African perspectives on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

Edited by Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, Lucy Shule and Stephen Buchanan-Clarke
ABOUT THE ARTIST

The artwork on the cover is the first in a series of four titled ‘Walks in the Present’ by the Mozambican artist and art teacher Pedro Langa. The other three appear elsewhere in this volume. They are distinctive versions of the Sadza Batik technique, in which patterns and colours are linked to represent the need for change and transformation, rooted in the rescue of humanity. This series is the artist’s second work that features the multidimensional situation experienced by people affected by violent extremism, who take refuge in the relief provided by messages of peace. Pedro’s art is inspired by the cultures and traditions of Zimbabwe, where he lived for about 15 years, and studied art. He is represented by numerous galleries and art dealerships, including digital art platforms.
African Perspectives on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

Edited by Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, Lucy Shule and Stephen Buchanan-Clarke
This volume is based on three workshops on Violent Extremism in Mozambique and the Southern African region, hosted by the Centre for International and Strategic Studies (CEEI) and the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM), and supported by the Maputo Office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). An inclusive workshop report titled ‘Managing Violent Extremism in Africa: Lessons, Strategic Options for Mozambique and Southern Africa and Institutional Responses’ (CEEI, SADSEM, FES) is available upon request.
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<td>ACADIR</td>
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<td>ACIRC</td>
<td>African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises</td>
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<td>Armed Conflict Location and Event Data</td>
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<td>French Armed Forces in the Southern Zone of the Indian Ocean</td>
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<td>GTI</td>
<td>Global Terrorism Index</td>
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<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
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<td>Hor of Africa</td>
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<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>IFF</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
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<td>intergovernmental organisations</td>
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<td>IGP</td>
<td>Inspectors General of Police (IGP)</td>
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<td>Iiag</td>
<td>Ibrahim Index of African Governance</td>
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## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INGD</td>
<td>National Institute for Disaster Risk Management and Reduction</td>
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<td>iDove</td>
<td>Interfaith Dialogue on Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>IPI</td>
<td>International Peace Institute</td>
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<td>IPOA</td>
<td>Independent Policing Oversight Authority</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
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<td>JCET</td>
<td>Joint Combined Exchange Training</td>
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<td>LMPDS</td>
<td>Muslim League for Peace, Dialogue and Solidarity (Cameroon)</td>
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<td>LNG</td>
<td>Liquid Natural Gas</td>
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<td>LPC</td>
<td>Local Peace and Reconciliation Committee</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>MNJTF</td>
<td>Multinational Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>MNJTF</td>
<td>Multinational Joint Task Force (Lake Chad Basin)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MOZNorte</td>
<td>Rural Resilience Project in Northern Mozambique</td>
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<td>MRG</td>
<td>Mediation Reference Group (SADC)</td>
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<td>MSU</td>
<td>Mediation Support Unit (SADC)</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NCRM</td>
<td>National Christian Resistance Movement</td>
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<td>NDF</td>
<td>Nigerian Defence Forces</td>
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<td>NEET</td>
<td>Not in education, employment or training</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for African Development</td>
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<td>non-government organisation</td>
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<td>NISS</td>
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<td>Policy and Strategy for the Management of Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMC</td>
<td>Private Military Company</td>
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<td>Transnational organised crime</td>
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<td>TSCTP</td>
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<td>violent extremism</td>
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SOUTHERN AFRICA is experiencing an upsurge in violent extremism (VE). The DRC, Mozambique and Tanzania have experienced attacks by extremist groups, with events in Cabo Delgado province in Northern Mozambique making international headlines in recent years. Among others, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been called on to support the Mozambican government and has deployed a Standby Force to the area. Although a military intervention may help to limit violent attacks, it cannot bring lasting peace. This would require addressing the complex political, economic and social factors that have created a breeding ground for VE.

Recently, members of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies at Joachim Chissano University in Maputo, the Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADSEM) network, and the Maputo office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation held a series of workshops, produced a detailed report and participated in a training session on preventing and countering VE. The curriculum for the latter was co-designed and delivered by Dr Christina Liang of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and Prof Anthoni van Nieuwkerk. Building on these activities, SADSEM, in partnership with the FES, produced an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of VE, focusing on African experiences and lessons.

This edition of the *Southern African Security Review* is the fifth in the biennial series and brings together the insights of a wide range of academics from the region. Three editors – Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, Lucy Shule and Stephen Buchanan-Clarke – have overseen the production of themes relating to VE. Quality control was a priority, and the chapters were subject to blind peer reviews by three independent experts.

Our thanks go to the authors and all the members of the SADSEM network who participated with Mozambican colleagues in deepening our understanding of this disturbing feature of the southern African security landscape. We are grateful that the unwavering and long-standing cooperation between the FES and the SADSEM network has once again been able to facilitate such informed reflections on the southern African peace and security agenda.

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Violent Extremism in Africa: A strategic perspective

Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, Lucy Shule and Stephen Buchanan-Clarke

Southern Africa is experiencing an upsurge in violent extremism (VE). Attacks have taken place in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique and Tanzania, with events in the province of Cabo Delgado in northern Mozambique being the most challenging and disconcerting. In 2021, after numerous delays and false starts, including relying on private security companies, the Mozambican government finally agreed to undertake a stabilisation mission in concert with the Southern African Development Community (SADC), aimed at countering the activities of the Islamist extremist movement Al Sunnah wa Jama’ah, also known as Ansar al-Sunna. The SADC Mission to Mozambique (SAMIM) has since been deployed to the area. However, there is no clarity about its funding, and therefore its duration. At the same time, the Mozambican government has invited the Rwandese military to help counter Ansar al-Sunna’s activities. Drawing on their experiences in the Sahel and elsewhere, a range of outside interests from the EU to the US have offered to help train and equip Mozambican forces.

Although military interventions may help to limit violent attacks, they cannot bring sustainable peace. This requires dealing with the complex sociopolitical, security and economic factors that enable extremist groups to operate. Clearly, SADC and its member states need to develop their own responses to events in their own territories. Incidences of VE are best understood in the contexts in which they occur.

In 2020 the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM) partnered with the Centre for International and Strategic Studies (CEEI) at Joachim Chissano University in Maputo and the Maputo Office of the
Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) to explore VE in the African context. They organised a series of inter-regional dialogues to broaden the understanding of the violence in the north of Mozambique, and to explore possible strategic options to deal with it. Based on these activities, a situation report with policy recommendations was produced (Chingotuane et al 2021). The report, and particularly its emphasis on military force and counterterrorism, suggested that a broader discourse as well as meaningful policy changes were needed for the country, the region and the continent.

This publication explores these dimensions through an African lens. It addresses VE in three ways: conceptually, in terms of state conduct, and in terms of a detailed coverage of the Cabo Delgado crisis, drawing on in loco research.

In this opening chapter, the co-editors offer a strategic perspective on VE in Africa. It explores relevant terms and concepts, offers a historical overview, briefly examines international experiences and their relevance to Africa, and critically assesses state and non-state attempts to manage it. It identifies the key issues relating to VE from an African policy perspective, and concludes with guiding questions as an orienting mechanism for subsequent chapters. The role of women in VE– a neglected area of study – features throughout the publication.

**Terms and concepts**

Over the past two decades, the threat posed by both state and non-state groups that espouse extreme religious, political, or ideological positions and are willing to use violence to achieve them has become a defining global security challenge. Africa has been particularly affected. Violent non-state armed groups have increased in number and geographic reach, with a corresponding increase in the annual number of terrorist attacks attributed to these organisations (Pettersson et al. 2021).

As Walter (2017) argues in a study of modern civil war trends, post-2003 intrastate wars differ from previous civil wars in three striking ways. First, most are being fought in countries with Muslim majorities in Africa and the Middle East. Second, the rebel groups fighting these wars espouse a radical religious ideology. And third, these groups are pursuing transnational rather than purely national aims. Today, violence perpetrated by these organisations has become a dominant form of conflict both in Africa and across the developing world. These trends have prompted new lines of research, the development of new
terms and concepts aimed at explaining their complexities, and corresponding policy frameworks.

VE has played an increasingly prominent role in policies and developmental programming over the past decade. In part, the term arose in recognition that traditional counter-terrorism approaches which sought to address the threat of terrorist attacks purely through intelligence, police, and military means were failing to address the underlying factors prompting individuals and groups to turn to terrorism. Moreover, the Global War on Terror politicised the term ‘terrorist’ to the point where it became, in large parts of the world, synonymous with failed state-building exercises, the erosion of civil liberties, human rights violations, and neocolonial expansionism.

The terminology around VE has, albeit to a lesser degree, suffered a similar fate, and it still lacks a universally accepted definition. VE is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon with some of the terminology surrounding it being vulnerable to translation challenges across international contexts. The term ‘extremism’ is subjective, and therefore largely contingent on who is doing the defining. Also, like the term terrorism, VE can and has been exploited by authoritarian regimes to negatively label legitimate opposition or divergent social movements. However, as Harling, Simon and Schonveld (2018) point out, both critics and proponents generally acknowledge the shortcomings of VE as a concept. As argued by the terrorism studies scholar Alex Schmid (2017), ‘the language of VE can describe various ideological types of political violence in a sensitive manner and, perhaps for exactly that reason, is much better at mobilising collective action than language centred on the more contentious word “terror”’.

Despite their widespread use in describing modern conflict systems, the terms ‘terrorism’, ‘insurgency’, and ‘violent extremism’ are often used interchangeably, which can create confusion. It is therefore important to examine these concepts more closely.

**Extremism** refers to attitudes or behaviours regarded as far outside the social norm. When used in relation to political violence or conflict, it is generally associated with fanaticism or fundamentalism of some kind and with activities that are not morally, ideologically or politically in line with common practices in a given society.

**Violent extremism**: there is no universally accepted definition of the term ‘violent extremism’. Even the UN Secretary General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism states that VE is a ‘diverse phenomenon, without clear defi-
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The term ‘violent extremism’ is neither new nor exclusive to any region, nationality or system of belief. It goes on to say that definitions of ‘terrorism’ and ‘violent extremism’ are the prerogative of member states, in line with their obligations under international law, particularly international human rights law, and that the Plan of Action would pursue a practical approach to preventing VE ‘without venturing to address questions of definition.’

However, the term is generally used to refer to the beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political objectives. VE organisations generally do not abide by international humanitarian law, and routinely target both combatants and non-combatants. Conflicts involving VE organisations therefore tend to take a heavy toll on civilians.

**Radicalisation:** This term is wisely used to convey the idea of a process in which an individual or community adopts an increasingly extreme set of beliefs. Radicalisation can take place in a variety of settings, including prisons, madrasas, youth centres and online forums. It can also occur after initial recruitment into a VE organisation. Della Porta (2018), for example, defines radicalisation as ‘a process of escalation from nonviolent to increasingly violent repertoires of action that develops through a complex set of interactions unfolding over time’. This process is usually informed by a context-specific set of drivers – or ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors – which the UN Plan of Action (2015) defines as follows:

- **Push factors**: This term refers to the conditions conducive to violent extremism and the structural context from which it emerges. These include a lack of socioeconomic opportunities; marginalisation and discrimination; poor governance, violations of human rights and the Rule of Law; prolonged and unresolved conflicts; and radicalisation in prisons.

- **Pull factors**: These are the individual motivations and processes which play a key role in transforming ideas and grievances into violent extremist action. These include individual backgrounds and motivations; collective grievances and victimisation stemming from domination, oppression, subjugation or foreign intervention; distortion and the misuse of beliefs, political ideologies and ethnic and cultural differences; and leadership and social networks.

In a landmark 2017 study by the United Nations Development Community (UNDP) of the incentives and drivers of radicalisation, accounts by former combatants revealed that democratic participation, self-identification with the nation-state, and grievances against different organs of the state all played a significant role in their decision to join a VE organisation. Moreover, violent abuse or torture by state agents of individuals or members of their families...
often served as a ‘transformative trigger event’ that prompted the individual to voluntarily join a VE group. According to this study, the average age of people recruited into VE organisations are from 17 to 26. Given Africa’s youth bulge and low levels of youth employment in many states, this creates large pools of potential recruits (UNDP 2017).

**Terrorism:** This term refers to an operational strategy adopted to achieve a particular goal, usually political in nature. It is a tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which publicity often plays a significant role. The targets of terrorist attacks are often chosen to communicate a message to a wider audience. While the terms ‘VE’ and ‘terrorism’ are often used interchangeably, organisations that use terrorism as an operational strategy do not necessarily have to be motivated by an extremist ideology.

**Insurgency:** This is generally regarded as a protracted violent conflict in which one or more groups seek to overthrow or fundamentally change the political or social order. They are usually led by substate groups who rely on guerrilla tactics, terrorism, propaganda, and grass-roots support to bridge the asymmetry in equipment, training, and doctrine with state forces. Given the diverse nature of insurgencies, the term is used imprecisely, and insurgents have been called revolutionaries, terrorists, guerrillas and extremists, depending on the context.

**Counter-insurgency:** This can be defined as the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and even civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency. It usually comprises elements of offence, defence and stability operations, and, in its modern doctrinal form, rose to prominence during the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Isaac et al 2008).

Government efforts to address VE in Africa remain strongly focused on the traditional counterterrorism responses of military intervention and law enforcement. However, the study of VE over the past two decades has produced a compelling body of evidence about the various factors at an individual, social and structural level which work in different combinations to contribute to its emergence and must ultimately be addressed to prevent its spread. While criminology, security studies and terrorism studies saw a rapid increase in activity immediately following Al Qaeda’s 2001 attacks on the US, in the intervening years, the study of VE has become truly multidisciplinary, with significant contributions from civil war studies, sociology, peace studies and psychology, among many others.
Some key questions

Key questions have included the relationship between VE and blocked political participation and ethnic and/or religious marginalisation (Crenshaw 1981; Hassan 2012; Horgan 2014); the search for personal and group identity (Botha 2014; Choudhury 2007); the role of religious and ethnic fractionalisation and ideology (Jurgensmeyer 2003; Weiss & Hassan 2015; Wiktorowicz 2005); ideals of masculinity and gender constructs in radicalisation (Archer 2008; Davis 2009); socioeconomic factors, including literacy, education, poverty, and access to justice; (USAID 2017; Carrington, Guala, Puyol 2020) the impact of human rights violations and predatory security institutions (UNDP 2017); and the relationship between transnational crime, illicit revenue streams, and VE organisations (Dutton 2018; FATF 2005; Le Billon 2021).

While early studies of VE often portrayed women as passive victims, evidence suggests that women play an important moderating role in respect of extremism, particularly in family contexts, suggesting that they should be prioritised in efforts to counter its spread. These findings underscore UNSC Resolution 1325, which articulates the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women and girls; the contribution of women and girls to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peacebuilding; and the importance of their equal participation as active agents in peace and security (UN 2000). Aside from the positive role women and girls can and do play in addressing VE, there is also a significant amount of literature documenting the active participation of women in different VE organisations, and the important role the promise of a bride plays in recruiting young men (Alison, 2004; Banks, 2019).

Two policy approaches

Research on VE have helped to inform two complementary policy approaches, namely Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE). These initiatives seek to address the underlying conditions conducive to recruitment and radicalisation of VE, with the end objective of denying groups that use terrorism new supporters or recruits.

In 2015, President Barack Obama chaired a three-day summit on CVE. A year later, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon, announced a UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, which contains extensive recommendations on how member states should develop a ‘comprehensive approach encompassing not only essential security-based counter-terrorism measures but also system-
atic preventative steps to address the underlying conditions that drive individuals to radicalise and join violent extremist groups’ (UN 2016).

In the intervening years, dozens of states across the world – including numerous African states - have developed national CVE and PVE plans. The African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) has increasingly adopted use of the terms ‘preventing and countering violent extremism’ in its communications, while many regional economic communities (RECs) have developed or are in the process of developing regional strategies to prevent and counter VE.

In Africa, the majority of VE organisations, including Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, espouse a form of Muslim fundamentalism referred to as Salafi-jihadism. Salafism, as outlined by Sedgwick (2015), is the atavistic idea that the most authentic or ‘true’ form of Islam can be found in the lived experience of the earliest generation of Muslims to follow the Prophet Muhammad. Jihadism is informed by the idea that all individual Muslims are obliged to wage jihad (religiously sanctioned warfare) against non-Muslims in order to establish a global Muslim caliphate, rather than an inner struggle against sinful behaviour or a collective obligation carried out by legitimate representatives of the Muslim community in self-defence. As Hamid & Dar (2016) write, ‘Salafi-jihadists tend to emphasize the military exploits of the Salaf (the early generations of Muslims) to give their violence an even more immediate divine imperative’.

Salafi-jihadist groups can use this exclusivist approach to justify their violence against other Muslims, including non-combatants. It should be emphasised that this form of religious interpretation, and even the more widely followed versions of conservative Islamism, represent just a fraction of the global population of Muslims. In the US and Europe, VE and PCVE initiatives are also used in respect of white supremacist and Christian nationalist groups, both of which have similar atavistic and exclusivist ideological tenets to those seen in Islamist extremism.

Despite progress made in understanding the complex nature of VE, as well as the implementation of PCVE initiatives in several African contexts, the threat of VE in Africa has not diminished. Organisations such as Boko Haram in West Africa and Al-Shabaab in East Africa continue to thrive after more than a decade of efforts to counter them, while new organisations such as Al Sunnah wa Jama’ah have emerged in regions previously considered safe from the threat of VE. The Islamic State, after losing territory in the Middle East following the destruction of its proto-state in Iraq and Syria, has actively worked to embed
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itself in African conflicts and form links with local armed groups, and now has its most active affiliates on the continent.

It is therefore clear that current policy approaches to addressing the threat of VE are either not working, or must be improved. In part, this is due to the fact that research into VE has been driven by scholars outside the continent, and subsequent policy frameworks do not speak to local realities. For example, key issues that remain unresolved in building effective measures to address VE include addressing the active role the state often plays in driving VE; the unique impact of colonisation on post-independence African society and identity; and the potential role of traditional cultural practices in countering VE, to name a few.

Moreover, African scholars and policy-makers must also consider how VE, and efforts to counter it, will interact with emerging environmental, political and social challenges including climate change, an increasingly multipolar international system, and a demographic youth bulge.

Violent extremism in Africa and southern Africa

The international community has sought to manage VE for almost three decades. However, as noted earlier, there is still no internationally accepted definition of VE. As the UN Secretary-General has noted, the concept is neither new nor specific to any region, identity, nationality or belief system. The UN, for example, used the term for the first time while adopting Resolution 1963 (2010). In Africa, VE has been explained in terms of circumstances in a specific subregion, or individual countries in a specific subregion. To this end, it remains important to understand the dynamics that explain VE in various regions and subregions.

Little is known about the existence of VE in pre-colonial African societies. Most of the available literature refers to terrorism perpetrated by colonialists. Reid (2021) and Ajalata (2011) refer to state terrorism and European colonial terrorism respectively. Both trace terrorism back to the slave trade, colonialism, Africa’s integration into the capitalist world system in the 15th and 16th centuries, and the subsequent division of Africa. Nevertheless, much more of the available information focuses on post-independence Africa. VE in Africa only emerged in the early 2000s. Initially, when VE turned into a security threat to the West, more attention was paid to the Middle East and Afghanistan, and only recently to Africa (Olojo & Donnelly 2021). The expansion of VE groupings across different parts of Africa and the Middle East calls for a more systematic
understanding of VE from an African perspective. However, given the Africa’s
cultural and historical diversities, it remains important to examine the factors
that shape VE in a particular region or subregion.

In 2021, Africa began to host some of the worst VE hot spots in the world. VE
groups operating in Africa are informed by local, national and regional factors.
Today, Mali, Somalia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mozambique, Niger and the
DRC are among the worst affected countries in the world, and face persistent
violence from groups associated with al-Qaeda or Islamic State (Brown 2020).

VE is multifaceted, comprising a combination of historical, political, geo-
political, economic, and social circumstances. Poverty and unemployment are
not in themselves triggers of VE, but manifestations of the injustices, human
rights violations, political and social exclusions, corruption, or persistent mar-
ginalisation that do drive VE. All these are complemented by weak or absent
governments. The presence of these elements facilitates the growth of radical
movements and violence (UNDP 2016).

Even though VE is often associated with ultra-conservative religious beliefs,
this is not always the case. Some occurrences, such as killing of 1.5 million
Cambodians by the Khmer Rouge in an attempt to establish a communist
peasant society (UNDP 2016), are not necessarily related to a particular reli-
gion. Moreover, some of the VE groups active in Africa today started as radical
movements and adopted violent strategies as they evolved.

VE in Africa is informed by both domestic and external factors. These range
from radicalisation to links with criminal networks, kidnapping-for-ransom,
arms proliferation, and instability. VE groups capitalise on social grievances,
unresolved conflicts, personal or community identity claims, religion, history,
marginalisation and exclusion to produce a perspective that facilitates recruit-
ment and radicalisation (AU 2014).

People join VE groups for diverse reasons, some of which are country-spe-
cific. These include maltreatment by security forces, poverty, and a lack of
access to employment. In late 2019 it was found that seven out of 10 people
in Africa had joined a VE group after being abused by defence/security forces
(Van Zyl 2020). Other factors include the impact of climate change, and intra-
state conflicts in the Sahel and Central and Southern Africa (ACSS 2015).

In West Africa and the Lake Chad Region (which includes Nigeria, Came-
roon, Chad and Niger), VE has intensified, with Boko Haram having far-reaching
impacts on people’s lives. Complex patterns of conflict in Northern Mali
have paved the way for VE groups to operate with impunity. Moreover, intra-
state conflict in Libya has provided some indication of the potential of VE to extend to West Africa (USAID 2021; Mahmood & Ani 2018).

VE groups such as Boko Haram, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) pose a security threat in West Africa. In the Central Sahelian nations of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, groups from the Al-Qaeda-allied JNIM and ISGS have manipulated [ethnic] identity to mobilise movements against each other, paving the way for recurring attacks (Brown, 2020).

When, in 2002, Boko Haram emerged in Maiduguri in Borno State in northeast Nigeria, it was largely non-violent. This strategy changed in 2009 after clashes between its followers and security forces. Afterwards, the group went underground. It re-emerged in 2010 and turned into one of Africa’s most extreme violent organisations, associating with the Islamic State (ISIS) (ACSS, 2015). In 2014, Boko Haram conducted frequent attacks in northern Cameroon, and by early 2015 it had extended its violent operations to Niger and Chad. In 2016, Boko Haram was subdivided into two groups: Islamic State-West Africa (ISIS-WA), and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) (Mahmood and Ani, 2018). Even though Boko Haram poses an existential threat to the Lake Chad region, it no longer controls as much territory as in 2013-4 (Mahmood and Ani, 2018).

Elements of VE in Nigeria and other parts of West Africa pre-date the emergence of Boko Haram. One example is the emergence of a radical movement in Kano, Northern Nigeria, between 1982 and 1984 (ACSS, 2015). Another relevant factor is that most Boko Haram recruits are descendants of the Kanem-Bornu Empire, which prospered between 1086 and 1903 and encompassed the current northern and north-eastern Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Niger, western Sudan and southern Libya (ACSS 2015).

The Maghreb – comprising Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia – has experienced a greater upsurge in VE than other parts of North Africa, due to its proximity to the Middle East. The Israel-Palestine conflict as well as the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions have contributed to the mushrooming of VE groups.

The Central African Republic (CAR) does not belong to the Sahel, Horn of Africa, North Africa or Great Lakes region. Its proximity to the DRC and Chad makes it vulnerable to VE. CAR leaders have manipulated religious and ethnic identities in an environment marked by poverty and insecurity, making further rendering it vulnerable to VE (Knoope et al. 2022).
VE in East Africa is a growing threat, as demonstrated by the emergence of habaab, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Maalim & Nyambura 2018). As in other regions, violent extremists capitalise on and exploit grievances relating to poverty, unemployment, exclusion and oppression. Much of the region is poorly governed and sparsely populated, allowing criminal networks to flourish. Since 2010, at different times, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and to some degree Rwanda and Burundi have experienced VE attacks, with more incidences threatened.

As elsewhere, VE in East Africa is driven by external and internal factors. External factors were more evident during the 1980s and the 1990s. These included initiatives by faith-based organisations in Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern states to establish extremist religious interpretations in some of East Africa’s religious educational and cultural institutions. VE, particularly in the form of al-Shabaab, initially emerged in Somalia, and then spread throughout East Africa. From 2010 onwards, apart from Somalia, VE incidences in East Africa increased from just a few in 2010 to about 20 a year (Ali, 2016). Al-Shabaab in Somalia is considered to be Africa’s most dangerous VE group, as demonstrated by the size of the area that it controls and the value of black-market businesses under its operation (Brown 2020).

In this region, VE groups use land-based as well as maritime resources to fund their operations. Among others, violent extremists capitalise on gaps in maritime security to engage in the maritime trafficking of drugs, arms and humans. Given that maritime police/coast guards focus on piracy, which is also sometimes undertaken by VE groups, the police tend to overlook trafficking in the ports in the region (Zyland & Lycan 2020).

Compared to the other regions, southern Africa has been characterised as ‘insulated’ from and a latecomer to VE. This is despite the fact that the region’s history is shaped by anti-apartheid and anti-colonial movements as well as Cold War rivalries. According to Van Zyl (2020), since 2017 southern Africa has experienced growing threats of VE, with more than 350 incidents occurring mainly in Mozambique. Moreover, individual countries such as Tanzania have experienced incidents related to VE since 1998.

