

Coalitions for Representation ¹

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The 20th century has been described by *Freedom House* as the century of democracy. For this organization that had monitored the progress of societies on a predefined scale of civil liberties and political rights, the world has progressed politically over the last hundred years.

Tracking of Democratic Polities ²

<i>Political Order</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>1950</i>	<i>1900</i>
Democratic	120	22	0
Restricted Democratic Practice	16	21	25
Constitutional Monarchy	0	9	19
Traditional Monarchy	10	4	6
Absolute Monarchy	0	2	5
Authoritarian Regimes	39	10	0
Totalitarian	5	12	0
Others	2	74	75
TOTAL	192	154	130

The democratization evidenced by the table above, however, does not reflect the travails that many of the newly democratized countries experienced. As continually monitored by comparative politics scholars, a number of the societies that have democratized in the phase referred to by Huntington as the "Third Wave" ³ have been beset by problems.

The Philippine experience alone indicates the struggle that comes with democratic transitions. Fifteen years after the first people power uprising deposed a dictator, the foundations of our fledgling democratic order was rocked anew recently, by an inflamed crisis of leadership that did not only indicate the weakness of the popularly elected but morally depraved former President Joseph "Erap" Estrada, but also mirror the problematic nature of Philippine elections. This recent episode completes the range of

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challenges to the stability and consolidation of our democratic order. Like the crisis of leadership, we have had other open threats to our democratic order in the past, such as the coup attempts waged in succession by right wing military organizations against then President Corazon Aquino, from 1987 to 1989. These have all failed and the bitter consequences of such unsuccessful and destructive coup attempts are sufficient either to temper military adventurism or alarm a generally passive but periodically watchful Philippine citizenry.

More than the open challenges against any post-EDSA 1986 administration, there are structural infirmities that have been manifest but have not been resolutely attended to by leaders of government and even those from civil society. In particular, for the purpose of this presentation, we refer to the **evident weakness of our parties and party system**. While the 1986 Constitution gives import to the development of a multi-party system and even provides for a mechanism for the outgrowth of new parties, through proportionate representation, the experience in party development after People Power I is not at all gratifying. *Why do we say so*

Too many pseudo-parties in motion


Part of the reason for our negative assessment is the constant realization that our major political parties, dubbed as such only because they happen to garner the most number of positions after the elections, have remained the same in their acts (or lack of action). While the parties that dominate after People Power I do not carry the labels of the previous dominant parties⁴ they have behaved in ways that would put to shame the superficiality of their predecessors. The post-EDSA I dominant parties have simply carried over the undesirable characteristics of the big parties of the past—they revolve around personalities, they operate simply as vehicles for securing political office for their members, and they have failed to act on, with firmness, their pronounced stance on a host of policy issues when they finally get a share of policy making powers. For these parties, what has happened was expected. Paraphrasing an old adage, you cannot teach old dogs--traditional politicians and their parties--new tricks, much more about new politics. For this reason, we can shift our attention to the "other" parties that continue to have potentials—the party-list groups (PLGs).

Why are PLGs believed to have more potentials We can cite at least three reasons, namely:

- PLGs, being new, are envisioned to represent the interest of marginalized, deprived, and vulnerable sectors. ⁵
- PLGs were anticipated to draw themselves from the lot of civil society groups that serve as countervailing forces during the anti-dictatorial struggle. As such, they would be very clear about their reform agenda relative to the traditional political parties who would be more compromising.
- Given their presumed shared characteristics, ⁶PLGs were believed to be much more inclined towards forging principle/issue-based coalitions.

The Philippines' adoption of the party-list system also follows from the global trend to veer away from the majoritarian systems in order to ensure more expansive representation. Based on data from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance ⁷the number of countries that have adopted the proportional representation has increased. As shown in the chart below ⁸(PR) system was employed by 32% of the countries (211) surveyed in 1997, just a percentage point away from those who employed the first-pass-the-post (FPTP) plurality elections. Interestingly, of the so-called established democracies, a plurality (42% or 15 countries) have taken on the PR system.


