



The Dynamics of Conflict in the Multi-ethnic State of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Country Conflict-Analysis Study

TIMO KIVIMÄKI, MARINA KRAMER AND PAUL PASCH

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You can't shake hands with a clenched fist.
Indira Gandhi

Foreword

Civil peace building, conflict management and crisis prevention have become important aspects of international relations regarding development cooperation in the past 15 to 20 years, and have taken root as goals for political action. Although the basic idea that development cooperation always seeks to be a policy for peace is by no means new, what is new is its attempt to contribute directly to peaceful development in conflict situations. This concern is no longer just an overriding, abstract goal: it should be reflected in specific strategies and measures, and the conflict impact of aid is now open to assessment in much the same way as the environmental impacts. The issue of civil peace building acquired a new dimension with the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001; the debate on crisis prevention and conflict management may provide substantive input in this context.

Civil peace building comprises all non-military measures adopted before, during or after a violent conflict. Its purpose is peaceful conflict transformation and/or the promotion and establishment of structures and mechanisms for non-violent conflict management. Peace cannot be created at the highest political level alone; rather, the whole of society – industry and business, academia and education, faith-based communities, the media and local NGOs (multi-track diplomacy) – must be involved in the peace process. Moreover, peace building is always an intra-societal process, which external actors can at best support but cannot enforce. Promoting local peace actors and peace constituencies is therefore especially important in facilitating the peace building process.

From the 30 to 50 violent conflicts a year between, but mostly within, countries it is clear how necessary it is to find constructive ways of resolving conflicts. Many countries also find themselves in a grey area between war and peace, in which the Government is undergoing a process of insidious or overt disintegration. Violent disputes are often the core problem. Besides causing enormous human suffering, violent conflicts reverse past progress – including that achieved through development cooperation – and block opportunities for future development. They are

also a major burden on the international community (cost of military operations, reconstruction aid, etc.).

International development aid in civil peace building

International development cooperation plays a key role in civil peace building, as it is a challenge which requires a coherent, holistic and interdisciplinary approach. The aim is to address the causes of conflict, support structural stability, promote state and non-state peace actors through social and political programmes, and contribute to a sustainable peace in post-conflict societies, e.g. through reconciliation work.

The commitment to conflict sensitivity in all official development activities shows that peace building has now become a priority cross-cutting theme in development cooperation. Non-government actors are equally committed to pro-active development-oriented peace work and are engaging in partnership with official development agencies in order to contribute to peaceful conflict transformation at various levels of society.

Since the mid-1990s a number of bi- and multilateral donors (Germany, United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, the World Bank among others) and the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) have carried out country and project studies to determine what influence development cooperation has on conflict situations. Past experience can be summarised as follows:

- *Relative influence of development cooperation:* Expectations of what development cooperation can achieve should not be estimated too high. The responsibility for preventing or ending conflicts rests mainly with the parties concerned. In most cases, development cooperation will be unable to prevent or end violent conflicts on its own. It may, on the other hand, tip the balance between civil and violent forms of conflict.

- *Development cooperation is not neutral in conflicts:* Development cooperation exerts an intended and unintended influence on conflict in partner countries. These effects are identifiable both at the level of individual measures or project regions (micro level) and at the level of a country's overall policy (macro level). At the micro level the question in many partner countries is whether and, if so, how, account has been taken of the ethnic affiliation of

the target groups. There is considerable evidence to show that even “purely technical” measures have a positive or negative impact on social tensions and conflict situations.

■ *Development cooperation and the fight against terrorism:* The terrorist attacks of the past decade had a significant impact on German and international development cooperation and became more important as a result of new challenges as social misery and insufficient education were identified as prime breeding grounds for terrorism.

The ‘localisation’ of conflict assessment

A wide consensus has emerged in recent years that successful policymaking and programming in conflict situations must start with an accurate understanding of the local context, conflict actors, causes, and the dynamic relationships among them. To meet these challenges the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has developed guidelines to offer practical tools for a systematic Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment in country conflict-analysis studies. These guidelines are intended to help international development agencies involved in international development cooperation to:

- Carry out a conflict analysis to ensure their work is conflict-sensitive;
- Systematically incorporate recommendations stemming from the country-related analysis and the conflict mapping into their project planning;
- Monitor changes in the constellation and dynamics of the conflict;
- Consider the possible impacts of the project on the conflict; and
- Draw conclusions about adapting the project planning.

Conflict assessment is marked by its action orientation, its flexibility, and its emphasis on collaborative methods to elicit views on the conflict from diverse perspectives. These attributes may lead conflict assessment processes to be especially able to pick up “weak signals” and to promote cooperation and enhance understanding of the “other side’s” perspectives.

Conflict assessment aims to enhance understanding of complicated socio-political situations to support better decision making and to face many common challenges,

including accuracy, precision, timeliness, and relevance. These strengths of conflict assessment may at times come at the cost of analytic rigour, precision, and sensitivity to the possibility that some stakeholders could provide misleading information.

The context of Bosnia and Herzegovina

17 years after the termination of the brutal Bosnian war the international community is still very much engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina through various institutions such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the Special Representative of the European Union (EUSR), the European Union Force (EUFOR), the European Police Mission (EUPM), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), various UN-institutions and international aid organisations.

The international community is committed to help Bosnia and Herzegovina to overcome the shadows of the traumatic past and to assist it on its way to transatlantic and European integration and to help the country to regain its status as a modern and functional European country.

The current constitution – being one of the annexes of the Dayton Peace Agreement – is not conducive to the efficient functioning of state institutions, because of its complex structure of semi-autonomous entities, e.g. the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with its 10 Cantons. Back in 1995 the Dayton Peace Agreement was a very welcome achievement, but with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ambition to accede to both NATO and the EU, things have changed.

Given the political stalemate of the past several years there seems to be consent among local political elites and the international community that Bosnia and Herzegovina is in need of constitutional reform. A better functioning of state level institutions needs to be ensured. In October 2010 general elections took place. For a state that has begun to lag behind the rest of the region, that should have been perceived as a starting point to move forward from the political deadlock. However, it took the leaders of the main political parties 15 months of brinkmanship to come to a watered down compromise that allowed for a principal agreement on the formation of the Council of Ministers.

Thus there is a pressing need for some conclusive decisions to be taken with regard to the future of the Office of the High Representative, the Brčko District, compliance with the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, NATO membership and EU accession candidate status.

The international community is more and more convinced that the driving force behind these changes should come from the people and their leaders. The reform process should be taken in a continuous step-by-step approach. The harmonisation of the Constitution with the European Convention on Human Rights is the first of the necessary steps to be taken. Furthermore, the rule of law and the principles of legal certainty should be respected. But above all a paradigm shift needs to take place so that resolution and reconciliation amongst the people can yield fruit. It goes without saying that local ownership is the only way to guarantee the outcome of the necessary reforms.

Constitutional reform must be well prepared and agreed by local politicians in order to maintain a viable coalition government. A solution to the conflicting concepts of *Confederation* versus *Federal State* must be found in a way that civil society actor can play an active role in policy formulation. Overall the required reforms should be perceived as a win-win situation for everyone. This of course is easier said than done. Much has been and still is being published about the country. Still, sometimes there are misconceptions regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina.

However, according to most of the recent studies as well as the FES scenario project the international community still has some obligations to fulfil to assist in the efforts to overcome the dysfunctional Dayton structure. In addition the potential for a return to violent conflict is still very eminent. According to the FES project "Bosnia and Herzegovina 2025: Scenarios on future developments" there is a strong potential for social unrest and/or ethnic violence in three out of five scenarios. These potential threads seem to be much under-estimated by the international community at a time when it aims at reducing its responsibilities and presence in the country.

PCIA for Bosnia and Herzegovina

Under these difficult circumstances, it seems to be quite timely for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung to publish its second *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment- The Dynamics of Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (the first one was published in 2005). The present conflict assessment aims to enhance the understanding of complicated socio-political situations to support better decision-making in crisis prevention and conflict management and to offer recommendations for conflict-sensitive development cooperation. **The people of Bosnia and Herzegovina - like all the people of the Western Balkans - deserve to have a peaceful, prosperous and socially just perspective within the European family.**

Sarajevo, February 2012

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The present publication *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment – Country Conflict-Analysis Studies: The Dynamics of Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina* – is the result of extended fieldwork conducted by the authors between June 2010 and December 2012.

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The Authors

Executive Summary

Background & objectives

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a multi ethnic and religious state, has been in the focus of peace and conflict research ever since its creation following the Dayton Agreement that terminated the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995). 17 years after the end of violent conflict, considered as the prime example of the so-called “New Wars”,¹ the international community is attempting to decrease its involvement in BiH. However, the country itself seems anything but ready to become a self-sufficient functional state, not least because it appears that none of the three main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats) accepts BiH in the setup as it exists at the present time. Though reform processes and convergence with the European Union should be aspired, many socio-political and economic challenges paralyse the state and thereby hinder much needed progress.

Against this background the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in BiH initiated this country conflict-analysis study which aims to map the dividing lines in the society, identify the motives, opportunities and risks for conflict and for peaceful development and in conclusion, offer strategic recommendations for effective and conflict-sensitive International development assistance. For this purpose, after pointing out the relevance of the PCIA study in regard to its main conclusions and recommendations, the methodology of the PCIA is introduced. The study consists of four chapters: a brief historical background, a diagnosis of the basic conflict lines, an analysis of scenarios of peace and conflict and an assessment of the role of international assistance. The final chapters conclude with prospects and recommendations for future international engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In conclusion

Against all palliation by external and internal actors alike, the study soberly concludes that there is a continued need for the cooperation between international political bodies.²

¹ As for example in: Kaldor, Mary 1999. *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

² In form of, for example, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Union (EU).

the donor community and the local government of BiH because post conflict recovery has not been achieved yet. Although BiH is often regarded as a successful case in comparative research and, despite the fact that the international community expresses the wish to terminate their involvement in the country rather sooner than later, it is clear that there cannot be a promising exit-strategy for international actors at this point. According to the findings of the PCIA, the process of post-conflict-recovery will only be concluded, or at least sufficiently secured, once there has been a shift in the current socio-political mentality, economic policy has been made sustainable and standards regarding internal security, human rights and the rule of law have been upheld. The shift of the political mentality from “zero-sum” to “positive-sum” approaches, the paradigm shift towards inclusive agendas rather than “winner-takes-all” concepts as well as the economic stabilisation through attracting foreign investment are all reliant on the achievement of internal stability and security. Thus, although the right to self-determination of the state of BiH has to be adhered to, international actors should recognize that the process of post-conflict recovery in BiH is a slow one. Recovery can only be achieved through serious long-term commitment and that cooperation between the three main actors needs to be maintained as long as the conflict potential in the country is still undeniable.

Framing the PCIA

The PCIA study is based on a broad range of information according to the specific guidelines designed by FES.³ The analysis of conflict potential is based on strong theoretical approaches that derive largely from the field of peace and conflict research. Recurring and relevant themes regard the literature on “New Wars”, identity based conflicts, greed and grievance based conflicts and theories of power sharing and consociationalism. Moreover, theoretical background was provided through literature on international engagement and concepts about perceived bias or partiality as well as the role of capacity development and local ownership. Statistical data was used mainly to underline demographic and economic facts to characterize the current state of the country. Numerous formal and informal personal interviews were conducted mainly in BiH and Germany in the course of 2011, supporting the

³ Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) 2011, *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment, Methodical Guidelines*. 7-8, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/05594-guidelines.pdf> (retrieved on 25.11.2011).

study with personal opinions of a variety of stakeholders and experts and offering insights behind the theoretical and public curtains. An expert workshop, held in June 2011 in Sarajevo, helped round the first drafts of the study. In addition, the study also makes good use of the FES project on scenarios for future development in BiH, developed through a theoretically guided process.⁴ Finally, based on the above analysis, the study concludes with targeted strategic and programmatic recommendations for International development assistance.

The argumentation

Historical background

The current situation and developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina stand in direct correlation with the country's and regions' recent eventful past. The three crucial phases in BiH's recent history are identified as:

- the pre-war phase (until 1992), when BiH was part of Yugoslavia and the focus was on citizenship-based mentality.
- the war phase (1992-1995), characterised by extreme ethno-nationalism and violence.
- the post-war phase (from 1995) , focusing on ethnicity and religion based identity.

At the time of writing (January 2012) the country is struggling to reach the minimum criteria of political and economic stability and the potential for social unrest and ethnic violence is real. Furthermore, with regard to the much emphasized goal of European integration, the political leadership as well as the administrative level demonstrate a lack of preparedness, and in some cases even willingness, to move towards the adoption of the the "acquis communautaire".

4 Pasch, Paul (ed.). *Bosnia and Herzegovina 2025: Scenarios on Future Developments*, Sarajevo, FriedrichEbert-Stiftung, Sarajevo, 2012. http://www.fes.ba/publikacije/2012/Scenariji/Publikacija%20Scenariji%20BiH%202025_ENG.pdf. Local language edition: http://www.fes.ba/publikacije/2012/Scenariji/Publikacija%20Scenariji%20BiH%202025_BHS.pdf.

Identifying basic conflict lines

The political and economic dimensions are those in which main conflict lines remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina and challenges are clustered according to those two categories. Disputes in the **political** context begin with the role of the international community. Among the population of BiH there are differing opinions regarding the duration and the mandate of international engagement and how this should be understood in the context of local ownership and capacity development in the country. Nationalist regional loyalties also play an important role: While the EU supports inter-BiH cohesion, the ethnic groups look for support to their 'homelands' (Croatia, Serbia) or newly-found allies (e.g. Turkey). This leads to a second conflicting issue that regards the current constitutional set-up and the distribution of competencies. Generally, the Bosniak population supports the strengthening of the centralised structures over the entities, whereas particularly the Serb population wants to increase the influence and autonomous rights of the entities with a focus on the RS. Some Croats support this idea, stipulating that in addition, a separate Croatian entity should also be created, an idea vehemently opposed by the Bosniaks. Perceived past injustices play a significant role in the discourse. The ambiguity about the constitutional set-up and its future prospects is in the meantime being (ab)used by political elites in the respective entities to gain popular votes by applying rhetoric that is not conform with the constitution and by threatening secession. This problematic comes along with the relative failure of consociationalism in BiH. Established under the Dayton Agreement in order to prevent the recurrence of ethno-nationalism, the provisions of ethnic quotas and requirements for multi-ethnic parties seem to achieve little, not to say the opposite, of their intention.

Under this condition it comes as no surprise that religious and ethnic divisions remain strong, which is the third basic conflict line. Interestingly, in this context all sides feel marginalised respectively and each ethnic group apparently has its own truth about the recent history of the country. The need to find a commonly acceptable narrative about the past remains one of the biggest challenges to decrease conflict potential in BiH.

The second cluster of **economic** motives for conflicts derive largely from the grievances inherited from the pre-war and the war period. BiH's industry rests on obsolete sectors, privatisation was rather unsuccessful and poverty is blatant. Characteristics of the war economy or criminal

economy in BiH, fuelled by corruption and weak state structures, hinder the country's progress towards a functioning market economy. This causes frustration among the population with the political elites, the administration as well as the police and provides potential for aggression and outbreak of violence among those that are driven by greed or opportunistic sentiments.

A second enormous problem is unemployment, especially hitting hard the younger generations. Connections, not education, guarantee employment: the lack of prospect and support structures gives room to discontent and conflict potential, especially among a generation who lacks the reconciling experience of living in a multi-ethnic context from the pre-war time.

In addition, there is an urgent need for a sustainable development strategy. Since the end of the Bosnian War the country's economy has been supported by foreign aid and international assistance leading to a dependency on external support rather investment. Opinions differ as to whether the foreign investments to date created enough interdependence for external actors to step in and prevent a recurrence of violence or whether the investments were still comparatively low enough to marginalise BiH and external interest in its economic and political development.

Developing scenarios of peace and conflict

In order to work against this short-sightedness, the PCIA analyses five possible future scenarios for Bosnia and Herzegovina that are supposed to support strategic planning for local and international actors alike:

- Status quo
- Dissolution
- Functional Decentralised State
- Functional Centralised State
- Regional Reconnection.

It is striking that in three out of five scenarios social unrest and/or ethnic violence is envisioned and international intervention for pacification stipulated.

In this chapter, the authors try to identify:

- The conditions of the development of various main political scenarios.
- The conflict risks leading to the envisaged political situation.
- The main conflict-related consequences of each of the main scenarios and their variations.
- The main opportunities for peace involved in each of the scenario.

Outlining the role of international assistance

The developed scenarios depict the numerous remaining conflict potentials but they also show the way for peaceful development. Regardless of the future scenario, international development assistance should attempt to support the identified peaceful potential. To this end, the PCIA study concludes by formulating recommendations for meaningful International development assistance intertwined with examples of already established conflict sensitive projects conducted by the FES in BiH.

Looking ahead

The findings of the PCIA study give legitimacy to the continued presence of the International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and even more so to the continued provision of International Development Assistance. External and internal actors alike have to accept that only conflict-sensitive, long-term and well-orchestrated commitment can lead to the completion of post-conflict recovery. It should be both in the interest of BiH citizens, as well in the international community's, and particularly in the European Union's, to do what they can to promote a stable and functioning state of Bosnia and Herzegovina that will contribute positively to the Western Balkan region on its way to convergence with the European Union. Perhaps, most of all, a middle way has to be found between the scenario of the continued stagnation and paralysis under the status quo and all the other scenarios that entail progress but only after the recurrence of violent conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

1. Introduction

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a relatively new, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-linguistic state that emerged from the breakup of Yugoslavia in the beginning of the 1990s. Its conflict tension and potential as well as its social instability, divisions and antagonism, and economic challenges, predominantly emanate from the disastrous Bosnian War of April 1992 - December 1995, which killed about 200,000 people.⁵ The country's economic structures of conflict – especially widespread unemployment, dependence on primary production and the massive and inefficient (post-communist) public sector – constitute a considerable conflict challenge. This is despite the fact that the country has had relatively large exposure to the international development cooperation community. Since the Dayton Agreement was signed in 1995, over USD15 billion in international development aid poured into Bosnia and Herzegovina,⁶ mainly covering the costs of peace troops and administration, reconstruction and development support, including the Office of the High Representative (OHR) for Bosnia and Herzegovina and other bodies. Thus the relationship between development cooperation and conflict is an important consideration for the international community. The country is very open to and focused on its own conflict history, and thus the peace and conflict impact of aid should be possible to assess by means of policy analysis.

This PCIA will assess the influence of development cooperation (broadly understood) in the peace and conflict situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina by mapping the opportunities and risks that different types of international aid interventions may have in the country. The FES guidelines on Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) methodology state that the objective of the PCIA is to help make aid more conflict-sensitive, so that “negative impacts [on peace] can be

reduced to a minimum and that positive impacts of the project activities are maximised”.⁷ To do this, it is crucial to define and map the conflict agents. Here the focus will be first and foremost on the peacefulness of ethnic/religious relations between the three main ethnic groups⁸:

- primarily Muslim Bosniaks (according to the 1991 Census: 44 per cent of the total population),
- primarily Catholic Croats (1991: 17 per cent), and
- primarily Orthodox Serbs (1991: 31 per cent).

It appears that none of the three groups accepts Bosnia and Herzegovina in the setup as it exists at the present time. This assessment will focus mainly on today's situation, but in order to understand the underlying conflict sensitivities, the study will also look into the war period from April 1992- December 1995. While the scope of this study is not to explain the war as such, **the analysis will identify the dividing lines in the population as well as look into the motives of potential present conflicts, partly by utilising the explicit expression of these motives and divisions in the Bosnian War.** The conflict(s) of the 1990s will also be used for an assessment of specific risks for a variety of groups and scenario mapping. The assumption is that if the risks are not dealt with, disputes on those grounds are likely to reappear if the country relapses into conflict.

The outcome of the study will be a set of strategic recommendations for the international development cooperation community in general and show some samples of FES activities in particular for future interventions in the country. How can development cooperation play a significant positive role in the development of the country in the years to come?

Furthermore, the study will draw from conflict studies by looking at the Bosnian conflict potential and using the literature and modelling of the so-called “New Wars”, of which the Bosnian war is often considered to be the “prime example”. The literature on New Wars helps, for example, the study to identify some of the conflict motives and

5 The war was characterised by a massive humanitarian emergency, which meant that a great share of conflict victims were indirect casualties, and not people killed by bullets or bombs. This is why there are very different estimates of the number of casualties. Depending on the definition, many casualties can be included in or excluded from the fatality count. The famous Uppsala conflict dataset, which only records direct casualties, reports only 12 900 casualties between (and including) 1992 and 1995. On the other hand, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has stated that 102,622 were killed during the war, while the Bosnian Government and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have estimated that the number of direct and indirect casualties might be double - up to 200,000 people.

6 According to the US Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm> (retrieved on 25.11.2011).

7 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) 2011., *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment, Methodical Guidelines*. 7-8. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/05594-guidelines.pdf> (retrieved on 25.11.2011).

8 Despite different claims by some ultra-nationalists there seems to be no evidence by scientific research that the ethnic groups in BiH differ much genetically. See for example: Marjanović, Damir 2005. “The Peopling of Modern Bosnia-Herzegovina: Y-chromosome Haplogroups in the Three Main Ethnic Groups”, *Annals of Human Genetics*, 2005 (69), 757-763.

conflict agents. More importantly, the New Wars literature will be used for the identification of violence that is generated by efforts to demonstrate symbolical positions in identity-related disputes. It seems that, in the case of New Wars, PCIA cannot simply identify grievances or gainful motives for violence. Instead, much of the **violence in the “New Wars” serves as a function for argument**. Dispersing an ethnic group from a territory, for example, articulates a framework where the dispersed people are guests or visitors who do not have any ownership of the territory. Massive criminal violence in New Wars is often used by “migrant populations” (people who are not considered as indigenous or local) for claiming space and discrediting the existing local order.⁹ Furthermore, the analysis of what aid can do to address the engendered conflict problems, such as safety of women and the political economy of rape in conflicts, will benefit from the literature on “New Wars”. Finally, the diagnosis of problems specific to New Wars will utilise the literature on this theme. These specificities are:

- the erosion of the state’s monopoly on the use of force,¹⁰
- centrality of identity-based conflict motives,¹¹
- asymmetric setting with governmental, genocidal targeting of civilians,¹²

- use of unorganised terror for the purpose of ethnic cleansing of an area,¹³
- the use of rape as a weapon of conflict¹⁴
- the lack of political control of (civilian) troops¹⁵
- disproportionate number of indirect casualties of war (the presence of a complex humanitarian disaster instead of just conflict problems) and
- the risk of children getting mobilised into warfare.¹⁶

While the main objective of this analysis will be to assess the impact of peace and conflict development interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the aspect of New Wars provides an opportunity for this study to draw conclusions that aim at some generality with regards to conflict impact of aid in societies affected by New Wars.

9 Kivimäki, Timo 2012. *Can Peace Research Make Peace? Lessons in Diplomacy*. Adlershot: Ashgate.

10 Kaldor, Mary 1999. *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Mello, Patrick A. 2010. “In Search of New Wars: The Debate about a Transformation of War”, *European Journal of International Relations* 16(2), 297-309.

11 Hansen, Lene 2006. *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*. Routledge, London. Kaldor 1999. Kaplan, Robert D 2000. *The Coming Anarchy. Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War*. New York: Random House. Hewitt, J. Joseph, Jonathon Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr 2008. *Peace and Conflict 2008: Executive Summary*, Center for International Development and Conflict Management.

12 Kaldor 1999; Kaplan 2000; Mello 2010.

13 Kaldor 1999; Kaplan 2000.

14 Hansen 2006.

15 Hewitt, Wilkenfeld and Gurr 2008.

16 Kaldor 1999.

2. Historical Background and Basic Political Setting

One look at the recent history in BiH shows the drastic changes that the country has gone through in only a couple of decades. Some of the historical events have been given a new lease of life today as the current political argumentation refers to interpretations of paths of history for the justification of ongoing political projects. Thus for example, some Bosniaks resist the independence of the Republika Srpska (RS) claiming that this entity was created by Serb ethnic cleansing during the Bosnian War, while at the same time the ethnic cleansing during World War II (WWII) is mentioned by some Serbs as justification for the retaking of the “Serb areas” that now constitute the Republika Srpska. This chapter will give a short historical background to the current conflict situation and identify the phases and systems in recent history that marked the lives of the BiH population.

Illustration 2.1
Recent historical phases in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Until 1992 Pre-war society/ mentality	1992-1995 War society/ mentality	1995-today Post-war/ Dayton society/ mentality
“Brotherhood & Unity”*; Focus on citizenship-based identity	Extreme nationalism; instrumentalisation of religion for ethno-nationalist purposes, violence, ethnic cleansing	Focus on ethnicity/religion-based identity; segregation

* A popular slogan used in Yugoslavia during the rule of the Communist Party; personal experience of one of the authors. As well see in Mesić, Stipe. *The Demise of Yugoslavia: A Political Memoir*. Central European University Press. 2004.

The first phase, pre-war, is the one until 1992, when BiH was one of the six constitutive Republics of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia). The Tito regime was essentially a communist socialist dictatorship coupled with economic pluralism, free travel, foreign currency accounts and relative intellectual freedoms. The political identity of the regime

was derived from the Partisan struggle, the capacity to provide reasonable living standards and the special international position as a bridge between East and West as a non-aligned country.¹⁷ No nation or Republic was *de jure* considered as dominant and power was decentralised in favour of the Republics and the two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo). The Communist Party propagated “Brotherhood & Unity” amongst South Slavic nations and Yugoslavism was especially strong in the modern and secular BiH.¹⁸ However, as the economic and social gains faded in memory, the Communist Party became marred with corruption scandals, while the historical moments at the end of the 1980’s (Berlin Wall etc.) fuelled the aspirations of ethno-nationalists. It was at this point that Yugoslavia started to dissolve. While Croats and Bosniaks generally favoured secession, the Serb population in BiH did not. This historical legacy puts the three Bosnian ethnic groups into different positions. For the Bosnian Serbs this legacy implies the weakest ownership of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The second phase, the Bosnian War, was characterised by extreme nationalism, violence and war crimes. Many attempts from all sides were made to territorially divide BiH along ethnic lines: Serbs had (and still have) Republika Srpska (RS), the Croats had Herceg-Bosna, and the Bosniaks the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia. The efforts of Bosnian Serbs and Croats were supported and directed by their ‘homelands’ and their Presidents, Slobodan Milošević (former Yugoslavia, now Republic of Serbia) and Franjo Tuđman (Republic of Croatia) respectively played a significant role in the war effort. Bosniaks were generally less keen on partition and were fighting for the only homeland they had, Bosnia and Herzegovina. War crimes were committed by all sides; however Bosniaks suffered the most casualties, around 66 per cent.¹⁹ The atrocities of war committed in the interest of ethnic cleansing and the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina further strengthened the Bosniak sense of ownership of the unity of the country, as partition is now associated with the atrocity of violent ethnic cleansing. Separate territories of the three ethnicities were created through ethnic cleansing, and were possible only through

¹⁷ Kaldor 1999. 36.

¹⁸ According to Kaldor 1999. “Six months before the 1990 elections, a poll conducted in BiH showed that 74 per cent of the population favoured the banning of nationalist parties.” 41.

¹⁹ International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) figures.

this type of violence. The international community proved toothless in handling the crisis and seemed to have misunderstood the conflict. The three main ethnic groups of BiH today still have very different interpretations of the war and its causes.²⁰ Many of the current political disputes are derived from the different interpretations and diagnoses of the Bosnian War.

The third phase, after the War, started with the Dayton Agreement, which in 1995 brought peace, but not much more to the citizens. According to Kaldor,²¹ Dayton was successful because of North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) military action and because the ethnic cleansing had almost been completed. In addition, Serbs were demoralised by the Croatian military operation Oluja ("Storm") in Croatia, which reclaimed the area of Krajina from the Serb forces. As agreed in Dayton, BiH was partitioned into Republika Srpska (49 per cent of the territory) and the Bosniak-Croatian Federation (51 per cent of the territory). BiH today consists of two entities and three ethnic groups, all of which profess deep ethno-nationalism,

with little touching points. In addition, some Croats also have aspirations to follow the RS model and establish a third entity.²² Religion plays a pivotal part in the ethnic identity of the three groups. According to the Dayton Agreement, the ethnic groups are compelled to take all state-level decisions together, but Croats and Serbs often deliberately block or boycott the work of the institutions to make their point clear: BiH in its current structure is unsustainable, a lame duck. Bosniaks appear to be the only ones in favour of a 'unitary' state. Yet, none of the three groups accepts Bosnia and Herzegovina as it is at this moment. Something that all ethnic groups have in common is, however, their aspiration to join the European Union (EU) as a full-fledged member. The international community, represented through the Office of the High Representative (OHR), acts as a sort of fire-fighter. The legitimacy of OHR as the strong international presence among the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina was originally related to the role of the international community as guarantor of stability and provider of public services, while today, its main function is to prepare the country for membership in the EU and NATO.

20 Skoko, Božo 2011. *Što Hrvati, Bošnjaci i Srbi misle jedni o drugima, a što o Bosni i Hercegovini?*, FES, Sarajevo, <http://www.fes.ba/publikacije/2011-03-Skoko-Sto.hrvati.bosnjaci.i.srbi.per.cent20.pdf> (retrieved on 25.11.2011). An English language summary is available at : http://www.fes.ba/publikacije/2010-11BiH_sazetak_SKOKO_ENG.pdf.

21 Kaldor 1999, 60.

22 Interviews in June 2011 & *Fortieth Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations*, 21 April 2011- 15 October 2011. 6.

3. Diagnosis of the Basic Sources of Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In order to recognise the potentials of peace and conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and subsequently identify where the international community can be most effective in its development activities, it is crucial to diagnose the main sources of conflict in the country.

In this Chapter we will identify the causes, antagonistic motives and opportunities for conflict in an effort to look into the main structures that have been sources of conflict. Then we will look into the perceptions of these structures and draw mental maps of the divisions and agents that are at the core of the issues. As remarked by Timo Kivimäki and Paul Pasch in the PCIA for Burma/Myanmar: "The starting point for all mental mapping of conflicts is the realisation that the conflicting parties are not 'playing the same game'. Rather, they all perceive the conflicting parties, rules and strategies of the conflict differently."²³ **Thus, the aim of this Chapter is to investigate the potentials for conflict in the perception of the different stakeholders and agents.** The interviews conducted through June 2011 (for a list of interviewees and questions see Appendices 5 & 6) helped identify the conflict elements and perspectives, while other literature was used to highlight critical points of the discourse.

This Chapter organises and divides the presentation of different sources of conflict into political and economic clusters.

3.1 Political Causes of Conflict

For the outsider, the most easily and commonly perceived problems in BiH are of a political nature. Most of the political causes stem from the remaining disputes that caused the Bosnian War and, many in the country say, the ambiguity of the Dayton Peace Agreement in their settlement. A person working close to the judicial system told us in an interview in Sarajevo (27.06.2011): "It is crucial that we start working on the professionalisation [of the legal profession]. There is a problem of lack of knowledge on all levels

of society and this is supported by the media. For example, Dayton is good, but it is rarely understood. Everyone thinks they are jurists, but citizens cannot interpret Dayton as they wish. This just leads to problems. People are literally *illiterate* when it comes to the knowledge of such issues."

Other political causes stem from geo-political interests, both Bosnian and Herzegovinian and foreign.

3.1.1 Continuing constitutional disagreement among ethnic groups over fundamental political principles regarding the form of the state

The **constitutional order** of Bosnia and Herzegovina remains complicated and contested even after the Dayton Peace Agreement. The country is administered on four levels. In order to make sense of the structure it is possible to regard the highest level as that of a confederation. This is the level of the nation-state, only that in BiH the word 'nation' is normally reserved for ethnicities. The second level can be understood as that of states of the confederation. Again, however, there is a terminological complication. State level normally refers to the highest level; the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Two entities exist on the second level of governance; Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The reason why the latter is called a Federation is because this entity is considered to represent two of the main ethnic groups (nationalities as they are called in the country): Bosniaks and Croats. In other words, in Bosnia and Herzegovina the level that is called the state is above the level that is locally called the Federation. In this study we use the local terminology despite the possibilities of confusion when interpreting these terms from the point of view of standard political science or constitutional law. However, we call Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs ethnic groups rather than nations and reserve the term nation to the citizens of the entire state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ideology that emphasizes the objectives, rights and identity of the ethnic group (Serbian-ness or Bosniak-ness, for example), will be called ethno-nationalism, while the term nationalism will be reserved to the attitude that prioritizes Bosnia and Herzegovina identity.

The third level of governance applies to the provinces in the Federation. This level is locally called the canton level, while the fourth level in both entities is the level of municipalities, or local authorities.

23 Kivimäki, Timo and Paul Pasch 2009. *PCIA - Country Conflict-Analysis Study. The Dynamics of Conflict in the Multiethnic Union of Myanmar*. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/07808.pdf> (retrieved on 01.12.2011).

The role of levels of the nation-state (entities VS the nation-state)

BiH is a state with an extreme model of federalism, where the country is almost equally divided between two entities: the Federation, which encompasses 51 per cent of the state territory, and Republika Srpska with 49 per cent. The prime division of the conflict appears to be the **disagreement on the form of the state**, that is, whether it should continue to be a *unitary state* with the borders as they are today, or whether the door to territorial *secession* of the entities and/or ethnic groups should be opened. The question of the form of the state is at the heart of BiH's existence: the war in 1992-95 started with BiH's secession from SFRY and the war itself revolved around the secession of territory from BiH, triggering violence. This debate started with the war, continued with the Dayton Agreement²⁴ and is still on-going today. Dayton's provisions drew new borders within the country through the creation of two entities.

According to Article III Paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the state-level of governance takes care of the following functions:

- Foreign policy.
- Foreign trade policy.
- Customs policy.
- Monetary policy.
- Finances of the institutions and for the international obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- Immigration, refugee, and asylum policy and regulation.
- International and inter-Entity criminal law enforcement, including relations with Interpol.
- Establishment and operation of common and international communications facilities.
- Regulation of inter-Entity transportation.
- Air traffic control.

The competences of the state level are not all exclusive, though, as the Constitution allows for the entities to keep parallel foreign and economic relations with neighbouring countries (Serbia and Croatia, who are also signatories of the DPA). The practice has shown that Serbia, especially, has utilized this opportunity to cooperate directly with

²⁴ *The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/07808.pdf (retrieved on 01.12.2011).

the Republika Srpska, while only exceptionally communicating with the state level. Many of our Serb interviewees in June 2011 assessed this as a good thing, as the perception is still that, because/while the BiH state level is not functioning well, at least the population can rely on their 'homeland'. Despite the Constitution, the practice has also been for parties to have direct contacts to Croatia and Serbia. This has led to the habit/understanding, since June 1999,²⁵ of treating the Bosnian war as an international war, due to the direct contacts between conflicting Bosnian parties to Serbia and Croatia.²⁶

The mandate of the two entities is "in theory", limited to the following stipulations of Article III Paragraph 2:

"a) The Entities shall have the right to establish special parallel relationships with neighbouring states consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (b) Each Entity shall provide all necessary assistance to the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to enable it to honour the international obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, provided that financial obligations incurred by one Entity without the consent of the other prior to the election of the Parliamentary Assembly and Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be the responsibility of that Entity, except insofar as the obligation is necessary for continuing the membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina in an international organization. (c) The Entities shall provide a safe and secure environment for all persons in their respective jurisdictions, by maintaining civilian law enforcement agencies operating in accordance with internationally recognized standards and with respect for the internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms and by taking such other measures as appropriate. (d) Each Entity may also enter into agreements with states and international organizations with the consent of the Parliamentary Assembly. The Parliamentary Assembly of the entity may provide by law that certain types of agreements do not require such consent."

These tasks are defined for entities, but the Constitution also says that all functions not listed in the Constitution

²⁵ The New York Times, 16.07.1999.

²⁶ For the linkage between domestic and international in Bosnian war, see Bose, Sumantra 2002. *Bosnia after Dayton. Nationalist Partition and International Intervention*, London: Hurst & Co. & Goldstein, Joshua and Jon Pevehouse 1997. "Reciprocity, Bullying and International Conflict: Time-Series Analysis of the Bosnia Conflict", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No. 3, 515-529.

RS: Should I stay or should I go?

The self-proclaimed main proponent of RS autonomy and independence is Milorad Dodik, the President of RS. However, while many, including the international community, take his threats of independence seriously, many others dismiss them as false threats and a mere tool for political and personal bargaining.

A Bosniak official told us in Sarajevo (25.06.2011): "Not even Dayton allows to break off as an entity: in order to do this, one would need a three-quarter majority in BiH, the same as at the 1991 referendum. Dodik is doing a lot of lobbying for his ideas; he has a complex as the "father of the nation". I think he is serious about secession. He has been threatening it since 2006, mostly in order to protect his own octopus (of criminality). He should either be vacuumed by his own octopus or retire because of his criminal actions."

On the other hand, a Serb ethno-nationalist politician told us in Banja Luka (20.06.2011): "Dodik has been talking about secession since 2006 - this is just marketing, he simply wants to get the message across. His is just a threat against Sarajevo's megalomaniac wishes. RS would never be able to secede within the borders as they are at present - it would be too vulnerable - and a strong state implies taking care of your borders properly. Secession is therefore unlikely. We consider Dodik to be a very brave politician, although he is not in line with our politics."

A politician interviewed in Prijedor (22.06.2011) proposed: "They should simply let us have our separation referendum; people should be given a chance to speak their minds. However, I do not believe that in that case Dodik would really let us have a referendum. Dodik would hit his head against the wall, what else would he do? He is lucky that the international community banned the referendum."

belong to entities. Political power is concentrated in the two highest layers of political governance. This power of these two layers is limited by the Dayton Peace Agreement, whose implementation is largely in foreign hands.

During the Bosnian War, the Serbian parties (Srpska demokratska stranka – Serb Democratic Party, Srpski pokret obnove - Serbian Renewal Movement, and Savez reformskih snaga Jugoslavije - Union of Reform Forces, and from 1991 Skupština srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini - the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina) resisted Bosnian separation from Yugoslavia. Later the Assembly opted for Serbian separation from Bosnia and union with Serbia. Separation was also opted for by some radical Croat parties. However, after the war, the main constitutional contradictions of today are related to the roles of the two highest levels of governance, the borders of the two entities and the possibility of a division of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina into Bosniak and Croat entities. In general, the ethno-nationalist Croat parties such as Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (Croatian democratic Union, HDZ) and HDZ 1990 have pushed for the establishment of a third, Croat, entity alongside the Bosnian and Serbian entities. As recently as in April

2011 they revived the extra-institutional Croat National Assembly, which raises "concerns about the risk of parallel governing structures eventually emerging".²⁷ Some of our interviewees from the Croatian and a few from the Bosniak ethnicity even expressed the conviction that one of the keys in solving problems in BiH is solving the "Croat issue", while generally Bosniaks were not of this opinion.

On the other hand, Serbian parties have tended to emphasize the position of the second layer of administration, and the powers of the Republika Srpska have been especially close to the hearts of Serb parties. Early in 2008, for example, the leadership of Republika Srpska's ruling party, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), called for the transformation of BiH into an asymmetric federation (or confederation) and claimed the right to self-determination and including the right to secession for the entity. Yet it is likely, despite the Serb parties' insistence on the rights of separation, that a majority of the Serbs see the existence of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a relatively comfortable

²⁷ As recently as in 2011: *Fortieth Report of the High Representative (...)* 2011. 9.

reality.²⁸ Instead of focusing their energy on changing the Dayton Agreement, the Serb parties tend to try to push the limits of the practical autonomy and power of the Republika Srpska within the constitutional limits of the Dayton Agreement. Many Serb informants, for example, evaluate the usefulness of the NATO and the EU on the basis of whether they will be beneficial for the power of the Republika Srpska.²⁹ Instead of open resistance, Serb ethno-nationalists, just as the Republic of Serbia, ignore the existence of the state level of governance and try to build their own political reality, disregarding the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosniaks in particular see this threat as the continuation of the 'Great Serbia' policy.

Meanwhile the explicit political bargaining has taken place on lower levels of constitutional reform. At the centre of the debate are issues such as whether police and military forces belong to the highest or the second highest level of administration, whether the highest level of administration has powers over the protection of ethnic minorities in the second layer units of administration, and which level of governance the different state properties belong to.

Constitutional disputes can spark violence in two main ways. On the one hand, it is possible that violence is used in constitutional bargaining: threats can make opponents in a dispute more dependent on a compromise solution and this can improve party's bargaining leverage. The heavy international presence in favour of the constitutional ideas of the Dayton Peace Agreement could make it difficult for the top level conflicting parties (such as entities, or leading ethnic parties) to use violence or threats as a bargaining chip. Yet, threats of unilateral political decisions on referendums and separation have been made by the leadership of the Republika Srpska. If these threats materialise, the enforcement of a new status of this entity could involve violence. Furthermore, another risk is that violence is used at a lower level by undisciplined actors in the articulation of interpretations on ethnic and national rights. Provocative elite level rhetoric could spark this type of violence. According to a contemporary novelist the common pattern is that *"it is more respectable to die for one's grandfather's honour than to live for one's*

grandchildren's future".³⁰ This was typical in the Bosnian War and it is the pattern of violence in the so-called "New Wars". Three alternative paths of such violence can be imagined: one related to the demonstration of power of the different units of governance, a second more indirectly related to loyalty to collective identities, and a third related to the ownership of the state/nation.

Firstly, positions in some of the constitutional debates may be demonstrated through violent action.

Republika Srpska, for example, has demonstrated the autonomy of the entity by ignoring obligations it had to the state, by refusing to implement state-norms and the use of state-terms, as well as by using rhetoric that was not in compliance with state-level interpretation of political correctness.³¹ In the chapter on scenarios we will present the specific "frustration violence" scenarios that this type of frustration towards state paralysis and exaggerated entity-primacy can lead to.

Another danger of demonstrative argumentation could occur if violence was used to constitute the realities of ethnic relations by using the discourse of loyalty and belongingness.

