

Inclusive Participation in Nigeria's Security Sector

Trends and Opportunities

Iro Aghedo
July 2020

→ The rising insecurity points further to the socio-political and economic failure of the country, Nigeria.

→ The state is under threat and a failure cycle given inadequate fund, training, collaboration and a security system that neglects some stakeholders.

→ A reform that includes stakeholders is essential to support the state for effective policing.



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Trends and Opportunities

by

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This analysis titled *Inclusive Participation in Nigeria's Security Sector: Trends and Opportunities*, written by Dr Iro Aghedo is number 1 of 6 analyses. The other of the six analyses are:

Analysis 2:

Towards an Accountable Security Sector in Nigeria by Dr Abdulwahab Ademola Lawal

Analysis 3:

Institutional Capacity and Capability of Nigeria's Security Sector by Dr Wilson O V Ijide

Analysis 4:

Non-State Security Sector in Nigeria: Trends and Challenges by Dr Ndubuisi N Nwokolo

Analysis 5:

Nigeria's Security Architecture for the Future: State of National Security Agencies' Coordination and Cooperation by Brig Gen Saleh Bala (Rtd)

Analysis 6:

Policing, Police and the Feasibility of Their Reform in Nigeria by Dr Chris M A Kwaja

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The rising intensity of insecurity challenges in Nigeria necessitates the quest for effective and efficient security. The ideal expectation is that the country reflects the findings of the analytical discourses in its security reform as evidence-based decisions.

Ulrich Thum

Resident Representative,
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Nigeria
July 2020

Inclusive Participation in Nigeria's Security Sector Trends and Opportunities

Abstract

Nigeria has been under the grips of multiple security threats as insurgents, terrorists, militants, bandits, kidnappers and murderers have held sway in different parts of the country. The pervasive violence has engendered the atrocious loss of lives, livelihoods and investments, and as well fuelled humanitarian crisis and forced migration. Crime policing and stabilisation efforts of the poorly funded and ill-equipped security agencies have only yielded marginal results, leading to renewed agitations for inclusive citizens' participation in security governance. This discourse examined the collaborative roles that civilian and non-state groups can play in mitigating the levels of insecurity in Nigeria. The study relied mostly on desk research and unravelled some critical stakeholders that have been excluded from the security sector. Such stakeholders include civil society organisations, academics, youth, women and traditional rulers. The study analysed the ways the stakeholders have been marginalised in security governance by the state and its agencies. Importantly, the study highlighted the inclusive mechanisms that should be deployed in enhancing the participation of stakeholders to ensure efficient and effective security governance in Nigeria.

Keywords: Security Sector Reform, Inclusive Citizens' Participation, Civil Society Organisations, Academics, Youth, Women and Traditional Rulers

1 Background

The incidences of violence and insecurity have surged in Nigeria since the country returned to a civilian rule in 1999. Ever since it went through a bitter civil war, between 1967 and 1970, the country has never been so confronted with large-scale violence as it is witnessing today. Even though the current Muhammadu Buhari-led administration promised at its inauguration in May 2015, to mitigate the levels of insecurity and corruption, not much has been achieved as these menaces continue to make global headlines. The situation has even worsened with the stark realities caused by the economic downturn following the plunge in global oil prices and the debilitating impact of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. More than ever, the average Nigerian is groaning that life has become more difficult and miserable due to rising poverty and palpable security threats.

The Boko Haram (BH), an Islamic insurgent sect,

continues to unleash violence on lives, livelihoods and investments across the north-east despite the government's claim of having degraded the violent jihadists. Although the government has recaptured most of the communities controlled by the insurgents between late 2014 and early 2015, the group continues to launch sporadic and deadly operations, including deploying suicide bombers to attack both soft and hard targets. Animasawun (2017) pointed out that the estimated insurgent group's activities and the states' repressive tactics to contain the insurgents have claimed over 20,000 lives and made the number of the internally displaced persons (IDP) to be about two million since 2010. Maza, Koldas and Aksit (2020) reported that such deaths and displacement figures have exceeded 100,000 and 2.4 million, respectively.

Besides the BH onslaught in the north-east, some north-west states, especially Zamfara, Katsina, Sokoto, Niger and Kaduna, have

witnessed regular attacks by bandits in the last few years. Apart from the wanton destruction of government infrastructures, kidnap victimisation and rustling of cattle, incessant banditry forced many to flee their homes and thousands of people died. Relatedly, violent clashes between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers have caused terrible misfortunes in the lives of the people in the last couple of years. The clashes over the entitlement claims to land, pasture and water resources have spread from the northern to southern states. The proliferation and heightened intensity of the livelihood conflicts have left destruction, injuries and deaths in their trails (Chiluwa and Chiluwa 2020).

Furthermore, the relative peace fostered by the Presidential Amnesty Programme in the oil-producing Niger Delta region under the Umaru Yar'Adua and the Goodluck Jonathan administrations has come under renewed threat because of the resurgence of militant activities. Since 2016, the Niger Delta Avengers and other new groups have resurfaced with agitations for local control of oil and gas resources. These new militant groups have bombed critical oil pipelines and installations in the region, substantially reducing Nigeria's oil production capacity and worsening the country's economic crisis (Nwokolo and Aghedo 2018). Besides the low-intensity conflict (LIC), the criminal activities of oil smugglers (known locally as 'oil bunkers') and artisanal oil refiners persist across the region.

Similarly, in the Igbo-speaking south-east region, pro-Biafra ethnic nationalism and self-determination struggles are being rekindled. Apart from the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), another more active agitation movement, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), emerged from the region. The groups claim that the south-east is economically and politically marginalised by the various governments of the country and so they agitate for the region to secede, as it attempted between 1967 and 1970 (Onuoha 2011).