The emergence of VE in Mozambique and the DRC has had a major impact on regional security. Unlike other African regions, VE is mostly experienced in countries that have gone through decades of intra-state conflicts, such as DRC and Mozambique. VE threats in the region are largely linked to al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab and ISIS (Omari and Macaringue 2007; Iroanya 2017).
As in West Africa and on the Horn, the operations of VE groupings have stretched from inland areas to the Indian Ocean. The VE attacks in Cabo Delgado in 2019 and 2020 were conducted simultaneously from inland and from the coast. As will be discussed later in this volume, VE groups have funded their operations via the smuggling of minerals as well as poaching (Van der Merwe 2017; Zyland & Lycan 2020). South Africa is an exception in that terrorist threats also emanate from far-right extremist organisations. Notable examples include the Afrikaner Weerstands beweging (AWB), which demanded an independent Boer republic, and staged violent protests aimed at derailing South Africa’s transition to democracy. The Boere Aanvalstrope and the Boeremag carried out terrorist attacks in 1996 and 2002 respectively, driven by similar ideological and political objectives (Schoeman & Cachalia 2017).

In June 2022, Harry Johannes Knoesen, leader of the National Christian Resistance Movement, also known as the ‘Crusaders,’ was sentenced to two life terms and an additional 21 years imprisonment for planning and recruiting people to carry out terrorist attacks, including targeting national key points, attacking military and police installations, and attacking informal settlements occupied by African people. He believed these attacks would provoke racial conflict and destabilise the country, thereby creating an opportunity to establish a separate Afrikaner state (SAPS 2019).

About this volume
This study is presented in three parts. Part one deals with the vital issue of the drivers of VE, notably the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors referred to earlier. In chapter two, David Matsinhe examines ‘push factors’ in greater detail. These involve poor governance, political and social marginalisation, and the challenges of centre-periphery relations, both within individual African states and international systems.

In chapter three, Abdi Aynte examines the ‘pull’ factors for VE in the African context, and explore online and offline recruitment and radicalisation strategies used by violent extremist actors on the continent.

In chapter four, Jaynisha Patel explores the ways in which VE intersects with transnational organised crime, enabled by corruption and poor governance, and how these organisations commonly fund their operations. She also examines current Combating Terrorist Financing (CFT) policies and mechanisms and their level of efficacy in addressing this challenge. She uses the conflict in northern Mozambique as a case study.
**Part two** deals with responses to VE by the AU and RECs. In chapter five, **Amanda Lucey** looks at the genesis, status and successes/failures of the National Action Plans that African governments are meant to develop and implement as key responses to VE, and suggests how these could be improved.

In chapter 6, **Clever Chikwanda** examines whether the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the umbrella term for the AU’s framework for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa, is suited to dealing with VE and PCVE, and whether adjustments are required.

PCVE – an increasingly transcontinental phenomenon – requires concerted international action in partnership with local actors. However, whose interests do these ‘international actors’ serve? In chapter seven, **Theodora Thindwa** explores the origins and nature of foreign involvement in PCVE, as well as the partnerships with local actors, and its impact on Africa.

**Part three** deals with VE in southern Africa, specifically northern Mozambique, and the deployment of the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). In chapter eight, **Énio Chingotuane** and **Egna Sidumo** examine the advent of VE in Cabo Delgado and the attempts by interested parties, including the Mozambican government and regional and international actors, to address the crisis. It draws on the recently published Situation Report published by SADSEM and FES (Chongotuane et al. 2021).

After much deliberation, SADC Heads of State agreed to an intervention in Mozambique to address ‘terrorism and violent extremism,’ including the humanitarian situation. In chapter nine, **William John Walwa** and **Gabriel Malebang** explore the genesis and nature of SAMIM, and analyses its effectiveness, relevance and impact.

SAMIM has been deployed in the context of national, regional and international competition to control Cabo Delgado’s counterterrorism activities. In chapter ten, **Rasul Ahmed Minja** situates this dynamic in the light of experiences with PCVE elsewhere in Africa, especially the Sahel, Horn, North and Central Africa, and offers policy recommendations for Mozambique and SADC.

In a concluding chapter, the three co-editors draw together the key insights and messages emanating from the ten chapters, and provides a set of recommendations for improving the management of VE in southern Africa.
Endnotes
1. For a discussion of the differences between terrorism and insurgency, see Kiras (2007).
2. For example, the international community’s investment in combating VE by boosting the capacity of the G5 Sahel Defence Force is about 2 billion pounds a year, four times the average annual allocation for humanitarian assistance in a region with the world’s highest humanitarian case load per capita. Similarly, at the national level, the amount allocated to military spending is roughly one fifth of the annual budgets of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali (People’s Coalition for the Sahel 2021).
3. The UN places a strong emphasis on preventive measures and structural issues, and thus prefers the abbreviation PVE (Preventing Violent Extremism). A recent development has been to bring together the notions of Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) under the single banner of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE).

References


PART ONE

Drivers of violent extremism
Radicalisation by design: Contingencies of violent extremism in Africa

Dr David Matsinhe

Violent extremism, or any type of conflict, does not develop in an economic, social or political vacuum. The ongoing VE we are witnessing in Africa emerges from historical contingencies that are multidimensional and complex. The conditions of possibility are economic, social, cultural, environmental, political and psychological. Complexity denotes the understanding that there are no simple, linear and monocausal relationships between the independent, intervening, and dependent variables for violent conflicts, as Cramer has forcefully argued (2006). Accordingly, consistent with the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (2015), the view taken in this chapter is that responses to VE that do not take account of its complex and multidimensional nature will have no chance of succeeding.

The UN Action Plan wisely acknowledges various drivers commonly cited in the literature on VE, such as a lack of socioeconomic opportunities; marginalisation and discrimination; poor governance, and violations of human rights and the rule of law; prolonged and unresolved conflicts; and radicalisation in prisons (UN 2015). However, drawing on insights from the field of behavioural psychology and architecture, this chapter argues that this literature does not go far enough in recognising the active role played by the state in fomenting VE by shaping the physical, social and political conditions which impact upon human behaviour and produce certain responses. It also highlights additional exogenous factors, such as global predatory economics, which deserve greater attention when considering the causes of and solutions for fragility and the proliferation of VE on the continent.

To adequately comprehend, prevent and counter VE, and establish lasting peace, human security, the rule of law and human rights, military force alone
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is not enough. While the structural drivers of VE – sometimes called the ‘push factors’ – are many and varied, this chapter will examine five, in order to provide greater insight into how they operate in isolation or together. These are:

1. State fragility – a lack of monopoly over the means of violence and taxation.
2. Poor governance – governments unable and unwilling to manage state institutions and resources for the benefit of all.
3. Political and social marginalisation – asymmetric power (im)balances between the political elites and ordinary citizens.
4. Youth marginalisation – the inability to transition from adolescence to adulthood.
5. Predatory global economics – extractive economic relations between African countries on the one hand, and Western and Asian countries on the other.

These factors were chosen for closer analysis due to their prevalence in African states that suffer from high levels of terrorism and VE.

State fragility

Among the emblematic features of fragile and failed states has been the proliferation of rebel groups on the margins of the state, often with extreme politico-religious views, which use violence to express their grievances (Graff 2010).

There is still an international consensus about the criteria for statehood set out in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights of Duties of States (1933), namely a permanent population, defined borders, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. While this framework is still useful as a litmus test for statehood, in real politics it is not enough. Besides passing the Montevideo test, a polity must also satisfy other terms and conditions, namely monopoly over the means of violence and taxation (Weber 1919; Elias 2000); the capacity to exercise sovereignty over its territory; and the ability to secure peace, security, stability, the rule of law and human rights. While all African states pass the Montevideo test, many struggle with the terms and conditions of real politics, and their inability to meet those conditions is a major driver of VE.

Highly fragile states tend to have high levels of terrorism. This can be seen by comparing country rankings on the Global Terrorism Index¹ and Fragile States Index.² For example, Somalia (3rd) Burkina Faso (4th), Nigeria (6th),

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Mali (7th), and Niger (8th) all fell within the top ten countries most impacted by terrorism in the GTI’s most recent annual index (IEP 2022). In 2022, these same countries all ranked in the top 20 of the world’s most fragile states, except for Burkina Faso, which ranked 29th (Somalia 2nd, Nigeria 16th, Mali 14th and Niger 20th). In southern Africa, the two countries most affected by terrorism (DRC and Mozambique) also have among the highest fragility scores in the region as well as globally (see Table 1).

**Table 1: Rankings and scores of SADC member states on the Fragile States Index (FSI) and Global Terrorism Index (GTI), 2022**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SADC member state</th>
<th>FSI ranking &amp; score (2022)</th>
<th>GTI ranking and score (2022)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>35th / 88.1</td>
<td>86th / 0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>123rd / 56.1</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>47th / 82.3</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>6th / 107.3</td>
<td>17th / 6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eswatini</td>
<td>52nd / 80.4</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>65th / 77.4</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>52nd / 80.4</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>45th / 83.0</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>154th / 37.9</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>21st / 94.3</td>
<td>13th / 7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>109th / 62.9</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>127th / 54.2</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>79th / 72.0</td>
<td>73rd / 1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>61st / 78.2</td>
<td>36th / 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>42nd / 83.6</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>15th / 97.8</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The degree to which a country’s military is under civilian control is a key indicator used by the FSI to determine state fragility. While most African states have succeeded in keeping the military under civilian control, in many cases, such control has been precarious. Even civilian governments tend to lean heavily on military solutions for threats to peace, stability and security. Many citizens distrust and fear their security forces, and perceive them as unprofessional, corrupt, unreliable and dangerous. In their analysis of Afrobarometer data, Nkomo and Buchanan-Clark (2020:22) found that across 34 countries surveyed, roughly 51 per cent of citizens expressed trusting the police ‘somewhat’
or ‘a lot,’ with 48 per cent reporting trusting police ‘not at all’ or ‘just a little.’

When civil–military relations are poor, security forces tend to use excessive force. When states fail to guarantee public safety and security, private armies and security companies proliferate to protect homes, neighbourhoods, businesses and assets. The use of private military and security companies threaten public safety, peace, security, and human rights. Such companies tend to violate international humanitarian and human rights law, bypass due diligence requirements to prevent, mitigate and remedy their adverse human rights impacts, and commit war crimes without being held accountable in the absence of internationally binding instruments and mechanisms (Amnesty 2021; Gwatiwa 2016; PSC Report 2021). This can be seen in the case of the use of the Dyck Advisory Group and Wagner Group in Mozambique, and the Wagner Group in Mali, Libya, and Sudan (Amnesty 2021; Gwatiwa 2016).

**Poor governance**

Poor governance has increasingly been recognised as a key structural driver of VE. Not only does poor governance provide VE actors with an opportunity to capitalise on community grievances against the state, but in cases such as Somalia, VE organisations have stepped in to fill service delivery failures, thereby embedding themselves in the local political economy (Skjelderup 2020).

The International Labour Organization (2016) has compiled definitions of governance by international organisations including, among others, the African Development Bank (AfDB), World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). However, according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2015), whatever the definition may be, what is crucial is that governance must be driven by human rights-congruent principles, namely participation, equity, non-discrimination, inclusiveness, gender equality, rules-based norms, transparency, accountability and responsiveness.

Therefore, it follows that the effects of good or poor governance permeate nearly all aspects of citizens’ lives. Precisely for this reason, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) utilises a wide range of governance indicators grouped into the following categories, namely security and rules of law, participation, rights and inclusion, foundations for economic opportunity, and human development.³

According to the 2020 IIAG, between 2014 and 2019 African states saw increased deterioration in security and the rule of law due to increasing repres-
sion, and a slow deterioration in terms of participation, rights and inclusion. Again, states that experience some of the highest levels of annual terrorist incidents on the continent, such as Somalia, Burkina Faso, and Mali, also rank among the worst governed (IIAG 2020). In southern Africa, the two countries most affected by terrorism (DRC and Mozambique) also have some of the worst IIAG scores in the region (see Table 2).

Table 2: The rankings and scores of SADC member states on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance and the Global Terrorism Index, 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SADC member states</th>
<th>IIAG ranking and score</th>
<th>GTI ranking and score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>43rd / 40</td>
<td>86th / 0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>5th / 67</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>38th / 43</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>49th / 32</td>
<td>17th / 6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eswatini</td>
<td>36th / 44</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>20th/ 52</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>35th / 44</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>23rd / 52</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>1st / 77</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>26th / 49</td>
<td>13th / 7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>7th / 65</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>3rd / 72</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>6th / 66</td>
<td>73rd / 1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>19th / 53</td>
<td>36th / 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>21st / 52</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>33rd / 46</td>
<td>= 93 / 0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Countries that are poorly governed are often characterised by unsustainable levels of government debt. In some cases, the debt is contracted illegally. A leading example from southern Africa includes Mozambique’s $2.2 billion loan scandal (Hanlon 2016). The debt scandal was discovered in 2014 when Nyusi was minister of defence. Three Mozambican state-owned companies secretly borrowed $2 billion from international banks to finance purchases of fishing vessels and military patrol boats. According to an independent audit, $500 million disappeared (Hanlon 2020).

Mozambique, like many African states, has become locked into predatory economic relations with extractive multinational corporations domiciled in
Western and Asian countries, and often falls for predatory lending practices by international creditors (Bonizzi et al. 2017). Production is not diversified, and there is a tendency to depend heavily on one product, usually oil, gas, or other minerals, that takes up the largest share of the economy. Productivity and GDP tend to be low, while inflation and unemployment rates tend to be high. The business climate tends to be unfavourable to internal capital and entrepreneurship. Interest rates are high, which discourages local investors and economic growth. In addition, there is a poor culture of protection and advocacy of consumer rights. From the formal to the informal sectors of the economy, transactions tend to be predatory.

In addition, poor governance often means that nepotism and clientelism are the dominant means of resource and opportunity distribution. This has clearly been seen in, for example, the Angolan oil sector (Bassetti et al. 2020), the Mozambican natural gas sector (Friends of the Earth 2020), and the Zimbabwean diamond mining sector (Global Witness 2018). Lack of accountability permeates not only state institutions but also economic and social institutions. Political elites commodify state institutions, services, and sovereignty for personal enrichment, while protecting themselves with a lack of transparency. The recent case of state capture in South Africa is another regional example. Those excluded by the system, notably young people and professionals, emigrate abroad for education and work, which explains the multitudes of skilled Africans living abroad and sending sizable amounts of remittances home (Momokhere 2018).

Other characteristics commonly seen in countries that exhibit poor or absent governance include a corrupt, unprofessional, clientelist public sector; inadequate health care and educational services; precarious housing conditions for large portions of the population; and poorly maintained infrastructure. Electoral systems (institutions, personnel and processes) are often perceived as biased and unfair.

In many African states exhibiting poor or absent governance, there has never been a transition of power from former liberation movements to the opposition. Since independence, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe remain under the rule of former liberation movements unwilling to relinquish or share power. Allegations of rigging have overshadowed nearly all the elections in these three countries. It has been common for election monitoring bodies to pronounce election as unfree and unfair, resulting in volatile post-election political conditions. When power is transferred peacefully, this is normally precarious (Troco 2019).
In recent years, the continent has seen an increase in coups d’état (Powell, Reynolds & Chacha 2022). Interference with civil and political participation ultimately results in African governments mired in crises of legitimacy, and peoples’ vote of no confidence. Political demonstrations and riots are common, and peaceful assemblies are often met with violent repression. The ruling elite resort to political violence to silence their opponents, while allegations of politically motivated attacks and assassinations are common. The closing of civic and political spaces has tended to precipitate the formation of politically disgruntled groups, some of which arm themselves and undertake violent operations against security forces and civilians. This has been seen in Burkina Faso, Sudan, Mali, and Chad in recent years.

**Political and socioeconomic marginalisation**

Political and social marginalisation, particularly along ethnic or religious lines, has been widely recognised as a key structural driver of VE (Stephens, Sieckelinck & Boutellier 2021). In states with high levels of political and social marginalisation, those perceived by the ruling elites as supporters of the opposition tend to be excluded from serving in the security forces and public services. Public services tend to be highly politicised, while state institutions and resources are frequently used in the service of governing parties.

Political exclusion also finds expression through untrustworthy legal systems in which equality before the law and fair trials are rare or absent. Political elites enjoy impunity even though the breadth and depth of their crimes threaten national economic and political stability. In southern Africa, Mozambique’s US$2.2 billion loan scandal is a clear example of a political elite engaging in financial crime which has severely impacted upon the country’s economy and growth prospects (CIP 2021).

Political exclusion is also evident in the arbitrary arrests and illegal detentions of those who harbour old unflattering views of the governing elites. Such governments tend to show little respect for civil and political rights. They take an aggressive, and often violent, stance against freedom of association, assembly and expression, while security forces are at the service of the ruling elites. Though there may be independent media, journalists are frequently subjected to harassment, intimidation, threats, and persecution through prosecution (e.g. defamation lawsuits). Extreme political intolerance and cultures of not being willing to share political power are common. Driven by hatred of the opposition, ruling elites often deploy death squads to eliminate political rivals, civil
society leaders, journalists, and human rights defenders. The middle classes are small, weak, and subservient to the small ruling elite. Academia and civil society also tend to be weak and under attack by the political elites and their armies of supporters. All these trends have been observed, documented and reported in Angola, Eswatini, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Amnesty 2018; CIP 2021; HRW 1997; PRI n.d.).

Resources and opportunities are unfairly distributed through clientelism, resulting in high concentrations of wealth in the hands of a small economic and political elite. This is accomplished through the politicisation of the government and the economy (Van de Walle 2003). In Angola, the ruling MPLA maintains a monopoly over economic resources and opportunities, and distributes them to sympathisers and supporters (ICIJ 2020). In Mozambique, the ruling Frelimo keeps the distribution of economic resources and opportunities strictly partisan (Orre & Rønning 2017). In their book Comrades in Business: Post-Liberation Politics in South Africa, Heribert Adam et al. provide an account of how this process unfolds in South Africa, while Zinyama (2021) gives an instructive account of how corruption and clientelism shapes the distribution of economic resources and opportunities in Zimbabwe.

Another impact of high levels of political and social marginalisation and inequality is that natural resource wealth is captured by the political elite, often to the detriment of the poor. This is clearly visible in the ‘new scramble for Africa’ by Western and Asian extractive multinational corporations. This scramble has precipitated unprecedented expropriation of the commons by local elites for speculative purposes. In Mozambique and Zimbabwe, for example, rural and urban communities have been displaced to make room for expensive real estate development and resource extraction (Pearce 2013). In rural areas, farmers and pastoralists have been forcibly removed from their sources of food, water, health, housing, and livelihoods without just compensation or alternatives, driving them further into poverty (Amnesty 2019, 2018; HRW 2013).

Across the continent, there are extreme asymmetries in access to good quality education between the elites and ordinary citizen, with the former secluded in expensive private schools at home and universities abroad, while the latter are stuck in poor, dilapidated public schools and universities at home. As highlighted by Oxfam (2019), Africa is the second most unequal continent in the world, and home to five of the most unequal societies globally. These include Eswatini, Nigeria, Namibia, South Africa and Botswana (Oxfam 2019). The richest 0.0001 per cent own 40 per cent of the wealth of the entire continent, and
Africa’s three richest billionaires have more wealth than the bottom 50 per cent of the population, about 650 million people (Oxfam 2019).

Year after year, the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) shows that the majority of people in southern Africa experience poor human development and multidimensional poverty. Even those who live above the official poverty line remain subject to multiple deprivations. Disease control systems are inadequate, and people widely succumb to easily preventable diseases.

**Youth marginalisation**

Africa has the fastest growing population in the world, with more than half the global population growth between now and 2050 expected to occur on the continent. It also has the world’s youngest population, with 75 per cent of sub-Saharan Africans under the age of 35 (UN 2022). Some 53 per cent of Africans are between 17 and 26 years old (UNDP 2017). Young people, who are still in the process of forming their personal identities and world views are more vulnerable for exploitation by political and religious entrepreneurs in the form of recruitment into VE organisations, particularly when they have few prospects for employment or other forms of self-advancement.

The African Development Bank (AfDB 2015) reports that while 10 to 12 million young people enter the labour market annually, the continent only creates about 3.1 million jobs. In addition, most young people of working age are absorbed in the informal market, which provides some 80 per cent of jobs on the continent (AfDB 2015). In other words, most of the continent’s young people work under precarious and dangerous conditions. The AU’s 2019 State of African Youth Report shows similar worrying trends. From 2013 to 2017, the total unemployment rate among youths across the continent increased from 16.8 to 17.4 per cent, and the rate of young people not in education, employment, or training (NEET) increased sharply from 19.4 to 27.7 per cent (AU 2019).

The AfDB (2019) warns about the severe and pervasive consequences of youth unemployment, including worsening living conditions, conflict, and migration out of Africa. African scholars have written extensively about the consequences of youth unemployment. Honwana (2012, 2013, 2014) has focused on the transition from childhood to adulthood. Drawing on interviews with young people across the continent, he shows that failed neoliberal economics, poor governance, and political instability have aggravated unemployment throughout Africa. These changes have transformed the temporary phase of transition from childhood to adulthood into a permanent condition of
‘waithood’. This is a trap in terms of which young people experience a chronic state of failed transition to adulthood. As a result, the sociocultural expectations of masculinity and femininity fail to materialise, as respectable marriages become increasingly elusive. Young men and women reach biological adulthood but remain economically, socially, and culturally trapped in childhood. There are no jobs and funds for dowries, marriages and new families. VE organisations, particularly those that offer the promise of wives or financial incentives that would allow young recruits to pay for dowries, thus have large pools of potential recruits (Matsinhe 2015).

In 2013, youth unemployment in Africa prompted the UN to consider whether African youth was an opportunity for labour and economic growth or a ticking bomb threatening peace, security, and the stability of nations (UN 2013). As some chapters in this book point out, poverty and unemployment are among the catalysts of recruitment of young people into VE groups. Various analysts have deliberated on the nexus between youth unemployment and crime in Africa. Accordingly, Adesina (2013), Adenike (2021) and Emmanuel (2020), among others, have raised concerns about youth unemployment and rising incidences of violent crime, kidnapping and insurgency in Nigeria. Donkor (2021) and Izzi (2020), for instance, rightly speak of the promotion of youth employment as a form of peace-building. For these reasons, when designing policies and programmes to prevent and counter VE, youth employment should be seen as vital.

Predatory global economics

VE does not occur in a vacuum, but in and through a dense and intense web of unequal global economic relations in which, due to its natural resources, Africa is positioned as prey. The predatory relationship between the continent and the outside world intensified under slavery, with the extraction of black bodies as cheap and free labour destined for the economic development of Western regions of the world (Rodney 2018). Currently, Western and Asian extractive corporations view Africa as a source of cheap natural resources, and are therefore found throughout the continent extracting minerals to develop their home economies to the detriment of the economies of the places of extraction (Rodney 2018). The endogenous conditions – such as inequality, multidimensional poverty, antagonistic group relations, political intolerance, and religious fundamentalisms – are not unconnected with exogenous conditions. African economies are detrimentally entangled with the global economy, and unless
this reality is taken into account in the design and implementation of policies to combat and prevent VE, such policies risk being ineffective or futile.

The rush of extractive multinational corporations to acquire large tracts of land for food production, mining and oil and gas extraction to service their lucrative home economies has introduced a new dynamic in recent years (Aryeetey & Zenia 2010; World Bank 2011; Chung & Gagné 2021). The acquisition of land, in connivance with local political elites, means that communities in many parts of the continent, notably the natural resource-rich ones, are often removed from their home ecosystems without respecting internationally recognised and sanctioned human rights standards. The prior, free, and informed consent of communities, which include community consultations, just compensation, resettlement, environmental impact assessment and monitoring, are often ignored in the rush for profits. As a result, communities lose their livelihoods and cultures. This has been the case in Mozambique, where communities have been driven off their land to make way for onshore natural gas extraction, but is common across the continent (Li 2010; Marcatelli 2019; Sevilla 2019; Wiegink & García 2022). In their research about the impact of extraction in Mozambique, which has seen the emergence of a deadly insurgency in recent years, Wiegink & García (2022:2) write:

Extractive projects need land to build the infrastructure to extract, process, and transport the resources, and to accommodate staff. To make way for such projects, people living on or using coveted land need to move, a process which is generally referred to as project-induced displacement ... like development-induced displacement, extraction-related displacement is typically legitimized in the name of (sustainable) development ... the development and economic progress resulting from such projects is unevenly distributed, as displaced people are largely excluded from the labour markets and business opportunities that are created by extraction projects ...

These developments continue to put pressure on communities as they must compete against each other over diminishing resources. This tends to create hostilities in a violent quest for survival. Meanwhile, resources continue to flow out of the continent, often without benefiting local economies. Researchers and CSOs have built a voluminous body of work on these phenomena (Amnesty 2018, 2019; Cuffaro 2018; Chelwa 2015; Global Witness 2016a, 2016b; HRW 2013; Pearce 2013).

Consistent with Rodney’s observation, it is maintained here that the emer-
gence and spread of VE in Africa is not unconnected with the economic development of western countries through the exploitation of the region’s natural capital (Rodney 2018). Western and Asian extractive corporations have acquired large tracts of land for mining and oil exploitation, thereby dispossessing and dislocating farmers and pastoralists (Pearce 2013). In turn, farmers and pastoralists are pitted against each other in a violent competition for the remaining inferior land. The link between conflict and resource extraction in the Sahel is consistent with Rodney’s thesis that western countries have kept social groups at odds with each other in order to facilitate exploitation.

Conclusion
The push factors – state fragility, poor governance, political and social marginalisation, youth marginalisation and predatory economics – described in this chapter are not mutually exclusive or exhaustive. They overlap, and also interact with one another.