Violence is often a way of showing belongingness and loyalty to a group or articulating the relevance of ethnicity in politics. Committing violent acts in defence or in revenge of injustice against an ethnic icon is very common in the so-called "New War" settings. In the post-conflict setting the role of ethnic groups may be emphasised by moves that demonstrate the collective responsibility of all individuals of an ethnic group for the atrocities committed by some individuals in the name of the ethnicity. Similarly, collectively denying the atrocities of all those individuals that belong to one's own group may represent a provocative demonstration of the relevance of ethnic loyalty. Blaming individuals from an ethnic group whose other individuals have committed atrocities would be felt to be unfair,³² given that atrocities in New Wars rarely have the backing of masses. Thus demonstrative argumentation of such collective guilt could spark violence. However, protecting

28 Topić, Tanja 2008. Political analyst at FES. Interview by John Feffer, in Banja Luka, April 2008, <http://balkansproject.ips-dc.org/?p=170> (retrieved on 01.12.2011).

29 Šolaja, Miloš 2008. Director of the Center for International Relations, Banja Luka. Interview by John Feffer, in Banja Luka, April 2008, <http://balkansproject.ips-dc.org/?p=169> (retrieved on 01.12.2011).

30 Veličković, Nenad. 2011. *Sahib. Impressions from Depression*. Omnibus Library Book, Sarajevo. 151.

31 Dahlman & O'Tuathail 2005. *Broken Bosnia: The Localized Geopolitics of Displacement and Return in Two Bosnian Places*. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*. 95, 644-662. And Billig, Michael 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage Publications.

32 Ajder, Miroslav 2008. Journalist in Banja Luka. Interview by John Feffer 28.09. 2008, <http://balkansproject.ips-dc.org/?p=216> (retrieved on 01.12.2011).

individual perpetrators by denying atrocities is also felt to be unfair,³³ and thus this could also provoke violent reaction. Denial and collective blame are the two sides of the same controversy. A Bosnian Serb journalist put the blame issue in a more constructive way by concluding that “terrible things were done, but not in my name”.³⁴ The specific conflict scenarios that this pressure to show loyalty can lead to, the “true Bosnian” violence, language and repatriation conflicts, will be identified in their development paths in the chapter on scenarios.

Closely related to the discourse of loyalty is the discourse of treason. Nation-building often requires discourses of loyalty and treason. The role of such discourses is to strengthen the nation by constituting moral punishment for disloyalty to the nation and loyalty to an alternative collective unit, while at the same time constituting rewards for those loyal to the nation (BiH). The articulation of an interpretation of alternative loyalty as treason could require violent punishment of treacherous behaviour. Such violence could be sparked between ethnic groups (for example, ethnic Bosniaks punishing some Serbian groups for anti-BiH activities) or within ethnic groups (for example, Bosniak religious leaders mobilising punishment of secular Bosniak leaders). Given that Bosnia and Herzegovina is very much an incomplete nation, such discourse can be dangerous since “treacherous” attitudes, such as loyalty to Serbia, Croatia or the community of Muslims or loyalty towards the EU, are very common. Similar interpretations of loyalty and treason can be articulated in the context of ethnicity, too. Violence may be used against those who “commit treason” against the interests of Muslims/Bosniaks, Serbs or Croats. By punishing traitors of an ethnic group in the previous war, ethno-nationalists may emphasize the continuing relevance of ethnic identities. These political conflict motives, too, could spark language conflicts, “true Bosnian” violence, and repatriation conflicts. This will be discussed in the scenarios chapter.

Finally, demonstrations of ownership of the nation could generate justifications for parties to act violently. Bosniak war veterans demonstrate their rightful ownership of part of the state budget. This demonstration has been violent as their identity is coercive and the

common denominator of the group is the ability to fight. Somehow the state should be associated with the civilian political system, so that rebellion against it may be seen as unpatriotic, in contrast to the notion of the “true patriots” using violence against an “unpatriotic” civilian government. In addition to the role of war veterans, it might be expected that the ownership issue would be seen in the light of ethnicity. The association of the names of the three main ethnicities suggest Bosniak ownership of the state, with ethnic Serbs feeling most ownership of the Republika Srpska, while the name ‘Croat’ simply refers to belongingness to another state (Croatia). The association between the Croats and their homeland Herzegovina helps include the ethnic Croats into the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, if Herzegovina is associated with the Croats, and Bosnia with Bosniaks, where does it leave the ethnic Serbs whose history has marginalised this ethnic group from the nation-building process, and whose majority opinion tends to emphasise entities rather than the state? The fact that the state level’s name is so close to that of the federation of Bosniaks and Croats emphasizes the marginalisation of Serbs in the nation-building process. The unfortunate naming of ethnicities and the nation will fuel demonstrative behaviour unless names used for ethnic groups or the state are changed or their equal ownership of the state will be sufficiently explicitly and clearly demonstrated by the state.³⁵

Division of power in the political institutions: The problem of party politics being framed ethnically

Democracy is difficult to organise constitutionally if the society is deeply divided along ethnic lines. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ethnic framing of politics is a clear legacy of the Bosnian War and the Dayton Peace Agreement, and it has been brought to extreme forms by ethno-nationalist parties. Dayton is problematic as it was only meant to help manage the transition in BiH, but is now being used far beyond that. Politics in BiH seem to be revolving solely around ethnic and religious identity and the three main groups make a point of claiming

33 Čehajić, Sabina 2008. *Victim dehumanization: Moral disengagement strategies*, Puls demokratij. And Čehajić, S., Brown, R. and Castano, E. 2008. *Forgive and forget? Antecedents, mediators, and consequences of Intergroup Forgiveness in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Political Psychology, 29(3), 351-367.

34 Ajder 2008.

35 This could be learned from the difficulty of identification of “United Kingdomers” in Northern Ireland as citizens of the United Kingdom. These people do not live on the island of Great Britain, and thus they are not British, while the word United Kingdomer is obviously not used. This unfortunate naming has haunted the unity of the UK and it has, in part, generated a lot of demonstrative action against the right of Great Britain to rule over Northern Ireland.

Play pretence?

One of our Bosniak interviewees in Sarajevo (25.06.2011) was very vocal about the RS obstruction of state structures: "In the state institutions, RS representatives behave as if they were a full-fledged state: they are only concerned with their interests. Even when we meet to discuss EU integration, often they say: 'This is our position and we will not budge!' This makes work with Brussels very difficult. (...) Another problem in BiH is that if there is indeed a problem, it is not addressed in the country. They (RS politicians) go directly to the EU Delegation or Brussels; they do not go to the BiH state institutions. The EU, meanwhile, shrugs and says: 'They are difficult, we have to find an agreement with them'. On the other hand, if you

are being 'easy', the EU pays little attention to you and says: 'We'll deal with them easily.'"

An official from RS and a Dodik supporter sees the situation differently (Banja Luka, 20.06.2011): "I will continue to build state structures in the RS. We are actually only threatening to have a referendum because they [the State level] would like to abolish RS. We are not happy with the creation of large state institutions. There is now a trend to open agencies. But actually the more state agencies we have, the costlier the state apparatus and taxes become. The state is following a consumerism model. They want to accumulate power in Sarajevo, so that we just remain a conch with no powers."

political rights based on this, and this may lead to the erosion of modern state structures.³⁶

According to Dayton, the division should be clear. However, as there is unwillingness to recognise, or rather, a willingness to disregard the state structures in favour of ethno-centric structures, the state is unable to function properly. For example, RS seems to be preparing a secession following the model of the SFRY autonomous provinces by making their institutions stronger, and blocking the common BiH institutions in order to show their inability to perform.³⁷

The division of powers between political institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina draws from two constitutional principles: **consociationalism** and **intergrationism**. The starting point of the division of powers is in the fact that the ethnic minorities cannot accept simple majoritarianism (where "the winner takes it all") as this would leave their own ethnic interests in a permanent minority. To avoid this, many post-conflict countries have opted for a consociational model of constitution whereby the

collective voice of ethnicities is emphasised in an ethnic power-sharing arrangement. This is the first consideration of the Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutional division of power in its political institutions. Consociational democracy is characterised by four institutional devices:

- a power-sharing government, a so-called grand coalition with representatives from all primary groups;
- minority veto on issues that can infringe on national interests;
- proportionality in the electoral system and in the civil service; and
- ethnic autonomy.³⁸

These elements have been guaranteed in the state constitution by several means.

The arrangement for power-sharing is based on a government with a strong presidency. The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of three members: One Bosniak and one Croat, each directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly elected from the territory of the Republika Srpska. The Presidency has a strong role in the selection of the Cabinet, called Council of Ministers.

³⁶ Kaldor 1999. 76.

³⁷ Gromes, Thorsten 2009. „Von der Krise in den Krieg? Vierzehn Jahre nach Kriegsende wächst in Bosnien und Herzegowina die Gewaltbereitschaft“, *HSFK-Standpunkte*, Nr. 3/2009, Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung Frankfurt/M, 3-4, http://hsfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/Standpunkte_3_2009_web.pdf (retrieved on 11.04.2011).

³⁸ Lijphart, Arend 1977. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 25-44.

The division of the country into two entities represents ethnic autonomy, while leaving the Croat autonomy weaker, despite some stipulations of ethnic veto rights,³⁹ unless there is a division of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina into Croat and Bosniak entities. Guaranteeing ethnic autonomy by means of geographic division has been possible largely due to the ethnic cleansing policies in the war that caused all 18 regions (10 of them in the Federation, called Cantons, and 8 of them known as just “regions” in the RS) of the country in a situation with clear majority of one ethnic group. In statistics originating from 2003 only one of the 18 regions had less than 60 per cent majority for its dominant ethnic group.⁴⁰ Demographic statistics vary, however, and this makes it difficult to produce reliable information on the dominance of different ethnic groups. With people returning to their regions of origin after the war the situation also changes over time. According to Federal Office of Statistics (Federalni zavod za statistiku), Statistical Yearbook 2009,⁴¹ the ethnic dominance has become less pronounced, while Central Bosnia and Herzegovina-Neretva Cantons have become areas where the biggest ethnic group still has a majority but no longer over 60 per cent majority. This is especially true for the Croat ethnic group, whose numbers have been declining over the years, triggering a Serb politician in Banja Luka (25.06.2011) to tell us: “There is no (recent) census in BiH. Apparently, this is because Croats are afraid that their numbers have become too low and that they will simply become a minority”. Yet ethnic dominance of regions is a reality that Bosnia and Herzegovina is going to live with for a long time to come.

However, in addition to the **founding of entities**, the Constitution also explicitly defines the **quota of each of the ethnicities**. While doing this, it leaves the ‘Others’ (ethnic groups other than the three biggest⁴²) outside

39 For more on ethnic veto rights, see Recchia, Stefano 2007. *Beyond international trusteeship: EU peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2007*, Occasional Paper n°66, February 2007, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 7, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ66.pdf> (retrieved on 01.05.2011) and Bochsler, Daniel 2011. *Non discriminatory rules and ethnic representation: the election of the Bosnian state presidency*, *Ethnopolitics*, 10(3), September 2011, 7 http://www.bochsler.eu/publi/bochsler_ethnopolitics2011.pdf (retrieved on 01.05.2011).

40 Prismresearch 2003. *Social Trust Survey*. Prismresearch, Sarajevo (no longer available online). Regional ethnicity data reproduced in Peter Håkansson and Fredrik Sjöholm 2007. “Who Do You Trust? Ethnicity and Trust in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 59, No. 6, September, 2007, 961-976.

41 Available at <http://www.fzs.ba/Statistickipercent20godisnjakpercent202009.pdf> (retrieved on 01.10.2011).

42 There are 17 recognized minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, <http://www.nacionalnemanjinebih.org/> (retrieved on 01.12.2011).

any representation in the upper house, the so-called House of Peoples. Minorities of the three main groups in the entities (Bosniaks and Croats in the Republika Srpska and Serbs in the Federation of BH) are also left with no representation in the House of Peoples at state level, as the representatives from RS are defined as Serbs and the representatives from the Federation of BH are defined as Bosniaks and Croats in equal number.

Proportionality in the electoral system in Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on a bicameral parliament where both houses have a fixed representation of people from the two entities (one third from Republika Srpska and two thirds from the Federation of BiH). While in the lower house (House of Representatives) decisions are made on a majority principle, in the upper house (House of Peoples) decision-making requires the majority of all three ethnic groups. The latter arrangement guarantees a veto to all three major ethnic groups, not only on important national issues but in every issue concerning legislation. This arrangement obviously tends to lead to paralysis, which seems predictable given the Constitution. In issues that need annual decisions, such as the budget, there is a constitutional stipulation for political decision-making which ensures that the budget of the previous year will be accepted on a provisional basis for an (extendable) three-month period if a decision on the budget cannot be reached.

The problem with consociational democracy is that ethnic quotas tend to consolidate the ethnic framing of politics.⁴³ This is why some theorists claim that divided societies need integrationist incentives in their constitutions. In many former British colonies ethnic groups can only vote their own candidate (for example, Fiji). This tends to encourage ethnic politics further, as candidates are not rewarded for reaching out to other communities. The fact that in Bosnia and Herzegovina parties may reach out to other ethnicities is an example of integrationist incentives in the election law. However, unfortunately the “ethnic purity” of entities and cantons deny most of the incentive from parties to reach out to voters of other ethnicities. The temptation for ethnic mobilisation of political parties was intended to be curtailed by means of a new election law that gives incentives for multi-ethnic campaigning platforms. However this initiative was not passed in the 2001 election law. As a result, of the main parties only

43 Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. *Ethnic groups in conflict*, Berkeley: University of California Press. 574-579.

SDP BiH - A true multi-ethnic force? The perception of social democracy in BiH

SDP BiH is according to its by-laws multi-ethnic in party structure composition and programme. However, although SDP BiH politicians mostly disagree, we heard from all three ethnicities that they do not consider SDP BiH a 'real' multi-ethnic force. The Serbs and Croats forthrightly denounce it as a 'hoax' (interviews in June 2011). One of our Croat interviewees (Mostar, 29.06.2011) explained it in the following words: "It is enough to play with nationalist sentiments before the elections in order for nationalist parties to win the elections, in spite of them not having done anything in the past four years. In this kind of environment, even the SDP ceases to be an alternative and copies the nationalist parties and say: 'You are not the only bad boys here, we also know how to manipulate people's fears - look at us!' In this way, they even managed to box out the two HDZs. (...) SDP simply embraced the ethno-nationalists' methods of coming to power and stopped searching for alternatives. Furthermore, another problem of SDP is that they have more 80 per cent Bosniak membership, but they present themselves as a multi-ethnic force. HDZ does not understand that SDP has the right to an alternative [system]. (...) However, SDP is dealing with things in a wrong way. For example, they make coalitions with the wrong partners, the Bosniak nationalist party Stranka demokratske akcije (Party of Democratic Action, SDA) and two catastrophic Croatian parties, Stranka za boljitak (Party for Betterment) and Hrvatska stranka prava (Croatian Party of Rights, HSP), a right wing party that is proud of its Ustasha heritage. They are killing their social-democratic idea, especially amongst the Croats. I cannot say in Mostar that I am a European social democrat; the connotation is simply too negative. Even those who swear on Europe here don't have any political culture."

In Sarajevo (25.06.2011) a Bosniak left-leaning analyst concurred: "All of our political parties are faulty: SDP actually represents the Bosniak interpretation of events and Bosniak domination over the backs of some weak Croats. There are many clues for that. I think they will throw the last shovel on the grave of BiH. They are just pretending to be multi-ethnic and liberal, but they are hypocritical, sophisticated nationalists. They only see

the war through Bosniak eyes: they only see that there was aggression, but deny the civil war. Which truly multi-ethnic party's mayor would say in 2009 that they do not support the Dobrovoljačka Street commemoration? In this way, they are anti-reconciliation. In 1993 and 1997 this would not have been possible. They have seen that SNSD's systems of leadership and party politics mixed with populism was a successful model, so they overtook it. It is a sort of liberal nationalism."

Basically, according to our interviewees, not only the image of SDP as a multi-ethnic party has been spoiled, but also the image of social democracy, that is anything that is left-leaning as an ideology, and this might have long-lasting political consequences. Our Croat ethno-nationalist interviewees in Mostar (29.06.2011) even claimed outright that SDP BiH was actually a Communist party and branded all the Croat SDP members as Communists, which is the ultimate insult amongst ethno-nationalists due to the burden that the Yugoslav heritage still entails. While it is a fact that SDP has continued on the ashes and legacy of the Communist Party (and there is no attempt by the Party to hide that), this kind of branding by political opponents indicates an over-simplification of the political reality and, in some cases, accumulation of political points. It is however, interesting that while the great majority of our interviewees across the three ethnic groups gave positive reflections on their lives in Yugoslavia, the image of the Communist Party, which was actually responsible for the state of affairs in the country, is extremely and unapologetically negative.

One Croat analyst in Mostar (29.06.2011) commented on the issue of social democracy: "We have a paradoxical situation in BiH: we have two parties in power who are only nominally social democrat, but they are far away from that. If you compare the parties led by Zlatko Lagumdžija (SDP BiH), Milorad Dodik (SDP RS) and Zoran Milanović (SDP Croatia), they have no common points, ideals or programme orientation."

As expected, our SDP interviewees (June 2011) did not agree with such assessments of their politics. However they conceded that the ethnic mix in the party was not "ideal" and agreed that more can and should be done to make the party "more" multi-ethnic.

Socijaldemokratska partija BiH (Social Democratic Party BiH, i.e. SDP BiH) has a multi-ethnic campaigning platform. Other main political parties are still mostly based on ethnicity rather than their political programmes.

Ethnic quotas in the executive branch of the state tend to create similar inflexibility. This is why the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution has also been designed to involve elements of a comprehensive model that aims at including ethnicities and encourages reaching out to other ethnic constituencies. Elements of this model of constitution can be seen in the fact that people can vote for which party they want in their constituencies, not just for their own ethnic candidates. Yet, as mentioned, the large ethnic majorities in each entity and canton make this less rewarding. Further evidence of the integrative model of constitution is the existence of certain more integrative institutions - that is, institutions that, while they are based on ethnic parity, have no veto provisions and decide by simple majority. These institutions are the Constitutional Court, the Central Bank, the Joint Interim Commission, the Human Rights Chamber and Commission, the Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees, the Commission to Preserve National Monuments and the Commission on Public Corporations. Yet the integrative aspects of the constitution are weak (and watered down by the "ethnic purity" of regions), and the main deterrent against ethno-nationalism is still OHR. Furthermore, the perceived partiality of OHR and the unfortunate name of the state that alienates ethnic Serbs from ownership of the nation-state both hamper the process of national integration in the country.

Members of the SDP in Sarajevo (June 2011) gave us some deferring opinions: "The election results mean that Bosniaks in all municipalities voted for persons that stood for the SDP programme and not according to the national identity of a party. We have a similar situation in the Sarajevo Canton. Serb and Croatian parties are not in favour of multi-ethnic voting. They are our main problem." Another concurred: "Our party encompasses all religions. The basic question is whether the citizens want a multi-ethnic state. They have showed in our last elections that they do."

It is also important to note that the vast majority of our interviewees in June 2011 saw the solution of the outcome of the 2010 elections as currently the biggest challenge and priority for BiH, affirming that the 'pause' mode has to end in order to hinder further decline of the country.

In cases such as the one above, many analysts (for example, most of the participants in our workshop in Sarajevo in June 2011) and many of our interviewees are of the opinion that it is not just the constitutional model which hinders agreement, but also the politicians, who are often unwilling to change the status quo, mostly because of their personal interests, that is the fear of losing the power and influence they have amassed. Those kind of politicians rarely put the emphasis on their political programmes, which become indistinguishable, but rather use hate speech to get their 'messages' across. The constitutional model makes it possible for such politicians to use, or, better said, abuse, its elements for hindering progress and change, instead of making it a positive tool or at least a tool that could disable these politicians.

In conclusion, the difficult navigation between consociationalism and integrationism in Bosnia and Herzegovina's political system has led the country into a situation where it has to balance between four evils. The above analysis has been dealing with the first three evils while the role of the international community, which is feasible only as an interim arrangement, will be dealt with in the next chapter. Either:

- The country will have to compromise the autonomy of the three ethnic groups (integrationist option); or
- The central state will have to be extremely minimal, almost non-existent (consociational option); or
- The country will have to accept a continuing paralysis in decision-making; or
- Bosnia and Herzegovina will have to accept that many of the crucial decisions that it needs to implement will be imposed by the international community.

Compromising ethnic autonomy would require the emergence of a Bosnia and Herzegovina identity (which is difficult as long as the country's name rules out one of the three main ethnicities), and the decline of the three ethno-political identities. Yet a compromise would not be possible before all of the three ethnic groups are willing to reach one, as it will not be likely that any of the ethnic groups want to compromise their own autonomy unless the others do this too. In recent opinion polls it seems clear that this option is generally resisted in the Republika Srpska, while supported by a majority of Croats and Bosniaks of the Federation. According to the poll 73 per cent of respondents in the Republika Srpska felt that the status of the ethnic level of administration ("entities")

Just another day in BiH: A state with no government

The last elections in BiH were held on 3 October 2010 but until the date of writing (December 2011), there is no Council of Ministers in place. Two Croatian ethno-nationalist parties, HDZ and HDZ 1990, unhappy with the election results that, according to their perception, did not reflect the will of the Croat population in BiH, and in blatant disregard of the Federation Constitution, blocked the formation of four cantonal governments and thus obstructed the constitution of the Federation's House of Peoples. International analysts, such as the International Crisis Group, maintain that all sides were to blame, as the two HDZs and SDP, as the biggest winners of the elections, rejected reasonable internationally-brokered coalition proposals.¹ The main problem, Croats maintained, is that Bosniak voters "hijacked" the Croat votes, by voting (and electing) SDP Croats, who, in their opinion are not the true representatives of the Croat people in BiH, unlike the two HDZs. The situation deteriorated even further when SDP formed a Federation government in coalition with the Croat ultra-nationalist HSP, violating the FBiH Constitution and contrary to the ruling of the Central Election Commission (CEC), relying on a highly controversial ruling of the High Representative Valentin Inzko. HDZ, in turn, created a Croat National Assembly, an extra-constitutional representative institution and turned to the FBiH Constitutional Court. The case was, however, later withdrawn. In the meantime, RS called for a referendum on the laws by the High Representative and the constitutionality of the Court of BiH. The March 2011 ruling by the High Representative suspended the CEC verdict and in the eyes of many analysts undermines the rule of law and legal structures.

While in the summer of 2011 it was unlikely that a compromise would be reached soon,² it took a severe budgetary crisis and stern warnings by the International Monetary Fund for the political elites to give up their brinkmanship and indicate that a compromise was possible.³

One political analyst in Mostar (29.06.2011) told us: "SDP managed to box out the two HDZs. I talked with some diplomats from the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) countries and they told me that they were all aware that the HR made a mistake by letting the election result to go through. I went publicly against this, I called it a coup d'état and political violence and earned the title of nationalist. You cannot rule the country by saying: I will take the one whom I prefer. The Croatian political will has to be respected. Well-educated people in Herzegovina maintain that this is actually a process of de-constitucionalisation of Croats and our relegation to the status of a national minority because of the Bosniaks who have to be healed from their genocide - they had to leave many territories where they had been living for centuries (now in RS). That is a bad way to compensate, in the eyes of Croats. Any provisions that let the Croats be outvoted are bad. This is not new: it started with the Washington Agreement and is now visible in the election laws. All of this strengthens the ethno-nationalist Croats, HDZ and the like who do not have to do anything anymore to get votes."

An ethno-nationalist politician in Mostar (29.06.2011) explained his view: "It is inadmissible that the rights of one nation (the Croats) in the country are being 'broken' and ignored. We first need changes in the electoral law and then we can turn to the normal development of the country."

1 For a detailed analysis of the situation, refer to: International Crisis Group 2011. *Bosnia: State Institutions under Attack, Policy Briefing, Europe Briefing N°62*, Sarajevo/Istanbul/Brussels, 6 May 2011, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/B62per cent20Bosniaper cent20--per cent20Stateper cent20Institutionsper cent20underper cent20Attack.pdf> (retrieved 21.12.2011).

2 Rathfelder, Eric 2011. *Gesamtstaat steht auf dem Spiel*, Die Tageszeitung, 28.11.2011, <http://www.taz.de/Bosnien-und-Herzegowina/182732/> (retrieved 01.12.2011).

3 Jukić, Elvira 2011. BIRN, *Breakthrough on Bosnian Impasse*, 28.12.2011, Sarajevo, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/end-of-political-stalemate-in-bosnia> (retrieved 28.12.2011).

has to be maintained or it should be elevated to the level of independent states. At the same time 69 per cent of people in the Federation felt that entities should be abolished in order to prevent administrative paralysis on the level of state policies.⁴⁴

The minimalisation of the reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a country and the paralysis of central decision-making are the two options unless ethnic autonomies are compromised. Those in favour of compromises in ethnic autonomy tend to see the paralysis and minimalisation of the state as the main constitutional problem, while those interested in keeping ethnic autonomy tend to see the dominance of the state level and the international community over the entities as the main problem. Also, in the diagnosis of this problem the nation is divided into two. While Croats and Bosniaks tend to be frustrated about the paralysis and the minimalisation of the state level and would thus want to abolish the entities and endorse the international presence as a way out of the paralysis, 73 per cent of the inhabitants of the Republika Srpska consider the presence of the Office of the High Representative as illegitimate.⁴⁵ This conflict between alternative visions of the basic constitutional choices needs to be addressed by means of dispute resolution and open dialogue in order to avoid violent demonstrative argumentation on the matter.

The role of the international community and geopolitical and strategic interests

As long as it is difficult for the domestic political actors to find a balance between the three first above-mentioned evils, a slightly chaotic environment will persist in the interim. This situation makes demonstrative practices against the state possible, triggers discontent of the population that was displaced during the War as they feel disenfranchised, makes the mobilisation of criminals possible due to low law enforcement, and weakens the economy due to a lack of a viable strategy. Most politicians fail or refuse to understand that the weaker the public order, the more probability there is for a “messy” outcome.⁴⁶ A philosophical question is whether the state is weak *because or in*

spite of the international community. So far it has not been possible for civil society organisation to fill in that gap. Civil society engagement in light of economic misery remains weak since individuals are generally preoccupied with organising a decent living within their micro-cosmos.

Also the role of the international implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement constitutes a contradiction between the “constitutional theory” and the reality. Many of the functions constitutionally defined for the state are taken care of by the international community. The importance of this as a conflict issue can be seen in the recent study of ethnic interpretations of conflict in BiH,⁴⁷ which revealed that a majority (56.5 per cent) of Serbs still consider the international community as the main culprit for war in Bosnia. The role of the international community was initiated in the Dayton Peace Agreement in the establishment of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which met annually until the end of the 1990s, and less often after that. The PIC has representatives from 55 countries and its steering board consists of eight of the most central of these countries, the EU presidency, European Commission and the Organization of Islamic Countries represented by Turkey. The PIC has nominated its High Representative to chair the steering board of the PIC, and to take up/carry out the role in the implementation of the peace treaty as defined by the PIC.⁴⁸ The Office of the High Representative oversees the implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace treaty on a day-to-day basis. According to the home page of the OHR, “The High Representative ... is working with the people and institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international community to ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina evolves into a peaceful and viable democracy on course for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions... the OHR is working towards transition – the point when Bosnia and Herzegovina is able to take full responsibility for its own affairs”.⁴⁹ Yet the role of the OHR divides opinions along ethnic lines: 84 per cent of respondents of the Federation felt that the role of the OHR is positive while 73 per cent

44 Ipsos 2010. *Research on Public Opinion in BiH*, August 2010, Prepared for: National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

45 Ibid.

46 Gromes 2009. 7.

47 Skoko 2011.

48 There seems to be ‘confusion’ about who the ‘boss’ is: OHR or PIC. Recent studies have taken to explaining that, in fact, contrary to the common perceptions of the people of the OHR actions, the High Representative is in fact in charge, but in order to work at full efficiency he logically needs the support of PIC. See for example Foreign Policy Initiative BH 2011. *Policy Analysis, The Myth about the Closure of OHR*, Analysis 4/11, Sarajevo, April 2011, http://www.vpi.ba/eng/content/documents/The_Myth_about_the_Closure_of_OHR.pdf (retrieved on 04.01.2012).

49 http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/default.asp?content_id=38519 (retrieved on 15.04.2011).

Ethno-nationalist critique of the international community

While many of the interviewees we spoke to were of the opinion that the international community's role in BiH, and especially OHR's, has become obsolete, others conceded that it was still relevant for upholding peace and progress in the country.

A Serb ethno-nationalist politician in Banja Luka (21.06.2011) told us: "I think the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) should leave - they have achieved all of their goals. If there is no mediator this country will finally become our own responsibility. (...) OHR has imposed itself unlawfully as the master of everything, as a parent. This is paradoxical, because at the same time the expectation is that we should become independent. We are like a bunch of brothers in a family: we are complaining and whining about OHR, but we do not talk to each other."

Another Serb politician in Banja Luka (20.06.2011) even accused the international community of wrongdoing: "Many affairs were planted against the RS by OHR, Stabilisation Force (SFOR) etc. (...) In 2007 civil and military missions were closing down - OHR should have been closed down as well (Schwarz-Schilling proposal). We believed international interventionism would fade away. However, the 2006 elections were a catastrophe, which resulted in a prolonged mandate for OHR. We have been in a stagnation phase for already five years and are back at the very beginning. (...) The international community does not realise that it cannot decide in the name of a child that has already become of age. BiH should be treated like all other states. We should simply be given a list to fulfil and

the international community should simply leave and leave us to our own devices."

Along the same lines, a Croat politician told us (Sarajevo, 28.06.2011): "Dayton inhibits EU integration. Dayton is deforming this country. The biggest disturbance factor in this country is OHR. The whole system in this country is set up in a way that we cannot reach an agreement. Croats are like collateral damage; there is a wish to get rid of the Croatian presence. Foreign officials want to stay here, they are well-paid for not doing much." A fellow ethno-nationalist Croat politician in Mostar (29.06.2011) agreed and even put in doubt the work of the international community so far: "(The international community) presents BiH as a successful experiment, which is ridiculous: the country is more divided than ever."

However, a Serb activist in Banja Luka (20.06.2011), critical of the ethno-nationalists, was of a different opinion: "We cannot solve our problems all by ourselves - we need the international community. (...) The EU says that Bosnia is its priority - but at the same time there is no Ambassador. I am against the EU giving "fast-track access" to European integration. We have to learn and take every step on our way. To skip steps is bad for BiH. For example, we did nothing for the police force reform. (...) We are behaving like bad students, we cheat."

A pragmatic voice from the ranks of the international community in BiH conceded in an interview in Sarajevo (27.06.2011): "Some want us to stay longer in the country. However, the longer we stay, the weaker we get. It is artful to retire successfully and in time without becoming ridiculous."

of respondents in Republika Srpska feel that the OHR should leave BiH.⁵⁰

The Office of the High Representative constitutes the highest political authority in the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The High Representative is "a mechanism to resolve disputes in cases in which there was no domestic

institution empowered to do so," as for example "for unblocking conflicting situations and disputes between the entities and the state."⁵¹ Its authority and the role of the international community can be exemplified by the decisions of the 1997 Bonn session of the Peace Implementation Council (and international body) that provided the Office of the High Representative with the so-called "Bonn

50 Ipsos 2010.

51 Foreign Policy Initiative BH 2011.3.

powers” to dismiss elected and non-elected officials who obstruct the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.⁵²

The international community’s original power was based on the need for an external force that could impartially implement a peace agreement in a country where former conflicting parties could not trust one another. According to many interviewees, the presence of NATO and the EU in crucial roles of the political process was realistic and necessary for survival. Later, the leverage of the international community has been based on the conditions that NATO and the EU set for Bosnia and Herzegovina to membership. As a result of this change, the role of the European Union and its special representative in Bosnia and its delegation has received more influence inside the OHR and as an alternative to the OHR. The High Representative until September 2011, for example, was at the same time EU Special Representative (EUSR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, as the OHR is preparing for closure, the EU is taking on greater responsibility in assisting BiH’s reform process for EU accession, in September 2011 the HR Valentin Inzko turned over his duties as European Union Special Representative to Peter Sørensen, Head of the European Union Delegation to BiH. This approach from the Dayton Agreement mandated international presence motivated by Bosnia and Herzegovina’s effort to approach EU membership could be welcomed. It could help the international presence maintain its impartiality in a situation where OHR is supported by two and opposed by one of the ethnic groups. This is because while the Dayton-mandated OHR presence is contested by ethnic Serbs of BiH, EU membership is a prospect that all of the main ethnic groups support, even if the ethnic Serb support of EU membership is weaker than the support of other ethnicities.⁵³ In the past (that is, until the EU omitted this reference from their penultimate Progress Report), RS political elites often quoted the EU position that BiH membership could not be considered until the retreat of OHR.⁵⁴

The EU has also taken the central stage with regard to the military aspects of the implementation of the peace agreement. Peace-keeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately after the peace agreement was taken care of by a NATO-led operation Stabilization Force for Bosnia

and Herzegovina (SFOR). On 2 December 2004 the European Union Operation (EUFOR), a part of EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, was authorised by the United Nations Security Council as a legal successor to SFOR. The mandate of EUFOR is to “contribute to the safe and secure environment, deny conditions for a resumption of violence, and manage any residual aspect of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH [Dayton Peace Agreement]”.⁵⁵ The current mandate (from UNSC) of EUFOR was extended in November 2011 for another year. In addition to the EUFOR troops with an original strength of 7000 troops, EU has since January 2003 had a mission to support the police in BiH. The European Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) followed on from the UN’s International Police Task Force, whose tasks were mandated by the Dayton Peace Agreement (at present just over 2000 policemen).

The European military presence is not as uncontroversial in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as is the political presence of the EU. While EU membership is supported by a majority in the country, the prospect of NATO-membership is again an issue on which the country is divided. While 90 per cent of respondents in the Federation supported the country’s EU membership, 63 per cent of respondents of the Republika Srpska opposed the country’s NATO membership. The recent history of NATO’s siding against Serbs both in the BiH and in Serbia (over the Kosovo issue) is often mentioned as the reason for this resistance. Some analysts during our workshop in Sarajevo (June 2011) believed that it is conceivable that the question of membership in one or the other organisation could trigger violence.

The international community also has a judicial role in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has been used in questions related to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s approach to EU membership, and it has, for example ruled elements in the Bosnian treatment of ethnic groups other than Serbian, Bosniaks and Croats as discriminatory. Furthermore, after 1999 once the international community had defined the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina as international, the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court and its special International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was extended due to the stipulations of the Geneva Convention on civilian protection in international wars.

52 ICG 2011; Dahlman & O’Tuathail 2005.

53 Ipsos, 2010.

54 Foreign Policy Initiative BH 2011. 5.

55 EUFOR website, www.euforbih.org (retrieved on 04.01.2012).

BiH Serbs and NATO

In Banja Luka (20.06. 2011) an ethno-nationalist politician explained to us his stance against NATO: "(We) are against NATO membership for BiH. It is an emotional debate: it is immoral to invite a nation that has been bombarded by those same forces into this terrorist union. It is very offensive by NATO commanders to call the bombardment 'collateral damage'. That is stupidity. They represent a perfidious political aim: we should admit to the genocide in Srebrenica, admit

that we are guilty of everything; we should say sorry to the people who committed crimes against us and on top of that even pay them compensation. Therefore, we should stay away from NATO. It would be like joining Hitler in 1945. NATO is a sick old man, living its last days, it will definitely die soon. In addition, they have standards, for example, Croatia had to buy a lot of arms - (membership) is very costly. What for? To go to war in the name of NATO and their dubious aims in Afghanistan, Iraq etc.?"

Four elements in the power of the international community in the transition process could be problematic for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina:

The first is related to the definition of the mandate and rights international organisations have in the implementation of the peace agreement after the peace process. After the Dayton Agreement international organisations have taken and modified their mandate from extra-regional international actors, reporting to international organizations without reference to the constitution of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Operations are integrated into international structures that citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are not parties of, such as the UN Security Council, PIC, or EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy.⁵⁶ The extent to which the international community has defined its extensive mandate in crucial Bosnian political processes and especially in those of the Republika Srpska has caused some Serbs to conclude that "the region is on sale to the EU and the NATO" (2008).⁵⁷

The second problematic issue is related to ownership of the peace process and state formation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Instead of emphasizing local ownership, the language and practices of international actors has sometimes demonstrated assumed ownership of the political processes. Central international actors sometimes use language that clearly claims ownership

of political processes. EU's Special Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana for example, explained the peace process as if EU had made all the decisions by itself: "It was as a result of Srebrenica that we took decisive action to change the course of events in Bosnia. In 1995, at Dayton, we reached a political agreement that ended the Bosnian war."⁵⁸ Former director of the Woodrow Wilson Center's East European Studies program, Martin Sletzinger (2011), described the current process as follows: "After 20 years of nation-building in the Balkan countries, a big payoff may be in sight. But it will still be a long time before *the United States can declare victory...*"⁵⁹ Thus, according to this scholar, peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not an internal peace, but a victory for the United States!

The third potential problem is the duration of the mandate of international organisations. Instead of emphasising a dialogue between local and international actors, mandate issues are presented as something that are decided upon by the international actors themselves, and despite several plans of withdrawal, mandates have been extended time after time.⁶⁰ One of our Bosniak interviewees (Sarajevo, 25.06.2011) characterised the EU position thus: "The problem with the EU is that they cannot have

56 Caplan, Richard 2002. "A New Trusteeship? The International Administration of War-Torn Territories", *Adelphi Paper No. 341*, Oxford: Oxford University Press/ International Institute for Strategic Studies

57 Milanović-Blank, Ranko 2008. Interview by John Feffer in December 2008, <http://balkansproject.ips-dc.org/?p=370> (retrieved on 01.01.2011).

58 Solana, Javier 2005. "Bosnia is shackled as long as war criminals are free", July 10, 2005, *Financial Times*, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/9adeb3b2-f16c-11d9-9c3e-00000e2511c8.html#axzz1t2sywFzH> (retrieved on 01.12.2011).

59 Sletzinger, Martin 2011. "A glimmer in the Balkans: after 20 years of nation-building in the Balkan countries, a big payoff may be in sight. But it will still be a long time before the United States can declare victory and pull out", *The Wilson Quarterly*, January 1 2011.

60 For this criticism, see International Crisis Group 2011 (2)

a foreign policy which is aligned in all segments, because there are too many countries involved. For example, UK is of the opinion that OHR has to stay. Other countries believe OHR has to go away quickly, so that the EU's influence can grow stronger. The EU did a lot of research on BiH and decided that maybe a middle way would be beneficial: to first make the EU Delegation stronger and only then let OHR go. Now that process has started."

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the international community has not always been seen as impartial in their implementation of the peace treaty.⁶¹ The fact that Serbian nationalists resisted Bosnia's independence and once Bosnia and Herzegovina was independent wanted to separate makes the situation of Serbs difficult for the implementation of a peace agreement that aims at building a nation of the people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The primary obstacle for a perceived impartial role is related to the positions in the Bosnian War, but they also relate to the war on Kosovo and the Serbo-Croatian war. Serb informants often mention the NATO bombing of Serbia as a reason for the lack of trust of the West among Bosnian Serbs.⁶² Thus supporting the implementation of such a peace treaty often brings the Serbian ethno-nationalists at odds with the international community. There is no official record of the ethnicity of those officials the OHR has discharged using its Bonn authorities, but there is reason to assume that a great majority of them have been ethnic Serbs.

Furthermore, the internationally supported work to prosecute war criminals has been perceived as ethnically biased. Ever since the war crimes chamber of the Bosnian state court was established in 2005, Bosnian Serbs have had objections to its work. The RS government, led by Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, claimed it has been used to prosecute mainly Serbs.

While the state court does not keep a record of the ethnicity of persons indicted for war crimes, the RS Centre for Investigating War Crimes (CIWC) claims that 70 per cent of all indictees have been Serbs, around 16.5 per cent Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), and 12.5 per cent Croats.

Croats also have complaints about the work of the war crimes chamber. The NGO Croatia Libertas claims that the

chamber is "under heavy influence of Bosniak politicians", arguing that the small number of convictions against Bosniaks is proof of that, "especially when compared to the number of convictions against Serbs and Croats and the draconian punishments they've received".⁶³

The Bosniaks, on the other hand, view the state court as an important means of confronting the past and bringing those responsible for war crimes to justice. Many Bosniaks say that the high number of indictments and convictions against Serbs only reflects the fact that most of the crimes of the 1992-95 Bosnian war were committed by Serb forces and should not be seen as evidence that the court is an anti-Serb institution, as Dodik claims.

A recent study commissioned by FES on ethnic stereotypes and ethnic interpretations of conflict issues in BiH clearly shows the centrality of the problem of perceived ethnic partiality of the international presence.⁶⁴ While most Bosniaks perceive the international presence as crucial for peace, a majority of Serbs (56.5 per cent) feel that the international community was the main culprit of the Bosnian War! As a result a majority of this crucial stakeholder group in the peace of Bosnia and Herzegovina sees the international role as negative and partisan, and therefore wants the OHR and NATO out. The commonly shared hope for EU membership remains the only relatively neutral framework that European international involvement seems to be able to use for its services for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

While the EU is currently the most important international factor in BiH, as it clearly has an interest in keeping peace in its neighbourhood, **the influence of other countries with strategic interests in BiH** should also be taken into account. While from the above, USA's position is clear, it is also important to consider the positions of countries such as Turkey, Russia, Croatia and Serbia. Turkey raised its profile in the country through its close cooperation with Bosniaks, so to speak, through the 'Muslim connection' and has inspired many other Muslim, mostly Arab, countries such as Saudi Arabia and Malaysia to invest. Russia has traditionally been an ally of Serbia and thus of the Serbs in BiH. It often has differing views from

61 Gromes 2009.

62 Šolaja 2008. This was also confirmed in our interviews.

63 Sadović, Merdijana 2011. *The Trials of Bosnia's War Crimes Court*, IWPR Insight, 1 April 2011, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, <http://iwpr.net/report-news/trials-bosnias-war-crimes-court> (retrieved on 12.12.2011).

64 Skoko, Božo, 2011.

Are you also a 'Fridge'?