Voting Participation in 1998 Party-List Election, By Region



From the theoretical promises to the global context, the Philippines' seems to be on the right track when it comes to institutional arrangements for greater representation. In paper, this clearly appears to be, but not so much in reality.

We can hark back to the 1998 electoral experience and summarize such episode as follows:

- As always, voting participation remained high with more than 80% of the 34 million voters participating.
- Out of more than 28 million voters who participated in the election, only 9.1 million (27%) registered a valid preference for the party-list election.
- Across regions, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao posted the highest percentage of valid participation in the party list election with 35.70%, while Region IX (Western Mindanao) posted the lowest at 15.80%. (See Chart below)



- There were 123 PLGs that participated. Only 13 PLGs garnered representative seats in the Lower House of Congress, with only one (1) PLG, the Association of Philippine Electrical Cooperatives (APEC) grabbing two seats.

- The limited number of PLGs that landed seats in Congress could be attributed to the novelty of the political exercise. Given the lack of information about how the party-list component of the election proceeded, it is safe to assume that a number of the voters either left the item blank or committed mistakes in enlisting their preference.
- Based on election results, the votes for PLGs ranged from a low of 6, 079 for the Philippine Jury Movement to a high of 503,487 for APEC, rendering, as an absolute average, a miniscule .83% vote share for each PLG. Such data indicates that the sheer volume of accredited PLGs, 123 in all, definitely dispersed the voters' choices. Of these 123 there are quite a number of pseudo-PLGs.

Come May 14, 2001, the experience of 1998 may possibly be repeated. For one, the number of participating PLGs would swell to close to 180 as more than 50 of the 143 wanting-to-be PLGs have been recently accredited by the COMELEC. Such number would surely further disperse the votes, not to mention confuse the electors, a condition that would possibly lead to an even lower filling-out of the party-list portion in the ballot.

Aside from vote dispersal, serious questions have been raised about the nature of the existing and new PLGs, whether these organizations represent the the marginalized and the underrepresented that the Constitution stipulates should be additionally represented via the party-list election. Among those who have filed for accreditation are powerful organizations such as the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Philippine Medical Association, the Philippine Dental Association, and the Construction and Real Estate Brokers Association. These groups are definitely not marginalized nor under-represented by virtue of their important societal and political connections.

Aside from these dominant organizations allowed to participate, the prohibition on the participation of major political parties in the party-list has also been lifted for the May 14 contest. In this regard, the fledgling PLGs who work largely with their embryonic networks would really find it difficult to compete against the powerful associations turned PLGs and the dominant parties who have established a web of vote-mobilizers in several areas across the country.

Finally, like the significant number of PLGs that were formed by or to support national politicians in 1998, such as a group of women supporting then candidate for Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the May 14, 2001 race also has a number of similar PLGs. Two, the Citizen's Movement for Justice, Economy, Environment and Peace (JEEP) and the Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), are closely identified with People Power II ousted president, Erap Estrada.

Given these developments, the expectation now is that the May 14, 2001 party-list elections would simply replicate the sad experience last May 11, 1998. If this dire forecast materializes, the fortunate consequence, hopefully, would be to open the eyes of the bonafide PLGs that what is required is to forge collective ways to secure greater representation. Lest the real PLGs want to become marginalized in an arena that is already constricting, the present and the immediate future makes it necessary to consider forging coalitions, amongst themselves and with other groups, for various purposes.

Working with this preference for coalitions, this paper examines the factors that facilitate or hinder coalition building among parties. Such discussion leads us to make recommendations with regard to the means that could be adopted in order to reduce the fragmentation currently seen in Philippine party politics.

The Players and the Environment for Coalitions

Recognizing that political parties are the ones that enter into alliances, the first factor that should be examined in understanding the nature and outcome of coalitions is the political party itself.

In such examination, we are tempted to effect what Maor⁹ did in his work that explores the internal workings of parties and how such impacts on party and political system change. In his introductory chapter, Maor addressed three questions, as follows:

- a. What does a party do
- b. What motivation underlies a party's behavior
- c. How do parties operate and why does a party operate the way it does

However, in the interest of brevity, we could collapse these three questions and simply stress that the first and second question clarifies what parties are—a **group of individuals directed at a particular goal (or goals)**. The third question, on the other hand, leads one to examine the internal workings of a party—the power and control that their leaders have vis-à-vis the members, the degree of centralization, and the party's accountability to its members, among others.