Behavioural psychology and architecture have demonstrated the reciprocal interactivity and influence between human behaviour and physical, social, and political conditions (Design Council 2010; MacDonald 2015; Lang 1987; Gifford 2002). African states are conducive to the emergence and development of VE by design. Designs, shapes, and conditions set the horizons and parameters of what is possible in any given place. For people to move or not move in certain directions, to position or not position themselves in certain spaces but not in others, the architect designs the built environment to facilitate those desired behaviours. The designs of African states through the factors described in this chapter are bound to produce certain behavioural outcomes, some of which may lead to VE. Contact between humans and their multilayered environments shape human sensory perceptions and behaviour with palpable impact. Architects have learnt this valuable knowledge to good effect, enabling them to design and build spaces that facilitate or discourage certain behaviours – this is purposeful design.

To the ordinary citizen, the conditions of many African states are prohibitive and punitive – they impose certain orderings in space, proscribing and prescribing the possible and the impossible. Whether the political elites in charge are aware of this or not, design – the shape of things, places, spaces, buildings, economies, politics, and social forms – influences human behaviour in fundamental ways, both consciously and unconsciously. Politicians and policy-makers are in fact designers who, without thinking and acting as designers, design
economic, social, cultural, and political spaces that produce certain outcomes among their populations. They are designing contingent conditions which they would not want for themselves and their families. They find the living conditions they impose on the masses through legislation, policy-making, the use of force, and extra-legal behaviour (corruption) unsuitable for themselves. Thus, while these political elites impose deplorable education and health systems on their people, they themselves seek state of the art education and health care abroad. They design without human empathy, building systems without walking in the shoes of the users.

The factors described above are inappropriate designs for influencing behaviours which would lead to prosperity, opportunity, peace, security, stability, the rule of law, and human rights. On the contrary, these design factors tend to shape human behaviour toward the delinquent expression of economic, social, and political grievances, such as VE.

Presence, residence, and visibility in communities are among the essential means through which states exercise their sovereignty. These come into effect through public infrastructure, telecommunications, transport, roads and bridges, social services (education and health), potable water distribution and sanitation systems. In exercising sovereignty, states have the responsibility to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, and civil rights of citizens, based on the principle of non-discrimination – that is, without regard to race, religion, ethnicity, political affiliation and sexual orientation, among others. When the state fails to do so, it fails to exercise its sovereignty over its territory, and creates economic, social, cultural, civil and political vacuums. To fill these vacuums, desperate communities are inclined to welcome religious entrepreneurs who seize the opportunities to advance their own agendas. In Africa, we see its ultimate expression in the proliferation of VE.

Endnotes
1. Countries are scored in terms of the numbers of terrorist incidents, fatalities, injuries, and hostages taken. The measures are then multiplied by their weighting factor and aggregated to provide a score between 0 and 10. The GTI defines terrorism as ‘the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a state and non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.’
2. The Fragile States Index score is based on the sum of 12 indicators, each scored between 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest intensity (most stable) and 10 being the highest intensity.
(least stable). Indicators include security apparatus, factionalised elites, group grievance, economic decline and poverty, uneven economic development, human flight and brain drain, state legitimacy, public services, human rights and rule of law, demographic pressures, refugees and internally displaced persons, external intervention.

3. These categories are made up of 14 subcategories, consisting of more than 100 indicators. The latest IIAG is calculated using data from more than 30 independent sources to provide a score from 0 (worst) to 100 (best).

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Troco, A.A. (2019). Electoral governance and democratisation in southern African post-conflict states - electoral management bodies in Angola, Mozambique and


Youth recruitment and radicalisation:  
a case study of Al-Shabaab in Somalia 
and East Africa

Abdi Aynte

Somalia has been unstable since the overthrow of the dictator Siad Barre in 1991. Clan-based warlords quickly turned on each other in a competition for political and economic control, plunging the country into civil war which saw a total collapse of governance and the rule of law. The resultant power vacuum became a breeding ground for radicalisation by militia groups seeking to control different parts of the country.

The most popular militia group that emerged from the collapse of governance in Somalia is Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group associated with Al-Qaeda. Over the years, Al-Shabaab has embarked on various terrorist activities in Somalia and neighbouring countries, notably Kenya and Uganda (UNSOM 2017). Thousands of people have been killed, maimed, or injured in terrorist attacks in Somalia and surrounding countries. Al-Shabaab’s brutal attacks on both government and civilian targets have caused a near constant climate of fear and panic. Today, about two decades after Al-Shabaab’s emergence in Somalia, the group still poses a major threat to efforts to stabilise and develop the country. Its continued influence in Somalia is fuelled by constant recruitment and radicalisation, particularly of young people.

Al-Shabaab can only sustain its activities due to the human and other resources it has acquired over the years. It maintains itself via the constant recruitment and radicalisation of young people (Botha & Abdile 2014). Al-Shabaab is Swahili for ‘the youth.’ In particular, it targets adolescents and young adults in the 18-22 age group. According to Botha & Abdile (2014), only some 30 per cent of recruits are older than 30. The same authors assert that adolescents aged 12-17 and young adults aged 18-22 are often highly impressionable, and
open to new ideas and ideologies. Al-Shabaab takes advantage of this developmental psychology.

This chapter will provide an overview of some of the push and pull factors involved in the radicalisation and recruitment of young people. It will include a look at some of the key messaging, incentives, and strategies used by the group, as well as the role of technology and media platforms most utilised by recruiters. Lessons learnt from this will help to inform policy-makers in the southern African region, which may have less experience of VE than their counterparts in Somalia and on the Horn of Africa.

**Defining radicalisation and recruitment**

Before evaluating the methods used by Al-Shabaab to radicalise and recruit new members, we need to gain a clearer understanding of these two terms, and the context in which they apply. Like VE, there is no single definition of radicalisation. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), radicalisation is intimately linked to VE (UNODC 2018). As noted elsewhere in this volume, VE is best defined in a specific context; however, it generally presupposes the use of violence to advance a particular extremist political or ideological position or objective.

In this frame, the notion of radicalisation points to an instance where extremist political ideas, beliefs, and aspirations are utilised and exploited to recruit followers who are ready for violence. In other words, radicalisation entails the idea of condoning, facilitating, supporting, and utilising violence to meet political-religious or other aspirations.

Radicalisation goes hand in hand with recruitment – the actionable step after radical or extreme beliefs have taken hold. In a sense, the process of radicalisation prepares individuals for the process of recruitment. However, recruitment, whether forcible or otherwise, can also occur when a member of an extremist organisation becomes further radicalised.

**Vital factors in the recruitment and radicalisation process**

Evidence-based knowledge of why people join Al-Shabaab and similar VE organisations should be the basis for effective counter-radicalisation strategies; otherwise, they will be ineffective. A study by Nganga (2020) revealed that former Al-Shabaab fighters had diverse reasons for deciding to join the group. The interviewers developed a profile of a typical Al-Shabaab recruit. Factors that facilitated his or her recruitment included religious belonging, socioeconomic
conditions (education, unemployment), political circumstances, as well as a desire to be part of a collective identity. This was followed by a series of recommendations to the Somali government, neighbouring countries, and international organisations and donors on how to counter Al-Shabaab’s growing recruitment activities. Several factors were highlighted for consideration.

The first factor is the role of identity based on faith and socialisation within the family that can play a role in the radicalisation of young people. Political socialisation includes forming a sense of social identity derived from ‘knowing one’s membership in a social group or groups, including the emotional and value significance attached to that membership’ (Nganga 2020). An individual’s brand can be defined as the sum of his or her cultural, social, and religious identity, and the myths and symbols representing the group. As Beadle (2017) asserts, individuals develop their identity during their youth, particularly in their late teenage years. Al-Shabaab mainly targets youths in this age bracket since they can be more easily persuaded to adopt a particular ideology. Faith and family identities are used within the radicalisation process. Carvalho (2020) and Botha & Abdile (2014) both highlight the role of religious leaders in radicalisation efforts.

Besides religious identity, recruiters often exploit certain family dynamics. Radical ideologies become much more acceptable when they have already been adopted by a family member or a close friend. Additionally, family members have been used to actively persuade others within the family to join Al-Shabaab. Zych & Nasaescu (2021) as well as Hafez (2016) argue that parental teachings and observed behaviours favouring extremism can encourage or induce young people to adopt extremist views, and that, due to the strong bonds between family members, a family is often an effective tool for radicalisation, especially in the Islamic world.

Second, social-economic factors such as poor education and unemployment also play important roles in radicalisation and recruitment. The importance of education in preparing young people for work cannot be overstated. The more educated people are, the more likely they are to participate in mainstream politics, thereby making them less likely to be radicalised. However, education in and of itself is not the answer to radicalisation. Rather, the type and quality of education provided is vital. For students to be able to think critically and openly, they need to be exposed to a variety of fields of study, such as history, philosophy, and the social sciences. This will help them to understand domestic and international realities (Kombo 2018). Moreover, a lack of
education detracts from employment opportunities, and is a general barrier to self-employment. A study by Tushambomwe-Kazooba (2006) discovered that many new business owners in Uganda were not adequately trained, which resulted in poor business practices and management decisions. Many of those without jobs lacked the education necessary to land better-paying positions. In this context, the fact that interviewees cited economic hardship as a factor in their decision to join Al-Shabaab and claimed to earn between $150 and $500 a month clearly illustrates the importance of socioeconomic factors in respect of recruitment.

Third, political instability in Somalia is also a factor that makes the country susceptible to VE and the radicalisation and recruitment of young people. Somalia has struggled politically since the collapse of a central government in the early 1990s. With different regional leaders emerging in various parts of the country, it became difficult for the governing authorities to prevent the formation of criminal gangs. The emergence and ongoing radicalisation of youths in this context can be traced back to the failures of the governing authority. Without a central government, Al-Shabaab has controlled some parts of the country for a significant period, including some strategically essential regions such as the port of Kismayu, which it controlled for years before being driven out by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Without a stable political environment, and a sense of national unity and patriotism, Al-Shabaab is able to more easily entice young Somalis into joining the group. Botha & Abdile (2014) have identified a sense of belonging as a vital factor in the radicalisation and recruitment process. Joining Al-Shabaab guarantees members security and a ‘family’ that will stand with them regardless of their situation. Former and current combatants were strongly influenced by friends. Many Al-Shabaab recruits join the group with their friends, highlighting the importance of interpersonal relationships in the recruitment and radicalisation processes.

Clearly, it is vital for governments and security services to develop tailored strategies that address all these factors in their own contexts.

**Recruitment methods, messaging, and platforms**

Recruitment by Al-Shabaab is never a random exercise. Instead, it is well choreographed and well defined, with specific targets and messages in mind. The group uses a range of tactics, from traditional face-to-face recruitment strategies to technology and social media platforms. It is also adept at using methods which speak to local contexts and social and political change. Its various
recruitment methods have helped to enable its expansion into the wider East African region.

Direct recruitment usually involves a personal approach by a member of Al-Shabaab. The recruiter can be a close friend or family member, or a relative stranger. Al-Shabaab has been known to target school dropouts as well as individuals whose application to join the military or a military school has been rejected. In this way, the organisation taps into the anger and disappointment potential members may have towards the government. The group emphasises the narrative that joining Al-Shabaab will provide new recruits with an opportunity to earn dignity and respect in their communities (Zeiger & Gyte 2020). In a similar vein, the group has targeted prison inmates through letters and visits, promising them an opportunity to improve their social standing (Zeiger & Gyte 2020).

A major feature of Al-Shabaab’s recruitment strategy has been the infiltration of religious schools and training centres, as well as the use of religious propaganda. For example, radical ‘sheikhs’ such as Ahmed Iman Ali, Aboud Rogo, and Makaburi have played key roles in recruiting Kenyan youths into Al-Shabaab in Somalia (Williams 2018). Al-Shabaab has also been known to capture religious leaders and force them to use their religious networks and proximity to youths to recruit new members (Williams 2018).

Hassan (2012) argues that Al-Shabaab messaging sells the idea that joining makes one a hero for fighting to defend Islam against its perceived enemies, and that these jihadist actions will give the recruits a ticket to paradise. The notion of being a ‘hero’ who gains a reputation as a respectable member of Muslim society and is courageous enough to lay down his or her life to fight Islam’s enemies can be attractive to young people. Moreover, the notion that one can command the respect of one’s peers as well as girls is a particularly attractive message to young men (Hassan 2012).

As Lind et al. (2017) argue, Al-Shabaab recruitment messages target Muslims, portraying the humiliation Muslims have endured in Kenya. These messages perpetuate the idea that Christians have occupied the coastal regions that should belong to Muslims, and have killed Muslim leaders. Often intertwined with this ideological narrative is the idea that the US is responsible for all the social and economic hardships in countries throughout the Muslim world, as well as the suffering brought about by the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This messaging is intended to inspire rage among Muslim communities, convincing them to join Al-Shabaab to wage jihad against the West and its proxies.

Indeed, Al-Shabaab uses jihad ideology to recruit and radicalise individuals,
and to prepare them for suicide missions. Videos recording the final testimonies of suicide bombers and the praise bestowed on them by others is used to popularise the idea of martyrdom and suicide missions among Al-Shabaab’s ranks (Speckhard et al. 2019). Besides the role of ideology and the exploitation of religious texts, one of the main ways in which the group has recruited new members is through financial incentives, in a context of youth unemployment and poverty. Studies by Hassan (2012) and Williams (2018) emphasise the role money, weapons, and other financial incentives play in the recruitment process, including the promise of girlfriends and wives. According to a report by the Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI, 2020), Al-Shabaab pays its fighters wages ranging from $50 to $200, which attract people who are struggling to provide for their families.

However, Al-Shabaab is also often able to forgo using either ideology or financial incentives, and simply force individuals to join. Members are forcibly recruited through abductions, threats to families, and compelling parents to give up a male child (IAGCI 2020). Additionally, children are taken when families cannot pay the zakat – taxes that Al-Shabaab collects from the community to fund its activities (IAGCI 2020). These children are raised among the group, assimilating to their way of life and adopting their teachings and ideology (IAGCI 2020). This helps to ensure that Al-Shabaab’s beliefs are passed on through generations. Al-Shabaab also targets vulnerable groups, such as internally displaced persons (IDP), for forced recruitment, and has even staged jailbreaks and forced prisoners into joining (Botha & Abdile 2014). In many instances, those who try to resist joining Al-Shabaab are made to pay compensation, or can be killed to instil fear in those communities which try to resist their commands.

Al-Shabaab has also become adept at using more indirect recruitment methods, utilising digital technology and various social media platforms. The rise of the internet has connected disparate groups and communities, reducing the world to a global village in which sovereign countries and their borders are increasingly irrelevant. Individuals can communicate via the internet regardless of where they are, so long as they are connected. Somalia has not been left behind. In 2017, 2 per cent of the Somali population (119 000 people) had internet access, and it is predicted that internet connectivity will expand rapidly in the next decade (World Bank n.d.). Al-Shabaab has used online videos as a means of recruitment and spreading propaganda since as early as 2007 (Speckhard et al. 2019). It has also used the internet to maintain a steady flow of recruits from the Somali diaspora, communities which would previously be
much more difficult to reach. According to Speckhard & Ellenberg (2020), the number of individuals recruited via the internet continues to increase.

Platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and many others have become increasingly hard to moderate, even within developed nations. The fact that Al-Shabaab messaging is primarily in Swahili makes moderating and banning its content even more difficult. This provides terrorist groups such as the Al-Shabaab with relatively safe platforms where they can communicate their messages without worrying about the authorities.

Al-Shabaab’s recruiting efforts are media-intensive, using social media platforms, direct mail items, and video content to reach potential recruits. It has also created its own media outlet, which it uses to publish extremist content. Formally known as the al-Kata’ib al-Kata’ib Media Foundation, this media channel is used to disseminate propaganda videos in Somalia and surrounding countries (Cox et al. 2018). It has released productions with tailored messages. These include messages for strategic purposes, such as a 2012 video in which they threatened to attack American and European targets in Kenya unless western governments stopped supporting the Kenyan military fighting the group in Somalia (Molony 2019). There are also productions designed to highlight successful terrorist operations, such as extensive coverage of the September 2013 attack on the Westgate in Nairobi, Kenya (Onguny 2020).

In recent years, the group has also begun to produce high-quality video content and utilise video-sharing platforms to broaden their social media presence. However, it still produces online written content in the form of digital magazines such as *Gaidi Mtaani* (‘Terrorist on the Street’), a Swahili-language magazine designed to spread Al-Shabaab propaganda (Lind et al. 2017). Integral to Al-Shabaab’s messaging is the strategic way in which it promotes its operational successes while criticising the government of Somalia, countries contributing troops to AMISOM, and western development partners. The group’s ability to disseminate its messages through multiple platforms makes them extremely difficult to trace and stop, while providing Al-Shabaab with the ability to present an alternative coverage of political and security events in which it casts itself in a favourable light (Cox et al. 2018:14).

**Countering recruitment and radicalisation**

Over the past decade, efforts to counter the threat posed by VE organisations has evolved to include non-military measures for PCVE. Among other things, these include working with local stakeholders to address the push and pull
factors which drive recruitment and radicalisation. Somalia, like many other
countries, has developed a National Strategy and Action Plan for PCVE which
highlights various local drivers of VE as well as the role of core constituencies
within the PCVE agenda, including youths, women, the private sector, civil
society, religious leaders, and the Somali diaspora (Federal Republic of Somalia 2016). Moreover, several PCVE programmes aimed at disrupting recruitment
and radicalisation have been established.

Van Zyl and Mahdi (2019) evaluated PCVE projects implemented across
East Africa, including 27 such projects in Somalia. Collectively, these projects
included a broad range of activities aimed at various target groups, including
youths, women, government agencies, religious leaders, CSOs, law enforce-
ment agencies, former combatants, children, and the private sector. Activities
commonly used within these projects included skills development and voca-
tional training, dialogue and participation initiatives, awareness raising and
sensitisation, recreational and cultural activities, mentorship, and well as psy-
cho-social support efforts.

While the results were mixed, the study does offer some valuable lessons.
First, it is important that policies or projects designed to counter recruitment
and radicalisation are based on strong context-specific research. This will help
to ensure that counter-narratives and related activities speak to local realities
and the specific tactics, messaging, and strategies used by the VE organisation
in the given region. As argued by Botha and Abdile (2014),

Counter-radicalization measures have proved to be ineffective and even counter-
productive if they are not based on a clear understanding of what causes individ-
uals to be susceptible to violent extremism. There is no shortage of publications
on the root causes of terrorism. However, most concentrate on the broad circum-
stances that motivate people to commit acts of terrorism and are therefore not
always applicable.

To this end, wherever possible, local stakeholders should be actively consulted
about the design of these policies and projects, in order to draw on local knowl-
edge and strengthen community buy-in. Second, care must be taken to ensure
that individuals or communities targeted as beneficiaries of these initiatives are
not disadvantaged, either by being inadvertently labelled as ‘potential terror-
ists’ or for retribution by a VE organisation, such as Al-Shabaab. Finally, projects
designed to counter recruitment and radicalisation will only be effective if they
are scalable, measurable, and financially sustainable (Van Zyl & Mahdi 2019).
Scalability can be addressed, for example, by using the same social media platforms and digital technologies as VE organisations, and partnering with institutions with a national reach, such as a public schooling system or national broadcaster. Policies and projects to counter recruitment and radicalisation should also include specific indicators to ensure that their impact can be measured, and data is regularly collected to monitor their efficacy. Finally, to better ensure financial sustainability, these initiatives should be endorsed by government and have buy-in from local communities, rather than being wholly led by international NGOs which often operate on fixed funding cycles.

In recent years, the role of women and girls both as targets of and active participants in VE organisations has received increasing attention. Research indicates that women and men are recruited and radicalised by a similar set of push and pull factors, including social-political grievances, financial incentives, coercion, or religious and ideological beliefs (Chowdhury 2013). However, there are also factors that can make women and girls more vulnerable to recruitment. VE organisations often use the promise of brides to recruit males, which means that women and girls are important assets. Women and girls often have poorer economic prospects in developing societies, and are more susceptible to financial enticement. In some cases, women and girls are particularly sought after by extremist groups to carry out suicide bombing missions due to the belief they are less likely to be stopped and searched by security authorities. Boko Haram, for example, has frequently used female suicide bombers in northern Nigeria (Bloom 2011).

Ndung’u, Salifu and Sigsworth (2017) and Wandia (2022) recognise the multiple roles played by women within Al-Shabaab, and the unique ways in which it targets women and girls for recruitment and radicalisation. Moreover, mothers tend to have a strong influence over their children’s beliefs and identities, and are well-placed to identify signs of radicalisation among their sons and daughters. Therefore, efforts to disrupt recruitment and radicalisation must consider the specific ways in which these policies and programmes address gender, and cater for the unique vulnerabilities of women and girls.

Conclusion
As highlighted above, VE organisations such as Al-Shabaab use a range of tactics, strategies and messaging to recruit and radicalise members. Recruitment efforts can include any number of ideological, financial, and coercive components working separately or in combination. Moreover, growing internet con-
nectivity and the widespread use of social media and digital communication platforms across the continent has provided these organisations with new opportunities to spread propaganda and widen their pool of potential recruits. This makes effective intervention extremely difficult.

Ultimately, the best way of to disrupt recruitment and radicalisation is to shrink these potential recruitment pools by addressing the social, economic, and political factors that make individuals and communities vulnerable in the first place. This means improving governance, fighting corruption and improving service delivery, particularly in marginalised areas. It also requires including young people in economic development, thus enabling them to see a future for themselves as active and productive citizens. Security services also have an important role to play in protecting vulnerable communities which VE organisations may target and forcibly recruit. This can be best achieved by ensuring that security services adopt a human rights-centred approach which prioritises the protection of communities, rather than the state and the interests of a political elite.

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The growing number of VE groups and their expanding reach among extremist movements are grave threats to peace in our contemporary world. In recent decades, these groups have established themselves within and across a multiplicity of environments in which complex systems of power and distribution present leverage points for consolidating their presence. If rooted successfully within these complex environments, extremist groups are more likely to ensure their survival and enable their evolution into more potent threats to peace, security and development. The leverage points often appear where grievances about the state meet material deprivation and weak security. But what creates these leverage points which extremists can exploit? In many instances, it is the blurred, collusive influence of corruption and organised crime. Although scholars have unearthed direct links between organised crime and extremist groups, such as opportunities for financing, there is also a host of indirect enablers of extremism, including instances where direct links seem unlikely. Often, indirect enablers are born from the conflation of corruption and organised crime, and it is this grey area that requires a more nuanced discussion.

Southern Africa has, until very recently, been insulated from the religious and ideological extremism that has swept across the rest of the continent. Today, the insurgency spearheaded by Al Sunnah Wa Jama (ASWJ) – known locally as Al-Shabaab – presents a microcosm of what may happen throughout the region if conditions remain fertile for expansion. To date, studies have found no evidence of proceeds from Mozambique’s well-established illicit economy directly funding ASWJ’s operations. This has led some analysts to dismiss a deeper link between the two phenomena and/or to attribute the onset of civil conflict as purely the result of political and economic marginalisation.
However, a closer examination reveals that corruption, organised crime, and VE activity are inextricably linked in northern Mozambique. This chapter will examine the role of corruption and organised crime, as well as the relationship between these two factors, as indirect enablers of extremism. It invites the reader to contemplate the implications for Africa and especially southern Africa, within a more informed and nuanced perspective.

**Background**

The term transnational organised crime (TOC) is widely used and has come to encompass an ever-broadening range of activities. In fact, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), adopted in 2000, avoided defining TOC and related activities too closely, as it noted that new types of crimes were emerging in a fluid and unpredictable world. However, Article 2(a) of the convention does define an organised criminal group (OCG) as a ‘group of three or more persons that was not randomly formed; existing for a period of time; acting in concert with the aim of committing at least one crime punishable by at least four years’ incarceration; and; in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit’ (UNODC 2004).

In Africa, OCGs are on the rise as they take advantage of weak and corruptible institutions, unstable nations, and materially desperate populations. This is evidenced by the Africa Organised Crime Index which shows an increase in organised crime between 2019 and 2021, alongside a decrease in the resilience of the state and society to resist organised crime. Key to these findings is that state-embedded actors gained power following the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, and that conflict continues to provide breeding grounds for OCGs in Africa (Africa Organised Crime Index 2021).

Moreover, a 2018 study of serious and organised crime in Africa, conducted by Interpol and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) under the EU-funded ENACT project, found that large fortunes are amassed through illicit markets in Africa as OCGs exploit political and social vulnerabilities, state fragility, and weak policing. The report also notes that OCGs in Africa trade in a plethora of illicit and stolen goods, from narcotics to motor cars and rare art, and engage in the trafficking of humans and wildlife (ENACT 2018). The same report has also identified growing links between OCGs and extremist groups in Africa, highlighting that each operates as a transnational network with multiple opportunities for funding, and significant overlaps in human capital along supply lines.

Although OCGs have a long history in Africa, the continent has more recently
become known as the new arena for expressions of VE. Between 2011 and 2016, terrorism in Africa resulted in 33,300 fatalities, with Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan accounting for the largest share of attacks (UNDP 2017). However, terrorism has burgeoned in a growing number of countries, from the Sahel down to Mozambique. In 2022, the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) reported that 48 percent of terror-related deaths had occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Unfortunately, gains made in decreasing the death rates in Mozambique and Nigeria were dwarfed by findings from elsewhere on the continent. The top ten countries that experienced an increase in deaths between 2020 and 2021 included four in SSA and three in the Sahel. The report also found that the Sahel-based Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) is the fastest growing VE group in the world (Institute for Economics & Peace 2022). Moreover, ideological extremism waged by the Islamic State (IS) is a mounting concern for the continent’s security. Since December 2020, IS has used its Al-Naba newsletter to highlight Africa as a key frontier for achieving its goals. More recently, in its December 2021 newsletter (edition 317), IS emphasised its Africa operations, highlighting their ‘successes’ in Nigeria and Mozambique (Al-Naba 2022). Soon afterwards, edition 320 featured an editorial on Africa that justified war against Christians on the continent and again highlighted successful attacks.