There is a number of activists, analysts and aspiring politicians who wish to put the rights of the individuals in focus: not only do they change their names in order not to be 'ethnically detected', but they also declare themselves outside of the three main demarcations. In an interview with an activist in Sarajevo (27.06.2011), we were told: "People in the cities mostly voted for SDP. However, I do not believe that the average Bosniak voted out of spite to the Croats. They are nationalists and would not do that. They voted for President Komšić because he is better to them than any other Bosniak candidate. Plus, there

are 100.000 people like me who are non-declared in their ethnicity. I personally don't see ethnicity as an identity. People tell me: you are then 'Others'. I say no, we are Jews, Roma, 'Fridges' etc. That is ethnically discriminatory. I am also not a national minority. We joke that people from mixed marriages are double-constitutive. The tragic truth is that they are forced to choose whether they are one or the other, especially if they want to be civil servants, because as 'nothing' you cannot get a job here. In addition, if you do not ethnically define yourself, you cannot participate in the political life. They don't let us be as urban and civic as we actually are, basically because the Constitution does not let us."

the EU on the PIC and it is unclear how these strategic differences might be played up in the future. The Republic of Serbia is as well a significant factor in peace keeping in BiH, because just like the Republic of Croatia, it can influence the opinions of Serbs and Croats in BiH respectively.

3.1.2 Disagreements about the rights of individuals and groups

The Constitutional disagreement about the rights of individual groups and individuals can be divided into two parts. *On the one hand, individuals demand rights that they should have regardless of what their ethnic origin is. On the other, ethnic groups struggle for their collective rights outside the setting of the form of the state and the division of powers between political institutions.* Here we will look into both of these conflict sources separately.

Rights of individuals

Dayton favours groups over individuals, as politics is often framed ethnically. Even SDP, a multi-ethnic party, is compelled to make its decisions according to the ethnic key, as we have seen from the example above. Currently, if an individual is outside one of the three main ethnicities, they may never be able to have a political role or obtain employment, disfranchising him or her of their rights in their own homeland, leading to political

marginalisation. It is a programmatic mistake 'made in Dayton' that the Constitution of BiH provides that only ethnic Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats can be elected members of BiH Presidency and the House of Peoples (Articles IV and V). In 2009 in the case *Sejdić and Finci vs Bosnia and Herzegovina*, the European Court of Human Rights found that such a provision is in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights. The change of this provision in the BiH Constitution is now on the list of the EU for the commencement of accession negotiations and there is well-founded hope that in 2012 this provision will be changed.

Also, many feel that the name for anyone who is not a Serb, Croat or Bosniak as 'Others' (e.g. in the Preamble of the Constitution) is offensive and denotes them as second-hand citizens. Basically, if one does not belong to one of the three constituent people, one cannot participate in the political life on an equal footing. This is wrong on many levels, especially in BiH, where mixed marriages were common - all of these people today are basically compelled to declare themselves as one or the other, while they are actually both - and true representatives of the multicultural country that BiH was and still is.

Rights and 'ranks' of the constituent people

Most political rights in BiH are derived from being a part of an ethnic group, not just because of the Constitution,

but also because there seems to be little willingness to have multi-ethnic parties. In addition, there are countless reports of both **perceived and factual dominance of one ethnic group** over the other. In a post-war society, this can present a major issue. Here are some of them:

- Dominance of Bosniaks over BiH (e.g. Serb and Croat frustration on the level of the nation-state is displayed towards Bosniaks in their own areas).
- Dominance of Bosniaks over Croats in the Federation.
- Dominance of one ethnicity in each of the regions - all regions are based on a strong ethnic majority.

In addition, some **perceived and factual historical injustices** are always present in the minds of the three main ethnic groups:

- *Serbs:*
 - some regional Serb majorities suffered ethnic cleansing
 - some Serb territories were 'retaken' after WWII
 - the traditional conflict between Ustashas and Chetniks
 - their compatriots who were chased out of Croatia
 - NATO bombing

- *Bosniaks and Croats:*
 - Serb domination during SFRY
 - Bosniaks and Croats who suffered ethnic cleansing by Serbs
- *Bosniaks:*
 - Bosniaks who suffered under Croatian attacks during the Bosnian War
- *Croats:*
 - "Serbs attacked the homeland, Croatia"

All of these issues were mentioned in many instances where grievances are raised and political decisions negotiated.

3.1.3 Mental maps: Agents in the ethnic and political divisions

The main stakeholders of the peace in BiH have very different perceptions and expectations of each other. This table attempts to explain the complex relationships in which some of the stakeholders are involved.

Illustration 3.1.
BiH - A trilateral marriage of the unwilling?




Table 1: Stakeholder relationships in BiH

	BiH	Federation BiH (Bosniaks)	Federation BiH (Croats)	Republika Srpska	Serbia	Croatia	OHR/ International Community	EU
BiH		Through the eyes of the Dayton Peace Agreement: the Federation is a constitutive entity of BiH and Bosniaks one of the three ethnic groups.	Through the eyes of the Dayton Peace Agreement: the Federation is a constitutive entity of BiH and the Croats one of the three ethnic groups.	Through the eyes of the Dayton Peace Agreement: the Federation is a constitutive entity of BiH and the Serbs one of the three ethnic groups.	Good neighbourly relations sometimes marred by discussions on Republika Srpska and war crime cases.	Good neighbourly relations, especially since the signing of the mutual extradition treaty in 2009. War crime cases occasionally mar relations.	Good working relationship: BiH is almost a <i>de facto</i> international protectorate. Full membership of NATO expected by 2015.	BiH is a potential candidate country for EU accession (Stabilisation and Association Process since 2007).
Federation BiH (Bosniaks)	The largest Bosnian parties support a unitary state, but are not happy with the current structure (they would like to see the two entities dissolved).		They like to view their relationship with the Croats as good, however the Bosniaks do not support their complaints for a "third Entity", as for them this would mean a near dissolution of BiH.	Most Bosniaks find it unacceptable that Milošević's nationalist-separatist project in BiH is still alive, although the country has moved towards democracy.* They feel that the Dayton endorsement for the project is a mistake.	Not too much contact. Emotional relationship due to war crime cases.	Not too much contact. Emotional relationship due to war crime cases.	The large Bosniak parties need the crisis, in order to keep the international community in the country and the OHR, in order to weaken the RS.	The Bosniaks are aspiring to full EU membership.
Federation BiH (Croats)	The largest Croatian parties think it is unfair that there are three main constitutive ethnic groups in BiH, but only two entities.	Large Croatian parties claim that they are suffering under Bosniak dominance in the Federation.		The Croats would gladly have the same status as Republika Srpska.	Relationship emotional due to the war.	Very good relationship with the "homeland". Due to their doubt citizenship, their vote is often heard in Croatia, as it translates into nationalist votes. Dayton gives them the right to establish 'parallel relations' to Croatia.	Croats support the OHR, as it means stability for the country.	The Croats are aspiring to full EU membership.

Republika Srpska	BiH	Federation BiH (Bosniaks)	Federation BiH (Croats)	Republika Srpska	Serbia	Croatia	OHR/ International Community	EU
	Many inhabitants of RS sees BiH as a virtual state, only kept alive thanks to the international community. ** Others emphasize the administrative level of entities inside BiH. Citizens and politicians sometimes behave as if RS was a state and shouldn't have connections to Bosnia.	Troubled relationship, also due to the ruling party not acknowledging what happened in Srebrenica as genocide.	Some Serbs support the Croats in their aspirations for a separate entity, as they believe that would consolidate the role of entities (including RS) or that it will eventually lead to the dissolution of BiH.*** However, according to the Ipsos survey, more Serbs support the current Constitution than separation.	Frequent diplomatic visits and exchange, but no territorial pretensions. Since embarking on the EU, NATO etc. agenda, there is only moderate interest for BiH. Belgrade often uses RS when the issue of the status of Kosovo is raised, to strengthen its own position.	If RS were to become part of Serbia, its leaders would be totally marginalised. They would have no role in the new state. Right now, all economic and financial power lies within the entities. No one would be ready to give that up and relinquish control to Belgrade. Dayton gives them the right to establish 'parallel relations' to Serbia.	Recent rapprochement with Croatia's President, Ivo Josipović. Expressions of mutual regret for wartime hostilities and public commitments to resolving environmental problems.	The leading party assumes that they may continue with their political provocations, due to a stabilising OHR presence. On the other hand, international presence is felt as anti-Serbian as it strengthens BiH against the wishes of the RS. NATO has a bad image in RS due to memories of the NATO campaign in 1995. The Serbian Democratic Party is under sanctions from US.	Paradox: The citizens of RS have no problem with identifying with the EU but they have a huge problem associating with the OHR, NATO and even with BiH, their own state.
Serbia	Recognises it as a sovereign state and has no territorial pretensions.	Recognises it as one of the constituting ethnic groups. Relationship sometimes marred due to war crime cases.	Recognises it as one of the constituting ethnic groups.			Good neighbourly relationships, especially in the past year due to the good working relationship of the Presidents Tadić and Josipović.	Recognises the authorities of the OHR in BiH.	Serbia is an EU candidate country (target date to join: by 2017).

Croatia										
	BIH	Recognises it as a sovereign state and has no territorial pretensions. Relationship sometimes marred due to war crime cases.								
	Federation BiH (Bosniaks)	Recognises it as one of the constituting ethnic group. Relationship sometimes marred due to war crime cases.								
	Federation BiH (Croats)	Frequent diplomatic visits and exchange, but no territorial pretensions. Since embarking on their EU, NATO etc. agenda, weaker interest for BiH.								
	Republika Srpska	Good relationships.								
	Serbia	Good neighbourly relationships, especially in the past year due to the good working relationship of the Presidents Tadić and Josipović. Marred occasionally by war crime cases.								
	Croatia									
	OHR/ International Community	Recognises the authorities of the OHR in BiH.								
	EU	Croatia is an EU potential candidate country (target date to join: Summer 2013).								

* Silajdžić, Haris (SBiH) in *Nezavisne Novine*, 24.09.2008, as found in Gromes, 2009.

** Dodik, Milorad (SNSD) in *Dnevni Avaz*, 09.10.2009, as found in Gromes 2009.

*** Parish, Matthew 2011. *Croat Crisis Pushes Bosnia towards Endgame*, Transconflict, March 2011, <http://www.transconflict.com/2011/03/croat-crisis-pushes-bosnia-towards-endgame-233/> (retrieved on 01.04.2011).

3.1.4 Potential antagonistic ethnic divisions

Antagonism between ethnic groups is partly related to the perceptions groups have of each other, and partly to incompatible worldviews. Both types of perceptions can be sources of ethnic antagonism.

Negative perceptions of each other directly antagonize relationships. A study on trust in BiH by Håkansson and Sjöholm⁶⁵ has shown that in general trust is low in BiH, especially for low-income individuals who are not members of voluntary associations and who live in ethnically diversified regions. In addition, they found that all of the respondents (84 in total) trusted all people of their own ethnic group, while 35.7 per cent trusted all people of another group. Interestingly, they also found out that the more people trust persons from their own ethnic group, the more likely they will trust others.

The educational system fails to address the issue of negative perceptions of other ethnic groups due to the segregated ethno-centric school system. And while the general recommendation of the international community in BiH is to have mixed schools, influential ethno-nationalist politicians do not share their opinion: "I am in favour of a truly segregated education system. Actually, the international community is forcing us to accept the solution of 'two schools under one roof'. I am against it. Why here? None of them is on Bosniak territory. Everyone should be the master of their own destiny." (Croat ethno-nationalist politician, Mostar, 29.06.2011). Even in some mixed schools (e.g. in Sarajevo), pupils may be bullied because one of their parents was on the 'wrong side' during the war, something that lets children grow into intolerant nationalists as they seek refuge. Due to the segregated system, the quality of education is also an issue.

Overall the educational level in BiH is rather low. In addition, there is still 10 per cent illiteracy in BiH and around 50 per cent of the population are either illiterate or have an education level of only primary school (eight years duration) or below.⁶⁶ According to a survey by OSCE, 48

65 Håkansson & Sjöholm 2007. 961-976.

66 Herić, Emina & Kristina Grgić, 2008. *The Development and State of the Art of Adult Learning and Education (ALE), National report of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Institute of International Cooperation of the German Adult Education Association, dvv international – Office in Sarajevo, October 2008, 10, http://www.unesco.org/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/INSTITUTES/UIIL/confintea/pdf/National_Reports/Europe%20-%20North%20America/Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina.pdf (retrieved on 01.11.2011).

Voices across the state

One of the Serb ethno-nationalist politicians we interviewed in Prijedor (22.06.2011) summed up his view on why it is important to keep the Dayton model for BiH, from the Serb perspective: "The Dayton Agreement brought peace, as well as some structure for this country to function. In the future, Bosniaks see this country as a centralised, predominantly Muslim country, in opposition to the will of the Serb and Croatian nations (populations) and with the support of international influences. This is why it is important to keep Dayton's structures - otherwise we will suffer regional consequences. I support the Dayton model for BiH." On the other hand, a Croat ethno-nationalist politician in Mostar (25.06.2011) was very direct and said: "Dayton managed to stop the war. Everyone lost from the war. But the Dayton Agreement is the strait jacket of the Croatian nation."

The extreme reliance on group belonging is a thorn in the eye of many citizens of BiH who would like it to be a true equal multi-cultural society. In June 2011, a Bosniak journalist told us that in many cases ethnicity is used in order to punish or reward people. In the opinion of this journalist, the recent case of the editor of the Information Programme of the Federation public service broadcaster proves this: "Duška Jurišić (...) was sacked for being 'islamophobic' and leading

'anti-Bosniak politics' and basically simply being a Serb (implying that she cannot be objective when reporting about Bosniaks). Some Bosniaks were of the opinion that she cannot be at the helm of the Federal Television because she comes from a minority (in the Federation). This is very discriminatory."

A Croat ethno-nationalist politician (Mostar, 29.06.2011) was of the opinion that: "We need quality laws and see what belongs to which nation. However, even the laws that we have today are not being properly implemented."

However, many of our interviewees, even ethno-nationalist ones, confirmed that the situation was indeed different in Yugoslavia. A Croat ethno-nationalist politician told us in Mostar (29.06.2011): "Before the war when someone asked, 'What are you?', people would say "I am a 'Mostarac' (a person from Mostar)" and not a Serb, Croat, Bosniak. The quality of life in that sense was much higher." A Bosniak analyst we spoke to in Sarajevo, 25.06.2011 concluded the recent past thus: "Generally, we have more enmity today than in 1992 and 2002. Spite is now reigning over BiH. Muslims were the last to get their 'nationality', and Serbs and Croats did not take them so much into consideration until then. We all now have the feeling that we do not know each other."

per cent of women and 25 per cent of men in rural areas of BiH suffer from functional literacy while the figure is 7.8 per cent for men and 22.25 per cent for women in urban areas.⁶⁷

At the same time the incompatible interpretations of the social structures of Bosnia and Herzegovina makes the different ethnic groups 'play different games' with different rules, which then, indirectly, can be a source of antagonism. One Bosniak independent analyst commented (Sarajevo, 25.06.2011): "The international community does not seem to have a serious interest in this region. The Serbs

see everyone as their enemy; they see a conspiracy against them everywhere. The Bosniaks say, on the other hand, the international community hates us because we are Muslim. At the same time, the Croats are whining: why doesn't the international community like us?"

We will first discuss the direct divisions and then the incompatible interpretations typical especially for ethno-nationalists in the different groups.

⁶⁷ OHR BiH Media Roundup, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/default.asp?content_id=36370 (retrieved on 11.05.2011).

The role of confessional media

One Croat media analyst told us in an interview in Sarajevo (28.06.2011): "In Yugoslavia religion was socially irrelevant, while today we have a religious boom to the extent that religion today usurps the secular state. Religion in BiH today is seen as social power. The religious media have promoted a religious renaissance in BiH, but have also geared its adherents to intolerance of other religions. Confessional media are powerful in BiH, because their publications are distributed in the parishes, so they reach a large number of people. The most prominent confessional media are Glas Koncila ("The Voice of the Religious Council" - Catholic), Pravoslavlje ("Orthodoxy" - Orthodox) and Preporod ("Renaissance" - Muslim). Religion is constantly used for nationalism by politicians and religious groups. It is interesting that these publications were all more liberal, humanist and open during Communist times than today. Paradoxically, because of its intolerance, religion in BiH teaches things that are in contradiction to the principles of human rights. They are not friends of ecumenism. You just have to look at the publications and you will see how the different religions here treat certain issues, for example, Pravoslavlje and its presentation of the Kosovo issue. Or their attitude towards ethnic cleansing in BiH, that is appalling and inhuman. Every religious leader and community is only concerned about their own victims, for example the Croat religious media talk only about Bleiburg camp and not

Jasenovac. Bleiburg and the counting of Croatian victims is a huge topic, while Jasenovac is ignored: this is terrible, as the Catholic Church also partly supported the fascist regime in Croatia, responsible for so many deaths. The Church, also through Glas Koncila, prepares the people for the next general elections, paving the way for an HDZ win. They even write favourably about former Croatian Prime Minister Sanader, who is clearly a criminal and who stole money and did illegal activities - that is very shameful, as they should stand up for morality and truth. They also support Thompson (a fascist-leaning singer from Croatia, banned from some EU countries). He gained his fame during the 1990s war when he composed hate songs against Serbs. Religion is closed, it only defends its own people and accounts of history."

Religious leaders that we spoke to were quick to confirm that the relationships to their counterparts of other religions were courteous and correct (but not too close).

A good peer-to-peer assessment of all other media, including print, television and radio, may be found in the recent *Balkan Media Barometer - Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011*.¹

1 Tešanović, Nataša (ed.) 2011. *Balkan Media Barometer - Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011*, available at [http://www.fes.ba/publikacije/2012/BMB/FES%20-%20BMB%20BiH%202011_book%20BHS%2010_2_2012.pdf](http://www.fes.ba/publikacije/2012/BMB/FESper cent20-per cent20BMBper cent20BiHper cent202011_bookper cent20ENGper cent2010_2_2012.pdf).

Bosniaks VS Serbs VS Croats

An extreme division seems to revolve around the ethno-nationalism of the three main ethnic groups. In the past BiH was a multi-ethnic and multi-denominational republic, but the war radicalised the nationalist movements and triggered exaggerated identification with one's ethnic group. It seems that it is difficult today to decouple the affiliation to one ethnic group from the religious affiliation. Consequently, this is manipulated by politicians who, quoting the Dayton Agreement and its provisions for ethnic representation, insist on the link between affiliation to one ethnic group and denomination on the one hand, with nationalist political affiliation on the other.

Since these radical political affiliations clash on the state level, state and nation-building is very difficult. The three constitutional people are presented as three different blocks with contrasting political views. Each block is presented by ethno-nationalist politicians as a compact one, which surely does not reflect the reality of the situation, as the opinions are diverse in each of them and are not solely defined by ethno-nationalist politics. Basically, if you are a Serb, you cannot be seen as pro-Bosniak or if you are a Croat, you cannot be pro-Serb etc., simply by virtue of being a part of your ethnic group. This kind of attitude/positioning/prejudgement makes political discourse almost impossible, as we have the case of three majority groups living in the same country, each working

One passport, two passports

One of our interviewees in RS (25.06.2011) noted an interesting loyalty issue: "Most Croats have double citizenship. Among the Serbs in BiH, only about 3,800 have two passports - Serbia is much more restrictive in giving citizenship." According to another informant (Livno, 30.06.2011), the meaning of the second passport is also related to the exit strategies of people: "Whoever can get the Croatian passport gets it, and eventually disappears."

Another interviewee, a Croat in Mostar (29.06.2011) complained: "Croats are in the worst position in BiH. There is no official census currently, but I regularly receive different data, for example, from the Catholic Church, on the number of blessed houses in Herzegovina. According to them, there were 12,000 less than in the previous year. Croats are simply dripping away and as they have the opportunity to have double citizenship, they go to Croatia to find jobs. Our political position is that the people do not feel comfortable, as if they were not in their own country."

for their own benefit, but not for the benefit of everyone in the country. This does not make sense because, in turn, every one of these three groups is a minority in one or the other part of the territory of BiH.

Serbs VS Bosniaks and Croats

However, the division between ethnic groups is not merely one based on elite manipulation. In relation to political decisions this division is quite objective. There seems to be a political coalition and convergence of interests between Croats and Bosniaks against the Serbs. In many central issues regarding the future of the country ethnic Croats and Bosniaks find unity in favour of the state, in favour of the EU, OHR, NATO, while the ethnic Serbs are generally more oppositional to the common political projects of the Croats and Bosniaks (and the international community).⁶⁸ The naming of the groups and the state tends to emphasize this politically highly central divide. The country of Bosnia and Herzegovina suggests an ownership of the state level of the Bosniaks and Herzegovinians (Croats), leaving Serbs out. Also the division of the country into two main entities, the Croat-Bosniak entity (Federation) and the Republic of the Serbs (RS), sediments the political coalition of Croats and Bosniaks against the Serbs.

Main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats) VS Other ethnic groups

Although the Dayton Agreement brought peace to BiH, it also brought a Constitution that is practically in violation of international law, due to its provisions for minorities: only the main, constitutive ethnic groups are formally included in the political process. This was confirmed by the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights, *Sejdić and Finci versus Bosnia and Herzegovina*, which the two representatives of minorities won in December 2009.⁶⁹

The world according to Bosniak ethno-nationalists

Bosniaks feel that in recent history, they were permanent victims of Croatian and Serbian ethno-nationalists. During World War II the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), a puppet-state of Germany (1941-1945), considered them as 'Muslim Croats' and therefore some of them became members of a Muslim SS-division. On the other side of the divide, many of them joined Tito's multi-ethnic partisan forces. During the war they suffered considerable losses by the Chetniks, Serb nationalists and royalists. During Yugoslavia, they felt marginalised, as by virtue of being considered a religious and not an ethnic group in communist Yugoslavia; they were seen as Islamised Serbs and Croats. However, after long negotiation, in 1968 they were allowed to declare themselves as 'Muslims by nationality'. This did not satisfy them and they had the feeling that

68 Ipsos 2010.

69 Council of Europe, *Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*, http://www.coe.org.rs/eng/news_sr_eng/?conid=1545 (retrieved on 21.12.2011).

The case of Srebrenica

What happened during the Bosnian War in Srebrenica is still much disputed between the Serbs and the Bosniaks (and Croats). Here are some Serb ethno-nationalist perceptions that deeply frustrate Bosniaks,¹ taken from our interviews in June 2011:

“Srebrenica was clearly not genocide. In this context, Bosniaks pretend to have been victimised. On (the Serb) side, we simply call it ‘crime’. We are for a new, truthful and thorough investigation of the events there, as this would prevent it from being manipulated. One cannot build a state on lies and untruths.”

¹ For a thorough account see for example a Bosniak author, Suljagić, Emir 2005. *Postcards from the Grave*, Saqui Books.

“It is a fact that in 1992 in Srebrenica terrible crimes against Serbs were committed: Milivoj Ivanišević in his book claims 700 Serb civilians were killed. Even after Srebrenica became a safe zone, Bosniaks undertook their military actions from there. This oppression of the Serbs provoked a terrible revenge in 1995. Even UN General Morillon warned Karadžić that if Serb forces enter Srebrenica, there would be a massacre.”

“(If Srebrenica is genocide) isn’t Jasenovac then as well? During WWII many thousands of Serbs were murdered by the Muslim 13th Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Handschar (1st Bosnian). In the villages around Srebrenica, the Bosniak Naser Orić killed 3,200 during the 1990s war. The safe zone of Srebrenica was well-armed and Bosniaks made many attacks on Serbian villages. One crime gives birth to another.”

their Bosnian identity was neglected, as they did not see themselves as an exclusively religious group. In addition, they felt clear domination from Belgrade and the Serbs, especially in the Army structures. Being a poorer Republic, they also felt overlooked by development initiatives and investment policies initiated by the central government. When the Bosnian War began, they saw themselves as victims from both Serb/Yugoslav and Croatian forces, and their country in chaos. Eventually, they established a relationship of relative trust with the Croats, less so with Serbs.

The genocide in Srebrenica in 1995, where the Army of Republika Srpska under the command of General Ratko Mladić killed more than 8,000 men and boys, is deeply engrained in the conscience of the Bosniaks. While Serbia and RS apologised for the massacre, in 2010 and 2004 respectively, the current president of RS is still denying it was genocide, contrary to the ICTY ruling. This still causes a lot of trouble in the already strained Bosniak-Serb relations, especially as the Serb side continuously maintains that the number of victims has been inflated. Dodik’s statements that “Srebrenica happened because

of Jasenovac”,⁷⁰ an Ustasha concentration camp in World War II, are in line with his typical populist fashion and lead to the detriment of Serb-Bosniak relations in BiH.

The nine-month siege of the Muslim part of Mostar and the consequent shelling of the Old Bridge, an iconic Ottoman monument from the 16th century, by the Croatian Defence Council forces is another event that forms part of today’s Bosniak identity.

Furthermore, as long as BiH is an integrated state, displaced Bosniaks now residing in the Federation do at least have indirect access to their homeland in the ethnically cleansed areas of the RS. They are the ones who most strongly relate to the unitary state, as, in comparison to Serbs and Croats, they have no other ‘homeland’ to turn to. Therefore, they are also the most eager to preserve it in the borders in which it is now and are concerned by the separatist disposition of the Serb and Croat ethno-nationalists.

⁷⁰ Nacional 2011. *Ludilo u Šumskoj. Milorad Dodik: Srebrenica se dogodila zbog Jasenovca*, 25.05.2011, <http://www.nacional.hr/clanak/108804/milorad-dodik-srebrenica-se-dogodila-zbog-jasenovca> (retrieved on 25.05.2011).

Bosniak ethno-nationalist interpretations

Just as the other two ethnic groups, the Bosniaks also have their own way of interpreting the past and present in BiH. Here are some of the topics that move ethno-nationalist Bosniaks today (all excerpts of interviews were recorded during interviews in Sarajevo, Prijedor and Tuzla in June 2011):

About the war and the RS

“The war started with the aim of the Serbs founding their own state, for them to have domination over Croats and Bosniaks. 64 per cent of BiH population declared they were for BiH independence at the referendum. Serbs are victims of their own ideology: ‘We should not let 1941 happen again.’ Serbs just took over power by force [in RS] and now they do not feel responsible for what had happened. We had to defend ourselves and we started the Territorial Defence (TO). After that the conflict escalated. (...) Today, we Bosniaks feel like foreigners (in RS). We used to be a majority in (some areas such as) Prijedor”

“We were made to accept RS as a reality. We are living in the state as it is because Richard Holbrooke lied in 1995 to my President (Alija Izetbegović) that Serbia is preparing to send 15 new divisions to BiH and that NATO will bomb the BiH Army if we try to enter Banja Luka. We live in a political system that is a victim of lies.”

“I do not think that the situation with RS has come to an end. The only moment when RS was a bit more acceptable was in 2004 when Dragan Čavić, the then President of RS, on RS Television read the conclusions of the Commission of RS on Srebrenica. Only then did they stand on moral ground. The first thing Dodik did when he came to power was to revoke these conclusions. But one cannot negotiate on the facts! We cannot negotiate with Dodik about what happened in Srebrenica, Prijedor or Sarajevo. Facts are facts.”

On HDZ

“HDZ want Croats to be more equal than the others on one piece of territory and that is not possible. We should not have RS as a model for these things. HDZ had 15 years to deal with the Croatian problem, they have been in power that long. SDP is also publicly offering to find the solution to the institutional equality of Croats. HDZ does not want to talk with (SDP) about it, so (SDP) found HSP as a partner.”

About the neighbourhood

“In my opinion, the biggest factor of instability in the region is still Serbia. And no matter who is there in power, the only thing that changes is their tools and not their aims. Regrettably for us and for reasons that I cannot understand, Tadić (Serbian president) found an ideal partner in Ivo Josipović (Croatian president). I am not a fan of conspiracy theories. (...) But (they) meet and talk about BiH without a BiH representative. They are leading lebanisation politics towards BiH: that means keeping good relations with their ethnic group and not with the BiH state.”

And the future?

“The biggest challenges for BiH are: Firstly, Bosnian Serbs and Croats should turn towards BiH, their true homeland. Secondly, Croatia and Serbia should start leading quality politics towards BiH and understand that the capital is Sarajevo and not Banja Luka or Mostar. It is as if everything was set against BiH to secede. (...) Serbs would like to be independent, but they can't. Previously they aimed at joining Serbia. (...) Now their aim in RS is to have less and less Croats and Bosniaks. For example, there are less Bosniaks now in Prijedor than six years ago: We were at our maximum in 2000. We cannot find employment. Everything here is done in a way that we do not want and cannot come back.”

The importance of... being: RS

Here are some Serb ethno-nationalist voices from June 2011:

“It is not OK to throw all the blame for the war on one nation, on the Serbs. I respect the interests and rights of the others, but I cannot escape the impression that the Federation wants to weaken RS. Because of the war it is very difficult to show that RS actually has good intentions. RS is being negated by forceful centralisation.”

“RS is now internationally confirmed and recognized. During the war we were not, therefore we wanted to become a part of Serbia. Now we have our own state, so there is no problem and no such aspiration. We are one nation, and therefore we simply wanted to have the right to decide where we belong [with Serbia or BiH] and that cannot be called nationalist. This does not mean we would like to destroy the country we live in. Maybe [RS’s] existence may seem radical, but it is also honest, without hidden intentions.”

“Today I am not for RS separation from BiH, as I am for a realistic, geopolitical approach. I am for respecting the Croats and Muslims that also live with us here.”

“There is a difference between being nationally aware and a nationalist: actually, I perceive myself to be a patriot. You have to be one in the Balkans. (...) RS was founded against all odds, it was almost an impossible state. My first homeland is RS (territorially, but otherwise it is Serbia). RS is closer to my heart than BiH, but there is no Muslim for whom BiH is dearer than it is to me. My family has been here for centuries. This is my country.”

“We should not change the name of RS, no matter what it reminds people of. This question comes from the point of view of Sarajevo. Changes in names are normal for Muslims. First they were Bosnians, then Muslims (when Tito gave them nation-status) and now they are Bosniaks.”

“Another problem here are social sensibilities. The Federation does not have the ambition to tidy up its territory. We want and can make our territory work. RS is wealthier than the Federation, comparable to what was in Yugoslavia: we are like Slovenia, they are like Kosovo back then. RS has the capacity to function, while the Federation is simply not ambitious enough. We can even say that the RS transformation to democracy has succeeded, unlike in the Federation.”

The world according to Serb ethno-nationalists

The dominance of the Serbs in recent Balkan history was established in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia under the Serb Karađorđević dynasty. During WWII, most Serbs joined either Tito’s multi-ethnic partisans or the royalist Chetniks. The Chetniks propagated, amongst others, the idea of forming a ‘Great Serbia’, that is, roughly encompassing all the territories in the Balkans where Serbs live into one state. The most traumatic experience for Serbs as a nation in WWII was the Croatian Ustasha concentration camp Jasenovac, where 100,000- 700,000 persons⁷¹ were brutally killed, literally exterminated, the majority of them being Serbs. This memory is still often invoked.

During Yugoslavia and especially in the 1980s, the Serbs in general experienced power slipping away from their hands. Therefore they had the feeling they had to defend themselves once the conflict begun, especially as they were polarised by Milošević’s nationalist rhetorics and the news of the fate of Serbs in Croatia, who suffered persecution and, in some cases, exodus. During the Bosnian War, some local Serb majorities also experienced exodus (e.g. from Herceg-Bosna). In their view of the world, most of the Western worlds sided with the Croats and Bosniaks due to a ‘conspiracy’ against the Serbian nation. They generally see the number of Bosniak victims at Srebrenica as exaggerated.

71 The number of victims varies according to the source, e.g. BBC 2005. *Balkan ‘Auschwitz’ haunts Croatia*, 25.04.2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4479837.stm> (retrieved on 01.05.2011).

Past and present in the eyes of BiH Serb ethno-nationalists

Interviews with Serb ethno-nationalists, mainly analysts and politicians, were held in Banja Luka and Prijedor in June 2011.

The breakup of Yugoslavia and beyond

“The inception of BiH as an independent state was unconstitutional: it went against the will of one of the constitutive nations, the Serbs. At the beginning of 1990 I had the impression that we Serbs will not have it easy in case of the breakup of Yugoslavia and therefore I voted against BiH independence. I believed that was the logical option and that the union of BiH with Yugoslavia could last as there are Muslims/Bosniaks in Serbia, while there are none in Croatia and Slovenia.”

“We did not learn much from history. Serbs thought of Yugoslavia as a whole, common country. Communist policy was damaging towards the Serbs: the 1974 Constitution supported secession. The civil war that ensued after the break-up is to blame for the bad relations today (in spite of the ‘Yugo-nostalgia’). The intentions of some nations and nationalities were not honest. Muslims participated in the break-up of our common state.”

“Back then, the international community asked BiH not to be loyal towards Yugoslavia during the independence referendum, while now they are asking us Serbs to be loyal towards BiH. There is something faulty with such logic.”

“Europe is making mistakes because it is being led and misled by Muslim politics. The USA was the first to choose this policy of following the Muslim line with the aim to destroy Russia’s influence over the Balkans. The USA supports the Turks and their influence here, although Germany and the UK do not. But America’s influence is everywhere, even Europe is their geopolitical project. After the fall of the Berlin Wall it was clear that Yugoslavia as well should cease to exist, as there was no need for it anymore [in the new world order], so Germany chose the side of Turkey in this

matter. Yugoslavia did not exist because the nations loved each other, but because of geopolitical strategies of world powers (e.g. UK wanted to prevent Russia from reaching the warm seas and Germany from reaching the Middle East). The USA just adopted this UK policy. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was clear that the West should first dispel the “Serb states” because of the Serb connection to the Russians. Americans here did the worst crimes against peace. (...) The EU knows that the Turks are not the same as the Bosniaks - there is a cultural difference, and Europe fuelled the Bosniak identity. That was a mistake. 1992-95 the Mujahedin came to Maoča and now my driver told me that last week he was asked by them to show his ID in the middle of the road. How come they are there and they can stop my driver? (...) How can this happen?”

“EU politics is very astute. They are conscientiously using Muslims in BiH for their own interests: they are eager to show to the world that they are not against Muslims [instead of taking care of the Catholic Croats]. They are also mute on the question of Kosovo, where international law has been blatantly abused.”

“All of these partition processes were started by the idea of Cesare Balbo in *Le Speranze d’Italia* (“The Hopes of Italy”) in 1844. At the Berlin Congress in 1878 BiH was given on a plate to Austria-Hungary: what was happening then has been happening again since the 1990s. For example, back then, they also proclaimed a new joint language. One cannot really “proclaim” a new language, it has to happen naturally. I am very sensitive about the question of language. It is shocking that Bosnian is not only being declared as a language, but it is even being imposed on us. At the same time, only three nations and two languages entered Yugoslavia, but how many do we have now?”

About the Bosnian War

“All great tragedies are manipulated. The last GDR ambassador to Belgrade wrote a book where he, for example, analyses the role of Alexandra Stieglmayer (journalist in BiH 1992-1996; spokesperson for OHR 1998-2002, now ESI researcher) on the perception of

the conflict in BiH. At the end of 1992 she wrote an account of how thousands of Bosniak women were raped by Serbs. That influenced public opinion in Europe and USA. Of course, there were many women raped, but not in those numbers, it was exaggerated. (...) Furthermore, during the war, Bosniaks claimed

250,000 Muslims had been killed. This was mostly used by Haris Silajdžić and the government of Alija Izetbegović. However, other sources, like a report by the Norwegian government and as well the ICTY figures claim that the total numbers of people who died during the war from all sides is 100,000."

What does the future hold?

Here is what some ethno-nationalist BiH Serbs in June 2011 had to say about the future of BiH:

"The biggest challenge for BiH in the future are nationalist arguments in the political discourse - they are alive because of the Croats and Muslims. The Serbs have already compromised a lot: We will not be living in the same state with other Serbs. Bosniaks should now start compromising with us and give up their ideas of having a centralised BiH. A good example is Canada: Anglo-Saxons there made major compromises and now they have an integral, unified Canada."

"In my opinion, the Croats are the key to solving BiH problems. It is clear they signed the Washington Agreement in 1994 in order to get an ethnically clean state [Croatia]. In this case, I support the Muslims. Bosnian Croat politics is megalomaniac and unrealistic and they are feeding Muslim radicalism with their behaviour. Arabs have not made many real investments in BiH, they have mostly invested in radicalisation. Muslims have changed the nature of their roots. If Bosnian Croats could get any territory, they would ask for more and try to revive the Banovina. Serbs are actually the least of problems for BiH."

"Europe has to understand that we Serbs are *one* people, *one* nation: It is wrong to think that 'Serbs'

live in Serbia and 'Bosnian Serbs' in BiH: We are all Serbs. The politics of dividing the Serb nation is not good, it will not bring peace. We might be silent at the moment but... Serbs are a European nation (...). The EU has to tell the Muslims that they will not have a country that is centralised. They will have to give concessions to Serbs, just as in the last 20 years, although these concessions are relatively small, for example, when Catherine Ashton came and we only displayed the RS flag. This was retaliation to what happened in Kosovo: they are not using the Serb flag any more there, and therefore we wanted to strike back. We Serbs are one nation and we have showed solidarity to our brothers in relation to the EU."

"The key to solving problems is the level of tolerance that the Muslim nation will show. This also includes the 'Croatian question'. In addition, international factors should be unbiased. The three nations need to be tolerant of each other and treat each other with respect. If we do not continue to do this, we should definitely dissolve. However, I am not in favour of dissolution, as it would not happen by peaceful means."

"The international community should make Muslims understand that a centralised state is not possible; deal with Croatian aspirations; give concessions to Serbs, as we just want to be 'svoj na svome' ['be ourselves on our own territory'] - that is, we accept the existence of BiH, but RS has to remain intact."

Today, Serbs nominally feel thwarted in their efforts to establish their own independent state in the form of Republika Srpska. They are not happy with BiH as it is now, as through the joint Presidency they do not feel they can exert enough power over their 'own' affairs. The majority has been wrongly taught to believe that RS is *de facto* a state.

In addition, Serbs feel an alliance to the greater Serb nation, and therefore share the same nation-building traumas as the Serbs in Serbia, such as for example, the battle of Kosovo Polje in the 14th century, where the Serbs, according to Milošević, defended Europe against Islam.⁷²

72 Milošević, Slobodan 1989. *Speech at Kosovo polje 28.06.1989*, www.youtube.com/watch?v=GXmJ5oinNus (retrieved on 01.02.2012).

The past through BiH Croat eyes

Here are some voices of different Croat ethno-nationalists recorded in Sarajevo, Mostar and Livno in June 2011:

On the events before the Bosnian War

“We are in favour of dealing first with the national and then civic issues. Pavelić (the leader of the Independent State of Croatia, NDH, a puppet-regime of Hitler and Mussolini) did a great thing in giving Croats a state. However, we are also not denying the negative things that he did. NDH was not a mistake, the alliance with Hitler was our only shot at having our own state and Pavelić took it. We will not renounce our history. This is what people very often do here. (...) I am also in favour of Serbia becoming the Yugoslav Kingdom again - they have their monarch, so why not? (...) Yugoslavia was not all bad, it had its positive moments.”

On the Bosnian War

“The problems of the Croatian nation [in BiH] are not new. We were the most numerous in 1991 at the census. It is not right that Bosniaks claim that they love this county more than us. Hrvatsko vijeće odbrane (HVO - Croatia Defence Council) was a legal force of the Croatian nation/people that rose first to defend BiH in the 1990s war. Thanks to HVO we had Herceg-Bosna, an entity that functioned better than how the Federation is functioning today, it was

well-organised. (...) Herceg-Bosna was simply an answer to a threat. While our villages were burned down, Alija Izetbegović was saying ‘This is not our war.’ (...) The EU did not want to accept a Muslim country in Europe, thus we were glued together. We were annexed as collateral damage.”

“Bosnian Serbs were the worst war criminals (during the war), they sent so many people away from their homes. The biggest direct victims of the war are Bosniaks, but the indirect victims are Croats, with over 50 per cent are displaced.”

“Let us revise the last war in full, we might be surprised at who actually did what.”

“President Tuđman, our ‘father of the nation’, had to make an agreement with the Americans in order to obtain the integrity of the Republic of Croatia, and we can understand that. However, more disappointing than that is that Croats from BiH signed the Dayton Agreement. (...) Today it is in fact tragic that Croats are a minority in a country where they have lived since the 11th century. But we have to realise that not only the Croats, but also the Bosniaks did not get their own entity.”

“Today we all live next to each other, not together. The issue with segregation is actually an issue with assimilation: (the international community) wants us to assimilate with (the Bosniaks) and thus they shout that we want segregation, which is not fully true.”

The world according to Croatian ethno-nationalists

In spite of the official line of apology and regret, many Croats still see Jasenovac as an almost justified reaction on Serb domination in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, when the Croats were thwarted in their efforts to form their own state. During World War II, Croats usually joined either the fascist Ustahas, who are still revered in some communities as ‘real’ Croats, or Tito’s Partisans. The biggest trauma of Croatian World War II history is

the 1945 massacre in Bleiburg, Austria. There Partisans, contrary to Tito’s and the general headquarters’ instructions, executed thousands of Ustahas (along with some Serb Chetniks and Slovenian Home Guards). This has been negatively perceived as the symbol of Communist violence over Croatian nationalism and has been a subject of historical debate ever since.

Serb domination continued during SFRY and only minor concessions were made to the nationalism movement after the 1972 Croatian Spring. Many Croats especially

What is the Croat population in BiH feeling unjustly treated about?

Whether it is well or ill-founded, the feeling of injustice amongst the Croat population can develop into a powerful motive of violence under aggravated circumstances. For example, many of our Croat interviewees agreed that life in Yugoslavia, in comparison, was slightly better than it is today for them. They conceded that they were somewhat 'jealous' of the Serbs in BiH, as they have their own state and they do not: 'If we had, we would not be having the problems we have now.' Here are some other grievances expressed by Croat analysts and ethno-nationalist politicians (Mostar and Sarajevo, June 2011):

"The Serbs are doing everything to become a separate state one day. Bosniaks want to build a state where they will be the majority. The Croats have more of a territorial problem, they want to be territorially equal. This means that probably the borders will have to be redone. The problem is that we have two entities: Bosniak and Serb, while the Croats are marginalised. In addition, they have a lack of representation in institutions. The easiest way for Serbs and Bosniaks is if the Croats simply left the country - then they could split the country with the Serbs easily."

"In addition, in their implementation, some provisions of Dayton and Washington were derogated. I do not think Tudman was naïve in signing [the Agreements], you have to trust that the Agreements will be interpreted as agreed. They unfortunately were not, for example, it is guaranteed that Croats will have their own member of the Presidency - but this is not what is happening right now. They have tricked us. Please as well note that a provision in the Washington agreement says that the Federation BiH will go into confederation with Croatia. This did not happen."

