of a human being. As an ability to regulate our behaviour, it is most visible in those tasks of *ourselves* which are related to self-control, decision-making process, complex problem solving and conflict resolution (Rigoni, Sammicheli, Brass, 2011). "Willpower training" begins at the age of two and three when the learning of self-control is intensified. This is the period of emergence of the sense of self as the awareness of one's own self in a form of separation from the surrounding environment, which is a prerequisite to acquire self control, as a form of behaviour which at the earliest age shows volitional behaviour of an individual. At this age, it is the persons surrounding the child – parents/guardians – who have the key role in child's development. The key requirements imposed by the social environment at this age pertain to the acquisition of good hygiene habits and control

of impulsive behaviour. This is the period when the conflict referred to by Erik Erikson in his theory of psychosocial development as "autonomy versus shame and doubt" is resolved, which lays a foundation for later autonomous and independent behaviour of an individual. Namely, he believes that the child's development will be positive if there is a balance between parental guidance and discipline and enabling the child to be independent and choose his behaviour. The origin of volitional effort and belief in the ability to act and of the successful adaptation of an individual lies in this balancing between parental demands and enabling the child to make decisions independently. "If children emerge from the first few years without sufficient trusts in caregivers and without a healthy sense of individuality, the seeds are sown for adjustment problems" (Berk, 2010:141-142). Negative outcomes of this developmental phase and the seeds of the problem with the adjustment and acceptance of oneself are the child's feeling of being forced, doubt in his own ability to control impulses and the absence of competent behaviour. Erikson emphasises that the way in which a person deals with social experiences influences development of personality and that the main developmental positive force of our ego in this stage of development is the developed *will*, developed sense of autonomy and self-esteem. A child should emerge from this crisis with a healthy personality, developed creative and inventive will and self-esteem, knowing that his believing in himself and his parents will not be endangered by his willingness to autonomously and independently make choices, requests and inquiries. Actually, the child will know that making his own, independent choices, doing what his *self* wants, will not "jeopardise" relationships with other key persons. Believing in oneself and in the ability of action reveals the quality of individual's interaction with the environment thanks to which, we can talk about socially adjusted and at the same time self-satisfied individual. Nevertheless, although psychodynamic theories emphasised the importance of early experience of will training in an individual as a precondition for creative, mature

and intensive development of personality, with the emergence of the behavioural paradigm, this concept based primarily on the subjective experience was to a great degree neglected. Newer research in the field of neuropsychology, social psychology and cognitive psychology puts the concept of will back to the focus of psychological research, placing the emphasis on cognitive characteristics of this phenomenon. Focusing rather on the issue of how an individual “handles” his volitional processes than on metaphysical and existential issues, a large number of studies indicated that our perception of our will, i.e. belief in power/strength/freedom or determinism of will affects human behaviour in the social context. A significant number of studies conducted over the last two decades confirmed that the exposure to deterministic¹¹ beliefs increases the likelihood that people would behave immorally and antisocially (Rigoni et al. 2011). Persons who believe in freedom of their own will are more willing to behave pro-socially compared to the persons who believe in determination of their behaviour (Baumeister, Masicampom, DeWall, 2009). Explaining the reasons why perception of our will has such effects on our behaviour, Baumeister argues that deterministic beliefs by themselves imply that a person has “no choice” to behave any other way but “the one”, which is, as a matter of fact, only one way of self-justification. Considering that self-justification is used as one of the cognitive schemas to maintain a relatively favourable perception of ourselves, particularly when faced with the evidence contradictory to the positive view of ourselves (Aronson et al., 2005), it is a good frame of reference for contextualising and justifying personal failures. Rigoni, Kuehn, Satori, Brass (2011) went even further and showed that a thought, belief in free will activates brain regions that correspond to the intention to undertake an action. This means that the belief in free will itself innervates and activates those brain parts which

11 This refers to the belief that our thoughts and our action are predetermined by either internal or external factors, such as: genetic factors, environment we live in, family or cultural heritage or even luck (Rigoni et al. 2011).

are responsible for intention to undertake some action. This research, as many others, indicates that neural and cognitive processes are in the background of volitional behaviour and that the ability of self-control and other processes of self-regulation (author's note) to a great degree depend on the individual's perception of the nature of his will (Vohs and Schooler, 2008; Baumesiter et al. 2009, Rigoni et al. 2011, Regoni et al. 2012 as cited by Brass et al. 2013).

However, does this imply that it is justified to assume that without believing that we can control, change and improve our behaviour, we would have low or almost no incentive to make even the smallest effort to face the challenges imposed on us by the social environment? How do we behave when we do not believe in the possibility to volitionally control and direct our actions? Is the diminished sense of personal responsibility, i.e. absence of belief in the power of will, fertile ground for the sense of helplessness, occurrence of unwanted behaviour, anomie, isolation and self-alienation? The increased sense of personal responsibility for the preferred choice of behaviour results in people's behaviours which are directed towards desirable, constructive, "developing" behaviours (Harmon, Jones and Mills, 1999, Mueller and Dweek, 1998, as cited by Rigoni et al. 2011). The sense of responsibility and belief in the ability of personal action can guide people to behave in a socially desirable, constructive way. In that sense, knowledge and learning about the will can be very practical, worthwhile and well invested effort, because when we know what guides and leads our action it is easier for us to foresee the outcomes of the behaviour, which is the first step for high-quality change, either on personal or social level. In a permanent quest for answers to the question why some individuals are active in political processes and others are not and what lies in the "core" of their political preferences and beliefs, a large number of authors tried to offer a more detailed insight in the key determinants of this very complex behavioural pattern. Although the "power of belief in the nature of will" has been

proven in many experimental situations in our everyday life, we choose behaviours (make decisions, act actively or inactively, solve conflicts, etc.), which in addition to the belief in the nature of our will, have some specific value for us and which lead to very clear consequences for the choices made (Rigoni et al. 2011). In that sense, examining the will, particularly political will which is due to its nature already positioned in a special context, requires a wider picture and overview of a number of other factors which through their complex interaction explain behaviour of an individual.

POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR AND POLITICAL WILL

Political psychology, as one of the youngest psychological disciplines, has been trying to establish over the past six decades what mobilises, guides, inhibits and determines the role and position of an *individual* in the structure of relations and processes relevant for his political behaviour. An individual, as a part of a wider and more complex social structure and its innate relations, in the context of psychological understanding of the political process, is a key player in political action and his perceptions, beliefs, opinions, values and interests (in addition to all other "external" actors) stand in the core of political behaviour and action. As a matter of fact, political psychology, from the perspective of an individual, is interested in individual's *perception* of the politically relevant environment, his satisfied and unsatisfied *needs*, *positions* on the politically relevant environment, as well as the *behaviour* which results from the above (Siber, 1998). The past several decades have witnessed an increase in the amount of research in a number of psychological fields (social psychology, personality psychology, political psychology) examining political behaviour with the aim to shed some light on the nature of relations between politics and personality of an individual. However, intensive research of political behaviour has not resulted in

a single definition of that term and there is no consistency in operationalisation of political behaviour. Siber (1998:28) determined political behaviour as *“each such behaviour directed towards maintaining or changing the existing structure and power”*¹², leaving thus room for interpretation what concrete behaviours and activities comprise political behaviour. In operationalisation of this term, Milas (2007) defines political behaviour as views and actions aimed at achieving certain principles and values, thereby determining the key variables encompassed by this concept in a more concrete manner. Notwithstanding the absence of a clear definition of this term, at least in the field of political psychology, majority of the current theoretical debates observe political behaviour at its manifested and measurable level by means of two basic forms of political involvement: political activity, i.e. *quantity and quality* of political activity and political orientation, i.e. ideological and value orientation of an individual reflected in the *course* and *degree* of ideological saturation of a certain political behaviour (Siber, 1998). At first, explanations of individual preferences and participation in political activities were predominantly based on situational and cultural characteristics of an individual, such as social and economic status, religious beliefs and place of residence (e.g. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, as cited by Houghton, 2009). However, later works focus more on explanation of the role of dispositional personality variables in the political activity of an individual. Smith (1968) was among the first researchers to try to make a schematic overview of relations between psychological variables and political behaviour and to establish a *“model”*, *“map”* of political behaviour. His work inspired many authors to utilise and give a concrete form to the role of psychological characteristics and processes in the analysis of political behaviour. Speaking of this region, it was Siber (1998) who, relying on Smith’s work and Lewin’s description that *“behaviour or any*

12 Siber 1998:28: *“svakog onog ponašanja koje je usmjereno ka zadržavanju ili mijenjanju postojeće strukture i moći”*

kind of mental event ... depends on the state of the person and at the same time on the environment" (Lewin, 1936: 11-12; as cited by Greenstein, 1992:109), tried to present the complexity of interrelations of variables relevant for understanding of political behaviour (Figure 1). Although Siber himself says that this complex chart could be expanded by a number of variables and relations, it clearly shows that political behaviour is the result of interaction between individual's personality and the environment and that political choices and action do not occur by chance. Personality traits, needs and motives, values, social views and assessment of personal efficacy comprise relevant elements of a hypothetical architecture of the individual's political personality which operates on different levels and whose elements operate to a different extent to activate him at the political level (Caprara, Vecchione, 2013).




Figure 1. Schematic overview of the position of an individual in the society, psychological processes and contents and political behaviour (Siber, 1998)

Traits, as basic dispositions and more enduring part of individual's personality incline him to think, feel and act consistently and due to such characteristic, they proved to be relevant for understanding of political orientation of an individual based on the *course and degree* of ideological saturation of his political behaviour. ¹³ However, taking into consideration their basic characteristics, personality traits do not necessarily initiate political action of an individual. They imply consistency of action in different situations, but it is the motives at the implicit or even unconscious level that act as drivers of political behaviour (Winter, 2013). Motivation is by its nature a latent, intervening variable explained by means of the content and process theories of motivation. This means that, in order to explain political behaviour, we need to understand which very *specific needs* instigate political behaviour (content theories) or to consider under which *assumptions* a certain need results in action, with the expectations, perceptions and values (i.e. cognition) being the key assumptions and main drivers of the individual's action (process theories). Explaining the differences in political behaviour of both political elites and citizens, Murrey, McClelland and Winter, as well as numerous other authors and theoretical approaches within the content theory models, emphasise the relevance of three needs. These are: the need for socialisation (affiliation intimacy), the need for achievement and the

13 The existing studies of voters' personality traits that are based on the currently most prominent theoretical model of personality known as the five-factor model of personality indicate that the factors of openness, conscientiousness, extraversion and agreeableness are very important in explaining this aspect of political behaviour. The openness to experience as the trait reflected in intellectual and artistic interests of an individual, his preference for variety, independent judgement and the extraversion which is visible in interpersonal characteristics, increased activity, need for excitement, etc. are the traits which proved to be of crucial importance for understanding of relations in political arena. Politicians (political elites) score higher than citizens on extroversion (Best 2011, as cited by Caprara, Vecchione 2013), while openness is highly related to liberal preferences in the American political context (Jost, Kruglanski and Sulloway, 2003; McCrae, 1996, as cited by Caprara et al. 2008). Conscientiousness is closely related to the conservatism (Gosling, Rentfrow and Swann, 2003).

need for power. Growing number of studies confirmed that the leaders who have higher power motivation are readier to make strong and powerful political moves wherefore they are perceived by their followers as charismatic (House et al., 1991, as cited by Winter 2013) and by their opponents as aggressive and warlike (Winter, 1980; 1987; 2000; as cited by Winter, 2013). Affiliation motivated leaders are peaceful and cooperative so long as they are surrounded by like-minded others and do not feel threatened, while the achievement as motivation did not appear to be relevant for political success, particularly if power is a stronger motivation for an individual (Winter, 2010b, as cited by Winter 2013). It can be assumed that affiliation as a motive to a great degree determines political action of citizens. The environment, whereby I mean the relevant others and groups we belong to, are a strong source of our self-worth, hence the assumption that individuals in our environment and belonging to a group generate a strong social pressure in voter's environment. The group has its mechanisms to maintain social behaviour at an expected (reference) level. Considering that we are prone to conforming to any standards established by our reference groups since conformity is rewarded by that group and nonconformity is punished (Aronson et al., 2005), the need for affiliation can be one of the more relevant motives for understanding of political behaviour of an individual. However, it is very difficult to speak of the concrete motives that drive both citizens and political elites because we draw conclusions about them indirectly by means of analyses of secondary sources (external behaviour of an individual, written speeches, etc.). Therefore, process motivation theories appear to be a more appropriate model for explanation of political behaviour at the level of an individual.

Fundamental understanding of the role of cognitions in explanation of behaviour of individuals, as presented by Kelley, Murrey, Festinger, Tolman, Vroom, Bandura and others, confirms that individuals are able to regulate and control their behaviour through cognitive interpretation

and construction of their reality, i.e. by the ability to set objectives, develop strategies, think about oneself and assess their behaviour and success (Caprara and Cervone, 2003). The aforesaid studies of will also indicated this relevance. We position the picture of the environment in which we exist and ourselves (self-concept) in cognitive schemas¹⁴ and by means of automatic thoughts, attributions, implicit thoughts and other cognitive shortcuts, we maintain cognitive consistency and congruence of both ourselves and the picture of the environment we live in. This actually means that we receive pieces of information from our environment without significant mental investment and place them in the already existing and formed thought structures reflected in our beliefs, opinions and values, which drive us to be active as we desire to stay

14 Just like scientists, we create on a daily basis various hypotheses and expectations or more precisely (cognitive) schemas which serve as the basis for perceiving the information, but also for reception and processing of information from the outer world. These schemas are made of our assumptions and knowledge, as well as the impressions we create. Culture is an important socialisation factor for creation of a cognitive schema. Persons coming from individualistic cultures and persons coming from collectivist cultures have certain differences. Also, it is a well known fact that we do not “invest” ourselves greatly in processing of all information and that we invest minimum effort in their “incorporation” in the already existing schemas. We mainly use so called automatic thoughts with minimum effort to process information, without particularly expressed will, conscious act and intention in reception and processing of information. When explaining causes of certain behaviour we mainly use attributions. A great number of studies confirmed the existence of differences in attributions of persons coming from different cultures, depending on whether they come from individualist or collectivist cultures (Miller, 1984., Morris, Peng, 1994; as cited by Aronson et al., 2005). One of the main aspects of differentiating between attributions is whether they are internal or external. Internal causes include the aspects such as competence, power, expertise, i.e. opinions, character or personality traits. The external attributions mainly refer to situational factors explaining the cause of certain behaviour. In the sense of determining ourselves, our roles and status, people in many non-western cultures have interdependent perspective of themselves, which means that they define themselves in the context of their relations with other persons and they are aware that someone’s behaviour is frequently determined by the opinions, feelings and actions of other people. The overview of the cognitive structure of the reality we live in is based on the findings by Aronson and his associates (2005).

in the state of harmony both internally (to behave in accordance with what we believe in) and with the environment we belong to (actions in accordance with the expectations of the environment, particularly of relevant Others from our environment, e.g. an important authority or group). Cognitive schemas, although very useful considering that they help us organise the knowledge and information received from the environment, can be very challenging and dangerous for political action as they function as very resistant and impermeable filters that the information *not compliant* with the existing, accustomed and formed schemas for information processing can hardly pass through. These cognitions are actually leading motivations that affect our information processing, i.e. selection of those pieces of information out of those offered that we will notice, think about and later recall (Kerr and Stanfel, 1993., Olsen Roesse, Zanna, 1996; Stangor and Mc Milan, 1992, as cited by Aronson et al., 2005). Significant number of studies confirmed that people think only superficially about the majority of events around them and they use so called automatic thinking which functions on a principle of investment of the minimum effort to process information, without will power, conscientious approach or any intention in the acceptance and processing of information. Automatic thinking dominates the greater part of our mental activity (Aronson et al., 2005). We receive the information relevant for political behaviour in this same way. Cognitive theorists emphasise that individuals perceive complexity of the political environment using heuristics as already accepted mental shortcuts for organisation of information and simplification of political choices (Sniderman, Brody, Tetlock, 1991 as cited by Redlawsk, Lau, 2013). Voters (citizens) schematically assess the information on candidates and politicians, whereby the existence and persistence of a schema as well as the power of simplified thinking characterise an unmotivated individual who relies on partisanship, ideological preferences and other shortcuts in his political action (Chong, 2013). Rational interpretation of a potential choice is thus entirely diminished and individuals do not consider

potential implications of certain characteristics of candidates and are not open for information relevant to make a rational political decision. However, regardless of how much they facilitate activities of an individual, cognitions as motivational structures are prone to changes due to some other needs, such as for example emotions. The existence of an outstanding motivation to cautiously pass judgements has been proven in a large number of experiments. In other words, *when the stakes are high* people tend to pass more accurate judgements and it is more likely that they will notice the facts that are not compliant with their already existing schemas (Kruglanski, 1989; Neuberg, 1994; Tetlock, 1992; Trope Lieberman, 1996; as cited by Aronson et al., 2005).

Considering that a large number of studies confirmed them to be the leading principles and leading cognitive schemas (author's note) in the life of an individual, values and value systems represent the main schemas that guide actions of an individual, including his political behaviour (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1996; Knafo and Schwartz, 2001). Values have a paramount influence on our views and behaviours (Eysenck, 1954; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992, 1996; Rohan, 2000; Rohan, Zanna, 2001, as cited by Franc et al., 2002) and we use them equally as the criteria for selection and justification of our own behaviour and as the criteria for evaluation of people and events.¹⁵ They have a central role in politics as organisers of political judgements and preferences and they enable people to organise their political evaluations in a relatively consistent manner (Feldman, 2013). Defined as "ideas or beliefs related to desirable goals or behaviours, that go beyond specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events and which are

15 Ideological orientation, which different theories explain as either the value matrix through which an individual perceives the environment he lives in or as the product of the value system nurtured by an individual, is elaborated in more detail in the next text by D. Abazovic outlining ideology as the key motivational cognitive schema for political behaviour of an individual.

hierarchically ordered by relative importance to an individual" (Schwartz, 1992:4), values are, according to this model, the key motivators for political action. Considering that people continuously adjust to situational requirements and choose between different goals in light of their own priorities, values proved to be more relevant than personality traits for explanation and prediction of voting behaviour and it is proven that they have a predictive role in explaining voting decisions (Schwartz, 1994; Barnea and Schwartz, 1998; Caprara, Schwartz, Cappanna, Vecchione and Barbaranelli, 2006; Schwartz, 2007; Schwartz, Caprara, Vecchione, 2010). Caprara et al. (2006; Caprara, Schwartz, Vecchione and Barbaranelli, 2008) found that the centre-right voters attribute more importance to the values of security, conformism, tradition, power and achievement and less importance to the values of universalism and self-direction. Using the Schwartz (1992) taxonomy, Barnea (2003, as cited by Caprara et al. 2008), established relations between personal values and voting behaviour in 14 democratic countries. In every country, individual personal values differed significantly among supporters of different political parties. These differences are congruent with the traditional views of right and conservative ideologies in Western democracies concerning social order and of left and liberal ideologies concerning equality, solidarity, and social justice.

Being rooted in the culture we belong to, they give evidence of a permanent influence of socialisation processes and belonging to a family, group, class and community on the development of an individual, his identity and functioning. The culture that we come from has a strong influence on adoption of cognitive schemas, on what we notice and remember. Results of previous studies of the structure of the value system and differences in relevance and desirability of values show that there is a universal structure of values with regard to the age, sex and education at the level of an individual and with regard to the culture, political and economic system at the level of a society. Schwartz tested this model

on several occasions (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz and Sagiv, 1995; Schwartz and Sagie, 2000).

In addition to the value system, Caprara and Vecchione (2013) put emphasis on the sense of *congruency* as a relevant motivational cognitive schema for political action of an individual. People prefer to behave in accordance with their beliefs, views and values and do not like to put their values against such information that contradicts these beliefs (Festinger 1957, as cited by Beck 2003). Elaborating this aspiration towards cognitive consistency and congruency, Caprara and Vecchione (2013) outline a congruency model of political preference and participation as a framework for understanding why citizens are, to a varying extent, prompted to act. They believe that when the citizen recognises that the “political offer” is congruent, corresponding to his own value system, i.e. the most important values in his representation of his social and personal identity, such citizen will feel a higher degree of personal commitment and social support in communicating his own value system. If voters recognise in their leaders the similar personal characteristics they use to describe themselves, it will be easier for them to understand their actions. The feeling that we are close with our representatives and that they can recognise our needs is a good precondition for participation and readiness to “pay the price” of political engagement. Moreover, in such situation, by voting for a congruently perceived political option, an individual can feel self-actualized participating in the activity which reflects his identity. People tend to vote for those political parties and coalitions whose leaders and political programmes they perceive as the ones supporting and promoting the values they consider important.

Nevertheless, although the values and congruency of cognitive schemas referred to in the text above were determined as relevant to activate political will of an individual, they are not sufficient to explain and permit people to “invest their talents and virtues in politics, unless

properly equipped for the political arena” (Caprara, Vecchione, 2013:42). People can be outstandingly energetic and open and have such value priorities that it is astonishing they are not politically active, but it is very probable that they will not enter politics actively for as long as they do not feel “efficient” to be able to act in line with the expected political course. Self-efficacy is a strong cognition which drives the action of an individual. Starting with the assumption that the action of an individual is primarily motivated by his beliefs and feelings about himself, political behaviour, as an aspect of a wider social behaviour, is such form of behaviour which enables an individual to maintain psychological life based on his benefit, as well as the growth of his personality in the community in which he exists. competence and belongingness are two psychological needs that arise from “the self’s requirement for environmental mastery and warm interpersonal relationships” (Reeve, 2010:6) and the likelihood of action is the highest when we are motivated by these two needs. However, regardless of how important and unfulfilled the need was, it will not result in certain behaviour for as long as the individual feels helplessness (Vroom, 1964, as cited by Siber 1998). Helplessness is the result of the expectation and assessment of the valence of the result.¹⁶ The expectations from oneself and performance, the concept known as self-belief, refer to underlying evaluations and expectations individuals have about themselves and their life (Caprara, Cervone 2003). The concept of influence of perceived self-efficacy on thinking, motivation, learning and performance, social adjustment and benefit through the promotion of academic achievement, work achievement and healthy habits in the social cognitive theory was developed by Bandura (1986, 1997, 1999, as cited by Caprara, Cervone 2003). Personal achievement is the strongest factor in self-efficacy. Believing in the possibility to achieve

16 In accordance with Lewin’s theory, this is a psychological value – attractiveness of a goal, object or person in the living environment. A positive valence leads to approaching to and looking for a certain object, while the negative one leads to avoidance and distancing from the object, goal or a person (Petz, 1992).

desired results in the field of politics on the basis of one's abilities and capabilities and believing that it is possible to change the political system through individual and collective influence is closely related to the belief in freedom of will and the ability of action referred to at the beginning of this paper. Political self-efficacy, the „feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact on the political process, namely, that it is worthwhile to perform one's civic duties“ (Caprara, Vicchone, 2013:42) is a strong drive for political action. “Lacking a sense of personal efficacy may nurture both feelings of distance and alienation conducive to disenchantment and ultimately to withdrawal from politics“ (Caprara, Vicchone, 2013:43). A study conducted by Caprara and his associates (2009) showed close relations between political participation and perceived efficacy. In this study, politicians showed higher levels of perceived political self-efficacy than political activists, who on the other side, showed higher levels of perceived political self-efficacy than the voters who were not politically active. His main argument for self-efficacy, saying that people who believe that their behaviour will be more efficient really act in accordance with that belief, can be understood as a cognitive schema or perception of their own will power (author's note) by means of which people function, receive, process and store information and act in accordance with. Like self-fulfilling prophecy, an efficient behaviour evokes new behaviour, thus creating a cycle of self-fulfilling prophecy. Studies (Vecchone and Caprara, 2009) demonstrated that the belief in political self-efficacy has a meditational role in those personality traits and values that we connect with political engagement, which means that believing in political competence has a motivational role.

In the end, we can conclude that the perceived congruence, perceived political efficacy and value system are the key motivational cognitions that drive the personality (traits) of an individual and unquestionably lead to the political engagement. These three cognitive components

of motivation, as I will refer to them, go hand in hand in increasing the level of political participation. Starting from the initially presented map of political behaviour of an individual, everything presented in the text above indicates that in addition to all basic characteristics of the society and environment in which an individual exists and which undoubtedly affect him and define his social and individual status, it is the basic psychological content and processes of individual's personality that, in the myriad of all factors that affect political behaviour, are of key relevance for understanding his political action. Developed value system which motivates an individual to take action directed towards social and personal responsibility and the perceived political self-efficacy and congruence seem to be of crucial importance for manifested political will that is visible through active political action of an individual when he recognises that he is in the environment supportive of his ideas and opinions, as well as when he perceives that his needs are recognised by those towards whom his political action is oriented. "The more politics is perceived within the reach of their (citizen) understanding and pursuits, the more people will have reason to invest in politics. Conversely, incongruency between leader' behaviors, political programs, and citizens' priorities may fuel feelings of distance, alienation, and powerlessness conducive to various forms of democratic disenfranchisement no matter whether due to self- or social exclusion. This may be the case when voters face a world of politics whose functioning is incomprehensible or beyond their control, when issues seem irrelevant, or when political programs are disjoined from people's priorities and values"(Caprara, Vecchone, 2013:45).

POLITICAL WILL IN BIH

Should we try to understand and explain political behaviour of citizens in the society in which we live, taking into account all mentioned variables key to its understanding, we can unreservedly assign ourselves the educational role with regard to this subject matter. To expect that any citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina already has a clear, concrete and manifested political will would indicate complete absence of understanding of the situation of his political life. To expect from citizens and, I would dare to say, from political elites to enjoy the cake, in the sense of the political culture, without having learned to enjoy the bread, sets the tone and perspective of misunderstanding of the current state of affairs. This was confirmed by Dalton and Klingeman (2009) who speak of the limited social inclusion in Eastern European countries (Haward 2003). Majority of citizens in Eastern Europe were involved in political processes during democratic transition but following the changes in the 1980s and 1990s, all forms of political activities decreased. As a consequence, Eastern Europe still faces the challenge of integrating its citizens into democratic politics by nurturing the democratic process. There are not many studies carried out on a representative sample in Bosnia and Herzegovina which could serve as a basis to draw conclusions about political behaviour at the level of the whole population. However, the voter turnout at the 2012 Local Election and 2010 General Election indicates that there are still a large number of those who do not participate even in this simplest form of political behaviour (over 43% according to Puhalo, Perisic 2013). Analysis of the Position of Youth and Youth Sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2008) revealed that only 5% of young people are members of youth organisations/associations, 6% are members of a political party and only 1% of young people are members of a youth representative body. In 2007, over 95% of young people said that they had never contacted a politician, participated in any public debate, online political discussion, public hearing on municipal budget, etc. Three out of four persons at

the age of 16 to 30 claim that they are not interested in politics, with significantly higher proportion of women (82%) than men (72%) not being interested in politics. Puhalo and Perisic (2013) in their study on characteristics of abstaining voters and voters in Bosnia and Herzegovina argue that although voter turnout levels are low, abstaining voters (i.e. those citizens who are the subject of our attention because of the absence of political will - author's note) are not those who are not interested in politics but those who are not satisfied with electoral options. Findings of this study substantiate, in a very pragmatic manner, the motivational cognitions elaborated in the text above as being of key relevance for understanding of political behaviour. Namely, as Puhalo states, it was established that abstaining voters and voters are more different in terms of the variables I presented in the text above as the key variables for political activity than in the terms of their socio-demographic variables. These are motivational cognitions manifested as the perception of the ability to act, trust in institutions, interest in politics, perception of congruence of the values embraced by the ruling system, because while "voters turn out for elections ... justifying it as their duty and habit (value, author's note) ... abstaining voters justify their abstention by the nonexistence of any benefit for them, disappointment, corruption and crime of politicians, but also by the failure to fulfil electoral promises (feeling of political inefficacy and recognition that their values and needs are not recognised – incongruence, author's note)... Voters show stronger nationalist sentiment, have need to have a leader and more pronounced collectivist authoritarianism (congruence because parties at the elections match this profile)... Cosmopolitanism and liberalism mainly characterise those respondent who never vote (their value system is not recognised and they choose the abstinence since none of the political parties supports these values, author's note)"¹⁷ (Puhalo, 2013: 298-302). Even if voting constitutes the

17 Puhalo, 2013: 298-302: "glasači izlaze na izbore... ističući kako je to njihova dužnost i navika... apstinenti svoj neizlazak pravdaju time da neće imati nikakve koristi, razočaranošću, korupcijom i kriminalom političara, ali i neispunjavanjem

lowest form of political participation, it is obvious that people have no reason for political action, for voting unless they perceive that the voting serves to promote and achieve to a certain degree their personal value priorities. As people increasingly perceive political programmes, leaders and the overall political engagement as irrelevant and incongruent with their value system, interests and priorities, on the basis of the theoretical postulates presented in the text above, it can be expected that voting and any other form of political action would be diminished and that increasing number of people would be inclined towards abstention, feel helpless and detached from the political life of the community we live in.

On the other side, cognitive processes, cognitive schemas about ourselves and the environment we live in fall under the influence of the already existing schemas that were adopted through the mechanism of socialisation and which form an integral part of collectivist thinking and perception of the self and of the role of an individual in the social environment. Maintaining the traditional sense of collectivism we are “predetermined” to cognitively construct the environment and ourselves through situational attributions, neglecting the dispositional factors. This means that in explaining the social and personal behaviours and certain events we tend to be more willing to attribute the cause of both our own behaviour and behaviour of others in our environment to the external factors and force majeure that cannot be controlled (war, poverty...) and not to assign them to personal characteristics of an individual, e.g. his responsibility, conscientiousness, commitment, ability to act, will power, perceived efficacy, etc. I would dare to say that in addition to the aforesaid perception of political inefficacy and incongruence, bias in cognitive schemas and automatic thinking make the political action in transitional societies even more difficult, which is reflected both in

predizbornih obećanja... Glasači su veći nacionalisti, imaju veću potrebu za vođom i izraženiju kolektivističku autoritarnost... Kozmopolitizam i liberalizam su najviše prisutni kod ispitanika koji nikada ne izlaze na izbore“

helplessness and in self-fulfilling prophecy of “impossibility to act and impossibility of change”. I would dare to say that we “live” a cognitive schema of belief in the impossibility to change the current state of affairs, the schema of the so called learned helplessness according to which even when we can act, having seen that our effort cannot change anything (because we are the “product” of collectivist culture and our individualism has not been nurtured, raised in any of the segments of political socialisation, from the family to school and society in general), we tend to remain in the state of the “unchangeable”. As a matter of fact, citizens, failing to manage in such chaos of unclear expectations, unclear values and inarticulate volition, seem to have entered a vicious circle of learned helpless behaviour and even when they have an opportunity to act by the power of their will, they pursue cliché based, but confirmed, proven, tried and (currently) least painful behaviour. At the same time, we face new value orientations and preferences based on democratic principles and individual responsibilities. Democratic societies expect more from an individual. Considering that we are certainly both at the individual and institutional level committed to democratisation of the community we live in, it is then expected to see clearer and more visible styles of citizen participation, political motivation and *expression of political will* by means of a higher degree of participation in and control of political activities. It is a challenge to involve citizens in purposeful and meaningful political participation after so many years of “ritualised engagement” (Dalton and Klingeman, 2009). An imperative is to establish a clear reference framework that will allow our political being to grow and our political will to train through the adoption of new values and fostering of the sense of self-efficacy. Education, which in numerous studies proved to be an important factor of influence on political activity of an individual is, in our case, the key social factor affecting the change of adopted cognitive schemas. These newly adopted cognitive schemas are a precondition for volitional mobilisation of an individual to achieve the desirable change. I believe that this text, as well as the entire book,

is a missing link which will contribute to raising political will, while other processes to replace the political system, economic system and build civil society take 6 months, 6 and 60 years respectively (Dahrendorf, 1992, as cited by Lasic, 2011). In the course of these great changes at the level of transformation of the political culture and value system, those who were “given” more, i.e. intellectual elite, have the task to take the action to enlighten the others that the different can and should be achieved and that it is better. The will requires sacrifices. It requires the system. It requires saying NO. It requires saying YES. It requires belief in oneself and perception of self which has power to make difference. So, should we begin?! On Monday or RIGHT NOW?!