Apart from identity-driven conflicts, criminal violence is also very rampant in Nigeria. Often, in a bid to gain access to political power, politicians employ violent strategies such as the use of thugs for kidnapping and assassination of opponents and snatching of ballot boxes to have their ways at the polls. Ironically, the recourse to violent politics has fuelled the emergence and radicalisation of insurgent movements in some areas of the country (Iyekepolo 2016).

Worse still, the incidence of non-state violence across the country has led to frightening repression and high-handed tactics by the state as witnessed by the number of anti-terror legislation, dragnet arrests, detention of militants and agitators, declaration of emergency rules and killing of insurgents. Paradoxically, as the authoritarian excesses of the state grow, they have been largely counter-productive as seen in the lots of violations of human rights, which have attracted local and international opprobrium (Akinlabi 2016).

2 Description of Identified Gaps

Despite the proliferation and escalation of multiple violent conflicts in Nigeria, agitations for Security Sector Reform (SSR) have not been popular and well-received (Page 2019) and perhaps starting with the strong resentment and lack of trust with the security sector (Omole 2020). The centralised security apparatuses and the civilians they protect hardly collaborate on mutual security issues and interests. Ironically, many critical civilian stakeholders are excluded from security sector governance and policymaking.

Conventionally, as autonomous groups existing between the state/public and private spheres, civil society organisations (CSOs) often set societal norms, create the agenda of governance and act as a watchdog of public institutions. Despite their responsibilities in preventing the state from totalitarian tendencies, creation of public opinion and championing the course of those oppressed, most CSOs in Nigeria have

been excluded from the security sector space. Even those in academic institutions who lecture, research and produce knowledge on conflict situations are also largely not carried along in managing security threats. Several academics with specialisation in security/strategic studies and peace/conflict research dedicate most of their times and energies in gathering and analysing information on trends, causalities and management of violence. But puzzlingly, their evidence-based produced knowledge, findings and recommendations are hardly utilised in the security sector policy formulation and execution (Aghedo 2017).

Furthermore, the youths are some of the greatest participants in violent conflicts in Nigeria as both perpetrators and victims. In most conflict situations, it is the young persons, especially the unemployed males, who are deployed as foot soldiers. This is the reality in Nigeria, whether during the Niger Delta militancy, ethno-religious conflicts across the north-central zone, the BH insurgency ravaging the north-east or the banditry in the north-west. However, the voice of the youth demographic at the epicentre of violence scarcely resonates with security public policy.

Besides the youths, even though women are hardly involved in Nigerian conflict situations as fighters, they make up a huge casualty figure. In most cases, it is the women who get injured or killed because they are soft targets (Agbalajobi 2009: 3). As mothers and caregivers, women find it difficult to escape when attackers strike. Despite these stark realities that the input of direct participants and casualties of any issue could help management and women being mostly the victims, and as well, mothers and caregivers of the other victims of security lapses issues, women are hardly consulted in security policymaking, execution and management.

Similarly, traditional rulers who are the custodians of governance at the grassroots have also been excluded from security policymaking in

the country. As rulers at the community levels, these kings, queens and chiefs are often involved in the mediation and resolution of a good number of disputes to prevent escalation. Thus, they often have a good knowledge of the sources of security threats and conflict actors in their domains, including where such entrepreneurs of violence and their sponsors live. But despite being critical stakeholders, these indigenous rulers are barely consulted in finding solutions to challenges of insecurity in the country.

Historically, the police have been functioning as a state force rather than the people's security organisation in Nigeria (Thomas and Aghedo 2014). This state-centric approach to policing has excluded the people and several other stakeholders from crime-fighting, making security the business of the police and its ancillary agencies alone. This orientation of the police towards national rather than the people's security has not changed to date (Thomas and Aghedo 2014; Arisukwu 2012) despite the astronomical increase in Nigeria's population to over 190 million as at 2019 and the emergence of new forms of security threats such as ransom kidnapping, insurgency and terrorism. Besides, the security agencies have not been able to ensure public safety and protection of lives in the last few years. But despite this obvious failure to protect, the state and its security agencies continue to resist the clamour for civilians' inclusion in security provisioning (Hills 2012). Such resistance played out when the six south-west states, namely Lagos, Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Ekiti, on January 9th, 2020, established their security outfit known as *Amotekun*. The Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, Mr Abubakar Malami, opposed the regional security network as illegal (Okon-Ekong, Enumah and Sowole 2020; Odiwuri 2020; Fashina 2020; Kupoluyi 2020 and Oluwole 2020).

This discourse analyses the imperative and modality of including some critical civilian

stakeholders in security governance in Nigeria for effective protection of lives and property. The discourse is divided into five sections. Immediately following the two preceding sections is the third part, which examines SSR as a conceptual and analytical framework. The fourth section discusses the impediments and challenges faced by the CSOs, academics, youth, women and traditional rulers in the quest for their inclusion in security governance. The fifth section concludes the discourse with recommendations on how the identified stakeholders can be included in security sector governance in Nigeria.

3 Security Sector Reform: Conceptual and Analytical Underpinnings

SSR has increasingly become recognised by most states as a critical requirement for conflict prevention, early warning crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction (Hutchful 2012; Oluyemi 2020). In the last few years, SSR has gained popularity as part of the toolbox of interventions within conflictual states and those societies working towards stabilisation and peacebuilding. However, the scope of SSR has been a subject of great debate among scholars, policymakers and other practitioners. While it was initially conceived as the prerogative of the state, the scope has been broadened in the last couple of years to include several non-state actors including civil societies, community groups, traditional institutions, media, academia and others (Jackson 2018). It has been realised that the government alone cannot guarantee durable peace, hence, the need for democratisation of SSR processes to ensure a broad-based inclusion of several actors.