Between divergent and competing goals¹⁰, on one hand, and the system of intra-party management, on the other, the experience of more stable democratic countries suggest that it is the latter, indicating the strength or institutionalization of political parties, that determine the possibility of and consequently the strength/beneficiality of party coalitions.

Thus, strong political parties, with strength measured by Huntington's fourfold criteria of coherence, complexity, autonomy, and adaptability, make for stable coalitions and less fragmented party systems¹¹. Stable coalitions, on the other hand, consequently lead to much more secure democracies.

From parties, we must look at the larger environment. For this sphere, we refer to three sub-layers and how each sub-layer expands or reduces the fragmentation among parties.

The first sub-layer pertains to the social structure. In the literature of political parties, what comes to mind here is a concept that encapsulates how social structures impact on the political formations that emerge—*social cleavages*. In his study of the dynamics of party and party system formation Maor¹² extends the initial assertion of Lipset and Rokkan that preceding social cleavages which brought to fore particular issues that were eventually resolved through critical junctures of "revolutionary change" gave way to certain types of parties. These ranged from ethnically and linguistically based parties arising when the chief social cleavage was between center and periphery, to green/ecology parties that came about when the post-materialists collided with the materialists beyond 1968.

Without questioning the impact of social cleavages on politics, specifically party formations, we need to recognize that more and more, due to the technological changes that have impact even in politics, social cleavages do not readily translate to political cleavages.

The second structural sub-layer is political, the form of government. Between the two forms—presidential versus parliamentary, it is held, specifically by Linz, Diamond and Lipset, that the record of the latter in sustaining democratization and fostering stable coalitions is much more superb than the former¹³. They cite as evidence the disastrous experience of Latin American countries as against the stability witnessed in parliamentary democracies of Western Europe. The argument of the three comparative politics scholars could be stretched to suggest that in parliamentary democracies, the coalitions that come before and during elections (electoral coalitions) continue to sustain their alliance once they are successfully positioned in government (governing coalitions), lest they run the risk of losing their dominance in parliament.

Recently, however, other comparative politics scholars re-examined the record in Latin America. In a compilation of these studies, the findings reveal a variety of experiences in the area. Of note, the editors of such volume¹⁴ stressed that the factors that

determined the workability of presidential systems in eight countries of Latin America, are essentially the same as those that determine the stability of parliamentary government—the **party system and its features**—the number of parties (and the degree of fragmentation) and party discipline. For this matter, presidential systems do not necessarily make for weak and dispersed party systems. Rather, the strengthening of the party system, including the consolidation or coalition of programmatic political parties, contributes significantly to the effectiveness of presidential governments.

The third sub-layer has to do with the rules of the game—the electoral laws and system. As many of the democratizing countries are arguably endowed with weak, personalities and clientelistic political parties, the predominant prescription to strengthen the parties in these polities is to adopt electoral systems that are "depersonalized." It is for this reason that the global trend mentioned above is most welcomed, specifically the growing regard for party-list proportional representation (List PR). It is believed that the application of List PR would provide the opportunity for policy-oriented, programmatic parties that are, for purposes of achieving their goals, more inclined to enter into "substantive coalitions."

Aside from the electoral system, the rules of and management of the electoral process also has a big effect on the behavior of parties. In the case of List PR, there are several variants of rules that may affect the number of parties participating.

The first is with respect to the type of list either the closed, open, or the free¹⁵. While each has its advantage, the first, the closed list, tallies with the goal of "depersonalizing" elections¹⁶. The second concern about a List PR system is with regard to the threshold, the percentage of votes required for a party to gain representation. As noted by ACEP, there are two kinds of threshold—the effective and the formal¹⁷. Aside from the forms, there is also the determination of the percentage required. If the intent is to reduce fragmentation, then the threshold should be high. However, increasing the threshold may lead towards the wastage of votes for the parties who failed to get the percentage required. As noted by ACEP, thresholds ranged from 0.67 in the Netherlands to 10% in the Seychelles, and in some countries, such as Poland, due to the high (5%) threshold, over 34% of the votes cast for parties which did not make the threshold were wasted¹⁸.