"Until 2003 we had the same number of ministers in the Federation as the Bosniaks and had thus the same voting rights. Wolfgang Petritsch changed this, so Croats today can be outvoted. (...) We have been outvoted at least 100 times in the Federation, due to its Constitution (...) We are being politically and also economically marginalised. Not just Croats, but also the Herzegovina region is being marginalised due to the centralisation of Sarajevo. Cantons are not fulfilling their role as they should. At the same time, Croats receive most protection from the cantonal level. "

"I think that it is not important if the Croatian representative is Croatian, he can also be a black man, Serb, or Bosniak I don't care, however, Croats have to be the one electing him. (...) I dream of the day when I will be able to give my vote with full confidence to a Bosniak, Greek, Bantu-Negro or a Serb, if he will represent everything I want. Why doesn't a German elect a Belgian representative to the European Parliament instead of the Belgians? What the Bosniaks have done to us is terrible. Is Tudman guilty for this? No, the guilty ones are the ones who derogated Dayton. Željko Komšić is not the expression of the political will of the Croatian nation."

"The High Representative is against the Croatian nation. Hopefully God will avenge us. The representatives of the American government here are the most responsible for this situation because they let the laws negate the will of one nation. Only in a banana-republic is it possible to break electoral laws. Valentin Inzko and the American Ambassador would have been in jail if they had broken the law in their own country. Here they did not break it directly, but they instigated others to break it. In addition, Inzko is totally under the influence of the Americans and on the side of SDP - he is against the Croatian nation. He has almost abolished the Croats in BiH and they are saying this is legal."

resented the Communist regime since they were not openly allowed to profess their faith, which they believe is central to their identity.

During the War in Bosnia, Croats were already traumatised

by the attack on their homeland. Therefore they entered the War already prejudiced, mostly against Serbs. 16 years after the war most Croats dislike the fact that they lost the 'independence' they gained through Herceg-Bosna and wish to have their own state, or an entity similar to

the RS model. They seem to be very unhappy with the dominance of the Bosniaks in the Federation and remain very attached to their 'homeland' Croatia.

The world according to the other ethnic groups

Other ethnic groups are not featured prominently in BiH society today, due to their lack of political rights.⁷³ Throughout history, they have always been marginalised in the processes, although less so in Yugoslavia when they were able to participate in political life through the virtue of being one of the recognised 'nationalities' in SFRY.

These views of the world depict the real risk of conflict potential and extremism, as in many cases conflict is not rational but irrational and emotional. Antagonistic emotions are conveniently fuelled by selected negative collective memories from the past. This is further underpinned by separate, ethno-centric school systems. However, one cannot help but wonder if, by an appropriate national strategy on a 'common history' could be agreed upon, leading to a more harmonious coexistence. This strategy could perhaps focus on developing 'new memories', that is, to focus on what was positive in the joint history, for example, the relative peace amongst the ethnic groups during Yugoslavia.

In addition, it seems that nationalism during the Bosnian War was reconstructed for political purposes. There is an 'instrumentalist' conception of nationalism, reinventing particular versions of history and memory to construct new cultural forms that can be used for political mobilisation.⁷⁴ In addition, it seems that the international community failed to understand the fundamentals of the concept of conflict in BiH, and saw it as a matter of competing nationalisms while it was actually a new concept of nationalism. As Mary Kaldor writes: "By assuming that 'fear and hate' were endemic to Bosnian society and that the concept of the nationalists represented the whole of society, the international negotiators could see no other solution but the kind of compromise which the nationalists themselves aimed to achieve. By failing to understand that 'fear and hate' were not endemic, but coined

73 There are about 300,000 classified "other" citizens in BiH belonging to 17 recognised nationalities (Albanians, Montenegrins, Czechs, Italians, Jews, Hungarians, Macedonians, Germans, Poles, Roma & Sinti, Romanians, Russians, Rusyns, Slovaks, Slovenians, Turks and Ukrainians, see <http://www.nacionalnemanjinebih.org/> (retrieved on 01.02.2012.).

74 Kaldor 1999. 35.

during the war, they strengthened the nationalist goals and helped to weaken the internationalist humanitarian outlook."⁷⁵

3.1.5 Potential antagonistic political divisions

Besides the obvious divisions between the different political camps in BiH, there are as well political divisions across the camps:

Unitarianists VS Secessionists

Unitarianists: Those in favour of BiH remaining in its international borders as they are now and who support the power of institutions of the nation-state.

Unitarianists may belong to any ethnic group. According to the political discourse, they are less numerous in RS, but some analysts⁷⁶ claim that a referendum on the independence of RS would not necessarily lead to its independence. Also the Ipsos poll seems to suggest that a majority of respondents in the RS support the current constitution with strong powers in the entities, rather than separation from the BiH.

They can be further divided in the following groups, according to their opinion on RS status:

a) Those against RS in the form as it is now.

This opinion stems from the concern for the unity of BiH. Many maintain that the pretence that RS is a state should be stopped. In addition, Bosniaks see the existence of RS as the legitimisation of Milošević's criminal politics. Possible solutions would be: (I) to dissolve RS into cantons, and (II) for RS to become an autonomous region of BiH.

b) Those who accept the status quo.

It appears that nationalist Serb politicians actually benefit the most from this arrangement, while a majority of people of RS tends to support this.

c) Those who are in favour of creating three entities (following the lines of the three ethnic groups) in BiH.

75 Kaldor 1999. 58

76 E.g. Topić 2008.

This option is mostly propagated by the nationalist Croat parties, with the majority Serbs supportive. The majority of Bosniaks are mainly against, as they believe this could eventually lead to dissolution and less power for them.

Furthermore, the groups can be divided into:

a) Those who would pursue unionism by means of armed struggle.

It is difficult to say whether this will eventually happen, as, reportedly, the willingness to go to war has diminished.

b) Those who are only ready to employ peaceful means.

The Dayton Agreement offers a good foundation for this.

Secessionists: Those in favour of the dissolution of BiH. From all sides of the divide, they propagate ethno-nationalism and do not support the power of institutions of the nation-state.

There are two ways in which dissolutionists think:

a) Those for a RS-Federation partition.

Many Serbs appear to be in favour of this partition, due to their conviction that RS is a state. The case of Kosovo plays a significant role in this discourse. Dodik is constantly playing with the option of a referendum on secession. The question is whether; in case of this scenario, the Croats would play along or demand their own state (see b).

b) Those in favour of a RS- Bosniak Territory- Croatian Territory Partition

Many ethnic Serbs are already nominally pursuing their own independence, while Croats, dissatisfied about the dominance of Bosniaks in the Federation, have been talking about following the same path (reminiscent of the ideology of the late Mate Boban and Herceg-Bosna during the Bosnian War). While generally not in favour, there is however a steady fraction in the Bosniak population who wouldn't mind living in their own state (reminiscent of Fikret Abdić's Autonomous Province).

The ethnic Serbs' viewpoints can also be divided in the following:

a) Those who favour the partition of RS from BiH according to the Kosovo model.

This might be supported by Serbia.

b) Those who favour the partition of RS and its merging with Serbia.

This is the tougher option. Serbia is unlikely to support this idea due to impending NATO and EU membership.

Furthermore, all the groups can be divided into:

a) Those who would pursue partition by means of armed struggle.

b) Those who are only ready to employ peaceful means.

'Internationalists' VS 'Localists' (i.e. those in favour of the OHR and international presence VS those against)

It is no secret that international presence has had both positive and negative effects on the current situation in BiH. While it has been instrumental for keeping peace and stability, especially in the aftermath of the war, it has been criticised for crippling the political maturation of the country and consequently preventing the local political forces to take up *ownership of the state and political processes*. It seems that when it comes to taking responsibility for the whole country, no one is willing to do so, due to the pronounced vested ethno-nationalist interests (which translate into votes) that the main parties have. Most of the people want peace, but no one claims ownership of the Dayton Agreement. However, all groups have a somewhat ambivalent relationship to the matter:

'Internationalists' are those in favour of the OHR and international presence in BiH.

Amongst all three main ethnic groups, international presence is credited for up-keeping the Dayton Agreement and peace by 'correcting' extreme ethno-nationalist behaviour. However, many, mostly Serb but also Croat politicians, use this corrective for nationalistic provocations. This prevents the country to mature politically, take responsibility and find a home-grown solution.

'Localists' are those against the OHR and international presence in BiH.

In principle this position is very common, but in practice, in view of the power political realities, not many of the 'localists' are ready to act upon their resistance to the OHR. While the Bosniaks are the most positive about

international presence as it upkeeps the Dayton principles and therefore territorial integrity, a majority of Serbs are against as its presence is in fact seen as anti-Serbian since it strengthens BiH against the power of the RS.


3.2 Economic Causes, Motives and Opportunities for Conflict

Economic structures and processes offer some sources of peace and conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Chapter 3.2.1. describes the economic situation, 3.2.2 - 3.2.4 focuses on these 'objective' economic challenges, while chapter 3.2.5. maps the perceptions on economic challenges as terms of their relevance for the potential for conflict.


3.2.1 Economic situation

Even more than twenty years after the fall of Yugoslavia, BiH is still dealing with a dual economic challenge: first, it has to cope with the consequences of the Bosnian War, and secondly it has to finish its transition from socialism and its centrally-planned economy to a market economy. Yet the macroeconomic challenges facing Bosnia and Herzegovina are not comparable to many other conflict economies. Transitions, even if still not entirely completed, have been managed with massive help from outside the national economy. The economy has become service driven, while productivity, especially in agriculture, has not improved as much. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina faces economic challenges that are directly relevant for conflict potential.


Graph 3.2: GDP Composition, 2010




Graph 3.3: Distribution of labour force, 2012




Graph 3.1: Gross domestic product per capita



Graph 3.4: Current account balance, as percentage of GDP



Graph 3.5: Unemployment rate, IMF estimate



The War destroyed the economy and infrastructure in the country, causing production to fall by 80 per cent from 1992-1995 and unemployment to soar.⁷⁷ War profiteering left a lasting legacy of criminalised economy and economic inequality. After the Peace Agreement, the economy and growth recovered, albeit never fully, facing many market restructuring problems. Weak state structures provide the basis for endemic corruption. The GDP in 2011 was EUR 12,519 million, which is EUR 3,258 per capita.⁷⁸ A large current account deficit of USD 1,175 billion

(2010 estimate) and high unemployment rate of 43.1/27.2 (2010, CIA/IMF estimate) remain its two burning macroeconomic challenges. The problem of the current account balance can best be put into proportion by showing it as percentage of the total GDP. However, as the graph below shows, the problem with the current account imbalance has improved substantially after having been badly out of hand in the beginning of the millennium.

The 'Konvertibilna Marka' (BAM), pegged to the Euro (EUR 1 = BAM 1.95583), is the national currency. It was introduced in 1998 and its choice as a national currency reflects both the legacy of Yugoslavia and the War, when the German Mark was commonly used for transactions due to high inflation rates and later as a common currency in the chaos of the war. As in many other transition economies, a considerable portion of economic activity remains unofficial and unrecorded. As a result, for example, the unemployment rate is estimated by the IMF at

77 Labour and Employment Agency of BiH, *Labour market statistics*, monthly report for May 2011, CIA, *The World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html> and Agency for Statistics of BiH <http://www.bhas.ba/index.pjp?lang=en> (retrieved 06.12.2011).

78 European Commission 2011. *Commission Staff Working Paper, Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011 Progress Report, Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012, SEC(2011) 1206 final*, Brussels, 12.10.2011. 60. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/ba_rapport_2011_en.pdf (retrieved on 02.02.2012).

27.6 per cent and the Agency for Statistics of BiH at 43.1 per cent of the total labour force.

A more recent challenge that has its roots in the international markets but affects BiH as much as any other country in the EU (and beyond), is the current recession and the fear of a double dip. If the current political stalemate is added to the mix, it is clear why BiH's credit ratings have fallen in the last year.⁷⁹

Some of the economic challenges are relevant to the conflict potential in the country. Conflict still implies lower levels of income, which again lowers the threshold of violence. Post-conflict reconstruction and the transition to market economy imply changes in the relative receipts of people and groups of people. This often leads to the relative deprivation of those who lose out in the transition, and thus to conflict risks. Finally, transitions, unless managed well, imply opportunities for illegitimate benefits, such as corruption and war profiteering, which are then defended by means of violence. Lack of clarity in the rules and failure of law enforcement in economic competition have led to a criminalised economy and to gainful, opportunity-based violence. These kinds of challenges will be analysed separately in Chapters 3.1.1. and 3.1.2.. Chapter 3.1.3. will look at the logic of the economy and identifies those tendencies that can further create problems that will later lead to lowering the threshold of violence, relative deprivation (frustration violence) and opportunity-based conflict.

3.2.2 Economic grievances may lead to frustration violence

Even though BiH is divided politically and ethnically, and conflict has so far been explicitly motivated by ethno-politics, the energy that fuels political discontent has often been economic frustration. Economic problems occupy 5 of the 6 main grievances of people.⁸⁰ Of these problems, unemployment and poverty are by far the greatest concern, while corruption comes next. With an ethnically functionalised economy and political economic decision-making, economic grievances easily fit into the existing ethnic divisions that offer opportunities for the violent

addressing of these problems. In BiH every seventh person lives below the absolute poverty line and has less than BAM 205 per month. Furthermore, one in three elderly people are to be considered poor.⁸¹

High unemployment rates and often inadequate conditions for the employed

The country has a labour force of 2.6 million (2010 estimate), of which 43.1 per cent is officially recorded as unemployed. However, real unemployment seems to be in the range of 27.6 per cent.⁸² According to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Federal Office of Statistics (FZS),⁸³ the average net salary in 2010 was just over EUR 400 (BAM 804.37). As the unemployment benefit is slightly higher than the net minimum wage, it practically discourages active job search or even employment.⁸⁴ Many workers in the grey economy are registered as unemployed, so that they can still have access to free health care and other unemployed benefits, provided by the state. Statistics show that 41.5 per cent of BiH's population is poor, meaning that half of the overall population face some form of social exclusion, and almost one quarter of the population is on the verge of poverty.⁸⁵

Furthermore, while people are unemployed throughout the whole territory, in many instances this is linked with ethnicity and political affiliation, fuelling the feeling of injustice and relative deprivation. This reality can create inter-ethnic problems. Especially in areas where there are many returnees. Unemployment can affect conflict potential on the one hand by adding to sense of hopelessness, which tends to lower the threshold of violence.⁸⁶ Unemployment can also contribute to relative deprivation, a situation with a great discrepancy between actual and expected

79 The Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, <http://cbbh.ba/index.php?id=549&lang=en> (retrieved on 06.12.2011).

80 Ipsos 2010.

81 UNDP, <http://www.undp.ba/index.aspx?PID=32&RID=1> (retrieved on 06.12.2011).

82 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2010. *IMF Country Report No. 10/347, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Selected Issues*, Washington DC, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10347.pdf> and <http://www.bhas.ba/index.php?lang=en> (retrieved 06.12.2011).

83 <http://www.fzs.ba/> (retrieved 01.06.2011).

84 IMF 2010. 13.

85 UNDP Mission to BiH. Human Development Report 2007: Social inclusion in BiH and *Social Inclusion Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina*, and Council of Minister of BiH 2010.

86 Collier Paul, Anke Hoeffler 2004. "Greed and grievance in civil war". *Oxford Economic Papers* 56: 563-595.

economic income.⁸⁷ This is especially so among the formerly politically privileged group in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former elites of the Serbian population. While during the era of Yugoslavia Serbs were often perceived as the dominant population, this dominance was lost in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the Serbs were no longer the biggest ethnic group.⁸⁸ The contribution of unemployed Serbs as recruits of opportunist Serb politicians during the Bosnian War was well recognised by the documentation of the ICTY.

Another group of relatively deprived people may be the group of war veterans who feel that their deserved share of economic welfare should be high due to their contributions to the country. War veterans are amongst many of the unemployed. IMF figures speak for themselves: "(...) there are a number of government-run, non-insurance, cash benefits programs, which are not conditioned on recipients' income and ability to work. The overlay on these programs—war invalids benefits, medal holders benefits, demobilized soldiers unemployment benefits (terminated on 05.01.2010), civilian victims of war benefits, and non-war invalids' benefits—collectively amount to 4.5 per cent of GDP and cover 183,500 individuals. There are also close to 21,000 recipients of pensions granted under favourable conditions to former military personnel (many involving early retirement), for whom the informal sector is the only option for employment."⁸⁹ Relative deprivation among war veterans is also dangerous for peace since in this group of people who have the experience and skills of warfare, conflict motive (relative deprivation) merges with opportunities.⁹⁰ Violent demonstrations of war veterans have been among the incidents during the last few years that have claimed lives.

Considerable income inequality

Another source of relative deprivation is inequality. The unequal distribution of individual or household income

87 Gurr, Ted Robert 1994. "Peoples Against States," *International Studies Quarterly*, 38(3), 347-377.

88 Malcolm, Noel 1994. *Bosnia: A short history*. New York: New York University Press.

89 IMF. 14.

90 For theory on opportunity structures among former combatants that lead to the recurrence of violence and conflict see for example: Nilsson (Themnér), Anders (2008): „*Dangerous Liaisons, Why Ex-Combatants Return to Violence. Cases from the Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone.*” Uppsala University.

of participants in the economy is a strong concern for all countries, especially those going through a transitional period. The sense of unfairness concerning income can trigger social unrest. The Gini coefficient, measuring the inequality of distribution of family income, was 34.1 in 2007, putting BiH at 91 of 134 countries (a value of 0 expresses total equality and 100 maximal inequality).⁹¹ In global comparison this seems to be not a bad result, however BiH fares worse than any other country in the region, except for Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The minimum net wages in BiH are different in the two entities: BAM 308 in the Federation, and BAM 370 in RS (01.07.2010).⁹² Also, wages tend to be slightly higher in RS than in the Federation.⁹³ An interviewee in Sarajevo (26.06.2011) remarked: "A Herzegovian will not come to work to Sarajevo, the salary is too low - companies from Croatia usually have their main subsidiaries for BiH in Mostar. Statistically, RS has better salaries, but we add expenditure for meals to ours." These perceptions are important because in the case of more centralisation of the state, people living in the entity or areas that are doing better in terms of wages might not be willing to have their wage issues governed centrally. In addition, in Herzegovina, where most Croatian firm subsidiaries are located, centralisation might mean a change in their 'special relationship' with Croatia and a shift of these firms to Sarajevo. All of this could lead to discontent and eventually, social unrest.

Rank discordance: Serb political dominance VS Muslim economic dominance in some regions

Frustration violence is sometimes caused by so-called rank discordance.⁹⁴ Rank discordance exists when a group of people has a low social rank by most measures, but feels that its race or ethnic origin somehow implies for them a higher rank. If the group has power and the political means to impose the interpretation that the ethnic origin is meaningful and vital for the individuals' social status, this group has an interest in demonstrating this,

91 CIA.

92 IMF. 14.

93 Ibid. 16.

94 Galtung, Johan 1971. "A Structural Theory of Aggression" *Essays in Peace Research*, Vol. II Chapter 4. Also see Anderson, Bo & Morris Zelditch 1964. *Rank Equilibration and Political Behavior*, *European Journal of Sociology*, 1964, 112-125.

even violently. According to Ed Vulliamy,⁹⁵ Serb violence against Muslims in Bosnia was partly motivated by this rank discordance: In many regions Muslims were the intellectual class, while the Serbs were not as well off economically. At the same time Serbs were the dominant ethnicity in the former Yugoslavia. Thus in these regions of Bosnia aggression could offer them a way in which they could articulate their higher social rank despite their low economic and educational rank. Our interviews did not directly support this theory, and thus it could be possible that rank discordance, and especially the dominance of Muslims in professional positions, has been a regional phenomenon, more common to the areas where Vulliamy has conducted his research, than in areas where we gathered observations.

Similar rank discordance exists regionally in the Republika Srpska where there is a temptation for the Serbs to demonstrate the relevance of its regional ethnic majority status instead of the importance of the state's ethnic power balance. By treating local Muslims badly, a violent Serb can articulate a reality where Serbs have the dominant position despite the Muslim majority on the level of the state.

Rank discordance may also be identified in a historical spectrum. While in the past Serbs had the upper hand concerning political decisions in Yugoslavia, and therefore also in BiH, Muslims in the Republic of BiH at the time had relative economic dominance, partly thanks to their overwhelming numbers (48 per cent of the total population of BiH at the last census in 1991).

An education system in a dead-end street

Education is the first step in finding a good job. However, due to the lack of resources, educational ethnic segregation, corruption and prejudice, young people are hindered in their educational efforts and rarely achieve their full potential. Since educational opportunities in countries in transition are often dependent on networks and ethnic origin, educational discrimination also leads to discrepancy between expected and actual opportunities to education. The education sector problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina may also be indirectly linked to violence.

They lead to further economic deprivation and a sense of unfairness, which again lowers the threshold of violence.

Many of our interviewees in June 2011 pointed out that if one wishes to obtain secure employment, the civil service is the best option. However, according to them, most of the positions there are obtained by pulling strings. The situation is similar in many SMEs. Basically, if good qualifications are no guarantee for getting a job, why study hard? Furthermore, there seems to be a discrepancy between the education on offer and the needs of the job market (interview with a Bosniak educational expert, Sarajevo, 28.06.2011). The quotas for university and high-school admissions should be adjusted to the job market. In the words of our interviewee: "More university places for technical training and less for social subjects are needed. (...) A director of a company building motorways told me that his biggest problem is that he cannot find civil engineers (...). At the same time during enrolments for high-school, two and a half classes [roughly 75 places] of the School for Civil Engineering and Surveying are empty. This is because parents want their children to go to a Gymnasium (a prestigious school with general, more academic education, usually leading to University). We like the prestige of a Gymnasium, but currently most of these people are unemployed. The school quota should follow the job market needs."

Another burning issue in this context is the brain drain. Young people in search of better future prospects use any opportunity to leave the country. For example, Croats who have enough resources often go to study to their 'homeland' and make the choice to stay there due to the better conditions and perspectives (multiple interviews in Mostar and Livno in June 2011). The perceived lack of a future in BiH and the inability to find a job even with good qualifications hinders BiH's future economic development. In addition, even young people who come back with foreign degrees are faced with administrative hurdles: most of the degrees (Bachelor, Master, PhD) obtained in EU countries are still not recognised by the authorities, basically discouraging young and educated people to return to their homeland (informal talks with holders of foreign degrees, Sarajevo, June 2011).⁹⁶

⁹⁵ Vulliamy, Ed 1998. "The Crime of Appeasement", *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 74, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), 73-91, 78.

⁹⁶ In informal talks with politicians in Sarajevo, we were assured that this issue will be handled very soon.

3.2.3 The weakness of public order offers opportunities to gainful violence

While grievances offer motives, the weakness of public order offers the means and opportunities for violence. In addition, law enforcement problems together with a high level of corruption and extensive criminal economy also offer opportunity-driven motivations for violence.

Mobilisation of criminals

The weak BiH institutions are not able to uphold the rule of law in the country. This is partly related to the paralysis of the state level, together with the lack of capacity and resources in the entities. In spite of the reportedly good cooperation of the police in both entities (interviews in Sarajevo and Banja Luka, June 2011), state institutions of law enforcement do not have full access throughout BiH territory due to constitutional confusion and paralysis, and because of the Republika Srpska's aspirations towards statehood. Two issues which seem to be especially worrying are the national political crime syndicates, composed by the political elites, and the position of BiH in international organised crime (workshop in Sarajevo, June 2011). The former issue appears to be outside the reach of the law, due to the close relationship of the political and law-enforcing structures.⁹⁷ Many such relationships have their roots in the Bosnian war. A Bosniak academic told us in an interview (Tuzla, 26.06.2011): "*Criminals have become heroes.*" They have become the establishment and even worse, they are perceived as people who have 'made it' in life. Being prosecuted for such crimes means a fall from political and social grace and loss of influence and power of an individual politician but does not prove the efficiency of the law-enforcers, as there is no real political will to improve the situation. The latter issue is connected to law-enforcement in the region, which varies from country to country. Criminal gangs have a long history of cooperation in the Balkans and there are clear signs that the most notorious of them are active in the whole region and beyond.

97 Azinović, Vlado, Kurt Bassuener, & Bodo Weber, 2011. *Assessing the potential for renewed ethnic violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A security risk analysis*. Atlantic Initiative Democratization Policy Council. Sarajevo. October 2011. They even quote the words of one international judicial official saying: "If I had to choose between war crimes and organised crime, I'd prosecute organised crime, since that is what the politicians are most afraid of." 51.

Furthermore, due to scarce resources, neither the state nor the entity level are capable of offering social programmes to address law enforcement. As state monitoring is not effective, criminals often use these opportunities for pursuing their own economic agenda, fuelling corruption and feelings of inequality and injustice amongst the population.

Criminal economy

In addition to allowing violent mobilisation, the weakness of the public order system creates opportunistic motives for violence. The black market is thriving, which on the one hand partly relieves the burden on the lower-income families, but on the other hand it also helps criminal activities flourish and weakens the state. The grey economy, such as unrecorded employment, is widespread and the IMF estimates it to be 37 per cent of GDP in the Federation and 21 per cent in the RS. The security system is very much burdened by such practices, as "most workers in the grey economy are formally registered as unemployed so as to have access to various benefits"⁹⁸ such as health insurance etc. (interview with a Serb in Sarajevo, 26.06.2011).

The protection of criminal opportunities is often one of the profitable motives for violence. This is why the weakness of the law enforcement system in preventing the criminalisation of the economy is a major source of conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as it offers opportunistic violence.

Furthermore, according to the UNODC report on corruption in the Western Balkans in 2011,⁹⁹ the prevalence of bribery in BiH is over 20 per cent, higher than in any other Western Balkans country. Pulling strings for obtaining employment in the public sector, paying an unofficial 'fee' to jump the queue in a hospital, or paying something extra to quickly obtain an official document is the bitter reality in BiH. People who either do not have the financial resources to pay for all of these 'services' or are not well-connected feel marginalised and angry. The feeling of economic injustice and inequality leads to blaming

98 IMF 2010. 12-15.

99 UNODC 2011. *Corruption in the western Balkans: Bribery as experienced by the population*, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption/Western_balkans_corruption_report_2011_web.pdf (retrieved on 01.12.2011).

'others' for one's circumstances, often a different ethnic group. However, in addition to frustration, those protecting their corrupt income against competition and against the police are a conflict risk. Corruption inhibits economic growth and thus contributes to frustration violence. Political corruption, especially at the lowest level, is an acute problem, leading to only a low amount of revenue available for public services to the citizens.¹⁰⁰

3.2.4 The economy and indirect causes of conflict Dependence on foreign aid and assistance

Dependence on external aid weakens the state and makes it difficult for Bosnia and Herzegovina to take charge of its own strategy of conflict prevention. Once the levels of aid decline due to reasons external to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country's conflict prevention capacity might be at risk/challenged. While BiH has received over USD 15 billion in international development aid since 1995,¹⁰¹ according to World Bank statistics it received only USD 415,150,000 in net official development assistance and official aid in 2009, considerably less than 10 years previously, when it received USD 1,040,330,000.¹⁰² From these figures, it is clear that BiH is forced to gradually move from an economy dependant on development aid to a sustainable market economy. Most of the aid in 2009 went into Infrastructure (41 per cent) and Economic Development and Social Protection (32 per cent), while the least funded were Health, (2 per cent), Local Governance (2 per cent), Cross-cutting Issues (2 per cent), and Education (1 per cent).¹⁰³

Table 2: Net Official Development Aid (current US\$)¹⁰⁴

Country	2000	2005	2010
Afghanistan	5	95	185
BiH	200	145	131
Cambodia	32	40	52
Iraq	4	799	69
Moldova	33.66	47.04	131.42

In comparison to other post-conflict countries and Moldova (as another country on the outskirts of the European Union), BiH has over the years received a relatively large portion of ODA. However, due to the financial crisis and an assumed BiH fatigue, the annually allocated amount seems to be in the decline.

In the future, the government will have to develop and implement economic reforms to make it independent from aid, as the amount is due to drop further as the international community prepares to leave BiH. Can BiH function fully without international aid?

Economic power and 'carrots' all outside the nation-state boundaries

Reliance on foreign input to the economy makes economic governance difficult. This again means that BiH is not able to manipulate economic rewards and punishments in a way that could minimise the risk of conflict. Foreign dominance in the economy is especially problematic in view of current trends in global economy, including recession and the need for drastic economy-specific reform measures. BiH economic dependence is based on the following economic factors:

- International aid agencies and donor countries which make policy decisions in what to invest in BiH (see above);
- Foreign corporations that invest into the country, as there is not enough capital in the country itself (interviews with officials in Prijedor, Doboj and Mostar, June 2011);

100 CIA.

101 US Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm> (retrieved on 01.12.2011).

102 The World Bank, *Net official development assistance and official aid received (current USD)*, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DI.ODA.ALLD.CD> (retrieved on 12.12.2011).

103 Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Finance and Treasury, Donor Coordination Forum of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010. *Donor Mapping Report 2009-2010*, <http://www.donormapping.ba/pdf/DMR-Report-Eng-2010.pdf> (retrieved on 13.12.2011).

104 Source: The World Bank, *Net official development assistance and official aid received (current USD)*.

Will foreign investment hinder a new war?

A Sarajevo-based Serb analyst told us (26.06.2011): "Because of economic globalisation, I do not think there will be another war. For example, Raiffeisen Bank has invested money into BiH and thus Europe will not allow for a new war to happen. In Yugoslavia there was much less foreign investment. Capitalism will not allow for a new conflict - and they will not allow for idling around jobless. (...) When security is

concerned, I do not think that the world will allow for another hotspot of violence."

A Bosniak politician was not of the same opinion (28.06.2011): "The international community actually does not have enough economic interest to stop a war here. We are such a small, meaningless country. There are still a lot of weapons lying around. (...) The military presence of the international community is not strong here."

- EU membership potential that dictates strict economic criteria for admission;
- Croatia and Serbia who dominate the choices for the Bosnian Croatian and Bosnian Serb population;
- The Bosnian diaspora, which supports the economy at home. Private remittances from family members working abroad amount to between 15 and 18 per cent of GDP each year.¹⁰⁵

The BiH population spent more than they earned from domestic sources in the last ten years, which the IMF explains by the fact that in the Balkans, the "pre-crisis growth model relied on booming domestic demand financed from abroad."¹⁰⁶ In some cases diaspora funding has contributed to the capacity of domestic conflicting parties to wage war, and in this sense, the control of the political economy¹⁰⁷ through a rich diaspora is often dangerous to peace. And, last but not least, economic power outside the state boundaries leads to a feeling of poverty and helplessness in terms of economic participation, which in turn leads to a lack of ownership of development and peace. However, while many of our interviewees in June 2011 claimed that another conflict is not possible due to high foreign investments, implying that foreign countries have high stakes and interests in BiH peace, others were more sceptical about this issue.

No viable national strategy for maximising trade opportunities

Due to the political instability, not many countries are ready to invest in BiH. In 2009 the global economic crisis hit the inflow of foreign direct investment, which fell to EUR 452 million, the lowest since 2003. The main investors were Austria, Slovenia, Germany, Turkey, Croatia and Serbia.¹⁰⁸ A sort of 'investment apartheid' can be noted: the Croatian part of the Federation has been receiving a lot of investment from Croatian companies, RS from Serbia and the Bosniak part of the Federation from Turkey.¹⁰⁹ These limited trade connections should be expanded and explored nationally. Furthermore, in some areas, only the products from the 'mother homelands' are used, although they compete with domestic products, directly taking the better part of the profit cake from BiH producers (interview with a Croat politician in Mostar, June 2011).

Foreign Direct Investments (flows and stocks) are compiled in accordance with the most recent methodological standards and instructions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).¹¹⁰

However, the country is in dire need of a coherent national strategy for investment, which would create a more

¹⁰⁵ IMF 2010. 13.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. 4.

¹⁰⁷ Luxshi, Vimalarajah & R. Cheran, 2010. *Empowering Diasporas: The Dynamics of Post-war Transnational Tamil Politics*. Berghof Arbeitspapier Nr. 31, 10/2010.

¹⁰⁸ Foreign Investment Promotion Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FIPA), <http://www.fipa.gov.ba/page.asp?id=23>, (retrieved 12.12.2011).

¹⁰⁹ More data may be found at the website of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.cbbh.ba/index.php?id=34&lang=en&table=uvoz_po_zemljama (retrieved on 01.12.2011), as well as FIPA's website.

¹¹⁰ See also Central Bank of BiH: <http://cbbh.ba/index.php?id=777> (retrieved on 01.12.2011).

Table 3: Flows of foreign direct investment classified by country of origin (in millions of BAM during the period)

Date	Flows of foreign direct investment											
	All countries	Austria	Netherlands	Croatia	Italy	Germany	Russia	Slovenia	Serbia	Switzerland	Turkey	Other countries
2006.	864.8	235.0	41.2	182.0	41.8	37.2	...	115.7	38.8	55.6	47.7	69.6
2007.	2.5997	292.4	28.9	160.6	23.1	16.7	332.7	132.8	1,351.1	65.7	-0.5	195.8
2008.	1,337.4	242.9	36.0	103.0	47.6	28.8	339.4	210.2	213.3	40.5	5.8	69.6
2009.	353.0	85.2	-18.6	106.8	11.1	-4.6	129.8	65.1	1.5	-122.1	34.4	64.2
2010.	339.6	-7.1	7.5	26.6	20.8	53.5	-24.6	-40.9	30.4	97.5	36.5	139.2
Q1 -Q2 2011	180.8	-8.7	10.5	-26.0	-7.2	16.0	77.5	36.8	68.2	-39.8	6.3	57.2

competitive environment and open new work places. At the moment, each entity and even in some cases each canton or municipality, are fending for themselves; often the entity or state level seen as more of a hindrance than a support (interviews with Serb officials in Prijedor and Doboj, June 2011). According to World Bank and International Finance Corporation statistics BiH is highly uncompetitive in regional comparisons.¹¹¹ BiH ranks at only 125 of 183 countries in its 'Ease of Doing Business with' list for 2011 (127 in 2010), while Macedonia ranks 22 (34), Montenegro 56 (56), Albania 82 (77) and Moldova 81 (99). Besides the typical issues such as starting a business, enforcing contracts and such like, stability of law, poor infrastructure and trading routes remain problems and need more strategic investment. Most of our interviewees saw attracting more investment as one of the main challenges of BiH.

In addition, strategic investment projects have been stalled for many years, making the transport of people and goods difficult. The most notable one is the trans-European highway 'corridor 5c', which is supposed to connect St. Petersburg via Budapest – Osijek – Sarajevo – Ploče with Dubrovnik, aiming at connecting BiH to the main European motorway network (from Venice to Kiev) and thus to the European trade flows. Only 45 kilometres are being built at the moment in BiH (Kakanj - Vlakovo), while project documentation has been developing for the remaining 292 kilometres for the past 10 years.¹¹²

111 Doing Business, <http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreconomies/bosnia-and-herzegovina> (retrieved on 01.11.2011).

112 BiH Ministry of Communications and Transport, <http://www.mkt.gov.ba/Default.aspx?pageIndex=1> and Wikileaks <http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10SARAJEVO75> (retrieved 12.12.2011).

The issue of national strategy can both divide and unite the country: if one ethnicity or entity is doing considerably better economically, this might lead to political and social conflicts like those in Belgium or Italy. The question here is whether the fragile peace in BiH would be able to prevent conflict in such cases. On the other hand, if a coherent and well-distributed investment strategy was in place, the risks of this scenario happening would become lower.

Unsuccessful privatisation of state enterprises

The political division between ethnically-based political parties, especially in the Federation, makes agreement on economic policy even more difficult.¹¹³ Privatisation in such an environment is susceptible to corruptive practices and favouritism, as each party is run like a separate feudal court trying to secure revenues for their rank and file. This practice in return fuels motives and opportunities for profit-motivated violence in defence of one's economic interests in the privatisation process. Most importantly, though, the problems in privatisation have led to economic inefficiency, which again leads to economic grievances and the lowering of the threshold of violence. Specific to BiH, there have been two models of privatisation, with two sets of rules, one for each entity, which has added to the complexity of the operation.¹¹⁴ One Serb interviewee in Banja Luka said (21.06.2011): "The privatisation model is bad. The economy cannot succeed with such usurious

113 CIA.

114 Hećimović, Esad 2000. *Dva smo sveta različita*, Dani No 156, 26.05.2000, <http://www.bhdani.com/arhiva/156/t1563.htm> (retrieved 12.12.2011).

Investment: Views from the outside and inside

In our talks with a foreign diplomat in Sarajevo (26.06.2011), he remarked: "It is tricky to do business in BiH because the legal situation is complicated. (...) If you are a company and want to build in one canton you need permission from the municipality, and sometimes from two local authorities. In addition, you will need permission from the canton and an environmental permit from the Federation. (...) In BiH, one sits around waiting for all of these permissions. Corruption is also a major issue, as many internationals adhere to strict compliance regulations. However, it is good that foreign firms are investing - it gives a positive signal to other potential investors."

From the inside, the situation does not look less complicated. One Serb official in Doboj told us (23.06.2011): "There is a paradox in BiH: we are

fighting against the centralisation of power in BiH, while the cantons and RS are centralised themselves. Decentralisation should go towards the communal level. Until 1989 we had decentralisation: municipalities were important. Today we have the feeling that we have three states: in the cities some institutions now belong to the Federation, some to RS, and some to the state."

Another Bosniak interviewee (Sarajevo, 25.06.2011) also complained that the levels of governance do not actually communicate or, more precisely, are instead used for political power games: "Dodik, instead of negotiating with the state, went to Italy and made an agreement with Berlusconi concerning two hydro-plants on the river Drina. RWE, a German electric utilities company, also made an agreement with RS concerning a hydro-power station, but then backed off and saw that it should work with the state as well."

Is international aid really helping?

There have been international efforts to reduce public administration. And while in some areas they have certainly been successful, the sustainability and effectiveness of such projects is put into question by one of our interviewees in Doboj (23.06.2011): "Four years ago OSCE did a project here on local government reform, in the fields of transparency, budget and

communication. The OSCE Chief came here to give a certificate to the mayor about a successfully implemented project. One of the targets and successes was that the municipality should have no more than 158 employees. However, what happened after one year? The municipality had 250 employees. It is a mockery. People here like to take pictures and present themselves as reformists, but they are far from that."

credits. The consequence is thousands of unemployed persons. We have given people the possibility to be corrupt but not prosecuted." Another Serb interviewee in Prijedor (22.06.2011) agreed: "A lot of money was invested, but where has it ended? Privatisation has been a catastrophe."

BiH has inherited an out-dated heavy industry (raw materials, military production, etc.) from Yugoslavia, which is in part what makes privatisation difficult. Some industries, such as the iron and steel industry, have nominally been successfully privatised. However, they have usually

been bought by only one company, hindering the development of a healthy market economy due to the lack of competitiveness (e.g. ArcelorMittal, who bought Iron and Steel Works Zenica and is has a monopoly on this market). Also, RS has privatised more companies than the Federation, but this does not mean that the privatisation there has been more successful: "They let everything rot and then sell it for close to nothing." (interview with a Serb in Doboj, 23.06.2011). The practice is that run-down state enterprises are offered to cronies of the neo-feudal lords at dumping prices.

Ethnic key to a job

This is often felt by the returning population, in the words of one of our interviewees in Republika Srpska (21.06.2011): “There are not many returnees because there are no jobs. We need measures for sustainable return. Many Muslim returnees face discrimination when applying for jobs simply because of their religious affiliation.”

A Bosniak in Tuzla (24.06.2011) told us that: “In the Federation it is not unusual to have people from different nationalities working together. However, in RS they are more sensitive, they always point out: ‘We have here a girl from the Federation that works with us’. I can also envisage social unrest due to the lack of jobs (...). We need to work on national unity.”

Bloated state administration

The numbers of employees in public administration are rising, and this is not favourable for economic development. According to the World Bank the current percentage of public administration employees is around 13 per cent, which is not sustainable since it consumes around 60 per cent of the budgets.¹¹⁵ This is mainly because of the different levels of governments as there are practically 14 governments in one state (FBiH, 10 Federation Cantons, Brčko District, RS and the State level), which inevitably leads to duplication. Many people aspire to work in public administration, which not only offers job security but also higher salaries, which is still rare in a country with a considerable informal sector. The IMF also advises that “the overall weight of the public sector on the economy should be lowered”.¹¹⁶

3.2.5 Mental maps: Agents in the economic structures

The unemployed VS The political and economic elites

The number of formally unemployed who are living either in poverty or on the verge of it suggests that if the situation further deteriorates they might be a force to reckon with. The common denominator of unemployment (and even of employment which is poorly paid, causing poverty) is typical across all the ethnicities (and entities). Besides

the generally poor job market situation, other external factors may influence the ability to obtain employment.

For instance, sometimes jobs are given according to the ethnic key, which fuels the feeling of injustice and relative deprivation. When a job is handed to a less qualified person due to her/his ethnic origin, there is a discrepancy between expected and actual economic situation.

As one can see from the above example, not only does unemployment hinder development in a certain region, but it also hinders returns to areas where there are no jobs, thus preventing possible reconciliation. This is also felt in other areas where one ethnicity is the minority, as for example in Sarajevo, where reportedly Croats may face difficulties in finding employment or even getting a deserved promotion (interviews in Mostar, 29.06.2011). Moreover, another worrying issue is job discrimination based on the political key, which creates social discontent in the disadvantaged group and reinforces the wish of many to leave the country.

Who might the unemployed revolt against? The governing structures are so complex (municipalities, cantons, entities, state), that it is difficult to predict who exactly will be the target of discontent. However, the most probable is that entities and the state will attract most of the resentment, as much of the political and economic power is in their hands and they, on one hand, would have brought a deterioration of the situation upon the population, while on the other hand they are in the position to make crucial decisions to develop socio-economic strategies.

¹¹⁵ World Bank 2011.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. 52.

Political key to a job

In all parts of BiH there is growing frustration with how jobs are awarded. A Bosniak in his 30s in the Croatian part of the Federation told us (30.06.2011): "Our life together before was better, because there were no ethnic parties. Today, even a cleaning lady has to be a party member in order to gain employment. You do not get a job because you are a good professional - you get it because you are a good party member. Life here is very hard. (...) In Yugoslavia we had no unemployment, no problems, nationalism was kept under control and our lives together were better. Tito was

a very positive figure. (...) He kept nationalism under control. People here can't wait to leave, regrettably. Whoever can, gets the Croatian passport and disappears. Others pull connections in other countries."