SSR is an expansive concept used to denote several practices, actors and interests. It has been used to capture the enhancement programmes aimed at addressing the range of security and justice challenges faced by states emerging from conflict or those seeking stabilisation in line with democratic norms and principles (Jackson 2018). Conceived in this light, SSR is used to refer to the

“benign provision of assistance from state to state, primarily given to countries transiting from a conflict or a post-conflict phase, to aid them in their transformation into stable and sustainable states,” (Mohlin 2017: 107). It is a carefully planned and phased intervention, which helps to restore sustainable peace to areas where violence or atrocities have been committed and so require healing and development reconstruction for collective benefits.

Thus, SSR programming is crafted in line with democratic norms to facilitate inclusive participation. It is formulated and executed to reflect gender sensitivity by including women groups who can project the females’ voice. Indeed, most conflict situations are characterised by gender-based violence, including the raping and kidnapping of girls and women as a weapon of armed conflict in certain contexts such as north-east Nigeria where BH terrorism festers. Against such backdrops, SSR provisioning is crafted in a way that it will not exacerbate gender-based inequality and the war of the sexes (Saferworld 2016). Thus, the peacebuilding element is characterised by fairness, equity and justice.

The principle of inclusivity is one of the cardinal elements of SSR programming. To ensure success, critical stakeholders must be engaged in the SSR process. As noted by Hutchful (2012: 65), this involves “full participation by all four dimensions of the ‘civil’ – executive (policy), legislative (oversight), judicial (rule of law), and civil society and media (oversight and critical input).” In addition to the police and security forces, the practice involves the “local, communal, and customary organs of security and justice, and ensures adequate representation along the lines of gender, race, and ethnicity,” (Hutchful 2012: 65).

According to Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002: 175), strengthening the institutional framework of SSR involves three core challenges on how to, “(a) ensure the proper location of security activities within a constitutional framework

defined by law; (b) build the capacity of policymakers so that they can effectively detect and respond to security threats; and (c) ensure that both state and non-state actors playing oversight functions are accountable and are able to enforce the law effectively.”

4 Challenges and Impediments to the Quest for Inclusive Security Governance

Despite the growing popularity of SSR in the United Nations' (UN) circle and several other global conflict hotspots, the SSR practice has not gained much resonance in Africa, except in South Africa. Although SSR has also been employed as a peacebuilding design in a few African states, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, the practice has not recorded much success (Hutchful 2012). Similarly, the deployment of SSR in Nigeria's Niger Delta region could not guarantee sustainable peace and post-conflict development reconstruction chiefly on account of the exclusion of key stakeholders (Aghedo 2013). The application and facilitation of SSRs' inclusive participation efforts in Nigeria continue to meet some challenges as seen in the discourse on each of the stakeholders:

4.1 Civil Society and Security Governance

Civil society denotes persons, institutions and organisations that are driven by goals of public concerns through ideas, actions and demands on governments. It is a sphere of social life that is open, self-generating and autonomous from the state, operating in the public realm, guided by civility and public action. It is an intermediary between individuals and the state (Ikelegbe 2003). The civil society comprises the ordinary citizens who are largely peasants, institutions (schools and churches), professional groups and trade unions (like the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ), Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) and Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC)). Civil society is crucial in the context where the state is ineffective in the discharge of its principal responsibilities, such as meeting the genuine

needs and aspirations of the citizens as well as guaranteeing the protection of their lives and property (Ikelegbe 2013).

Civil society helps in developing the capacities of individuals, providing a platform for meeting the citizenry's welfare needs and building of sustainable peace through dialogue, mediation and advocacy. In effect, it could be conceived as an alternative form of governance as it performs its roles that fall within those of the state in a complementary way. There is the notion that civil society is well suited to addressing certain problems which seem to have overwhelmed the state (Sakpere 2015). It sustains political reforms, legitimises state and government, as well as prevents political decay and improves governance (Osumah 2016).

As property holders and parties to contracts, ethically, members of civil society are critical stakeholders in security governance. They suffer deaths, losses of valuable property and violations of their established rights owing to security threats such as kidnapping, armed banditry, cultism and terrorism. For example, the BH uprising engendered huge humanitarian crisis as manifested in the internal displacement of 2.2 million persons, as well as the abandonment, closure or destruction of 13,000 churches in 2016 (Okakwu 2016).

State security agencies have not been able to stem these security threats. The security operatives have often acknowledged that security maintenance is everybody's business. Thus, they have occasionally urged members of civil society (individuals and groups) to be more security conscious and where necessary assist security agencies with useful intelligence. The civil society sometimes partners with security operatives to address security challenges through donations of equipment and playing complementary roles. For example, in the context of BH following the inability of the Nigerian state to guarantee the protection of the citizens from brutal attacks, murder, abduction and economic misery, the Civilian Joint Task

Force (CJTF) comprising largely professionals, traders, civil servants, students and local hunters emerged to complement the role of the security operatives in the north-east region. The CJTF has been collaborating with the Nigerian military to efficiently confront BH insurgents in their communities (Osumah and Azelama 2016).

In concert with military troops, the CJTF has reportedly helped to foil BH attacks and killings of civilians. The counterinsurgents have also contributed to the recoveries of weapons, as well as recapturing communities that the jihadists annexed. For example, in concert with the military troops, the CJTF foiled BH attack in Maiduguri in January 2015, killed about 500 insurgents and recovered several weapons and ammunition that they abandoned (Audu 2015). Also, the CJTF on 16 June 2013, 28 June 2013 and in April 2014, reportedly arrested 35, 25 and 40 insurgents, respectively (Okeowo 2014; Amnesty International [AI] 2015; Osumah and Azelama 2016). Besides, the CJTF alone or in concert with the security forces recovered communities and towns such as Mubi initially overrun and occupied by BH insurgents (Ubhenin 2016; Osumah and Azelama 2016).