Grievances are commonly fed by weak institutions, with the GTI also finding a correlation in developing countries between VE groups and a combination of weak institutions and societal fracturing (Institute for Economics & Peace 2022). States are often paralysed by corruption, which benefits a handful of well-connected elites or ethnic groups, and greases the palms of opportunistic lower-ranking state officials who act with impunity. The term ‘corruption’ is used to imply public sector corruption, specifically instances that involve the use of public office for personal gain.

The relative youth of African states is often cited as a reason for their incapacity and thus for corruption. While this is partly true, it’s an outcome rather than a cause. For a more nuanced approach, the sequencing of institutional development must be considered (Fukuyama 2014). African countries were born rapidly, and were expected to develop a range of public institutions covering all areas of governance and supporting functions simultaneously. African states are also the overseers of considerable ethnolinguistic diversity that was politicised through the violent legacy of European colonialism. Without a sequenced process of institutional development, a fine balance of power between institutions that keeps each accountable has not taken hold, and consequently left these
institutions vulnerable to capture by elite greed (Fukuyama 2014; Herbst 2000; Tilly 1990). Today, we see that the confluence of these factors has birthed weak institutions (including ineffective national security institutions), a reality that has created, among other things, entry points for OCGs and collective action among marginalised groups harbouring new and old grievances against the state.

However, grievances tell only half the tale. Extremist and organised crime groups also require infrastructure, networks and impunity. In many contexts where extremist groups have consolidated their position, illicit trade – another beneficiary of weak states – is also present. While in some instances extremists benefit directly from illicit economies, the link is sometimes less direct, with both groups of actors thriving on shared infrastructure, networks, and an incapacitated state. Ultimately, what emerges is a trinity of unintentional dependency whose survival depends on preserving the perverse and often indirect relationship among these three elements.

**Corruption as an enabler of violent extremism**

The rapid delivery of public institutions in African countries was overlaid by a confusing process of decolonisation whose legacy of extractive institutions was primed for capture by a newly emerging elite (Acemoglu & Robinson 2012). Today, corruption in Africa is an elusive and parasitic labyrinth that has weakened governance, security and development.

Having the potential to stoke divisions and perpetuate grievances in society, public perceptions of corruption are an informative indicator of the extent to which people feel its impact. Measuring perceptions of corruption is especially pertinent, as high levels of perceived corruption are central to the momentum of some of Africa’s most prolific extremist groups. For Boko Haram, highlighting corruption was crucial to its recruitment strategy and narrative, persuading local communities that the adoption and implementation of Sharia law would curtail corruption in Nigeria. This strategy successfully permeated the psyche of its followers, as many cited this as their motive for supporting the movement (Zumve, Ingyoroko, & Akuva 2013). This illustrates how perceived corruption, underpinned by ethnic and geographic factors, may create grievances that can work to the advantage of extremist groups, but also illustrates the dangers of excluding groups with pre-existing social bonds, thus preparing the ground for collective action to take a dangerous turn (Crenshaw 1981).

Given the centrality of perceptions of corruption as a push factor towards extremism, it is useful to explore some available data. In 2021, SSA countries
scored a low average of 33 out of 100 on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), with 80 per cent of countries failing to make anti-corruption gains over the last decade (Corruption Perception Index 2021). In southern Africa, the CPI has earmarked Mozambique as a country to watch, while Botswana, a top performer in the region and continent, has suffered a five-point reduction in its score.

According to Afrobarometer, Africa’s leading public opinion survey, public perceptions of corruption are on the rise and are not confined to key institutions, but rather span the length and breadth of the state. In 2021, a majority (58 per cent) of Africans said corruption had increased in their country in the previous year, adding that ‘most’ or ‘all’ of key institutions were involved in corruption. This included the police (47 per cent), members of parliament (37 per cent), the presidency (35 per cent), and local councillors (31 per cent) (Keulder 2021). Figure 1 depicts perceptions of corruption within three institutions that the average citizen is most likely to encounter, and also those tasked with providing security and justice. The data spans 34 African countries, is nationally representative, and was collected between 2019 and 2021. It shows that the gatekeepers of security, justice and local governance are seen to be heavily involved in corruption, which can also work to undermine trust among local populations in counter-insurgency operations. As we will see later on, this reality has affected counter-insurgency dynamics in northern Mozambique.

**Figure 1: Perceived corruption within three public institutions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Most or all</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local government councillors</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges and magistrates</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police</td>
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*Source: Calculated by the author, based on Afrobarometer, 2021.*

Given the central positioning of piety within extremist narratives driven by religious ideologies rather than material wealth, these VE groups are able to present themselves as an attractive alternative to corruptible government institutions.
In fact, Afrobarometer data shows that Africans have high levels of trust in alternative sources of authority (moral or otherwise), such as traditional and religious leaders. Figure 2 depicts data about trust in institutions. Nearly half (47 per cent) of respondents said they trusted religious leaders ‘a lot,’ and a third (34 per cent) said the same about traditional leaders. However, public institutions such as the courts of law (24 per cent), local government councillors (18 per cent) and national assemblies (17 per cent) took a significant knock. Therefore, it is not difficult to imagine how extremist narratives rooted in religious morality or justice and more specifically Sharia Law permeates the psyche of communities whose levels of trust in government (at a local or national level) are extremely low. Research conducted in Borno, Nigeria, shows that local people prefer to resolve disputes through traditional or religious authorities, because the police are perceived as corrupt as well as unresponsive (Boash & Patel 2022).

**Figure 2: Public trust in leaders and institutions (a ‘lot’ of trust)**

![Figure 2: Public trust in leaders and institutions (a ‘lot’ of trust)](image)

*Source: Afrobarometer, 2021. Author’s own calculations.*

More broadly, worsening corruption and impunity for transgressors undermine the state’s capacity to secure its territory, encompass all its citizens, and improve the lives of ordinary people. In essence, corruption yields a weakened state. In doing so, it not only plays directly into the hands of extremist narratives, but also opens gateways for illicit markets whose consolidation depends on a compromised and weakened state.

**Organised crime enabled by corruption**

In its simplest form, OCGs use corruption to diminish risk. It allows them to act within and profit from an illicit economy with impunity. Louise Shelley (2005) maps the evolution of this phenomenon, charting two dominant pathways through which OCGs use state weakness to establish themselves. First,
there are groups that successfully penetrate the state and establish a collusive bond with state officials, generating some kind of symbiotic relationship. This scenario typically supposes that OCGs rely on the survival of the state, whose preservation is aligned with their long-term interests. This is so because they rely on the state to allow the illicit trade to continue, for example by ensuring that goods move through ports as well as checkpoints.

The other pathway for an OCG to consolidate itself is to take advantage of instability. A weak state, unable to assert a monopoly on security, leaves gaps within peripheral provinces for illicit economies and/or VE to take hold. This being so, the ‘Global War on Terror’ encouraged states to assert themselves in peripheral spaces that could become safe havens for VE groups. A textbook example of this is the Taliban’s use of Afghanistan’s peripheral provinces to establish opium production as well as organisational strongholds. Two decades later, research shows that African states did not adapt the policy of ‘expansion’ (or strengthening state presence in peripheral areas), leading analysts to conclude that broad deterrence strategies have been ineffective in reducing the number of potential safe havens for VE groups (Downey 2021).

These spaces are often without a functioning licit economy, and OCGs can step in and provide income-earning opportunities to the same local dwellers whose material deprivation is perpetuated by their marginalisation (intended or unintended) at the hands of the state. With large swathes of local communities dependent on illicit trade for survival, not only does the price of disrupting the operation increase, but so does the value of a chaotic and ungoverned space within the country. Instability can also drive market growth on which OCGs can capitalise. This includes a growing demand for illicit product like weapons, new opportunities for supply routes, and a reservoir of displaced people vulnerable to human smuggling or trafficking (Walker & Restrepo 2022).

Although quite general, these two scenarios are helpful in analysing the different outcomes of state weakness, particularly where this itself is an outcome of corruption. It is also useful for understanding the nature and functioning of OCGs, which tells us, in turn, how they might respond to emerging extremist groups – including whether cooperation is in their best interest.

**Preparing fertile ground for VE groups**

Within the crime–terror nexus, there are two independently associated considerations. First, there is the direct link between criminal activity as a source of financing for extremist groups; and second, there can be links between OCGs
and extremist groups (Wang 2010). In recent years, the link between illicit trade and extremist or rebel groups has come into focus with more evidence of the opportunities for group financing. For one, ENACT (2018) found that, in Africa, armed groups or rebel groups often draw proceeds from illicit economies, including profiting from human and drug trafficking, selling stolen goods and poaching. Further evidencing this direct relationship, the Rebel Contraband Dataset shows that between 1990 and 2012, 22 African rebel groups were illegally extorting natural resources, and 17 were involved in the smuggling of natural resources (Wash et al. 2018). However, the presence of lootable resources or illicit trade routes unpack a singular facet of how organised crime can enable VE. Financing and profits aside, the indirect relationship between these two shadowy operations can mutually benefit both parties when certain conditions are harboured within a weak state. The consequence is a sharp decline in the actual operating costs of an extremist group, and a similar decrease in the opportunity cost for an individual to join such a group.

One such condition is the weak enforcement of law and order – an enabler of illicit economies. Extremist groups can comfortably operate under the cover created by organised crime. With corruption or instability protecting illicit trade, not only are extremist groups able to pose as members of OCG to go undetected in certain operations, but an official who is accustomed to taking a bribe from an OCG may also be less resistant to taking a bribe from an extremist group. In addition, officials who have been demoralised by OCG-related intimidation may also be less effective when working to counter VE (Kleiman 2004).

TOC also makes use of porous borders that are staffed by corrupt officials, or left vulnerable by a weak state. Porous borders can be used by VE groups to move people and supplies, while simultaneously spreading their ideology.

Alongside this, peripheral regions ideal for the production or transit of illicit commodities often have informal, unregulated and cash-based economies. The high volumes of cash passing hands supports illicit trade, but also favour VE groups who can move or spend cash with little fear of detection. Informal economies also deter formal financial institutions, and favour cash-based systems. This includes Hawala – an ancient informal value transfer system prevalent in the Middle East, North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Indian subcontinent. While it follows Islamic traditions, its use is not limited to Muslims. OCGs and extremists have used Hawala to transfer money discreetly around the globe. This includes al-Shabaab, which was found to be using it to collect taxes and for business transactions in Dubai (Wise 2011). More recently, evidence has come
to light that kidnapping ransoms in southern Africa have been paid via Hawala (Hosken, Hyman & Makheeta 2022). All of this means that seeking to freeze the assets of organisations involved in VE, or limiting their access to formal financial institutions, will not be very effective (Balasubramaniyan 2015).

Weakened security in a region dominated by informal and illicit economies offers locals few pathways to gainful employment, and many idle youths turn to petty crime and drug abuse. With the state paying scant attention to petty crime, youths can act with impunity, while also growing frustrated with the absence of opportunities. In Nigeria, research has shown that frustrated young people who were disempowered and involved in petty crime were must vulnerable to seduction by the extremist narratives of Boko Haram (Zumve, Ingyoroko & Akuva 2013). These young recruits are well placed to secure funds for VE groups through predatory acts.

Home-grown VE is often partly funded by predatory crimes such as banditry or kidnapping. In fact, the prominent south-east Asian VE group Jemaah Islamiyah relied on robbing local shops for funding (Balasubramaniyan 2015). This practice is also common among localised or home-grown VE groups in Africa. According to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Shabaab have widely used predatory crimes such as kidnapping for ransom, human trafficking and extortion as sources of local income. Most infamous for kidnapping (for ransom, human trafficking, forced marriages and the forced recruitment of soldiers), is Boko Haram, which 2014 grabbed global headlines for the kidnapping of 270 schoolgirls in Borno, Nigeria. Today, locals in the area remain fearful as kidnappings continue to target schoolchildren and even farmers.

Finally, the presence of infrastructure and human capital to facilitate the illicit trade of OCGs can be beneficial for an extremist group. Besides informal money systems like Hawala, extremists can also make use of seasoned service providers such as money launderers, document forgers and suppliers of cloned cell phones (Kleiman 2004). All of this works to reduce operational barriers and decrease the operational costs of a VE group.

Understanding some of the conditions required for the establishment of OCGs within weak states is helpful for identifying the conduits that spill over to enable the launch and consolidation of groups employing VE to destabilise the state. When analysing the lethal insurgency in northern Mozambique, these conditions bring to the light the extent that the state has in fact enabled VE through its collusive relationship with OCGs.
Mozambique’s forgotten Cape: an insurgency in Cabo Delgado

Infamous for its underdevelopment and illicit trade, Cabo Delgado is home to a populous, fractured and marginalised society. This underdeveloped northern province is home to large numbers of unemployed youths, many of whom are poor and illiterate. Since 2017, the local population has witnessed an insurgency that hopes to establish a breakaway region founded under the authority of Sharia law. A major factor is its distance from Maputo, the country’s capital – in fact, parts of Cabo Delgado are further away from Maputo than Cape Town, the continent’s southernmost city. As a peripheral province that is home to ethnic minorities, decades of neglect and corruption have encouraged local grievances. Overlaid are the activities of OCGs whose collusive relationship with the state ensures that whatever gains do make their way up on north are captured by a handful of well-positioned elites.

Corruption in Mozambique is widespread. One need only point to the ongoing ‘hidden debt scandal’ – the largest case of corruption ever brought to light on the continent – to illustrate the extent of the problem. The trial, involving 19 defendants, involves a secret and illegal loan paid out in 2013 and valued at about $2 billion. Among others, it was intended for the strengthening of Mozambique’s maritime security. Complicit in the scandal are highly placed members of the ruling party, the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), including former president Armando Guebuza’s son (Toulemonde 2021). The fallout of the debt scandal is expected to cost the economy US$11 billion, and will consume gas revenues for a decade. Living standards will also take a knock, with creditor repayments coming at the expense of capital and social expenditure such as education, roads, and sanitation (Public Integrity Centre 2021). The scandal has not only undermined state institutions, but also weakened maritime security. For a country whose coastline stretches an expansive 2 700 kilometres, maritime security is especially important. Crucially, some of the loan was intended for the purchase of three Ocean Eagle interceptor boats for coastal monitoring and protection (Homeland Security, n.d.).

Mozambique is also prone to illicit financial flows (IFFs). The UN’s framework for IFFs (2020) identified four different types of IFFs. Evidence suggests that Mozambique is susceptible to each: tax and commercial activities, illegal markets, corruption and exploitation-type activities/financing of terrorism. With more evidence emerging about the insurgency in the north, it is vital for IFFs and their linkages to illegal markets and corruption to be better understood as conduits for the propping up and financing of terrorism.

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Corruption in Cabo Delgado as a direct enabler of extremism

Levels of corruption in Cabo Delgado are very high. In fact, corruption is so embedded that some argue it is the single most important shaper of the provincial economy (Stanyard et al. 2022). As corruption seeps through governance, illicit trade and, more recently, the management of natural resources discovered in the province, local grievances continue to mount. Although unpacking the entire problem would require a full-length study of its own, the following examples will begin to highlight the length and breadth of the predicament. Management of the recently discovered liquid natural gas (LNG) deposits in Cabo Delgado has caused rifts between local communities and the state. Gains from the sector thus far have served the designs of the ruling elite and added yet another chapter to grievances against the state by the disenfranchised population.

Controlling and commissioning the various facets of the extraction, from drilling rights to security, is a lucrative business for those who have worked their way through Frelimo’s webs of patronage. The sheer quantity of LNG to be extracted means that the stakes are very high. The gas fields are estimated to harbour as much as 125 trillion cubic feet of gas, which makes Mozambique one of the largest future extractors of LNG in the world (Van Der Schyff 2020). During a phase of exploration between 2010 and 2013, French interest in Mozambique ramped up, including French exports of military equipment to the value of about €12 million. In 2015, Mozambique’s newly elected president, Filipe Nyusi, travelled to France on his first diplomatic trip, while Mozambique purchased French military vessels at the same time. All the while, TotalEnergies (a French multinational oil and gas company) was securing its interests in the gas fields, and by 2019 it became the main player in Mozambique’s LNG extraction after buying out Anadarko’s Africa assets. This helped to boost Nyusi’s prospects in the elections that year, allowing him to announce just 18 days before Mozambicans went to the ballot box that he had secured US$880 million in government revenue (Friends of the Earth International 2020).

As the insurgency spearheaded by ASWJ continued, the next step was to secure LNG sites. In 2017, Erik Prince, founder of the security company Blackwater and the beneficiary of state patronage in Mozambique, set up a company through which he could acquire vessels to protect LNG sites. A year later, the Dyck Advisory Group (DAG), a private security company based in South Africa, was used to secure LNG sites in Cabo Delgado. Unfortunately, this meant that the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM) did not intervene in an ASWJ attack just 7 kilometres from the LNG site they were ordered to protect. Further harm was
done to locals when, fleeing from the attack, an LNG subcontractor grabbed the land and began construction (Friends of the Earth International 2020).

This grim reality was foreshadowed by the nature of the resettlement process. Observers noted that it was fraught with intimidation and force, while outspoken local leaders were replaced with more pliable authorities (Mukpo 2021). Joshua Dimon, a US-based academic who observed Anadarko’s consultation process, said that ‘the minute the project was confirmed in 2012 through 2014, a lot of elites realized the land was going to be valuable, and grabbed it’ (ibid). Once again, well-positioned elites are expected to be the biggest winners, at the expense of ordinary Mozambicans. More broadly, society will have to repay the reckless debts incurred by the state with LNG revenues. Closer to the site, thousands have been displaced with little hope that their resource-rich province will provide them with any prosperity of their own. Although concise, this retelling of past events begins to indicate how Cabo Delgado’s natural resources have been managed, and to whose benefit. It is also a key component of the grievances created by corruption that will shape the province’s peace and stability in the decade to come.

More broadly, corruption has seeped into prospects for development and gainful employment, harming the local population and feeding into their grievances. This has, in turn, created entry points for extremist narratives and recruitment. According to the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), youths in the area believe corruption has impacted on their own prospects. Describing corruption as a ‘beast with seven heads’, they provide examples of appointments within local government and public administration based on patronage rather than merit, members of the SADM seeking resource rents from insurgents, and the normalisation of paying bribes to receive services. Moreover, young people believe that the unequal distribution of wealth between the centre and the periphery has trapped them in poverty, leading some to judge that their lives may be improved if they take drastic action such as joining ASWJ. This research highlights the important causal chain from corruption to grievances to extremism (Lucey & Patel 2022).

**Corruption enables organised crime**

Overlaying this aggrieved state–society relationship is the region’s thriving illicit trade. Stretching further back than the LNG dealings has been state collusion with illicit traders in Cabo Delgado. These relations have negatively impacted on local populations while compromising the functioning of the state
itself, with implications for the rise of VE in turn. With a long history of trade, predating European colonisation, Mozambique’s coastal towns were hubs for merchants and traders from Zanzibar and the Arab world. With its expansive shoreline and role in connecting eastern and southern Africa, geography has been both a blessing and a curse. Trade brings with it both licit and illicit goods. During the 18th and 19th centuries, ports in northern Mozambique fell under the control of Zanzibar’s Sultan who incorporated them into an ivory and slave trade (Goredema 2013). When Portuguese colonial rule ended and Mozambique was plunged into an 18-year civil war starting in 1975, these historical trade routes became conduits for traders to access capital and goods. It also allowed certain elites to capture economic opportunities presented by OCGs, and by end of the century Mozambique was a prominent hub for cocaine and heroin trafficking (Hanlon 2001).

Today, the illicit economy has mushroomed in size and scope. According to an Interpol report (2018), it spans most of the province’s key sectors. From illegal timber, rubies and the trafficking of pangolins to illicit pharmaceuticals and narcotics, TOC routes weave through Mozambique, moving easily through ports and across porous borders.

Protecting this trade is an armour of corruption. From the upper echelons of the political class come reports which suggest that Guebuza shelved skilled technocrats to make way for Frelimo military figures, so that profits from the illicit economy stayed within the ruling party’s nets of patronage (Norbrook 2021). Another report has found that heroin and cocaine coming into Pemba is linked to a trader whose numerous businesses lean on networks of the corrupt to ensure that containers are not thoroughly searched. Moving to lower-level officials, corrupt customs officials are then responsible for ensuring that the narcotics make it to a company warehouse, where much of it awaits further sea transport to Europe or land transit to their final destinations in southern Africa. In other instances, various TOC networks which get their illicit cargo ashore using small boats (locally referred to as dhows) also rely on lower-level officials to ensure protection (Nelson 2020).

Using the framework proposed by Louise Shelley (2005), evidence suggests that illicit trade in Mozambique is incumbent on its collusive relationship with the state. This is seen through both the political elite and lower-level officials benefiting from the trade - whether through profits or bribes – and in return, allowing safe passage through ports and checkpoints. As such, the long-term interests of the OCGs rest on the survival of the state and not within the unsta-
ble arena of conflict, from which the relationship was born. This then anticipates how the illicit trade would react to the insurgency. In line with Shelley’s theory, a report by Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime (2022) found that despite early instances of ASWJ imposing tax on land trafficking routes under its control, OCGs have now shifted their sea routes to dock further south of Cabo Delgado, and thus out of reach of insurgent influence and the ongoing military operations by SAMIM.

**Fertile ground for insurgents**

If, based on the available evidence, one is to dismiss any direct links between ASWJ and OCGs in the region, the need remains to consider more opaque and indirect links that enable VE to take hold in a region so besieged by organised crime and its collusive attachment with the state. This section will assess the extent to which the indirect enablers of VE discussed earlier are at play in Cabo Delgado.

Aside from the presence of natural resources, such as rubies, gold, coal, timber, and now LNG, which in itself poses a potential future source of funding for ASWJ if the group is able to establish itself as a main player along the supply chain, the more immediate source of financing for the group is probably derived from its ability to leverage off the weak state presence and security in the area. Having ruled out direct financing opportunities for the group from the illicit narcotics trade, the group is still able to take advantage of the severely compromised security situation by successfully pursuing predatory crimes, a tactic used by homegrown extremist groups such as those in Nigeria and Asia (discussed earlier). An attack on Mocimba in 2020 involved, among other forms of looting, a raid on a bank, with part of the cash distributed among locals (Dos Santos 2020).

Combing through data from the ACLED shows that in the first quarter of 2022, ASWJ stole, looted and kidnapped civilians during at least 32 attacks or raids. Reported most often is the theft of food, retail items from shops, and household items. Other stolen goods include arms, ammunition and motorbikes. Women and children are disproportionately reported as victims of kidnapping, although not all cases involve ransom, suggesting that ASWJ might be active in human trafficking, or forcing kidnapped women into marriages with the group’s fighters. If the former is a reality, it is yet another indirect benefit of the presence of OCGs for ASWJ, with northern Mozambique a known hotspot for the recruitment and transit of trafficked persons. When ransom is
demanded, reports suggest that ASWJ typically demand US$16 000 per person (Stanyard et al. 2022).

Then there is the compromised integrity of state officials. As noted earlier, many are willing to accept bribes from traffickers, with the effect of making public officials less resistant to accepting bribes from ASWJ. FADM members have reportedly accepted bribes from ASWJ to avoid certain areas planned for attacks, and in some instances even to switch sides (Lucy & Patel 2022). ASWJ members have also been sighted wearing FADM uniforms and bearing its weaponry during attacks (Dos Santos 2020). This suggests that equipment is being made available by corrupt FADM personnel. Added to these realities, FADM has been known to abuse its power by harassing locals for bribes, with some even claiming that the army favours protecting the wealthy over average citizens (Lucey & Patel 2022). This suggests that the public service culture of soliciting bribes has impacted on the way in which the national military treats certain citizens. Ultimately, this has created pools of distrust and resentment which gives ASWJ an opening to recruit disgruntled youths, who feel that the FADM works against them (ibid).

Porous and poorly secured borders have facilitated another entry point for OCGs to transport goods. For example, one land route for heroine that docks in Tanzania’s major port city, Dar es Salaam, crosses the country’s southern border and proceeds into Cabo Delgado. Here, low-grade heroine is distributed by Tanzanian crime networks to locals working in artisanal mining. In addition, foreign nationals from Tanzania are gaining access to residency permits for Montepuez (in Cabo Delgado), from where they can gain access to the illicit ruby economy. Even a suspected Tanzanian ivory poacher, Chupi Mateso, used his networks of corrupt officials to attain a residency permit that then allowed him to traffic goods with impunity (Nelson 2020).

Highlighting these instances of TOC is necessary if one is to understand how porous borders and corruption that have weakened resistance to organised crime simultaneously reduces the difficulty and cost for extremists to move across the same border. Because border towns on either side are interconnected, large numbers of people cross the border every day – whether legally or not – which can also act as a conduit for the spread of ideology. In fact, the presence of Wahabism in Tanzania has been well documented by scholars (Solomon 2018), with evidence suggesting that Saudi-backed investments and a Kuwaiti charity were used to bribe Tanzanian officials to overlook the spread of this extremist ideology (Kagwanja 2006). It is unsurprising, then, that Tanzanian
fighters forming part of broader Islamist networks are known to fill the ranks of ASWJ (International Crisis Group 2021). More recently, security officials have expressed concern that Somali jihadists might also be involved in ASWJ activity, again highlighting a larger, more severe danger posed by porous borders allowing easy access to the conflict zone (ibid). Moreover, a northern escape route from Cabo Delgado into southern Tanzania, used by those fleeing the conflict, have led to the insurgents launching attacks in Tanzania (Cabo Ligado 2020).