To resolve the problem of wastage, some countries, such as Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, adopted a system that is technically referred to as the *apparentement*¹⁹ where smaller parties are allowed to exist independent of one another but would have to agree to come into coalition so that the votes cast for each one in the List PR would be credited to the *apparentement*. In the case of Chile, to force the parties to come together, the election of its 120 member Lower House is through an open-list PR system where two seats are elected from each district. Under their system, the parties present a list of two candidates and voters indicate a preference for one candidate from any one of the lists. The votes of both candidates on each list is totaled first. The first seat is awarded to the most popular candidate from the list with the most votes. To determine who gets the second seat, the vote of the party which gets the most votes is divided by two first. If the number is higher than any of the total of the other party lists, the second candidate of the most popular list gets the seat. If the votes are lower than the total garnered by the most popular candidate from the second party list, then the remaining seat goes this first running second party list candidate. In short, parties could only win representation in Congress if they are part of one of the two largest lists in a given district²⁰.

The final component of the sub-layer is the management of the elections. Here, we refer to factors that vary from the capability of election officials to carry out their functions fully and implement the rules/policies of the elections, to the design of the ballot. If the mandated election agency does it work creditably, then incidences of fringe parties muddling the electoral contest would not materialize.

Turning to the issues

More and more, however, due to technological advancements and the sweeping wave of political change across the globe, the attributes of parties and the ways that they have worked with one another has changed. Like the welcomed shift from issues of high (security) to low (political, social development economic) politics in the realm of international relations, there is less rigidity taken on ideological grounds by parties at present. In lieu of ideological goals, parties seem to direct themselves to issues.

In a volume that inquires into the formation and dynamics of party systems in post-Communist states in East Central Europe, Herbert Kitschelt²¹ and company provide an excellent account of the interaction among parties (in elections and the process of policy formulation) and between parties and their constituents in four East Central European states—the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In their work, the authors asserted that whether "democracy becomes the *only game in town* depends on the quality of democratic interactions and policy processes." ²²

Working with empirical techniques of data collection, the authors identified a number of factors that make for theoretically closer inter-party collaboration or what they quote from Lijphart as "consensual" democracy. ²³Aside from stressing the facilitative role that electoral laws of proportional representation played, as well as the natural inducement for coalition politics of the parliamentary system, the authors, with data from surveys of party-elites, identified three other factors which determine the configurations of party collaboration. The three factors are:

- Distance among the parties on the regime and decommunization divide (how much acceptance of former communists in the new polity)
- Distance on policy issues
- Generalized disposition to collaborate with a competitor (sympathy toward or representativeness of competitor)

In general, what Kitschelt and company produced is a method²⁴ that could be replicated to determine the extent by which parties in other countries, in particular our own--the Philippines, may be brought to work with one another by way of ascertaining just how divergent they are, whether the differences are on the level of passions (in the regime divide or in the generalized disposition to collaborate with a competitor) or policy issues. Figure 1²⁵ illustrates the configurations of dyadic party collaboration rooted on the two (policy distance and generalized disposition towards collaboration [which is partly hinged on the distance among parties on the "regime divide"]) of the three factors cited above. What is notable about the figure is that it presents the opportunities, or shall we say, choices, that parties could work with despite fundamental differences (such as the lack of sympathy, the strain from an "ideological" [left/right] divide), such as alliances in times of crisis (Case IV), notwithstanding the distance between parties on policy issues.