Although the potentials and contributions of civil society are recognised and applauded as reflected by frequent calls that security is everybody's business, they are hardly allowed to participate in making security decisions because the state security operatives are anxious that unscrupulous elements often infiltrate them. For example, in October 2013, there was a strained relationship between the Joint Task Force (JTF) comprising various security operatives and the CJTF over an allegation of infiltration of the CJTF by 30 suspected BH insurgents (Osumah and Azelama 2016). Also, in March 2014, there was a reported strained relationship between the Nigerian soldiers and CJTF over what to do with BH suspects arrested by the CJTF. The hostility between them led to the killing of two CJTF members (Tonwe and Osumah 2015; Osumah and Azelama 2016). These allegations and

developments have strained the collaborative relationship on which the CJTF and JTF were established.

4.2 Academics and Security Governance

Nigerian academics comprise lecturers and researchers in Nigeria's tertiary institutions and various think tank groups in the country. Many of these academics have made impacts both in Nigeria and in different parts of the world. Like many Nigerians, most academics are dissatisfied with the state of security, and they are willing and excited to make some contributions to the development of policy blueprints with the government in addressing the sordid situation. They have produced seminal works with informed opinions and expert advice necessary to guide relevant security agencies in making rational choices in the face of competing policy decisions. However, the managers of the Nigerian security sector have not used the 'findings of researchers' as well as they should. As Rashid (1994) argued,

"Many governments [...] neglected and declined to actively solicit the views and research inputs of national think tanks, particularly as related to the primary areas of policy setting or policy prescriptions. While a number of social scientists continued to produce research that was relevant to policy-making purposes, such efforts have often been wilfully ignored. Where research has produced divergent views, it has usually been considered as subversive. Evidence has also indicated that even when solicited by governments, the rate of adoption of recommendations made by social scientists was dismal."

Added to the disregard for the use of research findings for evidence-based decisions is the seeming insensitivity on the part of the security sector managers to dissenting voices to government thinking and actions. Intellectual products of academics are often and readily dismissed as utopian, and sometimes academics with dissenting views are labelled as voices of

opposition elements. Instructively, insensitivity, suspicion, mistrust and sterile lack of cooperation between academics, think tanks and governments were heightened, particularly, during the military rule. According to Mkandawire (2000),

"... the repressive politics that became the norm simply left no room for intellectuals to occupy public space. Many spaces that were open (at least theoretically) to intellectuals elsewhere were erased, infested or occupied, sometimes physically, so that neither 'ivory towers' nor 'Olympian detachment' nor 'self-imposed' marginalisation were meaningful options. In addition, most spaces over which we could exercise our autonomy were funded by outsiders who also sought to delimit our intellectual spheres. Such were the constraints that in most cases the choice was between exile, sullen self-effacement and invisibility, or sycophantic and fawning adulation of power. There were, of course, those who heroically gave themselves the option of standing up and fighting—who ended up in jail or dead. The repressive politics was further fuelled by the penchant of African leaders to assume the role of philosopher king and to reduce intellectual work to the incantation of the thought of the leader. [...] In many cases most of the ideological schemes propounded by African leaders were highly idiosyncratic and often so incoherent as to be beyond the comprehension of the propagators themselves. Adhesion to them was not only difficult but also hazardous to those sycophants who diligently sought to follow the leader through infinite twists and turns as the leader sought to bridge the cavernous gap between the rhetoric of national goals and reality of predatory self-aggrandisement."

On October 19, 2019, at a roundtable conference of Strategic Think Tanks in Nigeria, organised by the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), the Federal Government pledged to utilise the inputs of think tanks in improving policy formulation and

implementation more optimally, towards finding solutions to various challenges in the country. Also, General A G Olonisakin, Chief of Defence Staff and interim Chairman of the National Institute Board of Governors, in his speech delivered by AVM N A Balogun, the Chief of Policy and Plans, at the Defence Headquarters, emphasised the importance of think tanks in the country (NIPSS 2019).

4.3 Youth and Security Governance

The concept 'youth' is often defined in terms of age. Without prejudice to national and regional variations, youth, as Ki-Moon (2016) recounted, has been defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2250 (2015) as persons within the age bracket of 18 to 29 years. They occupy the transitional stage between childhood and adulthood (Osumah 2016). In Nigeria, youth constitute an estimated 70 per cent of the nation's population (Ki-Moon 2016). To encourage the participation and empowerment of the youth in socioeconomic activities and boost social security, successive governments created some platforms such as the Ministry of Youth, YouWin enterprise empowerment scheme and Anchor Borrowers' scheme. Not much had been designed as a specific scheme to boost youth participation in environmental security and governance apart from the recent encouragement of the formation of vigilante groups in some communities.

Although these platforms were established in efforts to encourage youth to participate in security governance, they are under-represented in the management of the platforms. The running of these platforms is often vested in the elite who are not youth. Where youth are seldom involved, they are often the children of privileged people. The children of the economically neglected and politically marginalised are rarely integrated. Besides, these platforms are not well funded to make a significant impact in promoting youth empowerment and self-reliance. Thus, as victims of economic

marginalisation and elite insensitivity, some youth engaged in some of these platforms such as the vigilante groups often transform the platforms into criminal organisations and extortion rings (Kimani 2009; Tade and Adeniyi 2020). Meanwhile, some frustrated, poor and angry brigades of youth that have no access to these government-created platforms are propelled or compelled to create violent platforms such as area boys (loosely organised gangs of bullies who often collect tolls and are a menace to their communities), cult groups, *yahoo-yahoo*¹, kidnap gangs and bands of ethnic militias for themselves as a way of taking their pound of flesh from the state that sparingly integrates them in the scheme of things (Imobighe 2003; Jega 2007). During armed conflicts, the youth are most affected as they are often faced with terrible consequences such as death, injury, loss of loved ones, halt of education, destruction of homes, risk of displacement, forced recruitment into armed groups and sexual abuse. Sometimes, they are forced to take up responsibilities attributed to adults such as raising their younger siblings. For example, on account of BH activities, over 2000 youth were abducted and 950,000 children denied the opportunity of accessing education because of the deliberate violent attacks on schools and closure of many others (Okakwu 2016).