In recent years, a significant share of conflict-related events has transpired near the border and along the coast, where weak maritime security persists. Using data from ACLED, the precise coordinates of attacks, battles and other hostilities can be geocoded onto a map, as in Figure 2. Showing data from 2020 (dark gray pins) and 2021 (light gray pins), ASWJ attacks or battles are common along the shoreline and near the border. In fact, within 30 kilometres of the Mozambique’s northern border, there have been 22 attacks over two years. During one of these, two local workers were beheaded (about 15 kilometres from the border), while an information-gathering mission led to a woman being kidnapped and never seen again (about eight kilometres from the border).
There is an urgent need for Mozambique and Tanzania to work towards improved cooperation on border security. While there are reports that cooperation is ramping up, it remains to be seen if transnational OCGs that benefit from weak border security may continue to assert their interests ahead of national and human security threats.

Underpinning these dynamics is an informal and underdeveloped cash-based local economy, which has several benefits for OCGs and ASWJ. Mushrooming from these conditions are informal traders who cross the border to sell goods, avoiding customs fees while inflating prices. This informal, customs-free cross-border trade is also suspected to be a source of revenue for ASWJ (Lucey & Patel 2021).

Additionally, the absence of formal banking has facilitated unregulated handovers of cash among people, businesses and other economic actors. Included here are the middlemen involved in the illicit trade or trafficking of goods, who go largely undetected as they pass large amounts of cash between them (ibid). A common characteristic of homegrown insurgent or extremist groups is the use of cash rather than formal banking systems. Since operations appear to be largely financed through predatory crimes, and the insurgency localised, there is little need for the group to rely on formal banking to finance operations. Cash and looted goods can easily flow from the group’s leaders to its foot soldiers, with little risk of detection (Balasubramaniyan 2015). This also makes redundant some traditional counter-terrorism strategies, such as freezing assets.

Another consequence of informality is a sizable local reliance on an informal money transfer mechanism – Hawala. Afrobarometer data collected in 2018 found that close to 90 per cent of people in Cabo Delgado did not have a bank in their area or within walking distance of their home, while about 60 per cent said that nobody in their household had a bank account. At the same time, one in three people admitted to receiving remittances (Lucey & Patel 2021). The high reliance on remittances for survival alongside a lack of formal banking highlights the extent to which locals rely on other, more informal systems to receive money.

The ancient Hawala system, accessible and accepted under Sharia law, has been used by locals for survival, and co-opted by OCGs demanding ransoms for kidnappings. The relationships between the hawaladars and clients is supported by trust and honour, while the money transferred is password-protected and sent using codes that frequently change. Hawaladars are integrated into their communities, building social bonds with families that often become
intergenerational (El-Qorchi 2003). Given their off-the-record and fluid nature, the size of a hawala network within a country is usually undetermined (Financial Action Task Force 2013).

Its unregulated and accessible nature makes it a natural choice for OCGs, whose use of the system can easily be copied by the homegrown insurgency to finance their operations. Indeed, the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) has noted that ‘the main conduits for laundering the proceeds of crime appear to be through banks, bureaux de change, cash couriers and hawala systems’ (2021). Other experts are also reported to have raised concerns about informal money transfers, including Hawala and mobile money M-PESA, forming part of ASWJ financing strategy (Lucey & Patel 2021). Cabo Delgado’s undeveloped and informal economy has made way for Hawala to become the preferred money transfer system, creating grey spaces which OCGs and extremists can exploit.

Hawala is an example of how organised crime and extremist groups can exploit the same resource to lower their operational costs and diminish risk. There are, however, many other ‘resources’ – be it human or other – that exist in northern Mozambique to aid organised crime which can also be useful to ASWJ. Document forgers are one such example. While information is still scant, one report from November 2021 suggests that northern Mozambique is battling with document forgery (Noticias 2021). In Nampula (the province neighbouring Cabo Delgado and home to prominent trafficking kingpins), a Bangladeshi businessman was caught trying to obtain a Mozambican identity (ID) card. When asked about the document’s origin, he told officials that ‘someone had taken care of it’ for MZN 10 000 (about US$156). In 2021, a spokesperson for the National Directorate of Civil Identification (DNIC) said that, in Nampula, attempts to secure illegal documents had increased.

While the conflict continues, evidence highlighting other instances of shared human resources or infrastructure remain unknown, and ought to be on the radar of investigators, security personnel, researchers, journalists and other stakeholders. Working in the shadows of OCGs are not only document forgers but people providing services than can be useful to ASWJ, such as money launderers, or people cloning cell phones. The conflict in northern Mozambique must be understood through the state’s enabling and collusive relationship with OCGs, which have weakened security, undermined development, and created networks, human capital and infrastructure that are useful for groups like ASWJ.
The way forward

The conflict in Mozambique, born out of social and economic marginalisation, has benefited immensely from a breakdown in the rule of law. This breakdown, designed by well-connected elites, allows them to deepen their pockets off the back of TOC in Cabo Delgado. Cabo Delgado, which is prone to IFFs, has entrenched elite greed while simultaneously disenfranchising the local population. This collusive vortex has produced a potent danger to national and regional security that has devastated the lives of those who live and work in the northern parts of the country. Consequently, grievances against the state have become a chronic feature of this provincial society, creating clear pathways for ASWJ to recruit. Addressing these grievances and creating a more inclusive economic and political system is urgent. At the national level, political reform and the establishment of moral leadership at the helm of state institutions must be prioritised. Strengthening the rule of law and allowing independent, assertive oversight will be essential in ensuring that justice and peace can take root in Mozambique’s north.

Resources must be allocated on a needs basis, so that development deficits in the north can be addressed. With the scope of the challenge as large and multifaceted as this, a good starting point would be to address the grievances being created by the LNG sector, which if left to balloon, will cause significant pushback in the decade ahead. Here, expanding inclusion ought to be a priority for the government. In pursuit of this, the government could consider ring-fencing a portion of income from gas revenues for youth programmes in Cabo Delgado, while also allocating jobs for the same youth cohort within the LNG sector. Together, these strategies will increase youth resilience to recruitment into ASWJ while also promoting inclusive development.

However, offsetting development deficits is not a simple task. Although ADIN has developed a socioeconomic strategy for Cabo Delgado that does consider youth inclusion and other progressive strategies, transparency and accountability remain major concerns. This will be a major hurdle as ADIN works to raise US$764 million to implement its strategy (Cilliers et al. 2021).

Rigorous anti-corruption mechanisms will be necessary, but ADIN also needs to achieve buy-in from local communities, religious networks, and the private sector. This requires ongoing and inclusive consultative processes that avoid the development blunders seen in Kenya, for example, where large development projects are resented by locals in peripheral communities whose genuine development needs have been ignored in favour of mega-projects that
have encroached on their land without offering them any meaningful value (Onyango & Patel 2021).

Placing local communities at the heart of development strategies will also help to facilitate networks of community intelligence. These can be useful in the fight against ASWJ and OCGs, but would first require exercises of trust-building between the state and society to allow people to move beyond past injustices and negative perceptions.

Now that OCGs have adjusted their trade routes to land further south, they must be dismantled before they entrench themselves across a new set of communities. Such an effort cannot be Mozambique’s alone, necessitating more concrete efforts from SADC and the AU. This is especially pertinent as the African Continental Free Trade Agreement seeks to facilitate higher volumes of intra-continental trade and the movement of persons.

The pushback against ASWJ, and all the forces that have enabled it to grow into a potent threat to peace, will require a coordinated and multi-pronged strategy. The conflict now risks spilling over into other parts of Mozambique, and has already resulted in attacks in Tanzania. Without a decisive, coordinated effort to tackle TOC, create stronger institutions and more positive state-society relationships, Cabo Delgado may be a harbinger of what could spread to other parts of southern Africa.

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Responses to violent extremism by the African Union and Regional Economic Communities
Can National Action Plans enhance responses to violent extremism in Africa?

Amanda Lucey

The drivers of VE are complex and multifaceted, including marginalisation, inequality, a lack of inclusive economic opportunities, and poor governance (see Van Nieuwkerk, Shule and Buchanan-Clarke in this volume). As such, any analysis of responses to VE must occur on multiple levels, taking into account the range of actors and different dimensions involved (Chingtuane et al. 2021). To date, however, responses have primarily been focused on traditional and militarised counter-terrorism (CT) approaches, which have failed to stem the rising tide of radicalisation. In fact, the Global Terrorism Index (2020) found that deaths from terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa had risen by more than 200 per cent over the previous decade, with countries such as Mozambique, Uganda and the DRC witnessing a proliferation of terrorist attacks. Such incidents bring to the fore the importance of addressing the root causes of conflict through preventive action rather than relying exclusively on reactive securitised responses.

In 2015, the UN raised this vital issue when it released its Plan of Action on VE. It noted that two of the four pillars of the UN’s Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) – addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, and ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law as the basis for the fight against terrorism – had often been overlooked. Rather, engagements had focused on the remaining two pillars of the strategy, namely building the capacity of countries to combat terrorism, and strengthening CT responses. Therefore, the Plan set out a global framework for Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE), which stressed the importance of comprehensive and holistic efforts. The Plan also noted that action at the national and regional levels would have the most impact, and therefore urged member states as well as regional and subregional organisations to develop their own plans (UN 2015).
This chapter looks at National Action Plans (NAPs) as a means of PVE. It first outlines how the idea of NAPs arose, followed by recommendations from the UN on what should be included these plans. It then considers African regional and subregional efforts in respect of PVE, followed by an analysis of the successes and failures in developing NAPs globally and across Africa, with specific country examples. It also outlines some of the challenges associated with this approach, and concludes with recommendations for enhancing such frameworks.

The genesis of National Action Plans
Before the 9/11 bombings in the US when al-Qaeda targeted American installations in coordinated terrorist attacks, terrorism rarely featured at the UN. However, in the face of the attacks the UN responded swiftly, adopting Resolution 1368 on 12 September 2001. This brief resolution condemned international terrorism, and called on the international community to ‘redouble their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts’ (UNSC 2001:2). On 28 September 2001, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 was adopted, which aimed to expand counter-terror policies and capacities in all its member states. This marked a turning point for the UN, and promoted the growth of an institutional architecture and decisions that have subsequently shaped global efforts on CT.

Initially, the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) was established to monitor the implementation of the resolution. In 2006 the UN published the GCTS, with its four pillars mentioned above. This was intended to provide a wide array of measures to prevent terrorism, but the focus remained on CT capacity in member states. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) was subsequently established to assist with these efforts, in addition to the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). In 2012 the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) was created. The UN’s architecture has therefore evolved considerably since its inception.

In response to the UN’s growing focus on terrorism, civil society actors and academics outlined concerns over the potentially negative impacts of such an approach. For example, UNSCR 1373 did not make any detailed references to human rights standards, which some argued allowed countries to adopt such approaches in pursuit of narrow elite gains. The lack of a universal definition of counterterrorism, for example, can be broadly interpreted by member states, enabling state abuses such as the restriction of humanitarian and civil space. While succeeding UN resolutions used more explicit language about human
rights, minimal efforts were undertaken to address this in practice (Saferworld, 2021).

The GCTS has now undergone multiple reviews, with a greater emphasis on human rights and the inclusion of civil society. The latest and seventh review, adopted in 2021, claims to have incorporated inputs by 53 CSOs, but critiques of the process reflect the ongoing challenges of gathering consensus on counter-terrorism measures. There is still no universal definition of ‘terrorism’, and the definition of ‘violent extremism’ is unclear and contested. As a result, the review only summarises the diversity of opinions collected, including those of member states, and does not reflect any comprehensive analysis of the negative impacts of CT or PVE, or the effectiveness of efforts. This has resulted in a highly technical and constricted document. It also suggests the use of CT approaches to counter attacks by race, ethnicity and ideology, raising red flags over the use of this wording by authoritarian governments to manipulate ethnic, racial and religious differences and to crack down on certain minorities (IPI Global Observatory 2021).

The UN’s CT architecture has also been criticised. For example, UNCCT was created following a large voluntary contribution from Saudi Arabia, and most of its funding to date continues to come from Saudi Arabia and Qatar. This has led to allegations of partiality, with both countries having chequered pasts in respect of CT, and assertions that this funding has unduly influenced the UNCCT agenda and neglected the pillar on human rights (Fillion 2020).

At the same time, UN peace operations have increasingly operated in contexts marked by threats of extremism. This has led to the development of more robust mandates, such as in Somalia and Mali, and the development of peace operations directed primarily at countering terrorism, such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in fighting Boko Haram. Member states also adopted stronger CT approaches to respond to the growing threat of the Islamic State (IS), as well as Boko Haram, al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda. Questions remain over who should be leading such approaches, as militarised approaches can be ineffective or even counterproductive. Some have raised concerns that, should the UN fail to be effective in its engagements, less principled institutions could fill the void. This could derail efforts, since heavy-handed government CT responses have been known to drive extremism, as found in the seminal 2017 UNDP study titled Journey to Extremism.

It was therefore the growth of a highly securitised CT agenda that prompted the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to balance CT with a preventive and
more nuanced approach. This resulted in the development of the UN’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. The Plan stresses the importance of addressing the root causes of conflicts, as well as challenges such as the marginalisation of certain ethnic groups and human rights violations. However, the primary responsibility for implementation is given to member states, leaving the effectiveness of this agenda dependent on the political will of countries. Despite its holistic focus, Saferworld (2021) has suggested that this plan has allowed member states to blame a small group of non-state actors, rather than looking at more systemic and structural issues. The next section examines the guiding principles set out in the UN Plan.

What should be included in a National Action Plan?
The UN’s Plan of Action, while counting on domestication at national and regional/subregional levels, nevertheless provides a useful framework for developing a more systematic and comprehensive approach to addressing VE. Nationally, the UN advises that plans be developed in a multidisciplinary manner, with input from a wide range of actors. These plans should promote respect for the principle of equality and equal protection under the law, with the aim of developing accountable and transparent institutions. It recommends that the plans address the issue of foreign terrorist fighters, allowing for the prosecution of travelling with the intention of committing terrorism and for terror-related financing. NAPs should prevent terrorist groups from trading in oil, hostage-taking or receiving donations, and national development policies should be aligned to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to address the drivers of extremism. NAPs should also ensure funding for implementation and outline effecting monitoring and evaluation mechanisms (UN 2015).

Moreover, the UN Plan emphasises the use of dialogue and conflict prevention in developing NAPs, including the exploration of restorative justice, engaging religious leaders, and offering alternatives for education and employment to those that have joined extremist groups (see Van Nieuwkerk, Shule & Buchanan-Clarke in this volume). It also cites the importance of strengthening good governance, human rights and the rule of law. In this context, it stresses the need for legislation grounded in respect for human rights, access to justice for all, basic service provision, the professionalism of security forces, and accountability for gross violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law. It also discusses rehabilitation mechanisms, prohibition of hate speech, and respect for freedom of speech. The Plan cites means
of paying particular attention to youths, such as through integrating them into all decision-making processes, and specific programmes for youth empowerment (Resolution 2250). It also speaks to mainstreaming a gender perspective, and applying a gender-sensitive lens to all work on VE, as evinced by UNSC resolution 1325 on women and peace and security of 2000. In addition, the plan details ways of enhancing education, skills development and employment facilitation. Finally, it outlines the need to address strategic communications, the Internet and social media (UN 2015).

Regional and subregional organisations are also encouraged to develop plans, since VE goes across borders. Beyond this, member states are encouraged to strengthen these organisations by information-sharing. It proposes the establishment of early warning centres, and urges these organisations to provide technical assistance to member states in building capacity for VE or in supporting effective cooperation. The next section looks specifically at regional and subregional efforts to develop action plans on VE in Africa, since these can often guide the efforts of member states.

**African regional/subregional efforts to prevent VE**

*The African Union*

The AU has not yet developed a Plan of Action for Preventing Violent Extremism, and continues to place its focus on CT, which is a significant gap in terms of a continental policy framework. It uses frameworks such as the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999), the Algiers Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (2002) and the African Model Anti-Terrorism Law (2011), but a problematic definition of terrorism in the Convention, defined as any violation of the criminal laws of a state and which may endanger people or property and aimed at intimidating any government institutions or creating a general insurrection, leaves those frameworks vulnerable to varying interpretations. CT efforts are primarily directed through the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), which is headquartered in Algeria. Its main objective is to strengthen the capacity of the AU to prevent and combat terrorism through research and analysis.

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) addresses issues of terrorism and has also set up a subcommittee on CT. The AU’s Roadmap of Practical Steps for ‘Silencing the Guns by Year 2020’ calls on the need to enhance national capacities for CT and PVE through the development of national and regional
structures, architectures, and comprehensive counterterrorism strategies (AU 2020), but little has yet been achieved. As a result, national efforts to develop action plans have varied and have primarily been driven by international rather than African actors. The AU has launched the Interfaith Dialogue on Violent Extremism (iDove) within the Directorate of Citizens and Diaspora Organisations (AUC-CIDO), which provides an opportunity for youth leaders to engage with one another, but a comprehensive PVE approach is needed.

The question, therefore, is where the AU’s PVE approach should be located. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)’s Roadmap (2016-2020) previously named five priority areas for the AU, namely conflict prevention, crisis/conflict management, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, strategic security issues, coordination and partnerships. To achieve its focus on conflict prevention, structures such as Early Warning and Mediation directorates/divisions were set up. In 2021, the AU launched its reform process, merging the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) with the Department for Peace and Security (PSD) to create the Commission and Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). The African Governance Architecture (AGA), designed to address issues of democratic governance, has also been combined into a secretariat with the APSA under the Governance and Conflict Prevention Department and the Conflict Management Department, both of which are located in the Commission for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (ISS 2021).

Should PVE then be addressed within the APSA, given that PVE entails addressing the root causes of conflict and conflict prevention, peacebuilding and transitional justice, or within the ACSRT? The ongoing reform process has created opportunity to reflect on how the Commission and ACSRT can align their interventions in order to provide more effective guidance for future national efforts that promote information-sharing and good practices.

Subregional efforts in respect of PVE
Some RECs have made progress in developing their PVE approaches. In December 2019, ECOWAS adopted an action plan for 2020-2024 on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa (ECOWAS 2019). It has eight priority areas, including community dialogue and preventing violent extremism, but little has been done to implement it. Challenges have included the multiplicity of counter-terrorism initiatives in the region, which raises questions over who should lead on implementing the PVE approach, as well as bureaucratic delays
and inadequate resources. The plan has been further criticised for failing to adequately address the root causes of extremism and allocating most of the plan’s budget to CT measures (ISS 2021). It is therefore unlikely that this plan will influence any national efforts to develop NAPs in the near future.

On the Horn of Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has established a Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE) which was officially launched in May 2018. IGAD has also developed a Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism. Importantly, it contains concrete measures to strengthen regional capacity for PVE, as well as measures to strengthen the capacity of at-risk communities to reject the ideologies and aims of violent extremists and to strengthen human rights and the rule of law. It also contains measures for enhancing diplomacy capacity on PVE, and promoting knowledge-sharing and research. Moreover, it proposes operational priorities for the implementation of the regional strategy, and outlines the structures for doing so. It also specifies that IGAD will develop a results framework for M&E (IGAD 2018). Therefore, the plan seems to have key elements that are crucial to include, but in the absence of an established M&E framework it is hard to evaluate its efficacy. It is also too early to tell how this strategy has influenced the domestication of national policies.

Meanwhile, SADC has not yet developed a PVE strategy, but does have a Counter-Terrorism Strategy. During a regional workshop in 2019 on ‘The Role of the Criminal Justice System in Preventing and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism,’ SADC member states identified the need for legislative and technical assistance in the development of Plans of Action for PVE, but this does not appear to have been taken further (SADC 2019). Given the rise of extremism in SADC countries such as Mozambique and the DRC, it may be prudent for the organisation to review its PVE focus. In the past, SADC has frequently been criticised for failing to engage civil society and for adopting a hard security approach, which has been evident through SAMIM. SAMIM remains centred on military action (with ongoing narratives by the Mozambican government that the insurgency is foreign-led), despite contrary evidence that points to underdevelopment in the region, the lack of inclusive governance, economics, corruption and marginalisation as reasons for recruitment among local Mozambicans (Lucey & Patel, 2022). SADC would do well to learn lessons from its subregional counterparts and to develop a community-focused approach that it can impress on its member states.
In sum, while ECOWAS and IGAD have developed PVE approaches, it may be too early to tell how these have influenced national responses. The lack of an AU focus certainly leaves opportunities for improvement. At the same time, national responses to PVE have been undertaken across the continent, often independently of regional and subregional initiatives. These are now examined.

Lessons from the development of National Action Plans

By 2019, International Alert estimated that more than 30 countries worldwide had developed PVE strategies or plans, although these were at various stages of development or implementation. This number has almost certainly grown since then, with countries such as Djibouti adopting and validating its NAP in January 2021. Outside of Africa, countries that have developed NAPs include Albania, Australia, Canada, France, Finland, Kosovo, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the US. Regionally, the EU has been active in developing a comprehensive VE strategy, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has developed a Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism (2018–2025). ASEAN has also developed a work plan to implement its activities, with clearly defined roles and responsibilities (ASEAN 2019). In Africa, countries that have developed NAPs include Burkina Faso, CAR, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia and Tunisia.

In general, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF, 2019) has observed that NAPs provide a good basis for policy intervention. According to the Fund, they have achieved successes in framing the drivers of extremism and in detailing the national legal framework for VE, with some identifying guiding principles for action. However, some countries fail to define key definitions on extremism and its prevention, as well as on terrorism, while others leave this broad enough to be all-encompassing and open to abuse. In an independent review of NAPs, Feve and Dews (2019) note that terms are sometimes conflated. They further stress a lack of consistency on how to address the drivers of extremism, particularly when it comes to governance and peace-building. Another of their criticisms relates to plans that are overly ambitious or that use a one-size fits all approach that lacks context.

NAPs should also address systemic issues relating to redress for past violations, economic grievances, marginalisation, governance and inclusion. This is often lacking, with states being wary to take the blame for their role in driving VE. Nevertheless, there are some positive examples of NAPs attempting to
address structural issues, as detailed in a report by the Women’s Alliance for Security Leadership (2017). For example, Kenya’s NAP is seen as being innovative in terms of proposing changes to curricula to integrate conflict resolution skills and promoting pluralism and diversity. The Kenyan NAP also speaks to changes to educational institutions that promote diversity and free thought. Somalia, on the other hand, stresses the importance of highlighting a peaceful message from Islam in educational criteria and fostering relationships between teachers, families, students and local community leaders. Somalia’s NAP also refers to community policing, which is important as police abuse can be a contributor to radicalisation and should be commended for taking this inclusive perspective to security. Crucially, the Women’s Alliance argues that NAPs should also go into detail on how human rights will be incorporated across different actions but in their review of these plans, this is often not specific enough.

Because the PVE field is relatively new, most of the good practice guidance on NAPs relates to planning and development. For example, the GCTF (2020) makes suggestions on developing effective NAPs, such as strengthening national–local cooperation, identifying the comparative advantages of different PVE actors, developing an inclusive dialogue on PVE, investing in local actors, promoting information-sharing and collaboration, and ensuring adequate financial and technical support. Feve and Dews (2019) argue that a wide variety of stakeholders should be consulted in the lead-up to a NAP, since this can foster a ‘whole-of-society’ approach and start developing a sense of trust, which is vital considering that communities should be at the heart of PVE approaches, given that they are the first to be affected. Communities could also raise issues of governance in PVE and be part of the solution through engagements that promote local ownership. Burkina Faso is an example of a country that has engaged civil society in the development of its NAP. Moreover, the authors argue that approaches should be based on a comprehensive needs assessment that is evidence-based and transparent, in order to further build trust with communities.

The GCERF (n.d) has lauded the process of developing an NAP for establishing coordination among different actors, sometimes leading to the appointment of focal points or coordination mechanisms. For example, a number of countries such as Tunisia and Kenya have developed new coordination mechanisms to ensure the implementation of their plans, such as Tunisia’s National Counter-Terrorism Commission and Kenya’s National Counter Terrorism
Centre. Nigeria and Mali, conversely, have used already existing focal points, namely the National Security Adviser and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture respectively. Thus, NAPs can develop an institutional architecture for addressing extremism that builds on a multi-stakeholder approach. In Europe, local PVE actors have underlined the importance of developing national hubs that provide support to local actors (EC 2021).

The implementation of plans, as well as their monitoring and evaluation, can also be challenging. As such, NAP activities should also be clearly defined to provide clarity on the means of implementation. In Uganda, UNDP worked with the National Technical Commission of Uganda to develop explicit coordination activities that would lead to concrete reforms on education, since they were not clearly defined in the original framework (International Alert 2020).

The GCERF (n.d.) also argues that resources and technical expertise are key to implementation. Funding for PVE programmes can often be limited, and even where funding has been mobilised, donors fund short-term projects with preferred partners rather than building the long-term capacity of local organisations (Rosland, 2016). For example, CAR’s NAP outlines the useful role that Local Peace and Reconciliation Committees (LPRCs) can play in the plan’s implementation, but these committees suffer from poor resources, a lack of organisation and collaboration, and a lack of trust in government. Early warning systems that make use of LPRCs have been set up by the UN Mission in CAR, but suffer from a lack of follow-up. It is also worth considering how NAPs on PVE could overlap with other existing NAPs, such as on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), peacebuilding and transitional justice (see Van Nieuwkerk, Shule and Buchanan-Clarke in this volume). Given the plethora of NAPs that member states are expected to develop, overlaps should be reduced to minimise financial and technical costs.