Figure 1. Configurations of policy proximity and dispositions towards mutual collaboration in party systems

How close are the parties in the space of salient policy issues

Distant		Close	
Does Party A have a High Generalized Disposition to Collaborate with Party B		Does Party A have a High Generalized Disposition to Collaborate with Party B	
NO	YES	NO	YES
Does Party B have a High Generalized	Does Party B have a High Generalized Disposition to	Does Party B have a High Generalized Disposition to Collaborate with	Does Party B have a High Generalized Disposition to Collaborate with

Disposition to Collaborate with Party A		Collaborate with Party A		Party A		Party A	
NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
<i>Infeasible Coalitions</i>		<i>Case IV Potential Crisis Alliance</i>		<i>Case III Deep Passionate Divisions</i>		<i>Case II Temporary Alliances Log-rolling Case-to-case Cooperation</i>	
						<i>Case I Feasible and Durable Coalitions</i>	

In pursuit of strong coalitions: Applying the factors in the Philippine case

Come to think of it, coalitions are quite easy to form. In contemporary Philippines, even our traditional parties have shown the propensity to enter into coalitions, from the initial Kilusang Bagong Lipunan of Marcos, though induced by Martial rule, to the United Nationalist Independent Organization (UNIDO), the key opposition umbrella from 1983 to 1986. Post People Power I politics has also seen five governing coalitions—²⁶in support of Aquino, the triumvirate of Lakas-NUCD-UMDP in support of Ramos in 1992 and the LAKAS-LABAN coalition formed during the midterm election of 1995, the Laban Ng Malayang Mamamayang Pilipino (LAMMP) of Erap Estrada from 1998 to 2001, and the existing People Power Coalition (PPC) of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Without extending the discussion on these coalitions (as our chief concern is in exploring alliances among PLGs), we could argue that these formations, classifiable as "governing" coalitions, did not significantly contribute to the sustained improvement of governance nor the production of substantive policy reforms across these administrations.

However, the assessment of coalitions among the major parties is not our primary interest. As we started off with, through the discussion on the experience of party-list elections in 1998, our interest lies in bringing about alliances among the substantive and significant PLGs in the country. As such, we offer the following assertions or recommendations.

First, given the novelty of the List PR system in the country, the results in 1998, and its imminent replication come May 14, are expected. The low turn-out for the party-list election could be additionally attributed to the "impersonal" character of PLGs. With more information dissemination and with the number of PLG representatives in Congress increasing, not to mention a projection of its performance, we should expect a natural increase in the participation level for the List PR elections.

Together with the natural increase in List PR votes vis-à-vis the total votes cast, we would also see a natural rate of decline in the number of PLGs vying for a Congressional seat. At this point, the horrendous number is fueled by what we may refer to as a malady that also explains the prevalence of illegal games of chance in our country—the hope for instant gratification. However, as it becomes clear the List PR election is not a game of chance, the pseudo-PLGs would soon exit from the scene.²⁷

To go beyond the natural rate of decline, a process which may take time, it is best to facilitate coalitions based on issues. For a start, the focus should be in generating consensus among the PLGs that could qualify to be **programmatic**—those who have clearly articulated goals, has a functioning organization where the relations between

leaders and members are defined, with formal links to other civil society organizations, and other indicators of being reputable PLGs. For this group, we recommend the conduct of a survey of their leaders, adopting the method (with a revised instrument and list of issues) employed Kitschelt and company in their study. Extending the issues identified in a previous study by Leones and Moraleda²⁸, we could source the stance of each PLG on any or all of the following issues:

Cluster on governance

- National-local government relations (from the general issue of federalism, to the amendments to the local government law to effect a higher share of responsibility and internal revenue allotment for local government units)
- Constitutional/political reform (from the overarching issue of constitutional change--to specific issues such as revising the law on party-list election, judicial procedures, etc.)

Cluster on economic development

- Position on the further deregulation, privatization, and one the overall economic development strategy and the consequent issues of social welfare, employment generation, workers' wages and benefits, taxation, agrarian reform, strategies to address fiscal deficit, foreign debt

Cluster on social development

- Issues relevant to education (the role the state in financing higher education), protection of children's and women's right, the housing problem, population management, culture and arts (specific issues of expression and censorship), public health

The results of the survey of PLG leaders could be disseminated in a workshop participated in by PLGs whose positions are close on most of the common issues and who have a positive disposition towards collaboration with the other PLGs.

Aside from this, there must be a continuous education of the voting public on the benefits to be derived from the List PR system. Such education campaign can be waged collaboratively by the COMELEC, the agency tasked to engaged in such initiative, and the PLGs themselves. For the PLGs, such education campaign would serve the dual purpose of creating a direct link with a broader constituency.