4.4 Women and Security Governance

Gender equality and increased participation of women is crucial to achieving a truly reformed security sector (Ghittoni, Lehouck and Bastick 2019). The UN Police encourages an increase in the number of female police officers in peacekeeping operations and domestic police

services because the representation of female police officers is critical to operational effectiveness and efficiency. This is so because women can be trained to be proficient in firearms, leadership positions, public order management, specialised tactics, intelligence and high-risk operations. The UN Police adds that female officers help to rebuild trust in some societies. For instance, in some communities, only female police officers are acceptable to interact with female members of the community. Similarly, in post-conflict settings where gender-based violence has been used as a weapon of conflict, community members are more likely to approach female police officers (UN Police 2016).

Security has highly gender-related issues. These issues include physical violence and sexual violence, particularly, in volatile situations as in the case of the BH insurgency in the north-east. For example, over 6,535 women and girls across the north-east have suffered sexual violence (Ajayi 2018), and 276 schoolgirls were abducted at Chibok in Borno State on April 14, 2014, and another set of 109 schoolgirls were abducted at Dapchi in Yobe State in 2018. Women and girls have been subjected to various security threats, including being abused as 'forced wives' by BH insurgents and sometimes deployed as suicide bombers. As suspected BH fighters, they have been victims of the military's persecution. And some women have been clamped into detention following dragnet arrests by counterinsurgents. Furthermore, women and girls freed from the BH sect have faced threats of ostracism and exclusion from communal events and celebrations on the grounds that they would have been radicalised. Also, as widows, divorcees and ex-wives of BH fighters in Nigeria's

¹ Yahoo-yahoo is a colloquial name for cybercrimes in Nigeria. It involves credit card fraud and sending of hundreds of unsolicited email initially proliferated through Yahoo messenger that gave the platform for chats, and these days done through several online platforms and carried out mostly by the youth (young boys) and so the names Yahoo-yahoo and Yahoo boys given the cybercrimes

and cybercriminals, respectively. See Stephens, M (2020, January 2): How to Become a Yahoo Boy: Yahoo Boy Formats That Work (2020). *Naija Home Based*. <https://www.naijahomebased.com/become-yahoo-boy-formats/>

conservative cultural context, women suffer emotional isolation and trauma. Those who have children are considered by potential husbands as a liability. Derogatorily, the women are described as BH wives, Sambisa women, bad blood or *annoba* (epidemic for Hausa). As refugees in the heavily guarded IDPs' camps facing limited food supply and other humanitarian services, they have become vulnerable to sexual exploitation including 'survival sex' and 'sex slavery' in the hands of security operatives, CJTF members and humanitarian service providers. For example, in December 2016, four soldiers, two policemen, two CJTF members and other officials were reportedly arrested for sexual violence against women in IDP camps (Human Rights Watch [HRW] 2010; Osumah 2019).

Another manifestation of the gendered nature of security activity is the way security agencies or officers respond to sexual violence. The police which is principally vested with the responsibility to guarantee the protection of the rights of all citizens, have been unsympathetic, subjective and unprincipled in managing incidences of violence against women and girls on several occasions. For example, the police perceive marital sexual violence as a family issue, which should be settled by couples themselves and/or by the involvement of other family members. Also, police officers are sometimes terrible in handling sexual violence by their refusal to visit the site of the incident or reluctance to conduct an investigation or bashing of rape survivors with a barrage of questions as well as asking for funding of investigations (Dark 2018).

Despite the highly gender-related nature of some security issues, the security agencies established to manage security have been dominated by men and modelled as a masculine institution with high levels of gender abuses, which include unfriendly conditions of service, especially, for the female police officers. Despite the women constituting nearly 50 per cent (49.23 per cent) of the proportion of Nigeria's population and potentially 50 per cent of the

nation's workforce (World Bank 2018), there is extremely low representation of women in Nigeria Police Force (NPF). In July 2010, women constituted only 4 per cent of the total population of NPF. About 97.4 per cent of the female police personnel occupied low ranks compared to 93.02 per cent of their male colleagues. Of the 18,745 of the police senior officers as at July 2010, 936 representing only about 5.01 per cent were women (Akinjobi-Babatunde 2015; Oluwafemi 2019; Egbuna 2019).

Even the Police Regulation and Order Act is replete with provisions that entrench discrimination against women. The Police Act Number 122-127; Force Order Number 30; and Force Administrative Instructions Number 23 disqualify married women from joining the Police. Before a woman in the police can marry, she must have served in the police for three years after which she will apply for permission to marry and the fiancé will be investigated and cleared before permission is granted. The Police Act discourages unmarried policewoman from getting pregnant; if she gets pregnant, she will be discharged from the force (Regulation 127). The same requirement does not apply to men. Meanwhile, as seen in the regulatory documents, even upon marriage, privileges as married force members are not granted married policewomen as they are subjected to postings as though they were not married. Also, the Police Act forbids policewomen married to civilians to live in the Police Barracks. Furthermore, the regulatory instruments of the NPF discriminate against women as regards dressing and nomenclature. Section 128 of the Police Act prohibits policewomen from wearing earrings and using face powder, lipstick or coloured nail varnish. Also, policewomen are required to place the alphabet 'W' before their rank and are given special kind of appointment (A/P) numbers to easily identify them as women.

Although the Police Regulation Act provides the same conditions for both men and women in the

recruitment of personnel, the physical suitability for the job of policing has masculine bent. In part, the Act states that "Women police officers shall as a general rule be employed on duties which are concerned with women and children, and shall be particularly employed in the following duties: investigation of sexual offences against women and children; recording of statements from female witnesses, female accused persons and children; attendance when women or children are being interviewed by male police officers; the searching, escorting and guarding of female prisoners in police stations; and the escorting of women prisoners to or from police stations; school crossing duties and crowd control where women and children are present in any numbers." The Act states that female police officers recruited to the General Duties Branch of the NPF may be employed in any of the following office duties, namely clerical duties, telephone duties and office orderly duties to relieve the male officers.