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is also an important aspect of NAPs. International Alert (2020) suggests that M&E not only promotes the effective implementation of NAPs, but can also develop trust, accountability and transparency among different stakeholders. In this regard, it has proposed nine good practice principles for monitoring PVE NAPs:

1. A robust and comprehensive monitoring framework and Theory of Change.
2. An inclusive and transparent monitoring process.
3. The plan is adaptive to the VE context and integrates learning from implementation.
4. It considers areas of overlap and avoids duplication with other NAP monitoring frameworks.
5. It is well-resourced, and builds monitoring capacities.
6. It establishes mechanisms for coordinating and managing the monitoring process.
7. It captures impact, results, process and risk.
8. It embeds gender sensitivity.
9. It embeds conflict sensitivity and Do No Harm.

In many cases, it may be too early to tell exactly how effective NAPs have been in terms of their ultimate impact. Nevertheless, a well-established M&E system can allow for course correction, and ensure that plans are adapted as needed. A key question relates to the indicators used – since VE does not necessarily result in terrorism, how should preventative action be measured? Should it be measured in terms of social cohesion and metrics for peacebuilding, rather than the number of terrorist attacks? How would such measurements be made, and by whom? Would communities be better placed for this? Such questions remain vital in developing M&E strategies.

**PVE through a gender lens**

Viewing PVE through a gender lens is a fundamental aspect of a NAP, since women and men are affected differently by VE. For example, men may be expected to protect their families by means of violence, while women can play a wide variety of roles within terrorist groups, ranging from victim to perpetrator. Even so, many plans fail to include such an analysis. In the previously mentioned review by the Women’s Alliance for Security Leadership (2017), it was found that only three countries globally referenced gender, with only one – Switzerland – providing concrete recommendations to ensure gender mainstreaming into PVE strategies and action plans. Plans also varied on their strategies to ensure meaningful inclusion.

The review also looked more broadly at issues of inclusion across different categories (women, youth and adolescents, civil society and media) and found a wide variety in terms of how often they were referenced across different countries. These are reflected in Table 1.
### Table 1: Themes by number of references in National Action Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Youth &amp; adolescents</th>
<th>Civil society</th>
<th>Media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There were also substantial differences in countries’ perceptions of how these actors should be included as positive forces for change. According to the review, Somalia and Burkina Faso’s NAPs refer to building the capacity of women, while only Switzerland referenced the inclusion of women in policy-making and decision-making processes. Such efforts are vital for ensuring the meaningful inclusion in PVE engagements, and future NAPs would do well to integrate this into their drafts. It is also worth noting that, despite its prevalence and impact, none of the plans addressed Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV) in their national contexts. Similarly, the Women’s Alliance for Security Leadership (2017) notes that, beyond vocational skills training, NAPs tend to lack a comprehensive approach to youths, and do not address the different experiences of young men and women. One good practice noted in the NAPs of Denmark, Finland and Norway relates to the organising of youth dialogues, while Switzerland speaks to increased voter participation among youths, and France calls for a focus on youths in the justice sector. Even so, a more comprehensive and detailed approach is needed.

The reviewed plans contain frequent references to civil society, but except for Burkina Faso has not involved them from the start. Moreover, they often neglect ways of including the media in a proactive manner. Positively, Somalia’s plan refers to strategic communications to counter extremist messages, while Burkina Faso alludes to their important role in accountability and early warning. These efforts reflect practices that should be considered when developing NAPs in other countries.
The role of national action plans

This section now considers two case studies to illustrate factors that can contribute to the success of NAPs. Kenya’s NAP is often thought to have been successful, while Nigeria’s efforts appear to be less effective. These are now considered in turn.

Case study 1: Kenya

Kenya was one of the first countries to develop a NAP, known as the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE), dating back to 2016. It comprises nine pillars around which PVE actors can organise their work: media and online, psychosocial, education, legal and policy, arts and culture, training and capacity-building, political, faith-based, and ideological and security. The development of the strategy marked a shift in the government’s response towards a ‘whole-of-society’ approach, but initially suffered institutional challenges, since the strategy was national but alluded to implementation at the county level.

Due to these institutional challenges, there were tensions around the control, ownership and buy-in of Kenya’s NSCVE. There were also challenges in respect of funding, and building the capacity of personnel. As a result, Kenya’s counties were encouraged to develop and implement their own plans. This has been said to have greatly improved implementation and to have shown the importance of considering the devolution of implementation at different levels, from the national to the regional (Princeton School of Public and International Affairs 2020).

In addition, Kenya’s original NAP was accused of failing to adequately capture the concerns of local communities, but this has subsequently been updated and is now cited as a good example of trust-building between national security agencies and local civil society groups through subnational governments (Rosland & Skellet 2018). For example, Kwale county launched a multi-stakeholder platform on PVE with 50 youth and human rights-focused agencies as well as NCTC representatives, donors and embassies. The Kenyan experience has been lauded for using local solutions, bringing together grass-roots partners, being cheap to implement, being seen as legitimate and credible by local communities, and by employing a historical and context-specific approach (Strong Cities Network 2021). The NCTC has also established a Country Support Mechanism for the GCERF which provides vital funding towards community initiatives to counter VE. Inclusion and adequate provision for community engagement is therefore thought to be important when developing an NAP.
Case study 2: Nigeria: The failure of the state

In November 2017, Nigeria launched its national action plan (NAP) for preventing violent extremism (PVE). The framework was developed by the government’s Office of the National Security Adviser in consultation with civil society organizations, the media, students, and the academic community. It has four key focus areas:

- Strengthening Nigerian institutions to PVE;
- Strengthening the rule of law and human rights;
- Building community engagement and resilience; and
- Integrating strategic communication to PVE.

Nigeria has also developed a multi-stakeholder network called Pave to address VE (UNCCT, n.d.). However, VE remains an ongoing problem. Many studies have given reasons why this is so. Firstly, despite its PVE plan, Nigeria’s approach has remained primarily militarist. Its CT missions have been widely criticised for their human rights violations, which can drive radicalisation. Notably, Nigeria was denounced by Human Rights Watch (HRW) for its conditions and outcomes of terrorism trials in 2017 and 2018 (HRW 2018). Corruption has also been cited as a major challenge, as military funds have been used to enrich certain political and business elites. There has also been collusion between the government and militants, as well as criminal groups (ISS Africa 2020). Nigeria could also do more to ensure that it engages communities in its NAP (ibid). Most importantly, as Mofoluwawo (2021) argues, Nigeria can do more to address the root causes of extremism, including poor governance, poverty, unemployment and so on. As this case study shows, it is important to ensure that state responses to CT do not work against PVE efforts. Moreover, corruption, collusion and human-rights abuses hinder trust between the government and communities and can play a role in further radicalisation.

In sum, a lot can be learned from past efforts to develop NAPs going forward. What these experiences show is that clearly defined terms, objectives and priorities, with demarcated roles and responsibilities from the national to the local level, are vital for ensuring success, as well as means of monitoring and evaluating. The inclusion of a wide range of actors, not only in the implementation but also in the conceptualisation is key. Heavy-handed CT approaches, interspersed with human rights abuses and corruption, can also derail such efforts. Nevertheless, a word of caution must be offered in the development of NAPs, as the next section shows.
Can National Action Plans be counterproductive?
In some instances, NAPs can be counterproductive. In a review of NAPs, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering extremism (2020:7) stated that:

As is now widely recognized, presumptions and assumptions about the drivers of VE and the underlying factors must be robustly challenged. Having reviewed numerous national plans and policies on the prevention and countering of violent extremism, the Special Rapporteur concludes that the importance given to religious ideology in both mapping the pathways to radicalization and devising strategies aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism was done at the expense of appropriately addressing other factors, despite the lack of empirical data to support the assumption that religious ideology supports terrorism.

Therefore, this approach risks further marginalising certain communities rather than addressing the root causes of violence. Saferworld (2021) takes these criticisms further, cautioning that a focus on PVE has meant that many traditional areas activity at the UN have become subsumed by PVE objectives and goals. This has the potential to divert attention away from broader peace and development efforts, and to bring prominence to securitised and state-centric agendas. Moreover, the failure to define ‘terrorism’ and ‘violent extremism’ has allowed governments to use PVE as a pretext for pursuing elite interests. It has been asserted that such efforts could risk the UN’s reputation and credibility, should it be seen to inadvertently enable abusive approaches by states. As such, it is vital to address issues of corruption, exclusion and discrimination under the guise of PVE.

In addition, it has been cautioned that the concept of radicalisation is contested, since those who hold radical beliefs do not necessarily engage in violence, while some people who engage in terror attacks do not necessarily have radical beliefs. Certain groups, such as young Muslim men, tend to be stigmatised, and labelling those who criticise structural problems as radical can suppress constructive calls for change. The threat of counter-terrorism can also be overplayed, leaving less resources for other efforts. Moreover, there have been assertions that governments have used NAPs to surveil certain civil society groups, while, conversely, using CSOs for intelligence-gathering can undermine their credibility and damage trust. As a result, it has been recommended that a continued focus be placed on conflict prevention, and that an independent oversight mechanism is established to ensure that UN counter-terrorism
programming does not do more harm than good. Saferworld therefore proposes that terminology about CT and PVE should be reviewed and clarified, and that operational guidelines should be introduced.

**Recommendations**

Key recommendations emerging from the above analysis include:

- Action Plans are advised for national governments, as well as subregional and regional organisations, but communities should be engaged in their conceptualisation, development and implementation.
- Action plans should detail focal points, roles and responsibilities, as well as mechanisms for coordination. They should avoid duplication with other action plans in order to prevent a waste of resources or ‘plan fatigue.’
- Action plans should address governance issues, including human rights abuses by state actors, and should not be used for intelligence purposes that stigmatise communities.

**Conclusion**

As this chapter has shown, the need to develop NAPs stemmed from the recognition that the drivers of VE are wide-ranging, and that militarised approaches to CT are not sufficient to address the root causes of this phenomenon. Heavy-handed government responses can further radicalise individuals and worsen the situation, and therefore a human-rights based approach that engages with local communities is required. NAPs can be preventive rather than reactive, and can also drive systemic change.

The UN’s Plan of Action for PVE provides some guidelines for developing national, subregional and regional action plans that can constitute best practices, but these have not always been put into practice. NAPs continue to lack detailed human rights approaches, and have sometimes failed to adequately detail strategies for the inclusion of women, youths, civil society and the media, who should be consulted from the outset. For NAPs to be effective, they must clearly specify the roles and responsibilities of different actors, and provide mechanisms for coordination. The implementation of these activities is also dependent on levels of detail, political will, and funding, and plans should be monitored and evaluated to ensure their efficacy. Countries also need to avoid duplication with other existing plans that could lead to a waste of resources. At the same time, heavily militarised counter-terrorism approaches amid an
environment of corruption, collusion and human rights abuse can detract from the success of PVE approaches.

More broadly, action plans should be carefully developed. Firstly, they should not result in prevention and peacebuilding activities being neglected. Plans also need to address the role of the state in terms of marginalisation, governance or abuse, which are often seen as drivers of extremism. All terms used should be clearly defined, and it is of the utmost importance that these plans do not provide or allow for certain communities to be stigmatised or spied on.

In this regard, regional organisations could do well to develop regional plans that address these issues and provide guidelines that member states can use. These organisations should provide non-politicised and technical support, while advocating a ‘whole-of-society’ approach. In this regard, the AU should consider where best to locate its PVE approach, and should work with other RECs, such as IGAD, to share best practices, while also supporting other RECs to develop their own regional plans. NAPs can play a key role in PVE, but should not be regarded as a panacea.

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THE ROLE OF NATIONAL ACTION PLANS


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The AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): Leading edge or toothless dog?

Clever Chikwanda

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the umbrella term for the AU’s apparatus for promoting continent-wide peace, security and stability. Its main component is the Peace and Security Council (PSC), supported by the Panel of the Wise (PoW), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund.

The objectives and functions of the PSC are widely defined, ranging from preventing conflicts through peace-building to post-conflict reconstruction, and incorporating aspects of traditional as well as human security. Among others, it is empowered to coordinate and harmonise continental efforts to prevent and combat international terrorism, which is closely related to VE. In this sense, it can be argued that it provides a degree of guidance for addressing VE in Africa. However, this chapter argues that the APSA is not doing so effectively, and that this is particularly evident in the case of the persistent outbreak of VE in Cabo Delgado in Mozambique. This chapter explains why this is the case, and recommends how the APSA should be improved.

The APSA has its origins in the formation of the AU in 2002, successor to the Organisation of African Union (OAU), which was formed in 1963. The OAU was founded in a specific pan-African context, at the start of the era of decolonisation, and one of its main objectives was to affirm Africa’s independence and to eradicate all remaining forms of colonialism and white minority rule.

Understandably, in those circumstances, the OAU adopted respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states as a foundational value. However, it also undertook not to intervene in the internal affairs of member states, which severely limited its ability to deal with conflicts. For this and other
reasons, the OAU failed to establish any effective conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, with far-reaching consequences for the course of events in postcolonial Africa.

Towards the end of the century, member states realised that global and continental circumstances had changed, and that attention had to shift away from the liberation struggle to accelerated socioeconomic development, in a context of sound and stable governance. Vitally, the preamble to the AU’s Constitutive Act declared that the ‘scourge of conflicts’ in Africa constituted a major impediment to the continent’s socioeconomic development, and that peace, security and stability was a prerequisite for implementation of its development and integration agenda. In a significant shift, the Act authorised the AU to intervene in the internal affairs of member states in ‘grave circumstances’ such as war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.

The system for achieving these objectives – known as the African Peace and Security Architecture, or APSA – was set out in the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which was also adopted in 2002. Besides the council itself, as noted previously, it comprises a Panel of the Wise (PoW), a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an African Standby Force (ASF) and a Peace Fund (PF).

According to the protocol, the objectives of the PSC are to promote peace, security and stability; anticipate and prevent conflicts; undertake peace-making and peace-building functions for resolving conflicts in circumstances where they have occurred: promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction; and coordinate and harmonise continental efforts to prevent and combat international terrorism.

Notably, its objectives also include promoting and encouraging democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life, and international humanitarian law as part of efforts to prevent conflicts.

Echoing the OAU, its principles include respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, and non-interference by any member states in the internal affairs of others. However, they now include a right to intervene in ‘grave circumstances,’ namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Significantly, they also recognise the right of member states to request an intervention by the AU to restore peace and security.

The Panel of the Wise is meant to comprise five ‘highly respected African personalities’ tasked with advising the chairperson of the Commission on all
issues pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa.

The CEWS is meant to help the AU anticipate and prevent conflicts throughout Africa. According to the protocol, it is meant to comprise an observation and monitoring centre, known as the Situation Room, responsible for data collection and analysis, as well as observation and monitoring units at Regional Mechanisms which are meant to collect and process data at their level and transmit this to the Situation Room.

The CEWS is meant to utilise an early warning module based on clearly defined political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators to analyse developments on the continent and recommend the best course of action. It reports to the chair of the AU Commission, which, in turn, is meant to advise the PSC on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security, and recommend the best course of action. In terms of the protocol, member states are committed to ‘facilitate early action’ by the PSC and the chairperson of the commission, based on early warning information. However, this clearly requires ongoing political will from the AU and member states which is sometimes lacking.

The PSC protocol also provides for the establishment of an African Standby Force, comprising multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components on standby in their countries of origin, and ready for rapid deployment. Member states are meant to take steps to establish standby contingents for participation in peace support missions decided on by the PSC or authorised by the AU Assembly. Its envisaged functions include:

- Observation and monitoring missions, as well as other types of peace support missions;
- Interventions in member states in respect of grave circumstances, or at the request of member states in order to restore peace and security;
- Preventive deployment in order to prevent a dispute or a conflict from escalating, an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighbouring areas or states, or the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement;
- Peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation; and
- Humanitarian assistance, to alleviate the suffering of civilian populations in conflict areas, as well as support efforts to address major natural disasters.
The ASF is a multidisciplinary force comprising soldiers, civilians and police in five regional standby brigades who are meant to be on standby in their countries of origin. After more than a decade of investment and development, the AU declared the ASF ready for rapid deployment in 2016. It comprises a central headquarters located at the AU Commission, and five regional brigades of up to 6,500 members. However, the force has never seen any action. Instead, as Dessu and Yohannes (2022) argue, ad hoc troop coalitions have become the norm in Africa.

The APSA’s last pillar is the Peace Fund, which is meant to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security. It is meant to comprise AU appropriations and voluntary contributions from member states and other sources within Africa, including the private sector and civil society.

**APSA Road maps**
Several APSA road maps have been adopted, spelling out the practical steps needed to advance the work of the five pillars. The APSA 2016-2020 Roadmap is the most recent.

According to the AU, the Roadmap is the result of an inclusive and participatory process involving different departments at the AUC and at the RECs/RMs. It details joint aims in five strategic areas: Conflict prevention (including early warning and preventive diplomacy); crisis/conflict management (including the African Standby Force and mediation); post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building; strategic security issues (such as illegal flows of small arms and light weapons, improvised explosive devices, disarmament, counter-terrorism, illicit financial flows as well as transnational organised crime and cybercrime); and coordination and partnerships. It also covers various cross-cutting issues. However, despite its detailed attention to all these aspects, it does not deal explicitly with VE.

**Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)**
The AUC’s Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) provide that, ‘when alerted by a Member State, an AU official or a REC that a major inter- or intra-state crisis is breaking out or appears imminent, the Chairperson of the AUC and the Commissioner for Peace and Security should immediately assess the risk of escalation, conferring with the relevant REC for a situation assessment’ (AU 2012). AU officials with knowledge of the states involved in the conflict in ques-
tion, representatives of the relevant REC and a specialist in conflict analysis should make up a fact-finding mission. However, the SOPs do not clearly spell out the division of labour between these parties.

**Collaboration with RECs**

RECs are the essential building blocks of the AU. The AU recognises eight RECs, including SADC. Its relations with RECs is informed by the Treaty establishing the AEC and the AU Constitutive Act, which portrays the AU’s role as that of ‘coordinating and harmonising the policies between existing and future RECs for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the AU’ (AU 2000). Similarly, RECs are recognised as an integral part of the APSA. While the 2002 protocol assumes the primacy of the AU in maintaining peace and security in Africa, it calls on the AU’s PSC and the Chair of the AUC to work closely with RECs in order to ensure that their policies and activities are aligned with the principles and objectives of the AU (AU 2002).

In 2004, the Chair of the Commission specified the need for ‘harmonisation and close cooperation between the AU and the RMs. If the AU and the RECs are to form a single security architecture ... decisions taken at continental level should be upheld by the RMs’ (Van Nieuwkerk 2011). In 2006, the AU Assembly urged the RECs to coordinate and harmonise their policies among themselves and with the Commission, with a view to accelerating Africa’s integration (AU 2006).

In 2008, the AU and the RECs signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation on peace and security, based on three principles. The first is subsidiarity, which provides that the AU should only act when RECs can not. The second is comparative advantage, which stipulates that whether or not the AU or SADC should act, depends on which of them is best placed to deal with the matter. The third is complementarity (Nagar & Nganje 2018). What any of these mean in practice was not spelt out and mutually understood. This has been left to the interpretation of each party and their respective circumstances at any given time.

SADC has established a number of mechanisms for these sorts of interventions. For example, the stated objectives of its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Affairs is to ‘prevent, contain and resolve inter- and intra-state conflicts by peaceful means’ (SADC 2001). The 2004 SADC Summit in Mauritius established the Mediation, Conflict Prevention and Preventative Diplomacy Architecture to pre-empt violent conflict and mediate solutions. This led to
the establishment of three components of the regional architecture meant to strengthen SADC’s Mediation Capacity. These are the Panel of Elders (PoE), the Mediation Reference Group (MRG) and the Mediation Support Unit (MSU) (SADC 2010). However, implementing the harmonisation process has remained elusive, as the different entities continue to operate in silos (Dawn Nganje 2018).

Weaknesses of the CEWS
Since its inception, the APSA has been criticised on various grounds. According to Mawanasali (2005), the CEWS is a ‘weak institutional component’, as it does not provide for strengthening the early warning modules at the sub-regional level. He also states that the APSA still lacks expertise and skills in political analysis, since the Early Warning Unit (EWU) simply relays raw information provided by member states and the international media. Additionally, some governments are sensitive to criticism and dissenting views. As such, they are unwilling to cooperate with the EWU and give it unconstrained access to national sources of information. Moreover, the AU still persists in assessing conflict situations on the basis of certain indicators, and analysing them with predictive models.

This approach was also evident at the launch of the SADC Regional Counter-terrorism Centre in February 2022 when the SADC Executive Secretary, Elias Mpedi Magosi, declared that the RCTC would play

... a catalytic role in advising on counter-terrorism and the prevention of violent extremism policies and programmes, coordinate the implementation of the SADC Regional Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and research, analyse and disseminate information to NCTCs and other relevant stakeholders, including regional and international partners.

Most of the issues surrounding the APSA hinge on the decision-making ability and political willingness of member states, which are decisive factors for successful early warning. According to Birkit (2010), the CEWS is not politically astute, and its analysis should be informed by sound political judgement. Its slow responses are caused by a lack of proper coordination between the regional organisations and the AU.
Problems surrounding the Peace Fund

The financial burden of peacemaking should be shared among regional and subregional security mechanisms. However, they all depend on the same donor countries and institutions for financial support, and it is uncertain whether RECs will be willing to accept any suggestion to centralise fundraising for peace efforts, as was once proposed (Mwanasali 2005). Some elements of the APSA suffer from serious institutional and financial shortcomings. This is attributed to the general lack of capacity of AU institutions, the lack of political will by a majority of African states, and shifts in international support (Ganzle & Franke 2010).

It can therefore be concluded that SADC does not fully utilise the architecture it established and invested in heavily to benefit the region. For example, the Microeconomic Surveillance Unit, Mediation Reference Group and Panel of Elders were operationalised in 2015, but have not achieved much in practice. Instead, SADC has reverted to its old ways of appointing diplomats to conflict situations. In the Mozambican case, it deployed SAMIM, yet the above-mentioned architecture could play a significant role in peace-making and peace-building. This narrow approach by SADC is self-defeating.

The APSA as a means of dealing with VE

In its current form, the APSA does not effectively address VE. Numerous adjustments need to be made for this infrastructure to become more effective. Problems surrounding its conflict resolutions efforts include its static approach of consent-based intervention, the prominent role of non-state actors, an over-reliance on external funding, limited political will, and continuing influence of external factors in shaping the dynamics of security challenges in Africa (Wachira 2017).

Other compelling reasons are the findings of the 2017 Kagame Report on the Reform of the AU. Among others, it found that despite the principles and operating procedures set out in various policy instruments, the AU and RECs have not cooperated effectively in respect of peace and security in recent years. It argues that the AU has failed to implement its decisions in this regard, and that there is no clear division of labour between the AU Commission, the RECs and RMs. The report urges the AU to ensure that there is a clear division of labour, and to clearly recognise the principles of subsidiarity, comparative advantage and complementarity (AU 2017).
However, there is no consensus on the meaning of these three terms, particularly for member states. They are therefore likely to interpret them differently, in order to safeguard their particular national interests. Put differently, they are likely to shift support to the AU or a specific REC depending on where their interests lie at that particular time, which compromises consistency. This challenge is compounded by the reality that many African countries have overlapping memberships of different RECs, compelling them to shift loyalty whenever this is convenient. Again, the agreements entered into between the RECs and the AU at the secretariat level have often left those supposed to enforce the agreements outside of the matrix (Nathan 2016). Equally important is the fact that the PSC has proven to be a weak institution, and that many RECs lack capacity.

The lack of cooperation and coordination is also quite visible in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, where SAMIM has been deployed to contain the emergence of VE, among various government agencies and other actors. It is equally visible when one looks at the continental, regional and national actors.

VE is an emergent phenomenon, particularly in southern Africa. Those who have experienced it elsewhere on the continent and beyond are yet to adequately understand its dynamics, let alone addressing it. This makes the search for effective peacemaking solutions increasingly elusive. This is exacerbated by APSA’s current practice of undertaking ad hoc and reactive interventions as opposed to pre-emptive and proactive ones. It reacts when conflicts have already reached a crisis stage. Mozambique is a telling example. SAMIM was deployed by SADC when the economic, material and social damage had already escalated significantly (see Walwa in this volume).

Additionally, the AU Assembly generally meets only twice a year, and by that time it will have been overtaken by events. Also, there is no investment in gathering intelligence and appropriate early warning information. By contrast, APSA needs to invest in a thorough and responsive analysis of the complex dynamics presented by VE.

Again, the absence of a deepened conflict analysis in Cabo Delgado has led to several knock-on effects. The first is that the PSC has failed to identify all the vital actors and parties (local, regional and international) to the conflict. Therefore, it does not have a thorough knowledge or understanding of these parties’ positions, interests, needs and alliances, and their strengths and weaknesses. This lack of information makes the PSC’s approach selective and weak, as it excludes crucial players such as business (local and international). Yet, given
their massive interests in the burgeoning oil and gas industry in the province, local and global business are at the centre of this conflict.

Such an approach also leaves CSOs and CBOs out of the equation, even though they play active roles in local communities, and have a thorough knowledge of the local dynamics surrounding violent conflict, including how it could be defused. It also ignores other international forces or agencies who play shadowy roles in the conflict, such as former colonial powers and international funders.

Furthermore, VE thrives in poorly governed areas, yet the AU does not have the legal means to punish autocratic governments, or bring them to account. Mozambique happens to fall in this bracket, making it a fertile ground for VE. It is a classic instance of a weak state leaving a power vacuum that can be filled or exploited by other forces. Weak public institutions and high levels of poverty provide room for illicit activities such as poaching, which have thrived in Cabo Delgado since the 1990s. A number of other African countries ravaged by VE also fall into this category, including the DRC (Haysom, 2018). Another key challenge is that

... increasingly AU policy decisions tend to focus on hard security mechanisms ... for example, the African Centre on the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the African Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) as well as the PSC Sub-committee on Terrorism are the ones most commonly referenced in almost all PSC decisions relating to the threat of terrorism in Africa (Amani Africa Report 2022).