Finally, there are requisite changes in the party-list law and in the capability of the agency, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), tasked to ensure the conduct of free, fair, and efficient elections in the country.

Endnotes

[1] Paper developed for the Ateneo School of Governance and delivered before a forum held last December 16, 2000, at the Institutue of Social Order Seminar Room, Social Development Complex, Ateneo de Manila University.

[2] Excerpted from Freedom House at <http://www.freedomhouse.org>

[3] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991

[4] Pre-EDSA political parties, only the Liberal Party (LP) remains standing. Founded in 1946 as the Liberal wing of the Nacionalista Party, to serve as the vehicle to propel Manuel Roxas to the presidency, the LP has survived due largely to the complementing

blend of senior politicians of probity, led by former Senator Jovito Salonga and a number of young legislators, immersed in the idealism that followed People Power I. While the LP participated, under the UNIDO, in the mainstream political struggle leading to the ouster of former President Marcos, the party has been weakened by the evolution of new dominant catchall parties in the post People Power I period, first the LDP, then LAKAS-NUCD, and finally LAMP.

[5] The twelve sectors identified in the 1986 Constitution to join the party-list polls are the following: war veterans, senior citizens, women, the differently abled, peasant farmers, urban poor, fisherfolks, indigenous cultural communities, youth, labor, overseas workers, and the professionals.

[6] This includes the assertion that since these civil society drawn PLGs have endured years of being "powerless" in the fringes of mainstream politics, and as they have been constantly opposed to a tyrannical or a debasement leadership, the talking points for coalition building would go beyond the vote or office orientation of traditional political parties.

[7] Visit the Institute at <http://www.idea-int.se>

[8] From the Global Distribution of Electoral Systems, prepared by the Administration and Cost of Elections Project (ACEP) at <http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esh.htm>

[9] Moshe Maor, Political Parties and Party Systems: Comparative Approaches and the British Experience, London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 3-14

[10] Maor neatly summarizing these into either an ideological left-right divide or the unifying but competitive goal to seek votes, office, or a public policy, op.cit., pp. 7 -10

[11] The four variables of Huntington are quoted in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp. 35-36.

[12] Moshe Maor, op.cit.

[13] Diamond, Linz, Lipset, op.cit., pp. 39-40.

[14] Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

[15] Refer to the comparison of these three types of list at <http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esg03.htm>

[16] Although as reported in the comparison provided by the ACEP, the ballot in South Africa had the party name, its symbol and the picture of its leader.

[17] See the definitions at <http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esg01.htm>

[18] Ibid

[19] Go to <http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esg02.htm> for a definition.

[20] The foregoing account of the Chilean experience is taken from http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esy_cl.htm

[21] See Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski and Gabor Toka, Post -Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter Party Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

[22] Ibid., p.1.

[23] Ibid., p. 345

[24] The authors employed a survey of party elites in the four countries. The questionnaire requires the political leaders to identify their party and the other parties' (from their perspective) position on a host of issues ranging from the management of the economy (privatization versus command economy) to the participation of former communists in public life.

[25] Op.cit., pp. 351

[26] President Aquino refused to identify with any of the parties that supported her during her early days or even the party formed (Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino [LDP]) as constitutional order, in 1987, was restored. Instead, in the first legislative elections, the Lakas ng Bansa coalition was forged comprising parties such as UNIDO, PDP-Laban, and the Liberal Party.

[27] The decreasing number of PLGs is a justified expectation in the wake of another recent phenomenon, the declining number of contenders for the Senatorial race. While the number went beyond 80 candidates in 1987, there are just above 30 candidates at present vying for 13 seats. As PLGs begin to realize that the chances of electoral success are slim, they, like the Senatorial wannabes, may opt to simply coalesce or support stronger PLGs.

[28] Errol B. Leones and Miel Moraleda, "Philippines," in Wolfgang Sacsenroder and Ulrike Frings, Political Party Systems Development in East and Southeast Asia, Uldershot: Ashgate Publishing Inc., 1998, pp. 304-305.

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