In terms of the content of training on the job of policing, women are discriminated against. For example, Section 123 of the Police Regulations states that "A woman police officer shall not be called upon to drill underarms or to take part in any baton or riot exercise." In essence, women are excluded from the 'core police duties', and consequently denied the 'honour', 'status' and 'career advancement' associated with deployment to those duties (Oluwafemi 2019).

A good number of security forces in Nigeria have borrowed a discriminating leaf or two from the Police Act in establishing their various laws. Private organisations are not left out as many of them operate on 'a get pregnant, get fired policy'.

Apart from these discriminatory provisions in the Police Regulation Act, Force Order and Administrative Instructions, women in the NPF face sexual harassment, especially, on hiring, promotion and firing. For example, it is estimated that about 60-70 per cent of the women in the NPF experience sexual harassment

although less than 7 per cent report any incident (Oluwafemi 2019). This form of violence combined with the discriminatory rules and practices affect women enlistment and career progression in the police force. For example, for over two decades of the return to civil rule, no female officer has been appointed as Inspector General of the NPF or head of the armed forces. Apart from the country's immigration service that at some points had Lady Uzoamaka C Nwizu and Mrs Rose Chinyere Uzoma at the top as Comptroller-General of Nigeria Immigration Service, no female officer has become the controller-general of other para-military establishments.

In the country's armed forces, there are increasing definite steps to guarantee gender equality in participation in security management. According to the Chief of Defence Staff, General Gabriel Olonisakin, the military has raised the 17 per cent requirement for women's participation in the UN peacekeeping operations to 27.9 per cent. He also noted that the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) has commenced the training of female cadets as combat officers, while the Nigerian Navy (NN) has deployed women as sailors and key aspects of ship maintenance. The Nigerian Army (NA) has established the Nigerian Army Women Corps (NAWC) while in 2018, the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) put in place the Women of War (WoW) to involve women in all aspects of air operations including flying aircraft, maintenance, air traffic control and engineering (Nwezeh 2019). It has been reported that female Nigerian soldiers are now, similarly, drafted in and engage in the war against the terrorist BH (Lakemfa 2019).

However, there are still calls for the eradication of gender bias in deployment in military operations and career progression, including occupying strategic positions in the military (Nwezeh 2019). So far, no senior female officer has held the position of a commanding officer or service chief. In the history, till date, of the three arms of the military (Army, Navy and Air Force),

the highest rank a woman attained was a Rear Admiral held by Itunu Hotonu (retired). A Major General position was held by Abimbola Amusu (who retired recently as Army Medical Corps Commander). The current highest-ranking serving woman, Jamila Malafa, is a Commodore in the navy who once served as the instructor of the Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Jaji, and now the Director of the Nigerian Navy Legal Services. On the military's treatment of women, Aisha Buhari noted that "the military is often hostile to women." She pointed out that the women neither join the forces early nor advance in the forces because of their genetic makeup coupled with rejection, isolation, unhealthy attitudes, sexist jokes and stereotype as well as exemption from participation in combat duties, restrictions on handling such positions as human resources, logistics, welfare amongst others which all have psychological implications on the women (Nwezeh 2019).

4.5 Traditional Rulers and Security Governance

According to Adewumi and Egwurube (1985: 20), "traditional rulers are individuals occupying communal political leadership positions sanctified by cultural mores and values, enjoying the legitimacy of particular communities to direct their affairs." Some of the high-profile traditional rulers in Nigeria include the Sultan of Sokoto, Muhammad Sa'ad Abubakar III and the Emir of Zuru, Mohammed Sani Sami, who both were former military generals. There are also the Emir of Kano, Aminu Ado Bayero; the Oni of Ife, Adeyeye Enitan Ogunwusi; the Oba of Benin, Omo N'Oba N'Edo Uku Akpolokpolo, Ewuare II; the Alaafin of Oyo, Lamidi Adeyemi III; the Olowo of Owo, Gbadegesin Ajibade Ogunoye III; the Oba of Lagos, Oba Rilwan Akiolu and the Obi of Onitsha, Obi Nnaemeka Achebe. There are also traditional female rulers, but they are not as many as their male counterparts. However, the traditional female rulers are not less prominent as evidenced by Her Royal Majesty Obi Martha Dunkwu (the Omu Anioma) in Delta State and Falowo Moyinoluwa (the female regent of

Ibulesoro kingdom) in Ondo State who was installed a king in April 2019. Interestingly, Falowo Moyinoluwa is a 24-year-old, and tradition refers to her as "*Kabiyesi*" meaning king [male] and regarded as a father. However, tradition does not allow her to have kids on the throne, and her rulership is temporal until the kingmakers choose a king (Aidoo 2019).

Traditional rulers in modern times are looked unto for wise counsel on socio-political issues in which security is not left out. Some traditional rulers such as the Sultan of Sokoto command greater respect than many trustees of formal government institutions in Nigeria (Ubhenin 2014; Chizea and Osumah 2017). This can be deduced from a statement credited to the late Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello (who was once an aspirant to the sultan's throne), that if he was asked to choose between the Nigerian Presidency and sultanate, his choice would be the latter (Agbese 2004).