This was echoed by many of our other interviewees. A Serb interviewee in Banja Luka (21.06.2011) told us: "It is difficult to get a job if you are a Serb in Sarajevo: this is 'nationalism light'. All access to jobs is through party structures and not even a cleaning lady can get a job without a Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata (Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, SNDS) membership card in RS."

The case of perceived unemployment

Because of the prevailing low standard of living, there is a perception that "*simply everyone is unemployed*" (interview with a Bosniak student in Livno, 30.06.2011), an opinion echoed by many of our interviewees throughout the country. This perception is such because of the recurring problems that even those who are employed face. A Serb interviewee in Banja Luka (21.06.2011) aptly elaborated: "There are several types of workers: in the first category there

are the 'potential workers' - they are those registered at the Employment Bureau and waiting for employment. The second are workers employed in the private sector and they can be divided into those who are not getting their salaries, those who are getting only 30-40 per cent of their salaries and evidently cannot live on them, and the lucky few who do get their salaries, as meagre as they are. The third category consists of those employed in the civil service, who do get their salaries on time."

Elites/'Haves' VS Ordinary citizens/'Have nots'

There is a lot of perceived frustration towards the political and economic elites in the country. Due to the unequal distribution of resources, the gap between the elites and the rest has become even more obvious in the post-war years. It is further prompted by the inability to find employment, low economic growth, instability and corruption on all levels. In some cases, economic woes have the potential to turn into violence and even war. And while some members of the elites are concerned about preventing armed conflict, as they could lose (some once again) what they have amassed, others see a conflict as the only way in which they could retain their power. In the latter group, most members are ethno-nationalist politicians,

who, when they see their power dwindling, incite hatred in order to keep their positions of power.

The gap between the 'haves' and 'have nots' is large, partly also because employment does not guarantee a decent standard of living; in fact, one can be poor while holding a full-time position. While the political elites are held responsible for the general lack of economic vision and non-functioning of the system, economic elites are responsible for the exploitation of such an environment.

It is striking that the state appears to support such a chaotic system, which might seem a good idea in the short-term ('most importantly, people have jobs and the State will take care of the rest'), while it might hinder

Tales from the grey economy

An unemployed Serb in Prijedor (22.06.2011) gave us her personal example for informal employment: "I used to work [in a position which entailed dealings with the larger public] until 2004. Since then, I have been officially unemployed although I worked from time to time, but the employers refused to pay my health and social insurance. Once even, a lady at the social services where I had come to claim my unemployment benefits recognised me, because I was working on a television channel, but in the grey economy. Although she understood my position, this was very embarrassing for me and I decided to quit my job. It

is terrible to be treated as a non-person. (...) Unemployment causes inter-ethnic conflicts. We have a lot of stress and tension because of the economic situation."

In Sarajevo (27.06.2011), another interviewee gave his view on why the grey economy can still operate: "We have good labour laws, but we ourselves do not respect them. Inspectors are not given enough support by the law-makers to start the process of dismantling the grey economy. They can give out fines, but the amounts are ridiculous. They are not allowed to close down firms. (...) The laws can only be changed on the Federal level, not on the state level, which also makes things more complicated."

proper economic development for decades. This clearly indicates that political leaders have no vision for a sustainable system but are exploiting public coffers and national resources to satisfy their short-term needs by securing sources of income for their party loyalists.

Regrettably, trade unions, as many other social groups in BiH, seem to maintain close ties with the governing structures, instead of truly taking care of workers' rights.¹¹⁷

Better-off entity/ethnicity VS Poorer entity/ethnicity

In the Federation, the Croats are perceived to be generally better off than the Bosniaks, mainly due to the stark presence of Croatian companies in Herzegovina. Some Croats hold a grumble against the Bosniaks for sharing the same entity and believe the Croat-majority regions would be better off and even more developed than today if it were not for the shared entity. On the state level, both entities seem to be doing similarly in terms of economic performance. However, in certain areas the perception is that RS is doing slightly better. It is said, for example, that bureaucracy is more structured and efficient in RS. There are however many Serbs who express discontent about the way the money is wasted at the State level and in the

Federation. If there were to be more centralisation, this could be a trigger for violence, because no one is ready to pay another one's bills. In addition, once privatisation is finalised and the cards for the market economy game become clear, it will be interesting to see how revenues will be distributed and whether that will affect the social peace.

Prospectless youth VS The state

Youth unemployment is a major problem in BiH: at 58.4 per cent, it is among the highest in Europe.¹¹⁸ Especially acute is the issue of young men who are frustrated by the state's inability to create jobs, since these impressionable youths often turn into angry and disillusioned men with radical ideas and demonstrative behaviour that creates social realities that disregard the peace treaty. The lack of support structures, unemployed and disillusioned parents, lack of prospects for the future and a culture tolerant to violence infuse young people with hatred beyond their years.¹¹⁹ As they have not fully experienced or understood the War, they are the most susceptible to becoming militarised and to employ violence in order to change their

¹¹⁸ See UNDP: <http://www.undp.ba/index.aspx?PID=32&RID=1> (retrieved on 12.12.2011).

¹¹⁹ For theory on „Youth Bulges“ supporting this assumption see for example: Urdal, Henrik (2006): *A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence*. *International Studies Quarterly* 50:607–629. Critique of the findings by Fearon, James D. (2010): *Governance and Civil War Onset*. World Development Report 2011 Background Paper, Stanford University.

¹¹⁷ Azinović, Bassuener, Weber 2011. 29.

The dilemma of the well-educated

Many people find themselves in dire straits and they feel that they cannot survive, in spite of their efforts to find a decent job. An unemployed Serb from Prijedor described the situation (22.06.2011): "I have been unemployed for many years now. I have a University degree and I used to have permanent employment many years ago. (...) Many people, many of my friends left the country in the meantime because of their inability to find a job. No one came back, so it can't be as bad abroad as it is here. It is tragic

that we in BiH educate people who then go abroad and as a consequence do not contribute to their own country. I am now taking a Masters degree in Belgrade; the University there has a better reputation than the ones here. Re-qualification institutions are almost non-existent here, even if you would like to start in another profession. However, I am painfully aware that I do not have any chances of employment here nor there. In Serbia there is also a lot of unemployment. It is not like in Croatia, where there are more jobs. In BiH the only jobs I have been offered are in the grey economy."

situation. In addition, they do not have any opportunity to meet and learn about each other, as their parents did in the past. One Serb activist interviewed in Banja Luka (20.06.2011) noted: "Young people from different ethnicities today do not meet. For their high-school trips they go to foreign countries, but they have not visited across the entity border. They practically do not know where they live. Questions, instead of being answered, are left unanswered." For example, many join football fan associations, which are often associated with hooliganism, and translate the ethnic hatred from the battlefield of the Bosnian War to the football pitch. Football plays such a significant role in the lives in the Balkans that many claim that even the break-up of Yugoslavia started on the football pitch, in the ill-fated match between Dinamo Zagreb and Red Star Belgrade in Zagreb in May 1990, when nationalistic tensions overtook the match and horrendous fighting broke amongst the rival supporters (Bad Blue Boys and Delije) with around 200 people wounded.¹²⁰ Today, there are numerous examples of hooliganism at football matches, one of the most shocking ones being the death of a Sarajevo supporter during the fighting that happened at the match Sarajevo-Široki Brijeg, in a Croat-majority area in October 2009.¹²¹ Coarse ethno-nationalist language is the norm at football matches throughout the region. One interviewee (Sarajevo, 16.06.2011) who works in the intelligence sector

agreed that football is one of largest venues for disenfranchised youth to express their anger.

Even young people who are well educated find it very difficult to find a job, which leads to frustration. Many of them, because of the lack of prospects on offer, decide to leave the country. This deprives the country of some of its brightest minds. That leaves a question about the population that remains and whether the pool of expertise for the future will be enough to make the country grow.

War profiteers VS War victims

During the war, looting and displacement were common and almost everyone suffered from it. Houses and factories were destroyed and many people had to start from zero. Practically everyone was impoverished. However, a small number of war profiteers emerged from the war rich and this stark inequality and injustice still triggers a lot of resentment.

The protection of criminal war profiteers blends into political preferences as some ethno-nationalist leaders need to emphasize the role of entities in law enforcement in order to prevent the revelations of politically compromising businesses. In the media there have been accusations against some ethno-nationalist RS leaders. The media-publicity easily and untruthfully implicates all Serbs, which can be a conflict problem. At the same time if some RS leaders are implicated in war profiteering and economic crime ("commercial nationalists") their decisions do not

120 B92 2011. *Godišnjica neodigrane utakmice Dinamo-Crvena Zvezda*, 13.05.2011, http://www.b92.net/info/komentari.php?nav_id=512037 (retrieved on 12.12.2011).

121 Slobodna Dalmacija 2009. *Kaos u Širokom Brijegu: propucan navijač Sarajeva, huligani tukli po kućama*, 04.10.2009, <http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/Nogomet/tabid/84/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/72916/Default.aspx> (retrieved on 12.12.2011).

The difficulty of curbing organised crime in BiH

One of our interviewees in Sarajevo (27.06.2011) explained the difficult work police structures have in coordinating organised crime busting efforts in BiH: "Organised criminality is by nature something that needs skills to work within an international police environment and requires that the single elements in a national prosecution system are as coherent as possible. BiH has 17 different prosecuting systems, which is a lot for such a small country. (...) In each Canton here we do not only have a police force, but also a Minister of the Interior. We have a system that is made out of a hierarchically-structured RS police, a small well-structured Brčko police, a conglomerate of Federal police, and, at the state level, the Border Police, State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), Indirect Taxation Authority etc. All of these have to cooperate smoothly, strategically and professionally against organised crime. The prerequisite is that they not only what they can but that they also want to work with each other.

And here there is apparently a conflict. The presumption is that they all have the same understanding of how all of these separate organisations, fragmented on the entity level, should work with the state level. This is seen differently in RS and the Federation. In the last 6-7 months this conflict has been developing into antagonistic positions: one side says we need a stronger integration, and the other says the opposite. The RS is interested in having a maximum autonomy, with the aim of getting everything 'that the HR took away from us' back. This means that they are using Dayton as merely a shell and BiH as the necessary evil. This impacts the question: how are they dealing with topics such as organised crime? (...) Everything that has to do with organised crime and which goes beyond the framework of working with an individual organisation is getting more and more difficult due to the political conflict. (...) The underlying political conflict makes the search for common ground very difficult. (...) The political discourse is negatively influencing the work of the police forces."

follow the interests of their constituencies in the state as a whole, since they are protecting their partisan interests. Furthermore, if these leaders have their own criminal history, then their ability and legitimacy in the development of law enforcement in the RS is compromised.

Criminal syndicates VS The state

The interests of criminal syndicates anywhere naturally go against a state striving for law and order and the implementation of the rule of law. Thus, if the state increases its grip on criminal wrongdoings and those involved in organised crime are less able to perform their activities, they might revolt and instigate against the state. The danger of a conflict emerging is realistic, especially if we take into consideration that there are still more than one million items of small arms and light weapons in private hands as well as a lot of leftover ammunition and, as more than 75 per cent of these are illegal, it is not known in whose hands they are.¹²²

War veterans VS The state

The links between war veterans as a social interest group and political parties of ethno-nationalist orientation are strong. Whenever there is an announcement of a revision of veteran's benefits, like lately of Bosnian Croats and RS veterans, there are risks of protests.¹²³ If the rhetoric of ethno-nationalist parties is added to the mix, great unrests are imaginable. From many standpoints, the criteria for defining war veterans must appear wrong. This question is not only controversial politically, but also economically, as the financial support that they get is derived from the limited resources of the state.

122 Azinović, Bassuener, Weber 2011. 53.

123 Azinović, Bassuener, Weber 2011. 29.

ICTY: A stumbling block in inter-ethnic relations

War veterans are especially susceptible to the question of justice, as this is where they derive their sense of purpose and dignity from. ICTY was established as a court that should bring justice to the victims of the war in Yugoslavia and, like other such courts, its findings have been contested. And while all former Yugoslav countries pledge their cooperation, in many cases they refuse to accept its judgements as fair. Concurrently, BiH ethnic groups have very different views of the work of the ICTY and this many times/ in many cases leads to feelings of injustice and frictions between the ethnic groups. While Serbs and Croats often contest its judgements, Bosniaks mostly support them.

Several Croat and Serb ethno-nationalist politicians in June 2011 openly told us that they consider the court to be a political court that they do not respect. A Croatian politician (Sarajevo, 28.06.2011) even added: "17 people from middle Bosnia were convicted - they even put on trial people whom we considered here to be deserters." A Serb ethno-nationalist politician in Banja Luka (20.06.2011) elaborated: "ICTY was presented as something which would enable (RS) to start reforms, but actually it worked as a weapon for destroying the door to reforms. The scope of the ICTY was wrong: it was used for political pressure instead of being used for achieving justice. (...) In 2005, 19 out of 90 persons accused by ICTY were arrested and extradited to the Court. From these 19 persons, 3 were arrested in Russia, 1 in Argentina and another 15 were neither in Serbia nor BiH. A good example of

the bias of the international community towards RS are Karadžić and Mladić, who were both arrested in Serbia, while RS and BiH had to suffer international accusations (about hiding them) prior to their arrest. The OHR used The Hague for imposing a protectorate. (...) RS heroes are those who managed to found a state in wartime, with all its cultural, educational, economic institutions. We Serbs are a state-building nation. ICTY and commander responsibility is wrong: for example, Šljivančanin was indicted because he did not assume that there would be a vendetta of the Serbs over the Croats. Naser Orić was not convicted, although, according to his own admission, he abetted in war crimes. In the case of Mladić, he is a real hero: he did not do or order any crimes. The crimes happened after he left Srebrenica. The Hague is a farce and Mladić has been convicted in advance. Gotovina is our enemy and a criminal, he killed Serbs and his case is not the same as Mladić's."

On the other hand, a Bosniak ethno-nationalist politician (Prijedor, 22.06.2011) had a strikingly different opinion: "I went many times to testify at ICTY. ICTY did great things. The Serbs are convinced ICTY is against them" His counterpart from another party in Sarajevo (28.06.2011) shared his viewpoint: "History classes in schools are a huge problem. One day when we are able to talk about it all together my proposal will be to learn about our recent history on the grounds of the facts and conclusions as established by the ICTY. The whole world acknowledges that the ICTY is a respectable institution with high judicial standards - only the Croats and the Serbs do not."

4. Scenarios of Peace and Conflict

The analysis of possible scenarios for Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on the diagnosis of conflict causes described above, and as a sequence of political scenario seminars that the FES organized in Spring - Autumn 2011.¹²⁴ The group was facilitated by Winfried Veit and Paul Pasch and consisted of 20 members of different ethnic groups. The participants came from different demographic, cultural and political backgrounds, thus mirroring the composition of Bosnian – Herzegovinian society. The scenarios created as a result of these seminars offer possible and different pictures of the future and they are not to be confused with predictions of events or outcomes. Scenarios are used for strategic planning (political, economic, military) in order to be better prepared for unpredictable events and future developments. They give a message to decision-makers (“If you do this, you might end up here; if you don’t do anything, you might end up there”) but they do not give recommendations or a blueprint for action.

With these scenario seminars it is possible to map the political perception by the people of their future. The five main options, identified collectively by the participants of the scenario workshops, give the structure to the conflict-relevant scenario mapping of this chapter. However, instead of simply looking at alternative future political contexts of conflict, this chapter will base the analysis of the conflict-relevant elements of the scenarios on conflict diagnosis below and try to identify:

- The conditions of the development of various main political scenarios.
- The conflict risks leading to the envisaged political situation.
- The main conflict-related consequences of each of the main scenarios and their variations.
- The main opportunities for peace involved in each of the scenario.


¹²⁴ Pasch, Paul (ed.) 2012. *Bosnia and Herzegovina 2025: Scenarios on Future Developments*, Sarajevo, FriedrichEbert-Stiftung, 2012, http://www.fes.ba/publikacije/2012/Scenariji/Publikacija%20Scenariji%20BiH%202025_ENG.pdf (retrieved on 01.02.2012). Also available in the local language at http://www.fes.ba/publikacije/2012/Scenariji/Publikacija%20Scenariji%20BiH%202025_BHS.pdf.

The five main political scenarios identified by the multi-ethnic, multi-regional group of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are the following:

- Status quo
- Dissolution
- Functional decentralised state
- Functional centralised state
- Regional reconnection within the EU.

The analysis of the scenarios starts with the status quo, the current situation, which in turn is the point of departure for each of the following scenarios, then moves first towards the strengthening of ethnic principles in the Constitution (‘Dissolution’) and then towards exploring the options where other, more functional principles become more prominent (‘Decentralised’ and ‘Centralised state’ and ‘Regional reconnection’). In the identification of the scenario of dissolution, our analysis will also identify a variation that the scenario seminar did not imagine (‘Somalisation’), but which nevertheless, in the light of comparative analysis, should also be considered as a result of some of the grievances related to the status quo.

Illustration 4.1. Basic scenarios



4.1 Status Quo

In the scenario workshops, a long lasting status quo was described as follows: “the constitutional structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina still remains the same – two entities and Brčko District, 10 cantons in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, three constituent peoples, the Others and citizens. Although some reforms [could be] implemented enabling Bosnia and Herzegovina to receive EU candidate status... [status quo will mean that] the state

is still in a bad economic situation and facing unsustainable public spending, massive internal and external debt, pending payments of wages and of social benefits. The functioning of the system still depends on the particular political agendas of politicians.”

4.1.1 Conditions for continuing the Status Quo

The difficulty in compromising ethnic autonomy springs from the fact that political preferences in several important issues are divided along ethnic lines. This together with the ethnic segregation of territory (with one of the three main ethnic groups having an overwhelming majority in almost all of the cantons and municipalities in the Federation and of course in Republika Srpska) supports the constitutional constellation where ethnic autonomy structures the political system. If communities were mixed, governance was territorially organised, and political preferences remained divided along ethnic lines, democracy would not mean much for the minority community of each administrative region.

Furthermore, ethnic autonomy is difficult to compromise because of the instrumental value of ethnicity as a politically relevant structure for the reigning elites. By mobilising one's own constituencies, politicians can manipulate and safeguard their political support amongst them. Furthermore, ethnic governance together with ethnic loyalty, even over the rule of law, is important for the legitimisation and covering of crimes (economic as well as war crimes) committed by ethnic elites and sometimes also by ordinary people. If the state-level cannot investigate Serb crimes in the Republika Srpska, or Croat and Bosniak crimes in the Federation, the strong ethnic loyalty of the entities makes the criminal investigation of an entity's own ethnic leaders difficult. Criminalised political economy is therefore also one of the factors pushing for the autonomy of the entities.

The status quo is naturally also encouraged by the fear of conflict if radical reforms were made. When analyzing the replies to questions regarding conflict and war made by the respondents in the interviews conducted for this study, it seems clear that there is a lot of disagreement on the long-term conditions of peace. However, in the short term there is almost a consensus on the fact that war can only be provoked if the Republika Srpska declares independence (which would especially provoke Bosniak

war veterans,¹²⁵ and perhaps the Bosniak units of the army), or if the central state imposes major compromises to the position of the Republika Srpska. In the long run economic grievances and the state level administrative paralysis might destabilise the country, while the problems in rectifying of the injustices of the Bosnian War might eventually upset the Bosniak ethno-nationalists and people who would still like to return to their pre-War homes. Eventually the intrusive presence of the OHR could also spark reactions, especially from the ethno-nationalist Serbs who are the least tolerant towards such presence. However, in the short run the core interests of the two entities are crucial for peace, and these core interests are the existence of the entity of the Republika Srpska and the unity of the country.

Moving away from the status quo towards compromises in ethnic autonomy would require a clear change in the balance of power between Bosniak and Serb communities (weakening of the autonomy-supporting Serb community at the expense of the state unity-supporting Bosniak community) or a much greater assertiveness of the international community in support of the unitary state and the Bosniak (and Croat) constitutional position. Alternatively, the moving from the status quo towards a more integrated, unified system would require the weakening of the ethno-nationalist appeal, and the strengthening of country-wide nationalism.

This fundamental change in the balance of power is not likely to happen. On the contrary, the balance of power between the three main ethnic groups is fixed in the Constitution and the fear of a war keeps any efforts to change it in check. Meanwhile, time runs against a greater international role. For example, the willingness of the OHR to use its Bonn powers has been drastically reduced since 2006. Ethnicity is not about to disappear from the political imagination of the people. With 75 per cent of people voting for ethno-nationalist parties, and with so-called multi-ethnic parties still campaigning on ethno-nationalist platforms, there is nothing to suggest a strengthening of unified, non-ethnic nationalism.

¹²⁵ Even if the war veterans represent only a small fraction of the population and even though their age makes their mobilisation more problematic, statistics of violent incidents in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as experiences from other countries (Zimbabwe, Mali, East Timor, Indonesia's Aceh, Burma in the 1960s, Northern Ireland, China in the 1960s, etc.) suggest that one should not rule out this group, with experience of mobilisation, skills, and special ownership of the state, of our calculations regarding conflict scenarios. However, there is no need to demonise this group by predictions of conflict initiation.

Global developments that have emphasised the divide between the West and the Muslim world, and European developments that divide between the Orthodox, Russian dominion, the US/EU dominated Protestant/Catholic West, and the Turkey/Middle East centred Muslim world, have not helped the nation-building process in Bosnia, which seems to be in the middle of global and regional divisions.¹²⁶ Despite the substantial differences between Bosnian Muslims and the rest of the Muslim world, the use of global jihadists in the Bosnian War, the sponsorship of Muslim activities in current Bosnia and Herzegovina by some Muslim conservative countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Malaysia, and most importantly, the perception by non-Muslims of the newly-minted association between Bosniaks and especially Muslims of Turkey, emphasize the global aspect of divisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite the differences between Bosnian Serbs and Serbs of Serbia, the perceived association of Republika Srpska and Serbia (to such extent that this perception can be extremely negative in the minds of some non-Serbs¹²⁷), emphasizes the regional divisions inside Bosnia and Herzegovina. Finally, the prospect of the Republic of Croatia's EU membership and the dual citizenship of a majority of Herzegovinians/Bosnian Croats, emphasize the regional and European belongingness of Croats to Christian civilization.

Thus the continuation of the status quo is the likely scenario for the near future, in the absence of the discovery of new concepts of governance based on models of integrating the competences of levels of governance into EU institutions, and in the absence of drastic external and internal shocks that make the status quo untenable. However, the status quo will be difficult to sustain as rational governance and economic growth, let alone integration to the EU, will require a better functioning governance system. Without economic growth and better service delivery from the state, grievance-based frustration violence will become much more likely, with food riots and opportunistic gang violence plaguing the everyday lives of the country. In the long run, drastic changes in the

126 Galtung 1993. Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, Nr. 3, Summer 1993, Council on Foreign Affairs, 22-49.

127 A Bosniak social democrat politician, Emir Suljagić, insisted in an Al Jazeera TV programme on calling Republika Srpska "Serbia", and claimed that the existence of "Serbia", "just outside Sarajevo, with a totally different culture" constitutes a war threat inside Bosnia and Herzegovina. Suljagić, Emir 2011. "The Café: Bosnia's Future: Can Bosnians overcome historic hostilities and international indifference to create a stable country?" Al Jazeera programme, 13.08.2011, available at <http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/thecafe/2011/08/201181310184441234.html> (retrieved on 01.12.2011).

system, such as the separation of the Republika Srpska from the state could be possible, or the imposition of a centralised state could become more likely.

4.1.2 Conflict potential in Status Quo

The main grievances related to the status quo or the further strengthening of the entities at the expense of the central state, are those held by the supporters of the central state, especially of the largest ethnic group, the Bosniaks, who feel special ownership of the state. The shadow of history complicates this grievance. If the Republika Srpska continues to remain strong, Bosniak ethno-nationalists will feel that they have fought for the unity of the country in vain, and that the unjust distribution of lands between Bosniaks (who were a majority before the war in many of the areas of the current Republika Srpska) and Serbs cannot be rectified. In addition, the Croats do not feel as strong an attachment to the state as their Bosniak partners do. Complaints about the "historical injustice towards the Croatian nation in BiH" (several interviews with Croatian politicians in Sarajevo and Mostar, June 2011), which prevented them by the means of the Washington Agreement in 1994 to retain their own entity of the RS model, are taking central stage in the rhetoric of Croatian politicians. They practically see themselves as the biggest losers in the ethnic game. If the issue of historical justice cannot be addressed within the scenario of the status quo, ethnically based frustration violence might occur. The Croat National Assembly established in April 2011 might be the very first step in this direction.

Furthermore, there are growing grievances among the entire population related to the lack of economic growth and the deficiencies of the provision of public services. Unemployment, corruption and crime are not going to disappear in the absence of reforms in the system of governance or in the absence of the removal of the paralysing lack of clarity in the division of competences between entities and the state. If the status quo cannot accommodate more functional governance, economically-based frustration aggression might occur.

Furthermore, in addition to grievances, the criminal economy that is fuelled by the inefficiency of law enforcement offers a lot of profit-motivated and weakness-related opportunities for conflict and violence. These abstract problems may occasionally be substantiated in

events where conflicting parties can easily be identified and mobilised for violence. A few examples of such events will be mentioned in the following sub-chapters. If opportunities for gainful violence cannot be blocked by means of legitimate and well-resourced law enforcement, conflict scenarios might materialise.

The existing pattern for acting on ethnic frustrations is related to hate-speech, which in turn is related to interpretations of history or to the characteristics of people belonging to other ethnic groups. It seems that the main focus of European security personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina is on this type of ethnically-based scenarios of frustration and aggression (discussion in Sarajevo with a EUFOR intelligence officer, 16.06.2011). Also, the attention of the report of the Atlantic Initiative¹²⁸ focuses heavily on scenarios where violence is sparked by hate-speech provocations. According to the report, irresponsible hate speech has become dramatically more pronounced during the past three years and especially during the 2010 elections. The EUFOR's records also corroborate this assessment (interviewee as above). The weakening and softening of the international approach towards the ethno-nationalist leaders of the country has contributed to this. According to the fear of both EUFOR and the Atlantic Initiative, these hate speeches could lead into irregular clashes and conflict without a high level of formal mobilisation. This type of conflict will be termed **provocation wars**.

One specific example of provocation wars that cannot totally be ruled out is the category of **religious conflicts**, sparked by a provocation related to religious rituals (for example, loud church bells, loud Muslim calls for prayers, smell of pig farming close to Muslim communities, the issue of headscarves, etc.). In an interview with members of the Bosniak Croatian diaspora in Germany (06.06.2011), our interviewees claimed that the greatest problem, among others, in the Federation is that the "Muslims have become more radicalised", a view based on the fact that more Muslim women had been wearing headscarves.¹²⁹ However, other interviews in BiH have revealed that although religion plays a more significant role within the Muslim community of BiH than before the war, the perceived 'radicalisation' issue might be an

exaggeration. They have been fuelled by the lack of information on the several Wahabi enclaves, isolated incidents such as the recent attack on the American Embassy in Sarajevo in December 2011 by Mevlid Jašarević, a Wahabi from Serbia,¹³⁰ the more open display of Muslim religious symbols, and the increased influence of conservative Muslim countries in BiH, such as Saudi Arabia, which is sponsoring the construction of the Sarajevo University central library "King Abdullah",¹³¹ or the new residence of the Rais al Ulemah sponsored by Muammar Gaddafi's Libya. Even though Bosnia and Herzegovina has no recent history of religious fanaticism, and despite the fact that social cleavages are ethnic rather than religious, religion still is one of the identifying anchors of ethnicity. One of our interviewees, a religious activist, even noted: "Religion was not the cause of this war, but it lent itself to manipulation. Nationalism is a false God." (Sarajevo, June 2011). Thus religious provocations and reactions to such provocations can serve the purpose of enacting ethnic loyalty. In particular, confessional media use this link between ethnicity and religion in order to increase their social influence and promote their causes. One of our interviewees, who is an expert on media (Sarajevo, 28.06.2011) even went so far as to say: "(Religious leaders) are not friends of ecumenism. (...) For example, (the attitude of the confessional media) towards ethnic cleansing in BiH is appalling and inhuman: religious leaders and communities are only concerned about their own victims". However, it is important to note that the Serb population in general appears to be less attached to religious causes than the Croats or Bosniaks. Conflicts and especially smaller clashes sparked by religious provocations between ethnic communities on local levels are a possibility in most parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The contradiction between group rights and historical rights involves conflict scenarios. Since ethnic groups are divided and have political relevance, and since they are guarded by territorial autonomy, it is good for ethnic autonomy that territories are ethnically relatively homogeneous. However, ethnic homogeneity has been achieved through ethnic cleansing. It is important, in order not to create a precedence of beneficial ethnic cleansing, and to

128 Azinović, Bassuener & Weber 2011.

129 Apparently in some rural communities and some neighbourhoods of Sarajevo women are paid BAM 400-600 to wear a headscarf. That payment might amount to more than average minimum wage and thus be cause to envy (source: several interviews and informal discussions in June 2011 in BiH).

130 Sarajevo X portal 2011. *Napadnuta Američka Ambasada u Sarajevu, napadač lakše ranjen*, 28.10.2011, <http://www.sarajevo-x.com/bih/crnahronika/napadnuta-americka-ambasada-u-sarajevu-napadac-lakse-ranjen/111028107#> (retrieved on 12.12.2012).

131 Univerzitet u Sarajevu 2012. *Univerzitetska biblioteka – završni razgovori*, http://unsa.ba/s/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1078&Itemid=348 (retrieved on 12.12.2012).

rectify historical injustices, to control from the state level the resettlement of returnees to the entities. However, if returnees are allowed to return, the homogeneity of entities are threatened, and thus territorial autonomy no longer guarantees ethnic group rights. This means that incidents where returnees are not allowed to return or where return is undermined by the reactions of the local job markets, politics and people, there is a risk of ethnically-based frustration violence. Other conflicts between previously “cleansed” ethnic populations (returnees) and local people testify to the fact that new generations might be more willing to return to the areas of their parents and demand their rights. The same can also be seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The rationale of some of the Serbs that participated in the cleansing of some of the Croat and Bosniak areas during the Bosnian War in the current Republika Srpska has been “justified” by the claimed ethnic cleansings of the Serbs by Nazi local collaborators. For these Serbs, ethnic cleansing was seen as the return of Serbs into their pre-World War II territories and a vehicle for a just revenge. Further, after the Bosnian War, the new generations in BiH are in fact more ethno-nationalistic than their parents (interviews with a Serb student in Banja Luka, 21.06.2011 and a Bosniak NGO activist in Tuzla, 24.06.2011): they are less tolerant and they have never been in other ethnic areas etc. Thus the fact that currently there is no push to return to the pre-Bosnian War regions does not guarantee that such push would not re-emerge with a risk of **repatriation conflicts**. Yet, the report of the Atlantic Initiative¹³² considers this type of conflicts as one of the three main conflict scenarios on the immediate horizon.

A political system that tends to paralysis nevertheless fuels violence in political campaigns. In some other “new wars” election candidates of minorities have been prevented from participating and voters from minority communities have been prevented from voting. This has been done in the name of democracy: the power of ethnically-defined majority populations.¹³³ While in the ideal world all of these options should be prevented by a well-functioning police, the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as comparisons with other “New War” sites”,

132 Azinović, Bassuener & Weber 2011.

133 This has happened in another New War-site in Sanggau District of Indonesia, where the district dominated by non-Dayak population was prevented from voting in elections for its major. This was justified by the Dayak perpetrators by reference to some applied principles of democracy: since Dayaks were the biggest ethnic group in the region, the victory of their candidate had to be secured.

suggest that such scenarios are possible within the status quo, even if their probability might be debated. All these incidents could lead to violent reciprocation. In a country where a policy of ethnic cleansing has succeeded to clear areas of unwanted ethnicities, cleansing an ethnic group from an electoral district could be perceived as a trigger for a broader **election conflict**.¹³⁴

Also the position of the Croats in the Federation could spark election violence. Currently the majority of Bosniaks in the Federation means that Bosniaks have significant influence in the selection of Croat representatives to state institutions. This compromises Croat political group rights. Some feel they should be allowed to vote for their own representatives, that is those solely from ethnic Croat parties (and not multi-ethnic parties of ‘doubtful intentions’; interview with a Croatian nationalist party official in Mostar, 29.06.2011). However, a voting system where candidates only need to get votes from their own ethnic constituencies encourages ethno-nationalism and discriminatory political agendas. Giving Croats an entity of their own would solve the problem, but this would complete the territorial apartheid between the three main entities and sediment the ethnically divided political system. Furthermore, it would consolidate the system based on entities, which almost all the Bosniaks and more than 50 per cent of Croats oppose.¹³⁵ As a result, the

134 According to Davidson 2007 (Davidson, Jamie Seth 2007. “Culture and Rights in Ethnic Violence,” in Davidson Jamie S. and David Henley (eds), *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: The Deployment of Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism*, London, Routledge, 2007, 224-46.), the precedence of “successful” ethnic cleansing is a great incentive for further use of this violent tool in politics. Cleansing of voters of certain parties has actually taken place, at least in West Kalimantan, where an internal migrant group was deterred out of their electoral districts, thus paving the way to the victory of the party that had competed with the party whose constituency was thrown out from the district (Sugandi 2006). The context of New Wars, here serves the purpose of facilitating generalisations from one conflict case to another. Yet, while it is necessary for any PCIA to generalise across different cultural and historical contexts, it is difficult to judge how the current context of the Bosnia and Herzegovina culture and politics would provide the conditions for any predictions on the likelihood of a conflict scenario taken from a different historical and cultural context. However seeking conflict scenarios only from Bosnian historical and political culture would dismiss the context of New War (and the lessons of other New Wars), which as such has relevance for the identification of potential conflict risks.

135 Calculated from the Ipsos 2010 survey. Support for the abolishment of entities in the Federation was 69 per cent, while support for the continuation of the current system was just 7 per cent. Given that Bosniaks only have a slight majority in the Federation, this means that more Croats must have supported the abolishment of entities than the current constitutional setting, even if we assume that all Bosniaks were in favour of abolishing of entities. The support for a Croat entity was just 12 per cent, which means that even if all the supporters of the current system or the Croat entity were Croats, there would still be as many supporters of abolishing the entities as the two other options. Another 9 per cent of people in the Federation supported a system of functional decentralisation in the form of 5-6 economic regions, which clearly is an option that goes

status quo is difficult and whenever Croat candidates lose against candidates that the electorate has perceived as protégées of Bosniak voters, election conflicts, as described above, could follow.

The growing discontent of groups that want to see the rectification of the past injustices of war could demonstrate the ownership of the state to the victims of the Bosnian War. Violent demonstrations regarding the benefits of war veterans sometimes exemplify this logic, where the democratic mandate alone cannot guarantee the legitimacy of politicians; instead, part of the ownership of the state apparatus is felt to belong to those who have invested in its defence during the war. A situation where the elected politicians are not willing (or able) to offer more support to veterans substantiates this otherwise abstract dispute about the ownership of the state. Decisions on the budget create a precise timing for the mobilisation of a conflict, while the sense of belonging among veterans and ethnicities that in the war were opposed to the unity of Bosnia Herzegovina help the timing and the identification of concrete violent mobilisation of clashes. Alternatively, as in the case of the violent veteran demonstration in 2010, the target can be politicians from the ethnic group of the veterans themselves, who are seen as selling out the heroes of their own group. Infighting within a conflicting party is not uncommon to New Wars.¹³⁶ Thus low intensity **conflicts initiated by “true Bosnians”** can be imagined in the context of status quo.

The frustration regarding to the slowness of the unification of the country has sometimes also become more concrete in incidents involving the definition of state's language. Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian are the three official languages of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They are all closely related and the language before the war was informally called Bosnian, since it was the variation spoken in BiH (Croatian and Serbian mix with a few Turkish words). The three official languages have similar grammars and

against ethnic autonomy. Thus if 78 per cent of people in the Federation oppose the level of ethnic autonomy the current constitution offers, it is clear that, according to the IPSOS survey, a majority of Croats want less ethnic autonomy, even if all the support to the status quo and the Croat entity came from the Croat community. (However, the Ipsos survey does not specify the percentage of Croats and Bosniaks who took part in the survey.) This seems to be in collision with the picture that the major Croat parties (HDZ, HDZ 1990) are giving during political discussions.

136 Compare with the case of Madurese Jihadists in Sambah Riots in Indonesia 1999; the fighting between ANC and Inkatha in South Africa during the anti-apartheid campaign, the current (2011) low intensity conflict between Sweden-based Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) and Aceh-based GAM in current Indonesian Aceh.

lexical resources and are mutually intelligible. Linguists, cultural researchers and political scientists are still debating whether these are really three separate languages or simply dialects or variations of the same language. Yet in political reality they are separate as a result of an 'identity policy' exercise undertaken in particular by the Croatian and Serbian governments since the early 1990s in order to bring about the separation of languages by underlining and institutionalising dialectal differences¹³⁷ and, in the Croatian case, word coinage and re-Croatianisation of syntax and other linguistic aspects. The practice of the EU of respecting up to three different terms for the same meanings for the three constitutional languages of Bosnia and Herzegovina reproduces this reality of linguistic division, while some Croats and Serbs (especially those, who would like to see language identity to support their claim for a separate identity) claim that there is an emerging unifying Sarajevo-based practice of trying to re-unify the Bosnian dialects into one language. According to a Croat political expert in Mostar (interview on 29.06.2011), "In Sarajevo, they talk a lot about the 'Bosnian state', 'Bosnian language' etc. Croats and Serbs should also be part of this 'nation', simply differentiated by faith. This is bad for the country," as it threatens the separate collective identity of Serbs and Croats. By defining the language of Bosnia and Herzegovina as one (Bosnian), many people, especially Bosniaks want to emphasize the unity of the country. On the other hand, the emphasis on the differences between Serbian, Croat and Bosniak languages articulate the reality of strong ethnic autonomy.

This is why frustrations related to the dispute over the role of entities acquire a concrete form where enemies and friends can easily be defined. Trivial debates/quarrels about how to spell a word, what kind of script to use and how to identify one's own language exemplify the dispute over the main constitutional conflict, and thus sometimes become heated.¹³⁸ This is why national or entity decisions, or even individual linguistic practices regarding apparently trivial linguistic conventions, have at least a marginal potential of triggering small-scale violence. Some Croat workers in

137 A similar debate is underway with regard to the 'Montenegrin language' which, in the opinion of many linguists, is an artificially distinguished dialect of Serbian.

138 There are three constitutionally provisioned languages in Bosnia (Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian). All documents, public credentials and official titles are written in all three languages. Yet, linguistic practices already fuel heated disputes. In the Al Jazeera programme (Suljagić 2011), the Bosniak politician insisted on defining his language as Bosnian language (not Bosniak), causing an angry response both from Serb and Croat ethno-nationalist panellists of the programme.

Germany (interview in Düsseldorf, 06.06.2011), for example, resented the use of word 'kahva' (as opposed to the Croatian 'kava', meaning 'coffee') in Bosniak cafés in Mostar. They feel that this is a provocation and radicalisation by their Bosniak counterparts. However, when asked whether before the 1990s Muslims used the word 'kahva', they could not remember. In an informal conversation with a Bosniak journalist in Sarajevo in June 2011, she was herself appalled by the trend to "push for the 'antiquation' and 'orientalisation' of the Bosniak language", amongst others, by adding the 'h' for words deriving from the Turkish language (e.g. *kahva*, *mahrma* ('headscarf')). Furthermore, she was of the opinion that this trend was against the modern society BiH is aspiring to be: "Why would I want to go back speaking a variation of my language that my illiterate grandma spoke? The language has evolved." It is perhaps likely that language-related resentment will never lead to anything serious in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but even so, language issues have often suddenly become prominent issues in the New Wars. Thus sporadic low-intensity **language conflicts** cannot be totally ruled out within the scenario of status quo.

Finally, the status quo involves the risk of inter-ethnic crimes spreading into communal riots. Since in the status quo the main grievance is on the Bosniak (and Croat) side, it would be more probable that ethnic crime would in the first instance trigger a communal anti-Serb reaction, where for instance, a Bosniak mob from outside the border of the Republika Srpska would punish the Serb perpetrator and defend a Bosniak victim after becoming frustrated about the lack of police interest in the case. The example of inter-ethnic tension caused by a football fan from Sarajevo being killed in Široki Brijeg (a town with a Croat majority) in 2009, serves as a real example of such a scenario. Other New Wars, such as the two wars in Indonesian Sambas and Sangau Ledo districts (1997 and 1999) depict cases where such tension led to a full-scale war and ethnic cleansing. In addition, youth as young as 13, in search of stability and social values that have been denied to them by the dysfunctional state and their families, and due to the traumas that their parents have suffered during the war, have become members of hooligan gangs, which in turn leads them to youth delinquency and crime. As the Atlantic Initiative aptly writes in their report: "Football hooliganism adds ethnicity and organisation to the mix".¹³⁹ Thus the status quo involves a probability of **criminal ethnic wars**.

139 Azinović, Bassuener & Weber 2011. 60.

Popular pressures to investigate nationally the claimed economic crimes and war profiteering of some Serb leaders in the Republika Srpska will also increase the longer the debate about the competences of the national judicial institutions inside the Serb areas continue. Since the grievance with the status quo (high levels of ethnic autonomy) is on the Federation side, it is likely that violent frustrations in this scenario would also derive/originate from this side (despite the fact that there are undoubtedly cases of economic crime on the Federation side as well). Revelations of evidence over such cases of war profiteering could then spark **corruption wars** between unionists and ethno-nationalists.

Ethnic mandates, vetoes and territorial governance are all a requirement for ethnic autonomy. However, these institutional structures also prevent the integration of ethnicities as they deny the incentive to promote multi-ethnic political agendas and platforms. The self-centred nature of ethnic groups (instead of common nationalism) is not optimal for a rational economic administration. But at the same time, any effort at compromising the institutions of ethnic autonomy is viewed as discrimination, which again strengthens the resolve of ethnic political sentiments. Ethnic autonomy and a political system based on strict ethnic quotas and extensive powers of the entities paralyse the central state and makes economic decision-making on the country-level impossible unless the country resorts to the paternalism of the OHR. The paradox of ethnic autonomy combined with unity of the state is that it is possible only if state sovereignty is compromised by allowing outsiders with no democratic mandate to resolve the paralysis in decision-making. Inefficient administration caused by this contradiction has resulted in the state's poor economic performance. This expresses itself in economic grievances, which as such may cause violent scenarios. Overall poverty lowers the threshold of violence,¹⁴⁰ while uncontrolled fluctuations in the economy create relative deprivation and motivations for frustration violence.¹⁴¹

The **lowering threshold of violence** could be demonstrated in scenarios that involve very weak motives of violence, but even lower obstacles for conflict behaviour.