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DINO ABAZOVIĆ

SOCIOLOGICAL MONSTROSITY OF POLITICAL WILL IN BIH

State in which nothing exists between 'hypertrophied State' and 'infinite number of unorganized individuals', constitutes a veritable sociological monstrosity, for collective activity is always too complex to be able to be expressed through the single organ – that of the State. ¹⁸

E. Durkheim

INTRODUCTION

It is certainly paradoxical that, not only in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, "political will" is mainly written about and analyzed when it is not present i.e. when it is inactive or non-existent, thus creating a rather narrow frame of reference in terms of definition of what

18 *"Društvo u kojem nema ničega između 'hipertrofirane države' i 'beskrajnogbroja neorganiziranih pojedinaca', prava je sociološka čudovišnost, jer kolektivna aktivnost je isuviše kompleksna da bi se mogla izraziti samo jednim organom – državnim"; "The division of labour in society", Free Press Glencoe, p. 11; see also "Professional Ethics and Civil morals", Rotledge Kegan Paul 1957, pp. 20-23. (cited in: Robert Pinker: "Socijalna teorija i socijalna politika", Hrestomatija, FPN Sarajevo, 2000)*

“political will” actually is. But I believe that, in the Bosnian context, the more important thing is what Mujkić described in relation to the aforementioned paradox - “... there is no such thing as the ‘absence of political will’, i.e. the ‘situation’ in political life which we tend to superficially describe as the ‘absence of political will’ is nothing but another manifestation of political will itself.”(Mujkić, text on page 11 of this publication)

So, if we are to discuss Bosnia and Herzegovina today and provided that we want/desire to do so in order to make a step forward by questioning the “political will” along the line, requires, in Bosnian context, a new understanding of old concepts and processes, i.e. in the manner they were elaborated in certain theoretical frame of references of modern sociological thought. These essential concepts and processes are ideology, ethnicity (nation and nationalism) and the specific social capital.¹⁹

Some theoretical frames of reference that I have in mind are those arising from the work of Pierre Bourdieu, Rogers Brubaker, Michael Foley and Bob Edwards. I will attempt to do it in the form of initial points for consideration.

If we start from the premise that Adam Michnik is correct in saying that nationalism is the last word of communism, a final attempt to find a social basis for dictatorship (Michnik, 1991),

19 I have already discussed these concepts and processes in other publications, in different texts and for different reasons. Surprising is the author’s realization that even though the reasons for writing these texts were not related to the problem of „political will“, re-reading, pondering, and combining the main theses of these earlier texts hopefully produced adequate sociological insight in conjunction with a given theme – problem of „political will“ in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

“then this political hypothesis sees nationalism not as a remote inheritance of historical conflicts and structural distrust, but as a purely residual phenomenon, essentially communist determined²⁰, a form of authoritarianism that emerged because of communist socialization”. (Mundjiu-Pipidi, 2004:62).

However, that which significant number of authors refer to when using the term “communism” did not have/leave the same intensity and consequences in societies, nor the nationalism had the same form, results and fate in post-communist European countries. For instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, even the declaration of independence²¹ was not an event of symbolic significance comparable to the withdrawal of the Soviet army from the countries of the former Eastern Bloc -in those countries, the communism was tied to foreign occupation, while, in BiH for example, we do not have a suitable equivalent. Of course, if we analyze the change of the ruling ideological paradigm, the debacle of SKBiH-SDP (political party which was the successor of the League of Communists) at the elections was not nearly as strong symbolic event compared with the said withdrawal of the army from the countries under former Soviet domination. However, regardless of whether Michnik was right or wrong, the first hard fact is that one ideology - communist ideology or the ideology of the former socialist regime (whatever term is used to characterize it) gave way, or was replaced by the ideology of nationalism.

Therefore, in the model of analyzing the nationalism in the former Yugoslav republics, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina but also in

20 I believe it is more adequate to use the term *socialism*, not *communism* as it used not only by Michnik, but also Alina Mundjiu-Pippidi whose work I refer to here.

21 Here, I refer to the understanding of independence in the period between the first multiparty elections and the outbreak of the war of aggression in Bosnia and Herzegovina - although that time period is relatively short, it should not be ignored!

countries that were under Soviet domination, it is perfectly correct for Alina Mundjiu-Pippidi to say that “due to its positive association with political fatalism ... [nationalism] emerges as a substitute ideology, a form of distinctive political identity “. (Mundjiu-Pippidi, 2004: 81)

Furthermore, we need to determine how this distinctive political identity, symbolic power, ultimately a symbolic violence against identity, came to be associated with ideology as concepts. Question formulated in this manner represents the starting point when discussing *doxa* (or ideology) in Bourdieu’s work.

According to him, *doxa* means accepting many things that people do not really know about, and, even though it implies practical knowledge people do not have the “tools” to understand their experience and talk about it (Burdieu, 1999). Therefore, those who are under the domination accept much more than we believe them to do, but also much more than they are themselves aware of.

According to Bourdieu, it is therefore extremely important not to succumb to the scholastic bias - which we are all exposed to, according to him - that is, to think that the problem can be solved only through awareness; according to him that is and will not be possible because

“... symbolic domination is more problematic, resistance is more difficult since it is something you absorb like air, something you don’t feel pressured by, it is everywhere and nowhere and to escape from that is very difficult...” (Bourdieu, 1999:270)

It is even more difficult, if we think about ethnicity and nation in terms of substantial groups or entities, which is present to a high degree in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and not only in Bosnia).

Therefore I believe that Rogers Brubaker is right in believing that we have to think about ethnicity and nationality in terms of practical

categories, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frameworks, organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects and contingent events. (Brubaker, 2002)

Since rationalization, ethnicization and nationalization are political, social and psychological processes, Brubaker, accordingly, insists on considering groupness as a contextual fluctuating variable rather than a group, as it has so far mostly been the case in social research.

Of course, the above frames of reference are not the only possible ones, and probably are not even appropriate approaches in all aspects - but, if nothing else, I offer this as an attempted appeal to leave the old paradigms which, apart from description, apparently do not offer much else.

ISSUE OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Furthermore, in the (post-)conflict society, such as that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, discussing the concept of “political will” primarily entails the narrative on virtually all segments of this society. This, at the same time, inevitably leads to a related concept - “accountability”, since even the extremely simplified descriptions of everyday phenomena that surround us, as well as the processes which we participate in, are sufficient only to conclude that “accountability” does not actually exist here.

Therefore, it is advisable to initially force ourselves to recognize that we are discussing something that is non-existent and absent, ergo, to recognize another paradox – to discuss the concept based on that which it is not, i.e. whose basis it has been negatively defined on.

If we are to, say, follow the tradition of stylistic exercises and replace the term “accountability” with “state”, would we get the same result?

Here, the state is still out of context, therefore it is obvious where it is absent and where it should be, or it is contextualized by its determination as repression and coercion. In simple terms, you can have as much accountability as you have the state.

Therefore, not much needs to be said about institutions, including the state, which the accountability, at least theoretically, rests with and where such action is implied in itself, while we need to say more about our relationship with the (non-)accountability, and (un-)accountability. Also, seemingly equally important to me is an almost specifically Bosnian phenomenon - "transfer of accountability".

Speaking of philosophical and moral aspect of accountability, Žarko Puhovski says the following:

"The complexity of this issue can be seen on a daily basis in almost anecdotal manner, merely by reading our newspapers, in which, at least once per week, one can find phrases such as: *the responsible authorities had no response* or *the responsible authorities refused to provide an answer*. Once again, it is linguistically and logically clear that one who refuses to give an answer is not responsible, as well as the one who cannot or may not be held accountable since he, for example, enjoys immunity. By definition, which they are likely to dislike, members of the parliament are irresponsible because they may not be held accountable, and the accountability is essentially a communicational relationship. In this case, we can say that: those who should be held accountable by virtue of their formal position are in fact not accountable, so they refuse to answer the question".²²

22 "Koliko je to pitanje kompleksno, može se pokazati na dnevnoj razini gotovo anegdotalno tako da se pogledaju novine kod nas u kojima se barem jednom tjedno nalaze formulacije tipa: odgovorni nisu imali odgovora ili odgovorni su odbili odgovoriti. Opet je jezično i logično jasno da onaj tko odbija odgovoriti nije

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, we are, at the same time, faced with the practice of “transfer of accountability”. I refer to the practice by which everything that local decision makers do not know about, do not want to do or will not do, they “proclaim it to be” the sphere of responsibility of the international community in BiH. Justifications mostly refer to “sensitivity” and “complexity” of an issue, while in principle this entails obligatory taking of unpopular actions that would be negatively interpreted within homogenized and ethnicized electorate that votes for them based on the principle of the protection of their own (mono)national interests. Also, the so-called international community “delegates” responsibility to the domestic authorities when faced with issues in relation to which there is no broad consensus among its key stakeholders. 23 One might describe this as a “levitating” accountability!

If we have the “responsible authorities” in a particular society which are not accountable, or do not want to be held accountable (it is necessary to emphasize the moral aspect of such practice along with its political and legal aspects,), as well as an entire class of privileged elite which enjoys all the benefits of this situation, we have to ask ourselves what about those who, in Durkheimian terms, represent an endless number of unorganized individuals who accept this as if this situation does not concern them i.e. as if it happens to someone else and, of course, elsewhere.

odgovoran, kao što nije odgovoran ni onaj kojega se ne može ili ne smije pozvati na odgovornost jer, recimo, ima imunitet. Po definiciji, što se njima valjda ne bi sviđalo, zastupnici u parlamentu su neodgovorni jer ih se ne može pozvati na odgovornost, a odgovornost bitno jest komunikacijski odnos. Ovdje se hoće reći otprilike sljedeće: oni koji bi trebali biti odgovorni po svojoj formalnoj poziciji zapravo to nisu pa ne odgovaraju na pitanje”; Puhovski, Žarko: «Filozofijsko-moralni aspekt zapovjedne odgovornosti», Zarez, issue no. 53, 12. 04. 2001, Zagreb

23 See more in Abazović, 2003.

Here, we can offer only indications needed for understanding Bosnian post-war phenomenology of the individual and provide a framework for further considerations.

From the viewpoint of individuals, significant number of them is in the phase which I describe as "victimization" stage, in which, from the perspective of the victim or an aggrieved party, all these negative phenomena are justified simply as the results of the war. The dominating discourse is based on fatalistic resignation to the outcomes of war i.e. the reasons for total inaction are to be found in the recent past in the form of violent intervention against the individual's knowledge and will, and, considering where he finds himself now, he is in a hopeless situation. There is no future different from the present which is characterized by extreme passivity.

The next phase which I will mention here is the "addiction" stage. It involves individuals who, due to specific circumstances, (e.g. continued education, employment, various forms of social engagement) managed to leave the "victimization" stage. These are the individuals who fully see their potential efforts and commitment as depending on "someone" or "something", but not on themselves. Unlike the individuals described in relation to the previous phase, the individuals at the "addiction" stage can be activated, but only through the persistent external stimuli based on authority - political, religious or financial authority, to name a few. The future exists, but it depends on others.

Minorities, i.e. those who are not even at the "victimization" or "addiction" stage face the consequences of social disorganization and unsuccessfully try to become part of critical mass that will, for a start, expose as fatal the dominant, perverted value system.

If we try to abstract the phenomenon of activism at higher level than the individual according to the criterion of coverage, at the group level,

for example, we face the primordial types of collective consciousness based on ethno-confessional elements and determinants in our country, but I think it is another topic which is, in any case, present to a more significant degree in various elaborations - from newspaper articles to scholarly works. Yet, systematic approach to the phenomenon, which is most often found in contemporary theories of organization and organizational behavior is simply not applicable in our context.

SOCIAL CAPITAL?

Let us take a look at the situation in the field of theory of "social capital". It is commonplace for most of definitions of "social capital" to be primarily focused on relations in society, which actually produce some benefits both for the individual and the community. Although we cannot use the relevant literature to identify a clear, unambiguous and integral opinion on what social capital actually means, we do not have generally accepted common ground that would incorporate different approaches to the definition of social capital as well.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the individual "definitions" are operationalized depending on individual studies and a researcher's disciplined approach i.e. the depth and level of analysis of a specific community. However, it is certain that the social capital is multidimensional and it has to be conceptualized in this manner in order for it to have some explanatory value.

However, in all studies of social capital it is clear that it is always about the different society networks i.e. about the connections that exist between individuals holding similar worldviews, yet they also bridge the differences among those holding opposing worldviews, including the norms themselves as well as reciprocity. However, regardless of

whether we look at social capital from the point of view of individuals or the community concerned, it is important to realize that we can primarily observe something almost at the level of a rule, stating that - social capital is about information, influences, solidarity, and that is what is available to stakeholders of socially networked relationships in the community.

Although I cannot offer a detailed analysis of the main insights from the rather wide range of approaches to the study of social capital on this occasion, it seems necessary and practical to provide at least a reminder regarding the "sources", i.e. previous perspectives of studying social capital in the form of enormous contribution of three authors in the first place - Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam. We mention Bourdieu due to his sociological understanding of social capital through its immanent critical theory of society and the role of elites; Coleman, a sociologist who studied the phenomenon through the prism of rational choice theory and established strong links between it and economic relations; and finally Putnam, because of political discourse on social capital through civic engagement and involvement.

Indeed, today's Bosnia and Herzegovina offers an almost ideal-typical setup for basic research into social capital (and a lot more, of course) which is presented in theoretical and empirical manner.

With regard to this, it is necessary to draw particular attention to the work of Michael Foley and Bob Edwards, who are, among others, recognized for the theoretical framing of applicative research into social capital in specific societies. Foley and Edwards are among the first to point out the very important aspect that must be taken into account with regard to research into social capital - according to them, generalized approach to social trust is irrelevant, simply because the conceptualization of social capital is directly dependant on the social context.

For a society such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, this is a highly important insight and one must not lose sight of it.

In the existing studies and research into social capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina we can start from the first and primary finding- Bosnia and Herzegovina has an unusually low level of social trust compared to other countries in the region and Europe (in BiH only about 10 percent of people think that people may be trusted; in Serbia this percentage is just over 13 percent, in Slovenia over 17 percent, while in the Scandinavian countries it amounts to slightly below or above 60 percent). This (in) directly confirms Putnam's thesis from the book *"Making Democracy Work"* which says that societies with low social capital are governed by the least successful governments, with high levels of corruption and inefficiency.

In any case, the study of social capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina, such as the one conducted by the UNDP Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is primarily reflected in the exact indicators of interpersonal trust as an expression of social support, integration and level of social cohesion. The collected and analyzed data supported by information obtained from the focus groups should be, and, in my opinion, undoubtedly is of an interest to the professional community and general public, but also to those who make decisions, at least in informative manner, about the way in which the things are going on "between us".

Here are some illustrative examples: people in BiH believe that the most significant level of social tension in the country is the one between the rich and the poor (88%), followed by tensions between the management and workers (86%), and only then between different ethnicities (79%). Today, unlike in 2005 (again, according to the exact indicators from the research the UNDP conducted in BiH), one can see a large drop in the perception of the importance of the wartime events, along

with a significant change in terms of responses - from “very important, I will never forget it” to “it is important, but I went on with my life”. To put it simply, BiH experiences some other major fault lines, apart from those of religious and ethnic nature. Respondents indicated that they spend much time with members of their own ethnic group, but they did not indicate a significant level of trust with regard to the members of their own ethnic groups, unless they are their family members or close friends. There is no difference among the respondents, regardless of whether they are Bosniaks, Serbs or Croats.

Given the very low level of social “inclusion” – e.g. the rate of membership in associations is 17.5%, mostly in political parties (sic!), followed by sports, art associations and unions. Considering that the number of those who describe themselves as active members is even lower (i.e. 10.5%), the resultant “exclusionary” social capital is most evident in the fact that 95% of respondents say that having “personal connections” is always or sometimes useful for gaining access to basic social services, and 85% of them consider “personal connections” as the only way to get a job. What is particularly worrying is the fact that more young people believe that personal connections are more important to gaining access to services than it is the case with the elderly. It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the respondents from the FBiH and RS, the respondents in the Brčko District demonstrated less belief in the benefits of having “personal connections”.

Although the research showed that BiH society is dominated by strong familial/kinship ties, lack of broader social ties constitutes an important dimension of poverty and social exclusion (so, 13.6% of respondents are unable to provide adequate heating in their homes, vacation away from home cannot be afforded by 61.7% of them, while a meal including meat, chicken or fish on every second day is unattainable for 31.3% of respondents). Generally, groups that are more likely to be

affected by social isolation are internally displaced persons, minority returnees, the elderly, women from rural areas and people with lower level of education.

So, “given the low levels of social trust, the fragmentation of the social sphere and high levels of social exclusion, the analysis of social capital in BiH is, therefore, opportune at the current time for three reasons: Firstly, attempts to foster the rebuilding of multiethnic and diverse communities would benefit greatly from a more thorough understanding of the degradation of social solidarity. Secondly, social capital research involves the analysis of both formal and informal networks. In terms of formal networks or associations, such research can shed valuable light on the functioning and effectiveness of civil society in BiH. At the same time, informal social networks – comprising family, relatives, friends, neighbours and acquaintances can have negative consequences for society at large, in particular where they encourage nepotistic and clientelistic relations. Thirdly, while BiH has seen steady levels of economic growth in the past few years, the economic benefits of this growth have been distributed unequally. The concept of social capital provides an innovative way of approaching poverty reduction through shifting the focus away from a deficit (or discriminatory) model of disadvantage in which the poor or excluded are seen as largely responsible for their conditions. Instead, overcoming poverty is understood to be, in part, as the overcoming of a lack of immediate support networks or network poverty” (*“The Ties That Bind ”*, 2009: 19).

While in other “happier” and better organized societies and countries a research of this type is specifically focused on studying levels of optimism, satisfaction with life, perception of governmental institutions and political participation as fundamental dimensions of social capital (extremely low rate of respondents reported that they contacted representatives of the authorities for any reason, and even when this was

the case, it took place at the local level and for “personal reasons” or for the purpose of gaining information), judging by domestic policies, authorities and ourselves, social capital in BiH will, for quite a while, remain solely at the level of a specific set of informal values or norms among group members that allow for the cooperation between them .

Finally, it is once again evident from the provided analysis and the resulting data that, if we take social capital seriously, the network of societal relationships which determine behavior of individuals and thus affect the economic development can hopefully result in what Roland Inglehart determines as its basic function - culture of trust and tolerance, in which the extensive networks of voluntary associations develop and emerge.

The extensive networks of voluntary associations of such kind represent an indispensable element in creating a social milieu that requires and entails responsibility – and corresponding climate of active and resulting “political will”.

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MIROSLAV ŽIVANOVIĆ

POLITICAL WILL: OR CONCEPT OF PUBLIC POLICY AS ANALYTICAL TOOL FOR RESEARCH OF POLITICAL WILL

The man is a being who seeks intrinsic meaning of his life or, which is the same, who seeks his rational and human abilities.

Đuro Šušnjić

“Lack of political will” is the expression most commonly used to justify or explain the absence or the lack of implementation of public policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is predominantly used by politicians but also it is accepted and referred to in analyses by civil society activists, media and academic and professional community. Obviously, there is a strong relationship between the concepts of public policy and political will, which although recognised by the public remains rather under-explored and insufficiently explained. Efficiency of the state and government is proportional to the efficiency of public policies they develop and implement. Current position of Bosnia and Herzegovina compared to the other countries in the region is a testament that in our country it is not possible to speak of public policies which in the public interest successfully generate public value. Moreover, government

activity (public policy) frequently does not have a typical form of the public policy.

Political will is therefore instituted as one of the basic concepts that can and has to be used to depict the social and political reality in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, there is no generally accepted understanding of the concept of political will and it can be concluded that any understanding of political will can have different meaning, which simply renders meaningless its use in attempts to explain public policies and really understand their eventual success or failure. In such situations, referring to the political will is as relevant as attributing the current situation to the circumstances of force majeure. On the other side, the existence or even prevalence of this excuse or justification is indicative of a certain logical rationale behind this concept which makes it acceptable in our public. Nevertheless, this cannot invalidate the fact that public policies, widely understood as everything the government does or fails to do, are explained in the context of the concept whose meaning is at the least unknown or at best interpreted in different ways. Consequently, this imposes the need to research the concept of political will, i.e. to try to answer some questions that have arisen so far concerning the political will. This should primarily ensure that we move away from a common practice in our society of equating political will exclusively with the publicly manifested will of politicians.

It would be expected to begin by defining the concept of political will, i.e. by answering the question what political will is. Should we turn our attention to Hammergren who says that political will is the slipperiest concept in the policy lexicon and it is the sine qua non of policy success which is never defined except by its absence²⁴, it is desirable to

24 Post, Lori Ann; Raile, Amber N. W.; Raile, Eric D. . Defining Political Will. *Politics and Policy*, 38(4), 2010. pp. 653 – 676.

proceed by explaining as comprehensively as possible what we refer to when speaking of political will. The aim is to gain some insight into the existing attempted definitions and identify possible common elements in these definitions. In addition, it is worthwhile at this level already to conduct an experiment and try to find a possible synthesis between the most profound and most convincing explanations. The rationale to proceed in this manner can be found in the assumption that every definition is determined by scientific and other effort invested in collecting and interpreting adequate arguments. There is no reason to reject the assumption that any attempted definition has its argumentative basis which can fit into a wider, synthesised and functional determination of the concept of political will.

The next question is why do we almost naturally connect political will and (un)successfulness of public policies? Understanding of political will is linked to the conceptual framework of public policies. Certainly, we begin from the obvious assumption that the “organic” connection between will and public policy stems from that fact that the process of preparation and implementation of public policy is entirely determined by stakeholders ranging from appointed and elected political office holders, civil servants (administrative apparatus) and formal and informal interest groups (civil society), economic organisations as well as interested citizens. To put it simply, the key link is the assumption that the will of public policy actors constitutes political will required for effective and efficient formulation and implementation of public policies.

The aforesaid paves the way to the next segment of this material which will be dedicated to the consideration of the answer to the question whether it is possible, based on the knowledge about elementary factors of political will and policy, define strategies and build mechanisms of (political and civic) action that could contribute to creation (or to deconstruction) of political will as sine qua non of a successful public policy.

ON WILL AND POLITICAL WILL

Ever since the very beginning of theoretical consideration of will, it has been observed as the “power”, “ability” of reasonable action as opposed to instinctive behaviour. While instinctive behaviour is entirely determined by natural, intrinsic instincts, such as instinct for survival and breeding, volitional behaviour is based on reason and moral, at least in a way as it was understood by philosophy and old speculative psychology²⁵. However, for the most part will is not manifested as either solely reasonable or solely affective action. It is rather, as suggested by functional psychology, an intellectual and affective process of decision making, i.e. of intentional mobilization and direction of one’s own behaviour in line with the decisions made²⁶. At this point, it is important to emphasise that natural incentives are challenged by the directed and intentional incentives appealing to human mind, such as norms and values, but also laws, custom and institutions. In modern psychology, “will is reduced to the issue of motivation and decision making process”²⁷. However, regardless of this contradiction, volitional action is always to a greater or lesser extent determined by the impulsive action too. One example would be exposing oneself to the deadly threat despite the survival instinct. Although it will not result in a desirable action (escaping the threat), the powerful effect of the survival instinct will lead to impulsive reactions that will affect volition of a person at that moment, such as fear, shivering etc. Looking at it from an opposite perspective, we could speak of instinctive reactions interwoven with volitional behaviour. For example, that would mean gradually and slowly moving away from the danger, as a result of the cognitive process and conclusion that a sudden movement would attract danger.

25 *Psihoedukacija: rečnik psiholoških pojmova*. Available on http://www.psihoedukacija.rs/recnik_V.php. Accessed on: 10.12.2014.

26 *Ibid.*

27 *Ibid.* “*volja {se} svodi na problem motivacije ili proces donošenja odluke*”

Ultimately, political community as a human invention owes its existence to the dynamics of natural incentives. The overall dynamics and mutual relations of the incentives in a given time and space determine the will. Political system is created by wilful actions of people gathered in a community, as a mechanism which provides us, as a species, with the designed and managed survival, i.e. satisfying our innate survival instinct. In other words, the political system, even if a primitive one, is an ultimate manifestation of political will. Once established, political system is maintained and developed through further dynamics of incentives now being significantly different due to the fact of real existence of the political system which, through the entirety of its institutions produces primarily directed and designed incentives which determine human behaviour. Natural and designed incentives become interwoven. Over the time, the political system, thanks to its historical factuality, develops its capacities to design and direct incentives. The basic manifestation of that system in the modern world is the state, its constitutional and economic system, its laws, government, legal system and administration. Both the political system as a whole and its constituent parts are at any moment exposed to the given dynamics of complex incentives which form and define them. Thereat, these dynamics are to a significant degree determined by the tension occurring between natural incentives and designed incentives managed by human action within the framework of a functional political system.

While the unconstrained dynamics of natural incentives also enable utterly deviant behaviour of individuals and groups, which in specific circumstances can have cataclysmic consequences (world wars, neoliberal capitalism), the guided and designed incentives strive to direct human action (creation of will) towards the organised, predictable and quintessential human satisfaction of the intrinsic instinct for survival, propagation of species. One of the main instruments in pursuing this mission is a public policy but the precondition to use this instrument is political will.

WHAT DO WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT POLITICAL WILL?

Available studies examining political will are most frequently inspired by the attempts of researchers to explain the success or failure of concrete public policies. Increasing number of such studies and widespread reference to the “absence of political will” in the public political discourse resulted in the scientific research projects aiming to analyse and interpret the concept of political will. Regardless of the type of these research projects, majority of the studies reported that political will is an overtly used but insufficiently understood and under-analysed concept. As such, it seems almost ideal for political (ab)use, particularly in some sensitive political situations when the public expects and demands explanations and answers from their political representatives.

Refusing to abandon the concept of political will to the realm of hollow political rhetoric and being convinced of its practical value, Post, Raile and Raile decided to pursue a pragmatic and systematic definitional approach focused on the research outcomes that can make political will an empirically useful and actionable concept²⁸. A dominant characteristic of this, just as any other similar research, is the belief of the authors that it is possible in this way to identify appropriate theoretical frameworks and appropriate tactics that would ultimately enable the development and application of practical solutions to the problems of political will, i.e. the lack thereof in formulation and implementation of public policies.

Certainly, research and analyses of political will imply addressing a number of questions. Is political will a binary of continuous concept?²⁹

28 Post, Lori Ann; Raile, Amber N. W.; Raile, Eric D. . Defining Political Will. *Politics and Policy*, 38(4), 2010. pp. 653 – 676.

29 Ibid.

What is meant by political will in practical terms? How to assess whether or not political will is present?³⁰ Is political will an individual-level or group-level concept? Does the concept of political will incorporate the issue of capacities? Political will as a universal concept. ³¹ What are the key elements of political will and its influencing factors?³²

For Post, Raile and Raile, definitional approach primarily means providing an insight in the existing attempts to define political will which are dominantly focused on a specific public issue of policy. In their analysis they refer to Hammergren and her identification of political will with the likelihood of reform and Kpundeh who defines political will as demonstrated credible intent of political actors (elected or appointed leaders, civil society activists, stakeholder groups, etc.) to systematically attack the perceived causes or effects of public issues.

They also cite Brinkerhoff's definition of political will defined as commitment of actors to undertake actions with the aim to achieve a set of objectives and to sustain the costs of those actions over time. ³³ His definition is based on a developed analytical concept differentiating seven measurable components of political will:

1. Government initiative (certain degree of initiative from local decision makers must exist in order to even talk about political will);

30 Malena, Carmen. Building Political Will for Participatory Governance: An Introduction. U: Malena, Carmen (Ur.). From Political Won't to Political Will: Building Support for Participatory Governance. Boulder: Kumarian Press, 2009. p. 17.

31 Post, Lori Ann; Raile, Amber N. W.; Raile, Eric D. . Defining Political Will. *Politics and Policy*, 38(4), 2010. pp. 653 – 676.

32 Malena, Carmen. Building Political Will for Participatory Governance: An Introduction. U: Malena, Carmen (Ur.). From Political Won't to Political Will: Building Support for Participatory Governance. Boulder: Kumarian Press, 2009. p. 17.

33 Post, Lori Ann; Raile, Amber N. W.; Raile, Eric D. . Defining Political Will. *Politics and Policy*, 38(4), 2010. pp. 653 – 676.

2. Choice of policy based on technically sound, balanced consideration and analysis of options, anticipated outcomes and cost-benefit ratio (choosing one of possible policies can be considered willingness to act);
3. Mobilisation of stakeholders (effort of government actors to consult and communicate with civil society and private sector);
4. Public commitment and allocation of resources (public commitment to a certain policy, accompanied by assigning the resources required to achieve established programme goals contributes to a positive assessment of political will);
5. Application of credible sanctions (a serious intent to implement a policy is reflected in well prepared and enforced sanctions);
6. Continuity of effort (real implementation of a policy requires the long-term effort and investment of resources);
7. Learning and adaptation (process for monitoring of implementation of a policy and adapting to emerging circumstances).³⁴

Brinkerhoff links his determination of political will primarily with the action of government actors, which implies that political will (both positive and negative) is built from the top down. However, this conclusion would not be correct so Brinkerhoff says that bottom-up sources of political will are also of key importance for the success of policies. This is explained through the economic concept of supply and demand, where bottom-up action (with the citizen groups, civil society organisations,

34 Brinkerhoff, Derick W. . Unpacking the Concept of Political Will to Confront Corruption. Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2010. p. 2.

private sector, etc. being the key actors) determines demand, while political action from the top down (most frequently represented by actors who are elected or appointed officials) represents the political supply.³⁵

Certainly, “demand” represents i.e. comes from a much wider context comprising the entire social, political and economic relations, so Brinkerhoff recognises political will as a durable but changeable variable that reacts to its environment. The environment implies demands, pressures and incentives whose relevance is determined by the quality and functionality of government and administrative structures and procedures linking the government and civil society.³⁶

Just like Brinkerhoff, Lawrence Woocher with the ambition to identify factors which can have effect on political will and appropriate strategies for its strengthening, directed his research towards the deconstruction of the concept of political will.³⁷ His work is focused on political action and policies aimed at preventing conflicts and mass war atrocities in the cases when the absence of a preventive action or its inadequacy is explained, of course, by the lack of political will.

Woocher believes that, in order to expand the basic conceptual framework of political will, it is important to understand the three models of decision-making process and government action. In the context of conflict prevention, Woocher identifies three preconditions for an

35 Ibid. p. 3.

36 Brinkerhoff, Derick W. . Where There’s Will, There’s a Way? Untangling Ownership and Political Will in Post-Conflict Stability and Reconstruction Operations. *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, Volume 8, No. 1 (2007). p. 116.