Traditional rulers have been actively involved in curtailing various security threats. At the peak of youth militancy and the renewed militancy in the pre- and post-amnesty intervention in the Niger Delta region, traditional rulers were involved in the search for peace and de-escalation of tension. Some traditional rulers were involved and deplored in encouraging the militants to accept amnesty in the Niger Delta (Chizea and Osumah 2017). Similarly, in the quest for peace in the renewed militancy in the post-amnesty period, traditional rulers in the region have been called upon to provide support. The Deputy Governor of Delta State and Chairman Delta State Advocacy Committee against Oil Facility Vandalism, Mr Kingsley Otuario, urged monarchs in the riverine areas of Delta State to use their privileged position to assist the state government with intelligence to stop militants from further vandalising oil and gas facilities (Ofiebor 2016). Perhaps, in line with the appeal, the Royal Majesty, Oboro-Gbaraun II, Aketeke Agbadaba of Gbaramatu Kingdom, reportedly promised to set a machinery in motion to intervene in the

renewed militancy in the region. He reportedly stated that:

"Tompolo is one of my illustrious subjects. It is, therefore, incumbent on me to set machinery in place to intervene in this matter. In as much as it is apparently a legal issue, a political solution cannot be completely ruled out and so I am desirous to see this matter resolved amicably," (Amaize, Daniel and Birisbe 2016).

Indeed, some traditional rulers in Ogoni communities in Rivers State have reportedly appealed to the federal government to mop-up arms from their communities. To achieve this, they called on the Federal Government to deploy military presence to their communities (Adedapo 2016). Similarly, in the wake of BH uprising, traditional rulers were involved in the government's efforts to manage the phenomenon. In fact, some traditional rulers were appointed to the Presidential Committee on the Security Challenge in the north-east zone, headed by Usman Gaji Galtimari, which was constituted by the federal government to identify the grievances of BH and guide the government on the desirability of negotiations (Chizea and Osumah 2018). The Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Sa'ad Abubakar III, or his representatives and the Emir of Bauchi were members of the presidential committee (Chizea and Osumah 2015).

Apart from the Niger Delta militancy and BH uprising, traditional rulers have been involved in mitigating political conflicts. For example, to avert bloodshed following the political crisis precipitated by the nullification of June 12, 1993, presidential election results, the Emir of Zaria was reported to have called on General Babangida to reverse the decision. In the same vein, on February 23, 1994, some traditional rulers in Oyo State were said to have asked, in a memorandum sent to the Abacha-created Constitutional Conference through the state's military administrator, that the June 12, 1993, presidential results should be upheld and the winner sworn in (Jega 2007). In recent times,

precisely in the lead to the 2015 poll, Jigawa State Governor, Mr Sule Lamido, urged traditional rulers to caution their subjects against violence (Ubhenin 2017).

Furthermore, traditional rulers have been called upon to be involved in tackling security threats such as kidnapping, human trafficking and cultism. Security operatives sometimes seek to partner with traditional rulers or institutions in the bid to address security problems such as kidnapping and trafficking. On February 18, 2018, through advocacy visit to the monarch of Benin, His Majesty, Omo N'Oba N'Edo Uku Akpolokpolo, Oba Ewuare II, the Director-General of the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP), Dame Julie Okah-Donli, sought the partnership of the Oba in the fight against human trafficking (Emerole 2018). Indeed, the Benin monarch has been active in the fight against security threats such as kidnapping for ransom, human trafficking, prostitution and land grab. For example, on March 9, 2018, the Benin monarch assembled all his chiefs, *Enigie* and *Edionwere* (priests of various deities and street heads in his kingdom) to unleash different curses on the perpetrators of human trafficking and violent crimes.

Also, he invoked his power as a spiritual leader of the kingdom to revoke the oath of secrecy administered on the victims of human trafficking by their sponsors in collaboration with native doctors. Added to the revocation of curses, the Benin monarch urged victims to speak out and seek assistance (Ebegbulem 2018). Furthermore, the Benin palace chief priests representing different deities of the Benin kingdom have performed relevant rituals to fight other evil acts such as cultism and illegal migration (Ebegbulem 2018).

While traditional rulers and their institutions have been involved in mitigating security threats, their level of involvement as critical stakeholders has been limited to mere traditional rituals, ceremonial and advisory roles. The stature and

relevance of traditional rulers have been eroded by lack of constitutional role stipulated for them and condescending treatments by the political elite and security operatives. On various occasions, prominent traditional rulers such as the Oba of Benin and the Alaafin of Oyo have strongly expressed their dissatisfaction with how traditional institutions have been relegated to the background and they have sought more space of constitutional power, more political visibility and social relevance (Chizea and Osumah 2015). While there is no constitutional role for traditional rulers in security governance, amid heightened insecurity, state security officials are, occasionally, hostile to them in tasking them to maintain security in their respective domains.

Put differently, in the absence of constitutionally defined roles, traditional rulers have been used like mere pawns and punching bags by the ruling political elite and top security operatives in the face of security threats. A few examples may suffice to buttress this point. The Lagos State Police Command accused traditional rulers in Ikorodu area of the state of conspiracy of silence on criminal activities in their respective domains, supposedly for not providing intelligence (The Cable Report 2020). Similarly, the Rivers State Governor, Nyesom Wike, threatened traditional rulers in the state in whose communities, cultism and kidnapping are encouraged (Azubuike 2019). Also, the Delta State Police Command threatened to sanction traditional rulers whose jurisdictions have been turned into a den of criminality, armed robbery and kidnap for ransom. In the same vein, some state governments in the eastern part of the country, such as the Anambra State government, threatened to dethrone traditional rulers whose domains have become popular hideouts for kidnappers (Chizea and Osumah 2015).