The same report further observes that the continued expansion of terrorism and VE in various parts of the continent highlights the limits of and challenge it poses to the AU’s peace and security architecture and its peace and security partnerships. Despite the increase in state security-based responses, the ‘hard security first’ policy approach has failed. The Amani Africa Report says that because of this failure, changing both the characterisation of the threat of terrorism as just a state security problem and the policy tools used in response to it based on such misdiagnosis has become imperative. It is therefore crucial to revisit the factors that made the emergence and the current expansion of this threat. Additionally, the SADC Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC) and the National Early Warning Centres are too state-centric, rather than focusing on human security (see Minja in this volume).
APSA’s failure to institute an appropriate diagnosis results in a number of critical gaps. It perceives VE as the major problem, yet this is a symptom of deep-rooted political, social, economic and other challenges facing local communities. All violent extremists are doing is to capitalise on the increasing socio-economic pressures facing marginalised communities.

Another challenge is that although APSA resorts to military deployments, the forces involved are typically trained in conventional warfare, while the violent extremists thrive on asymmetrical warfare. APSA is unable to train military personnel in the more complex skills needed to engage in these types of conflicts. Thus, while politicians regard SADC’s deployment of SAMIM as a panacea, many scholars, researchers and other practitioners believe this notion is ill-informed. While SADC continues to invest in increasingly heavy-handed ‘counterterrorism’ approaches, as demonstrated by the launch of the Regional Counter-Terrorism Centre (RCTC) in Tanzania, it is not helping to de-escalate VE (SADC 2022). On the contrary, research shows that 2022 has witnessed a surge in VE. According to the 2022 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 48% of global deaths as a result of terrorism. Moreover, four of the ten countries with the largest increases in deaths from terrorism were situated in the region (Burkina Faso, DRC, Mali and Niger) (Mweba 2022). Despite these stubborn facts, on 28 May 2022, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government ‘agreed to fully operationalise the African Standby Force (ASF) to strengthen the fight against terrorism on the continent, and end Africa’s dependence on foreign forces to fight terrorism’ (ibid).

The need for transitional justice
As noted in chapter one, another major challenge in many African countries is the failure of post-colonial states to achieving transitional justice – in other words, to address the injustices of the precolonial and colonial eras. Victims of past injustices are still suffering from the harrowing effects of human rights violations under colonial rule and during liberation struggles, which creates fertile ground for VE. Moreover, democratic institutions inherited from colonial regimes have not been thoroughly transformed. This is why the AU established the African Union Transitional Justice (AUTJ) Policy in 2019. It defines transitional justice as:

... the various policy measures and institutional mechanisms that societies, through an inclusive consultative process, adopt in order to overcome past viola-
tions, divisions and inequalities, to create conditions for both security and democratic transformation. [TJ]... is meant to assist societies with legacies of violent conflicts and ... gross violations of human and people’s rights in their efforts to achieve transition to the future of justice, equality, and dignity.

Therefore, transitional justice is a response to systematic violations of human rights, which seeks to provide recognition for victims and to promote possibilities for peace, reconciliation and democracy. This also applies to societies that are transforming themselves after a period of human rights abuses (Chitsike 2012).

As argued above, the failure to achieve comprehensive transitional justice deepens the root causes of VE and radicalises the marginalised, alienated actors, particularly youths. By contrast, effective transitional justice clears the way towards addressing the ‘push factors’ driving people to VE (Nieuwkerk, Shule & Buchanan-Clarke in this volume).

**The funding crisis and APSA’s challenges in preventing VE**

APSA is also faced with the challenge of procuring sustainable funding. According to the Kagame Report, 97 per cent of the AU’s operational budget is donor-funded, and this applies to RECs as well (AU 2017). At the launch of the Regional Counter-Terrorism Centre in Tanzania in May 2022, officials acknowledged the efforts of the UN, EU and Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and their continued collaboration and partnership in the fight against terrorism (SADC 2022). Nothing was said about funding from member states, yet this is vital for sustainability. There can be no African solutions to African problems without financial backup from Africa itself.

**The shortcomings of using Special Envoys to address VE**

APSA’s custom of nominating and deploying mediators/facilitators or special envoys to conflict situations is also not well-suited to addressing VE. The AU and most RECs, especially SADC, deploy former heads of state as mediators. Regrettably, they usually do not have enough time to remain in hot spots for significant periods, or to find effective ways to address the relevant issues. They also often do not understand the cultures, traditions, norms and values of local people. Ironically, violent extremists in Cabo Delgado live side with normal communities. These communities will not fully cooperate with SADC representatives, thereby stifling opportunities for dialogue.

APSA’s failure to recognise local communities as key stakeholders was dem-
onstrated in the DRC when, in 2018, Edem Kodjo, former prime minister of Togo and a former OAU secretary general, was appointed as mediator for the National Dialogue, only to cause the process to break down. Eventually, the Roman Catholic Church’s Episcopal Conference of the Democratic Republic of Congo (CENCO) facilitated a successful mediation process which resulted in the Peace Agreement that paved the way for the 2018 presidential elections. At first, SADC was not directly involved in this process, but later on endorsed the peace agreement. In 2017, SADC also deployed and appointed its own Special Envoy, the former Namibian president Hifikepunye Pohamba, to seek a ‘more permanent solution’ to the conflict, but this effort was short-lived. SADC had announced the appointment of Pohamba as special envoy to ensure that the elections proceeded without incident, and ended his mandate after the elections had been concluded (AllAfrica 2018).

Another shortcoming is that special envoys are given specific mandates and timelines to deliver results. However, addressing VE is not an event, but a sustained process. Instead, they should spend more time with communities in order to get to know their dynamics and traditions, this giving them a better understanding of what needs to be done.

Weaknesses in the AU’s Relationship with the RECs

The other challenge is the perennial fixation of regional and subregional entities on the sanctity of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. This issue protects autocratic leaders from scrutiny. It compromises the doctrine of good governance, which encompasses accountability, the reform of state institutions, and free and fair elections and deprives citizens of their fundamental rights and freedoms. This helps to elongate the life span of weak states, which breeds VE.

There is also an unhealthy relationship between AU and RECs on the one hand and civil society on the other, often characterised by mutual suspicion. CSOs are accused of harbouring regime change agendas since they are generally foreign funded, with some of the funders happening to be former colonial powers. As a result, CSOs and CBOs are doing a lot of peacebuilding and peace-making work, yet the RECs and AU seldom recognise them. Regrettably, these respective entities end up working in silos, thereby missing the power of the collective. Furthermore, a lot of valuable research about VE is being done at universities, related institutions and think-tanks. Unfortunately, APSA and the RECs have not harnessed this vital body of knowledge. It remains on the shelves while the APSA looks for solutions elsewhere. This apparent disconnect
between scholarly knowledge and what APSA and the RECs use to inform their interventions is regrettable.

Additionally, while the APSA reverts to the old tradition of deploying individuals, the AU’s standard operating procedures for mediation support specify that fact-finding missions should be made up by AU officials with knowledge of the states involved in the conflict, representatives of the relevant REC, and a specialist in conflict analysis. The AU Mediation Training Handbook also recommends a holistic and more inclusive approach, specifying that any special envoy should be accompanied by a team of specialists on legal matters, conflict resolution, peace agreements and communication, among others.

In the absence of deeper analyses, stakeholders still don’t properly understand the root causes of the conflict in Mozambique. The easy way out has been to label the protagonists as ‘terrorists,’ and the AU and most RECs have conveniently coined and promoted the mantra that they ‘do not talk to terrorists.’ What they miss is the fact that the so-called terrorists are young men and women who experience acute marginalisation, exclusion, poverty, inequality and joblessness, and a lack of access to education. Failure to engage with them has contributed to hardening and radicalising them, thereby strengthening their resolve to resort to violence.

Additionally, the AU and SADC alone have failed to demonstrate sufficient and sustainable capacity to effectively mediate peace settlements. The DRC is a telling case where the SADC-AU-UN collaborative efforts have been a military one, via the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). SADC and the AU have demonstrated limited election-related peace-making capacity in various member states, particularly the DRC, which have so far twice been resolved internally. Otherwise, the AU and SADC have repeatedly failed to respond timeously to electoral crises (Nathan 2012).

Peacemaking efforts led by a regional organisation require greater levels of coordination and cooperation to harness these potential advantages (Franke 2006). Van Nieuwkerk (2004) also criticises the regional approach to conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Africa when he argues that the AU and APSA will not make any difference to Africa’s security if Africa’s ruling elites do not develop the political vision and will to effectively promote human security on the continent.

The lack of consensus about the importance of good governance, and the absence of a true commitment to regional solutions to peace and security
issues, are lamentable. This problem is aggravated by unclear and contradictory principles governing the relationship among the UN, AU and RECs, despite attempts to formalise roles under the AU (Franke 2006).

Lastly, the continental and regional bodies have failed to fully appreciate the dilemma of women and children in this and other similar conflicts. They have failed to acknowledge and promote the vital role that women should play in peacemaking processes, as provided for in UNSC Resolution 1325 and the SADC Strategy on Women Peace and Security of 2017–2022. Any intervention that excludes women will not be sustainable (see Lucey in this volume).

**Reform of the AU and Africa’s failure to silence the guns by 2020**

Various attempts have been made to reform the design and functioning of the AU. The most recent attempt was the 11th extraordinary summit held on 17-18 November in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. More specifically, it focused on the reform of the African Union Commission (AUC), the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), and the effective division of labour between the AU and RECs, member states and continental organisations. Two notable areas targeted for reform was the failure of member states to contribute towards funding, and their failure to implement AU decisions (Amani Africa 2018).

The Assembly also adopted a plan for structural reform in terms of which the number of AUC departments were reduced from eight to six, some portfolios were redefined, and the Departments of Political Affairs and Peace and Security were merged (see Lucey in this volume). Judging by AU’s lack of urgency and perennial failure to implement its policy decisions, it remains to be seen whether these reforms will successfully address VE.

Several authors refer to the AU’s tradition of crafting ambitious programmes for addressing conflicts on the continent, but failing to implement them. One of its spectacular failures has been its campaign to ‘Silence the guns by 2020’. Louw-Vaudran (2022) argues that this has also been the case with the adoption of the African passport by 2018, and the self-financing of the AU through an import levy by 2017. ‘Clearly, 2020 has come and gone without Africa having reached the goal of being conflict-free. Therefore, the deadline was extended to 2030. Cynics are already predicting that this won’t be met, given the trend of insecurity the continent faces.’ She therefore predicts that the AU will fail to address the spread of terrorism, as it has failed to contain the surge in coups d’état, resource-linked instability and conflicts, and intra-state conflicts such
as those in South Sudan, Libya, Ethiopia and Cameroon. She goes on to argue that the campaign failed because there was never any clarity on what exactly ‘silencing the guns’ meant – there was no work-able implementation matrix and clear indicators. The AU is only beginning to develop goals and specific milestones that should be achieved between now and 2030. This includes a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework which was only adopted by the AU Assembly in February 2022, and the development of an implementation plan to guide the contribution of key actors (Louw-Vaudran 2022).

Africans want to see a more peaceful and prosperous continent by the end of the decade, but this is beyond the scope of what the AU and its organs and institutions can deliver if a new way of managing peace and security is not adopted.

**Recommendations**

- The AU needs to strengthen its partnerships with civil society, academia, research institutions and think-tanks in order to access and utilise all available knowledge on peace and security.
- The AU needs to design a new, responsive mechanism for managing VE, grounded in human security instead of traditional conceptions of state security. In the process, it should change the way in which it conceives of terrorism as just a state security problem. This will allow it to appreciate and address the root causes of VE.
- The AU should also develop a policy of engaging with ‘terrorists’. These are victims of marginalisation, exclusion, poverty, inequality, joblessness, and a lack of access to education. Failures to engage with them in these terms thus far has contributed to their hardening and radicalisation, strengthening their resolve to utilise violence.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has taken a closer look at the APSA and its various components. It has found that it is not well suited to addressing VE on the continent, and specifically in Cabo Delgado. As such, numerous adjustments need to be made.

First, RECs and member states should be made to buy into the AU’s policy for achieving transitional justice, as this could contribute to the durable transformation of the post-colonial state, and begin to address the drivers of VE.

There is a need to change the focus of the CEWS, its capacity, and its relationship with the regional early warning systems and member state systems.

APSA’s interventions in the region should be professionalised, and its five
pillars should have a well-oiled and flawlessly coordinated relationship, to enable effective mobilisation of adequate and appropriate material, human and financial resources when responding to VE.

SADC, as the responsible REC, needs to utilise its newly constituted peace and security mechanism to facilitate in conflict situations. This should also include the SADC Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC). Barring consistent political interference regarding their operations, these two have the requisite peace-making expertise and experience.

The AUC and the RECs should closely coordinate their operations, starting from the choice of mediator and development of the terms of reference, and including their particular mandate. In this way, they will appoint mediators acceptable by all parties, thereby guaranteeing their trust, which is key throughout the mediation process.

There is a need for capacity-building, proper resource mobilisation and political will by member states to enhance the transformation and effectiveness of the early warning system, thereby enabling timely preventative action.

Besides economic integration, the continent should also emphasise political integration, which would harmonise its governance systems. The status quo in which African countries are characterised by poor governance and an emphasis on sovereignty and the principle of subsidiarity has not helped. Rather, the doctrine of supranationality should be adopted.

The AU needs to consolidate its efforts towards strengthening its partnerships with civil society organisations and other non-state actors.

Lastly, APSA needs to craft a new, responsive mechanism for managing VE, based on the precepts of human security, as the current approach, based on traditional conceptions of security enforced by military means has not succeeded.

References
THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE


Foreign involvement in preventing and countering violent extremism

Theodora Thindwa

Africa is inundated with western actors seeking to counter and prevent violent extremism (Ismail & Sköns 2014). Interest in Africa has revived for various reasons. Some actors are in Africa to access its natural resources, while others are concerned about the transnational threats that originate from Africa. Some, such as Brazil, China and Russia, are emerging powers, some are former colonial masters, and others are non-state actors (Ebo 2007). Each of these are developing different types of relations with the AU, individual African countries, RECs, and local organisations.

In spite of all African countries attaining independence several decades ago, a myriad of foreign actors continue to influence its security landscape. Some provide technical support, capacity-building, joint military operations and intelligence-gathering (ibid). There are a number of scholarly works on the role of western actors in broad area of peace and security (Brosig 2010; Ebo 2007; Van Genugten 2008), but less so on foreign involvement in PCVE in Africa. This chapter is an attempt to help fill this gap. It provides an overview of international action in countering and preventing VE in Africa. It examines the origins and nature of international actors in PCVE in Africa, and asks whose interests they really serve. Partnerships with local actors and the overall impact of the involvements are also addressed.

The chapter argues that Africa’s own attempt to curb VE with the assistance of foreign actors has failed, largely due to the assumption that Africa is homogenous and that one policy approach will therefore fit all countries. In reality, African countries are shaped by seemingly similar yet different historical and structural factors and actors. The lack of agreement on the standards for evaluating PVE and CVE programmes in Africa has further made it difficult to regis-
The origins and nature of international actors in PCVE

Since 2006, as noted previously, Africa has experienced an influx of international actors involved in PCVE. These actors are dispersed across Africa, working mostly in VE hotspots. Most are concentrated in the Sahel region, and some in West and East Africa. They include intergovernmental bodies such as the UN and its subsidiaries, the EU, western powers, a few Asian countries, and various developmental agencies.

The adoption of the 2016 UN Plan of Action for PVE, which linked security and development, led to the inclusion of a plethora of actors who were previously unwilling to include issues of security in their programming. They include the UNDP, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UN Women, and the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) (Ucko 2018). This significantly increased the number of UN actors working on the continent. With the help of the US Department of State, the Plan of Action informed a number of African development programmes (Ucko 2018:257). Some foreign actors also assisted African countries to develop national action plans, while others included PVE in their generic programmes.

The contributions of the foreign actors include funding, capacity-building, equipment, military personnel, as well as intelligence-gathering (Ismael & Sköns 2014; Van Zyl 2019). In this case, an attempt has been made to build the security capacity of recipient African countries. But this begs the question: do foreign actors succeed in building sustainable security capacity in African countries? (see Lucey in this volume). Military interventions, driven mostly by western countries, remain the most common type of support to African countries, even though the drivers of VE are mostly social, economic, religious and political. These drivers also vary from one context to another (Ramdeen 2017). Use of military means has often led to large civilian casualties. This implies a mismatch between the drivers of VE and the solutions provided by western actors.

One key issue is that foreign actors tend to use external data to inform their
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African interventions (Van Zyl 2019). This is partly because reliable and accurate local data about VE hotspots that could and should inform the activities of foreign actors are lacking. As a result, analysts believe there is a need to improve local data about the drivers of VE in Africa and in specific locations, and a broader need to start research that will help to define VE in the African context (Haastrup & Dijkstra 2017).

The partner and donor community and VE

In some countries, there are negative stereotypes associated with the term ‘violent extremism’. As a result, some donors have renamed their PCVE intervention as programmes focusing on social cohesion, peacebuilding and improving justice systems (Van Zyl 2019). For instance, the Tanzanian government has prohibited the use of the term ‘violent extremism’ in programme documents as it tends to label certain groups in society as associated with terrorism (ibid:5). In neighbouring Kenya, donor-supported projects related to VE are closely scrutinised and highly regulated.

The US, EU and UK are the largest donors of development aid to Africa, with 44 per cent of funding going to social sectors, 20 per cent to economic sectors, and 11 per cent to humanitarian aid (OECD 2018). Table 1 records the contributions of some foreign actors in PCVE in Africa. The support provided varies from one region to another, and from one country to another.

The US is one of the most prominent foreign actors on the continent, through its US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the US Department of State (USAID 2016). USAID’s work is guided by the joint strategy for countering VE and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), developed in 2005. The first ever CVE programme was rolled out in 2006. The aim of the TSCTP is to support counterterrorism initiatives in willing countries in West and North Africa that focus on reducing radicalisation (US Department of State 2020). Up to 2016, USAID (West Africa) invested more than US$100 million in CVE and TSCTP in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

The US has also been actively involved in PCVE through the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), which was established in 2007 and works with national militaries. AFRICOM has 15 permanent bases and 12 contingency bases in Africa (Fabricius 2020). The US government further plans to build low-profile military bases in Africa valued at more than US$330 million between 2021 and 2025 (Turse 2020). Information on the actual amount spent on PCVE by AFRICOM is not readily available. What is clear is that AFRICOM provides military and
capacity-building aid as well as public diplomacy to counter VE. However, the support provided by AFRICOM is sometimes disguised as humanitarian assistance (IGD 2018).

AFRICOM’s global positioning technology has assisted Uganda to fight the Lord’s Resistance Army. Despite providing such support, AFRICOM has not engaged with the AU on the best possible framework for guiding engagements with individual African countries (Bowie 2012). Its terms of agreement with individual countries are mostly kept confidential. For instance, AFRICOM recently announced its intention to open an office in Zambia. However, there are concerns that this facility will eventually be transformed into a military base that will be used to monitor the neighbouring DRC as well as other southern African countries. This move can also be taken to reflect US recognition of the strategic importance of Zambia’s cobalt and copper reserves (Vijay 2022). Zambian officials point out that the Zambia AFRICOM office will help prepare Zambian battalions for deployment to the UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).

Table 1: Contributions of foreign actors to PCVE in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign actor</th>
<th>Area of operation</th>
<th>Support in US$</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN (Intergovernmental)</td>
<td>West and Central Africa</td>
<td>US$10,327,383</td>
<td>Before 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP (Intergovernmental)</td>
<td>AUC RECs (IGAD, ECOWAS, LCBC)</td>
<td>US$81,200,000</td>
<td>2016-2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU and member countries (Multilateral)</td>
<td>Donated to projects in West and Central Africa, Individual countries in Sahel</td>
<td>US$12,488,422 Actual amounts not known</td>
<td>Before 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Donated to projects in East Africa</td>
<td>US$47,867,043</td>
<td>Before 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sahel and Chad Basin</td>
<td>€8,000,000,000.</td>
<td>2014-2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>€29,700,000</td>
<td>2017-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>€26,300,000</td>
<td>2017-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>€15,016,000 €4 000 000 (for equipment)</td>
<td>2021-2023 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US (governmental and International Organisations)</td>
<td>West and Central Africa</td>
<td>US$109,551,927</td>
<td>Before 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Cost</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>US$60,089,784</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>US$23,440.70</td>
<td>Before 2019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>North and West Africa</td>
<td>Over US$330,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada (governmental)</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>US$799,000</td>
<td>Before 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea (governmental)</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Amount not known</td>
<td>Before 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia (Governmental)</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>US$39,486</td>
<td>Before 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden and Switzerland (Gov)</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>US$1,761,225</td>
<td>Before 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (governmental and related institutions)</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>US$884,851</td>
<td>Before 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US and Japan (governmental)</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>US$2,800,000</td>
<td>Before 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmental; Japan and EU</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>US$9,800,000</td>
<td>Before 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private security companies</td>
<td>Mozambique, Mali</td>
<td>Equipment and personnel; the actual contribution in US$ is not known</td>
<td>2020, 2022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Van Zyl (2019), Montull (2019), author’s calculations from other official documents.

Like those of the UN, EU interventions in Africa are meant to address both security and development challenges (Montull 2019). While the work of the UNDP is spread across various parts of Africa, the EU’s work is mainly concentrated in the Sahel region. Its focus on this region is driven by the realisation that instability there has direct consequences for the security of European countries. For example, EU interventions are meant to reduce the migration of Africans from the Sahel to Europe. The EU operation in the Sahel is guided by the Sahel Security and Development strategy which has been operational since 2011 (EU 2020). In spite of some positive strides in terms of regional integration, security challenges related to VE still persist.

**The limits to contributions by external actors**

From Table 1 it is evident that millions of dollars have been invested in addressing the problem of VE in Africa. While the involvement of foreign actors has helped in some areas, acts of VE persist and continue to spread. There are sev-
eral explanations for the limited efficacy of the foreign effort. One is that the varied interpretation of CVE/PVE by different western actors has led to different interpretations of the issues to be addressed. Consequently, most interventions do not address the root drivers of VE (see Van Nieuwkerk, Shule and Buchanan-Clarke in this volume). While foreign actors have ideas about what they intend to do, most local actors are oblivious to issues related to VE, resulting in antagonism between these two sets of actors (Thiessen 2019).

Western actors also tend to believe that African problems are better managed by external actors since they have knowledge of specific measures for addressing VE in various other contexts. As a result, local actors and structures are not directly involved in the programming. This also creates gaps in actual policies guiding CVE/ PVE, with negative effects on programme implementation (Boutellis & Fink 2016; Mahmoud 2016).

UN resolution 2396 recognises the role to be played by local communities and local actors in PCVE. However, not much has been done by western actors to involve local communities. Most western countries use local organisations to implement their CVE and PVE agendas by forcing some to use the label CVE or PVE in order to be funded (Van Zyl 2019). The result is a lack of ownership of the projects, and resistance from the communities. The term ‘violent extremism’ is widely associated with Islamist extremism, which makes it more difficult to implement preventive programmes in Muslim communities due to the implied suspicion and stigmatisation (see Van Nieuwkerk, Shule and Buchanan-Clarke in this volume). There is also a common belief that programmes implemented in one African region will succeed in others, due to the misconception that Africa is a homogeneous region (Mahmoud 2016). These beliefs and misconceptions need to be debunked. The tendency to import and also impose CVE and PVE initiatives on local organisations makes it impossible to address the specific needs of project beneficiaries. The result is that the project objectives are not achieved.

While this section has focused on some of the visible foreign actors, Africa also experiences the presence and influence of invisible international actors. They are always in the background, but still drive the agenda in the area of VE. They include some permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) namely Russia, China, France, the UK and the US. These nations strive to maintain their global influence as superpowers, while seeking to advance their national interests at the same time.
The hand of invisible actors in Africa

Africa remains a strategic location for achieving the foreign policy objectives of these countries (Fasanotti 2022). North and West Africa, where most of them operate, is a ‘strategic corridor connecting Africa to Europe and Asia’ (Sun & Zoubir 2018). For instance, Russia solders have been spotted in 17 African countries since 2016. Notably, the notorious Wagner Group, a Russian private security company which has been active across the Middle East and Africa, including Libya, Sudan and Mozambique, has largely been deployed to protect ruling elites (Fasanotti 2022). In 2019, the Mozambican government hired the Wagner group for a counterinsurgency operation, expanding its prior mandate of protecting the president (ibid). France has permanent military bases in Africa. Russia and France sell arms to some African countries, and receive payment in the form of mining concessions or commercial contracts as well as access to strategic locations such as ports (African Centre for Strategic Studies n.d.; Fasanotti 2022).

China is not directly involved in countering VE in Africa, but is a permanent member of the UNSC. Over the years, it has deviated from its traditional ‘non-interference’ policy, particularly in Africa, as was evident in its support of Sudan during in the protracted counter-insurgency campaign in Darfur (International Crisis Group 2018). Using its influence in the UNSC, China was a key player in ensuring that UN peacekeepers were deployed to the Sudanese region in 2008 (ibid). During the onset of South Sudan’s civil war in 2013, China, driven by its national interest, joined mediation efforts to end the conflict (ibid).

China has also provided financial resources to the APSA, which clearly has a key role to play in countering VE in Africa (Walsh 2019). China’s approach to Africa is shaped by two frameworks, namely the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which outlines China’s policies on Africa, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an extended development project aimed at linking China to the rest of the world along a series of economic corridors, and building its social and political power (Jie & Wallace 2021; Sun & Zobir 2018; Shelton & Paruk 2008). China’s influence is also less obvious due to its principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of countries with which it has bilateral relationships. In spite of this, China’s desire for Africa’s natural resources remains important in explaining its involvement in Africa (Walsh 2019).