37 Woocher, Lawrence. Deconstructing „Political Will“: Explaining the Failure to Prevent Deadly Conflict and Mass Atrocities. *Journal of Public and International Affairs*, Volume 12, No. 1 (2001). p. 169.

adequate action: (1) knowledge about the forthcoming conflict, i.e. early warning; (2) institutional capacity to act; and (3) will to implement adequate policy, i.e. political will to act.³⁸ Any conceptual consideration of political will must encompass the way in which governments arrive at decisions and take action. Accordingly, Woocher bases his work on the analysis of three models of government decision making taken from Allison and Zelikow:

1. The rational actor model (government decision making is rational and based on perception of the actors' objective situation, their objectives and expected outcomes of the policy options);
2. The organisational behaviour model (government actions are not conscious choice of a unitary actor but outputs of larger organisation based on pre-established organisational routines and standard operating procedures);
3. The governmental politics model (government behaviour is based on the participants in the process; their perceptions, preferences and stances; their power; but also on the existing action channels and rules of political negotiations).³⁹

Evidently, each of these models gives a specific and equally important aspect of the entire range of factors influencing government decision making and implementation of government actions, i.e. the factors that affect creation of political will. In that sense, based on the first model (the rational actor model), the main and critical factors of political will are the objectives of the actors, perception of the objective situation, assessment of the costs and benefits of the available

38 Ibid. p. 182.

39 Ibid. p. 185.

options, factor of limited rationality and problems of collective action. The organisational behaviour model recognises that the main factors of political will are organisational objectives, organisational culture, as well as organisational routines and standard operating procedures. In the end, the governmental politics model puts emphasis on political “players” as factors of political will, i.e. on their personal preferences, interests and experiences, as well as their political skills, their behaviour which is the result of their perceptions, preferences and stances and their power and on the existing action channels and rules and procedures of decision making abided by these political “players”.⁴⁰

Each of the aforesaid factors has a potential for effective mobilisation of political will, considering that each of them can be a subject of appropriate strategies aimed at (re)shaping or transforming political will.

This research by Lawrence Wocher is in an interesting way complemented by the work of Carmen Malena who focused in her research on the analysis of political will in the context of support building for participatory governance. Malena’s work concerning political will also represents an attempt to answer the question which strategies and activities proved to be most effective in nurturing political will for participatory governance and why.

Of course, like all other authors who decided to give their contribution to the development of the conceptual framework of political will, Malena rejects the notion of a passive acceptance of political will as an external factor that cannot be influenced upon and which either exists or not. Quite to the contrary, political will is generated and nurtured, wherefore it is important to seek to understand the principal elements

40 Ibid. p. 186.

of political will and the key influencing factors.⁴¹ Malena identifies three mutually reinforcing elements of political will: political *will*, political *can* and political *must*. In other words, in order for power holders to be able to commit to act and really act, they need to *want* to undertake certain activity, feel confident that they *can* (possess ability and capacity) and feel that they *must* undertake such action.⁴²

In determining this concept, Malena follows the logic of the ideal type and concludes that the reality of political will itself is complex and unpredictable. Therefore it is possible that action directed at want, can and must, will not necessarily result in political will. However, it is possible to identify political will even in the absence of one, two or even all of the aforesaid elements.⁴³

In an ideal scenario, implementation of each political activity or action is the result of a sincere wish of decision makers and political power holders. Malena differentiates between two main types of actors whose action is characterised by the strong political want. A natural type are those actors who instinctively, based on their personal beliefs and values, support certain policies and political actions. A converted type refers to those whose political want is the result of the recognised benefit that may be the outcome of implementation of certain policies. Malena claims that the political or personal interest is an important source of political want.⁴⁴

41 Malena, Carmen. Building Political Will for Participatory Governance: An Introduction. U: Malena, Carmen (Ur.). From Political Won't to Political Will: Building Support for Participatory Governance. Boulder: Kumarian Press, 2009. p. 19.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid. p. 20.

Political *can* is also an important element of political will. The actors, who are confident in their capacities and in the capacities of other participants in certain processes, are more likely to manifest political will. Conversely, feeling of the lack of ability, skills, mechanism and support can easily result in low political will. It is important to emphasise that Malena describes the ability and capacities as inclusive of legal and regulatory frameworks.

For Malena, the last element that completes political will as a whole is the political must. Probability of political action is higher, even if given actors have both the want and necessary capacity, if this want and capacity are accompanied by a pressure that demands action and makes inaction politically damaging. Political *must is, inter alia, related to Brinkerhoff's factor of the environment and there is a difference between the pressure coming from "the top", i.e. from the political leadership and pressure coming from "below" through citizen mobilisation, in the form of public demonstrations and rallies, petitions, strikes, media campaign, advocacy and lobbying tactics. The key generators of this kind of pressure are situations of political, economic and social crises. When it comes to political must, Malena also identifies the relevance of constitutional, legal and regulatory framework which can to a great degree determine the level of interest of key political actors and civil servants.* ⁴⁵

In addition to the political *want, can* and *must*, Malena introduces another key segment in her conceptual framework based on the fact that all these elements are under the influence of a wide range of factors at the individual, organisational, relational and social levels. Malena offers a very effective schematic overview (Figure 1) of this conceptual framework – a multidimensional circle of political will, which clearly

45 Ibid. p. 22.

indicates the complexity of the phenomenon of political will where all elements and factors influence one another.

Political will, in its entirety, is the will of individual political actors. The individual factor pervades all phases of the process of preparation and implementation of policy, from the detection of the problem and its inclusion in the social and political agenda to the work on its resolution through active application of selected programmes and measures. All individuals participating in this process and their will determine the final outcome of a certain policy. Influencing their will, we can influence the entire political will necessary to achieve the established political goal. In that sense, it is necessary to have in mind that the will of an individual is determined by a series of factors including: personal beliefs and values, character, upbringing, education, instinct, experiences, relationships. These are the factors that form individual perception, understanding of the world, attitudes and personal goals of an individual. All of these factors have effect on motivation and thereby on the will of individual actors. To change their will means to influence the aforesaid factors, where the best strategy would be, of course, direct advocacy.




Figure 1. Multidimensional circle of political will
 (Source: http://www.researchgate.net/publication/242417966_FROM_POLITICAL_WON%27T_TO_POLITICAL_WILL)

In terms of the factors which influence political will at the organisational level, Malena practically reiterates the characteristics detected by Woocher in the organisational behaviour model and speaks of organisational mandates, organisational culture, established practices and procedures as factors influencing political will and political action. She accepts the thesis that organisations act in accordance with the logic of appropriateness, i.e. with the pre-established patterns of behaviour rather than behaviour determined by rational consideration of consequences.

At the relational level of factors influencing political will, Malena considers the role and relevance of various actors, such as citizens and civil society. Malena here refers again to Woocher and his governmental politics model focusing on political processes defined as political negotiations based on predetermined relations between a wide range of actors holding different positions of power, having different perceptions and preferences. According to Malena, it is very difficult to nurture political will in a situation where citizens are disempowered or disengaged, civil society organisations are weak and disorganised or where relations between civil society and state are characterised by distrust and hostility.⁴⁶

In the end, the conceptual framework is closed with the factors pertaining to the given society as a whole. General political, legal, social, economic and cultural characteristics unquestionably, depending on their positive or negative nature, have either enabling or constraining role in the formation and development of political will. For example, in hybrid, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes where decision making lies outside official institutions under the direct control of political power holders, it is very difficult or even impossible to expect building of political will for public policies enabling participation of citizens in decision making processes. Political will and its dynamics is also influenced by

46 Ibid. p. 24.

the constitutional and legal framework, functioning of the state and rule of law, literacy rate, levels of general social trust and social capital. In situations where these factors are extremely negative, all strategies leading towards progressive change of the general social environment are actually the strategies that lead towards freer, more functional and effective building of political will.

Post, Raile and Raile, as well as Woocher and Malena when defining political will as the extent of committed (real) support among key decision makers to a certain policy as a solution for a particular problem⁴⁷ rely on the analysis of earlier attempts to define the concept of political will. It is noteworthy that the definitions of these authors, each in its own right, connect the understanding of political will with the key three categories, with the text itself not being identical, but with significant overlap, as already stated.

Woocher	Malena	Post, Raile and Raile
The rational actor model	Political <i>want</i>	Distribution of preferences
The organisational behaviour model	Political <i>can</i>	Authority, capacity and legitimacy of actors
The governmental politics model	Political <i>must</i>	Commitment of preferences

U ime, kao jedan od ključnih elemenata za razumijevanje političke volje, prema Post, Raile i Raile, je distribucija preferenci

Namely, according to Post, Raile and Raile, one of the key elements for understanding political will is the distribution of preferences

⁴⁷ Post, Lori Ann; Raile, Amber N. W.; Raile, Eric D. Defining Political Will. *Politics & Policy*, Volume 38, No. 4 (2010). p. 659.

concerning the expected outcomes of certain policies, where the preferences or expectations of influential political actors and decision makers have the largest value.

As the second key determinant of political will, the authors identify authority, capacity and legitimacy of key decision makers and reformers. The expected policy outcomes are difficult to achieve without political power and adequate resources, so it is no surprise that policies not backed up by sufficient resources “suffer a deficit of political will”⁴⁸.

The third determinant identified by these authors is commitment to preferences where they detect signals of commitment, such as allocation of analytical and other resources and the design and application of sanctions for policy violations. Commitment to preferences can also be assessed through evaluation of the incentives (in other words, the environment) available to decision makers.

Nevertheless, let us revisit the definition of political will given by Post, Raile and Raile, according to which political will is the extent of committed (real) support among key decision makers to a certain policy as a solution for a particular problem. For creators of this definition, it represents the basis for a more detailed description of the concept further divided into four key components or subconceptual areas, which include the following: (1) a sufficient set of decision makers; (2) with a common understanding of a particular problem on a formal social agenda; (3) committed to providing support; (4) to a commonly perceived, potentially effective policy solution.⁴⁹ As was the case with Malena’s analytical concept, these components are logically organised around a number of factors influencing political will (Figure 2):

48 Ibid. p. 658.

49 Ibid.

Table 2. Analyzing Political Will

Definition Component	Operationalization	Assessment Targets
(1) Sufficient set of decision makers	Sets of actors capable of approving, implementing, and enforcing public policies	• Institutions and factions.
(2) With a common understanding of a particular problem on the formal agenda	(a) Use of similar frame and terminology; (b) Status as “problem” on formal agenda.	(a) Commonality and convergence in statements of decision makers with regard to problem; (b) Importance and prominence of decision makers discussing problem; volume of discussion.
(3) Is committed to supporting	Distribution and strength of specific decision-maker preferences	• Incentives and disincentives for political actors (institutional, electoral, and others); • Allocation of analytical resources; • Credibility and obligation of statements (based on reputational costs); • Positions of key constituencies (domestic and international) and accountability relationships; • Bargaining mechanisms; • Cultural characteristics and constraints.
(4) A commonly perceived, potentially effective policy solution	(a) Use of similar frame and terminology; (b) Avoidance of known sources of ineffectiveness; (c) Capacity for policy effectiveness.	(a) Commonality and convergence in statements of decision makers with regard to proposed solution; (b) Nonuse of short-term “fixes,” knowingly ineffective policies, and diversionary tactics; (c) Funding commitment; (d) Inclusion of potentially effective sanctions and enforcement mechanisms; (e) Implementation resources and support of implementers.

Figure 2. Political will framework

(Source: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2010.00253.x/abstract>)

Summarising the attempt to find the answer to the question from the title of this chapter and determine what political will implies, it is more than obvious that political will is a concept which reflects all the complexity and multifaceted nature of the political process and action, ranging from personal attitudes and beliefs of political leaders, often erroneously equalised with political will, to the very culture in the community or society, which is the factor frequently neglected in the modern political discourse when discussing political will.

Conceptual frameworks we outlined are still enough to clearly demonstrate the banality of the use of the construction about the lack of political will in the context of unrealised or unrecognised policies and political actions. Instead of just being a pure figure of speech, it is obvious that the concept of political will can offer an adequate analytical tool, which if used adequately, has the potential to shed some light on the essence of the process of political decision making and assist us in preparation and implementation of strategies aimed at enabling and implementing social and political changes.

ABOUT PUBLIC POLICIES

Public policy is “whatever governments choose to do or not to do”⁵⁰. Despite being a very wide and impractical definition, it is very significant considering that it leads to the conclusion that the absence of public policy in the political system and community is actually the public policy. This has direct implications on our analysis of the relationship between political will and public policy. In the political community, public policy, as well as its absence and non-implementation is the ultimate manife-

50 Young, Eoin; Quinn, Lisa. *Writing Effective Public Policy Papers. A Guide for Policy Advisers in Central and Eastern Europe*. Open Society Institute, Budapest: 2002. p. 5.

station of political will. In other words, every time it is said that “there is no political will” for a desirable or expected action, what remains unsaid is that “there is political will” to maintain the existing state of affairs and status quo. The reality is actually that political (in)action in any case implies political will.

There have been numerous attempts to define political will, which is generally speaking a peculiarity of social sciences, and with the evident expansion of this discipline the number of these attempts is ever increasing. Reading materials intended for certain target groups, such as civil servants, define public policy as a tool in resolving public problems, representing a “flow or a plan of action that, in a rational manner, achieves the desired goals through the use of public money”⁵¹. Putting emphasis on action and decision making only further confirms the existence of inseparable links between public policy and political will. Anderson also defines public policy as primarily “a purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern”⁵².

Being aware of a wide range of definitions, Young and Quinn highlighted the concepts or elements encompassed by a large number of definitions. Accordingly, public policy is:

- Authoritative government action;
- A reaction to real world needs or problems;
- Goal-oriented;

51 Policy Development Manual for Civil Servants in BiH. Sarajevo: UNDP, 2010. p. 7.

52 Young, Eoin; Quinn, Lisa. Writing Effective Public Policy Papers. A Guide for Policy Advisers in Central and Eastern Europe. Open Society Institute, Budapest: 2002. p. 13.

- A course of action;
- A decision to do or not to do something;
- Activities carried out by a single actor or a set of actors;
- Justified action;
- Based on decisions already made.⁵³

Smith and Larimer argue that there is a “small academic industry dedicated to defining public policy”. However, they also make a funny remark that the public policy is like pornography citing the famous comment by US Supreme Court Justice who said that it was unlikely he could ever intelligibly define hard-core pornography, but that he can certainly recognise it when he sees it.⁵⁴ In addition, they cite Birkland who claims that there is no precise and universal definition of public policy, nor is it likely that such definition will be formulated in the foreseeable future. Instead, there is a general agreement that public policy includes the process of making choices and the outcomes or actions of particular decisions, with the public policy being “public” because these choices and actions are supported by the state holding monopoly over coercive power. In addition to the aforesaid, public policy is understood as a response to a perceived problem.⁵⁵

As an area of multidisciplinary⁵⁶ scientific interest, the concept of public policy offers a wide range of possible fields of public policy

53 Ibid. p. 14.

54 Smith, Kevin B.; Larimer, Christopher W. *The Public Policy Theory Primer*. Boulder: Westview Press, 2009. p. 3.

55 Ibid. p. 4.

56 Ibid. p. 5.

studies. Scientists and practitioners in this field are particularly interested in the public policies as a process, public policy cycle, communities and networks organised around public policies, public policy actors (individuals and institutions), public policy analysis and the very implementation of public policies. The text below will offer a more detailed overview of how different fields of interest fit into the concept of political will.

POLITICAL WILL IN CYCLE MODEL OF POLICY PROCESS

The very essence of public policy is action and the essence of action is will. Moreover, understanding public policy as a purposeful course of action “underlines the mainstream definitions of policy”⁵⁷. The purposeful course of action is certainly a process realised, as suggested by Colebatch, as a number of successive stages which are “often presented not as a line, but as a circle suggesting that there is a natural progression from one stage to the next”⁵⁸. Accordingly, it is understandable that publications on public policy very often have the same approach based on the understanding of a policy as a cycle of successive phases which, provisionally speaking, starts with the setting of objectives, followed by selection of the course of action, implementation, evaluation of the outcome and possibly reformulation of public policy, i.e. beginning of a new cycle.

The cycle model of policy process (Figure 3) to a great degree encompasses the terms used to denote specific areas of the research in the field of public policy.

57 Colebatch, Hal K. *Policy*. 3rd ed. Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill, 2009, p. 47.

58 Ibid.




Figure 3. The cycle model of the policy process
 (Source: <http://www.geostrategis.com/images/policycycle.jpg>)

Undoubtedly, a large number of authors utilises in their research this conceptual framework and although using different number of phases or elements and different denoting labels, the basic model is always the same: public policy is understood as a rational, problem focused, linear process in a continual loop.⁵⁹ The cycle model is not a scientific theory, considering the lack of a hypothesis or hypotheses it proves, but it is a very useful descriptive classification of the policy process saying what happens without saying why it happens.⁶⁰ It was actually this classification that enabled the scholars to focus on specific fields of public policy.

59 Smith, Kevin B.; Larimer, Christopher W. *The Public Policy Theory Primer*. Boulder: Westview Press, 2009. p. 32.

60 *Ibid.* p. 33.

For the purpose of this text, we will refer to Smith and Larimer's four key research agendas, which represent the four key phases in the cycle model of policy process:

1. Agenda setting (research focuses on the issue of problem definition and how a problem reaches the government agenda);
2. Policy design (at this level, research is focused on the public perception of the problem and policies, their influence of the distribution of power, values and social groups represented through the policy and commonalities in different perspectives);
3. Policy implementation (why policy succeeded or failed to succeed and how the decision on a certain policy became concrete action);
4. Policy evaluation (central issue in the research is what we did what was the outcome of the implemented programmes and policies).

Let us reconsider for a moment the question that was raised earlier but not answered: why? The actual experience of a daily political life indicates that political will, i.e. the alleged lack thereof, could be a possible answer. It has been already established that the public policy is a manifestation of political will, whereby the identified phases of the policy process, from problem defining to the evaluation of implemented solutions, represent indicators of effective political will. By way of explanation, each of these phases is characterised by volitional action and actions of public policy agents and actors, taking into account the fact that each phase is characterised by its specificities and requirements which reflect on the roles and mutual relationships of all agents and actors. Namely, it is obvious that in setting the agenda, i.e. recognising and emphasising the problem, the key role is played by a wider community which, with the assistance of media and other actors, shares

the similar perception of the problem and exerts the public pressure on government requesting the programmes and measures aimed at resolving the recognised problem. On the other side, the phase comprising the formulation or design of the public policy requires an active and constructive engagement of political office holders, professional and academic community, representatives of organisations of civil society, as well as managerial civil servants.

The main roles and mutual relations of all policy agents and actors change from one phase to another, whereby if the political will is understood as the aggregate will of all participants in a given political process, it leads to adequate transformation of political will. Here, it is possible to draw a parallel with the physics axiom saying that the energy in a closed system cannot be destroyed or created out of nothing, but it can only change from one form to another. *In the sphere of the political, it can be argued that every political system or community possesses political will. Political will is always present, and even if it is a subject to a constant change and transformation, it is always present in everything political.* It is, in authoritarian regimes, determined predominantly by the will of the leader or dominant elite or elites. However, in democratic regimes its composition is more complex, determined by the will of political leaders, economic actors, socially active individuals or groups, religious communities, formal or informal interest-based communities, but also to a greater or lesser degree by the will of citizens.

When it comes to concrete public policies, political will can also be determined by the will of distinguished individuals assuming or performing leading functions in the processes of preparation and implementation of public policies, which most frequently happens in relatively closed processes, but it can also occur in the form of balanced will of all stakeholders in the process, which is most likely to happen in the processes ultimately requiring openness, involvement and codeciding.

This is explained by a wide range of definitions, including the already cited Brinkerhoff's definition which determines political will as commitment of political leaders and bureaucrats to undertake actions with the aim to achieve certain objectives, while sustaining the costs of those actions over time⁶¹. Nevertheless, such narrow understanding of political will is applicable only in certain phases of the public policy process, such as implementation, and not in cases when examining the process in its entirety.

What does this mean for the public policy agents and their action within the public policy process with the aim to achieve certain objectives and results in the political sphere? Cyclic nature of the public policy process enables for appropriate transformation of political will. Disruption in preparation and implementation of a public policy or a complete lack thereof does not imply the lack of political will but of its transformation. Each time a political situation is explained by the phrase "lack of political will", it actually implies the absence of a critical mass of (public) agents and actors who will through their action enable necessary or expected transformation of political will. In other words, managing the process of public policy encompasses, inter alia, managing of the process of transformation of political will, as aggregate will of actors and agents of a concrete public policy or resolving of a concrete public problem or issues.

For examples, in a model called "Bridges from Knowledge to Action" intended for the public health policies, Lezine and Reed identified the roles of political will as presented in the Table 1. ⁶²

61 Malena, Carmen. Building Political Will for Participatory Governance: An Introduction. U: Malena, Carmen (Ur.). From Political Won't to Political Will: Building Support for Participatory Governance. Boulder: Kumarian Press, 2009. p. 18.

62 Lezine, DeQuincy A.; Reed, Gerald A. . Political Will: A Bridge Between Public Health Knowledge and Action. American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 97., No. 11 (2007). p. 2012.

Table 1. Political will in the bridges from knowledge to action model

Model phase	Primary Role of Political Will	Examples
Phase 1: Gathering Information	Apply political will to increase knowledge base	Legislatures request hearings on issue Reports Request increased research funding Community agrees to participate in research and dialogue
Phase 1.5: Preparing to Develop a Strategy	Build political will to make an actionable strategy on the basis of scientific evidence	Identify influential “champions” for prevention Establish coalition or task force to address issue Use media interviews and opinion editorials to increase public awareness Public forums Lobbying
Phase 2: Drafting the Strategy	Political will to craft the social strategy	Government and citizen groups join a coalition Identify leadership with conflict resolution skills, to facilitate participatory process Secure financial and social resources for process Policy entrepreneurs fit the strategy into political and economic context Groups take ownership and responsibility for strategy implementation

<p>Phase 2.5: Preparing for Action</p>	<p>Assessment and development of the political will necessary for implementation</p>	<p>Environmental scans and community analysis to identify needs, assets, and local opinion leaders (formal and informal) Assess community readiness and capacity Educate decision makers about the need for a long-term perspective on change in the field in question Preimplementation feedback from key stakeholders</p>
<p>Phase 3: Taking Action</p>	<p>Political will to implement plans</p>	<p>Cultivate interagency cooperation, community coalition Use media campaigns for public education Legislation or adoption of new and regulations Ongoing support by funding, training, and technical assistance</p>
<p>Phase 3.5: Evaluation</p>	<p>Develop political will for sustaining existing programs by using new knowledge and insight</p>	<p>Community demand for accountability Disseminate information about process and outcome results Funders request plans for sustainability Consider effect of policies and possible amendments</p>

Cyclic model of the public policy processes which can be viewed through four key phases (agenda, design, implementation, evaluation) suggests that the success of a public policy is highly likely if the process is marked by at least four phases of transformation of political will. If we start from the extreme complexity of the conceptual framework of political will we shall come to the inevitable conclusion that it is extremely difficult to design, and subsequently use something resembling an institutional mechanism whose primary task would be to establish and disseminate a wide range of inducements aimed at all relevant factors of political will, which would ensure the necessary transformation of political will in relation to the specific public policy. However, the model offered by Lezine and Reed, as well as other attempts to study political will, which are driven by ambition to come up with strategies and tactics intended for its development and mobilization i.e. transformation, actually support the thesis that difficult does not mean impossible.

BUILDING COMMUNITIES AND NETWORKS AS A POSSIBLE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING TRANSFORMATIONS OF POLITICAL WILL

The essence of political will consists of people or the human factor, so the strategic framework designed to manage transformations of political will itself is fundamentally determined by knowledge pertaining to human behavior and action. In the field of scientific research of public policy there is a special area of academic interest relating to public policy actors. The issue of actors is, in fact, relevant to all fields of study of public policy. Of course, by actors we mean all individuals as well as formal and informal groups and organizations and institutions which are, to a greater or lesser extent, positively or negatively interested in public policy or the issue whose solving the policy is intended for.

For the purpose of clarity of presentation, those actors that respond positively to the preparation and implementation of public policy and choose to (pro) actively participate in it will be designated as agents of public policy.

It is obvious that interest in actors has to include interest in their will. Moreover, it is the willing aggregate (in)action of all public policy actors which constitutes the political will for the preparation and implementation of specific public policies. The behavior of agents and actors of public policy is political behavior par excellence, and it is in the focus of interest of political psychology as an interdisciplinary field „that attempts to explain political behavior via psychological principles“⁶³. Here, we are particularly interested in the man as a political animal whose behavior is determined by a number of psychological factors, including personality, values, identity, attitudes and emotions.⁶⁴

All of these factors, as we have already seen, are nothing but the building blocks that determine the will and behavior of agents and actors of public policies. The process of preparation and implementation of public policies in which, of course, an important role is played by public policy agents, has to take into account the socio - psychological dimension of the entire process. In other words, *active approach to the public policy simply requires socio-psychological analysis of actors, individuals and groups, and then, also, based on its findings, a strategic plan for concrete action of public policy agents through which the inducements that will facilitate the transformation of political will needed for the expected implementation of public policy will be disseminated.*

63 „psihološkim načelima pokušava objasniti političko ponašanje“; Cottam, M., et al. Uvod u političku psihologiju. Zagreb: Mate, 2010. p. XIII.

64 Ibid. p. 7.

Interaction between the mind of a political being and his/her environment takes place in the form of cognitive processes, which includes receiving and interpreting information from the outside. ⁶⁵ Cognitive process leads to voluntary action, so voluntary action of actors results from his/her/their decision to act. Interest in public policy actors, and, consequently, their will, entails the study of decision-making process⁶⁶ and the way in which we make our own choices. In this sense, works dealing with the area of public policy often refer to the theory of rational choice⁶⁷, which has already been discussed in the earlier study of definitions of political will. In ideal rational world, public policies and decisions on the selection of options are essentially objective and they take into account the optimal effectiveness and efficiency of selected solutions. However, we are faced with the fact that the world we live in is far removed from the ideal and rational in everyday life and this is confirmed by analytical mechanisms of political psychology, as it is recognized by experts who, according to Smith and Larimer, observe at least two reasons for which the rational decision-making is considered an unrealistic expectation when it comes to public policy. These are the limits of political and practical nature. The citizens, as the most numerous political actors, gravitate towards current solutions to current problems, which significantly limits the timeframe for the preparation and implementation of public policies, and, consequently, the ability to make optimal rational decisions. In the sphere of practical nature, complexity of the issues and problems that are in the focus of public policies or their drafts goes significantly beyond the cognitive capacities of people as political actors. ⁶⁸ Simply put, it is not fully realistic to expect for political actors to have

65 Ibid. p 9.

66 Smith, Kevin B.; Larimer, Christopher W. *The Public Policy Theory Primer*. Boulder: Westview Press, 2009. p. 49.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

the ability to gain access to all relevant information, or to recognize all potential consequences and results of discussed action options in relation to which they may have access only to a limited number of options. The reality limits the rationality of the decision-making.

Numerous interpretations have appeared in an attempt to explain these limits to rational decision-making. Simon introduces the concept of “bounded rationality,” Lindblom discusses incrementalism. In a kind of synthesis of the two interpretations, one can say that bounded rationality of political actors (due to the inevitable cognitive and situational constraints) in the decision-making process generally leads only to small gradual changes in existing policies (incrementalism). It must be noted that the above does not negate the fact that both the radical and comprehensive change are possible, which is necessary and may be explained by some other models.

In the context of public choice theory, comparison between democratic system and free market is used to introduce the concept of supply and demand, in which the government uses the public policy to meet the “demand” on the part of citizens who, in this case, act as “clients” of sorts.⁶⁹

Research efforts within this theoretical framework have led, among other things, to the conclusion that the actual supply of public goods and public services is primarily and predominantly affected by a minority of actively engaged citizens/consumers. This represents a sort of reformulation of public choice theory whose basic concept involves active participation of all citizens, at least at the level which allows each of them to decide to leave the community in which they feel dissatisfaction with the supply of public goods and services. Conclusions regarding the

69 Ibid. p. 57.

dominant minority must not be ignored when discussing political will. At the very least, they can provide us with cost savings by making it possible to focus advocacy and lobbying activities on a smaller number of actors in some situations rather than lead major campaigns aimed at raising awareness about a particular issue or problem within the community.

While the agents of public policies need to map the actors and then motivate and mobilize them, the opponents of the public policies work intensively on the demobilization of actors via systematic activities aimed at their exclusion from decision-making process, which causes demotivation among them, and, consequently, marginalization or even complete removal from the map of actors. The space in which these continuous processes of mobilization and demobilization take place is called the community and this is why the community itself is in the focus of our consideration of the response to the need for transformation of political will.

Transformations of political will take place in the community, so the community represents the beginning and the end of each policy, and it is the home to all the agents of public policies and actors of political processes. The community represents the continuity of a problem, but it is also an inexhaustible source of solutions. The community is the primary manifestation of political will, thus making the management of the community and its own processes a kind of management of political will and its transformations!

We can distinguish social formations called networks and communities with respect to the dynamics and intensity of relations that develop between agents and actors dealing with specific fields and issues of public interest. We shall designate them as networks and public policy communities. Their existence and activities is an infallible indicator of existence of the will i.e. voluntary actions on the part of actors and agents of public policy. Both networks and communities are social constructs that can be

built and developed, so the assumption we present here is the following: by building and constantly strengthening networks and communities revolving around certain public issues and policies we also build the political will to solve them, i.e. the implementation. This implies that the strategy, tactics and methods used in building communities and networks can, at the same time, act as tools used for transformation of political will.

These are the essential characteristics of public policy communities:

- Limited membership, often determined by economic or professional interests, which sometimes deliberately excludes others;
- Shared values and frequent interaction;
- Sharing of resources regulated by leaders;
- Relative balance of power among the members,

while the key characteristics of a network are:

- Size and diversity;
- Variability of the level of contact and a lower level of understanding compared to the community;
- Unequal resources and insufficient capacity to regulate their collective use;
- Imbalance of power⁷⁰,

70 Hill, Michael J. *The Public Policy Process*. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2005, p. 69.

Furthermore, the strength of the community and network essentially determines the strength of political will in relation to the specific public policy or public issue. Again, both the community and the network are indicators of political will, whereby we emphasize the community as an indicator of a higher order in accordance with Olson's logic of collective action (public policy is also a collective action, and, conditionally, a kind of collective good) which argues that "certain small groups can provide themselves with collective goods without relying on coercion or any positive inducements apart from the collective good itself".⁷¹ In relation to the network, the community is a smaller group that can be potentially more successful in terms of preparation and implementation of public policy. We accept the community as an indicator of stronger political will simply because its maintenance and development, having in mind the above key characteristics, requires more voluntary actions in relation to what we need to ensure the survival of the network. Both networks and communities can be seen as stages of transformation of political will on the way to achieving determined public policy objectives.