Besides, in the quest for political relevance, the ruling elite make traditional rulers behave like members of political parties, have rulers play to their caprices or they are dismissed from their

position. During electioneering, they are compelled to canvass support for their state governors and the ruling parties in their respective domains in order not to face the risk of being suspended or dethroned. To survive elite resentment and hostility, traditional rulers have been made humiliatingly subservient to the ruling elite. However, such humiliation of rulers is not new. During the colonial era, many traditional rulers suffered punitive sanctions such as suspension, sack, exile and replacement with more subservient persons. Chief Nana Olomu of Itsekiri, Oba Ovonramwen Nogbaisi of Benin, Jide Kosoko of Lagos, King Koko of Brass, William Pepple of Bonny and King Jaja of Opobo had such humiliation. The deposition and hostility to traditional rulers continue to date. In November 2016, the then Edo State Governor, Adams Oshiomhole, suspended a traditional ruler allegedly for supporting an opposition party (Premium Times Agency Report 2016). In May 2019, the incumbent Kano State Governor, Abdullahi Ganduje, signed a bill creating four emirates to reduce the influence of the Emir of Kano, a position held then by the former Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria, Mallam Sanusi Lamido Sanusi (Ibrahim 2019). Eventually, on May 9, 2020, the governor dethroned Mallam Sanusi as the Emir of Kano on the grounds of insubordination (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC] 2020).

5 Conclusion and Recommendations

From the foregoing analysis, it is obvious that certain critical stakeholders, namely civil society, academics, youth, women and traditional rulers, have been largely excluded from security governance in Nigeria. The inclusive participation of these groups is imperative. Given the need for their participation, the following suggestions are to ensure and engage the excluded stakeholders' active involvement in security sector governance.

5.1 Civil Society

Partnership and collaboration between civil

society and security agencies should be sustained while avoiding acts that engender antagonistic and strained relationship between them. The pitiable perception of security agencies by members of civil society groups which have engendered condescending, non-cooperative and antagonistic relationships or attitudes to the security agencies can be changed through police-local engagements such as community patrols, athletic activities and anti-crime campaigns as well as a corresponding demonstration of matching words with actions.

5.2 Academics

Security operatives should be tutored to accept constructive criticisms emanating from the academics rather than dismiss them as voices from the opposition elements. Beyond being receptive to constructive criticisms, security operatives should allow the well-thought-out or thought-through ideas and evidence-based conclusions and recommendations from the academic community underpin their security blueprints for actions. The application of evidence-based results for actions can be encouraged and achieved through workshops and training programmes for both academics and security operatives. More practically, academics and think tanks generating data and evidence should focus on finding ways to get their evidence used by relevant security outfits. One way is to strengthen the capacity of the authorities for evidence and data they need to execute their tasks by helping them to gain easy access to research reports. Also, academics and think tanks can bolster the systems and tools built into security agencies to guide decision-making through design models. To make evidence use more routine, it is imperative to strengthen the interaction between academics, think tanks and security sector managers. A routine use of evidence in decisions is achievable when think tanks and academics involve stakeholders in the security sector governance in their research process for knowledge generation. A pilot and test approach can

enhance the capacity and incentives of security managers to use data and evidence.

5.3 Youth

The existing platforms created for youth participation should be strengthened through better funding, prudent management of available resources and inclusion of the youth in their management. Besides, there is the need for good governance at various levels of government by the initiation and implementation of programmes for youth employment and poverty alleviation beyond mere sloganeering and political calculations as well as provision of functional infrastructure supportive of a good life. Added to this, to ensure the effectiveness of government-initiated youth empowerment programme, it is imperative for the security agencies and other stakeholders such as private, non-governmental, community and faith-based organisations to make serious and complementary efforts to engage the youth rather than labelling them 'hotheads' who do not deserve serious attention.

5.4 Women

Admirable efforts to adequately integrate women into the various security agencies hitherto identified should be sustained and consolidated, while regulations and practices which promote discrimination and abuses against women should be rejigged. For instance, the extant Police Regulation Act, Force Order and Administrative Instructions which discriminate against policewomen in matters relating to reproductive roles such as marriage, obligation, pregnancy and maternity as they pertain to policing should be reviewed by relevant authorities to ensure a gender-friendly police force. In addition, there is the need to strengthen the technical capacity and professional skills of the police management in dealing with violence against women through regular training and institutional framework like

setting up of gender desk offices or committees in the various levels of government.

Apart from the police management, which is responsible for directing the affairs of the force, it is imperative to imbue the rank and file of the force with core values that respect women. Also, to bridge the gender gap in terms of representation both in the number and seniority in the security sector, there is a need for affirmative action in recruitment and promotion of women. Affirmative action would have measures put in place, right from recruitment to promotion exercises, to bridge gender disparities through exclusive reservations of certain slots for women to remedy the long-existing marginalisation.

Besides, considering the targeted victimisation of women and girls by militants, insurgents, bandits and terrorists, the opinions of women community leaders should be sought in crafting stabilisation and peacebuilding policies. Civil society groups including the mass media should effectively sensitise women who are victims of rape and other forms of sexual exploitation to speak up in order to secure justice.

5.5 Traditional Rulers

Traditional rulers need to be accorded constitutional recognition and specific roles as they were in the 1960, 1963 and 1979 constitutions. In the 1960 and 1963 constitutions, there were provisions for the Council of Chiefs for traditional rulers at the regional level, while the 1979 constitution provided for their representation at the federal level and Council of Chiefs at the state level. These provisions are not captured in the 1999 constitution, which is in operation now. The Councils in the previous constitutions played an advisory role on customary matters, cultural affairs, chieftaincy matters as well as advising on the maintenance of public order when requested to do so (Osumah 2016). But beyond advisory and ceremonial roles, for traditional rulers to be more effective in security governance as leaders

at the grassroots, they need to be constitutionally vested with powers to settle and sanction offenders on matters relating to cultural practices like inheritance and widowhood rites, marital disputes and other minor crimes like affray and stealing as a way to decongest police cells, prisons and courts in their various domains. Also, they should be vested with powers over the vigilante groups in terms of recruitment and control. To achieve this, the National Assembly through a review of the 1999 constitution can assist the traditional rulers to gain constitutional recognition and have a list of prescribed specific roles. This will free the 'royal fathers' and 'royal mothers' from operating based on the whimsicalities of state governors and other leaders.

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