140 Collier, Paul & Anke Hoeffler 2002. "On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 46, no 1, February 2002. 13-28.

141 Gurr, Ted Robert 1972. *Polimetrics: Introduction to Quantitative Macropolitics*, Prentice Hall.

Food riots involving extensive destruction of property by the urban poor is an example of this category of conflict. The incident that could spark this kind of violence can be very trivial, such as a decision by a company to sack a number of workers, or a decision by the state to elevate taxes for labour, or reduce the level of unemployment benefits.

Conflict behaviour sparked by relative deprivation could occur when economic changes put some groups of people in a relatively worse position than others. Decisions related to food subsidies could enrage the urban population; a revaluation of the national currency could deprive workers in the export sector; a rise in energy prices often sparks **envy-based violence** in impoverished states; and inflation could frustrate the urban unemployed poor. The deterioration of the conditions of students and resulting student riots can be categorised as envy-based. Falling standards, no standardisation, and no prospects of jobs creates a discrepancy between what is seen as fair and what is perceived as real (relative deprivation).

Administrative paralysis, the consequent economic mismanagement and the current economic crisis on a global scale can also create opportunities for violent struggle. Unemployment makes violent mobilisation of deprived masses easier:¹⁴² the unemployed have the time and opportunities, and they need money that the elite might promise as a quid pro quo for demonstrations. Elites might also mobilise conflict behaviour among the unemployed and thus create a class of conflict entrepreneurs who are not only motivated by their grievances but also by the economic and prestige-related incentives a rebellion offers. As unemployed people they have nothing, while as rebels they have both an identity and an income. These opportunities might make it easier for politicians to mobilise unemployed masses for intimidation and sabotage or for violent demonstrations.¹⁴³ Thus **spontaneous as well as manipulated riots by the poor, unemployed masses could be possible** in the status quo situation.

Furthermore, difficulties in the definition of competences in the judicial system have protected the criminal economy and war profiteers. Difficulties in law enforcement could help create a criminal economy that offers

opportunities for violent competition for the spoils of a corrupt system. Many nationalist politicians show clear contempt towards the judiciary, as for example, Milorad Dodik, who regularly criticises and undermines the work of the Court of BiH and ICTY. In addition, the inability to prosecute high-profile politicians is a fact that even highly-ranked judicial officials admit is worrying.¹⁴⁴ This could contribute to risks of small scale **criminal gang wars** mobilised by politicians and businessmen involved in the criminal economy. Furthermore, difficulties in law enforcement could encourage an environment (free of rules) where even minimal motives trigger violence. In this environment, hate speech and even football matches could spark low intensity conflicts.¹⁴⁵

4.1.3 Peace potential in Status Quo

An alternative to the belligerent scenarios within the scenario category of status quo could be developments that lead to practical problem-solving on concrete issues that relate to the above mentioned paralyses. At least five types of gradual changes would be needed.

First, if **nation-building** cannot be based on the destruction of constitutional guarantees for ethnic autonomy, it could start from the other end. The crucial question of integration is whether all groups are allowed to feel ownership of the country. A peaceful scenario where ethnic differences would not sabotage the unity and integration of the state would be a scenario that started with **shared ownership of the nation**. Right now, the narrative of defenders of unity and victims of historical inequity unnecessarily associate national unity to the partisan experiences of the Bosniaks and Croats in the hands of separatist Serb perpetrators. In such a unifying narrative the union of the victims is built on their opposition of the perpetrator. To be inclusive, the state will have to base its existence on a more inclusive narrative. The naming of the country as Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the exclusion of ethnic Serbs in the name of the Croat-Bosniak Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, does not

142 Tilly, Charles 1974. *An Urban World*, Boston: Little, Brown.

143 Collier & Hoeffler 2002.

144 Bukić, Amor, the Chief Prosecutor of RS, said in 2011: "Let's be realistic, someone who is of any importance in this country cannot be convicted". Depo Portal 2011. *Glavni tužilac Republike Srpske- Amor Bukić: "Haj'mo biti realni, u ovoj zemlji teško se može neko, ko je imalo značajniji, osuditi"*, 14.06.2011, <http://www.depo.ba/front/hajmo-biti-realni-u-ovoj-zemlji-tesko-se-moze-neko-ko-je-imalo-znacajniji-osuditi> (retrieved 01.08.2011).

145 Azinović, Bassuener & Weber 2011.

favour sustainable nation-building. The Bosnia-Bosniak link is clear, but in addition to that, Croats residing in Herzegovina have also colloquially been called “Herzegovians”. Even if the etymology of the name of the country has nothing to do with ethnicities,¹⁴⁶ the practice of the political language has created this linkage.¹⁴⁷ The fact that, for example, Richard Holbrooke¹⁴⁸ uses the word Bosnians as synonym for Bosniaks testifies to the association. The mistake by Holbrooke was a reflection of the realities he had witnessed, while at the same time his perceptions and the perceptions of foreigners in Bosnia and Herzegovina in general, shape the political realities in the country. For the realisation of a peaceful status quo, this narrative foundation that has been sedimented in the names of political units has to be altered. One way to do this would be to return to the practice of the Yugoslav times of calling Bosniaks Muslims rather than Bosniaks. This would dissociate one of the three big ethnic groups from the state and help create a reality where members of the other ethnic groups could also feel ownership of the state. However, this would be difficult. The fact that Muslims were classified according to their religion made it possible through Yugoslav history for Serbs and Croats to consider them as Muslim Serbs or Muslim Croats, rather than considering them on a par with the ethnic group of Serbs or Croats.¹⁴⁹ Thus naturally, Bosniak-ness has to be recognized as coequal with Serb-ness and Croat-ness. If it was possible to return to the practice several hundred years ago of calling Serbs Orthodox and Croats Catholics, this parity could be achieved. This would dissociate the ethnicities from names reserved to the state (and states outside Bosnia and Herzegovina), and thus allow Serb ownership of the state. Despite the fact that the name of the Federation was decided upon (in the Washington treaty of 1994) without any explicit intent on claiming the federation as the true part of the country, it would make a lot of sense to change the name of the Federation to accommodate the Republika Srpska also into the state. The name of Republika Srpska would then, too need a change, as this name refers to an ethnicity and

associates the entity with the Republic of Serbia (as can be observed from the practice of the Social Democratic Bosniak politician, Emir Suljagić, who called the Republika Srpska ‘Serbia’).¹⁵⁰

All this seems necessary for a genuine build-up of common multiethnic ownership of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus a condition for a peaceful status quo. Yet changing names and thus also identities of groups of people who perceive their group identity to be very important, is of course totally unrealistic, and especially difficult for outsiders in the international community. This is why it is more realistic simply to sensitise the donor community to this problem of naming, ownership and identities rather than to insist that it should in any way try to push the country in particular directions on this issue. Lasting peace will require dealing with the problem of common ownership and the names of the ethnicities, but this is something the international community cannot influence, it simply has to recognise the problem in order to anticipate the consequences of the difficulties of the ownership of the state by different ethnicities.

Secondly, integration and common nation-building¹⁵¹ requires the facilitation of inter-ethnic cooperation. This does not require constitutional changes, just incentives and **positive interdependence**. Gradual expansion of economic ventures involving cooperation between people from different ethnic groups is a very important step towards a common nation, even if the constitutional system remains based on ethnic autonomy. Inter-ethnic cooperation could be fostered by economic initiatives where individuals of different ethnic origins would have to participate.¹⁵²

Thirdly, if the system based on ethnic autonomy could gradually develop clarity as regards the division of labour between the state and entities, decision-making (without external dictation) could be made easier. The current paralysis is not just a result of strong consensus requirements. It is also caused by disagreement about

146 Malcolm 1994. Instead, Herzegovina, for example, has on several historical occasions been a Serb rather than a Croat stronghold.

147 The origin of the word “nigger” is the word “negro”, which refers to the dark skin colour of African-Americans. However, it is the practice of the use of the word that has associated the word with disrespect. After this practice is established, it is no longer possible to argue for the use of the word by referring to its neutral and objective origin.

148 Richard, Holbrooke 1999. *To End a War*. Modern Library. Blackwell/Ithaca: Cornell University Press [1st. ed, 1983].

149 Malcolm 1994. 198-201.

150 Suljagić 2011.

151 As explained in the introduction, our usage of the word nation differs from the standard usage of the word in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nation refers to the people of a country, while common nationalism (as opposed to ethno-nationalism) refers to a sentiment that emphasises the unity of all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.


152 McCarter, Willie 2008. “Economics of peace making: the case of The International Fund for Ireland”, 93-99, in Kivimäki, ed., *Lessons of Peace Processes. Special Edition of Asia Europe Journal*, no. 6.

what level various decisions should be taken at. **Greater consensus about the competences of entities and the state** could remedy this problem at least partially. The report of the scenario project revealed the fact that in general participants seemed to assume that effective economic policies require nationally cohesive strategies. Yet, while in the use of monetary instruments this might be the case, approaches/concepts regarding the finances of the entities could design different strategies, just as long as disagreement on competences does not paralyse the implementation of such policies. The good functioning of the USA, despite its far-reaching decentralisation, testifies to the fact that it is not decentralisation but confusion about the levels of competences that paralyse a decision-making system. The plurality of the economy could even be deployed/applied for the common benefit, if transnational ethnic linkages could be utilized to promote economic cooperation between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, Serbia and also Turkey.

Fourthly, if despite the basic structure based on entities, administrative sectors that suffer from logistical problems (caused by the awkward shape of the Republika Srpska) could develop cooperation across entities, many of the main problems of the administrative paralysis and logistics of public service provision could be solved. Experiences of reciprocal servicing of non-nationals in health centres in border areas (Tornio-Haaparanda, between Finland and Sweden, or Malmö-Copenhagen, between Sweden and Denmark, for instance) testify that functional cooperation can work even across state-borders. Therefore, functional cooperation between the municipalities of Republika Srpska and the Federation should not be impossible (not to mention the benefit this could bring to inter-ethnic confidence-building). This is already happening on a smaller scale and with limited aspects such as transportation in Sarajevo: Sarajevo is mostly in the Federation, while Eastern Sarajevo is in Republika Srpska. The successful cooperation of the two mayors was even awarded with a Peace Prize (interview with a Bosniak SDP politician in Sarajevo, 26.06.2011). However, this seems to rather be an exception, as interviewees in another town divided between the two entities, Dobož, considered the division as a considerable, unnatural obstacle in their lives (interviews with a Bosniak and a Serb in Dobož, 23.06.2011). **Small steps to problem-solving** would probably constitute the main non-violent path if Bosnia and Herzegovina continues in its current constitutional outfit.

Finally, if the contradiction between group rights and historical justice requires the mixing of populations in entities (repatriation of people who had to flee their homes during the war), this could be made less threatening for the ethnic Serbs if the existence of Bosnian Serbs was not based solely on Serb territory. If instead, ethnic existence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, could also be established through **non-territorial structures of cultural governance**, ethnic groups could exist even if they are mixed with one another. The Sami Parliament in Nordic countries for the ethnic Laps, and the Belgian constitutional provisions of non-territorial cultural assemblies represent options that have not been considered in the political debate in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If ethnic groups could exercise non-territorial ethnic autonomy and decide on their cultural matters in their own group without having to have control over an area that was exclusively theirs, the contradiction between group rights and historical justice could be eased even within the context of what would be essentially the status quo. Ethnicity in Bosnia and Herzegovina is partly associated with a specific territory and it would not be realistic to assume that this association could be abolished away any time soon. Yet, all ethnicities have already had to compromise on this association by allowing people of other ethnic groups to settle in territories they consider their own. This compromise has been and will be necessary for historical justice, and thus making it as easy as possible would make sense. This is why a scenario in which part of the territorial ethnic autonomy has been converted to non-territorial ethnic autonomy should be considered as one of the options in the general scenario category of status quo.

Illustration 4.2. Summary of the Status Quo scenarios



4.2 Dissolution

In the question of ethnic autonomy, both status quo and disintegration are on the same side of the political imagination in the sense that these two scenarios emphasise the importance of ethnicity. However, with regards to immediate conflict potential, status quo and disintegration are at opposite ends of the political spectrum. While status quo satisfies the immediate minimal interests of the possible conflicting parties, disintegration would not satisfy the core interests of supporters of a unified state or the interests of Bosniak and Croat ethno-nationalists. It would not offer a unified state and it would not rectify the consequences of the ethnic cleansing during the Bosnian War.

Disintegration would most likely be a consequence of dissatisfaction and conflict after the collapse of the status quo. The driving force that could spark disintegration is the dysfunctional structure of state-level administration and the continuing paralysis over state-level issues, as well as the desire for ethnic autonomy. Yet, since disintegration has only been envisaged along ethnic lines, it seems probable that it could only be a result of ethnic conflicts after the status quo. Violent opportunities could lead to state failure and criminal anarchy in the country, also known as "somalisation",¹⁵³ while wars sparked

by economic frustration would probably lead to more functional, less ethnic solutions. Thus the alternative or intertwining, simultaneous paths to disintegration could be envisaged as shown in illustration 4.3.

It is clear that the political imagination of the members of the scenario workshop has been limited due to the frame of the methodology and the group has failed to consider at least one serious option. Disintegration does not need to happen as a conscious decision and a reaction to problems in the status quo. It can also take place as a cumulative process caused by the widening criminal opportunities offered by a dysfunctional system of governance and growing reliance on external governance of the country. The sense of security caused by the international presence can encourage opportunity-driven irresponsibility among the country's politicians and business elite. At the end of the road of this development is a de facto disintegration of the state-level political system. This situation could be characterised in the existence but irrelevance and non-enforcement of laws and the Constitution. This phenomenon is known as state collapse or state failure, and since its purest and most extreme form has since 1990 existed in Somalia, this scenario could be called "Somalisation". Thus disintegration could also mean disappearance of all state-level governance, not just the take-over of entities of the role of the state. Illustration 4.4. summarises the path to such a scenario. The conflict potentials of such a scenario will be dealt with after first looking at the conflict potentials in the ethnic disintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

¹⁵³ The term „somalisation“ is in the meantime also used by UN officials, for example: UN Radio 2009. *UN official warns about "Somalisation" of Eastern Chad*, 12.11.2009, <http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/detail/85666.html> (retrieved on 12.12. 2011). Presently, the term is often used by analysts following the situation in Yemen and Lybia.

Illustration 4.3. Path to Disintegration





Illustration 4.4. Path to Somalisation



4.2.1 Disintegration and the potential for peace and conflict

Disintegration was imagined in the scenario workshops as a result of a conflict following the declaration of independence of the Republika Srpska. Interestingly, this scenario was also envisaged as taking place in the context of “the patronage of the international community to prevent violent conflict.” According to the conclusions of the scenario workshop, “These new countries [will be focused] on internal structural changes on their path towards EU integration. The economies in the newly formed countries are developing due to the influx of foreign direct investments and international aid.” While dissolution is imagined as something that divides the country into three ethnic parts, it could also be imagined as something that simply consolidates the role of current entities and cantons as independent countries. Violence as a consequence of dissolution could be imagined both between the Bosniaks and Croats on the one hand and the separating Serbs on the other, or between Croats who demand separation from the remains of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Bosniaks. And while the former is perceived as a possibility, the Croat efforts are not yet seen as serious enough to disturb peace. However, the Croat National Assembly was revived in April 2011 largely by HDZ and HDZ 1990, and its main demand is a reform of the Constitution, allowing the option for a third entity with a Croat majority. And although the idea does not seem to have wide public support,¹⁵⁴ the High Representative in his latest report to the UN raised concerns

¹⁵⁴ Ipsos 2010.

“about the risk of parallel governing structures eventually emerging.”¹⁵⁵

The scenario of disintegration can only be seen in the context of dissatisfaction with the status quo. The disintegration of a nation can take place violently or non-violently. The number of separatist wars in Northern Ireland (UK), Basque Country (Spain), Kosovo (Serbia), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), East Pakistan (Bangladesh), Nagaland (India and Myanmar), Karen and Kachin State (Burma/Myanmar), Patani (Thailand), Aceh and Papua (Indonesia), Mindanao (Philippines), Tibet and Xinjian (China), Eritrea (Ethiopia), and West Sahara (Morocco) to only name a few, clearly indicate the risks involved in the disintegration of a nation. However, the peaceful disintegration of Czechoslovakia, the relatively bloodless disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the far reaching autonomy arrangements in many other areas (Lland, Aceh and Greenland, for example) show that unity is not a necessary condition for peace.¹⁵⁶ Claiming (in a credible manner) that the separation of the Republika Srpska necessarily involves violence creates an expectation that would make peaceful disintegration even more difficult than it otherwise needed to be. It would be helping the construction of a social reality where disintegration, indeed, cannot happen peacefully. The perception that disintegration will necessarily be violent creates a reality where the prediction of conflict, if separation was to occur, will effectively prevent the willingness to accept separation of the RS from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and since this willingness is the condition for a peaceful separation, the “naturalisation” of the association between violence and disintegration will socially construct the reality of violent disintegration.

The main force of peace in ethnic disintegration, imagined by the members of the scenario workshop, as well as in most of our interviews in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is the international community in different reincarnations.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵ Fortieth Report of the High Representative (...), 2011. 9.

¹⁵⁶ These examples are simply to show that dissolution is not necessarily violent. They are not presented as cases with comparable legitimate claim for independence or autonomy.

¹⁵⁷ This is one of the features of the report of the workshop that suggests that despite the presence of Serb representation in the workshop the Serb voice cannot always be heard in the report on scenarios. A majority of Serbs in the FES survey (Šolaja 2010) felt that the Bosnian War was caused, not prevented, by foreigners, and the role of NATO has often been seen by Serb informants as a major destabilising force in the former Yugoslavia. The fact that now the international community is seen as a stabilising force seems unrepresentative of the position of majority of Serbs, which was also supported by our interviews, especially in Republika Srpska.

This foundation could be solid, at least for some time: a sufficient power position of the international community could analytically be predicted as a condition where none of the parties feel strong enough to challenge any agreements on separation.¹⁵⁸ Yet in the long run, grievances emanating from the legitimisation of the situation after ethnic cleansing, as well as the ambitions of common nation-building (or building of common citizenship) will have to be countered before ethnic disintegration could be a peaceful solution. None of this work is possible before there is clarity over the inevitability of disintegration, since the build-up of common citizenship is necessary for all the other scenarios. Moreover, in spite of the impression that the international community and especially EUFOR would act as a guarantor of peace, the Atlantic Initiative report refers to the dwindling capacity of the EU forces and quotes an officer of the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) calling EUFOR a “paper tiger”.¹⁵⁹ Further, some of our interviewees expressed their scepticism about the role of the international community in this case: “The international community actually does not have enough economic interest to stop a war here. We are such a small, meaningless country.” (interview with a Bosniak politician, Sarajevo, 28.06.2011).

Disintegration would seriously threaten some identities and this threat could lead to conflicts. On the one hand, the identity of war veterans as saviours of the country would be threatened if disintegration was discussed as a serious peaceful option. On the other hand, also the Bosniak and the Croat elements of the military could react violently if politicians were to allow independence for the Republika Srpska. In the former case of **veteran protests**, violence could be limited, while in the latter case, the magnitude of violence would depend on the role of the official institutions of power. The constitutional setting that defines the army as one and makes it difficult for the country’s military forces to go against a rebellious, separatist entity. Yet, it is imaginable that fragments of the military would resist the disintegration of the country forcefully. In spite of a successful reform, hailed by our interviewees (for example, interviews with a Croat ethno-nationalist politician, Mostar, 29.06.2011 and a Serb officer of the Army BiH, Sarajevo, 26.06.2011) and the international community alike, the regimental system of

the army and perceived injustices where army promotions are concerned, leave room for suspicion whether the army would act in unity in case of a dissolution. Alternatively, separatism of the Republika Srpska could be dealt with by means of a police operation (war caused by a split in the military). In cases where the organised and well-funded official institutions of coercive power could be mobilised, the magnitude of conflict could be much greater than in other cases of veteran protests. Any large scale country-wide violence would be likely to spark violence against soft symbolic targets.¹⁶⁰ Serb minorities in the Federation as well as non-Serb minorities in the Republika Srpska would be the obvious victims as they would be locally considered as non-threatening representatives of the otherwise threatening enemy. The targets of these **displacement conflicts** might be repatriated minorities, minority politicians or minority candidates for political offices, etc. Thus “target displacement conflicts” can take forms rather similar to those which could take place in the context of the status quo.

Dissolution would also threaten the identity of Bosniaks and Croats as the victims of the Bosnian war. For the victims of the Bosnian War, the peaceful separation of the Federation and the Republika Srpska would require the acceptance and recognition of the violent ethnic cleansing and ethnic separation of the mixed territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under this condition, not only the Bosniak but also the Croat population would have difficulties in accepting disintegration. According to the envisioning of the scenario workshop, even an agreement on the highest levels of separation of the three ethnicities would lead into a situation where a part of Bosniak population would oppose a dissolution agreement and express their disappointment through violent action. As a result, the consensus of the scenario workshop was that this scenario was not likely without blood-letting. In addition to further motivating the types of conflicts already mentioned, the shadow of the Bosnian War of the 1990s could spark **retribution conflicts** where Bosniak ethno-nationalists would target Serb “perpetrators” in an effort to deny the victory that the independence of the Republika Srpska would constitute. Retribution conflicts may also be imagined as a result of perceived injustices in the distribution of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s assets and heritage in the process of dissolution. This type of violence would be most likely take place in the areas of the

158 Gochman, Charles 1979. *Studies of International Violence. Five Easy Pieces?*, in Singer, David, ed., *Explaining War, Selected Papers from the Correlates of War Project*, Sage: London.

159 Azinović, Bassuener & Weber 2011. 71.

160 Horowitz, Donald L. 2001. *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*, University of California Press.

Republika Srpska that have been most disputed between Bosniaks and Serbs.

Several interviews for this study reveal that it would be the two above-mentioned groups, war veterans and the defenders of the Bosniak and Croat victims who might oppose the separation of the Republika Srpska violently. Disintegration would place these groups against Serb ethno-nationalist separatists in violent confrontation as a consequence of political decisions (by the Republika Srpska) to separate.

Another important issue to consider is the Brčko District Final Award: a decision has not yet been made and both entities feel entitled to the territory (or at least parts of it). In the event that this issue could not be resolved before a possible dissolution, Brčko could emerge as one of the most critical battlegrounds. Its potential instability was also recently acknowledged by the High Representative in his *Fortieth Report* to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.¹⁶¹


The peaceful and conflicting scenarios involved in the ethnic version of disintegration are summarised in illustration 4.5.

4.2.2 Somalisation and the potential of peace and conflict

The criminalisation of the economy and political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina could result in the Somalisation of the country, which in effect would be a consequence of the deterioration of the more alarming aspects of the status quo. **Further criminalisation of politics and the economy** and **escalating rioting of the unemployed urban poor** are thus also the characteristics of the consequences of Somalisation. Rioting urban poor under the tutelage of criminal politicians together with violent exploiters of the criminal economy, could develop into a class of war entrepreneurs, whose identity and income is dependent on the continuation of Somalisation. Some of the war entrepreneurs could emerge from private security firms. While their operations are regulated by law, it is undeniable that many of them still consist of war veterans and former members of the police or military, which implies that their allegiance towards one or the other side is strong. These war entrepreneurs would then become spoilers¹⁶² that actively sabotage any efforts at the development of the rule of law.

Another worrying fact is the amount and accessibility of arms and ammunition that is still present in Bosnia and


Illustration 4.5. Path to peace and conflict from ethnic Dissolution



¹⁶¹ Fortieth Report of the High Representative (...) 2011. 5.

¹⁶² Stedman 1997.

Illustration 4.6. Path to peace and conflict from Somalisation



Herzegovina. While disarmament has been called a success story by politicians and the international community alike, some of our interviewees have expressed their doubts about this: “There are still a lot of weapons lying around. We did not give everything back. We had 1 million people with weapons at one time. You can buy a gun for 200 Euro.” (interview with a Bosniak SDP politician, Sarajevo, 28.06.2011). Other reports confirm these doubts.¹⁶³

Peaceful ways out from Somalisation involve the **international community**, but not in a role as a permanent guarantor of security, but **as the facilitator of ownership and greater local responsibility for law and order**. As has been learned from Somalia, legitimate rule of law cannot be built from outside (Kivimäki 2001). Yet the international community can help in the creation of local

structures of governance. In a country where the state level of governance is most contested (Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina), the build-up of structures of governance could also start from lower levels of governance (**pockets of good governance**). As in the case of ethnic disintegration, the build-up of state-level governance could be best owned by the new state (one or three) if it was developed with EU integration in mind.

4.3 Functional Decentralised State

The scenario of functional decentralisation is based on decentralised rule, but one that differs from the current concept of decentralisation as a system that compromises ethnic autonomy for the sake of functionality of regional governance, and that reflects socio-economic necessities. In this model, administrative units do not follow ethnic lines whenever ethnic lines make the delivery of basic services difficult. Ethnic divisions are still acknowledged, but compared to the status quo, they have lost their centrality to the principle of functionality. Instead of the ethnic rationale for its own sake, functional administration aims at short distances and sizes of administrative units that optimise public services delivery. According to the definition of the scenario project of this scenario, “Bosnia and Herzegovina is a functional centralised state and a member of the European Union. The centralised political system established after the violent conflict and subsequent international military intervention enabled simplified decision-making processes, which resulted in political, economic and judicial reforms. Human rights legislation is being implemented, the economy is on an upward path, unemployment rate is in decline, and social cohesion is on the increase”. Even though functional decentralism will not entirely remove constitutional ethnic primacy, it is a significant leap towards that direction. Thus, in a situation where ethnic primacy has been the main interest of the Serb minority of Bosnia and Herzegovina,¹⁶⁴ it is natural to assume that a development against such a principle would upset the Serb minority and not the Bosniak or Croat ethno-nationalists (as in the previous scenarios).

The Ipsos 2010 survey reveals that dissatisfaction by the majority with a constitutional order based on near-independent entities is partly motivated by logistical problems. The fact that Republika Srpska stretches around

¹⁶³ For example, Azinović, Bassuener & Weber 2011.

¹⁶⁴ Ipsos 2010.

the Federation makes the provision of services expensive and logistically inefficient. The provision of entity-based central health, water, administrative and other services from Banja Luka, for example, makes it very difficult for residents of, say, Trebinje at the southernmost tip of the entity to receive these services. For the residents of Southern Republika Srpska it would be more convenient for logistical reasons to receive their centralised services from Sarajevo or Mostar, which would be nearest. If autonomy was designed for maximal efficiency, the borders of administrative units would be drawn for optimised service delivery rather than in accordance to the ethnicity of the inhabitants.

Another attraction of functional decentralisation is the fact that it is based on functional service delivery. This would avoid the perceived sabotaging of the central decision-making by the entities, especially the Republika Srpska. The fact that the entity-based system of decentralisation is mainly opposed in the Federation reveals that this paralysis of the central administration is the main reason for the appeal of a functional system of decentralisation. Residents of the Republika Srpska are the main losers in the logistical problems related to the entity-based decentralisation, yet they still strongly support their entity. Thus the main appeal of a functional system must be related to the administrative paralysis on the state level. Interviews for this study, as well as the conclusions of the International Crisis Group (2010), on the main perceived challenges of the political system, support this assumption. The Ipsos survey reveals that the level of dissatisfaction towards the state-level administrative paralysis is high, especially in the Federation. This paralysis is largely seen as the reason for the main economic and political problems. Functional administrative units would not have reasons to oppose the central state the way the entities undermine the central state in the status quo in order to emphasize the relevance of ethnic divisions in politics. Functional administrative units would protect the individual rights of members of ethnic minorities, as well as collective ethnic rights, but ethnicity would no longer be the sole foundation of the political system. In functional decentralisation governance is primarily optimised for functional efficiency, while ethnic divisions take a secondary place in this scenario.

Functional administrative areas would not reproduce the ethnic divide in political processes the way in which the current constitution does. While status quo is based on

consociational concepts of democracy,¹⁶⁵ functional decentralisation is a step towards a more integrative model (Horowitz 1995). If the ethnicity of a politician was not constitutionally relevant (as is the case in the current system), people would be able to define their collective identities without them being imposed by the political system.¹⁶⁶ However, this seems to be a far-fetched idea in today's BiH, where collective identities are realised through ethnicity and everything to the contrary causes paralysis and dispute, as can be seen in the recent case of Croats feeling disenfranchised (and cheated at) by the SDP, a multi-ethnic party with an apparent Bosniak-majority following the 2010 elections.

The political system of the status quo has offered poor outputs as a result of logistical problems, state-level paralysis and self-reproducing constitutional ethnic tribalism. Unemployment, crime, corruption and poverty are the main problems that have most often been mentioned by the people.¹⁶⁷ These problems push the system towards a more functional direction. Yet, since this functionalisation needs to compromise some of the ethnic autonomy (even if ethnic autonomy still is a secondary determinant of the political system), the transition will have to go against the wishes of most Serbs who consider the current level of ethnic autonomy as minimally acceptable. Thus the scenario project assumed that this change implies two main requirements: considerable conflict fatigue and international intervention.

The path to functional decentralisation is summarised in illustration 4.7.

4.3.1 Conflict potential in the transformation towards a more functional model of decentralisation


Functional decentralisation would mean a compromise on the current principle of ethnic autonomy among the three main ethnic groups. In view of the fact that the political preferences of the residents of the Republika Srpska are, on many issue areas, different from the preferences of other groups, the ending of ethnic autonomy would risk a situation where the Serb population would be in

¹⁶⁵ Lijphart 1977.

¹⁶⁶ Suljagić 2011.

¹⁶⁷ Ipsos 2010.

Illustration 4.7. Path to Functional Decentralisation



a permanent minority and in a position of opposition in those areas where functional necessities require compromises to the principle of ethnic administrative regions. The Ipsos 2010 survey shows that in the Republika Srpska in particular, this compromise is not realistic the way things are now. According to the survey 46 per cent of inhabitants of the Republika Srpska felt that the power of ethnically-based entities should be maintained as it is in the status quo, while 26 per cent felt that ethnic autonomy should be even stronger, and that Republika Srpska should be independent. The preservation of the Republika Srpska was often mentioned in the interviews

as the primary political objective of many of the Serb respondents.¹⁶⁸ It is interesting to note that while in the IPSOS survey the population of the Republika Srpska reflected the vision of their ethno-nationalist politicians, the Croatian population in FBiH seems not to have reflected the ethno-nationalist line of their party leaders.¹⁶⁹

In the scenario project, functional autonomy was imagined as a result of a major conflict shock and an international intervention to “oppose the ethnic politicians” (and in the case of RS, also the current will of the people there) for the benefit of the nation. Thus even the imagined transition to functional decentralism is violent: “Nationalistic rhetoric, chauvinism and hate fuelled by the discourse of political parties and the media in the country triggered random acts of inter-ethnic violence designed to shift the attention from the deteriorating economy, the lack of development strategies and staggering unemployment. (...) Popular discontent was manifested in a growing opposition to the ruling ethno-nationalist oligarchies that were accused of masking the dreadful economic and social conditions by fuelling ethnic conflicts.” Most respondents in the interviews did not expect major episodes of violence, but were afraid of smaller conflicts. However, neither did these respondents anticipate a war before the Bosnian War. In the identification of possible violent scenarios within the main scenario of functionalised decentralisation, we cannot not rule out the possibility of small-scale violence leading to a war. However, the most likely mechanism for the onset of war would be a development where one of these anticipated small-scale incidents escalates in an uncontrolled manner.

Development towards functionalised territorial units will emphasize the existing abstract dispute between people who would like to see the state level strengthened at the expense of entities and people who would like to see entities at least as strong in the future as they are now. These constitutional positions are abstract and the people holding them are difficult to identify (except for the fact that most Bosniaks are assumed to support the

¹⁶⁸ Šolaja 2008.

¹⁶⁹ The question in the Šolaja 2008 survey is: “Which thesis best represents your attitude towards the issue of territorial structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina?”(42). One could speculate that, since for the RS population entity equals ethnicity, they would like to retain the situation as it is, while as the Croats in the Federation do not make the same connection, since they ‘share’ their entity with the Bosniaks, they voted against this thesis. However, a mere 12 per cent in FBiH in favour of creating a separate, Croatian entity (even if all of those who voted in favour were Croats) does not support this theory.

first while most ethnic Serbs the latter position). Thus this abstract dispute will not as such spark violence. Instead, to anticipate dangerous developments, one has to be able to identify events that exemplify this dispute and which put supporters against each other in a more concrete manner. From the experiences of the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina and those of other conflicts, it is easy to see that at least the following incidents and practices could become concrete representations of the crucial dispute about entity power:

- The repatriation of Bosniaks in the Republika Srpska (**repatriation conflicts**),
- Disputes (**employment conflicts**) about specific employment opportunities for regional minority candidates (Serbs in the Federation and especially Bosniaks and Croats in the Republika Srpska¹⁷⁰);
- Disputes about inter-ethnic crimes (**criminal conflicts**);
- Disputes about the right to religious rituals that are considered by members of other religious groups as disturbing (**religious conflicts**);
- **High-politics incidents** of decisions to:
 - change borders of entities into more functional ones;
 - decisions by the Republika Srpska to reverse functionalisation by declaring independence; or
 - foreign policy decisions that the entities disagree about (for example the question of NATO membership).

This chapter briefly analyses each of these concrete dispute processes and tries to develop alternative paths that describe the possible developments that can take both peaceful and belligerent directions.

Moves towards functional decentralisation will constitute moves away from ethnically based territorial autonomy. If the constitutional order changes with the functionalisation of the political system and the veto powers of ethnic groups weaken (this must be one of the main ideas

170 In the Status Quo, minority candidates cannot be elected or appointed without majority approval. Whether in functional decentralisation this would be possible without majority approval depends on how far the functionalisation and de-ethnisation proceeds. However, a few members of the majority could still be violently dissatisfied by concessions to minorities even if they were accepted by the majority of the population, as we can see in the violence against returnees, for example. Even if the majority of the host population would accept some concessions to returnees, there may still be "true members of the host population" who will violently resist such concession.

of a functional order that does not cause administrative paralysis), the power of the Serbs might not be sufficient to prevent a push from the central government for the **repatriation** of the biggest ethnic group, the Bosniaks, in areas dominated by the Serbs in the post-war period. This change is likely to be met with feeling of existential threat. Since the returnees in the Republika Srpska are seen as concrete representatives of the threatening integrating state power (in spite of officials sticking to the line of them being welcome), and since they are a small local minority, it will be tempting for the Serb ultra-ethno-nationalists to hit the strong and threatening state by aiming at the easy targets of the returnee communities.¹⁷¹ Such attacks were common in the immediate aftermath of the Bosnian War, but have become very uncommon nowadays, largely because of successful law enforcement and the low numbers of returnees. There are still 113,000 internally displaced Bosniaks, of whom around 8,000 are living in collective shelters.¹⁷² However, discrimination against returnees is very common. At the same time/Nevertheless, a move towards functional decentralisation would present a radical change that would threaten some of the fundamental premises of the Serb political thinking. Thus, it would not be impossible if in this context the police protection of returnees became weaker and if popular anger against them became stronger.

Since targeting defenceless repatriating, ethnically-cleansed populations resonate with the experiences of the Bosnian War, violence against repatriating people will probably be reciprocated by militant supporters of "one nation", religious fanatics, war veterans, or the Bosniak/(Croat) units of the national defence forces. Depending on how much courage and power can be mobilised for a counter-attack, the target can be either directly the same people and communities that were responsible for the initial violence, or innocent minorities that belong to the same community as the initial aggressors, but who live in the other entity. Attacks against Serbs in the Federation could further trigger attacks against non-Serbs in the Republika Srpska, and violence could then escalate horizontally to the disputed border areas of the Federation and the Republic. The fact that the military forces

171 This target selection would be in line with the theory of Horowitz, 2001. The target has to represent a feared enemy (the central state), but it has to be concrete and less threatening, so that violence against this concrete target could communicate the same message as attacking the feared more abstract enemy, except that the operation would not be as frightening.

172 See www.cesi.fpn.unsa.ba (retrieved on 01.02.2012.).

of the country have now been integrated into one force could possibly initially reduce the intensity of conflict, if by then the military manages to be sufficiently integrated to prevent ethnically based splits.

The perception of discrimination in **competitions for publicly visible senior jobs** could spark violence if instead of a functional choice (say, a better educated candidate), the successful candidate is selected out of ethnic concerns, or concerns related to membership in ethnic parties. This is the practice today, as confirmed by our interviews (e.g. with a Serb in Banja Luka, 21.06.2011, a Croat ethno-nationalist in Mostar, 29.06.2011 etc.). Alternatively, if the candidate from the local majority loses against a functionally more competent candidate (such as a person with higher education), this, too, could spark violence. The move from ethnic-based considerations towards functional considerations (with possible constitutional changes) will involve many concrete cases where functional and ethnic rationales influence the selection of senior administrative officials. Such events could be seen as exemplifications of the general trend towards reduced ethnic autonomy, or as backlashes in the path to functional decentralisation and as such concrete exemplifications of abstract disputes. In such cases the supporters of the two rationales would also be easier to identify as they could rally publicly for their candidates. In a case where a candidate of the local majority ethnicity loses against a minority candidate, violence could be targeted against the winning candidate and his/her supporters. If the position was filled with ethnic criteria in mind, the reaction could be against minority candidates in other job competitions in the other entity, or frustration could be expressed by demands of punitive action on behalf of the central government against the entity that tries to reverse the process towards functional decentralisation. The problem with elite job competitions (competitions for political and administrative offices) is that mobilisation in these disputes is easy, which can be seen in the recent Croat-SDP dispute. The main stakeholders are elite people who have the intellectual capacity, and personal interest, in mobilising general political grievances for violent action in support of their candidacy. According to instrumentalist analyses of conflicts,¹⁷³ these settings are often the most dangerous for peace and harmony.

173 The instrumentalist view of ethnic conflict holds that collective identities are easily manipulated by political elites in conflict situations. The instrumentalist theory of ethnic conflict has revealed that the main drivers of ethnic conflict are not ethnic divisions as such but the interests of elites to mobilise these divisions for their own benefit. Wherever elites have personal interests in mobilising people by using their ethnic platforms, this is when the risk of ethno-political conflict is greatest. The main developers of the instrumentalist theory include Horowitz 2001; 2004, and Gellner, Ernst 2006. *Nations and Nationalism*. London: Wiley-Blackwell/Oxford: Basil.

Inter-ethnic crimes (often crimes where the perpetrator and the victim just happen to be of different ethnic origin) are also often triggers of violent communal reaction. Ethnic communities sometimes organise their own policing, especially when it experiences discrimination and in situations where the police is not perceived to be interested in capturing the perpetrator of the favoured ethnicity. In such situations there is a risk that the victim community organises an ethnically-based protection of the community against crime from the majority community. In some cases ethnically-based retribution and revenge take place against the perpetrators of ethnic crimes and sometimes also against their relatives and ethnic communities. Informal ethnic policing almost always provokes a counter-reaction of some form. Sometimes this reaction is in support of the police against the ethnic shadow police, while sometimes the ethnic community forms a self-defence organization of their own.¹⁷⁴

In connection with this issue, there are also denunciations by provocateurs who in fact only have their own gain and profile in mind. Today there are cases where ethnic or religious leaders report and denounce publicly hostile actions against a member of their minority group, without mentioning the outcome of the event (for example, whether the police acted or not). In most cases the police forces (mostly from the majority population) are said to have reacted in a transparent matter. However, this gains less public attention than the fact that the anti-ethnic incident happened (interview with an anonymous informant in Sarajevo, June 2011).

Due to the fact that **religion** is the main objective dividing line between the politically relevant ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, abstract disputes between functionalists and supporters of ethnic autonomy could also be sparked by religious issues that other communities feel disturbing. Issuing regional permissions for the building of churches or mosques is often a decision to which abstract grievances are attached. Denial of the right to build a mosque in the Republika Srpska, or the right to build an Orthodox church in the Federation could spark violent demonstrations, even though small-scale sabotage is more typical for minorities than open confrontations.¹⁷⁵ Another issue is the construction of religious buildings in areas deemed as "inappropriate", as is the case of the

174 Fearon & Laitin 1996.

175 Gochman 1979.

Orthodox Church in Potočari in Srebrenica, which is seen as a provocation to the Muslim population due to the massacre of Muslim citizens that took place there during the Bosnian War by Serb perpetrators. The case has garnered much media attention and political confrontation. Even when disputes about permission to build religious sites have not sparked conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the context of the *status quo*, opponents of change could be seeking events where the dispute between functionalists and supporters of ethnic politics becomes concrete. Since these decisions sometimes appear to be directed against the religious interests of the majority population, violent protests against religious institutions of the minority population could be more likely.¹⁷⁶ Following the same logic, the most likely counter-reaction would then be in the form of reciprocation against the perpetrator community in the other entity.

In tense situations church bells and the Muslim morning call for prayer could also provoke reactions against the minority community's religious practices. In some cases, practices that other communities perceive as disturbing or provoking are being emphasised at times of tension as these practices are used to "create space" for the minority community in the area dominated by another religious group. Louder, more visible practices, such as those that create traffic issues or general inconvenience, are used to demonstrate to the majority community the right of existence of the minority communities and of the need to accommodate the practices of the residents with other religious beliefs. These practices construct realities of cultural space, and sometimes provoke demonstrative reactions that intend to set limits to the minority's cultural space.¹⁷⁷ Violent ethnic cleansing and genocide are the extreme reactions of more powerful groups against practices that aim at creating a greater space for smaller and less powerful groups. The message of ethnic genocide and ethnic cleansing is that the minority is a visitor who can be thrown out or even killed, and that this group does not have a legitimate space as a local community in the area (Horowitz 2001).

176 The onset of violent conflict requires that the initiating community feels that it can be victorious in such a conflict (Gochman 1979).