In this respect, as mentioned above, a wide range of measures and instruments used for the purpose of building and maintenance of networks and communities centered around public policies is also utilized for the building and development of political will. Agents of public policy must not lose sight of this and, in military terms, both on strategic and tactical levels of their actions they need to draft a realistic and workable plan for managing these measures and instruments in order to enable necessary transformations of political will. The answer to the question of what these measures, tools and instruments are can be

71 „određene male skupine mogu sebi pribaviti kolektivna dobra bez pribjegavanja prisili ili bilo kojem pozitivnom poticaju, osim samoga kolektivnog dobra“; Olson, Mancur. Logika kolektivnog djelovanja. Zagreb: Faculty of Political Science of Zagreb University, 2009, p. 38

found in research whose ambition is focused on the study of networks and communities.

Policy network can be defined as a set of relatively stable relationships connecting various actors which are interdependent and without established hierarchies, and which share common interests in relation to a specific public policy, exchange resources in the process of realization of those interests and accept cooperation as the best way to achieve common goals.⁷²

In a broader sense, networks support a set of different functions that enable them to influence the processes of drafting and implementation of public policies, and these functions include filtering, amplification, gathering, investment/provision of resources, community building and, facilitation.⁷³ The practice has demonstrated that there are networks which perform all of these functions, as well as networks which are solely focused on some of the above functions. Regardless of their orientation in terms of functions, the success of the networks is determined by a number of factors that must be taken into account in their building and further development, which include issues such as location (both physical and thematic) of the network, their membership, management procedures and processes, resources, capacities and skills (both the network as a whole and its individual members), communications, external environment, and adaptability.⁷⁴

72 Börzel, Tanja A. . What's So Special About Policy Networks? - An Exploration of the Concept and Its Usefulness in Studying European Governance. European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 1 (1997) N° 016; available on: <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-016a.htm>.; accessed on: 03.01.2015.

73 Mendizabal, Enrique. Building Effective research Policy Networks: Linking Function and Form. London: Overseas Development Institute, 2006. available on: <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/146.pdf>. accessed on: 03/10/2015

74 Ibid.

Mendizabal argues that primary functions of a network determine the format and factors that these networks should develop. In this sense, if we are to accept the premise that the development of political will for a particular public policy is marked by a sort of transformation of the network into a public policy community, then it is obvious that our interest is focused on the networks which gather and build community. According to Mendizabal, these types of networks require active managerial structures (similar to secretariats) which can be used for filtering and amplification, but these are primarily active in the field of managing relations between a broad base of diverse membership. Membership is the fundamental characteristic of these networks, and excellence is expected of them in terms of logistics and communication skills, as well as skills related to fundraising and consensus building. At the level of public manifestations, functioning of these networks necessitates the organization of conferences, workshops and research focused on the membership. In the course of development from the network to the community, there emerges a necessity to draft appropriate arrangements to precisely define management process which will be primarily aimed at integration, prevention and conflict resolution. At this stage (from the network to the community) membership is reduced and, to some extent, closed, but it also directs its focus on all other functions inherent to networks.⁷⁵

On the other hand, research into community offers several key concepts that require our attention and which, apart from the "community" as a key determinant, also draw attention to "community development", "community organization", "community building", "capacity building", "social capital", "community competence" and "empowerment"⁷⁶. In

75 Ibid. p. 17.

76 Mattessich, Paul W. community building: what makes it work: a review of factors influencing successful community building. Saint Paul: Amherst H. Wilder Foundation, 1997. p. 56.

their research conducted in 1997, Mattessich and Monsey studied more than 500 studies on community building and identified 48 relevant studies which they used to give an overview of the key success factors of the development and community building processes.⁷⁷ This, of course, involves various social and psychological attributes. The authors divided these success factors into three groups:

- Characteristics of the community
- Characteristics of the community building process
- Characteristic of community building organizers

At the level of community characteristics considered necessary for its successful operation, the authors emphasize the issue of *awareness of the importance of a certain issue or initiative*. Not surprisingly, there is also previously mentioned and exceptionally important *role of motivation within the community*. Communities operating on a smaller geographical area have more chances of success, since they are easier to manage. Success of the community depends on its overall *flexibility and adaptability*, as well as on the existing *social cohesion* between its members. Communities that are effective and efficient in implementation of their set objectives are distinguished by pronounced *ability to engage in dialogue and reach consensus and establish quality cooperation*. Finally, functional communities require people who act as a kind of spokespersons who take over some of the leadership roles and have a good reputation in the community which respects them and, in some cases, follows them.

The process of successful community building requires a whole range of activities which need to be based on *all-encompassing, representative*

77 Ibid. p. 19.

and permanent participation of all or majority of members. It is this participation which increases the likelihood of reaching broader consensus on the need for the implementation of appropriate public policies etc. Of course, the demand for participation goes hand in hand with the need for a *quality communication system* at the level of community. Good communication has the potential to develop all of the above characteristics of the community, from the awareness of a particular issue to motivation, cohesion and participation. It also refers both to the communication within the community and the communication the community establishes with its surroundings. Furthermore, the process of community building implies *minimizing undesirable consequences of potential competition and contest within the community, development of group identity and clear and visible highlighting of the benefits* the members of the community will enjoy in the form of specific initiatives and policies.

It is necessary to stop for a moment and observe the fact that community building in the context of preparation and implementation of public policy is, primarily, an extremely complex and demanding process. Agents of public policies, especially those in leadership positions, are quite often exposed to the temptation to primarily focus their activities on the set goals of public policies, by which they neglect the dimension of the process itself. For Mattessich and Monsey, this simply means that the established task has been completed and short-term result achieved, yet neglecting the process of community building threatens its sustainability and long-term development. Therefore, the requirement which needs to be complied with is to *simultaneously focus both on result and process of community building*. With regard to this, the highest importance is given to the links with organizations outside the community as one of the success factors in the process of community building. It is through this type of connection that it eventually becomes possible to secure additional support (financial, political, professional), both for the

community i.e. for the process of its establishment, and for the public policy which the community supports.

A community that is centered upon and organized around an adequate public policy can be built up gradually and it develops its capacity by starting from the implementation of simple activities progressing and moving to increasingly complex forms of activities and work. This *progress from simple to complex activities* also represents an integral part of any successful process of community building. The same applies to the activity of *systematic collection of information and analysis* of various issues relating to the community.

Only a community that has sufficient knowledge of itself can be strong enough to commit itself to achieving determined goals. In addition to this, members of the community need to possess certain skills related to working in the community which may be acquired not only through experience, but also via *organized and systematic training* that will help with the development of community building capacity as well as with understanding and acceptance of public policies around which the community is formed. The community which is being formed needs to exert *influence over the decision-making process*, e.g. concerning the content of specific activities or the utilization of necessary financial resources. These financial resources, together with a wide range of material and technical resources, constitute available resources demanded by each functional community, regardless of whether it relates to a demographic category or the community that is centered around a public policy. In this sense, available studies, as interpreted by Mattessich and Monsey, suggest that successful community and its development require a *balanced combination of resources*. In practice, this means that the lack of resources is as equally harmful as their surplus, and the imbalance in the relationship between internal (within the community) and external (from the environment) resources can also have a negative impact on

community development. Members of the community whose work is motivated by financial incentives are likely to lose interest in community affairs if the financial incentive is absent, while, on the other hand, those who readily invest their own resources in the community building process demonstrate true motivation and determine the real power (including the power of political will) of the community in question.

Therefore, there is no doubt that it is the public policy agents that need to take responsibility for the establishment and development of policy communities, thus transforming the needed political will itself. In this respect, characteristics of agents also complement the list of success factors in the community building process, in relation to which, as Mattessich and Monsey suggest, a particular emphasis is placed on *understanding of the community*, *genuine commitment* to the community and its interests, the *relationship of trust* between agents and communities, their *organizational experience*, and personal *flexibility and adaptability*. Studies have shown that communities respond positively to agents that are familiar with their culture, socio-political structure, central issues and problems. These prerequisites are important for the agents themselves in the context of developing genuine commitment to facing the challenges within the community, by which, of course, the relationships of trust are built along with an environment in which there is significant level of utilization of existing organizational resources and capacities.

To sum up, “community development is inclined towards identifying and defining issues of public interest as well as informing and influencing public policies in relation to those problems”⁷⁸ which, simultaneously, makes it become the process of shaping political will, if we are to ac-

78 Working on Community Development: theory and practice: collection of papers. Zagreb: Center for Civic Initiatives.

cept the public policy as an objectification of political will. As a basic human survival strategy, organization of life within the community, i.e. the public policy community in this case, has the potential to transform the political will and enable activities for the benefit of progressive public policies.

CONCLUSION

It is probably wrong to name this part of the text “conclusion”, simply because it is not one. Subject matter presented here is primarily intended for informational purposes and it is aimed at those who, to a greater or lesser degree, act as active participants in the complex preparation processes and public policies and do not have the time or resources they could use to gain insight into the conceptual framework of the terms they employ in their daily work. Although these circumstances can be rationalized and even justified, one must acknowledge the fact that the lack of understanding and knowledge of some of basic definitions in the area of public policy can be a direct cause of misconduct in the management practice, which is certainly the reason that needs to be taken into account when looking for an explanation for failure or sometimes even a complete absence of public policies in certain areas.

Of course, this also applies to the problem of extremely shallow understanding of political will which is manifested in public space on an almost daily basis through the use of now ubiquitous phrase - there is no political will. This is, of course, not true and modern day Bosnia and Herzegovina represents a rather clear illustration of this.

For example, the state of contemporary BiH society is the perfect expression of (troublesome) political will of our society. There is a popular saying – the government is a reflection of the people! In this context,

however, we must bear in mind that a significant portion of our community is in fact excluded from the processes and the areas in which the complex interaction of sociopolitical actors takes places, along with political decision-making, formulation of political actions and their implementation. It seems that the aggregate political will of Bosnian-Herzegovinian society represents the totality of the will of active and interested sociopolitical actors, ranging from political leaders, political elites, state administration and various interest groups on one side, and political instinct of the passivized, resigned and excluded social groups and citizens on the other side. It is rather obvious that this political will keeps our community in the state of distinct political, economic and social inequality which is evidenced by our reports on human rights, our statistics, crime news, situation on the streets etc.

Change is necessary and it probably depends on the transformation of existing political will which can be achieved by changing the political behavior of current political actors, their potential replacement and, also, the inclusion of new actors. The argument that we present in this paper is that this can be achieved at the level of the process of preparation and implementation of individual policies in which all potential actors are included by means of strategies, methods and techniques of networking and community building. Actually, it is these efforts that enable the necessary transformation of political will which follows different stages of the policy process. In this way, quality networking generates transformation of political will that will put certain social problem on the political agenda and ensure the development and adoption of appropriate public policy intended as the solution to this problem, while the strong community of stakeholders derived from a wider network will strengthen the political will and allow for the actual implementation of this policy.

These considerations should be accepted as a call to the wider academic and expert community to initiate some sort of testing and

examination of presented assumptions about relationships and connections between the political will, public policy and sociopolitical networks and communities.

This is due to the fact that it is evident that the issue of political will is not specifically related to societies such as modern day Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the phrase “lack of political will” is a symptom of the global epidemics of poor management, i.e. of the condition in which “the governments change, yet they fail to adopt different public policies”.⁷⁹

Thinking about the answer to the question of why we fail to change the manner of management brings to mind the words of Ivan Krastev:

My answer is that the citizens have become hostages to the widespread culture of distrust. It is paradoxical that the democratization of society has led to decreased trust in democratic institutions and that the overall demand for transparency will not restore the lost confidence but rather deepen the mistrust of political institutions and political leaders. History testifies that civil mistrust of government is a crucial element of any democratic system, but when it exceeds certain threshold such mistrust undermines the position of citizens. If you do not trust anyone, you will change nothing.⁸⁰

79 ... „menjaju vlade, ali ne donose drugačije javne politike“; Krastev, Ivan. *S verom u nepoverenje: Može li demokratija da opstane kada ne verujemo svojim liderima*. Belgrade: Klio: Beogradski fond za političku izuzetnost, 2013. p. 8.

80 “Moj odgovor je da su građani postali postali taoci rasprostranjene kulture nepoverenja. Paradoksalno je to da je demokratizacija društva dovela do smanjenja poverenja u demokratske institucije i da sveopšti zahtev za transparentnošću neće povratiti izgubljeno poverenje, već će produbiti nepoverenje političke institucije i političke vođe. Istorija svedoči da je građansko nepoverenje u vlast presudan element svakog demokratskog sistema, ali, kada se prekorači određeni prag, takvo nepoverenje slabi poziciju građana. Ukoliko ne verujete nikome, ništa ne možete da promenite”;*ibid.* p. 9.

*Of course, the source of mistrust is "a general belief that powerful interests have seized democratic institutions in many Western democracies and that citizens are powerless to change it."*⁸¹ It is only the change of this belief that can lead to the "release" of institutions. This is also referred to in the theory of public value that offers the concept of governance through networked communities, where the focus of exercise of public authority shifts from the state and market to the civil society. For the proponents of this new paradigm of governing, this is the most appropriate model of governance in the context that is constantly shifting, imbued with diverse populations, burdened by complex and fluctuating needs and sensitive to risk. In such an environment, public policies become strategies which shape civil society and are implemented through networks and partnerships.⁸²

On the other hand, the theory of social capital has it that the trust is generated at the level of individuals, families, groups, networks and communities and the relations that exist within them, and that is another reason why the issue of political will should not be left in the field of political rhetorics or, even worse, manipulation. To borrow the language of the police, there is reasonable doubt that the way in which our networks and communities are organized and operated may be associated with the transformations of political will which the success of public policies by which we strive to change and humanize society depends on. Our obligation is to examine those grounds, as well as study and utilize them for the purpose of achieving progress.

81 „opšte uverenje da su moćni interesi zarobili demokratske institucije u mnogim zapadnim demokratijama i da su građani nemoćni da to promjene“; Ibid. p. 17.

82 Benington, John; Moore, Mark H. (Ur.). Javna vrijednost: teorija i praksa. Neum: Naklada Mate, 2013. p. 34

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SAŠA MADACKI AND NINA KARAĆ

POLITICAL WILL: A SELECTIVE SUBJECT BIBLIOGRAPHY AND DOCUMENTS REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Political will: subject matter, registrational-indicative, selective bibliography and documents was created within the project titled Political Will: Interdisciplinary Research Supported by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, as an auxiliary tool in finding sources related to the topic, aimed at simplifying the approach to research papers directly or indirectly related to the subject matter at hand. Bibliographic sketch represents the current view of the subject matter and is by no means final.

The bibliography was built in six stages:

1. Mapping the concept of political will in the reference readings (encyclopedias)
2. Mapping the bibliographic sources in Bosnia and Herzegovina
3. Mapping the bibliographic sources of monographies published outside BiH

4. Mapping the bibliographic sources – articles in periodicals outside BiH
5. Mapping the concept of political will in press
6. Mapping the concept of political will in documents of international organisations

MAPPING THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL WILL IN THE REFERENCE READINGS (ENCYCLOPEDIAS)

As the first step towards a more detailed definition of the concept of political will, available encyclopedias dealing with the broader area of political sciences were examined in order to locate definitions and more detailed determinations of the term political will.

During the research, 9 encyclopedias were located:

1. Bevir, Mark. *Encyclopedia of Political Theory*. SAGE Publications, 2010.
2. Hammond, Scott John. *Political Theory: an Encyclopedia of Contemporary and Classic Terms*. Westport//London: Greenwood Press, 2009.
3. Jones, R. J. Barry. *Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political Economy*.
4. Lee Kaid, Lynda and Christina Holtz-Bacha. *Encyclopedia of Political Communication*. SAGE Publications, 2008.

5. Nagel, Stuart . Encyclopedia of Policy Studies. 2nd ed. CRC Press, 1994.
6. O’Hara, Phillip Anthony. Encyclopedia of Political Economy. Rotledge, 2001.
7. Schlager, Neil and Jayne Weisblatt. World Encyclopedia of Political Systems and Parties. consulting editor Orlando J. Pérez. 4th ed.
8. Sheldon, Garrett Ward. Encyclopedia of Political Thought.
9. Thomas Kurian, George. The Encyclopedia of Political Science. CQ Press, a division of SAGE, 2011.

The initial criterion was set to find the headword **political will** or **will, political** in all nine located encyclopedias. **None of them contains a headword providing a more detailed definition of the concept political will.** After that the whole text was examined and political will was found being mentioned within the text accompanying those headwords that themselves do not mention political will.

Examples:

In the Encyclopedia of political communication, edited by Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha, published by SAGE Publications in 2008, political will appears in two headwords – electoral systems and public sphere:

Electoral Systems

...

Concentration or effectiveness, in the sense of aggregation of social interests and political opinions for the purpose of attaining political

decisions and rendering the polity capable to act. Elections are understood not as a mirror but as an act of forming the **political will** of the electorate. Parameters of a reasonable concentration of an electoral system are, on the one hand, the number or reduction of the number, respectively, of parties that receive seats, and on the other hand, the formation of stable party or coalition majorities in the government... (p. 209)

Public Sphere

The Public Sphere According to Habermas

Increasingly, discussions about democracy and the media are framed within the concept of the public sphere. In schematic terms, a functioning public sphere is understood as a constellation of communicative spaces in society that permit the circulation of information, ideas, debates—ideally in an unfettered manner—and also the formation of **political will**, that is, public opinion. In the vision of the public sphere, these spaces, in which the mass media and now, more recently, the newer interactive media figure prominently, serve to permit the development and expression of political views among citizens. (p. 682).

In The encyclopedia of political science, edited by George Thomas Kurian, published by CQ Press (SAGE) in 2011, political will is mentioned in 11 headwords:

African Union

For an organization that only became operational in 2002, and unlike the OAU, the AU has demonstrated a strong **political willingness** to engage with decisive issues such as conflict resolution and economic development. Its resource capacity is limited, however, which encourages dependency on foreign funds. (p. 32)

Bureaucracy

The Rechtsstaat model of civil service has been contrasted with the public interest model found in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In these countries, there is not the same emphasis on administrative law as in Rechtsstaat countries, and consequently, there is less adherence to the notion of rigidly following rules. According to Hood, public employees act more as “battle troops” to carry out the **political will** of the political incumbent. Despite this characterization, the degree to which the civil service is politicized varies considerably across these countries. For example, British civil servants have traditionally been considered to be neutral, working for the incumbent government, whereas in the United States, political appointees come and go with each presidency, and often are added or subtracted from particular agencies as presidents see fit. (p. 163.)

Deliberative Democracy

According to discourse theory, the communicative conditions for the democratic formation of opinion and **political will** function as an important channel for the wide-ranging rationalization of decisions, which are made by the law-bound government and administration. Rationalization is more than just legitimization, as in the liberal model,

but also less than constitution of power, as in the republican model. It is only the political system that can “act,” not the society as a collective subject. (p. 385.)

Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

Virtually all countries have ratified at least one international and/or regional human rights instrument that enumerates some economic, social, and cultural rights, and many also have constitutional or legal provisions stipulating rights protections and entitlements. However, in most states these rights are only partially implemented for a variety of reasons: insufficient resources, lack of **political will**, global economic pressures and commitments, and weak political institutions. Nevertheless, the existence of these rights commitments provides a normative framework for enlightened political actors and a basis for political mobilization and legal action. It is sometimes observed that human rights are claimed through mobilization from the bottom and not granted from the top, and that certainly is the case with regard to economic, social, and cultural rights. (p. 461.)

Laissez-faire

Academic and policy communities question whether unregulated self-interest or markets by themselves generate wealth and consumer welfare without leading to vast income inequalities or deleterious business cycles. The **political will** to open international markets is also declining.

Nevertheless, world exports of goods and services were at an all-time high of \$15. 8 trillion and \$3. 7 trillion, respectively, in 2008. Domestically, capitalism is flourishing, even if government intervention occurs in varying degrees. Nevertheless, despite a brief period of

success in the 1980s influencing U. S. president Ronald Reagan and British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, laissez-faire advocates have yet to win the battle of ideas in politics. (p. 906.)

Modernization

Rostow's approach fit modernization theorists' tendency to identify development as the movement from tradition to modernity, which happened to resemble the course of U. S. and western European societies at the time he was writing. Unlike the social psychological modernization theorists, Rostow stressed the importance of **political will** to build the "social overhead capital"—for example, human capital development, such as education, and national cohesion—necessary for development. Rostow's work also highlighted the growth of savings and investment during the take-off stage. Such capital might be gained from many sources, but to many practitioners of development, foreign lenders and foreign assistance became increasingly obvious sources of investment capital. (p. 1050).

Policy Innovation

Much of the political science research on policy innovation focuses on the adoption and spread of public policies within the United States. Although the findings of this research vary somewhat from study to study, there are some consistent results. States are more likely to innovate if they are in good fiscal health, if they have professional bureaucracies and legislative systems, and if they possess the **political will** to do so. External determinants are also quite important. (p. 1221).

Political Communication

The field of public opinion research focuses largely on how political influence is exercised through the uses of the means of communication and how such influence manifests in forming **political will**. (p. 1236)

Rather, propaganda is a means by which political beliefs and messages are made palatable and popular in a technological society; this is essential for forming **political will**, but it does not necessarily result in harmful effects. For Ellul, the technical mastery that characterizes propaganda in modern society is a cause for ambivalence, because propaganda is not only an instrument of public manipulation and deception, but as he defines it, propaganda is a necessary means by which institutions are able to match the scale of major societal problems.

In either case, propaganda is properly understood as a modern manifestation of instrumental reason. (p. 1237)

Political Law

The need for political law arises, first, from the incomplete vision that law, public administration, and political science each offer for statecraft. It is also meant, specifically, to address the difficulty in understanding democratic governing, arising from politically motivated challenges to the rule of law. One of the fundamental issues at stake is that democracy is flawed if it relies on **political will** to the detriment of the rule of law. (p. 1254)

This accountability comprises several elements. The most obvious is respect for legal rules, norms, and standards in the face of policy and administrative convenience and necessity and in the face of **political will**. Furthermore, all public officials are required, either on their

own or on the basis of the advice of counsel, to have some basic knowledge of those elements of the legal system that relate to their work. Likewise, in order to apply the primacy of legal instruments, they need to have sufficient awareness of, and sensitivity to, the role of law vis-à-vis other types of instruments that guide the execution of their tasks. Ideally, public officials should also voluntarily and willfully abide by established legal norms to be proactive in their compliance with the law. (p. 1257)

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques

Rousseau appears to find an answer in constructing a small homogeneous political community where individuals align their **political will** with that of the general will. Individuals thus give up nature for moral freedom, creating a political community they will for themselves. (p. 1490)

Transitional Justice

Usually a combination of methods works best when trying to address the multiple legacies of trauma, but even in the most fortunate cases, the process is long, expensive, and tortuous, requiring sustained **political will**, committed popular acceptance, and a favorable international context. (p. 1680)

In the other located encyclopedias, the concept of political will is found within other headwords, in the manner similar to the examples shown above. To illustrate, in the encyclopedia titled *Political theory: an encyclopedia of contemporary and classic terms*, edited by Scott John Hammond, published by GREENWOOD PRESS, Westport, Connecticut, London in 2009, political will is mentioned under the headwords **Amor sui**, **capillary power** and **tyranny**; while in the *Encyclopedia of Political*

Economy, edited by Phillip Anthony O'Hara, published by Rotledge in 2001, political will is mentioned under two headwords: **Budget Deficit: Political will to use fiscal policy; inflation** and **wage-cost markup approach**.

MAPPING THE BIBLIOGRAPHIC SOURCES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Within the cooperative bibliographic system COBISS. BH, the joint database was searched, and thus, all 50 libraries whose catalogues are in the system were encompassed⁸³The search was conducted using filters:

- the headword field was searched with the search word "political will" entered for all types of material (books, serial publications, articles etc.) and 0 results were found.
- the title field was searched with the search word "political will" entered for all types of material (books, serial publications, articles etc.) (0 results), and the title field was searched with the search word "politic* wi* (političk* volj*)" entered, and 1 result was found
- the key word field was searched with the search word "political will" entered for all types of material (books, serial publications, articles etc.) and 1 result was found, while the search for word "politic* wi* (političk* volj*)" found a total of 15 results.

83 List of all libraries in the system is available at: <http://www.cobiss.ba/scripts/cobiss?ukaz=CHDB&bt=LOC&id=1108120730006182>

None of the results found deals with the topic of political will as defined by the project document. Political will is mentioned in an article summary

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Since the library of Republika Srpska recently pulled out of COBISS:BH, COBIB:RS was searched and not a single record matching the criteria set for this research was found.

Within the cooperative shared catalogue Metel Win, selection was made of online catalogues of those libraries estimated to possibly hold material covering topics on which the bibliographic research focused. The online catalogues were searched jointly. Six libraries from BiH were selected in the Metel Win joint database:

- Human Rights Centre of the Sarajevo University
- Centre for Policy Studies, Sarajevo
- Prosecutor's Office of FBiH, Sarajevo

- Research and Documentary Centre, Sarajevo
- The Registry of the Court of BiH, Sarajevo
- Constitutional Court of BiH, Sarajevo

Not one of the selected libraries contained sources matching the defined search criteria.

MAPPING THE BIBLIOGRAPHIC SOURCES OUTSIDE BIH

World catalogue (WorldCat)

The World catalogue (WordCat) is an online shared catalogue encompassing over 10,000 libraries from across the world.


During the search, the advanced search option was used. The title field (TI) was searched for the topic of the bibliographic research, linking them by an operator for the monography material. A total of 179 results were found.

Material from a broad conception of scientific areas of political science was registered in the results found: international relations, defence, human rights, democracy, fight against corruption, government, terrorism studies. In contrast to the periodicals, healthcare as a topic has extremely low results (13 out of 179). Also, a minor number of records are duplicates (same title, different publisher). References 140-145 refer to the same work but with different bibliographic descriptions, and as the bibliography was not done *de visu*, we decided to leave all the

descriptions. During the classification of the material in the relevant field, the main thematic group was the area of application; so for example, a paper dealing with mobilisation of political will in order to reduce poverty was classified into economy, not politics.

Classification by areas:

Healthcare	13
Economy	24
Politics	99
Energy and environment	4
Defence	18
Law	4
Education	11
Interdisciplinary	2



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
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During the search in the SCOPUS and Academic search Premier (EBSCOhost) databases, 176 articles were found and they can be grouped in 10 areas:

Agriculture	1
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Politics	71
Pharmacy	1
Energy and environment	14
Industry	8
Defence	5
Law	4
Education	6
Interdisciplinary	3



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MAPPING THE PHRASE *POLITICAL WILL* IN THE PRESS

Excerpts from texts containing the phrase *political will*, published in the press between 2006 and 2014.

For the purposes of this overview, search of the INFOBIRO Digital Archive (www.infobiro.ba) covering the period between 1st January 2006 and 27th June 2014 was performed using the EXACT PHRASE IN THE TEXT filter. The search for “political will” phrase resulted in 973 articles. Of those, 139 were selected for this overview. They can be grouped in the following areas/topics:

- a) Constitution and amendments to the Constitution
- b) Implementation of judgement in the Sejdić-Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina case
- c) Passing of laws
- d) Corruption
- e) Elections

1. DNEVNI LIST daily, issue 4608, p. 9, 14/05/2014

Fight against corruption and organised crime merely discussed so far, actions to follow soon

EU Invests Eur 11 Million in Fight against Corruption in BiH

By: PREDRAG ZVIJERAC

The purpose behind the investment of dozens of millions of Euros is to, with the assistance of political stakeholders, ensure conditions that will enable the law enforcement agencies and other institutions to implement laws without any obstacles. In other words, the "*political will*" is sought. Without it, for example in the neighbouring Croatia, high-ranking officials, led by Ivo Sanader, former Croatian Prime Minister and former head of the HDZ party, and his party, would not have been processed in court. Part of the money will be invested in the development of the non-governmental, civil sector, and in information campaigns.

2. OSLOBOĐENJE daily, issue 24,227, p. 10, 16/05/2014

Political Parties in Crisis

By: DŽEVAD HODŽIĆ

First of all, I wish to emphasize that, when presenting such view, on one hand I said nothing new with respect to the conviction common in the politically developed context and even in our political context, which is that parliamentary democracy has no serious alternative, meaning that *political will* must be legitimised and verified in free, democratic, and multi-party elections, and, on the other hand, with respect to positions for a while now presented by many political analysts, which confirm that there is a key crisis in the partisan political activities. This crisis not only generates the crisis in the parliamentary political life, but the overall political and social crisis.

3. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, issue 5454, p. 04, 15/04/2014
Constitutional-Legal Committee of BiH Parliament House of Peoples
Supports Amendments to BiH Constitution
Deleting provision protecting officials' salaries
By: NIHADA HASIĆ

Dragutin Rodić from DNS, member of the Constitutional-Legal Committee, also believes that the discussion on amendments to the Constitution in order to enable reduction of salaries and their adjustment to the economic situation in the country has been going on for too long. "Let us adopt the proposed amendment, so that it doesn't turn out that we in the House of Peoples are the ones blocking the process. In 2012 we nevertheless had amendments to the law that led to the reduction of salaries, which was contrary to the Constitution", Rodić said. Ivica Čavar, consultant from the Centres for Civic Initiatives monitoring the work of the BiH Parliament also believes that there is finally *political will* to amend the Constitution in order to "cut" salaries.

4. DANI weekly, issue 873, p. 45, 07/03/2014
Political Will and Trade in Energy
By: ELDAR DIZDAREVIĆ

Also, the two electricity companies could have merged into one, thus utterly eliminating the mutual trade in electricity (this is something that the Elektroprivreda HZHB electricity company needs, because it has not thermo-electric power plants). However there is no *political will* to do that in FBiH, primarily *political will* in the territories supplied by the Elektroprivreda HZHB Mostar electricity company. The road for this type of policy was "paved" fifteen years ago by the former Aluminij company manager, Mijo Brajković, when he said: "We do not want to

have anything to do with Sarajevo". The policy remains to be actively applied till the present day.

...Trade in electricity inside BiH through middlemen is not logical, at least from the point of view of the two electricity companies in the Federation of BiH. However, that trade has been set up in such a way in our legislation, which is harmonised with the Treaty establishing the Energy Community, and it has been going on for years. Naturally, this illogical situation might change. Unfortunately, there is no *political will* to do it, more precisely, in one part of FBiH there is no such will, and that is the sole reason for the unnatural situation others have been using to their benefit.

5. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, issue 5378, p. 04, 16/01/2014

LARGE NUMBER OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED CRIMES IN BiH STILL NOT SOLVED

Time is coming to solve murders

By: DEJAN ŠAJINOVIĆ

Although there is commitment in BiH to solve all assassinations and serious murders that were committed since war, majority of them has not been solved. Mirsad Kebo, Deputy President of FBiH, who recently handed over to Fahrudin Radončić, BiH Minister of Security, documents related to politically motivated murders in FBiH he received from individuals, said that he had decided to do that because he was convinced that things were changing and that *political will* to shed light on those incidents was emerging in BiH. "*Political will* does exist, and it is getting stronger, but there is still resistance. I felt that this is the moment when something might be done. I know that this is not a safe thing to do, but this country has no future if we do not deal with these dark things from the past", Kebo said.

6. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, issue 5364, p. 04, 25/12/2013
Damir Mašić, Minister of Education and Science of FBiH and winner
of the Nezavisne novine award
Educational System Needs Reform
By: MAJA RENER-SMAJOVIĆ

Decentralisation of the educational system has caused problems, and without transferring at least part of authority to a higher level, chances of making significant steps in the educational reform are slim, because things now often depend on the *political will* of individuals too, says Damir Mašić, Minister of Education and Science of FBiH, who won the Nezavisne novine award as the best minister in the FBiH Government. commenting on the discrimination of children and the “two schools under one roof” phenomenon, he emphasized that in some communities, *political will* is clearly more important than the rights of children. “We gave this issue much thought and proposed a solution. However, competent cantonal ministries did not react or demonstrate the willingness to solve the problem in the field. Ministries of Education in the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton and the Central Bosnia Canton, where this remains to be a pervasive phenomenon, ignored the call and the proposed model of unification. The situation is no better in the RS, as witnessed by the unsolved problems pertaining to the education of returnee children in Konjević Polje and Vrbanjci”, Mašić said.

7. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, issue 6550, p. 04s, 09/11/2013

Fahrudin Radončić, BiH Minister of Security

Destiny of BiH to be Determined by Fight against Corruption and Poverty

By: SUZANA RAĐEN-TODOROVIĆ

FBiH Government. The key issue is whether there is *political will* to get involved in the matter. In both entities there is constant talk of major scandals. However, we don't see the epilogue and it always somehow appears that one person is protecting another. Is there *political will* to deal with that? *Political will* must emerge not only in the elections, but also under the public pressure. You see, the day before yesterday, Government of FBiH presented a set of anti-corruption laws. That's ridiculous. We have enough laws. That Government is teeming with corruption, three ministers in that Government are facing serious criminal charges, and such Government proposes the bill on forfeiture of property. And do you know what is the suggested was to forfeit someone's property, before the commencement, during the commencement, and after the completion of the criminal proceedings. The prosecutor's office is being completely bypassed, eliminated from the process, including the prosecutors, who direct and conduct investigations.

8. OSLOBODENJE daily, issue 24034, p. 06, 04/11/2013

Constitutional reform in Federation of BiH

DRAFT OF NEW CONSTITUTION SOON TO BE PRESENTED TO DELEGATES

By: M. Đ. R.

Constitutional-Legal Committee of the House of Representatives of the FBiH Parliament will meet on 7th November to discuss the proposed draft of the new FBiH Constitution. If majority of the Commission

members support the draft Constitution after considering the proposals and comments of political parties, it will be forwarded to the parliamentary procedure. Everyone in support of principals. The Constitutional-Legal Committee complies with the deadlines. October is behind us and the political entities were supposed to submit to us their positions on the constitutional reforms, they all received the working material. We will see at the session how things will work out. I think that there is a majority in the Commission, the principles were adopted, and it remains to be seen what comments will be made now. *Political will* is the most important thing here, to finally have something done in the FBiH Parliament, this is the first time that the Parliament is doing this instead of the political leaders or the likes, Mahmut Alagić, Chairman of the Constitutional-Legal Committee of the House of Representatives of the FBiH Parliament said.

9. DANI weekly, issue 831, p. 33, 17/05/2013

THIS for THAT

By: SVETLANA CENIĆ

Instead of the futile hunt for war profiteers and nationalist profiteers at home, and we all know who they are, why not impose special levies on them? Someone will once again say that there is no *political will*. *Political will* is also manifested by the election day, and civil unrest, and loud and public demands, not by waiting for the *political will* to be shown by an individual belonging among the profiteers. And so they whine in the South, which is kind of where we belong, not mentioning that the resourceful ones transferred the money to the banks of the rich North, evaded taxes, and now we and they blame everyone from Martians to Lilliputians.

10. DANI weekly, issue 825, p. 31, 05/04/2013

Vital Economic Interest

By: SVETLANA CENIĆ

Back in the day, Eisenhower observed that the spirit of such capitalism took over the government and that the public money went to private pockets, while crime was covered up with the assistance of democratic institutions. We forgot what the right to right is, instead, everything is placed under the umbrella of "*political will*". When you say "*political will*" it's like saying "Martians attack", it's something that comes from another place, something alien, and not the matter of a simple vote cast with the best will or in the best interest, which is usually only personal. For example, what kind of "*political will*" is it, that is, what kind of reluctant politicians are those who are not working on a solution for 21,748 milk producers in 87 municipalities, producers who are wondering what will happen with milk on 1st July, when Croatia officially becomes an EU member? We are talking about 21,748 families! Or, what kind of wretched politicians now provide citizen's identification numbers on the black market? That is what has been going on in both jolly entities, according to the information I received this morning. Who knows what innovations will follow? Buy two, get one free? Or, the price is going up if the number is easy to remember, like with that scramble for registration plates back then. Special numbers for VIPs. To let everyone know right from birth whose child it is, and who is privileged.

11. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 18/10/2011

Sejdić: Serious Sanctions need to be Used as Threat

By: NEWS AGENCIES

Sejdić and Finci filed applications with the Strasbourg Court claiming that, due to the provisions of the Constitution of BiH and the Election Law, they were thwarted in their attempt to stand for elections for the House of Peoples and for a member of the BiH Presidency because of their Roma and Jewish background. Towards the end of the last week, the authorities in BiH formed a 13-member Parliamentary commission, which is to prepare the implementation of the judgement and amendments to the Constitution of BiH. Sejdić believes that there is no *political will* to amend the Constitution and said that was testified by the forming of an interim Parliamentary commission of 13 members who are from the constituent peoples only, and which was supposed to reach decisions by consensus. "We have a problem with three men: Dodik, Lagumdžija and Čović, how do they then imagine 13 people in the commission to reach agreements", Sejdić wonders.

12. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 15/10/2011

Daily comment

Disintegration of State

By: FAHIR KARALIĆ

After two years of hair-splitting, there seems to be some sort of *political will* to implement the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg in the Sejdić and Finci vs. BiH case. commission for preparation of amendments to the Constitution and the Election Law commenced working, and, to everyone's surprise, its first decision, election of management, was reached by absolute consensus.

13. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 13/10/2011

BiH Has Potential to Move Forward

By: ŠTEFAN FUELE

You have had the visa-free regime for travelling to the European Schengen zone for almost a year, thanks to the reforms you implemented. This shows that where there is political will to make progress, citizens feel the true benefits. And *political will* is required in all areas.

14. OSLOBODENJE daily, 12/10/2011

Ahmet Dervišević, President of SDA in Brčko District

Now Not Time to End Supervision

By: ALMIR ŠEĆKANOVIĆ

For a long time there was talk of ending the international supervision over the District. The *political will* is there, but are there conditions to do it?

SDA believes that the conditions to end the supervision over Brčko have not been created. The list of reasons behind such a standpoint is endless, let me mention but few: guaranteed coefficient of VAT-originating funds for Brčko will expire in the near future, and the protection mechanisms have still not been sufficiently put in place, compliance of the RS authorities with the final arbitration decision for Brčko, the issue of cadastre, which also extends to Brčko, electricity supply... I wish to point out that with the assistance of the OHR and the Supervisor, as well as with the commitment of the SDA President, Sulejman Tihić, issue of the Constitutional amendment concerning Brčko was solved, which is a very good thing. The supervision cannot harm those with good intentions, and that is how I see it.

15. OSLOBODENJE daily, 11/10/2011

House of Representatives of BiH Parliament on Sejdić-Finci Judgement
Implementation in Early Stages

By: ALMIR TERZIĆ

SDS delegate, Mladen Bosić, is of the view that the whole matter could be settled in 24 hours if there was *political will* to implement the Sejdić-Finci judgement. The process needs to be unblocked, and by contesting the conclusion in the House of Representatives in the identical text, we risk taking everything back to the beginning, Bosić concludes.

16. OSLOBODENJE daily, 07/10/2011

Bosniaks and Division of Bosnia

By: ESAD HEĆIMOVIĆ

Political will of the majority of BiH citizens to live in the sovereign BiH was demonstrated at the referendum, but the meaning of this will continues to be interpreted in different ways. There are different, both Croatian, and Bosniak interpretations of the will demonstrated at the referendum. There are Croat politicians and historians interpreting the Croat “yes” at the referendum as the wish to separate from Yugoslavia as a state.

17. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 06/10/2011

ALREADY PAID TRANSLATION OF PEACE AGREEMENT DOES NOT GET GREEN LIGHT IN BiH PARLIAMENT

Dayton Agreement Still Not Officially Translated

By: UROŠ VUKIĆ

New copy, that is, certified photocopy of the original Dayton Peace Accord in English arrived through the BiH Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2009 at the request of the BiH Parliament, but it was officially never translated because there was no *political will* to do it. After that, the SNSD caucus hired the Association of Court Certified Interpreters and Translators of the RS to make the translation, which they did. Amir Zukić, SDA General Secretary says he sees no reason why the document still has not been translated, and that that should be a technical rather than a political issue, as some wish to present it.

18. DNEVNI LIST daily, 05/10/2011

SNSD Leader Milorad Dodik Admits It Will Be a While before New BiH Council of Ministers Gets Appointed

Increasing Number of Leaders Advocate for Špirić's Council of Ministers to Remain in Position until Elections

By: I. MARIĆ

According to Dodik's view of political tides and relations in BiH, and inside the wretched group of six parliamentary parties, the key problem is the different perception of BiH, that is, different interpretation of the concept of *political will*, and he refers that issue to the Croat and Bosniak leaders in FBiH.

RS has no such problem because Croats and Bosniaks, as constitutional peoples, exist only in documents and pose no threat to the dominant Serb people and its parties. Dodik's clarification in FBiH is that

political will being 50% plus one vote within one ethnicity is impossible to prove and justify by democratic practice.

19. DANI weekly, 30/09/2011

End or Beginning in Brčko?

The Six at Last Gasp

By: FARUK BORIĆ

From the media close to HDZ came the counter-response that after all, it is a matter of principle issues involving presence of certain constituent peoples in the executive authorities. According to HDZ and the fairly number of media "from West Herzegovina", Croats, being the smallest people, must not be outvoted and their *political will* must be respected. It is being respected in such a way that all representatives in the executive authorities must come from the parties that have 50% plus 1% of election legitimacy.

... And so this endless circle of exchanging arguments goes on and on, and it all comes down to the fact that there are at least two blocks of parties with different concepts of BiH: One is a tri-ethnic exclusiveness of political life in BiH, based on the majority will of each of the ethnicities according to the principles of liberal democracy (50% plus 1% of each ethnicity, which then associate into ethnic coalitions); the second, which believes that the factor of civic state (abstract citizen mentioned in the Constitution of BiH) should be combined with the rights of groups, including ethnic groups, which were never listed in the past 20 years, nor was there *political will* of the parties bragging about protecting the interests of their people to do it...

20. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 24/09/2011

Sead Lisak, Director of the BiH Agency for Prevention of Corruption and Coordination of Fight against Corruption

We Cannot Make Arrests as Croatian USKOK Agency Can

By: MIRELA KUKAN

The moment when the *political will* and the decision to solve the issue of appointing the Agency management emerged, things were done shortly. I am particularly happy because this appointment sent a clear message and a commitment that declarative support turned into practical, and without it there is no true fight against corruption. Due to the complexity of work in the chief position in similar agencies, in the neighbouring countries there was not much interest in that position when the appointments were taking place.

21. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 19/09/2011

NIGEL CASEY, BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

We Want BiH to Become Reliable EU Member

By: DEJAN ŠAJINOVIĆ

NN: Can you estimate whether OHR will remain in BiH in the next four years?

CASEY: That fully depends on the actions of the country's leaders. If there was *political will* and determination to solve the outstanding issues in a manner that would demonstrate that BiH has a successful and sustainable future, respecting the fundamental principles and the spirit of the Dayton Agreement, then OHR would no longer be needed. We will be as happy as anyone else when that day comes.

22. DANI weekly, 16/09/2011
BiH on so-called European path
All Talk with No Substance
By: DRAGAN STANOJLOVIĆ

As for the local officials, they wave the European path as a fan, as needed in daily politics, but without any realistic sense or ground. Thus, the Joint Commission for European Integration of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly concluded (?) that this year's report on our country's progress will be unfavourable. Imagine, even Nevenka Savić, Director of the Directorate for European Integration agreed with that, noting that "there is lack of *political will* for the faster European path for BiH".

23. OSLOBODENJE daily, 14/09/2011
Roland Gilles, FrenchAmbassador to BiH
Gap between BiH and Its Politicians
By: JASNA FETAHOVIĆ

Do you think it is possible for BiH to finalise that matter? Anything is possible when there is *political will*! That is done through an open dialogue among the political forces in the country and by speeding up the decision-making process. To be a candidate state means that there is a functional state. In that respect, I wish to emphasize that my country is committed to the unified state of BiH, with a sovereignty that is neither shared nor transferred. BiH urgently needs to send positive signals to the EU, showing through actions that it wishes to join the European family. One should not think that BiH will have a privileged treatment that will leave it free of its obligations. The international community certainly is engaged in supporting Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it is up to the country's leadership to take the road that only Bosnians are responsible for.

24. DNEVNI LIST daily, 12/09/2011

INTERVIEW Jelko Kacin, member of the European parliamentary delegation for relations with Albania, BiH, Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo

BiH Needs State Government instead of Council of Ministers

By: PREDRAG ZVIJERAC

When there is discussion about the Constitutional reform in BiH, the issue of entity voting and territorial restructuring always comes in. In your opinion, which is the direction that should and be taken? Is it realistic to create European regions in FBiH and RS, or even in the entire BiH without entities? All options remain open and all options are realistic if there is *political will*. Throughout its history, BiH was always a geographic, administrative, cultural, and economic whole, with no internal borders. However, I do not think that entities are the key issue. If BiH has all the mechanisms of authority required to implement the obligations stemming from the EU membership at the state level, then the entities can remain. Regionalization of BiH is certainly a way out of the current deadlock, but there is also need for a state-level Government instead of the colourless Council of Ministers with no true powers.

25. OSLOBODENJE daily, 09/09/2011

New British Ambassador to BiH Nigel Casey

International Community Is Responsible for BiH Future

By: J. FETAHOVIĆ

Due to the specific recent history, international community still has substantial responsibility towards BiH. However, we cannot achieve progress by ourselves, Casey said during his first meeting with the representatives of the BiH media. He underlined that it takes strong *political will* and vision of political leaders in our country. It is widely known what

are the decisions required in order for BiH to become a candidate for EU membership. With sufficient determination, they can be reached fast. This is the time for new effort, so that this country would move on, starting with the forming of the new Council of Ministers. We understand that BiH is an extremely complex country. But other complex countries work successfully; I myself represent such a country.

26. OSLOBODENJE daily, 03/09/2011

BiH Parliament intensified adoption as soon as possible

BiH Law on State Aid Acceptable to Brussels

By: A. TERZIĆ

In view of the fact that the Council of Ministers sent the bill to be considered in regular procedure, and bearing in mind the importance of passing it into law, it is possible that speed up of the process will be requested. I believe that there is *political will* to adopt the law on system of state aid in BiH as soon as possible, and that it is therefore possible to decide to have the process of adoption simultaneously in both Houses of the Parliamentary Assembly. That is the best solution and in the fastest version, the law may be adopted in latter October, Genjac estimates.

27. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 26/08/2011

Reactions to closing down of the Art Gallery

Politics as Shells

By: M. ČU.

Minister of Culture and Sports of the Sarajevo Canton, Ivica Šarić, believes that such an attitude towards seven cultural institutions of national importance is devastating and dangerous for the society and the state. If the situation persists, today we saw the closure of the Art Gallery, and the next day it may happen with any other institution, reads, inter alia, Šarić's reaction. He emphasized however that with this institution, the problem is the *political will*, not money.

28. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 22/08/2011

Number of patients paying treatments decreasing

Number of Private Practitioners Physicians Wanting to Work in Public Sector Increasing

By: E. HA

Political will. Smaller number of patients is to be expected where additional paying is required. I know that the prices are unchanged, which is evidence that outpatient clinics are working after all. Unfortunately, there is not a single private outpatient clinic that's in the system of equalization with the public sector. Republika Srpska is several years ahead of us, because they completed that work. We are in the last position in the Balkans. Such slowness is the result of *political will*, and we are keenly interested in entering the system, Omeragić says. Craft shops. We want to be part of the healthcare system, not part of the craft shops system. The previous authorities may the situation worse. As for the new authorities, I still can't comment yet because it is yet to start working.

29. OSLOBODENJE daily, 20/08/2011

Michael Brand, CDU delegate in Bundestag

International Community Must Correct Mistakes in BiH

By: JASNA FETAHOVIĆ

The Dayton Constitution would fail in any other European country because it is simply not in accordance with the accomplishments of a civilized society. It is not only up to Bosnia and Herzegovina to have the courage to say this and have the *political will* to do something about it, the international community also has to confront that situation filled with failure. That certainly will not succeed if Europe and the international community tell Bosnia and Herzegovina "you have to do this alone", it can only succeed if there is readiness to correct old mistakes.

30. SLOBODNA BOSNA weekly, 11/08/2011

Vera Jovanović, President of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in BiH

Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina Most Responsible for Ilija Jurišić, Ejup Ganić and Jovan Divjak's cases; Agreement with Serbia is Humiliating for BiH!

By: MAJA RADEVIĆ

"The Constitution reads that we are all a flock and that as a flock we must worry that, if we belong to one specific people, and we live in an area where the flock is not a majority, we must consider things and be afraid", you said several months ago. Do you believe that that there will ever be uniform *political will* in Bosnia and Herzegovina to have a thorough reform of the Constitution? I think that our only chance is to be placed under the European Union umbrella ignoring the conditions it set, and which it will clearly be very hard to meet.

31. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 19/08/2011

Nepotism and Corruption

By: MIRELA KUKAN

There is no *political will* in Bosnia and Herzegovina to fight corruption at the highest level, warns the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), an important institution of the Council of Europe that reported on the disastrous situation in our country. In addition to the report, the newspaper in the past two days has been full of information on nepotistic appointments to important managerial positions made by the new authorities led by SDP.

32. OSLOBOĐENJE daily, 27/07/2011

Bariša Čolak, BiH Minister of Justice

We Need Experts and Political Concert

By: MIMI ĐUROVIĆ RUKAVINA

Why is it like that? It takes a lot of professionals, and, in the end, everything requires a *political will* too. If that is lacking, and if there is no concert, then everything is hard. That is exactly why conferences of this kind are good. That is where we see where the problems lie, we analyse them, we look all those problems straight in the eye and we set about to change them. I am not running away from the fact that a lot remains to be done, and many things remain to be changed for the better for all of us.

33. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 17/07/2011

Pierre Mirel, *Director of the EC Directorate for Western Balkan*

BiH Must Not Waste Time

By: SANJA ŠABANOVIĆ

Adoption of the Law on State Aid has not been resolved yet. Significant steps were made in terms of finalising the draft law. European Commission works closely with all the relevant stakeholders in the process. We appeal to the Government to settle just few more outstanding issues so that the Law could be presented to the state Parliament. BiH is capable of making tangible results if there is appropriate *political will*. Abolished visa regime clearly proves that.

34. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 18/07/2011

BiH MADE NO PROGRESS IN MEETING REQUIREMENTS FOR
MILITARY ALLIANCE

No Steps towards NATO for 14 Months already

By: DEJAN ŠAJINOVIĆ

Ian Bratu, Norwegian Ambassador to BiH, states he does not believe that BiH will meet its obligations by September, but says that leaders in BiH have the *political will*. "Since there is no state level government, it is something that makes the process harder. I believe that the issue of MAP will be one of the first issues that the new Council of Ministers will take over in coordination with the Presidency of BiH", he added. We were informed by the US Embassy in Sarajevo that the current Council of Ministers might also solve the issue of military property by September if there was *political will*. "The US Embassy disagrees with claims that BiH cannot meet the MAP requirements by September this year. We urge the authorities in place to work on the military property issues in order to meet the September deadline," US Embassy stated.

35. SLOBODNA BOSNA weekly, 07/07/2011

SUPPORT TO THE BiH APPLICATION FOR EU MEMBERSHIP

By: DANKA SAVIĆ

Law on State Aid should not represent a problem for the application itself. What remains is also the Law on Census, and with respect to NATO, the issue of military property, and all of that can be solved much faster if you have a Government, and if there is *political will*. We expect that Peter Sorensen, who is not only the new Head of EU Delegation to BiH, but also the EU Special Representative, actively take over his role in BiH, and that the structural dialogue, started in Banja Luka, will be extended. We also hope that the new Council of Ministers of BiH will take a determined approach to meeting the few requirements needed for the BiH to apply for membership.

36. OSLOBODENJE, 10/07/2011

Michael Tatham, British Ambassador to BiH

Too Many Maximalistic Political Positions

By: JAKUB SALKIĆ

Political will • Is there a single leader in BiH capable of leading the country to the status of a candidate for the accession to the EU? There are many parties in the BiH Parliamentary Assembly and all of them, be it the parties in power or opposition parties, will play a significant role. I would place the emphasis not on one political leader, but on forming a *political will* shared by all parties in order to make progress towards the EU. Based on the example of other countries in the process of accession to the EU, where such strong *political will* exists, it can become the leading force for reforms enabling country's impressive and fast progress towards the EU membership. That's the dynamic that needs to be achieved here in BiH too.

37. DNEVNI LIST daily, 25/06/2011

Two years ago, CCI launched an initiative to change the method of election of school principals

Dželilović Showed No Interest in Parents Choosing Principals

By: ALMEDINA BEČIĆ

According to Adis Arapović, Project Manager in the Centre for Civic Initiatives, two years ago the initiative was officially launched in the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, and after a number of meetings with ministers, including the relevant Minister of Education, Esad Dželilović, a conclusion was reached that there is no *political will* to allow the parents the decisive decision-making power. The primary task of the political parties is to get as much power for themselves as possible, and there is no way they are giving up on that power. That's not good, of course, with the consequences already being visible, as there is much less attention being paid to the quality of education. School principles and school boards have practically become political positions, which is absolutely intolerable, Arapović said.

38. OSLOBOĐENJE daily, 12/06/2011

Damir Mašić, Federal Minister of Education and Science

Politics Can Abolish Two Schools under One Roof

By: SENITA ŠEHERČEHAJIĆ

If we take into account the facts from the field, and that certain progress, as you know, was only made in the territory of the Zenica-Doboj Canton, where such schools were unified in terms of legal status and administration, then it's not hard to conclude that very little was done on eliminating this phenomenon in the past period. The ways to do it existed and still exist. There has just not been, first and foremost, the *political will* among those cantonal ministers of education and cantonal governments where this phenomenon persists.

39. OSLOBODENJE daily, 26/05/2011

Tunjology

By: V. SELIMBEGOVIĆ

In an interview to Press, published also in the issue for Republika Srpska, because after all, we are talking about "one of the greatest Bosniak intellectuals", as the academician calls himself, we heard the latest version of his spiritual and political involvement. Academician Filipović, as a matter of fact, fought all these bloody years for BiH to remain in Yugoslavia, and against the "western thieves" (academician's own phrase), because the academician realised that "in BiH in early 1990's in, their (author's note: Serbian) *political will* was not taken into account". Alija Izetbegović made a fatal mistake "by his decision to separate from Yugoslavia in which the ethnic problems of Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks would have been resolved". This latest academician's view of the past is actually for the sake of the future: "Serbs need to be mindful of their position and rights in BiH, so as not to go through what they had been through in 1941 once again."

40. SLOBODNA BOSNA weekly, 05/05/2011

Professor Florian Bieber, international expert on Balkans

With Its Unyielding Elimination of Two HDZs from Government and by Imposing "Its Own Croats", SDP Encouraged Destructive and Dangerous Rhetoric of Milorad Dodik

By: DANKA SAVIĆ

Does it even have the capacity to speed up the forming of state government in BiH?

It is not about the capacity, but about the will. The government could be formed the next day provided that there is *political will*. Belgium is "celebrating" a year without the Government these days. Belgium

functions well even without the Government, and the central problem behind the lack of Government in Belgium is the political dispute over the organisation of the state and the status of French-speaking Belgians in the Flemish suburbs of Brussels. It is unclear whether these constant feuds block the forming of state authorities, or some parties want confrontation so that the government would not be formed.

41. SLOBODNA BOSNA weekly, 31/03/2011

During the last week's visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mevlut Çavasoglu, President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, spoke with our reporter and analysed the situation in BiH as well as how our country is meeting its obligations towards this European institution. The prominent Turkish diplomat dramatically warns of the consequences that the political agony might have on the international position of BiH.

Current problems with BiH we earlier had only in Moldova; if the problems are not solved, the Council of Europe will suspend BiH!!!

By: DANKA SAVIĆ

You spent the last two days speaking with politicians in Sarajevo, and we are beginning this interview after your return from Banja Luka. What are the impressions you are taking back to Strasbourg?

Everyone I spoke with here told me they wanted to reach an agreement, but the fact is that BiH has no government. Its establishment is the top priority for your country. It is simply necessary in order to conduct reforms and meet the obligations on the road towards the European integrations. I must admit that I was pleasantly surprised by the atmosphere in the Presidency of BiH, it is encouraging. However, generally speaking, what is absolutely necessary here is the *political will* for reforms, including the most important one, reform of the Constitution.

42. SLOBODNA BOSNA weekly, 24/03/2011
PLATFORM FOR SAVING THE WORST AMONG US
By: SENAD AVDIĆ

“How do you, colleague Avdić, comment on the unconstitutional election of government in the Federation of BiH?”, asked me on Friday just before midnight in the Croatian TV late-night news Siniša Kovačić, its editor and anchor. I need two to three minutes just to explain to the ignorant and disinterested, habitually superficial Croatian viewers, the “dramatic political scene in BiH”. I answer that constitutionality or unconstitutionality of any decision is not prescribed by the *political will*, obstinacy, anyone’s injured vanity, including that of the President of the Federation of BiH, Čović’s favourite legal “artist”, Borjana Krišto. I am not qualified or ready to make such serious assessments of the state and law; The Constitutional Court of the Federation of BiH has the sole jurisdiction in the matter.

43. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 25/03/2011
Muhamed Filipović on politics on behalf of Bosniaks
Bringing Croats Down to Ethnic Minority Is Impermissible
By: MUHAMED FILIPOVIĆ

I think that those powers, powers opposing such politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, might certainly win and bring the country back to the proper course of political development that would, eventually, open the way out of this *circulus viciosus* in which we have been for years. Falsifying the *political will* of Croats When Željko Komšić, SDP member, was for the first time elected member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the process directed by SDP, without support of any party with the Croatian prefix, the author of this text pointed out the negative aspects and the constitutional inconsistency of such actions

on the part of SDP that will result in weakening the political and any other unity in Bosnia and Herzegovina and make very serious political speculation and negative actions possible.

44. DANI weekly, 04/03/2011

Professor Edin Rizvanovic, Ph. D.

No Aid without State Aid

By: DŽENANA KARUP-DRUŠKO

DANI: Mr. Rizvanović, is BiH an economically functional country?

RIZVANOVIC: Bosnia and Herzegovina is an institutionally underdeveloped country. It is a process that requires a lot of time, knowledge, and persistence. As the process continues to unfold, we will see further increase of the functionality of the system, including its economic aspect. The main determinants of the process are the *political will* and readiness to accept European standards.

45. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 07/03/2011

PDP: RS Authorities Have Insincere Intentions

By: SRNA agency

Yesterday in Banjaluka, Crnadak said that the recent thematic session of the RS Government on fighting crime and corruption, and the RS President's letter to the RS judicial institutions along the same lines was just "empty talk and a farce" for this party. He claims that it has been five years that the RS authorities did not solve a single major problem or issue related to corruption and crime, that is, misuse of public funds. Crnadak says that the biggest problem in the RS is that there is no *political will* to fight crime and corruption, which is what the RS authorities should establish.

46. DNEVNI LIST daily, 16/02/2011

EBRD REPORT European Bank for Reconstruction and Development expects positive economic growth in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2011, but warns of the necessity to continue reforms

BiH Must Go through Reform of Its Public Sector if It Wants Recovery and Development

By: P. ZVIJERAC

“Political will for implementation of serious measures for fiscal consolidation, further liberalisation of economy and improvement of business environment will help Bosnia and Herzegovina to go back to the sustainable model of economic growth”, Peter Sanfy, leading EBRD economist said. One of the key priorities Bosnia and Herzegovina faces is the continuation of the privatisation process and progress in reforms aimed at improving the investment and business environment in the country.

47. OSLOBOĐENJE daily, 02/02/2011

Why is Željko Komšić Not Endangered?!

By: JOSIP VRIČKO

For example, in Croatia, even those who usually cannot agree on what day is today, share the same opinion about this. Thus, both Andrija Hebrang and Vesna Pusić claim that the smallest BiH ethnicity at this moment has no legal ground for its political influence, and that its *political will* is not represented in the way it was demonstrated at the elections. Besides, Pusić, whose invoking, unlike Josipović’s third entity, caused no reaction with us, in this context, mentions Komšić’s case, using the rhetoric identical to the one coming from harsh Herzegovina. ...Result of this is, let’s not forget, the joint statement of the Croatian President and the Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor of 12th January, which insists on the equality of Croats, but even more on determining

(defining) a representative of the constituent people as the representative whose legitimacy is proved by demonstration of the majority *political will* of his/her people. Lagumdžija, as he admitted himself, was not surprised by Kosor, because various HDZ parties are again like sisters.

48. DNEVNI LIST daily, 31/01/2011

Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu, with Croat politicians

Support to SDP, SDA, HSP and "Boljistik" Party Platform

By: I. MARIĆ

Presidents of HDZ BiH and HDZ-a 1990, Dragan Čović and Božo Ljubić, warned Davutoglu in a joint meeting of how fatal were attempts to eliminate two largest Croat parties from power and emphasized that Turkey supported the agreement that would enable BiH to a broad coalition and create room for constitutional changes. "We pointed to all traps and attempts to eliminate the *political will* of the Croat people at some level of authority as an utterly serious issue with unforeseeable consequences for BiH. Davutoglu had understanding for such messages", Čović said after the meeting with the Turkish head of diplomacy, who ended his visit to BiH in Mostar.

49. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 13/01/2011

Pragmatic and Reasonable Policy Is Chance for Success

By: VALENTIN INZKO

If there is *political will*, politicians can still find a solution, even though the RS law is before the Constitutional Court. Therefore, in the coming months, together with the relevant partners from international community, I will work with local officials so that the political leaders

would return to the table and find a solution that can be of use to everyone. The national authorities could have done this by themselves, but they didn't. Now is the time to take a look at all issues from a new perspective. It is time to build trust among political stakeholders; it is time to work in the true interest of all citizens. Because that is why the politicians were elected.

50. DANI weekly, 31/12/2010

Zlatko Lagumdžija, President of SDP BiH

And then Dodik Returned to Banja Luka

By: VILDANA SELIMBEGOVIĆ

DANI: In this new-year issue of Dani, you and Mr. Tihić are among the Persons of the Year, exactly because of the fact that SDP won the elections, while SDA, in spite of the prominent radicalization trends, managed to remain committed to the agreement and cooperation policy. As a matter of fact, the results achieved by these two parties indicated that BiH people, more than new arguments, want authorities that will enable the country to make a step forward towards NATO and the European Union. Those are, at the same time, signs of major expectations from these two parties; How do you plan to meet them?

LAGUMDŽIJA: There is a relatively simple way to do it: learn, learn, and learn some more, even from own mistakes, and then work, work, and work some more. As SDP joined the government, a new factor emerged in the political equation: *political will* to pass laws and implement those that were already adopted in this country. DANI: Let us go back to the Platform; even though the SDP BiH candidate, Željko Komšić, is the absolute single winner of the last elections, as part of the constitutional reforms, a different election of members of the Presidency is stipulated in the Platform. Why?

LAGUMDŽIJA: It was foreseen even in the so-called “April set”, and if we supported that provision back then, I don’t see why we should not support it now.