177 These ways of saying with violence, and acting with arguments are theorized in a more systematic manner in Horowitz 2001. The art of claiming space for a community with culturally provoking practices has been analyzed in the context of Indonesia's West Kalimantan in Kivimäki 2012.

A less likely, but certainly very serious path of development to functional decentralization is the **high-level decisions that considerably affect the balance of power between the state and the entities**. Decisions such as joining NATO, changing the constitutional rights of entities or altering the borders of entities may be necessary on functional grounds. However, they would greatly concretise the dispute about the division of power between the entities and the state. Gradual compromises to ethnic autonomy could help avoid a counter-reaction as people would not become upset simultaneously. However, high-level decisions would also define a time for the change towards functionalisation, and thus help the mobilisation against such trend. The integration of the defence forces has reduced the magnitude of potential violent reaction against decisions against ethnic autonomy. With an independent military, and especially if the constitutional order moves away from ethnic primacy to functional primacy, the coercive power to resist such decisions in the Republika Srpska could be much greater. The independence of the police forces does not constitute quite as great a danger. Popular reactions against high-level decisions are made less likely by the difficulty of finding a concrete symbol of the central government to target one's aggression against. The location of central institutions in Sarajevo (Parliament building, buildings of the Presidency etc.) is not tempting for ethno-nationalist Serbs as the area is generally dominated by Bosniaks. The fact that decision-making has been made constitutionally difficult for drastic changes in the balance of power between the state and the entities makes this violent scenario also very unlikely. Perhaps more likely would be decisions to reverse the trend towards functional decentralisation, such as a declaration of independence or a decision to join Serbia on the part of Republika Srpska. The Bosniak-dominated units of the national army or irregular troops of Bosniak war veterans, who feel they have invested too much to the unity of the country to allow the separation of Republika Srpska, could react strongly against such a decision. Furthermore, generations who have not witnessed the Bosnian War, such as the young population born in the decade before, during and after the war, is most inclined toward conflict as they did not witness the relative harmony amongst the different ethnic groups in the 1980s, and some not even the atrocities of the 1990s.¹⁷⁸

178 Puhalo, Srđan, Đorđe Čekrlija & Vladimir Turjačanin 2004. *Društvene orijentacije mladih*, Nacionalni institut za borbu protiv narkomanije, Banja Luka.

4.3.2 Peaceful scenarios in Functional Decentralisation

Alternatively, compromises to ethnic autonomy could take place over time if ethnicity could gradually lose its relevance in politics and administration.¹⁷⁹ The dysfunctional logistics of Serb autonomy in the Republika Srpska could foster the development of functional integration of the society, while according to Gurr (1994), ethnic discrimination and the threat to the cultural and autonomous existence of the ethnicity will only cause the Serbs to cling even more firmly to their ethnic autonomy.

Furthermore, in order to foster greater commitment of ethnic Serbs to the nation-state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the political culture, political practices and political language should change in a way that would allow greater Serb ownership of the state. Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be a reality where Bosnia is associated with Bosniaks, and Herzegovina with Croats. The call for a common Bosnian language cannot succeed if there is an association between Bosniak ethnicity and Bosnian language.¹⁸⁰ Calls for early de-ethnicised political practices often hide an effort to the rule of the biggest ethnicity and discrimination of the smaller communities. Again, this discrimination delays the de-ethnicisation of people's mental mind-sets.¹⁸¹ Thus it is not sufficient if Bosniaks as the largest ethnicity, and the community that the historical narratives portray as the victim community, start perceiving the irrelevance of ethnicity in politics, which is currently the trend in Bosniak centre-left parties. All the other main communities would have to feel the same way before the functionalisation of administrative areas is possible without external force or war. Integration cannot be forced and if it is, forced integration is felt as discrimination, which again leads to even greater ethnic resolve. Integration has to take place naturally, it cannot be decided by the main ethnicity: "One

cannot really 'proclaim' a new [common Bosnian] language, it has to happen naturally."¹⁸² Instead, more functional inter-ethnic integration has to be non-threatening, non-discriminatory and it has to share in the ownership of the common state (**non-threatening integration with shared ownership of the state**).

The integration of ethnic Serb identity into the common Bosnian and Herzegovinian national identity could be easier if historical inequity was associated with the individuals who committed atrocities in the Bosnian War, rather than associating atrocities with the ethnic groups of these individuals (**de-ethnicisation of historical unfairness**). Ethnic Serbs cannot integrate into the common nation as collective perpetrators and the villains of the common history. As a Serb journalist from Banja Luka said, in order for a Serb to identify with Bosnia and Herzegovina: "*Someone has to say: terrible things were done but not in my name.*"¹⁸³ Also, as another Serb analyst in Banja Luka (21.06.2011) said: "When you have a winner and a loser in BiH, it is not good."

The move towards functional decentralisation could also be less violent if the partial replacement of ethnic territories with functional territories would not threaten the cultural ethnic existence of the groups. If ethnicity and ethnic governance emphasise the existing non-territorialised forms and institutions, the loss of territorial ethnic autonomy could be less threatening (**non-territorial cultural autonomy**). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, both the Catholic Church and the Islamic Community have their seats in Sarajevo with administrative and organisational branches in the entire country. The Serb Orthodox church is organised in four Eparchies. This religious organisation is not dependent on territory, as the Orthodox Church cannot regulate Muslims, and the Catholic Church cannot regulate the Orthodox, regardless where they live. Similar de-territorialised organisation could be imagined more explicitly for ethnic groups, in the same manner as Belgium, for example, has national ethnic assemblies that regulate ethnic (linguistic) affairs within the country, regardless where the members of the two Belgian linguistic communities live. With the existence of non-territorial autonomy of ethnic groups, the move from ethnic administrative territories towards more functional administrative territories would not create as much tension.

179 Horowitz 1985.


180 Smith, Dan 1996. "Security, Identity and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland", *Security Dialogue*, vol 27, no 2, 179-184. The affinity between the concepts Bosniak and Bosnian is especially problematic due to the confusion in political language between the two. For example, Richard Holbrooke, the US face in Bosnia and Herzegovina uses the word Bosnians for the ethnic group of Bosniaks, see for example Holbrooke 1999. 206. At the same time he often uses the word Bosnia, for the name of the country. This is a strong linguistic linkage he attaches between one of the ethnic groups and the nation.

181 Indonesia with its ban on the identification of ethnicities in politics during the rule of President Suharto was often perceived as means for hidden Javanese dominance. This perception of discrimination greatly emphasised the relevance of ethnicity in politics. Agustono, Budi & Timo Kivimäki 2004. "Regional Empowerment and Ethnic Conflict in North Sumatra", *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 2.

182 Suljagić 2011.

183 Ajder 2008.

Illustration 4.8. Scenarios from Functional Decentralisation



While the path to functional decentralisation could be violent, one would be able to imagine different consequences once Bosnia and Herzegovina has reached this stage. If the process does not tackle the grievances of ethnic Serbs regarding the need to compromise their ethnic autonomy, the consequence of functional decentralisation will not be peaceful even if violence can be avoided in the process. If the ethnic Serb population fails to feel ownership of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and they lose their autonomous entity, they will feel oppressed and fail to integrate into the common national identity. This will sabotage the build-up of a common citizenship. The same is true for Bosnian Croats who, under the impression that they are victims of political coercion by their Bosniak counterparts, today feel less and less ownership of the state.

However, if the change is the result of genuine de-ethnicisation of society (a process whereby race/ethnicity becomes less important in politics), the greater **functionality of the administration** will offer benefits for peace. Greater functional rationality of administration is followed by growth, better service delivery and the reduction of economic conflict grievances. In the long run this would mean a **decline in grievances-based frustration violence** in Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁸⁴

Illustration 4.8. summarizes the path to peace and conflict within the greater scenario of functional decentralisation.

¹⁸⁴ Gurr 1972. Collier & Hoeffler 2002.

4.4 Functional Centralized State

While the scenario of functional decentralisation was a reaction against the ethnic-based dysfunctional administration of the *status quo*, functional centralisation is an even stronger reaction to the very same grievances. Further, the conflict risks involved in a process towards a centralised functional state are the same as in the process towards functional decentralisation, only much more pronounced. At the same time, the benefits with this more far-reaching functionalism for peace are similar in scope, while stronger in intensity. The imagined end result is not as centralised as one might assume from the name of the scenario, in which “people in Bosnia and Herzegovina [are] citizens with equal rights and individual freedoms... political system designed to comprise one President, one strong central government, a bicameral parliament and municipalities. However, new election legislation was introduced to protect ethnic and minority rights by using the principle of mandate rotation at all levels of governance between the three largest ethnic groups and the ‘others’.” A crucial issue that the scenario workshop failed to detail was the sub-state levels that were to be equally represented in the upper house: would these be the current entities, or administrative regions that are more functionally defined?

The scenario of the Functional Centralised State is imagined to evolve/develop within the framework of EU membership. “The centralised political system ... simplified decision-making processes, which resulted in political, economic and judicial reforms. Human rights legislation is being implemented, the economy is on an upward path, the unemployment rate is in decline, and social cohesion is strengthening.”

The report imagines this scenario as possible only after a “violent conflict and the subsequent international military intervention”. Functional centralisation was envisioned as so drastic an option that it risked international peace and made Serbia’s violent re-involvement in Bosnia’s affairs likely. In addition to international enforcement, the scenario was imagined to involve an international “Marshall plan” to appease the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina and make them forget ethnic differences. What is also interesting is that the members of the scenario project felt that functional centralisation was primarily a way to help the international community’s communication problems with Bosnia and Herzegovina: “After years of dealing with numerous institutions and representatives at 14 different

governance levels, the EU and the rest of the international community pushed for a centralised state in order to make communication and cooperation with the authorities easier, faster and more efficient. Serbia firmly opposed the intervention, claiming that the interests of Serbs in BiH were endangered. However, after strong political pressure by the international community, it renounced its opposition.”

Due to the fact that functional decentralism and functional centralism are just two degrees of functional processes away from the ethno-centric status quo, there is no need to repeat the aspects of the more extreme version. *The path is the same as for functional decentralisation, with just greater risks on the way and greater functional benefits if the process manages to stay on track.* In general, decentralised options are considered more stable for divided societies, and autonomy concessions are generally considered wise for peace.¹⁸⁵ This furthermore emphasises the risks involved in the process to functional decentralisation. The less extreme version of the functionalisation of the political system already has to rely on international assistance and attention to the vital interests of groups of people. This version of functional governance would need even more work to create shared ownership of the common country as it would mean an even greater destruction of the political core values of Bosnian Serbs (and to a lesser extent, the Croats). Even if it was possible to overcome the conflict risks in the transition to this type of governance, it would be very difficult to sustain such a rule (especially in the absence of international occupation).

This scenario would also transform the political landscape of the country and redefine the role of politicians. Eventually, one could imagine that political parties would have to fight for their survival by wooing a multi-ethnic base of supporters, something the majority of the parties today are unwilling to do (as well because of the ‘bad name’ that the SDP, in the eyes of some critics, is giving to multi-ethnic platforms). This could present an interesting path to reconciliation and unity, but also include a lot of political bargaining and compromise. The idea of reducing ethnic divisions by means of a “Marshall plan” that would create a lot of prosperity is also rather unrealistic. Expanding the common good does not reduce the need to divide the common pool of prosperity. In an ethnically divided society this division would not be easy, and the more prosperity

¹⁸⁵ Gurr, Ted Robert 2000. *People versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.

there is to divide, the more there would be an interest in fighting for beneficial terms of distribution.

4.5 Regional Reconnection within the EU

The scenario of a regional union of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo, is envisioned to replace ethnic needs by economic desires: "This Union is based mainly on economic interests and not so much on nationalistic feelings. As a result, a new political paradigm has been created and partition along national or ethnic lines has become senseless." Despite the fact that this union involves many of the former Yugoslav republics, the driving force behind the process is economic interest rather than historical nostalgia. At the same time, the vision of a regional union is seen as a stepping-stone for Bosnia and Herzegovina's accession to the EU membership. Finally, discussions in the scenario project revealed that the regional union would also be a way to mobilise EU's cohesion and structural funds as well as joint rural and agricultural development projects.

It is clear that the scenario of regional reconnection is another variation of the responses to the frustrations caused by the ethnically-obsessed political reality of the status quo. An economically more functional order of this variation is sought from regional functional cooperation rather than from intra-state constitutional arrangements (as in the two functional variations above). The general path to this scenario is thus similar to the one in Illustration 5.7.

It is however important to note that this scenario appears to be the least probable of all, also because of its remarkable timeline (13 years) and complexity. It would require considerable alignment by many external actors, such as neighbouring countries and the EU. In addition, the scenario stipulates that all ethnic divisions are set aside and that rationality prevails over emotion, basically stripping a whole generation of politicians of their ammunition and implying that the new generations believe in a true multi-ethnic society, something our interviews contradict. Moreover, there is vagueness in this scenario concerning the fate of the ethnicities and entities, which leaves us with many questions. And while the majority of the population might feel comfortable with an EU perspective, they might be left dissatisfied with other solutions this scenario might imply.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁶ Ipsos 2010.

4.5.1 Peace and conflict potential in the Regional Union scenario

Many of the critical requirements necessary for a regional union and the process towards common EU membership lie outside the nation in the EU and in the rest of the West Balkan region. However, in many sectors of cooperation (including in the fight against organised crime) the region has made progress and some of this progress is funded and made possible by the supportive attitude of the EU. Scenarios that aim at integration with the EU tend to be among the least controversial and most feasible internally, as they tend to be supported by the majorities of each ethnic community.¹⁸⁷

The political perception of most informants does not reach the conflict potentials of this scenario, perhaps due to the fact that many of its requirements to materialise are in the hands of the EU, and because of the fact that the EU membership is still not within reach of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The perceived problem with the scenario is in the fact that it is unrealistic, and thus it remains an utopia that is not seriously contested by means of an analysis of its conflict risk. However, some of its features make it possible to analytically project some conflict scenarios on the path to Bosnia Herzegovinian integration in the region and the EU.

The first conflict scenario is related to the fact that in the political perception of the people and the elites it relies entirely on a pacifying external input into the country. When the elite imagines the solutions to come from outside, they tend to ignore and neglect the preferences of their own citizens.¹⁸⁸ On the one hand, this is expressed in the shaping of public institutions to facilitate cooperation with external actors rather than to act as representational institutions of the citizens.¹⁸⁹ According to one informant for this study, the effort of the state to achieve prosperity has turned outwards: instead of trying to change things themselves, people have become apathetic and simply expect help from the EU (Serb judicial official, interviewed in Sarajevo, 27.06.2011).

¹⁸⁷ Ipsos 2010.

¹⁸⁸ Acemoglu, Daron; James A. Robinson 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁸⁹ This same problem could also be easily envisioned in the previous scenario, which was imagined as a result of the international community's dissatisfaction with "dealing with numerous institutions and representatives at 14 different governance levels".

Many aid-reliant sub-Saharan African countries have experienced this with the result that the state has ceased to function as an instrument for the people. The Philippines, before ending their contract on economically vastly important military bases in Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base, also represent this logic. After abolishing/eliminating the reliance on expectations that wealth comes from outside, the economy of the Philippines started to recover and the ownership of the people on their public institutions increased.¹⁹⁰ Despite the current support of European integration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, too great a reliance on the EU, with a reduced state responsiveness towards the needs of their own citizens, could express itself with **anti-EU rioting** among the poorest and unemployed, as well as among the marginalised ethnicities (the 'others' and perhaps the Serbs, depending on developments).

While greater access to EU's cohesion and structural funds as well as joint rural and agricultural development projects could certainly be utilised in a way that reduces conflict potential, new resources available for the public sector tend to increase competition for state power. This could lead to conflicts. While many of the interviewees, and certainly the discussion in the scenario workshops, perceive economic as opposed to ethno-national rationales, the empirical experience of ethno-nationalist conflict suggests that this is not at all the case. The focus on dividing the pie among ethnic groups will not cease if cooperation can increase the pie. Even a bigger pie needs to be divided. Some theories of ethnic conflict reduce the entire dynamics of warfare into a **competition for resources**,¹⁹¹ while others point to the fact that increased resources often trigger conflict.¹⁹² In Bosnia and Herzegovina greater access to EU resources could trigger competition between the state and the entities over the governance of these resources. Assuming that the country cannot manage to eradicate its corrupt and criminal economy, greater personal economic stakes offered by EU resources could magnify the conflict between public institutions and individuals. With more resources, the mobilisation of violence in these competitions could be easier and thus more extensive.

190 Kivimäki, Timo 1995. *Conditions of Hegemonic Order and Strategies of National Development: The Philippine Experience*, IDS, Helsinki.

191 Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin 1996. "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation." *American Political Science Review* 90(4): 715-735.

192 Basedau, Matthias & Jann Lay 2009. "Resource Curse or Rentier Peace? The Ambiguous Effects of Oil Wealth and Oil Dependence on Violent Conflict", *Journal of Peace Research* 46(6): 757-766.

However, European resources could also offer Bosnia and Herzegovina the possibility to establish funds that create growth by means of inter-ethnic business ventures. This could foster **EU-funded inter-ethnic cooperation and communication** and create positive interdependence and integration across ethnic lines. The experiences of the International Fund for Ireland in the transformation of the conflict structures in Northern Ireland suggests that with economic resources a fund that facilitates inter-ethnic business ventures can do a lot (in the long run, even) to integrate previously antagonistic communities.¹⁹³

Furthermore, linkages to the other former republics of Yugoslavia could offer an alternative to ethno-nationalism within the state. There could be less need to emphasize Serb-ness or Croat-ness in national politics if national boundaries did not constitute meaningful barriers to cooperation with ethnic communities in Serbia and Croatia. While this cooperation is not restricted in the status quo, the model of regional reconnection would bring this cooperation in harmony with state-building. The idea of playing down ethnic nationalism by offering positive channels has been found central to nation-building and the prevention of ethno-nationalist conflicts.¹⁹⁴ Thus regional cooperation could lead to scenarios where ethno-nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina could move **from exclusive nationalist agendas into better cooperation with neighbouring countries**.


Finally, since EU integration is a common project for all ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it could provide the foundation for a non-exclusive common national identity. Instead of defining the common nation by its history of victimhood, Bosnia and Herzegovina could develop **common ownership of the state as a modern European nation**.

The peaceful and belligerent scenarios emanating from the regional reconnection can be summarised in Illustration 4.9 below.

193 McCarter 2008.

194 Gurr 1994.

Illustration 4.9. Path to peace and conflict from the Regional Reconnection



5. How Can International Assistance Support Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

International official and NGO work for aid, peace-building and humanitarian assistance will necessarily affect the peace and conflict potential in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As established in the FES-methodology and its revisions¹⁹⁵ this influence will impact conflict motives, conflict agency and conflict opportunities. This is why it is necessary for this Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment to evaluate how actual and potential European activity affects motives, agency and opportunities positively and negatively.

5.1 European Union and Motives of Violence

There are two difficulties and paradoxes that frame and challenge the role of the international community and especially the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina. One is related to **the problematic constitutional framework that necessarily frames EU cooperation**. The other is **the history and the nation-state bias of international cooperation**, which colours European cooperation and threatens to make it look partial.

In support of constitutional progress in peaceful development the international community might inadvertently support the reproduction of the political reality of ethnic division. This is related to the primarily consociational nature of the constitution, which in its recognition of the need to satisfy the core interests of the ethnic groups in an ethnically divided society also supports political structures that strengthen and consolidate the already deep divisions. Supporting the Constitution, respecting the interpretation of three constituent people and 'Others', three languages and three religions, all sediment the ethnic division into the practices of EU cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Disregarding religions in political cooperation, treating Serbian, Croatian and Bosniak as dialects of one language, calling all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina a nation, calling Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Bosniaks, and Bosnian Croats ethnicities, and criticising the constitution for its sedimentation of the ethnic division could be more constructive for the integration of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, as signatories of the Dayton accords, Europeans cannot really go against the constitution and the peace deal they have helped to broker. *Yet European projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina should try to avoid taking ethnic divisions for granted. The sense of responsibility for the articulation of ethnic realities and divisions should be kept in mind in project planning.*

At the same time, international cooperation is traditionally biased in favour of the state level, and the allocation

195 Kivimäki & Pasch 2009.

FES Intervention Box 1 – National reconciliation

Over the past 15 years FES has been promoting **reconciliation at the local level** in collaboration with different civil society organisations in various parts of the country. Workshops and seminars focus on dialogue and conflict-resolution between people of different ethnic backgrounds who are living in small communities that were in the midst of open-fire during the 1992 – 1995 war and subject to ethnic cleansing campaigns. Dialogue sessions such as "Reconciliation and co-existence at the local level", "Return: Between Semblance and Reality" and "Truth and

reconciliation" aim to promote mutual understanding on conjoined living and common values. These programmes are broadcast by local radio stations and have substantial outreach within the local communities as important confidence building measures. The projects are implemented in cooperation with local NGOs such as Žene ženama, Helsinki Parliament for Citizens, Foundation Cure, Lara as well as radio and TV station (namely Radio ZOS, Radio Vesta, Radio Contact and TV Hayat) and have been conducted in various parts of the country such as Rogatica, Višegrad, Goražde, Mostar, Doboj, Seljublje, Jajce, Bratunac, East Sarajevo, Foča, Stolac, Sevarlije and Bijeljina.

EU assistance in BiH

The EU has provided BiH with more than three billion Euros in assistance funds since December 1995. The aid has been distributed according to the needs and strategic requirements of the citizens: until 2000 funds were directed towards humanitarian aid, refugee return and rebuilding physical infrastructure, while since 2000 it has been directed towards establishing institutions and political and economic systems, and helping to rebuild BiH into a fully functional state. Since the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) in June 2008, funds have been administered principally through the Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) adopted in 2006, targeting countries which are candidates and potential candidates for EU membership to “adjust its economic, political, security and social system to meet the requirements of future EU membership.”¹ Since 2005 the Directorate-General *Enlargement* has been in charge for managing all relations with BiH, including political and development aid management.

EU assistance in BiH has had considerable successes in the areas of infrastructure, reconstruction and returnees. However, difficulties have arisen in projects concerning state building, governance and rule of law implementation, and approximation to European

Standards. In its own words, “The complex constitutional setup, insufficient political support and an overall weak administrative capacity have not been conducive to reform implementation.”²

In the summary of a document by the EU-Delegation in BiH it reads as follows: “Currently, the Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) 2011-2013 for Bosnia and Herzegovina identifies the following as priorities:

- To support the strengthening of the rule of law by assisting the country to reform its justice sector and to fight against organised crime and corruption;
- To improve the capacity and efficiency of the public administration and set up a professional civil service, so as to support the country’s efforts to improve the functioning of the institutions at all level of governance;
- To support the social and economic development, in particular assisting the country in its efforts to develop the SME sector, to alleviate unemployment and to reform the education system to help adapt the qualification framework with the requirements of the labour market, and to invest in transport and environment infrastructure.

IPA component I allocated EUR 102.68 million for 2011”.³

1 Group of Authors 2011. *European Union Support to Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Delegation of the European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 3. http://www.europa.ba/documents/delegacijaEU_2012011614312492eng.pdf (retrieved on 03.02.2012).

2 Ibid.

3 European Commission, *Annex: IPA 2011- National Programme-Bosnia and Herzegovina*, COM-AC_DI(2011)D01752-01.

and distribution of IPA funds (EUR 95 million in 2011 and EUR 108 million in 2012) is heavily disputed.¹⁹⁶ It is quite clear that the occasions when OHR resorted to the *Bonn Powers*, the use of international power challenged ethno-nationalist leaders and officials of entities in favour of the state-level administration. As a result, many Serbs, who according to polls are more sensitive to ethnic autonomy, have felt that these decisions have been directed against them(selves). Conditions of the

country’s membership in the EU are often perceived as pro-state, and thus EU membership is supported more among Bosniaks and Croats than among Serbs. The negative historical relationship between ethnic Serbs and NATO further increases the difficulties for the EU countries to be perceived as neutral and non-intrusive in the domestic affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Without the perception of neutrality in the country’s internal affairs, the European Union presence risks to become a divisive issue and an additional motive for conflict. Projects that have difficulties being accepted by the main ethnic groups are therefore operating on shaky foundations from a conflict sensitive point of view.

196 See, for example, *Monitoring of the BiH European Integration Process, Annual Report 2011*, Foreign Policy Initiative, Sarajevo, February 2012, http://www.vpi.ba/eng/content/documents/Monitoring_of_The_BiH_European_Integration_Process_2011_Annual_Report.pdf (retrieved on 02.2.2012).

FES Intervention Box 2 – Clean governance

As weak governance capacities in BiH are not only apparent but rather transparent FES and its partner organisations Center for Civil Initiative, Transparency International, Centre for Student Democracy and Helsinki Parliament for Citizens should raise awareness among citizens and participants of civic

*educational programmes about the way the state acquires and exercises its authority to provide and manage public goods and services. Implementation of **clean and efficient public sector governance** would certainly contribute to the internal stabilisation of the country.¹*

¹ Stojanović, Igor 2012. *Citizens Participation in Decision Making*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and Centre for Civil Initiatives, Sarajevo.

In addition to this, there is a problem of ownership of the state and/or nation, as the ethnic groups often profess more loyalty to their ‘ethnic compatriots’ than to the country as such. This makes aid work difficult. In a recent report, the EU conceded: “A lesson learned in Bosnia and Herzegovina is that lack of ownership and political commitment is detrimental to the success of any assistance. The workshops aimed to include final beneficiaries as early as possible in the programming and project identification process to encourage ownership and commitment. (...) Setting effective coordination mechanisms to avoid similar delays in programming is an issue that the Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities need to address as a matter of urgency.”¹⁹⁷

5.1.1 How to alleviate grievances related to the state paralysis and economic problems?

While it is sometimes frustratingly easy to pinpoint the political roots of various economic problems, tackling these problems is nevertheless important for conflict prevention. Economic grievances are systematically mentioned among the main concerns of citizens in all polls. Low levels of economic standard of living in general and increasing poverty in particular may contribute to the lowering of the threshold of violence, while economic fluctuations and particularly differential development of ethnic groups could contribute to the discrepancy between expected and real benefits. This discrepancy could then fuel frustration violence. The fact that over half of the people in all ethnic groups feel that their household’s economic situation has deteriorated¹⁹⁸ gives a strong indication to the

increased probability of frustration, and thus emphasises the importance of basic economic development projects for conflict prevention. This also goes in line with UNDP’s observation that more than half of the population is socially marginalised. According to the Ipsos poll, 70 per cent of people see unemployment as one of the three main problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was verified in our interviews - all of our interviewees saw unemployment as one of the three biggest challenges for BiH in the coming years. Focusing on **employment generation projects** would thus be the first priority, not only in order to alleviate frustration-based motives of conflict, but also in order to reduce opportunities for the mobilisation of unemployed people with abundant time. Employment generation projects, especially those among young people, could also address the positive interdependence that is needed for the integration of potentially conflicting sides by increasing social cohesion. Since economic problems are often perceived as being a result of a dysfunctional state-system (which again is related to corrupt ethno-nationalist politicians), the frustrations of unemployed people, unless tackled, blame and aggression could easily be channelled towards people of the ethnic groups that the unemployed person perceives as guilty for state paralysis. Projects that involve people/representatives from different ethnic groups in activities that create livelihood help to generate the sense of interdependence that is so needed for peace and integration.

People from all ethnic groups have economic grievances: the same grievances should imply joint projects, although different labour and social security regulations between the entities and even cantons can make the mobility of workers difficult.¹⁹⁹ Employment generation projects

¹⁹⁷ European Commission, Annex: IPA 2011- National Programme- Bosnia and Herzegovina, COM-AC_DI(2011)D01752-01.. 3.

¹⁹⁸ Ipsos 2010.

¹⁹⁹ The latest European Commission 2011. *Commission Staff Working Paper* (...) also talks about this on page 32.

FES Intervention Box 3 – Workers rights

*FES aims to enhance the capacities of young trade unionists by providing a yearly **Trade Union School** and supporting its alumni network (www.mmsbih.org). Besides strengthening capacities, the trade union school aims to search for common grounds among young trade union activists. By joining forces in the common struggle for social justice and improved*

working conditions, participants achieve a better understanding of each other, learn to reduce the impact of existing prejudices, and slowly develop seeds for a joint national identity. Each of the four modules are held in different cities (Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Neum and Teslić) so that the participants gain access to different parts of the country, an opportunity which they do not usually have in their daily lives.

would be even more crucial if the country starts sliding back to violence and combatant identity, in which case a livelihood offered by militias might have to be replaced by alternative identities and livelihoods.

Focusing on the **reduction of corruption**, the second greatest concern of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina according to the Ipsos 2010 poll, could also have important conflict-prevention effects. Again, in addition to corruption being an important source of frustration and frustration violence, programmes against corruption (helping law reforms that could tackle corruption, the development of financial oversight best practices, the training of auditors, the training of investigating journalists, etc.) could help conflict prevention in other ways. Corrupt politicians and officials cause frustration whose source is easy to identify. This is why corruption-related frustration is easier to channel to violent action and conflict motivation: the target of violence is easier to identify as supporters of a politician, members of his party, and members of his ethnic group.

5.1.3 Grievances related provocations and historical unfairness

In the absence of developments in the functionalisation of the constitutional system of administration, the borders of entities that emanate from war and ethnic cleansing and other remnants of historical inequity could become a source of conflict motive (for provocation wars and “true Bosnian” violence, repatriation conflicts, etc.). While the powers of the international community are declining with their mandates limited as well as the terms of the OHR, EUFOR and the EUPM, some assessments assume that sensitivity about historical fairness will be reduced and that inflammatory political rhetoric, while hate speech has increased.²⁰⁰ The international community seems divided between positions on whether the international mandate should once again be upgraded to prevent this development towards provocations and conflicts. Anglo-American members of the PIC (with the assistance of the

²⁰⁰ Azinović, Bassuener & Weber 2011.

FES Intervention Box 4 – Sustainable development

*While in the weak centralised state structure there is no planning authority concerned with a national socio-economic planning strategy FES is in the process of assisting governmental and non-governmental organisations to develop a **national sustainability***

strategy in line with the Rio Process. Sustainable development is thus promoted with a particular concern for social justice, poverty eradication, equitable resource management, human rights, and national stability.¹

¹ Former Minister of Finance of the Republika Srpska, Svetlana Cenić has prepared a blueprint for a Participatory Action Research to develop a national strategy for sustainable development.

Recommendations: Economic development projects for conflict prevention

- Promote projects helping employment policy formulation and implementation
- Promote employment generation projects targeting unemployed adults, involving different ethnic groups
- Promote employment generation projects targeting youth, involving different ethnic groups
- Design projects enabling better movement of persons and capital between entities and cantons
- Promote projects on coordination of social security
- Assist the implementation of 2009-14 anti-corruption strategy and action plan
- Strengthen the capacities of the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and Coordination of the Fight against Corruption
- Support legal reforms tackling corruption
- Build capacities of civil society organisations as agents for the rule of law
- Promote projects helping social protection policy formulation and implementation
- Develop financial oversight and best practices
- Promote projects aimed at training of auditors, monitoring of public tenders
- Assist the training of investigative journalists
- Help strengthen the independence of the judicial system, especially as regards corruption prosecution

Atlantic Initiative) have been pushing forward changes that could give the international community a stronger role. At the same time Germany, together with the EU institutions and Russia, are less enthusiastic towards forcing a greater mandate for the international community against the clear will of the majority of Serbs and the Republika Srpska.

The idea of ‘managing’ the speeches of politicians would probably also not be appealing to European actors. *Respect for democracy, freedom of speech and sovereignty sets limits to what can be done to ethno-nationalist political argumentation.* However, there are options to tackle the motives of provocation wars even within the current international mandate. **Projects to find commonly acceptable interpretations of the history** of Bosnia and Herzegovina could be sought in multi-ethnic research cooperations/approaches that also aim at disseminating information. Furthermore, without necessarily challenging the conclusions of EUFOR and the Atlantic Initiative on the fact that hate speech signals conflict risk, it is possible that their conclusions are not in line with a systematic analysis of lessons of wars. *Often hate speech does indicate tension* and it is therefore associated with the risk of conflict. However, it might be the case that tension causes hate speech, and conflict, rather than hate-speech on its own having a causal power towards conflict. Some/Numerous conflict scholars who have studied intra-state democratic peace believe

that the verbal expression of grievances tends to be an alternative to expressing one’s grievances with violent action.²⁰¹ Thus, efforts to control public argumentation, or to cleanse political discourse from politically incorrect speech, could block verbal conflict and give rise to actual violence.²⁰² Instead of censoring hate speech, efforts to invigorate debate that is based on better researched factual foundations could a) critique hate speech that is based on unsustainable factual foundations, while at the same time b) channel ethnic tension to talk rather than act. In addition to letting out steam by supporting academic communication, the international community should support forums that help principled, publicised debate and dialogue among different authoritative persons from various ethnic groups – religious leaders, intellectual leaders, political leaders, media people, etc. – about the interpretation of history and about ethnic identities. In addition, such efforts should not only be limited to the political sphere, but should also be part of the education system, which at the moment seems to breed ‘little nationalists’.

201 Rummel, R.J. „Democracies are less warlike than other regimes”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 1 1995: 457-479 and Kivimäki, Timo 2005, „Media’s Contribution Towards Resolving Conflict: The Case of West Kalimantan”, in *Borneo Review*, Vol. XIV, No. 1, 2005.

202 Kriesberg, Louis 1998. *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution*, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.

FES Intervention Box 5 – Transitional justice

The concept of **transitional justice** focuses on the official politics of remembrance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. FES supports research-based projects with the aim of opening dialogue on the politics of remembrance and motivating the discussion of a possible common model of remembrance in the region. This project also serves as a basis for round table discussions on the concept of transitional justice with participants

from different spheres of life in BiH.¹ FES supports the regional Igman Initiative which under the umbrella of the presidents of Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and BiH promotes the resolution of key issues relating to the citizens of the four countries, the building of mutual trust and tolerance, and overcoming all types of discrimination.

¹ See FES and Alumni Association of the Centre for Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies (ACIPS). *(Re)vision of the past. Official politics of remembrance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia since 1990*, forthcoming (www.fes.ba).

Recommendations: Socio-political projects for conflict prevention

- Promote multi-ethnic research projects on historical interpretations
- Support the research of factual foundations for political debate through strengthening research institutions, party research divisions and academic projects on the present and past
- Publicise widely and evenly the factual findings of past and present socio-political and economic issues, especially concerning grievances in the actual debates
- Publicise best practices in ethnic cooperation

- Support forums helping principled, publicised debate and dialogue between authoritative persons of various ethnic groups about the interpretation of history and about ethnic identities
- Build capacities of civil society organisations as agents for social justice
- Support regular inter-ethnic exchange amongst youth and joint projects in educational institutions as well as in the framework of civil society organisations
- Support academic exchanges among experts from all ethnic groups in order to achieve a consensus on a national history curriculum
- Support efforts to create a pan-ethnic national youth magazine

5.1.3 Grievances related to the fear for ethnic identity

Comparative conflict analysis has found that national integration (in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this would be called state-integration or the creation of a common citizenship) rarely succeeds if it is based on the artificial suppression of sub-national identities. On the contrary, discrimination and existential threats to ethnicities often consolidate the perception of the political relevance of ethno-nationalist identities.²⁰³ Instead of rejecting Serb-ness, Croat-ness or Bosniak-ness, it seems that the most

realistic way to nation-building/common citizenship would be the creation of a **modern European identity** to which all ethnic groups would seem to subscribe,²⁰⁴ and of which all sub-national ethnicities should be allowed an equal ownership.

The experience of post-World War II has shown that ethnically diverse societies can build a modern European identity without forgoing their right to self-determination. Examples of identity (re)building already exists in the neighbourhood: during the 1990s wars and in the 2000s Croatia purposefully (re)constructed its 'European'

²⁰³ Gurr 1994.

²⁰⁴ Ipsos 2010.

FES Intervention Box 6 – Active citizenship

*Basing its work on studies such as “Social cohesion in BiH”, “Ethnic detachment”, “Image: mutual perception of Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks in BiH”, “Multiethnic marriage” and “Ethnic, National and European Identity in BiH”, FES aims to contribute to finding common ground for a shared identity of Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizens with its **civic education** work. Through its*

own instruments “Political Academy” and “School of Democracy” and with its partner organisations Cure, Helsinki Parliament of Citizens, Center for Civil Initiatives and Zasto ne, FES targets a broad audience with the aim of increasing participants’ awareness of active citizenship. The afore-mentioned studies and educational work have shown that a positive experience regarding the relationship between state and citizen can serve as a foundation for building a national identity.

identity in order to part from its perceived ‘Balkan’ identity during the Yugoslav era, which eventually resulted in a significant pull towards reforms for EU accession. However, Croatia is not as ethnically diverse as BiH, which implies that different strategies should be used in the latter country. This emphasises the need for the EU to show opportunities for the Serbs - which experience the greatest historical obstacles to European and especially North Atlantic integration - for the preservation of Serb cultural and religious identity within the European concept of cultural diversity. Modern European identity should present itself as something that is not exclusive of regional ethnic identities, and this could be demonstrated to the ethnic groups of Bosnia and Herzegovina by integrating different ethnicities into European Union programs for the protection of regional identities. A modern European identity should have a positive connotation and should be oriented towards the future. Such an identity should be promoted as an alternative to the ultra-nationalist and sometimes fascist war time theories of the three constituent peoples.

Although the struggle between national and transnational identities is still present throughout Europe, the case of the EU shows that regional identity can be encompassed in its work through targeted projects, as for example those by the European Commission Directorate-General for Regional Policy. Similar projects could be done in BiH, through IPA cross-border cooperation programmes that could target specific regions. Surely the EU’s Committee of the Regions (CoR) and especially its Working Group on the Western Balkans could also intensify their involvement in helping BiH overcome its challenges through strengthening local and regional authorities within the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society that Europe is. In

this context, the BiH Directorate of European Integration should be given more authority to drive the EU integration process forward.²⁰⁵

In addition to using European identities to offset the fear of ethnic extinction, it would make sense to help the build-up of non-exclusive, non-territorial ethnic structures, such as **cultural and religious assemblies** that could regulate cultural activities without the need for ethnic territories. The non-territorial Sami parliament in Finland, Sweden and Norway has managed to alleviate the fear of extinction among Sami and signalled to the Sami people that nation-states are not a threat to the Sami identity. Similarly, the Parliaments of the French, Flemish and German speakers in Belgium under constitutional Articles 115-130 have played a similar role among Belgian communities. This concept could be applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina, too. Once such assemblies exist, it would also be logical to establish dialogue forums between them. But assemblies as such would already be a positive development, as it would signal that ethnic existence is not threatened, and that it is not dependent on exclusive, cleansed ethnic territories and territorial apartheid.

EU border projects with Serbia, Croatia and other neighbours should be increased, as for example through the IPA Adriatic Cross-border Cooperation Programme that links transnational ethnic communities in a positive manner within the EU concepts of lowering borders. With many Bosnian Croats and Serbs having strong contacts to Croatia and Serbia respectively, this is not needed for the sake of building of transnational relations as such: relations are already very strong. European programmes

²⁰⁵ European Commission 2011. 9.

FES Intervention Box 7 – Culture of remembrance

For the past ten years FES has been implementing a cross border project under the title “**Culture of remembrance**”,¹ which aims to establish a constructive regional dialogue serving as a prerequisite for the

establishment of a common culture of remembrance, which is a basis for reconciliation between the three constituent peoples in BiH and between BiH and its neighbouring countries. Yearly studies are discussed with experts, politicians and civil society representatives in round tables and are publicly presented in TV debates.

1 For further information visit <http://fes.ba/publikacije/09-2011kultura-sjecanja.pdf> or www.fes.ba.

Recommendations: (re)construction of identity and conflict potential

- Help the promotion and build-up of a common European identity
- Support projects aimed at showcasing cultural diversity
- Support consultations between the authorities in BiH with the Committee of the Regions on strengthening local and regional authorities within a multi-ethnic context
- Organize training for further professionalization of civil servants, especially in transparency and accountability
- Set up more efficient post-project monitoring mechanisms in order to ensure that the project aims are maintained on the local level
- Support the creation of non-territorial ethnic structures, such as cultural and religious assemblies
- Intensify cross-border projects with Serbia and Croatia
- Develop cross-border projects targeting specific regions

are needed to signal that these contacts are appreciated and that they can be useful for the European Bosnia and Herzegovina, rather than considering them more or less treacherous and harmful for nation-building and common citizenship. Even before the former Yugoslav countries are full members of the EU, the utilisation of EU border projects or at least equivalents for candidate/ accession countries could signal something positive about the non-exclusiveness of the European identity, and, at the same time, alleviate the fear of ethnic extinction in the context of future EU membership.

5.2 European Union and Gainful and Opportunity-driven Violence

The international community, EUFOR and the EUPM have addressed the issue of lawlessness in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Peacekeeping and law enforcement are crucial

elements in the prevention of relapses into war among post-conflict countries.²⁰⁶ Without the capacity to contain violence, even trivial motives lead to the actual use of violence. A functioning and legitimate police force is therefore crucial for conflict prevention.

The problem with lawlessness in Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been a result of the lack of police resources. On the contrary, police personnel were abundant even during the Bosnian War. However, the police lacked professionalism and became subject to the influence of ethnic political leaders, and in this way it became an instrument for political violence. After the war the police have not had sufficient internal surveillance mechanisms to make them immune to corruption and power abuse. All these issues have already been tackled in the international contribution to law enforcement. The International Police

206 Collier & Hoeffler 2008.

Task Force (IPTF) of the UN was used for screening police officers on their conduct during the war to get rid of individuals in the force who had a tendency to use their police authority for violent, partisan purposes. The IPTF also started the international contribution to the upgrading of the **police training and police professionalism**. Professional Standards Units (PSUs) were created to build checks against the abuse of police power, and the partisan conduct by police officers.²⁰⁷ The lessons of most “new wars” makes it apparent that the build-up of mechanisms to check the police against corruption and power abuse²⁰⁸ is probably the most important of the international contributions in curtailing opportunity-driven violence. These activities clearly deserve continuation and resources.