51. OSLOBOĐENJE daily, 27/12/2010

Šemsudin Mehmedović, SDA Vice-President and member of the state Parliament

SIPA Protects Big Fish

By: ALMIR TERZIĆ

In the BiH Parliament you also complained about the fact that the SIPA director acts more on political orders, that is, that his true boss is the SNSD president, Milorad Dodik. One of the examples you provided is the removal of Dragan Lukač from the position of the Assistant Director for Fight against Organised Crime and Corruption. Why don't the competent parliamentary commissions, that is, the BiH Parliament react adequately? Unfortunately, there was also no *political will* in the competent commission for defence and security to examine these facts. I pointed to a number of omissions in SIPA, but I always faced a wall, because the big fish are the ones who get protected, while the latest political movies concerning the homogenisation of political blocks showed the essence of things. Through protection of the national interest, some wish to save themselves from personal responsibility for obvious criminal offences, which would not be the first time something like that is happening in BiH. SIPA became the lever of political options instead of being the lever of law enforcement agencies.

52. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 25/12/2010

Dodik: No Decision-Making without RS

By: D. ŠAJINOVIĆ

Republika Srpska today is the alpha and omega in BiH and no decision can be reached if the RS institutions disagree with it, Milorad Dodik, RS President, said in Banjaluka yesterday while talking with the students of political science from Belgrade. "Up until three years ago, high representatives kept imposing decisions and removing officials who disagreed with them. I am the first politician who said that, if they remove me, I will organise a referendum for the secession of the RS. That is when it stopped," Dodik said. Dodik told students that BiH was kept alive by the violence of the foreign factor, and that the *political will* of the Serb people in the RS was to have that entity independent, but that the present moment was not the time to realise that.

53. OSLOBODENJE daily, 23/12/2010

Management Board of the FBiH Pension and Disability Insurance Bureau

Reform of Pension System Necessary

By: J. GUDELJ

Zijad Krnjić, Head of the FBiH Pension and Disability Insurance Bureau stated that it would be good to unify the Pension Insurance Bureaus of FBiH and RS, and that that would raise the minimum pensions in the RS to the level of those in FBiH. "It's a process that also requires strong *political will*. It will not be done overnight, but we advocate unification of funds in FBiH and RS", Krnjić said. Petrović emphasized that the budget of FBiH Pension and Disability Insurance Bureau approximately equalled the budget of the whole Federation of BiH, and that managing that kind of money is a great responsibility.

54. DNEVNI LIST daily, 20/12/2010

SNSD, SDS and two HDZs should hold joint meeting in Mostar i
Croatian-Serbian Block against SDP Plan

By: DARIO PUŠIĆ

SNSD Executive Secretary, Rajko Vasić, claims that those parties had highly agreed views of how the country's government should look, but that organisation of another meeting in the HDZ BiH central office in Mostar had already been discussed earlier as a good move. The idea is to try and establish contact in Mostar in order to once again have the four stakeholders review their positions, although we have no secrets, Vasić said, but warned that SNSD still demanded that the Croat election legitimacy be respected. This is not about HDZ BiH, but the *political will* of the Croat people, and Vasić reminds that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers must be from the strongest Croat party. If we interrupt the rotation now, then Serbs will also never again be at the head of the Council of Ministers, Vasić explained.

55. DNEVNI LIST daily, 13/12/2010

Tenth jubilean seminar entitled "Corporative management the way for BiH's economic recovery", which gathered over 300 prominent managers and economists held in Dubrovnik

Our Country Must Increase Trust in Its Economy

By: G. ŠIMOVIĆ

Speaking about the direction of the country's economic recovery, Lagumdžija highlights several things: "First, we need to base our economic recovery on increasing competitiveness, primarily by strengthening institutions, fighting administration, reducing public expenditure of the unprofitable administration, by reducing the percentage of the budget pent on administration, and through complete reform of public

administration, which in itself will increase competitiveness, because it will be more flexible, Lagumdžija believes. On the other hand, he underlines stimulation of stronger export, because without strengthening export we stand no chance whatsoever, while fight against corruption comes next. "The last thing, into which we need to pack all this, is the "political rebranding", that is, correction of the image that BiH has as a country with problems. If this last thing falls into the domain of politics, the previous three are also the *political will* that will focus on those three things, that is, on strengthening the export orientation, increasing competitiveness, and fighting corruption and crime", Lagumdžija said. "

56. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 21/11/2010

Thomas Countryman, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
America Is Not Making New Plan for BiH

By: SEAD NUMANOVIĆ

Statements of all major officials, including President Obama, in the press, show that whoever speaks about the present-day Europe, must mention BiH. Are we in preparation of a new plan? I'd say no! USA will support all forces in BiH ready for genuine reforms. And those forces know what the "genuine reforms" are? I think so. They know what the priorities are now. For example, it is possible that we see a compromise with the military property even before the new coalition forms. We have every opportunity to and we would like to see such a development. Another priority are the amendments to the Constitution of BiH with respect to the European clause and the application of the judgement passed by the Strasbourg Court. That's not going to be easy, but more or less everyone in BiH agrees that those are true priorities. If there is *political will*, and I think there is, then these issues can be solved quickly. We'll see. It's up to the politicians in BiH.

57. OSLOBOĐENJE daily, 21/11/2010

Thomas Countryman, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Third Entity Is Not Solution

By: FARUK BORIĆ

When you say that much remains to be done, what is the first thing that comes to mind? What is it that the US administration, as one of the BiH's transatlantic partners believes that needs to be done urgently? The list of homework is long, and the citizens of BiH know that much better than I do. And I would say that first the coalition needs to be formed, not on the basis of who gets which chair and post, but on the basis of the programme for progress in BiH. Second, I think that it's high time to solve the military property issue. I think this is quite possible and that all the parties have the *political will* to do that now. We are not in the heated atmosphere of a political campaign and it can be done in parallel to the forming of the coalition Government. Third, there are some amendments to the Constitution of BiH that everyone agrees are necessary. For example, remedying the problem identified by the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, but also the European clause issue. These are not simple issues, but there is a kind of a consensus that it needs to be done. In addition, there are many things that the citizens of BiH demand, and who expect their leaders to make the Government more efficient. This does not mean that the country must be more centralised. We still support the essence of Dayton, which is the state of BiH with full sovereignty, two entities and three constituent peoples. And that is the foundation for BiH.

58. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 20/11/2010

Sulejman Tihić, President of the Party of Democratic Action, on new authorities and constitutional changes

SDA Does Not Want Bosniak State

By: NATAŠA KRSMAN

What does a large coalition mean and which parties should form it?

TIHIĆ: Large coalition comprises SNSD, SDS, HDZ BiH, HDZ 1990, SDP, and SDA. This coalition needs to be formed if there is *political will* to go with the constitutional reform and if we can agree which areas that reform incorporates. Is the forming of the coalition conditioned by the constitutional reform? TIHIĆ: For other reasons we don't need it because it's much harder to function with six than with four parties. I said that the government should be formed by four parties: SDP, SNSD, SDA, and HDZ BiH. We cannot change the decision of SNSD so that it would form a block with SDS, nor to make the two HDZs create another block. Could the coalition be even bigger, because SDP has been in negotiations with smaller parties? TIHIĆ: Based on how SDP BiH views the matter, it seems to me that the coalition might be even bigger, but ask them. Well, will any party remain in the opposition? TIHIĆ: As things are now, hardly. The constitutional reform is the most difficult issue in BiH.

59. OSLOBOĐENJE daily, 14/11/2010

Boris KOZEMJAKIN, President of the Jewish Municipality Sarajevo
Fraud Gets Right of Citizenship

By: EDINA KAMENICA

- Why was the Jewish Community, and still is, against the mentioned law as it is? I could speak about it extensively, but the essence is that the solutions that give the right of citizenship to new fraud are being made legitimate. These solutions lead to new robbery, much worse than

nationalisation was, and it is, unfortunately, final, and as such, fatal for the owners of nationalised flats, and their heirs. There is no *political will*.

- And again, there is no sign of the law on restitution? Unfortunately, there wasn't and isn't, as many like to say, *political will*. Although I would, naturally, like the new authorities to prove me wrong, I am not an optimist, and I don't think that anything will change in the future. It seems as if those who paraded our political scene so far agreed that this matter only be talked about, until the journalists and rare individuals get tired... Dual moral standards of the delegates who are members of various political parties, but also believers and members of these same churches and religious communities became prominent. On one hand, they adopt proclamations on the nontransferability of private property, on the other hand they swear by God's laws defending that property, whereas in truth they steal, indirectly or directly.

60. DNEVNI LIST daily, 06/11/2010

Jubilean 50th session of the Bishops' Conference of BiH ends

Property of Church and Survival Must Be Defended

By: ANTUN MRKONJIĆ

When talking about the return of Croats to RS, Bishop Komarica expressed his disappointment because there is no *political will* or funds to strengthen the return. "I urge the politicians from BiH and the Republic of Croatia to sit down and make a new return strategy and correct the injustice on all sides. Unfortunately, it is a very slow and indecisive process. One gets the impression that the steps of local and international power wielders are not harmonised. When they talk to me, internationals say: "Bishop, we provided huge funds for return, and there is no progress". Someone will have to answer where those funds went. Why didn't Croats from RS receive assistance as Serbs and Bosniaks did for return in FBiH?", Bishop Komarica wonders.

61. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 01/11/2010
Session of the "Krug 99" Association
BiH Should Be Organised According to Swiss Model
By: KRUG 99

BiH is a symbol, as it represents three worlds, Orthodox, Catholic, and Islamic, and that is why it is very important, but at the same time complicated, which is an enigma, Franjo Topić said yesterday at the session of the Association of Independent Intellectuals "Krug 99" held in Sarajevo on the topic "BiH, symbol and enigma". According to him, BiH went through three major epochal changes; change of one system into another, one state into another, and finally, it went through the worst of all, the war. Everyone knows that the current political organisation of BiH is not good, and that it now takes a good *political will* to find a better solution for everyone, not to cause damage to anyone, because one's happiness cannot be built on someone else's misfortune, Topić said, adding that the Swiss model would be the most acceptable, and the closest to BiH.

62. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 30/10/2010
Political rhetorics in u BiH
What Is Normal BiH for Us When Not All of Us Think Same?
By: SANJA VLAISAVLJEVIĆ

After the belittling, we also heard some more straightforward views of BiH. Exactly about the state whose "normalcy" is often discussed and whose "normalcy" is, from one piece of the country to the next, defined in quite different ways. I dare not say, different from one ethnicity to another, because someone will immediately respond: "What ethnicities?!" Which is when I would have to answer: All those ethnicities living in this country that, when you take a look at the *political will* of

the majority, quite differently view the organisation and survival of the country. I know that this is not a welcome answer, but the reality dictates that the most important ideas and commitments on the organisation of the country be placed on the negotiating table.

63. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 19/10/2010

Investigation against leaders of veteran organisation terminated
Tihic's Dirty Plan to Stage Destruction of Constitutional Order against
Heroes Fails

By: F. VELE

As the spokesperson of the Cantonal Prosecutor's Office, Jasmina Omičević, confirmed, investigation was terminated against the President of the Union of Persons Awarded the Highest War Awards, Dževad Rađo, Deputy President of the Union of Disabled War Veterans, Huso Tucak, President of the Assembly of the Union of Demobilised Veterans, Munir Karić, President of the Organisation of Families of Killed Soldiers, Izet Ganić, President of the Assembly of the Union of Persons Awarded the Highest War Awards of FBiH, Šerif Patković, and Fahrudin Hasanović Beli, President of the Union of Disabled War Veterans of Tuzla Canton. The actions they have been charged with do not constitute a criminal offence, Omičević said. Expressing his satisfaction with the decision reached by the Prosecutor's Office, Rađo told Avaz daily that that had been a political process. SDA leader Sulejman Tihic and his party devised and created that shameful staged process. I am extremely glad this this was now confirmed. I am also glad that the judicial authorities showed their strength and power and confirmed their independence. They complied with the law, not with the *political will* of the ruling oligarchies, Rađo told Avaz daily. SDA responsibility. He added that the Union for a Better Future of BiH (SBB) had been the only party that had stood with the veterans from day one and strongly fought to protect their interests.

64. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 19/10/2010

FBiH Privatisation Agency spends BAM 370,000 for audit reports
Money for Reports Wasted

By: MAJA RENER

FBiH Agency for Privatisation this year planned BAM 300,000 for financing of audit reports and other documents required for sale of companies. In view of the fact that two other reports will most certainly be made, the budget will be exceeded. Agency director Enes Ganić did not answer his phone yesterday, so we failed to find out where the extra money needed will come from. "The Government keeps passing decisions on audits that are not even discussed in sessions. The Government is only buying time, because there is obviously no *political will* to solve problems in companies in a proper way. The solution is either bankruptcy or sale", our contact in the Government told us. They pointed out that the Government is wasting the Agency's time and money to prepare reports on something that was already common knowledge.

65. OSLOBOĐENJE daily, 04/10/2010

Glavaš as a Message

By: JURICA GUDELJ

By confirming the judgement that the Supreme Court of Croatia issued in the Banimir Glavaš case, the Court of BiH demonstrated that in our country too things can be done quickly and efficiently if there is will to do it, *political will* that is. It is exactly the issue of *political will* that constitutes the key problem in the functioning of the BiH society. It would be very easy to implement the various necessary reforms and manage to obtain for the BiH citizens, for example, the visa-free regime, if there was *political will*. Also, lack of *political will*, particularly among the RS parties, primarily Milorad Dodik and his clique, is the basic obstacle to

every attempt to reform the BiH Constitution, that is, create a functioning state. Based on daily, even superficial reading through newspaper, it appears that in BiH there is *political will* to process war crime on all sides and arrest small and medium soft drug dealers. Thus, every day we read reports from war crime trials, while in newspaper crime reports we read about seizure of large or small quantities of “leafy matter resembling marijuana or skunk”. The big fish is left alone. Thus, very few or no one deals with the biggest issue, corruption.

66. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 24/09/2010

US Embassy organises reception

Moon: Progress in BiH Is Not Impossible

By: T. L

Progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not impossible, but it calls for *political will* and vision, last night Ambassador of the United States of America in BiH, Patrick Moon, said at the reception he organised at the beginning of his diplomatic mission in our country in the Art Gallery in Sarajevo. Belief in prosperity. Large number of politicians, public officials and representatives of international community and the diplomatic corps attended the reception in support and welcome of the Ambassador.

67. DNEVNI LIST daily, 23/09/2010

Josip Milić, union leader and the fourth candidate on the HSP BiH list for the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton

On 3rd October Use Pen to Avoid Dissatisfaction, Strikes and Protests

By: D. STEŠEVIĆ

- One can hear positions that no quality changes can be made regardless of whether one votes or does not vote. What is your opinion of this

position? In the darkness, one needs to light a candle, not cry because it's dark. It seems that it is vice versa in our case. It is as if the people are used to the darkness (crime), that it suits them and projects self-pity, so it makes it easier for our people to cry for being in the darkness, rather than muster the courage to turn on the light and thus change the situation. I am convinced that the situation can improve significantly, if there is knowledge and *political will*. Herzegovina-Neretva Canton and Mostar have natural resources. We have hydro-electric power plants on Rama and Neretva rivers; we have the Old Bridge in Mostar, a global tourism jewel, Međugorje as one of the best known religious centres in the world. And finally, we are the only Canton with access to the sea in Neum; therefore, we are the only ones with seaside tourism. One needs to know how to incorporate all of this and use the agricultural and processing potential, and making tourism and agriculture the pillar of development. Naturally, this may only happen if we have better authorities that show more honesty.

68. OSLOBODENJE daily, 14/09/2010

Haris Abaspahić, analyst in the Centre for Policy and Governance
We Returned from Brussels Phase to Dayton Phase

By: FARUK BORIĆ

- In many aspects, both in terms of obligations from the European partnership for BiH, and Stabilisation and Association Agreement, but other political matters as well, decision-makers "justify" blocked processes with the lack of "*political will* for reforms". Can you define the meaning of *political will*, the lack thereof and is the lack of *political will* simply a euphemism for obstruction? It is interesting that the European integrations are much less talked about in this campaign, when compared to previous campaigns. 45 years ago, one could often hear the phrase that BiH transferred from the Dayton to Brussels phase.

Nowadays it seems that we are back to the Dayton phase. Obviously the obligations on the BiH's road to Europe no longer represent the top political priority of the ruling parties. Reforms on the European path, meeting the requirements from SAA and the European partnership mean strengthening a number of state functions, and it is a process all countries wishing to join the EU went through. If someone's political priority is not to transfer any jurisdiction to the state level institutions at all, then it is hard to expect progress in the European integration process. We can call the lack of *political will* or obstruction, it doesn't matter. In that context, obligations taken over through the European partnership and SAA remain unfulfilled, and the EU officials get a clear picture that our commitment to the EU integration is only declarative.

69. DNEVNI LIST daily, 02/09/2010

Valentin Inzko, High Representative of international community in BiH

Division of Bosnia Would Be Triumph of Milošević and Karadžić

By: APA

High Representative in BiH, Valentin Inzko, expressed his hope that after the October elections positive changes will take place in the country. "We do not want to have another four years of stalemate, not once again", he said in his statement to the Austrian news agency APA, adding that it takes a "positive *political will* for solutions", which existed until 2006. "That is when new persons came to power, there was a redistribution of power and even though previously it was quite common for the Prime Ministers of two entities to meet for coffee every Sunday, it has not happened since 2006."

70. START, 17/08/2010

Word or two from Banjaluka

Treasure of Diversity

By: TANJA TOPIĆ

I could not but remember that we have the constitutional discrimination, even with the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights; it continues to be practiced systemically. Because it is constitutional. And because there is no *political will*. I forgot, what is *political will* in this country? The more I compared things, the more I realised that we live in a land of absurdities that are very difficult to understand and even more difficult to explain. One professor from India could not stop wondering about the "BiH nonsense", as he could not comprehend how such a small country can have so many problems. He kept saying, the smaller the county, the bigger the problems.

71. GLOBAL magazine, 12/08/2010

MIJO KREŠIĆ, DEPUTY BiH MINISTER OF SECURITY AND ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE AGENCY FOR FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

Terrorism is Politicised

By: JASMIN BOJIĆ

GLOBAL: Is there *political will* in Bosnia and Herzegovina to deal with terrorism? KREŠIĆ: It is difficult to give a specific answer to that question. *Political will* is demonstrated through strategic commitments and strategic goals that are transferred to law enforcement agencies and the entire system of security. Certain progress along those lines has been made, but I believe that it is still insufficient to be able to say that we are at a satisfactory level and that there is commitment in that respect that would be accompanied by a much stronger engagement in case of those criminal offences. Of course, a number of activities were undertaken in BiH, but it seems to me that it is still not enough.

72. DNEVNI LIST daily, 09/08/2010

Federation of BiH without official insignia for three years
New Authorities to Select Coat-of-arms, Flag, and Anthem
By: LANA RIZVANOVIĆ

Since 2007 and the ruling of the Constitutional Court of BiH, Federation of BiH has not had its official insignia, and will not get them until the establishment of new authorities, since the current structure in power has no intention of discussing this topic before the end of its mandate. National insignia, coat-of-arms, flag, and anthem of FBiH thus remain waiting until the *political will* and agreement come into the picture, although there were attempts made for the bigger entity to get the insignia.commission for Defining Proposal for FBiH Insignia, which was composed of Parliament representatives and delegates, and professionals, spent eight months trying to find the design and three proposed designs for the coat-of-arms and the flag were unanimously selected. The proposals were then forwarded to the Parliament for consideration.

73. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 17/07/2010

Agreement among leaders of Council of Ministers
Prime Minister and His Deputy Undermining National Army!
By: S. ROŽAJAC

Political will One cannot say that there is no money for that when we know that under the law, the state is the first to get the funds, while the remaining funds are allocated to entities. Budget is the *political will* of the parliamentary majority. When the Parliament adopts the budget, the Ministry of Finance applies it, a source from the Ministry told us. BiH Minister of Defence, Selmo Cikotić, confirmed to Dnevni avaz yesterday that the proposed amendments to the law are supported by the BiH Ministry of Defence and realistic. He believes that that

would solve the status of those who participated in the war without disturbing the concept of a professional army, reform of defence or BiH's progress towards NATO. Ministry of Defence defends its position. Cikotić says that he also heard that the Ministry of Finance's answer was negative and that now the BiH Council of Ministers has to state its position. According to Cikotić, BiH MoD will defend the position that it is possible to have the laid off soldiers retired. However, as he says, none of that will mean anything if the BiH Ministry of Finance keeps the negative opinion.

74. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 16/07/2010

Špirić Islamic Capital in BiH Keeps Terrorism Alive

By: M. ČUBRO

Chairman of the BiH Council of Ministers, Nikola Špirić, stated yesterday that capital from Islamic banks invested in our country did not serve the development, but helped development of radical Islam, which was connected with terrorism. Špirić also believes that there is no *political will* to fight terrorism in BiH. "We will not solve the problem of terrorism by pushing it under the carpet. We will solve it if the political support facilitating the development of that phenomenon is cut. Comparing terrorists with rockers tells us that the political support for that exists here. Those people cannot be brothers in war, and enemies of the country in the present day. A new political generation that wants coexistence and living together in BiH must emerge here," Špirić said.

75. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 15/07/2010

BiH Parliament House of Representatives Discusses Terrorist Attack Investigation on Failures of Bugojno Police to Follow

By: M. ČUBRO

Ahmetović informed the delegates that the day before he had formed a Working group for drafting the Law on Fighting Terrorism, as one of a number of measures that his Ministry intended to take in order to fight terrorism as efficiently as possible. "We believe it necessary to introduce a more stringent penal policy for the criminal offences of terrorism, instigating terrorism, financing of terrorist activities, and training and procurement. Ministry of Security has no jurisdiction to do anything else, although I have an impression that when something happens, everyone expects that we have the authority," Ahmetović said. During the debate, delegates from RS claimed there was no *political will* to put an end to terrorism, arguing that the current competencies of national institutions are sufficient to fight terrorism efficiently. "More competencies are requested while even the existing ones are not being used. There is no *political will* to solve this problem, because there are clearly centres connected to those organisations", Drago Kalabić, Chairman of the SNSD caucus in the BiH Parliament House of Representatives said. His peer from the same party and the Deputy Chairman of this House, Milorad Živković, said that in BiH, compared the fight against terrorism in BiH with a sick person who is the only one unaware of the symptoms, does not want to accept them, or start treatment.

76. GLOBAL magazine, 24/06/2010

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT DEFINES AGGRESSION

Political Will above Laws and Bylaws

By: SVJETLANA SALOM

Every citizen of BiH must have come across the concept of aggression many times, while professor at the Sarajevo School of Law, Ćazim Sadiković, ironically commented the news of “historic agreement” that every peasant knows what it means if you know where the borders are, and that is that every attack across them is an aggression. However, what our peasant has “known” for the past two decades has been the subject of discussions in international law. Only this month, in the meeting held in the Uganda capital Kampala, signatories of the International Criminal Tribunal managed to agree on the definition of the crime of aggression. If a layperson finds this to be a surprising or unbelievable paradox, in view of the judicial procedures held before international courts (based on definitions valid at the time), Sadiković reminds that aggression and genocide were also subject of Nurnberg trials in 1945. It is a matter of *political will*. “Agreement on the definition of aggression as a crime is some sort of a step forward, but not one to be applied in practice, because if there is *political will* among the decision-makers, there are no difficulties. Just remember that the main trial in Nurnberg was completed in only ten months. A look at what happened with our lawsuit in Hague, it lasted from 1993 to 2007. So, these are more of theoretical discussions about definitions, while the practice has its own course.”

77. GLOBAL magazine, 17/06/2010

REFORM OF PENSION FUND IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ON
HOLD FOR TWO YEARS

When Will the Law Jump out of Drawer?

By: DUNJA TROGLIĆ

Political will. However, for a working person to take the destiny in his/her own hands and thus get the opportunity to create his/her own old age, allocating money for that purpose during employment, a period of waiting again is required so that the reform can synchronise with the development in other areas. As is usually the case in BiH, it all depends on the *political will* of parties negotiating with the World Bank. "What gives us hope is that the IMF and World Bank are asking for decisive reforms in this field, and that adoption of law, it seems, will not only depend on the *political will* of parties. RS adopted the law and bylaws; but establishment of voluntary funds remains to be unannounced", Dedić says. However, reform of the pension system depends on IMF to a large extent, because those funds mean stability of the state budget that fills the pension fund. Director of the Federal Bureau of Pension and Disability Insurance, Zijad Krnjić, pointed out the importance of contract with IMF, as well as the importance of pension system reform for the whole system.

78. OSLOBOĐENJE daily, 01/07/2010

EU helps in strengthening institutions in BiH

Control in Public Administration Expenditure

By: DL. OMERAGIĆ

Political will. Strengthening the system of financial control will also insure efficient, effective and cost-effective expenditure of public funds. This helps the public administration to implement its goals, build

administrative capacities, and improve the management processes in the best interest of citizens of BiH. This will, however, require the *political will* and commitment to reforms to remain strong at all levels, Schuster said. Marie Farrar Hockley, Head of Operations Section for Justice and Home Affairs, Administrative Reform and Civil Society in the EU Delegation to BiH, and Sabina Jelić and Radmila Trkulja from the Ministry of Finance of FBiH and RS respectively also spoke about the importance of public internal financial control. The project will be implemented by PKF Accountants & Business Advisers from Great Britain, in a consortium with SIPU International, National Financial Administration of Sweden, and Pi Consulting.

79. GLOBAL magazine, 25/02/2010

DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT IN STRASBOURG STILL ON HOLD

Will Harmonisation of Constitution Result in Thorough Reform?

By: AZRA UGLJEŠA

“It is questionable whether there is *political will* in BiH to make the necessary constitutional changes. Europe clearly has interest in that, but solution to this big issue will probably be prolonged until after the elections,” Azra Hadžiahmetović, member of the BiH delegation in the Council of Europe believes. Priority over laws and regulations. Ćazim Sadiković, BiH member of the Venice Commission, unlike Monika Mijić, thinks that failure of our country to meet its obligation to amend the Constitution pursuant to the European Convention of Human Rights would violate the legitimacy of the upcoming elections.

80. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 12/05/2010

Kuzmanović Visits Metropolitan Nikolaj

There Is Good Will to Return Property to Serb Orthodox Church

By: FENA

RS President Rajko Kuzmanović met yesterday in Sarajevo with Metropolitan of Dabar-Bosnia Nikolaj, and discussed outstanding issues of the Serb Orthodox Church (SPC), particularly the repossession of property owned by the SPC. After the meeting, Kuzmanović said that Metropolitan Nikolaj had informed him of the current status of that property and pointed out that he believed there was *political will* in BiH to return the Church its property, Fena reported.

81. OSLOBODENJE daily, 30/04/2010

Extraordinary Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe

BiH Named a Totalitarian Society

By: FARUK BORIC

International pressure. ACIPS President relayed that all the participants in the debate were clear that the compromise could have been reached several months ago, but that there should have been *political will* and wisdom. As he says, Strasbourg is extremely concerned that that the ruling elite did not even attempt to take on a constructive approach to solving this serious issue. "Therefore, some of the participants in the debate noted that BiH is 'a politically disabled country' and a 'totalitarian society' established on the principles of state sub-units established on ethnic basis, that became obsolete in Europe long ago, and that no one needs anymore. It was noted that constitutional changes must take place and that the job must be done primarily by the elected BiH officials in cooperation with civic society and experts. Still, Kimmo Sasi,

the chief creator of the report, underlined the necessity of a ‘strong international pressure’ in order to start the reform,” Huskić explained.

82. OSLOBOĐENJE daily, 08/04/2010
2010 Sarajevo Business Forum ends
Energy and Food Activate Region
By: J. SALKIĆ H. ARIFAGIĆ

USA Deputy State Secretary, James Steinberg, also pointed out that the SBF was a very important gathering that should contribute to increasing capacity for investment and improvement of economic development. We are working on the issues of economic recovery and development, which creates stable business environment. BiH ought to improve the investment climate, establish a uniform economic space and improve laws in order to be interesting to the investors. It is hard to achieve that in the election year, but progress is possible, he underlined. According to him, all hurdles can be overcome if there is *political will* and readiness to achieve political compromise. We believe in BiH and its citizens, who deserve a better future, Steinberg said and added that there was already huge interest of US companies in BiH.

83. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 12/03/2010
Interested in Resolving Issue of Displaced Persons
By: SRNA

During his discussion with the BiH Minister of Human Rights and Refugees Safet Halilović, Betoki emphasized it was his impression during his visit to the countries in the region that there was *political will* to resolve the issue of refugees and displaced persons. He said he was encouraged to hear they were preparing a regional ministerial conference

on refugees, to be held on 25th March in Belgrade, press release from the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of BiH read

84. OSLOBODENJE daily, 06/03/2010

Veselin Vlahovic Batko Heard Before Judge in Madrid Yesterday
Ordered into Custody, No Bail

By: E. KAMENICA

Spanish police officers who have had personal contact with him, confirmed how cruel and cold-hearted Vlahović was, however, Ambassador Zovko says, the most important thing now is for Bosnia and Herzegovina to send some hard evidence to Madrid to convince the famous judge that BiH should be the first to prosecute the suspect for his crimes. What about the will? Well, under Spanish laws, Vlahović should be first tried for the criminal offences charged with over there, those being a number of aggravated armed robberies, and, if there is "good will", after this trial he could be "lent" to Bosnia and Herzegovina to be prosecuted there as well. He would first serve the sentence in Spain though. However, even if the judge were to decide to send him to BiH right away, "*the political will*" could still hold Vlahović in Madrid.

85. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 04/03/2010

Mevlut Cavusoglu meets with BiH Parliamentarians
ECHR Ruling to be Honoured before Elections

By: FENA

We all know that a broader constitutional reform is warranted, but prior to October Elections it is necessary to at least amend the provisions stipulating the issue of election of the members of the BiH Presidency and BiH Parliament House of Peoples. We have no doubt that this could

be done over a period of two months, as there are good suggestions made by the Venice Commission, as well as by national and international initiatives. The *political will* is needed, Cavusoglu said at the press conference after the meeting with the joint collegiums of the Houses of the BiH Parliament.

86. OSLOBODENJE daily, 26/02/2010

Lack of *Political Will*

By: AUTHOR NOT INDICATED

Having analysed the previous course of the public administration reform in BiH, one of the key problems observed in BiH is the absolute lack of *political will* to have a coordinated reform of public administration. Hence, at various government levels one can talk about the presence of more or less *political will* to implement the public administration reform, but when it comes to the need for its coordination, any and all *political will* melts away. This is noted in the research by ACIPS titled Evaluation of Progress Achieved in the Implementation of Public Administration Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, presented yesterday at a round table on this topic in Sarajevo. Deputy National Coordinator for Public Administration Reform, Suad Musić, said that the key problem in the implementation of the public administration reform was the very understanding of this process.

87. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 24/01/2010

Constitutional Changes Require *Political Will*

By: O. STJEPANOVIĆ

Even the best of constitutions cannot be the guarantee of good in themselves if there is no *political will* and climate among the people,

Slavo Kukic, professor at the University of Mostar, said in Bijeljina yesterday, attending the round table titled "Through Upgrades and Amendments to BiH Constitution Faster into European Integrations".