In order to eliminate the political nature of the police, recruitment criteria were created where people with previous political offices were automatically disqualified from offices in the police. New standards and police training have been further strengthened throughout the last decade by IPTF’s successor mission EUPM, the EU-led international police-monitoring mission. In view of the fact that the police participated in the Bosnian War as combatants, its de-politicisation is a very important contribution to the reduction of opportunity-driven violence. The police, by definition, is an institution with opportunities for violence, and thus making the police more professional and preventing the them/it from becoming involved in partisan campaigns contributes substantially to the reduction of conflict potential. This work, however, is not finished, according to the report of the Atlantic Initiative.²⁰⁹ In times of tension it would still be probable that, if pushed, the police would (be) split along ethnic lines.

In terms of the count of personnel, the reform of the police institution has meant a drastic reduction in the number of police officials.²¹⁰ According to the assessment of an official of EUFOR, law enforcement has dramatically improved in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of these international contributions, while hate speech has remained the only main provocation challenging orderly

politics (interview with a EUFOR intelligence officer in Sarajevo, 16.06.2011).

However, just as in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, the development of the indigenous capacity is difficult. Furthermore, foreign police and peacekeeping presence often leads to the erosion of legitimacy of law enforcement (as nationalists feel foreigners should not participate in this), and this further aggravates problems of law enforcement and makes the handing over of responsibilities difficult. The reliance of the population on foreign law enforcement further complicates the process of the development of the indigenous capacity for law enforcement. This was clearly testified in the scenario seminars where so many of the scenarios were envisioned only after a major international intervention. While the international community has managed to lower the level of political interference in police activities, European demands for police reform have become perceived as highly political and partisan, favouring the Bosniak state-elite. The three demands that the Atlantic Initiative study presented as the core European conditions for Bosnia Herzegovina’s EU membership are the following: 1) move all competencies for police matters to the state level, including legislative and budgetary; 2) eliminate political interference; and 3) territorially re-organise police agencies according to exclusively functional, not political or ethnic criteria.²¹¹ These demands clearly support the Federal against the Constitutional aspirations of the leadership of the Republika Srpska. As a result, the Atlantic Initiative report describes the hostility of the RS leadership towards police reform as an explanation of how the Republika Srpska makes rollback attempts against the police.²¹² In this way European efforts have not only been perceived as partisan with regards to the constitutional debate inside the country but also as partisan with respect to policies of the Republika Srpska. The Atlantic Initiative describes the dilemma of the EUPM as one where it has to balance between not being able to counter the “rollback efforts” on one hand and the mandate being terminated on the other. Just as the political nature of the police during the Bosnian War compromised its integrity and legitimacy, so did the partisan constitutional position of the European police presence reduce the legitimacy of the European contribution to law and order, especially in the Republika

207 Azinović, Bassuener & Weber 2011.

208 Kaldor 2004.

209 Azinović, Bassuener & Weber 2011. 47.

210 Ibid.

211 Ibid. 47

212 Ibid. 46.

Recommendations: Security sector strengthening to decrease conflict potential

- Training the police forces with the aim of further professionalisation, especially in the areas of corruption and power abuse in mixed classrooms
- Promote projects aimed at creating a more diverse police force in both entities
- Further support police reform, especially the cooperation of the police forces in both entities
- Support projects aimed at the integration of the armed forces
- Promote projects to reduce youth unemployment,
- Enhance vocational training systems.
- Strengthen the capacities for parliamentary oversight of the military and defence sectors

Srpska. As a result police reform measures have done little to professionalise the police force in this entity.²¹³

The problem of political partisanship aside, European assistance in law enforcement, support for internal police mechanisms to eradicate police corruption, and the EU's support to the training in the police academies in Sarajevo and Banja Luka have all clearly contributed to post-conflict stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These measures have narrowed the windows of opportunity for gainful violence.

In addition to police reform, there are **security sector reform measures focused on the army** that the international community could support. The most urgent problem in the military force is the almost total/complete division along ethnic lines. The structure of the military force is based on ethnic regiments – 1st Guards (Croat), 2nd Rangers (Bosniak), and 3rd Infantry (Serb) – under a unified command. It would be difficult to imagine that the military force would act as one in compliance with orders from above if it had to react to a conflict between ethnically structured conflicting parties. According to the Atlantic Initiative report, in 2008, a senior military force officer warned US diplomats that “the AFBiH would ‘break up’ if called upon to assist civilian authorities with an internal security challenge.” The Atlantic Initiative report describes events even in peace time where symbolic behaviour, such as the singing of the Croatian national anthem by members of the Croat Regiment (1st Guards) in an event to memorise fallen war veterans, suggest that the ethnic division of the military could be a serious challenge to peace. The military force by definition already has opportunities for violence. If it became divided along

ethnic lines in an ethnic conflict, it would offer a tremendous boost to the intensity of the conflict.²¹⁴

Another related problem is the insensitivity of the unified leadership towards the sensitivities of the ethnicities in decisions on cooperation with external powers. An example of this was a military exercise with NATO in Georgia in 2009 in a time of extreme tension between Russia and Georgia, which was strongly resented by the leadership of the Republika Srpska. While an exercise of professionalism for the 3rd Infantry, this decision to participate was insensitive and unresponsive to the preferences of the Serb people of Bosnia and Herzegovina who have historical reservations about NATO. Emphasising the non-Serb identity of the military leadership is not a good policy for the integration of the military forces and for the difficult integration of the Serb soldiers into the common state defence force. Integration here, too, requires allowing ownership of the army for all those involved.

In addition to security sector reform measures, the international community can support economic reforms that could help prevent opportunity-driven violence. Projects to eradicate **youth unemployment** would be very important in the effort to reduce the potential of violent mobilisation. The abundance of jobless young people in search of a livelihood and identity is probably the single most dangerous factor contributing to opportunity-driven conflict behaviour. Economically strong donor organisations have an important task in preventing these violent opportunities caused by youth unemployment.

213 Ibid. 43.

214 Ibid.

5.3 European Union and Ethnic Antagonism

This issue of how the international community can approach the problem of antagonistic agent structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been partly tackled in projects that have dual impact on the motives of conflict and conflict antagonism. While the creation of inter-ethnic communication forums is important for the resolution of disputes between ethnicities and for the transformation of violent argumentation into verbal battles, inter-ethnic communication is also crucial for the transformation of the agent structure of conflict. Only by the practice of inter-ethnic communication and through the dissemination of such dialogue can we work against the demonisation of potential enemies. Inter-ethnic dialogue can also be promoted on the level of mass communication by supporting **media and media-training that aims at creating outlets of dialogue between ethnic groups.**

In view of the fact that the dominant ethnic groups are always more eager to promote unity (as it always serves the dominant group), it would be also be good to expand the dialogue to show, for example, the 'human face' of the people of the Republika Srpska, that is, not merely report what ethno-nationalist leaders say, but also what ordinary citizens think.

Promoting dialogue and avoiding demonisation can be especially difficult for the international community in such areas of cooperation and for such international organizations (EUPM and OHR, for example) where the international community sees its function as something that opposes "the rollback efforts" or the "violations of the spirit of the Dayton Agreement" by the leadership of the Republika Srpska. Demonising the leadership of

any group that is necessary for peace is not wise, even if the international community has to resist those policies of the RS leadership that are not constructive for peace. Here the international community has to keep in mind the wisdom of Harvard-based peace negotiation specialists when they prescribe that in *problem-solving we will have to separate people from problems.*²¹⁵

In addition to international activity to promote inter-ethnic communication, the international community could promote inter-ethnic positive interdependence by offering capital financing to businesses that employ Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats alike. In such ventures employees will find their interests interlinked with the interests of their fellow workers from different ethnicities. The experiences of such activities by the International Fund for Ireland should encourage donors to operations which use this principle of creating inter-ethnic positive interdependence in as many of their projects, regardless of their primary objectives.²¹⁶

The policy of creating linkages of positive interdependence can in many cases also create cross-cutting cleavages that sometimes function as bridges across conflict-prone frontlines. If for example, **gender equality projects** attempt to engage Bosniak, Serb and Croat (and other) women alike, they do not only create positive interdependence (as progress in gender equality benefit all women alike), but also create bridges between ethnic divides. If Serb and Bosniak women feel that they are on the same side trying to break the monopoly of men in business, for example, the cleavage between men and women becomes a cross-cutting cleavage that exemplifies the commonness of interests between Serb and Bosniak women.

²¹⁵ Fisher, Roger and William Ury, 1982. *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, New York: Penguin Books.

²¹⁶ McCarter 2008.

FES Intervention Box 8 – Free and independent media

As part of its attempt to promote **free and independent media**, FES could campaign against the use of **hate speech** and support the media as an instrument for national reconciliation rather than as

a tool for ethnic incitement. For this purpose, FES has implemented the first home-grown analysis on the media landscape in BiH under the title "Balkan Media Barometer: Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011".¹

¹ For further information visit: http://fes.ba/publikacije/2012/BMB/FES%20%20BMB%20BiH%202011_book%20BHS%2010_2_2012.pdf or www.fes.ba.

FES Intervention Box 9 – Gender equality

FES is implementing projects with a special focus on **gender equality** and **empowerment of women** in the patriarchal Bosnian and Herzegovinian society. Though women were much more often victims of atrocities than perpetrators, women have shown a much greater readiness than their male counterparts to open dialogue on different issues from the past.

Many of FES activities to promote women's participation in political and socio-economic life are conducted with Serb, Croats and Bosniak participants. A recent World Café "Gender quota in BiH" with participants from all parts of the country produced a brochure: "It concerns both of us. The need for a gender quota in BiH."¹

¹ Soon to be published – for further information visit: www.fes.ba.

FES Intervention Box 10 – Multi-ethnic approach to project management

Together with **multi-ethnic political parties**, FES promotes dialogue and cooperation between political stakeholders and representatives of non-governmental organisations in BiH, the enhancing of gender equality within political parties and the political education of promising politicians. Besides developing

the capacities of the participants, the reconciliation aspect of this working line is very strong. Participants are of different ethnic backgrounds; belong to different political parties, while the venues of the educational events rotate between Mostar, Banja Luka and Sarajevo.¹

¹ For further information on this kind of FES projects visit www.fes.ba.

Perhaps even more important could be the **common interests of young people**. The mobilisation of multi-ethnic advocacy for the interests of young people in politics, business, labour markets, etc. as well as direct action for the improvement of the lives of all young citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, could help creating inter-ethnic youth alliances that promote understanding between ethnic groups. The leverage deriving from such shared grievances in post-conflict peace building has been studied widely, including in the context of Bosnia

and Herzegovina.²¹⁷ The stability of pluralistic democracies has often been attributed to the natural existence of a network of cross-cutting cleavages.²¹⁸ In less stable societies these cleavages could be built by using the instruments of development cooperation.

²¹⁷ Simonsen, Sven Gunnar 2006. "Addressing Ethnic Divisions in Post-Conflict Institution-Building: Lessons from Recent Cases", *Security Dialogue* 36(3), 297–318.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

Recommendations: Through dialogue to peace

- Support media and media training that aims at creating outlets of dialogue between ethnic groups
- Support the work of media outlets and programmes that offer a diversified and representative picture of current events
- Support programmes which give voice to ordinary citizens
- Promote projects on inter-ethnic communication
- Support projects with positive ethnic inter-dependence, such as businesses employing all ethnic groups and promoting gender equality etc.
- Support projects that focus on the common interest of young people, such as multi-ethnic advocacy for youth issues in politics, labour market, education etc.

General media recommendations from the *Balkan Media Barometer- Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011*¹

Reconciliation

- Continue media campaign against hate speech
- Support the media to play a more prominent role in the process of reconciliation

Strengthen journalistic profession

- Improve solidarity among journalists
- Support associations and trade unions of journalists so that the political powers respect them as partners
- Strengthen the protection of journalists against ethnic and political pressure
- Raise gender awareness
- Amend the Penal Code with the aim of making attacks on journalists a criminal offence, with the definition ranging from actual attack, to threats and the prevention of a journalist from completing his or her professional assignments

Self-regulation of media

- Promote codes of professional standards to further weed out hate speech in the media

- Adopt internal codes of conduct in media houses to improve standards of professional journalism
- Encourage internet news portals to participate in the process of self-regulation by joining the Press Council and accepting its code of conduct

Public broadcasting services

- Review the legislation for public broadcasting services and establish the Corporation of the Public Radio Television Services of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Ensure that the public broadcasting services fulfil their mission of providing accurate, unbiased and fair information to the public
- Set up a monitoring system for public broadcasting services to report regularly on their performance

Access to information

- Improve the law on Freedom of Access to Information.

Corruption

- Continue the campaign against corruption in society in general and the media in particular
- Intensify cooperation between the media and non-governmental organisations in this area

¹ Tešanović (ed.) 2011.

6. Conclusion: Post-conflict Recovery - Not Yet Achieved

In many instances the international community is trying to reduce its responsibility for post-conflict recovery and is in the process of severely reducing its engagement. However, 17 years after the end of the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina is far from enjoying internal stability in a peaceful environment striving for economic prosperity and EU integration. On the contrary, BiH appears in principle as a failed state because after all the record on post-conflict recovery is not very impressive. Regardless of this, the international community and the long serving Bosnian political elites are busy candy-coating the stalled situation in the country and justifying their Bosnia-fatigue by emphasising the need for local ownership.

Historically, 40 per cent of all post-conflict situations have reverted back to conflict within five years. In fact they have accounted for half of all civil wars. Further, in BiH the prevalent conflict potential evident by statistical data and many analyses is widely ignored by all actors, while selling the failure of peace-building as a success seems to have become the norm.

Like in most settings of post-conflict peace-building, there are three recognised actors in BiH: the United Nations Security Council; international aid organisations and the donor community; and the post-conflict government. There is of course a very strong interdependence of the three different actors and their approaches, strategies and programmes should be coordinated. 17 years after the war in BiH the coordinating body is still the **Office of the High Representative** with an executive mandate of the United Nation Security Council to oversee the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. The attempt to close the OHR before the long-term objectives and conditions for the closure are met will leave the international community without the executive mandate that might be in dire need once social unrest breaks out or ethnic violence resumes. The attempts to replace the OHR by a European Union Special Representative seem too half-hearted.

The second group of actors are the **international aid organisations and the donor community**. Post-conflict recovery is a slow process. In devastated post-war countries like BiH the building of functional state institutions,

socio-economic infrastructure, political structure and a vibrant civil society take time. As has been shown in this study, there are no quick processes apart from decline. A long-term commitment by international aid organisations is essential. Progress should not be measured by years of engagement but by hard indicators for internal security and socio-economic development.

Unfortunately, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian middle class is very weak and there is **no tradition of civil society engagement**. In countries as torn as BiH, strong civil society can offer a decisive pull in (re)constructing the missing structures. After centuries of foreign rule, brutal wars incited by ethnic polarisation and almost 50 years of communist corporatism public policies were object to foreign interest and seldom subject to the people's interests. The neo-feudal system of post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina has not brought any change to this pattern. As people are too much occupied with organising their economic survival, there is not much space for voluntary engagement for a society or a state that less than 30 per cent of the population identifies with. As much as the current political structure seems to be a hindrance for the stabilisation of the country, the absence of civic awareness and missing civil society engagement of its people appear to be precursors of a failed state.

The third actor is the **post-conflict government**. As a matter of course there is a requirement to respect the will of the post-conflict societies to self-determination and assist them in building a democratic society. That, however, is easier said than done. More often the perpetrators of war and/or war profiteers transform themselves into democratic leaders and succeed in continuing to strive for their nationalistic aims and/or economic interest under the disguise of democratisation. In a post-conflict society, more than in any other society, elections do not only produce a legitimate government but winners and losers. Losers are usually not reconciled. Governments tend to snatch short-term opportunities and thus refrain of doing what is most needed: the rebuilding of prosperity for all through economic development on the foundation of security.

For this to happen a paradigm shift is needed. The mentality that has crystallised during conflict and in years of stagnation and decline is that of a zero-sum game. This mentality does not produce constructive and productive politics. So the mentality has to shift from zero-sum to

positive-sum before productive and constructive politics can gain ground. This shift can only occur if the reality is that prosperity is being built in a secure environment. Thus the objective of facing reality is to change reality. As that is a long term aim, all three actors need to stay committed for a longer period of time, since in BiH that aim has not nearly been reached.

Further, in BiH it seems that the legacy of conflict is a sustained bad economic policy. This needs to be changed. Even with economic recovery, it can take a generation or more to return to prewar living standards and that time is now slowly running out for BiH. There is an urgent requirement for a reform agenda that will be focused on social inclusion. An inclusion agenda does not emerge merely from elections. Elections produce losers, which in the post-conflict society of BiH are then excluded. So the

three actors have to genuinely join forces to make the paradigm shift possible. Only internal security, the respect for human rights and the implementation of the rule of law can provide an environment that attracts foreign direct investment that in turn could promote economic recovery. Economic recovery is the true exit strategy for the international community. ***In conclusion, this study calls for the recognition that even 17 years after the end of the Bosnian war there is unfortunately a continued need to maintain the collaboration of all three actors through formal and mutual commitments until the following prerequisites for stability are achieved: creation of employment, especially for former combatants and well-educated unemployed youth, improvement of social security and health services, and the monitoring of clean government.***

Appendices

Appendix 1: Leading Politicians and Political Parties in BiH

Politicians

Dragan Čavić

Born in 1958. Former president and vice-president of Republika Srpska (in the periods 2002–2006 and 2000–2002 respectively); currently in the opposition (DP), member of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska. Often confused with Dragan Čović by foreign journalists and analysts.

Dragan Čović

Born in 1956. One of the most influential Croat politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and since 2005 the leader of HDZ, the largest Croat party. Between 2002 and 2005, member of the Bosnian Presidency, dismissed in March 2005 by the High Representative Paddy Ashdown. Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister of FBiH between 1998 and 2001. He has a degree in engineering.

Milorad Dodik

Born in 1959. Currently the most influential Serb politician in Bosnia; President of Republika Srpska since the general elections in October 2010, Prime Minister of Republika Srpska (February 2006 – October 2010; previously, between January 1998 and January 2001). Leader of the SNSD party. Before 1990 he worked in local government, then up to 1997 served as a member of the RS Parliament. He has a degree in political science.

Željko Komšić

Born in 1964. A Croat politician with the SDP party, and member of the Bosnian Presidency since 2006. He was appointed to the Presidency mainly by Bosniak voters and as an SDP activist he advocates a 'multi-ethnic Bosnia'; for this reason some Croat politicians and activists do not acknowledge him as a rightful representative of the Croats in the Presidency. He has a degree in law and political science.

Borjana Krišto

Born in 1961. President of FBiH since February 2007 until October 2010. Associated with HDZ BiH. From the mid-1990s, a member of local cantonal authorities; from 2002 a member of the FBiH Parliament. She has a degree in law.

Nebojša Radmanović

Born in 1949. Serb member of the Bosnian Presidency since 2006, member of the SNSD. He is a graduate of the Faculty of Philosophy and has a degree in history.

Igor Radojčić

Born in 1966. Speaker of the RS Parliament. Deputy President of the SNSD. He has a degree in engineering.

Haris Silajdžić

Born in 1945. Bosniak politician, member of the Bosnian Presidency from 2006 until 2010. Leader of the SBiH party, which was formed after some members left the SDA as a result of conflict with Tihić. Formerly co-founder of the SDA, head of Bosnian diplomacy between 1992 and 1993, and Prime Minister of Bosnia in 1993. A signatory to the Dayton Agreement.

Sulejman Tihić

Born in 1951. Currently the most influential Bosniak politician in Bosnia. Since October 2001, leader of the SDA (mandate confirmed in the elections in late May 2009). In the past, a member of the Bosnian Presidency (2002–2006), Deputy Speaker of the RS Parliament (2000–2006), member of the RS Parliament (1996–2000). He has a degree in law, and worked as a judge, prosecutor and a lawyer before 1990. Prisoner in a Serbian internment camp in 1992–1994.

Zlatko Lagumdžija

Born in 1955. Bosniak politician, leader of the SDP since 1997. During the war he served as a Deputy Prime Minister. Since 1996 he has served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH (mandate confirmed in the general elections 2010). After the general elections in 2000 he served as a Minister of Foreign Affairs (2001–2003) and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (until 2002). He earned his B.Sc. in 1977, an M.Sc. in 1981 and PhD in 1988 in the field of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering.

Bakir Izetbegović

Born in 1956. Bosniak politician, member of the Bosnian presidency since 2010. He served as a member of the Canton Sarajevo Assembly (2000–2002), a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Federation of BiH (2002–2006) and as a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH (2006–2010). Since 1990 a member of the SDA party which was founded by his father Alija Izetbegović.

He was Vice-President of the SDA from 2003 to 2009 (in 2010 he lost party elections for the party president to Sulejman Tihić). He has a degree in architecture.

Fahrudin Randončić

Born in 1957. He worked as a journalist since 1989. He founded Avaz publishing house in 1991 and the daily newspaper Dnevni Avaz in 1995. Since 2010 President of the new political party – Savez za bolju budućnost BiH (Union for a Better Future for BiH).

Božo Ljubić

Born in 1949. Member of HDZ from the time of the party's establishment until 2006. He served as a Minister of Health of Federation of BiH from 1994 to 2001. In April 2006 he founded a new political party – HDZ 1990. After the last general elections (2010) his party formed a coalition with HDZ.

Mladen Ivanković Lijanović

Born in 1960. Croat politician, the founder and the leader of the People's Party of Work for Betterment. Lijanović founded the party in 2001 and prior to that he was known as a businessman and one of the owners of the meat processing company Lijanović. He twice ran unsuccessfully for the Croat seat in the BiH Presidency. His party took advantage of the rivalry between the two major Croat parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina – HDZ BiH and HDZ 1990 – and gained a substantial number of votes from Croats living in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the last general elections. After the elections his party formed a coalition with SDP, SDA and HSP and subsequent to that they have established a government in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since general elections in 2010 he is a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH. He has a degree in mechanical engineering.

Zvonko Jurišić

Born in 1961. Croat politician and a member of the Croatian party of Rights of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HSP) since 1994. In the period 2000 – 2004 he was a member of the party's presidency and in 2004 he became its President. From 2002 until 2006 he was a member of the Assembly of the West Herzegovina Canton (Zapadnohercegovački kanton). In 2006 he ran unsuccessfully for the Croat membership of the BiH Presidency. Since the last general elections (2010) he has served as the member of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH. Jurišić has a degree in stomatology.

Živko Budimir

Born in 1961. Croat politician, President of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina since 17.03.2011. He is a former soldier whose political career began in 2006 when he joined HSP. In 2008 he was elected as a member of the City Council of Mostar. His party formed a coalition with SDP, SDA and People's Party of Work for Betterment after the general elections in 2010 and after that he became the President of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Mladen Bosić

Born in 1961. President of Srpska demokratska stranka (SDS – Serbian Democratic Party) since 2006. He was a candidate for the Serbian member of the Bosnian Presidency in 2006 but lost the elections to Nebojša Radmanović (SNSD). Since 2010, has been a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH. He has a degree in electrotechnical engineering.

Parliamentary groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The list below deliberately omits policy differences, as they are of secondary importance and have little influence on the activities of the parties concerned. A decisive majority of parties verbally champion democratic values, human and minority rights and the market economy (the social democratic and post-Communist groups are more reserved about the free market).

The differences in their positions as revealed by everyday political practice usually manifest themselves in connection with particular issues (the manner of privatising a company, the employment model at municipality or cantonal level, etc.), and are often indirectly related to prospective appointments to publicly financed posts. However, their principal divisions stem from affiliation to a particular ethno-political community.

1. Croat parties

HDZ BiH (Croatian Democratic Union BiH, Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica BiH). Established in 1990, it is currently the largest Croat party in Bosnia. Before 2000 and between 2002 and 2006, the overwhelming majority of Croat politicians active in Bosnia originated from the HDZ. As a result of splits and divisions, HDZ 1990 and NHI were spun off from the HDZ. Currently led by Dragan Čović. /

Member of the *International Democratic Union and European Peoples Party*./

HDZ 1990 (Croatian Democratic Union 1990, Hrvatska demokratska zajednica 1990). Created in April 2006 as a result of a split in HDZ BiH occasioned by supporters of Bože Ljubić, who currently leads the group. HDZ 1990 created and led the Hrvatsko Zajedništvo coalition in the 2006 parliamentary elections. /Member of the *International Democratic Union and European Peoples Party*./

NHI (New Croatian Initiative, Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa). A party created in 2007 as a result of a split in HDZ BiH occasioned by supporters of Krešimir Zubak, who currently leads the NHI.

HSP BiH (Hrvatska stranka prava BiH – Croatian Party of Rights of BiH) is a parliamentary party in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This party is based on the ideology of Ante Starčević (Croatian politician, publisher and writer). The party was established in 1991 as a branch of the Croatian Party of Rights. Since 2004 the party leader is Zvonko Jurišić. After the local elections the party formed a coalition with the SDP, People’s Party – Work for Betterment (Narodna stranka radom za boljitak) and the SDA and established a joint government in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2. Bosniak parties

SDA (Party of Democratic Action, Stranka Demokratske Akcije). The largest Bosniak party in BiH, established in 1990 by Alija Izetbegović, the first leader of independent Bosnia. Since 2001 led by Sulejman Tihić (Member of *International Democratic Union and European Peoples Party*.)

SBIH (Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Stranka za BiH) Created in 1996 by Haris Silajdžić as a result of some activists quitting the SDA. Much more radical than the latter, it criticises its competitor party for its ‘conciliatory’ attitudes, and calls for the abolition of RS through its incorporation into a centralised Bosnia, thus creating tension in Serb-Bosniak relations.

Savez za bolju budućnost BiH (Union for a Better Future for BiH) is a new political party founded by Fahrudin Radončić before the last general elections (2010).

3. Serb parties

SNSD (Alliance of Independent Social-Democrats, Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata) Established in 1996, this is the ruling party in Republika Srpska. It criticises the corrupt ‘wartime’ elite, that is, the leaders who were in power between 1992 and 1995 and, at the local level, even to 2006. The current RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik is the party’s unquestioned leader. /Member of *Socialist International*./

SDS (Serbian Democratic Party, Srpska Demokratska Stranka) In the first half of 1990s, the largest party of Bosnian Serbs, created and led by Radovan Karadžić. Marginalised since 2006 as a result of the SNSD’s decisive victory in the parliamentary election. Currently led by Mladen Bosić.

PDP (Party of Democratic Progress, Partija demokratskog progresna RS), a centre-right party created in 1999 by Mladen Ivanić, who remains its leader till the present day. / Member of *International Democratic Union and European Peoples Party*./

DNS (Democratic People’s Alliance, Demokratski Narodni Savez) Led by Marko Pavić. DNS is in the government coalition of RS.

SRS RS (Serbian Radical Party RS, Srpska radikalna stranka RS). Affiliated to the SRS of Serbia; calls for the incorporation of RS into Serbia.

SP (Socialist Party, Socijalistička Partija). Created in 1993, and associated with Milošević’s Socialist Party of Serbia. Led by Petar Đokić. This party is a part of the government coalition in RS.

DP (Democratic Party) is a new political party founded by Dragan Čavić. /Applicant to *European Peoples Party*./

4. Multiethnic parties


SDP (Social Democratic Party, Socijaldemokratska partija) A centre-left party, successor to the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It criticises nationalist ideologies. Led by Zlatko Lagumdžija. The party’s composition is mixed. It is popular among some Bosniaks and, to a lesser extent, Croats. /Member of *Socialist International and European Socialist Party*./

Naša Stranka (Our Party) is a new, multi-ethnic political party. Naša stranka participated in the last general elections in coalition with the New Socialist Party. Naša stranka was founded by Oscar winner Danis Tanović. It has no influence in Republika Srpska. /Member of *Liberal International*./

Nova socijalistička partija (New Socialist Party) was founded on 12.12.2009 as a part of the Socialist Party RS. Led by Zdravko Krstanović. Participated in the last general elections in coalition with Naša stranka.


Narodna stranka radom za boljitak (People's Party for Work for Betterment) is a parliamentary, multi-ethnic party founded on 01.10.2001. The party was founded by its current leader Mladen Ivanković Lijanović. After the last general elections (2010) the party entered into a coalition with the SDP, HSP and SDA. These four parties (also known under the nick-name "Platformaši") have contributed to the formation of the government in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Appendix 2: BiH's Legislative and Executive Bodies




Appendix 3: Ethnic Composition in 1998

Ethnic composition in 1998



Appendix 4: Federation of BiH

Federation of BiH



Source: <http://www.ohr.int>

Appendix 5: List of Interviewees

About the Interviews:

Most of the interviews took place from 06 - 30.06.2011 in:

Sarajevo (FBiH, BiH)
Tuzla (FBiH, BiH)
Mostar (FBiH, BiH)
Livno (FBiH, BiH)
Banja Luka (RS, BiH)
Prijedor (RS, BiH)
Doboj (RS, BiH)
Düsseldorf (Germany)

One interview was held by telephone, the rest in person.

The interviews were conducted by Marina Kramer, with Stefanie Krammer as the minute taker.

In addition, an expert workshop was held in Sarajevo with both local and international participants (see end of the list below).

Politicians

Alija Behmen, Mayor of Sarajevo, SDP BiH
 Azra Pašalić, President of Prijedor City Assembly, SPD BiH
 Dragan Čavić, MP, RS Parliament, Demokratska stranka Republike Srpske (Democratic Party RS)
 Emir Suljagić, Minister for Education and Science, Canton Sarajevo, SDP BiH
 Ivan Baković, Secretary General, HSP Herceg-Bosna
 Marinko Čavara, MP, FBiH House of Representatives, HDZ BiH
 Marko Pavić, Mayor of Prijedor, DNS
 Milanko Mihaljica, President, SRS SR
 Muharem Murseilović, MP, RS Assembly, Party for BiH N.N., Official, HDZ 1990
 Nada Delalić, SDP BiH
 Nermina Zaimović-Uzunović, MP, BiH House of Representatives, SDP BiH
 Obren Petrović, Mayor of Doboj, SDS
 Predrag Nikolić, Chief of Foreign Affairs, SDS
 Stanislav Čado, Minister of Interior of RS, SNSD
 Vlado Džoić, Secretary-General, HDZ BiH

International Community

Dita Kudelova, Political Desk Officer – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Enlargement Directorate General, European Commission
 Johann Hesse, Head of Operations Section for Economic Development, Natural Resources, and Infrastructure of the EU Delegation to BiH
 General (ret.) Victor von Wilken, Director, Department of Security Cooperation, OSCE
 Matthias Heinz, Director of the Economic Section, German Embassy
 N.N., Intelligence Officer, EUFOR
 Stefan Feller, Police Head of Mission, EU PM BiH
 Valentin Inzko, High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina

Civil Servants

Amer Kapetanović, Head of EU Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs BiH
 Gojko Vasić, Chief of Police, Republika Srpska
 N.N., High Official, BiH Judiciary

Civil Society

Azra Hašimbegović, Chairperson, Žena BiH
 Darko Brkan, President, Zašto ne?
 Denis Hadžović, Secretary General, Center for Security Studies
 Igor Tokić, Youth Coordinator, Independent Trade Union of Utility Workers of BiH
 Lidija Živanović, Executive Director, Helsinki Citizens Parliament Office for Banja Luka
 Marko Oršolić, Director, International Multi-religious Intercultural Center and Franciscan Priest
 Melika Malešević, AWO House of Trust Srebrenica
 Memnuna Zvizdić, Director, Women for Women
 Mladen Stjepanović, AWO House of Trust Srebrenica
 Momir Dejanović, President, Center for Humane Policy
 Omer Muminović, Coordinator, NGO IPAK- Youth Builds Future
 Ranka Mišić, President, Trade Union Association of RS
 Srđan Blagovčanin, CEO, Transparency International BiH

Academics

Enes Osmančević, Professor, University of Tuzla and newspaper columnist
 Enver Kazaz, Professor, University of Sarajevo
 Ismet Sejfića, Professor, University of Tuzla and NGO IPAK- Youth Builds Future
 Mile Lasić, Professor, University of Mostar

Media

Amra Selesković, Director, Vesta Association
Azemina Smailbegović – Mulahusejnović, Director, Radio ZOS
Drago Bojić, Franciscan Priest and Editor
Nataša Tešanović, Director, Alternative TV Station Banja Luka
Slobodan Vasković, Journalist
Vildana Selimbegović, Editor-in-Chief, Oslobođenje
Zoran Krešić, Journalist, Večernji list

Diverse Interviewees

Aida N., Activist and Muslim woman
Aleksandar Batez, Student
Edhem Čamdžić, Mufti in Banja Luka
Franjo Komarica, Catholic Bishop in Banja Luka
Josip Muselimović, Lawyer
Mirsad Pivčić, Student
N.N.a, "Gastarbeiter" in Germany
N.N.b, "Gastarbeiter" in Germany
N.N., High Official, Army BiH
N.N., Unemployed mother
Svetlana Cenić, Independent economic expert

Total: 61

Workshop Participants, Sarajevo, 14.-17.06.2011

Armin Hasemann, Department for International Development Cooperation, FES
Damir Kapidžić, Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo
Dennis Gratz, Naša stranka
Marina Kramer, Consultant
Miloš Šolaja, Center for International Relations, Banja Luka
Paul Pasch, Country Director for Bosnia and Herzegovina, FES
Stefanie Krauss, Intern, FES
Sunita Hasagić, FES
Tanja Topić, FES
Timo Kivimäki, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, University of Uppsala, Sweden

Appendix 6: Questionnaire

Almost 100 questions were developed by the authors for the purpose of the study. They were posed selectively to the respective interviewees.

General question Sub-questions check list

1. Explain the work of your organization.

1. Explain the work of your organisation and your position.
2. Who is the target group/beneficiary of your work/work of your organisation?

2. What, in your opinion, are the main challenges and opportunities for BiH today?

3. What are, in your opinion, the biggest challenges that BiH faces today?
4. What are the main concerns and main sources of hope in BiH?

3. What are the main constitutional challenges BiH faces?

- 5.-6. Have there been any tensions between the local government in your area and the state government? Which level of administration do you think represents your own values best: municipality, canton, entity or the state?
7. What is your opinion of the Finci and Sejdić VS BiH case? Should people from other ethnicities have the same rights as people of Bosniak, Serb or Croat origin?
8. What do you think of the intention of HDZ BiH and HDZ 1990 to form a Croat national assembly?
9. What do you think of the Serbian government holding a joint session with the RS administration on 18 March?
- 10.-11. What is your opinion of the Dayton Peace Agreement? What do you expect for Bosnia from the OHR, international community or the other former Yugoslav Republics?
12. Is coercive bargaining on constitution and its interpretation over yet?
- 13.- 16. What do you expect from EU membership? Is the EU a 'carrot' motivation enough to trigger significant changes? Will it (and should it) mean more power to regions, or to the state? What should be improved in the EU approach to BiH?
17. As a Serb/Bosniak/Croat/Other representative, what kind of rights do you expect in your municipality/canton/entity/in BiH for yourself as an individual and for your group?

4. What are the challenges in the current political developments (elections etc.) and how do you see your own organization/ethnicity tackle them?

18. How happy are you with the outcome of the 2010 elections, locally and nationally? Will it help overcome the current stalemate?
19. How do you comment on the fact that the majority of Bosniaks voted for moderate centre-left party, while Croats and Serbs voted predominantly for their respective nationalist parties?
20. How satisfied have you/your ethnicity been with the state and entity government's cooperation with the ICTY?
21. (For politicians/government members) How could your party/organisation help improve the situation in BiH and preserve peace?
22. (For ethnic groups other than Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats) How do you feel about your political rights (Dayton peace agreement)?
23. Is religion in BiH fostering or impending reconciliation? How does it affect politics?

24. (For Croats) How do you feel about having a SDP representative in the presidency, instead of one from an ethnic party?

25. Comment on the EU not having an Ambassador in BiH for a prolonged period of time.

5. How do you see security, law and order enforcement 'developing'? Is the escalation of violence still possible? What about human rights?

26.-31. Do you consider laws to be just in this area (for judiciary experts and politicians, one could ask what are the popular perceptions, and then specify which areas of law are felt most illegitimate by people, and in which areas)? Are they being enforced effectively? Is the police doing their job? Can you trust the police? Are they sufficiently resourced? Are they competent ((from ordinary people's perspectives, not judiciary experts)? How do you or your friends protect yourselves against violent crime or mobs? How safe do you yourself feel?

32. Are you happy about the way in which the terms of peace agreement are implemented and enforced? What are the main problems?

33. How do the state and the entities function? Are they able to implement decisions that reflect your (ordinary people)/popular (expert) preferences? What are the main problems?

34. Are decisions made as they are supposed to, or do people ignore politics and make their own decisions? Do bureaucrats follow political decisions?

35. How is the human rights situation in your area (informants)/different areas of BiH (experts)?

6. Do you see the current socio-economic problems, such as unemployment, as a threat to peace in BiH?

36.-38. How are you and how is your group (ethnic, religious, etc.) doing economically (e.g. poor, well-off) compared to other groups and compared to how you lived in Yugoslavia? Is there envy towards another group? Is the situation improving or deteriorating?

39.-41. How do unemployed people spend their time? How do they find a role in the society? Are unemployed young men threatening?

42.-44. Are there rich and poor people in BiH/your entity/municipality/canton? Why is there poverty? Is poverty ethically based?

45.- 46. How is political power and wealth related? Are powerful people rich? What about wealth and participation in the Bosnian War? Are the veterans poor or rich? What do you think about this?

7. How are relations between ethnic groups developing? Are ethnic representation and quota issues considered as fair?

47.-48. Describe ethnic groups in BiH. Are they peaceful or brave worriers? How are they, and how important is ethnicity for you? Why? (the FES study on ethnic stereotypes covers this questions, except for ethno-nationalist politicians)

49. What kind of relationship do the various ethnic groups have with one another, locally and nationally? Which groups are closest to one another? Who trusts each other?

50. How much does your community/ethnicity identify with individuals prosecuted for war crimes (e.g. Serbs - Milošević, Karadžić, Arkan, Mladić, Plavšić; Croats - Gotovina, Kordić, Pusić; Bosniak - R. Delić, H. Delić, Hadžihanović etc.) (It would be good if

people would also answer for other ethnic groups identified with war criminals, not only her/his own group.)

51. What are the dangers related to the radical/nationalist groups in your own community/ethnicity?

52. What is your opinion of civil society in BiH and especially its cooperation with the (a) state government, (b) local government, (c) the international community?

53. Are political interests and values ethnic? Do you feel affiliation to an ethnic party or non-ethnic political ideologies? Why?

57.-59. Do you call Bosniaks Muslims, Bosniaks or something else? Why? Is there a reason why the name of the state is Bosnia and Herzegovina? Does it refer to the ethnic group of Bosniaks? Is there a reason why many Bosniak parties do not have ethnic names while many Serb and Croat parties do?

60. Why is the name of the Republic of Srpska the same as the name of the pre-war separatist entity? Is it the same entity?

61. (For NGOs) How does inter-ethnic cooperation function in NGOs?

8. What are the historical incidents that BiH has to learn from? What are the historical unfairnesses that should be rectified?

62. Tell us about the kind of unfairness your ethnic group has experienced. What has this unfairness resulted in (poverty, loss of territory etc.)? How can your ethnic group live with this fairness? Should this somehow be rectified or compensated?

63. In your opinion, how did the war start? How did it end?

64. Do you know of any examples of inter-ethnic solidarity during the war?

65. What happened in Srebrenica?

66. Who are officially considered to be the war veterans in BiH? What do you think about them? Is the system fair?

67. What is your opinion of Tito? What is your experience of living in Yugoslavia? (Here it is important for the interviewers not to reveal their own opinions)

68. (For German Embassy/NGOs) Please comment on the involvement of German NGOs/Government during the war and how this developed in the aftermath.

9. What kind of alternative futures do you see for BiH?

69. Is a unitary BiH a realistic scenario? Why would BiH not be partitioned? Which is the preferred scenario from the point of view of your ethnicity? What are the advantages and disadvantages of partition? Of staying together? Do you think that partition would lead to another conflict?

70. (For Serbs and Experts) Would you/Serbs be ready to take up arms to protect the interests of Serbs if the RS was to decide to separate from BiH? What is the importance of the case of Kosovo for BiH?

71. (For Bosniaks) Would you/Bosniaks be ready to take up arms to protect the integrity of BiH in case of secession? Do you think another ethnic group would take up arms to protect the integrity and/or their interests in BiH? Would partition be acceptable?

72. What role could Croatia and Serbia play in the future of BiH?

73. In your opinion, what are the reforms necessary for BiH to overcome the current stalemate? What should your own ethnic parties do? What should parties of other ethnicities do?

74. What kind of social relations can you imagine between the constituent people? And with the 'others'?

75. What kind of economic developments can you imagine for BiH/your entity/canton/municipality?

76.-77. Of the scenarios you have described, which would you like to come true, and which you would like to avoid? What about the 4 scenarios outlined by the FES scenario exercise?

78. -81. Which of the scenarios you listed do you think are likely? What about the 4 scenarios outlined by the FES scenario exercise? Do you think another outbreak of violence/war is a possible scenario in BiH? Why yes/not? Is it probable that the situation could turn into a long-protracted 'frozen conflict'?

10. What are the main problems in BiH education system?

82.-83. What is your opinion of the current education system in BiH, especially concerning the ethnic divisions? What are other problems in the education system?

84. What would help to stop/reverse the brain drain from BiH?

11. How is the role of the international community perceived in BiH? (85.)

12. How does international aid affect peace building in BiH? (type of projects, distribution, collaboration partners, etc.)

86. What is your assessment of the development aid that the international community has been pouring into BiH?

87. Do you think that the distribution of aid has been fair to all the ethnicities?

88. How important has the prospect of joining the EU been in triggering changes?

89 - 92. Who benefits most from the present international presence and who would benefit most from their leaving? It seems that the US officials sometimes issue statements saying how they won the war in Bosnia, or the EU officials explain how they made decisions on peace. Is this a problem that they feel such great ownership of BiH and the Dayton Peace? Is there enough of ownership of peace and state for the citizens of BiH?

93. What are your expectations of the international community, including OHR, for BiH?

94. What is your assessment of the practice of OHR to discharge officials? Have they been equally fair to all the ethnicities? (Perception: more Serbs discharged?)

95. Which foreign organisation/country offers most understanding/support for the cause you represent?

96. What do you expect, hope and fear from the other former Yugoslav republics and the international Muslim community?

13. Where do you/people get your/their news from? How do media affect peace in BiH?

97. Where do you get your news from?

98. Do you ever read/watch 'unitary' media or media from other ethnicities?

99. How do media affect peace in BiH?

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