88. OSLOBOĐENJE daily, 25/01/2010

While Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia Take Big Steps Forward

We Cannot Hope for Membership Before 2025

By: FARUK BORIĆ

However... "Because of these relations of ours, we are progressing at five kilometres per hour, while Serbia progresses at hundred kilometres per hour. If BiH too were a simply organized country, *political will* would not have the institutional power to oppose. *Political will* is tied to the organizational mode of a country, and this organizational mode often produces *political will* that places the protection of the entities above the programme of integration into the European Union. It is a vicious circle, hence, the solution is the reform of the Constitution", explains Genjac, further supporting his views with the fact that for the first time the constitutional reform was mentioned and given considerable attention in the latest report of the European Commission.

89. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 29/10/2009

Opposing reactions to messages from the Council of the EU that agreement in BiH must be reached by national politicians

RS for Internal Agreement, FBiH Cannot Do Without Internationals

By: MIRZA ČUBRO, RADE ŠEGRT

SDA President Sulejman Tihić said he was afraid that the EU would be withdrawing from the Butmir Process as a result of the refusal of the "EU-U. S. Package". "I am concerned, because I know there is no

readiness, there is no capacity required for internal dialogue, there is no readiness to negotiate, nor *political will* to reach agreements, that is, no courage to compromise”, Tihić said.

90. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 19/10/2009

Dimitris Kurkulas, Head of Delegation of the European Commission

Butmir Initiative Chance for BiH

By: MIRZA ČUBRO

NN: Why do you think BiH has made no progress? Setbacks are evident even in the 2008 and 2007 reports. KURKULAS: I agree that no progress has been made, except for the conditions pertaining to the visa regime liberalisation, where significant steps forward have been made. In all other spheres, the main reason why progress has been missing is the lack of consensus on the specific future of the country when it comes to Euro-Atlantic integrations. I am aware that the constitutional structure of your country is rather complex, but I do not see this as the main reason for failure to meet the conditions. I am saying this because we have seen that regardless of the constitutional structure, when there is *political will*, many difficult decisions have been made. I must stress that we believe that, for your country to get the status of a candidate, it needs a constitutional reform to help establish a more efficient and a better functioning decision-making system.

91. OSLOBOĐENJE daily, 11/10/2009
After Butmir summit of political leaders
Key Topics Yet to Be Put on Agenda
Key Topics Yet to be Tackled
By: G. KATANA, S. ŠEHERĆEHAJIĆ

Unlike the real political approach from 1996, there is now more interest among high-level authorities in the U. S. in seeing the problem solved. However, this is not being done by cutting in with extraordinary measures. Evidently, the events in Butmir are merely the first step in probing the situation and accepting the approach of the most relevant participants, and an indicator that there actually is *political will* to solve the problem. This is why continued talks in about 10 days should constitute a true search for solutions to BiH problems, Halilović pointed out.

92. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 28/09/2009
Nataša Kandic, Executive Director HLC
BiH Cannot be Destroyed
By: SANJA ŠKULETIĆ

Do you think the history of the Balkans can be prevented from repeating itself? What has been happening here in the past is no longer permissible, and I hope there is awareness thereof. Now more than ever we have the pre-requirements for creating mechanisms that will not allow this repetition. I believe that the *political will* at one point in time will not be strong enough to resist the request for the fact gathering. Who will dare say they do not want facts.

... Still, there is no excuse for a failure in Serbia for many years to adopt a declaration on Srebrenica... This is what gives me the cause for concern, that even after the film on "the Scorpions" or after the judgment of the International Court of Justice in The Hague a *political will* has

not been created in Serbia to pass this declaration, to acknowledge the victims of Srebrenica, to turn a new leaf... Is it not high time to exert pressure to finally arrest Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić?

93. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 05/08/2009

BiH – Pandora’s Box for the EU

By: SRNA

Bosnia and Herzegovina is for the European Union a Pandora’s Box, which can be opened again, Marko Papić, an expert in the “Stratfor” Agency, believes. According to the assessments by the “Stratfor” Agency, obstacles to the Western Balkans membership in the EU could be removed if there was *political will*, but it is highly unlikely that the Euro-integration processes would speed up in the autumn.

94. OSLOBODENJE daily, 14/07/2009

Adil Osmanovic, Vice President of the RS

Political Violence on Scene in Republika Srpska

By: GORDANA KATANA

- The conclusion reached at the meeting you mentioned was for the delegates of the Bosniak Caucus to withdraw from the RS Council of Peoples until the RS Constitutional Court render a decision to amend the Rules of Procedure. Does this mean that the RS legislator will in fact be blocked? We are not very happy with the situation we have brought ourselves in. We kept saying we were ready for political talks and agreement, because each session of the RS Parliament is preceded by the session of the collegiums, which is the best place to feel the *political will* of the peoples’ delegates. However, we had not found the understanding for our proposals to be adopted, we were often outvoted,

and the very mechanism of the Council of Peoples was brought into question and its existence on such premises has totally devaluated, as almost all laws whereon the issue of protection of national interest of the Bosniak people had been invoked received the green light from the RS Constitutional Court. If this continues, the issue of the very existence of the Council of Peoples opens up. One should bear in mind that SNSD has a grip on three caucuses in the House of Peoples and it is no longer the House of Peoples, but rather the house of parties. This is only the tip of the iceberg and the only way for us to draw the attention of both domestic and international public to the matter that we can no longer keep quiet, because everything that was so unfortunately settled during the war, under the command of the war criminal Ratko Karadžić, is now being legalized and we cannot permit it.

95. OSLOBODENJE daily, 06/07/2009

Omer Ibrahimagic: Statehood and Political Development of BiH (12)
Inter-Entity Coordination

By: OMER IBRAHIMAGIĆ

Political will On the contrary, advocates of the entity exclusiveness at the expense of building state infrastructure have discouraged any and all attempts to launch initiatives to have some issues from previous jurisdiction of the entities solved at the state level, by arguing that such initiatives and their being regulated at the state level are not grounded in the BiH Constitution, or as they say "it is not in accordance with the Dayton"! If the BiH Constitution is Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement, and if it mandates that the entities cooperate with one another, that after six months from its coming into force they should start "negotiations towards incorporating some other issues into the jurisdiction of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina", then there is truly no room for such objections, in particular today, almost eight years after

the BiH Constitution came into force. Therefore, it is not a question of whether “the Dayton” provides for it, but whether there is *political will* to establish BiH as a normal European country, both institutionally and jurisdiction-wise.

96. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 12/06/2009

SDA Presidency on Appointment of First Man of FBiH Government
Mustafa Mujezinović – Candidate for Prime Minister of FBiH

By: MIRZA ČUBRO

Sulejman Tihić, President of SDA, explained yesterday that the appointment of the new FBiH Prime Minister would conclude the reconstruction process of the FBiH Government. “The appointment of the new Prime Minister will not imply any other changes to the personnel in the Government. There was no *political will* to do it at this point in time. Hence, Mustafa Mujezinović will be the new Prime Minister of FBiH, while the current ministers will remain in their offices”, Tihić said. Kebo emphasized that the decision to resolve Nedžad Branković from this duty would probably be made today, after he had resigned from the duty of Prime Minister late last month.

97. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 31/05/2009

Leaders of the Troika on Solana’s Letter

Dodik: We Must Put an End to Political Rows!

By: F. VELE, S. ŠKULETIĆ

The Prud Troika, consisting of the leaders of the SDA, SNSD, and HDZBiH Sulejman Tihić, Milorad Dodik, and Dragan Čović, have unanimously confirmed for Avaz that they were ready to work fast to meet five goals and two conditions put before BiH by the Peace Implementation Council

(PIC), that is, to meet the expectations of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Polity Javier Solana and to resolve the issue of state property by the end of June. The time has come. If there is *political will* and if we all want to act in accordance with the BiH Constitution, we can solve it in line with the OHR proposal from the time of Miroslav Lajčák.

98. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 20/04/2009

Munib Jusufović, Head of Independent Caucus of SBiH Delegates
Inevitability to Form New Party

By: A. DEDAJIĆ

In my opinion, the key issue is the SDA Congress in May, which will affect the future of SBiH, Jusufović says. According to him, there is *political will* for individual members of SBiH and SDA to join forces and form a new political entity, whose sole goal would be the stability of BiH. I am part of a group of people who believe that a merger like this would happen over the time to come. This must happen and I believe we are very close, Jusufović said. Special symbolisms. As Jusufović says, forming an Independent Club of SBiH Delegates has its special symbolism, given the structure of its members. Marko Vešović has left SBiH a year and a half ago, and he is now a member of the new Club. Alija Kurtović is a winner of the "Zlatni ljiljan" award, while Aida Cikić and I are former members of the SBiH Presidency, Jusufović says.

99. OSLOBODENJE daily, 13/03/2009

Faithful to God, Faithful to Bosnia: Friar and his Bosnia (39)
European Paradigm

By: PETAR ANĐELOVIĆ

Politically, it no longer suffices to exhibit sheer tolerance, whereby people merely tolerate the others and at the same time use various ways to limit their rights and their development opportunities, as has been the case over the past centuries and decades. What is warranted is a new model of political and cultural equality, both at the individual and collective level. This pertains to each nation and each state, including Bosnia and Herzegovina. "If *political will* for such an option is not shaped", Srećko Džaja says, "then any political speech on Bosnia turns into nothing and its future into a hot question mark".

100. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 06/03/2009

Road Map

From Prud to Brussels

By: TADEJ LABERNIK

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Javier Solana has finally realized that, if the EU really wants to become strong in its own backyard, then it should be careful not to lose its credibility and it must stand behind its standards, as well as behind its agreed proposals. If this is so, a candidate of the EU will represent the international community in BiH. An officer of the U. S. State Department has also indirectly indicated that the U. S. has never had anything against an EU candidate. A good sign for Europe, as well as for BiH. A portion of the political elite in Bosnia and Herzegovina still does not understand that the road to Brussels leads through Prud and similar political actions that must lead through dialogue and compromise to true priorities in

solving how a complex country should function. Long-term viability of such solutions cannot be provided by the international community, but only by *political will* of all players in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian politics.

101. OSLOBOĐENJE daily, 27/12/2008

State of the Country

In the Dayton Mud

By: ZIJA DIZDAREVIĆ

With the establishment of Republika Srpska as an entity (with many competencies of a state), a negative *political will* towards the BiH state was constitutionalized (permitted under constitution). This negative will has been enabled under the Constitution on two grounds (entity and national) with a power of veto. This is not about the protection of regional (entity) and national interests endangered by the state (supra) authority but about a constitutionally accepted right for the wartime intentions to continue paving their way within the legal and political order, within the peace agreement?! The RS has come into being as the negation of BiH and it has been permitted to continue as such under the Constitution and under being tolerated by international authorities. Prime Minister Milorad Dodik optimally uses these amenities by leaving in the game the option of the RS secession, asking as a minimum to preserve the constitutional frameworks that enable the RS to determine the faith of the entire BiH. BiH finds itself in an unnatural political and legal situation. This is a system in which a state has a weaker constitutional position than its administrative-territorial units. This is a state in which it is possible for a *political will* of a portion of the country, of a political party or even of an individual to rise above the Constitution, above the state and above all of its citizens. Constitutional (no)way out. It is good that the leaders of HDZBiH Dragan Čović, SNSD Milorad Dodik, and SDA Sulejman Tihić have agreed for the amendments to the BiH Constitution

to be initiated at the state assembly. This is where sincerity and ranges of *political will* of the Troika will be tested individually and collectively. It would be good for the opposition to partake in the process with the force of their proposals and not by displaying a discarding and negative attitude from the start and by (self)exclusion from the attempts that do enjoy support of decisive international players in the BiH reality.

102. DNEVNIAVAZ daily, 20/12/2008

Valery Perry, Deputy Director of the Department of Education in OSCE Mission to BiH

Many Schools Assimilate Children

By: ADNAN MUMINOVIĆ

What is needed is *political will* to make BiH a country in which children are not separated on ethnic and national grounds or by national curricula, says in an interview for our daily Deputy Director of the Department of Education in OSCE mission to BiH Valery Perry. She believes that a good constitutional setup of the country would contribute to finding solutions to piled-up problems, because strong state authorities could respond to all the needs of its citizens. *Political will*. How do you comment the latest research studies by UNICEF, Save the Children and Open Society Fund – BiH, wherein they point once again to the issue of discrimination in the BiH educational system? Those studies are very well carried out, but they have not revealed anything particularly new. OSCE, as well as some other non-governmental organizations working in the field of education, have been long pointing to the issue of discrimination and the need to have the problem solved. However, with these latest research studies we do have additional sources and information we can rely upon. How much have the BiH authorities done to solve the existing problems? The fact is, unfortunately, that national officials have not done much in all these years for BiH to get a multinational,

comprehensive, tolerant, and anti-discriminatory educational system. Still, we can single out the Brčko District as an example of good progress. They have demonstrated that educators, parents, politicians, and students, when they really want something, can actually go ahead and do it. It comes down to *political will*.

103. OSLOBOĐENJE daily, 12/12/2008

Michael Tatham, Ambassador of Great Britain to BiH

There is No Deadline FOR CLOSING OF OHR

By: MUHAREM BAZDULJ

- How do you see the current situation in BiH, and I primarily refer to the Prud Agreement and subsequent developments? Let me go back to the EC Report. It mentions two major problems. The first is the slowing down of the reform process over the previous period. I was personally shocked by the statistics. Over an equal timeframe, the previous composition of the state parliament has adopted around 80 laws, and the current one merely twenty or so. It is an exceptionally clear proof that the reform process is slowing down. This, hence, is the first problem. The second problem is the deterioration of the political climate in the country. Solving these problems is the main task for the BIH authorities. I believe that the agreement from Odžak, that is the Prud Agreement, is a step in the right direction. This Agreement proves that if there is *political will*, one can achieve progress even on the highly complex issues.

104. NEZAVISNENOVINE daily, 12/12/2008
From Prud Agreement into Laws
By: E. D.

It is crucial at this point in time for the agreement between the leaders of the SNSD, SDA, and HDZ BiH from Prud to be translated into concrete legal solutions, Miroslav Lajčak, High Representative in BiH, said after his meeting with Dragan Čović, President of HDZ BiH. "There is *political will*. The Agreement should now be implemented, confirming in this way our readiness for the integration processes with the European Union", Lajčak said.

105. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 27/11/2008
British Ambassador Visiting Mostar
Tatham: Translate Prud Agreement into Laws ASAP
By: A. DU.

British Ambassador to BiH Michael Tatham said during his visit to Mostar yesterday that he expected the political agreement between the leaders of the SDA, HDZBiH, and SNSD from Prud, that is, the principles arising from their agreement, to be translated into legal frameworks as soon as possible. Answering the question put by a journalist from Dnevni avaz, Ambassador Tatham said that the Government of Great Britain saw the Agreement between Sulejman Tihić, Dragan Čović, and Milorad Dodik as a positive thing, being an indicator that there is common *political will* in BiH. If it does exist, then one can find common grounds on all difficult issues.

106. NEZAVISNENOVINE daily, 20/11/2008

BiH Minister of Security on Delays in Forming of Anti-Corruption Agency

No *Political Will*

By: M. ČUBRO

Office for Fight against Corruption in BiH with investigative authority will not be formed because there is no *political will*, claims the BiH Minister of Security Tarik Sadović. Ministry of Security was supposed to prepare the law on establishment of this office by June this year. "Personally I would like us to establish an institution that will, similar to Croatian USKOK, have investigative authority in fighting corruption. That is impossible unfortunately, because there is no *political will* to do such a thing. We will probably have a body at the national level that will coordinate the work of existing institutions whose jurisdiction is to investigate corruption", Sadović said.

107. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 08/11/2008

Pierre Mirel, *Director of the EC Directorate for Western Balkan*

BiH Leaders Must Reach Compromise for Reforms

By: DEJAN ŠAJINOVIĆ

NN: Do you think that the BiH authorities will comply with the recommendations from the report? MIREL: At the beginning of this year, Authorities managed to find the consensus needed to sign the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and the Interim Agreement. So far, commitments pertaining to trade and trading issues following from the Interim Agreement were fulfilled in a satisfactory manner. The Agreement came into force only several months ago and this additionally liberalised trade between the EU and your country. I expect the authorities to also be able to overcome the current standstill and honour

our recommendations given in this year's progress report. It seems that the leaders are not demonstrating the feel for urgent solving of these issues, or responsibility for overcoming the current situation. What we need now are responsibility, *political will* and determination.

108. OSLOBODENJE daily, 01/11/2008

RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik

RS Will Not Hand Over military Property to BiH Ownership

By: G. KATANA

"When it comes to military property, we are not asking for anything more than observation of the Dayton Agreement, which clearly said that the property located in the territory of an entity shall be considered to be owned by the entity", RS Prime Minister said. He added that "Federation of BiH can give all the military property as a gift to BiH, but RS will not do it, because there is no *political will* to do it, nor does it have the right to do it under the Constitution."

109. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 04/10/2008

No *Political Will* to Change BiH Constitution

By: SRNA

Rajko Kuzmanović, RS President, said that at the moment there was *political will* or objective need to proceed with the radical change of the Constitution of BiH. "There are different tendencies to radically change the Constitution of BiH, but such demands are not serious, because certain prerequisites are needed to change a Constitution, that is, there has to be a general social need to do it, agreement of the three constituent peoples, and one *political will* that can realise it", Kuzmanović said in his opening statement at the 5th advisory session

titled October days of lawyers, at which building and functioning of the legal system was discussed.

110. DANI weekly, 30/05/2008

Silajdžić's Language

By: IVAN LOVRENOVIĆ

Bosnia and Herzegovina is the prime example for that. While, in the Yugoslav political framework, in the single party and ideological monolith regime - it kept its three ethnicities under control with a firm hand in a semi-hibernating state, the language issue was solved along the lines of uniformity –first as creation of the unitary Serbo-Croatian for the four “štokavian Republics”, and then as creation of the so-called BiH standard language for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The *political will* of the ruling structures played the key role in that, the science (linguistics) only serviced it. From the moment (multiparty elections in 1990, road to state independence...), when the passion for ethnic self-identification was let loose, the *political will* with respect to the language changed as well. Instead of one, three political establishments were created; project of trans-ethnic “BiH standard language” was buried forever, while the process of three-lingual ethnic and national standardisation was initiated. It is logical that the Bosniaks (back then still called Muslims), spearheaded this process, because they were of the longest period of time subject to ethnic non-recognition. Science again wholeheartedly serviced, and continues to service such choice and direction of standardisation, to equal extent in all three ethnicities.

111. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 21/03/2008

Independent Position

Banjaluka, at Last

By: DRAGAN RISOJEVIĆ

Banjaluka will, it seems, become the capitol of Republika Srpska on paper as well, after the Parliament adopted the amendments to the entity Constitution in the first round. This will formalise the state of facts that has been in place since 1998, when the entity-level institutions moved from Pale to Banjaluka. Thanks to someone's stupidity, all these years the Constitution read that Sarajevo is the capitol. Not Serb, not Istočno Sarajevo, but Sarajevo! All these years there was no *political will* to replace that one word, just like we waited all these years for the death sentence to be deleted from the Constitution. If only these technicalities were our only problem, but then again, this issue is as trite as the political stubbornness, which is why all these years the Constitution read that the entity capitol is in fact capitol of the other entity!

112. OSLOBODIENJE daily, 07/12/2007

From Dayton to Brussels

No one Rising Tensions after Initialling of SAA

By: ENSAR ZGODIĆ

As a matter of fact, our collocutor said, time of signing the SAA, getting the status of a candidate and accession is different from one country to another. He mentioned Slovakia as an example. High Representative Miroslav Lajčák hails from this country which was among the last to sign the SAA, and it took it only few years to become an EU member. *Political will* EU „It all depends on the *political will* of EU countries, and, in particular, the public mood. I even believe that EU would grant candidate status to Serbia, only if Serbia would endorse the independence

of Kosovo. If the things are sped up regarding Serbia and Montenegro, I see no reason why things should not be sped up with BiH as well. In addition, EU has always linked us with Serbia. The negotiations were launched in nearly same period, for the sake of stability", said Hadžikadunić, adding that, following the submission of application, it takes approximately one year to receive the questions from EU.

113. OSLOBODENJE daily, 05/11/2007

RS National Assembly on Lajčak's decisions again

Way Out of Crisis Depends on Agreement of Experts

By: G. KATANA

PDP is not in favour of blocking the BiH institutions. Member of the Executive Board of the Party of Democratic Progress, Igor Crnadak, believes that the way out of crisis that emerged after the recent decisions of the High Representative in BiH is showing through, and that the prerequisites for a solution to the situation were obviously created by the meeting of the RS and OHR legal teams. "All we need now is *political will*," Crnadak said on Sunday in Banja Luka, and added that PDP was not in favour of blocking the work of institutions, crisis in BiH, nor did he intend in his views to endanger the authority and position of OHR. According to him, decisions of the High Representative opened a number of potential, highly unlikely, but possible situations in which one people or entity would be eliminated from the decision-making process in BiH, which was the reason for not accepting Lajčak's measures in RS without an explanation.

114. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 21/10/2007

Judith Beth attending lecture in Sarajevo

There Is No *Political Will* in BiH to Make Joining EU Ultimate Goal

By: A. GR.

Senior scientific associate for EU policy issues towards Western Balkans at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris, Judith Beth, said yesterday in Sarajevo that there is no *political will* and intention in BiH to make EU membership its ultimate goal. During the lecture on the European perspective of BiH, that lasted several hours, and was organised by the EUSR press office in cooperation with the Alumni Association of the Centre for Interdisciplinary Post-Graduate Studies, Beth told presented her observations on the current position of BiH in the world and the reasons why it is still at a standstill in spite of all the efforts. She sees the main reason in the lack of *political will* and intention whose ultimate goal would be integration into EU. The role of the High Representative is to create prerequisites, but he cannot make formations that would lead to *political will*. BiH leaders in their public addresses leave the impression of truly wanting progress for this country, but they lack that *political will* in practice. They do not want to meet the conditions for accession to the EU, but keep redefining those conditions to their own benefit, Beth said at the yesterday's lecture.

115. OSLOBOĐENJE daily, 02/08/2007

Tihić and Lajčak satisfied with forming of HNK Government

By: J. FETAHOVIĆ

The High Representative, Miroslav Lajčak, also welcomed the forming of the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton Government, and urged it to build its own credibility by making up for the lost time. "Lack of a government clearly set HNK back. New Government must focus on the needs of

citizens in order to achieve specific results." In the next few days, he will lift the suspension on payment of funds from the budget to political parties at the national level and level of FBiH. "Forming of HNK Government is not only a good thing in itself, but is also an example that when there is *political will*, a fair compromise can be reached. Such takeover of responsibility is exactly what this country needs now and in the future, on its path to the EU", reads a statement from Lajčak's office.

116. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 19/06/2007

Miroslav LAJČAK, newly-appointed High Representative of international community in BiH

Bonn Powers in Case of Breach of Dayton and Constitution of BiH
By: MIRJANA KUSMUK

In his first interview after being appointed by the Council of Ministers of EU to the position of the High Representative in BiH yesterday, Lajčak said that *political will* and the agreement of political leaders is the key to the reform of BiH Constitution. "This is your country, your Constitution, nothing can be imposed there. I can hardly imagine the success of a project that is being pushed by outside forces. What matters to me is for us to find a common consensus with regard to key issues", he added. Lajčak underlined that BiH needs to meet all the three remaining conditions in order to sign the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, those being cooperation with Hague, police reform, and reform of public broadcasting system. "All of the conditions are of equal importance", he said.

117. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 28/03/2007

High Representative in Mostar today

Political Leaders Must Change Situation

By: T. Š.

Christian Schwartz-Schilling, High Representative in BiH, will visit Mostar today, where he will discuss progress in the process of unification of the City of Mostar with the Mostar Mayor Ljubo Bešlić, President of the City Council, Murat Ćorić, and representatives of party caucuses. "The High Representative will point to the fact that Mostar political leaders are the ones who need to change the situation in the city," reads the press release from OHR. "Mostar needs strengthening of the climate of responsibility. *Political will* to take over responsibility, reach compromise and get involved in constructive dialogue are the key for progress in Mostar," the press release further reads.

118. OSLOBODENJE daily, 16/02/2007

On the eve of political leaders' meeting on police reform

It "Only" Takes Good *Political Will*!?

By: A. T.

I am convinced that the European Union would be satisfied with nothing more than a demonstration of presence of *political will* and consensus to start the system of police reform, and that the Stabilisation and Association Agreement could be signed with the EU immediately, as here would be no further obstacles to that, Chairman of the House of Representatives of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly, Beriz Belkić, said on Thursday, commenting on the meeting of leaders of the main political parties, called for Friday by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Nikola Špirić, and dedicated to the police reform. Police reform is a long process, Belkić emphasized, requiring a period of at least two to three

years. The process should be preceded by adoption of very important documents, such as the Law on Police, and bylaws that will ensure its implementation in the field. "I think that the EU expects us in BiH, that is, leaders of political parties, to have and demonstrate *political will* that they are ready to comply with the commitment stemming from the basis of the agreed structure. Directorate for Police Reform has done its job and prepared a report, on which position should be taken in the meeting gathering leaders of political parties, Belkić said.

119. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 07/11/2006

Transparency International Research

Political Parties in BiH Still Most Corrupt

By: AUTHOR NOT INDICATED

Reforms in the past period clearly started bringing institutional results, but did not turn into specific effects, which is why, among 163 states, BiH this year shares positions 93 through 99 on the Global Corruption Perceptions Index. This was yesterday commented by the Chairman of the Transparency International (TI) Board of Directors, Boris Divjak, while presenting the results of the most representative global research on corruption. BiH did not make any progress, and remained in the same position as last year, sharing positions 93 through 99 with Argentina, Armenia, Eritrea, Syria, and Tanzania, Divjak said. He pointed out that the key cause for such disappointing results was the lack of *political will* to fight corruption on the part of BiH authorities. The biggest obstacle to fight against corruption is the corruption at the very top of government, and inappropriate influence of powerful oligarchies and criminal groups, Divjak said.

120. OSLOBOĐENJE daily, 26/10/2006

How to Staff Serb Caucus in House of Peoples of FBiH

First Adopt Amendments on Constitutionality

By: S. ŠEHERĆEHAJIĆ

Initiative launched by the Central Election Commission to change part of the Constitution of FBiH so as to enable staffing of the Serb Caucus in the House of Peoples of FBiH cannot be realised until the House of Representatives of the FBiH Parliament adopts the High Representative's amendments on the constitutionality of peoples. Previous delegates did not do that over a period of four years. The reason behind it, as they say, is the lack of *political will*. Let us remind that after the 2002 elections, Parliament of FBiH was formed in accordance with the decision of the High Representative on amendments to the Constitution of FBiH. Amendments, which are the constituent part of the decision, made a redistribution of delegate seats in the House of Peoples so that the decision of the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs could be implemented. Three caucuses were established, and of those, two (Bosniak and Croat), had 17 members each, while the Serb Caucus had 9 delegates because that is how many were elected in Cantonal assemblies, from which they can be delegated under the Constitution. "The House of Representatives back then adopted the decision to amend the Constitution of FBiH, but not the actual amendments. Therefore, the first step would be to adopt the amendments, and we can take it from there", says the Chairman of the Constitutional Commission of the FBiH House of Representatives, Slaviša Šućur. He further added that throughout the previous mandate, there had been no "*political will* to adopt those amendments".

121. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 07/10/2006

Bitter Message to BiH Croats

By: HUSEIN ORAHOVAC

Cardinal Vinko Puljić claims that Croats suffered injustice by election of Komšić. They certainly did, but only in the part in which Croats were *de facto* blocked from electing their representative in the state political leadership. Not in the part which says that Komšić will not know or will not want to care about the interests of Croats. The most tragic thing in this is that legislation in BiH is such that *political will* of an entire people can be completely ignored. In such a situation, dissatisfaction of people is on the rise, room is created for political manipulation, security is shaken, and radical forces get wings... Therefore, it is becoming a little obvious that by electing Komšić, someone wanted to put Croats into a position to seek rescue in requests for establishment of the third entity. And that story additionally, from the point of view of politics, complicates matters in BiH and security in the country.

122. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 24/09/2006

Third session of Assembly of Association of Missing Persons from Krajina

No *Political Will* to Discover Destinies of Missing Persons

By: AGENCIES

Representatives of associations of families of missing Serbs from the territory of former Yugoslavia stressed yesterday in Belgrade that there is still no *political will* among the countries in the region to discover destinies of missing persons, and that the politics do not allow known graves to be opened. As guests on the third session of the Assembly of Association of Missing Persons from Krajina, they sent a message that this type of associations must put pressure on all national and

international institutions dealing with the issue of missing persons so that it could finally be solved.

123. OSLOBODENJE daily, 20/09/2006

Debates

Nothing Is Integral

By: SALIH TATIĆ

Not even an integral economic market can come into life without an integral political market, and that will not happen unless systemic errors in our political system are corrected, that is, the imposed, grotesque political order of our country changed. Changes along those lines could be made by our political leaders, but that takes *political will*, which they lack. 1 In the foreseeable future one cannot see the minimum prospects of some sort of agreement to be reached by the entity political cliques. At least not until it becomes the interest of the powerful but hypocritical international community.

124. REPORTER, 23/08/2006

KONSTANTIN SHUVALOV, AMBASSADOR OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION
IN BiH

Our Position towards BiH is Respect of Current Constitutional Order

By: S. GOVEDARICA

Situation has been changing significantly for the better in the past months. Of course, our investments will be directed to places with positive investment climate and with *political will* for development of cooperation with Russia. Regardless of the fact that the business climate is not at its best, it appears that some Russian investors, such as the one who took over the Sase mine, did not present themselves in the

best way. I do not agree with you that in this case the investor did not present itself in the best way, because in that case exactly unfair court rulings were passed and quashed. There was discrimination by the local customs authorities and there were also illegal actions by some banks.

125. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 27/06/2006

MORE THAN BAM 1 MILLION SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED THIS WEEK TO ACCOUNTS OF SEVEN BiH CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS.

Institutions did not receive DECISION IN WRITING

By: M. LINGO

Director of the National Museum, Aiša Softić says that the directors of seven cultural institutions still did not receive the decision on payment of the first instalment of funds. "We received assurances over the phone. We hope that the money will be transferred to our accounts soon, because we are all in a difficult situation," Softić said. Having been asked if directors of these institutions considered filing a lawsuit against the Council of Ministers of BiH because it does not fulfil its commitments, Softić said they did. "When you are in a hopeless situation and when there is no *political will* to have your problem solved, you consider all options, including a lawsuit. That is one of our solutions too. However, I must emphasize that the Ministry of Civil Affairs did everything it could to help us", Softić added.

126. DANI weekly, 07/07/2006
Bosniaks Self-determine Interests of Croats
By: STJEPAN JURKIĆ

I also must remind esteemed Doctor Mujkić that *political wills* of all three autonomously self-determined constituent peoples in BiH decide about the unsuitability of the model for BiH's social system, not the *political will* of one people and Doctor Mujkić. Finally, I will eagerly remind Doctor Mujkić that it was exactly Bosniaks who were the first promote and autonomously apply the right to self-determination of BiH peoples in the sovereign BiH established at the ZAVNOBIH conference. And used it well. Thus, in the 1970's, they declared themselves as Muslims in terms of ethnicity and nationality, then in 1993/1994 they declared themselves as not being Muslims but Bosniaks in terms of ethnicity and Nationality, and they autonomously self-determined the establishment of their own Bosnian (Bosniak) language.

127. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 20/06/2006
Belgrade
BiH Must Solve Issue of Constitution and Borders
By: AGENCIES

In the "Dayton triangle" countries there will be economic or other progress as long as the issues of state, Constitution and border remain unsolved, particularly the constitutional position of BiH and borders and the Constitution of Serbia – these were the words said yesterday after the three-day seminar titled "Reconciliation in the Dayton Triangle". Vehid Šehić from the Forum of citizens of Tuzla, said that BiH is at the moment vulnerable with respect to any changes in the region, and that BiH is still subject of trade, and is being used as a kind of blackmail in solving other problems. Reminding of the attempts to change the

Constitution of BiH, Šehić said that there was no *political will* for that and that the politicians were not ready to deal with existential problems, which they cloud with the ethnic issue. Šehić said that political stability in BiH still could not be achieved because of the frequent elections, and criticised the international community for doing nothing to respect the principle of integrity of borders in the region.

128. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 18/06/2006

Igor Davidović, BiH chief negotiator

We Do Not Talk on Take It or Leave It Principle

By: TARIK LAZOVIĆ

We are negotiating with the EU, not individual member countries. However, during discussions on certain items, one easily recognizes whose interests are behind certain demands. In that position, I try to represent BiH as a serious country, a future member, and protect our interest. That way exactly we are showing that the negotiations are not conducted on the basis of the "take it or leave it" system, but that genuine negotiations are taking place. After the agreement we will have a lot of work to do. Some believe that the questions about when the Stabilisation and Association Agreement will be signed took us away from the essence of what we will face once it comes into effect? The negotiating team was not taken away from the essence of the agreement by that. The *political will* to have it signed as soon as possible is quite understandable and justified, because it is only the first step in joining the EU. It is followed by huge work on the road towards the candidacy for membership and filing of application. We also have a lot of work to do on building the system for the Agreement application that should take us to the position when we can file the application for candidacy.

129. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 01/06/2006

Independent position

INDIRECTLY DIRECT DEMOCRACY

By: MIROSLAV MIKEŠ

In some states, elected representatives of the people also elect representatives of judicial authority, who, in theory, should be independent. When you live in a semi-protectorate, and the question is which of the two halves of that situation is more pronounced, certainly the *political will* of the the key decision-maker defines and applies rules. Those rules can be interpreted quite differently depending on the political and economic interest of the power wielder. Direct and indirect democracy then starts losing sense, and if in addition you lose the right to express your opinion, it becomes clear which half of the semi-protectorate is more viable. Kosovo is still part of Serbia, the indisputable religious and cultural cradle of the Serb people. Kosovo was never a state, but the position of some mediators is that in case of need, a referendum in Kosovo will be permitted in order to hear the will of the majority in a democratic manner. Why not then, have those expressions of will throughout Serbia, including Sandžak and Vojvodina? Republika Srpska is part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and declaration on the status can only take place in the whole state, not in one part of it. A little confusing. Kosovo is part of the state of Serbia, while RS is part of state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the approach is quite opposite.

130. OSLOBODENJE daily, 16/05/2006

Following initiative to adopt constitutional changes by late May
Change of Constitution before Elections Possible but Difficult to
Achieve

By: ALDA OMERAGIĆ

“It isn’t likely, but would be possible with a lot of *political will*”. This is how the Chairman of the Constitutional-Legal Committee of the BiH House of Representatives, Mirsad Ćeman (from SDA) commented the initiative of the SDA President, Sulejman Tihić, to have the Parliament adopt amendments to the Constitution of BiH by the end of the month. After returning from the USA, Tihić said it was possible to have the amendments adopted by the end of May, and elections held in accordance with the constitutional changes. *Political will*. Ćeman explains that there are no obstacles to send amendments to the Constitution, and that the best thing would be if the presidency would do that again. He further explains that it would take a month and a half to two for the prescribed procedure, but that it can be shorter because the competent commissions already stated their positions on the amendments and the public debate was held. “It is possible that objections would be raised”, Ćeman says and adds that that is why it takes a lot of *political will*. He believes that neither the Election Law nor the already called elections represent an obstacle. “The Constitution is the top law in the country and if we change it, a new legal situation will occur. There may be objections as to why it is being done when the elections have been called, but not much time passed since, and besides, we have already had changes along the road, when the elections were organised by OSCE and Temporary Election Commission”, Ćeman says. Ćeman finds ground for a new debate on the amendments to the Constitution in the fact that the Venice Commission already said that the manner of election of the Presidency members went against human rights and that it needed to be changed. No one was yesterday able to confirm whether the amendments to the Constitution will again be sent to the procedure.

131. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 16/05/2006

Following announcement on return of Constitutional amendments to Parliament

SBiH Party, Žilić and Avdić Would Again Be against Same Set

By: H. ORAHOVAC

SDA President, Sulejman Tihić, stated after returning from the USA, that it was realistic that the constitutional changes that had not received the necessary support from the national House of Representatives again end up in the parliamentary procedure by the end of that month. Under the condition, he added, that there is *political will* to do it on the part of all stakeholders in the process. Shorter deadlines. According to the procedure for adoption of amendments to the Constitution of BiH, the proponent can practically return his/her proposal to the procedure endlessly, regardless of whether it was rejected once or six times.

This means that in the present case, the BiH Presidency can again send the same set of constitutional changes to the parliamentary procedure. If the state leadership does that, then the procedure will be repeated as in the previous case: the Constitutional-Legal Committee of the House of Representatives establishes the constitutional grounds, organises a public debate, reports to representatives, and eventually votes are cast on the proposed amendments. The only difference in the procedure is that deadlines can be made shorter in the second attempt. Tihić also presents the view that some of the representatives who recently opposed the constitutional changes would change their mind in the second attempt. The public labelled the representatives Mehmed Žilić and Sead Avdić as a duo that put an end to the constitutional changes. Whenever they arrive to the BiH Parliament, by the end of this month or in five years, I will not change my mind about the amendments that were once rejected. Thousand times again would I be against such amendments, Žilić told Dnevni avaz daily. Avdić shares his opinion. Returning the same set of constitutional changes to the

parliamentary procedure is insane. I don't know who needs that and why such, I dare say, incoherent proposals, are made public. Of course I would be against such changes again. But I am not against attempts to find a model acceptable to everyone.

132. DANI weekly, 07/04/2006

Daily poll: Pros and Cons of Amendments to Dayton Constitution of BiH

By: AUTHOR NOT INDICATED

Emir Habul, journalist. We have consensus. In his arguments, Silajdžić did not offer anything new, and he further spread the fear of dissolution, which represents an unrealistic option in the international context. The main objection is that Silajdžić did not present valid arguments as to what would be the alternative to failure to adopt constitutional changes. Lagumdžija's arguments were stronger for two reasons: in the sense that the constitutional changes are not ideal, but they strengthen the state capacity, and second, there is *political will* for this degree of changes. Personally, I would support the changes. Of course, there are numerous better legal and technical solutions but the Constitution is not a laboratory, but a social agreement willingly accepted and implemented by certain political forces. That is insufficient, but for the first time since 1990, we have some kind of consensus in BiH. In all frankness, Dayton has already been quite changed based on Bonn powers, changed for the purpose of strengthening the state. These changes also strengthen the state capacity and that's what matters.

133. OSLOBOĐENJE daily, 31/03/2006

Adnan Terzić spoke with Olli Rehn

Rhythm of Negotiations Depends on Reform in Police and Public RTV system

By: AUTHOR NOT INDICATED

Mladić is the key in the Serbia and Montenegro's negotiations with EU. BRUSSELS. Olli Rehn, European Commissioner for Enlargement, stated on Thursday that the potential suspension of negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between Serbia and Montenegro and the EU would be decided after the meeting with the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Carla Del Ponte on Friday. Del Ponte will meet with Rehn on Friday afternoon, after returning from Belgrade for the next round of negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between Serbia and Montenegro and the EU, which was supposed to take place on 5th April in Belgrade, AFP reported, FENA quotes. The twenty five ask for additional effort to be made by the Serbian authorities to arrest the former military leader of Bosnian Serbs, Ratko Mladić, so that the negotiations on the Stavilisation and Associatio Agreement, the initial step towards the EU, could continue. "We have reliable information according to which Serbia could arrest Ratko Mladić if there was *political will* and if that *political will* was demonstrated in a specific operation", Rehn stated, asking for that operation to involve the entire administration, including secret services.

134. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 31/03/2006

Safet Halilović, President of the SBiH Party Presidency

Dodik Demonstrating to Terzić Who the Boss Is

By: EDINA SARAC

Safet Halilović, President of the Party for BiH Presidency, as he says, once again decided to warn how fatal is the adoption of the agreement among leaders of seven political parties on constitutional changes. Memos that the RS Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik, sent to the Council of Ministers indicate who has the real power and intention to be the boss. The fact that he invokes formal and legal arguments while proving his factual power shows that in imposing his *political will*, both in RS and in BiH, he has more than a solid legal ground, and that he has no need to use violence as Karadžić did with respect to the Constitution of the Republic of BiH, Halilović told Dnevni avaz daily. Signatories of the agreement. In your view, accepting the agreement in the BiH Parliament means additional strengthening of Dodik's position, that is, position of those who will succeed him in the position of the RS Prime Minister? Yes. The agreement, if accepted by the BiH Parliament, would definitely ratify the Dayton foundations which recognised the original sovereignty of RS with respect to BiH, and its signatories showed that they are prepared to additionally affirm that legal ground. If that was not the case, the determined sender of the memo, Dodik, surely would not have volunteered to find himself among them. What memos are those and what is in them? Dodik sent a memo to ministers, deputies and assistants in the Council of Ministers, and directors and deputy directors of BiH agencies elected from RS, saying that every Monday between 8 and 12 o'clock, they can attend consultations in the office of the President of the Government concerning coordination of activities of "common interest". "Common interest" for RS or the state of BiH? For RS! Dodik discreetly reminds all those delegated from RS that they were sent to the state institutions to represent the "common interest"

that is defined in the office of the President of RS Government, not in the office of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Were you surprised by his letters? Such a memo should not come as a surprise for anyone aware of the situation along the RS – state of BiH axis. But, it was sent at the moment when the agreement signatories, including Dodik, are trying to convince the public that these constitutional changes will bring about the fundamental evolution exactly along that axis, and that in the future, the decision-making centre will be transferred from the entities to the state, and that the original sovereignty will be inherent to the state, and that the important state matters will be decided by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, not entity Prime Ministers. The consensus method. You mentioned memos at the beginning. To whom was the other sent? While the BiH citizens are being assured that the defence and security are in the state hands, Dodik sent another symptomatic memo to the Council of Ministers and the Directorate for Police Reform. It reads that Martens's plan "should not be the basis for implementation of the agreement, but the best solutions should be agreed by consensus". Therefore, regardless of the alleged agreement with the principles determined by the European Commission, Dodik insists that decisions at the level of the Directorate can only be made on the basis of the inter-entity consensus principle, and that the Directorate does not answer to the Council of Ministers, but to the entity governments. So, he, as an entity Prime Minister once again demonstrates who holds the real power? He warns Terzić that the Directorate should answer to the parties in agreement, not to the Council of ministers and the Minister of Security. No matter if Dodik is formally right, the memo clearly indicates that he, unlike Terzić, has a tool to implement his *political will*. Unlike Terzić, who reaches decisions not binding for Dodik, Dodik can force Terzić to take into account his interpretation of the agreement, and agree to decision-making based on consensus both in the Directorate and in all the other national executive authorities. So, Terzić does not have tools to execute his power

as the Prime Minister of the state, while Dodik, as an entity Prime Minister, can block anything? RS Government can block the operations of national institutions, in this case the Directorate, while the national-level Council of Ministers has no grounds for preventing such actions. When Dodik invites RS officials to agree on the "common interest", he most directly indicates who the real boss is, not only in reference to the fact that they are from RS, but also in reference to the fact that Terzić, as the Chairman, does not have a real tool that he can use to impose his *political will*, whatever it may be, to ministers, and deputy ministers from RS, just like the current and the future BiH Parliament has no tool it can use to impose its political and legislative will to the delegates in the Parliament coming from RS. Blocking the work of BiH Parliament. Thanks to the clause on entity voting in the agreement on constitutional changes, there is no real tool that the BiH Parliament could use to impose the will of its majority on the delegates from RS. If they would vote in accordance with the *political will*, which the RS Government and Parliament would define as their "common interest", and Dodik's memo indicates that he has the will to take over the defining of the entity's "common interest", the *political will* that the majority in the national Parliament would define as the "state interest" would be for nothing. Thanks to that constitutional provision, "common interest" defined by the RS entity bodies could always block making decisions of national interest in the BiH parliament. That is the meaning of the concept "original sovereignty" that RS has with respect to BiH

135. DANI weekly, 31/03/2006

Which Finger Did Haris Show

By: AUTHOR NOT INDICATED

Simply put, there is neither the *political will* nor parliamentary awareness to solve the problem affecting several thousands of FBiH citizens in accordance with the European standards and legal science. Until now, one group of former owners tied itself only to the Party of Democratic Action, while the other, the group of tenant's right holders, to the Social-Democratic Party as the natural/ideological allies in solving the fundamental issue: where are they going to live in the future. The problem was politicized as early as during the pre-war pre-election campaign. Not much changed in the meantime, that is, until the 2006 general elections campaign, which is in full swing. In Republika Srpska, this painful cut into the society has already been solved by law. Members of the FBiH Parliament of different vocation have not been able to find a final solution for years - it seems under the directive from the top of their parties. Whatever the solution, it would put an end to uncertainty. And it would mean several thousand votes less, gained by giving false promises.

136. OSLOBODENJE daily, 17/03/2006

IN THE FOCUS

BiH According to Dodik

By: ZIJA DIZDAREVIĆ

Dodik claims that the application divides BiH mentally and politically. Previously, when asked about his request to put in the Constitution of BiH the right of a people to self-determination, Dodik stated that the situation in Kosovo and BiH was similar. In the meantime, he repeated that the RS is a lasting political and territorial category and that his

“Government will stop every policy aimed at additionally devastating Srpska”. He added: “RS will not be an empty shell. Its budget is BAM 1. 98 billion, whereas the budget of the joint bodies of BiH is BAM 660 million. Doesn’t this ratio speak for itself?” As he says, his *political will* is for the RS to be a happier, better and stronger part of BiH. Weak and questionable BiH and strong and unquestionable RS is an affirmed Dodik’s political strategy. Who will bring about the policy that will reverse that strategy and how, remains an unanswered question.

137. NEZAVISNE NOVINE daily, 13/03/2006

MICHAEL HUMPHREYS, Head of the European Commission
Delegation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

BiH Is under Obligation to AMEND CONSTITUTION

By: M. ČUBRO

NN: When do you expect the continuation of negotiations on constitutional changes in BiH. HUMPHREYS: Heads of political parties will continue discussions on the constitutional changes these days. Until now, significant progress has been made with regard to a majority of outstanding issues, and the new opinion of the Venice Commission enables further progress, when the establishment of the president or presidency of the state will be negotiated. We all expect agreement to be reached soon, because the Election Law of BiH needs to be amended accordingly so that the fundamental human rights of the citizens of this country would not be breached at the next elections. Respecting the international obligations, such as the European Convention of Human Rights, is also part of negotiations about the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, and it is crucial to note that in contrast to the last elections, Bosnia and Herzegovina this time has a legal obligation to amend the Constitution and the Election Law in order to bring them in concert with the European Convention of Human Rights. As a member

of the Council of Europe that ratified relevant agreements on human rights, this country must also comply with that. Otherwise, it might easily happen that one of its citizens files an application with the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg against BiH. In a situation when these very important issues can be corrected, it is important to find the *political will* for a compromise that everyone will benefit from.

138. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 15/01/2006

Pero Bukeylović, RS Prime Minister, for Dnevni avaz daily

I Am Not Buying Votes of Assembly Delegates

By: N. DIKLIC

Pero Bukeylović, President of the RS Government, confirmed for Dnevni avaz daily that he is working on establishing a new, stabile majority in the RS National Assembly, in order to gain support for adoption of 2006 budget for this entity, and ensure the continuation of the executive authorities after the session at which the motion of no confidence will be voted on. In addition to the support to budget, Bukeylović says that he has also been negotiating with the representatives of parties about the support of 42 delegates to the RS Government remaining. He needs those votes in order to ensure support to his office after the National Assembly session at which the motion of no confidence, put forward by SNSD and PDP, will be voted on. *Political will* Without specifying with which parties he has been negotiating, RS Prime Minister told Dnevni avaz that once he assessed there was *political will* in the Assembly of this entity, he will again submit to the delegates the budget proposal, which was withdrawn from the parliamentary procedure two times. There were no major objections to the budget in the last session of the RS National Assembly, and I believe that we harmonised the amendments to the budget with the views of the majority of delegates. As soon as I receive confirmation that the *political will* for its adoption exists, I will request a session of the RS Assembly, Bukeylović said.

139. DNEVNI AVAZ daily, 09/01/2006

Sead Avdic, leader of BiH free democrats

Concept of Negotiations on Amendments to Constitution of BiH
Is Wrong

By: S. N.

BiH free democrats find unacceptable the concept of amendments to the Constitution of BiH, according to which all decisions in the future will again be reached with the agreement of both entities and the Brčko District. President of the party, Sead Avdić, points out that by the negotiations among leaders of eight political parties, "BiH, as a sovereign, internationally recognised country, is reduced to a simple sum of two entities and the Brčko District". *Political will* Such a situation cannot continue and damages the original jurisdiction of BiH. This installs the fatal principle that every decision at the national level is conditioned by the *political will* of one or another entity and the Brčko District, Avdić points out in his statement to Dnevni avaz daily. The Dayton Peace Agreement implemented the fundamental objective by bringing peace to BiH, he says, but the Constitution "spent its vitality and reached the limits of its use, which requires its fundamental change in order to successfully implement the process of European integration". We think that the quiet evolution approach to the amendments to the Constitution of BiH, recently recognised in Brussels, is primarily the demonstration of realistic politics and lack of minimum political consensus, and is but a compromise and a wish to achieve any success at any cost. In the minds of common people, such approach is seen as a concession to the forces wishing to cement and affirm the Dayton constitution, Avdić says. Bringing BiH closer to Brussels. In that sense, the process of "bringing BiH closer to Brussels" requires a new form of the BiH Constitution, transition of authority and responsibility from OHR to BiH institutions, and change of political philosophy relying on ethnic principle as the only political principle.

6. MAPPING THE PHRASE *POLITICAL WILL* IN THE DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

United Nations General Assembly

Document Symbol: A/HRC/26/NGO/48

Title: WRITTEN STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY THE ASIAN LEGAL RESOURCE CENTRE

The claim that the country has a constitution often termed a 'living document', but lacks the *political will* to ensure that the 'life' guaranteed under the constitution is upheld in all circumstances, has a ring of truth to it. What is required is national commitment to guarantee the rule of law and fair trial, under all circumstances.

Document Symbol: A/68/761

Title: BUDGET FOR THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1 JULY 2014 TO 30 JUNE 2015: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Continued progress in handing over security responsibilities to national authorities, through implementation of the transition road map, including adequate national security oversight and capacity to effectively protect civilians in areas without an UNMIL military presence; relative stability along the Liberian border with the Mano River Union countries, including an improved security situation in the border area with Côte d'Ivoire and political stability in Sierra Leone and Guinea; the *political will* to develop and implement bilateral, quadripartite and regional security and stabilization strategies; the *political will* to reform the security

sector, including the passage of adequate legislation and regulations; adequate budgetary allocations for the Liberia National Police, the National Police Training Academy and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization; continued donor support for the Liberia National Police and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization; and no major security incidents or destabilization resulting from the senatorial elections.

Document Symbol: A/68/PV. 74

Title: GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFFICIAL RECORDS, 68TH SESSION:
74TH PLENARY MEETING, MONDAY, 10 FEBRUARY 2014, NEW
YORK

In 2011, we the Member States all agreed that NCDs [non-communicable diseases] were one of the major challenges to development in the twenty-first century. They are also avoidable. The 2011 Political Declaration recognizes that the knowledge and expertise necessary to prevent deaths and disability from NCDs exists and that there is *political will* to prevent those diseases by using a range of solutions identified in the Declaration.

Document Symbol: A/HRC/25/NGO/5

Title: JWS BY CARITAS INTERNATIONALIS & OTHERS

The full realization of the rights to health, food, education, shelter, work, safe drinking water and sanitation, and other economic, social and cultural rights, will occur when the principle of equitable contribution and access to and sharing of the benefits of development lead the political choices of States and non-States actors. In this regard, setting the goals, targets and indicators for the Post-2015 Development agenda will be a great opportunity that shouldn't be missed, to progress

towards social justice and solidarity as well as a cut off mark to unveil *political will*.

Document Symbol: A/68/790

Title: SUMMARY REPORT OF THE 2013 PARLIAMENTARY HEARING

Another reason for establishing a stand-alone goal is to mobilize *political will*, which will in turn mobilize resources, thus helping to reverse the trend of chronic underfunding of gender-related policies. This is no simple matter in the current post-crisis time of global austerity, which has disproportionately impacted women. In many countries, in times of financial austerity, cuts are made first in the public sector, where women are largely employed.

In general, there was a level of frustration among participants — men as well as women — about the gap between the high-flown language on women’s rights issues and on-the-ground implementation, and between the enthusiastic consensus in meetings such as the present one and the obstacles encountered in the wider world. This is where parliamentarians have a critical role to play, which is to enact legislation and monitor its implementation. On the face of it, this seems a fairly simple way of translating obligations into practice, but of course *political will* needs to be present, and it is in this area, unfortunately, that progress seems to be encountering obstacles.

Document Symbol: A/68/PV. 76

Title: GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFFICIAL RECORDS, 68TH SESSION:
76TH PLENARY MEETING, FRIDAY, 21 MARCH 2014, NEW YORK

In taking stock today, some people may argue, perhaps justifiably, that we still have a long way to go in combating that scourge; but we would all agree that, without strong and sustained leadership, all the best blueprints, legal instruments and institutions will remain blunt tools. It should be recalled that the aim of this commemoration is, inter alia, to mobilize *political will* at the national, regional and international levels and to reaffirm our political commitment to the full and effective implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action and the outcome document of the Durban Review Conference, as well as their follow-up processes at all those levels.

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the Group of Eastern European States. We welcome this year's theme of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, namely, "The role of leaders in combatting racism and racial discrimination", as we believe that leaders can and must play a key role in mobilizing the *political will* to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. Leaders have the authority and capacity to promote greater respect and trust among the various groups within society. With their vision and insight, they can help to tackle hatred and extremism by building unity in the face of such threats.

Document Symbol: A/68/731

Title: OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCING OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: BUDGET PERFORMANCE FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1 JULY 2012 TO 30 JUNE 2013 AND BUDGET FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1 JULY 2014 TO 30 JUNE 2015: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

United Nations peacekeepers operate in increasingly complex and volatile environments. Key challenges include dealing with hardened and more sophisticated “spoilers”, preventing attacks against civilians and peacekeeping troops, mounting operations in remote areas with only limited infrastructure and addressing threats such as organized crime. To fulfil mandated tasks, missions will continue to rely on critical force enablers and multipliers, such as field hospitals, engineers and helicopters. In a similar vein, it will be crucial to adapt to new technologies, unmanned aerial systems being the most prominent example. Innovative and rapid measures will also be needed to respond to transnational crime and natural disasters. In all of these endeavours, the Organization will strive for improved performance and cost-effectiveness and engage with Member States and other partners to generate the *political will* necessary for moving forward.

Document Symbol: A/65/294

Title: IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL CONVENTIONS: NOTE / BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

At the Conference, the Copenhagen Accord was developed by a group of Heads of State and Government, and other heads of delegation and the Conference of the Parties took note of it. The Copenhagen Accord emphasized the *political will* to urgently combat climate change in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated

responsibilities and respective capabilities. As at 29 July 2010, a total of 137 parties had expressed their intention to be associated with or agree to the Accord.

Document Symbol: A/67/929

Title: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND PREVENTION

Challenges

65. While there is a broad range of policy options available to strengthen national atrocity prevention capacity, there are still challenges for Member States to fulfil the commitment made at the 2005 World Summit.

66. First and foremost, *political will* and leadership are required to translate that commitment into practice. It is sometimes difficult to demonstrate the added value of prevention, particularly early preventive action, which may not have immediate, visible outcomes. While such action is most likely to save lives and is less costly and contentious than action taken at a later stage, it can be challenging to secure the political support and resources required to undertake it.

Document Symbol: A/C. 3/64/L. 54/REV. 1

Title: GLOBAL EFFORTS FOR THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, XENOPHOBIA AND RELATED INTOLERANCE AND THE COMPREHENSIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF AND FOLLOW-UP TO THE DURBAN DECLARATION AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION: REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION / RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND SUDAN [ON BEHALF OF THE GROUP OF 77 AND CHINA]

Underlining the primacy of *political will*, international cooperation and adequate funding at the national, regional and international levels needed to address all forms and manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance,

Acknowledges the centrality of resource mobilization, effective global partnership and international cooperation in the context of paragraphs 157 and 158 of the Durban Programme of Action for the successful realization of commitments undertaken at the World Conference, and to this end emphasizes the importance of the mandate of the group of independent eminent experts on the implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, especially in mobilizing the necessary *political will* for the successful implementation of the Declaration and Programme of Action;

Document Symbol: A/AC. 183/PV. 337

Title: COMMITTEE ON THE EXERCISE OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE: 337TH MEETING, TUESDAY, 29 NOVEMBER 2011, NEW YORK

“Israel’s pursuit of its settlement policies and its insistence on a new condition that requires the Palestinian side to recognize Israel as a Jewish State reflect the complete lack of *political will* on the part of the Israeli

Government to enter into serious negotiations that deal with all the various aspects of the situation on the basis of international legitimacy and the provisions of international law within a specified time frame and without partial or gradual solutions.

United Nations Security Council

Document Symbol: S/2006/390

Title: TWENTY-FIRST REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

While the authorities cooperated with the International Criminal Court in arresting Thomas Lubanga, a former Ituri militia leader, and transferring him from Congolese custody to the Court's headquarters in The Hague, several dangerous Ituri militia leaders have been released from Government custody questionably, at least one of whom is reported to have rejoined a militia group in Ituri. Two prominent militiamen also escaped from prison in Kisangani. Although other Ituri leaders remain in jail, good-faith efforts of military judicial authorities to investigate alleged crimes remain blocked by a serious lack of *political will* and human and material resources. Important investigations, such as that of the Kilwa massacre, are stalled.

...FARDC has engaged in widespread, serious violations of human rights. This is partly due to the fact that the integration of the national army has been somewhat ineffective, particularly given the lack of *political will*, the mismanagement and diversion of funds earmarked for salary payments, and inadequate training and logistical support.

Document Symbol: S/PV. 4222

Title: SECURITY COUNCIL, 55TH YEAR: 4222ND MEETING, TUESDAY,
14 NOVEMBER 2000, NEW YORK

When we look at what has been achieved in Bosnia and Herzegovina five years after the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord with the assistance of the international community, we all agree that there is peace and progress in that country, however limited it may be. Indeed, our assessment is that overall progress has been very slow and that *political will* has been lacking in the leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the ground has been shifting, albeit slowly, in favour of those who wish to see a multi-ethnic, democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Document Symbol: S/PV. 5894

Title: SECURITY COUNCIL, 63RD YEAR: 5894TH MEETING, MONDAY,
19 MAY 2008, NEW YORK

Thirdly, we believe that improvements to the Dayton Constitution are needed to enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to meet the requirements for Euro-Atlantic integration. We are prepared to support the Bosnians in such an effort if they demonstrate the political will to pursue that approach. Those reforms can be achieved only with support among all three constituent peoples.

Fourthly, we would echo the comments of others underscoring the importance of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

Document Symbol: S/PV. 6771

Title: SECURITY COUNCIL, 67TH YEAR: 6771st MEETING, TUESDAY,
15 MAY 2012, NEW YORK

In conclusion, my delegation wishes to encourage all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina to recommit themselves to the full implementation of their obligations under the peace accords and agreements.

Political will is essential in moving forward the process of long-term peace, stability and reconciliation. South Africa remains dedicated to its task as a member of the Security Council to support Bosnia and Herzegovina in those efforts.

...

The European Union has the proven *political will* and the instruments necessary to support Bosnia and Herzegovina in that task. The EU approach is based on a clear and simple concept — in order to benefit from what the EU has to offer, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to assume ownership of a comprehensive reform process that will, step-by-step, lead the country towards accession. Based on that approach, the EU Special Representative in Sarajevo has worked tirelessly to facilitate the positive developments of the past months.

...

The meeting of six political parties in Banja Luka on 9 March yielded tangible political results regarding the distribution of defence and State property. Croatia reads the successful agreement on the principles to be used in resolving the property distribution issue as a demonstration of political will and commitment to the processes of Euro-Atlantic integration. We welcome this breakthrough as an encouraging message to the North-Atlantic Alliance in view of the forthcoming Chicago summit.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Comprehensive and intrusive inspections and audits of police facilities have continued to reveal grave deficiencies in supposedly unified police structures in ethnically mixed cantons of the Federation. During September and October, UNMIBH conducted comprehensive inspections of the six police stations in Mostar. In addition, in connection with a weapons inspection by the multinational stabilization force (SFOR) on 14 October, UNMIBH also obtained various financial and personnel documents on the Bosnian Croat police. These inspections and documents further confirmed the existence of parallel budgets and parallel personnel systems, undeclared police personnel, separate crime databases and shortcomings in the chain of command that constitute major impediments to professional and democratic policing. Regrettably, the *political will* of the Federation partners, particularly local Bosnian Croat authorities, to address such core issues is weak. Constant international presence and increased pressure are required to expose illicit police structures and to secure their removal.

Council of Europe Committee of Ministers (CM
COE)

CM/Inf/DH(2011)6; DH-DD(2010)108E; DH-DD(2010)307E

The Deputies,
noted with concern that, although there is a strong *political will* and commitments of all political parties participating in the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina for implementation of the judgment, no political consensus has still been reached on the content of the constitutional

and legislative amendments necessary to execute the present judgment despite the Committee's repeated calls since its 1078th meeting (March 2010).

GR-EDS(99)141

1. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: Exchange of views with Ambassador Robert Barry, Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina After being welcomed by the Chairman, Ambassador Barry, in his introductory statement, mentioned in particular:

- despite the tendency to be distracted by the Kosovo talks at Rambouillet, the international community should not forget its massive and continuing investment of human and financial resources in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where there were some grounds for optimism, even if *political will* still seemed to be lacking to ensure proper return of refugees and establishment of political parties based on multi-ethnicity;

CM/Inf(2000)7

The Council of Europe, founded only four years after the last world conflict, symbolises the speed at which old enmities and the scars of war can be overcome, given the *political will*.

CM/Inf(2003)48

Participants reviewed the situation in the three South Caucasian Republics following the elections held in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia during 2003. Despite considerable pre-electoral assistance from the Council of Europe and OSCE providing an adequate framework for holding democratic elections, the election process in all three countries did not meet international standards due to an apparent lack of *political will* to guarantee impartial implementation and transparency.

CM(98)PV2

We feel therefore that the final result satisfies the hopes of this organisation and the citizens of our 40-strong Europe. We hope very keenly that this spirit of wisdom will continue to guide us. This will require from us a genuine commitment and *political will* to strengthen democratic stability throughout Europe.