According to Walsh (2019:977), China plays a role in terrorism through the global ivory trade and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), adding:
China is not the only market for ivory, but there is no doubt that the current East African poaching epidemic is linked to the influx of Chinese. Ivory has long been a source of income for rebel groups, and the Lord’s Resistance Army and Somalia’s Al-Shabaab, among others, garner significant income from the ivory trade. SALW proliferation is an enabling factor in ivory poaching, as well as in the wider terrorist menace and structural instability in East Africa.

This implies that the invisible actors in Africa – notably China – are seeking to further their national interests, including economic gains, while influencing the outcome of local security issues. There is also hostility among these actors as they vie to further their own goals. For instance, in 2022 the AU suspended its assistance to the CAR after discovering that its government was working with the Wagner Group (France24 2022). All this suggests that some foreign powers are apparently helping to counter VE when their real intention is to further their business interests. It also explains why western powers believe VE is a problem that needs to be addressed. They pump in more money, while other non-western donors do not invest as much in Africa.

Interests of international actors in PCVE in Africa
This section examines the specific interests of international actors in PCVE in Africa. It addresses the question: ‘Whose interest do international actors involved in PCVE in Africa really serve?’ Ismail and Sköns (2014) argue that the interests of external actors in the field of security are varied. Most foreign actors provide assistance in order to further their economic and political interests, despite the principle of the state sovereignty.

Frimpong (2020) and Thiessen (2019:2) argue that external actors are more interested in protecting their military personnel, the interests of national governments and the security of donor nations than the concerns of local communities. For instance, US drone strikes have displaced local communities, destroyed their livelihoods and led to deaths and other casualties in West Africa (Berger 2019). This has also created a negative view of foreign actors. While military means may have worked in some settings, they largely appear to fuel insecurity.

Interests of the European Union
The EU intervenes in Africa in order to address transnational security challenges in the Sahel that are likely to affect European security. Montull (2019)
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asserts that the main interest of the EU in the Sahel is to safeguard European security, as this is the main source of ‘illegal’ migration to Europe. These initiatives are undertaken under the theme of the ‘externalization of EU borders.’ Montull goes on to say that the EU security and development approach in the Sahel is a ‘kind of laboratory for its foreign policy aid and capacity-building project.’ This is another case of an international actor introducing PCVE projects to serve its own interests.

Understanding the interests of foreign private military companies

Another strand in PCVE is the involvement of private military actors. It can be argued that private military or security groups engage with VE as a means of maximising profits and gaining a business advantage. Regardless of the involvement of foreign private actors in Cabo Delgado in Mozambique, the problem of insurgency persists. Indications are that the Mozambican insurgency was fuelled by a failure to transmit the benefits of the natural gas extraction by TotalEnergies in Cabo Delgado to local communities (see Chingotuane and Sidumo in this volume).

Between March 2020 and February 2021, the Mozambican government engaged the Russian-based Wagner group, the Dyck Advisory Group and Burnham Global to counter VE. While actual expenditure on each of these agencies is not publicly known (Bande & Constantino 2021), it amounted to an estimated US$154.8 million. Though the government spent huge sums of money, the private companies proved inefficient in countering insurgencies. In the end, it was locally based Maconde war veterans who succeeded in blocking the insurgents in Cabo Delgado (Nhamirre 2021). This shows once again that local knowledge plays a significant role in countering VE.

Interests of external actors in strategic locations

Some foreign actors deliberately fuel acts of violence in resource-rich countries such as Mozambique in order to access resources such as gas (Chingotuane et al. 2021; Feijo 2020). Similarly, the never-ending violence in resource-rich African countries is instigated by dubious foreign acts. Various western countries such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Japan and France have built military bases along the coasts of Djibouti and Somalia (Adeto 2019:16). Some western actors use these military bases to transport resources such as petroleum to the Red Sea. The presence of these foreign actors creates instability, as each of the actors strives to pursue their own economic self-interests.
Due to its strategic location, Djibouti, for example, hosts 11 military bases and military forces from seven countries. Among others, the US used Djibouti as a launch pad against Yemen (Fabricius 2020). This shows how various global powers are competing among themselves in the process of advancing their own interests.

When international actors serve their own interests, it creates competing interests and compromises assistance programmes. For example, Russia's presence in CAR has negatively affected the relationship between the latter and its main donors, the EU, US and France. These donors are now unable to influence affairs in the country, as Russia has become a close ally of the CAR government (Bax 2021). As foreign actors jostle to pursue their interests, they also tend to crowd into the same areas. For instance, forces active in the Sahel include the EU, UN, MINUSMA, and Italian soldiers in Mali, among others. Given that all of these actors are seeking to advance their own interests, their activities are not coordinated.

The role of African governments in attracting external actors

Africa leaders also have various motives for attracting international actors. France has an economic and political interest in maintaining its ties with its former African colonies, in the form of ‘francophone Africa,’ and maintains a number of security cooperation agreements with western and central African countries. Despite adopting a ‘hard’ security approach in the Sahel, France has failed to curtail VE and to adjust its interventions to align with political and social transformations in the region. France is active in Chad to support those in authority. This is also the case with Russia’s presence in CAR, where the Russian government and the Russian Wagner group have protected President Faustin-Archange Touadéra from an attempted coup (Bax 2021; Fabricius 2020). Russian advisers have also infiltrated the CAR’s economic and political spheres, and largely operate in areas rich in diamonds and gold.

There are also African governments that really need foreign solders to fight VE, which benefits both the African country and the foreigners. This situation is aggravated by deficiencies in national militaries and the lack of an operational African Standby Force (ASF) – hence the overreliance on foreign military forces (Dessu & Yohannes 2022; Fabricius 2020). The policy framework for the ASF does not recognise complex threats such as VE. As a result, it will probably not be able to counter VE when it becomes fully operational (Dessu & Yohannes 2022).
Final insights into the interests of international actors

External actors also advance their interests by dictating project priority areas. For instance, France and Germany tend to prioritise education, and all proposed programmes that involve education in support of PCVE are likely to receive funding (Van Zyl 2019). On the other hand, EU and Canada prioritise health and the improvement of livelihoods. The problem with this approach is that some priority areas may lead to interventions that do not match the local drivers of extremism. (ibid:15) Because donors are strict about their areas of work, some local people become frustrated, and are also unable to evaluate their activities. On the other hand, local CSOs tend to have a limited understanding of security issues, and lack the capacity to develop programmes that will address local interests (Ismael & Sköns 2014).

Harris-Hogan et al. (2016) point out that designers of PCVE projects should adopt the features of a public health model with primary, secondary and tertiary initiatives. The model is premised on the assumption that appropriate interventions will depend on the proper diagnosis of symptoms and the severity of the illness. Primary level programmes are meant to prevent the development of beliefs and attitudes that may lead to radicalisation. Secondary level interventions focus on those people who have already been radicalised, but are still not fully committed to the cause of radicalisation. Tertiary level initiatives focus on individuals who are fully radicalised and those who have passed through the primary and secondary levels. It is important for external donors to develop initiatives that are specific to contexts. For example, an education programme may be ineffective in areas where most people are on the tertiary level. Hence, it is imperative for PCVE programmes to address the appropriate stage. RECs should consider developing local systems that are able to identify and categorise the correct level of radicalisation, in order to develop relevant and effective responses.

What is emerging clearly is that in most cases PCVE programmes serve the interests of various foreign actors despite the case that some of the latter are engaged in either bilateral or multilateral initiatives. The priorities of local communities are rarely considered, which makes PCVE programming in Africa one-sided and problematic.

Partnerships with local actors

One of the ways in which international actors operate in Africa is to partner with regional and local actors. Partnerships are also recognised by UN Security
Council Resolution 2396, article 30, which calls on members states to work with local communities, mental health and education practitioners and relevant CSOs to address the challenges posed by returnees and relocators of VE (UNSC 2017). This implies the formation of partnerships to counter and prevent VE.

The Commonwealth Secretariat, which has observer status in the UN General Assembly, is also involved in PCVE in Africa. In 2017 the Commonwealth established a unit that supports national strategies in respect of VE. In 2021 a number of intergovernmental webinars were held in south, eastern, central and west Africa which focused on preventing terrorist use of the internet (Commonwealth Secretariat 2021).

The UNDP and its partnerships

The UNDP has been working with RECs, IGAD, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) and academia as implementing partners in development programmes (UNDP 2017). From 2016 to 2019, the UNDP targeted 16 countries in development-based responses to VE, listed in Table 2. The UNDP was supported financially by several other countries. Expenditure was as follows: UNDP, US$6 million; Japan, US$15 600; Netherlands, US$816 000; Sweden, US$3 300 000; United Kingdom, US$428 000; and an unfunded budget of US$55 000 000 (UNDP 2017). The UNDP is unique in the sense that it partners with both local and other foreign countries.

Table 2: Countries involved in UNDP regional and multi-country project on PCVE in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries considered to be epicentres of VE</th>
<th>VE spillover countries</th>
<th>Countries at risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Central Africa Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The philosophy of the UNDP is that VE in Africa is rooted in poverty, marginalisation and underdevelopment, and that addressing these issues will address the root causes of this phenomenon. Walch (2019) notes that stakeholders
in PCVE should engage with Non-State Armed Groups (NSAG) since they are practically involved in VE. Evidence from the Philippines, Colombia and Afghanistan shows that development aid without the involvement of NSAG often leads to increased violence. Subedi & Jenkins (2016) point out that, in some cases, local actors may not be neutral; therefore, thorough verification will still be necessary before local actors are involved.

**The EU and its partnerships in Africa**

The EU and France are active players in PCVE in West Africa. They support regional organisations such as the AU, ECOWAS and G5 Sahel, and the national strategies of individual countries (EU 2012). The EU remains the main foreign actor supporting G5 Sahel Joint Force, comprising Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, Chad and Mauritania. This joint force was authorised by the AU in 2007 and further strengthened by UN Security Council resolution 2359 (Frimpong 2020). Despite registering some successes, there are concerns that the strategies used by the G5 are inconsistent with various counterterrorism plans in the region. The EU provides support to G5 countries in three main areas: political partnership, security and stability support, with €147 million provided since 2007, and development cooperation of €8 billion between 2014 and 2020 (EU 2019). Since 2021, it has extended its capacity-building support to the Mozambican armed forces. The mission is Mozambique is expected to cost €15 million in 2021–2023. In 2022, the EU released €4 million from its EU peace facility for equipment (EU 2021). About 120 EU military personnel are involved in training the Mozambican military. Portugal, France, Italy and Spain are to provide personnel for this training mission (Bohne & Guilengue 2021). Whether or not this mission will lead to meaningful changes is not known.

The EU also has four security and development missions in Africa: EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Sahel Mali, the EU training mission (EUTM) in Mali, and EUTM in Mozambique. It has provided a total of €1,8 billion to address irregular migration and displaced persons, since most Sahelians migrate to Europe due to the instability in the Sahel region. The EU has supported G5 Sahel countries with €14 million. It has also provided millions of Euros in humanitarian support to individual countries in the Sahel region. The G5 Sahel countries are shown in Figure 1.

In spite of the support to the G5 Sahel group, Mali withdrew from the regional force in May 2022 following disagreements with the leadership of the G5 force. In addition, there were local resentment and protests against French sol-
diers in Mali, and they withdrew in February 2022 (Olojo et al., 022). Due to an over-reliance on military means in the Sahel region, friction has increased between local communities and military forces, and resentment has grown towards the governments in the region. As a result, the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin and the Islamic State local bureau have taken advantage of the divisions in communities to recruit more fighters (International Crisis Group 2021). All this is taking place in spite of the involvement of foreign actors. Since 2016 there has been an increase in attacks by jihadist groups, as well as an increase in ethnic violence (ibid:4).

Is there coordination among the various partners?

National, continental and international organisations have also coordinated some efforts to counter VE. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) encompassed member states in the Lake Chad Basin (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin). This partnership was supported by the US, the UK and the EU (Ramdeen 2017). However, it can be argued that this was not an equal partnership, as the more powerful external role players dictated the agenda for countering VE. African government should be proactive by identifying the conditions that can lead to VE, and also develop early warning systems (see Lucey and Chikwanda in this volume). This should be supported by capacitating local structures and actors to begin to addressing issues surrounding VE.

The lack of coordination among the foreign actors in countering and preventing VE has also contributed to inefficiencies. France supports Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali on a bilateral basis, while the US and EU have bilateral counterterrorism relations with with Cameroon, Mali, Niger, Burkina Fasi, Chad, Niger and Mauritania. The UN supports the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Initiatives for preventing and countering VE have proliferated at the country level, REC level, and also at the level of donor communities. All these strategies need to be coordinated, and focused to achieve results at the local level.

This discussion shows that partnerships are not well coordinated. There is a need for countries affected by VE to play a leading role in ensuring that non-military approaches which address local grievances and governance deficits are taken on board in various initiatives in the Sahel and other African regions affected by VE. This means that foreign actors need to redefine their approach to Africa.
Experiences in the G5 region shows that despite partnerships with foreign actors, VE still persists. This means that current approaches need to be reviewed. Foreign actors partnering with African countries affected by VE need to shift the narrative that guides their strategies for Africa.

**The impact of foreign involvement on PCVE in Africa**

Given the lack of clear and measurable indicators, measuring the effectiveness of foreign involvement in PCVE in Africa is not straightforward. Harris-Hogan et al. (2016) conclude that it is difficult to produce CVE policies with explicit outcomes due to the ambiguity of the concept and the lack of a clear plan of action. Moreover, PVE lacks a strong conceptual basis, which further complicates the issue of measuring its success (Ucko 2018). Hogan (2014) also stresses that most PCVE programmes around the world fail to answer the question of whether they will work, and if so, how. Consequently, there are methodological challenges in respect of M&E of PCVE.

Another factor that complicates evaluation is that beneficiaries of various PCVE interventions are in conflict zones, which makes it difficult to reach them (UNODC 2020). The issue of gender-sensitive indicators that go beyond the mere inclusion of activities focused on women and girls is also not clear in PCVE programming. PCVE should consider gender transformative program-
ming in the design phase, as well as the development of relevant measurable indicators (UNODC 2020).

According to a critical review of the 2016 UN Plan of Action, it consists of a list of recommendations rather than a plan to guide the action of member states (see Lucey in this volume). This makes it more difficult to produce a sound evaluation. Veldhuis (2012) also contends that security establishments struggle to measure the impact of CVE initiatives. Parker (2014:3) states: ‘What we have as programmes are not solutions but insights garnered from case studies around the world, that may or may not be transferable from one situation to another.’

In the African context, the success of PVE programmes undertaken by various actors has been mixed, with conditions of insecurity persisting in spite of various interventions. Given the complex nature of VE and its multiple drivers, most VE programmers point to an inability to develop measurable indicators that can inform evaluation of PCVE programmes (Romaniuk & Fink 2012; Van Zyl 2019).

A study of VE programmes in various parts of Africa has revealed that only 61 projects in East Africa and only 22 projects in West and Central Africa incorporate proper monitoring and evaluation procedures (Van Zyl 2019:12). Another challenge cited by the study is the lack of local capacity to conduct evaluations, resulting in observation bring used as the main method of evaluation. Van Zyl (2019) notes that this is the most common method used by PCVE projects in both East, West and Central Africa, with the number of people attending meetings and the numbers of violent attacks after a series of training sessions used as indicators of success. Clearly, this observation method is rudimentary, subjective, and prone to bias.

The lack of awareness of contextual realities of foreign actors in PCVE in Africa also negatively affects outcomes. Hofman & Sutherland (2018) contend that there is a lack of robust PCVE evaluation literature informed by empirical data, especially in the Global South. From these challenges, it can be deduced that future work in the area may attempt to provide measurable outcomes that are context-specific. The challenges outlined in this section point to the dilemma that while Africa is a recipient of foreign support in respect of PCVE, it is difficult to measure the overall impact.

Given the complexities mentioned above, no single method for evaluation can be recommended. Three recommendations follow, drawn from the literature and from the insights of a programme evaluation expert in southern Africa.
First, RECs should ensure that evaluation forms part of the initial programme design – these could be mid-term evaluations, or conducted at the end of the project. Utilising independent evaluators should be considered (Clément et al. 2021). RECs should also consider conducting systematic reviews of past evaluations of peace and security interventions in their region in order to identify recurrent themes, which could form a sound basis for programme evaluation in turn.

RECs could learn from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which conducted a meta synthesis of evaluations to inform its programming on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2020). Such an approach would also reveal methodological and content issues which could then be revised. RECs should also build institutional capacity so that they can ably commission evaluations, and understand what they are evaluating. Programme evaluation capacity-building should also extend to individual countries in Africa so that multiple stakeholders are involved (Clément et al. 2021). Most African countries have the capacity and skills to conduct evaluations in the health, education and agriculture sectors, but there is a lacuna in respect of peace and security programmes. Most development roadmaps on the continent recognise the role of peace and security in achieving sustainable gains, but little has been done to measure the impact of efforts to ensure that peace and security prevail. Credible data collection methods and robust information systems should form part of capacity-building so that countries which benefit from PCVE know what type of data they should collect, and how to make sense of it.

**Recommendations**

- African scholars and think-tanks need to conduct evidence-based research on the drivers of VE in various African countries. This will help to define the meaning of VE in the African context. This could form the basis for policy interventions relevant to Africa, and help to define the most appropriate forms of foreign assistance.
- The AU and RECs should play a leading role in ensuring that monitoring and evaluation of VE programmes in Africa takes local realities into account, and utilise credible security sector M&E frameworks.
- The AU should develop clear terms of reference for the engagement of African states and foreign actors with VE programming.
- The ToR should also help African countries to benefit from these partnerships by building appropriate local responses to VE.
• The AU’s early warning system should be optimised to identify the early development of VE, among others by identifying build-ups of structural grievances.

Conclusion
This chapter has examined foreign involvement in preventing and countering VE in Africa. It has identified the main international actors, and highlighted their types of contribution and areas of operation. It finds that external actors have generally failed to curb VE in Africa due to the assumption that Africa is homogenous, and that one policy approach will fit all countries. In reality, African countries are shaped by seemingly similar yet widely different historical and structural factors and actors.

The chapter also uncovered the varying interests of foreign actors in PCVE in Africa. Most western actors view Africa as a strategic partner that will enable them to create or pursue business interests while also helping to establish themselves as global players. Some international actors are effectively invisible. They include China, which is not directly involved in PCVE, but still pull the strings in its quest for resources while also finding markets for its arms in Africa.

As regards African governments themselves, some invite external actors to help them counter VE due to a genuine need, while others do so for self-serving reasons. At the same time, foreign actors also strive to achieve their own interests in the course of involvement in CVE/PVE, and begin to influence local politics as a result. This is particularly true when African governments engage in rent-seeking behaviour. Partnerships with local actors reveal that there are no guiding frameworks for these joint engagements. Most foreign actors design the terms themselves, with very little contribution from African governments. The overall impacts of these efforts have also been addressed in this chapter. While foreign actors have helped to curb VE in some parts of Africa, programmes are not being properly monitored and evaluated. Three recommendations have been made for addressing this shortcoming.
References


FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM


PART THREE

Southern Africa and the SADC Mission to Mozambique
The dynamics of PCVE in Cabo Delgado: The response of the Mozambican government and other domestic actors

Énio Viegas Filipe Chingotuane and Egna Rachel Isaias Sidumo

Mozambique has been combating violent extremism since 2017. To understand the Mozambican government’s approach to CVE, one must understand its initial steps in fighting against the VE grouping active in Cabo Delgado. At first, the government was reluctant to accept that the country was facing terrorist aggression of any kind. Government authorities classified the various incidents as ‘acts of banditry’ committed by common bandits or evildoers, not terrorists or violent extremists (Bussoti 2022). This was partly influenced by the Frelimo government’s experiences with Renamo, which it labelled over decades as ‘bandits and criminals.’ In January 2018, the national police force finally acknowledged at a press briefing that the acts committed against the population of Mocímboa da Praia were terrorist acts (Xinhua 2018).

It took almost two years for the Mozambican government to accept the existence of terrorism. Despite the claims by authors such as Fabricius (2017), Gari (2018), Opperman (2018) and Morier-Genoud (2018) that Mozambique was facing VE Islamist attacks, the government rejected the connection between the attackers in the north of the country to international terrorist movements of Islamic orientation. It was only in 2019 that President Filipe Jacinto Nyusi used the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘violent extremism.’ This meant that the military offensive launched in 2017-8 was not aimed at combating terrorism or VE, but at combating ‘banditry.’ The presence of terrorists in Mozambique was first recognised on 23 April 2020 when the National Defence and Security Council (CNDS) stated that Mozambique was facing ‘external aggression perpetrated by terrorists,’ contradicting the official discourse until that date (Visão 2022).
It was only in August 2020 that the government created the Northern Integrated Development Agency (ADIN), tasked with implementing a multisectoral CVE strategy. ADIN was meant to promote socioeconomic development in the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula, in order to address the grievances fuelling terrorism and VE. But ADIN remained inactive for a year, implying that the classic forceful means of combating VE remained predominant. However, despite the failure or delay in transforming the counter-terrorism strategy into a CVE strategy, ADIN and other similar initiatives show that the government is now more aware of the need for a shift in approach.

The question is whether Mozambique is truly interested in CVE or just in countering terrorism, which is one of the many manifestations of VE. This chapter attempts to clarify this issue. The key argument is that Mozambique is currently applying a counter-terrorism strategy and is still far from employing a full CVE strategy that would deal with the beliefs of those engaged in VE, and therefore its root causes.

The chapter starts by outlining the presence of VE in Cabo Delgado. Next, it deals with the efforts by the Mozambican government to address the crisis; and finally, attempts by regional and international actors to do so.

The chapter draws on the Situation Report published recently by SADSEM and FES (Chingotuane et al. 2021), and seeks to contribute to a better understanding of all efforts towards PCVE in Mozambique. It is organised into five sections. The first section examines the origins of VE in Mozambique. It seeks to contextualise the basic elements that made it possible for VE to thrive in Cabo Delgado. The second section describes the reasons behind the establishment of VE in Cabo Delgado. It attempts to identify the root causes, drivers and triggers of VE in the province. The third analyses the Mozambican government’s response, and attempts to address the ongoing violence and VE in Cabo Delgado. The fourth section presents the conclusions as well as recommendations.

**The origins of VE in Cabo Delgado**

Mozambique is currently experiencing the outcome of processes that have unfolded over several decades. One of them is the migration of people, together with the migration of ideas. Prior to 2017, the ideas of Aboud Rogo Mohammed, a radical Kenyan Muslim cleric, began to spread into Mozambique and to influence discussions about Islamic religion. Government authorities associate the start of VE in Mozambique with illegal immigration. To this end, in August 2021, the minister of the interior, Amade Miquidade, ordered the secu-
rity forces to intensify the fight against illegal immigration. He argued that foreigners who entered the country illegally were also engaged in illegal activities, including terrorism (Miguel 2021). In other words, new and dangerous ideas were migrating into Mozambique, together with illegal immigrants.

In this broad setting, different scholars have analyzed the roots of VE in Cabo Delgado from different perspectives. Liazzat J.K. Bonate (2020) believes there was a history of jihad in Mozambique whenever a new stream of Islam was introduced. She argues that local Muslims often responded to the new practices with violence. Bonate (2019) believes violence has accompanied every moment of reform in local Islam, and advances arguments about the interface between local Muslims and outside elements from Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, the DRC as well as the Persian Gulf countries. For Bonate, the recent conflict is a result of the interaction between views on Islam within the Islamic community in Mozambique and those from outside.

The entrance of external actors is generally considered to have contributed to the development of VE in Mozambique. Bassist (2021) and Habibe, Forquilha and Pereira (2019) argue that external actors contributed to the growth of VE in Cabo Delgado by influencing Muslims who were educated abroad. Bassist (2021) adds that from the very beginning the group had links with Salafi circles in Tanzania, Kenya, and Somalia, with some of its members indoctrinated and trained in Tanzania, Sudan and Saudi Arabia. The link between the group and international terrorist networks was confirmed when the Mozambican combined security forces (FDS) seized bases and camps in Cabo Delgado, and extensive documentation was found. The camps contained extensive libraries with religious content associated with radical Islam as well as plans and guidelines emanating from other terrorist groups on how to embark on Jihad. This material was used, above all, to indoctrinate people in the coastal villages and those forcibly recruited or captured.

**Reasons for the emergence of VE in Mozambique**

VE in Mozambique emerged unexpectedly, and grew rapidly into a complex problem that required multiple solutions. Although numerous research reports, intelligence reports and academic studies have sought to explain the motivations and objectives of the extremist groups operating in Cabo Delgado, most of these analyses do not present clear evidence of their formal political, economic, social or religious demands. Little is known about the group other than the fact that it carries out brutal attacks on civilians as well as government
and Frelimo officials. Therefore, the reasons for VE in Cabo Delgado remain unclear.

Unlike most extremists or terrorists, the group rarely, if ever, presents any information about its objectives, grievances and demands. Speeches, presented in (very few) videos, associate the group with radical Islam, and basic demands for the creation of a caliphate or the need to expel the government from certain regions. There is a clear difference between these home-grown messages and the propaganda output of Islamic State – Central Africa Province (IS–Central Africa).

The group produced several propaganda videos and published several photographs showing their achievements rather than presenting their goals or their grievances. The videos were distributed on Facebook, YouTube, Instagram and WhatsApp, mainly when conquering important villages or barracks, when capturing large amounts of weapons, or killing a large number of soldiers or policemen. Videos calling for the creation of a caliphate and even those associating the group with the Islamic State are sporadic. This posture is contrary to the normal posture of a terrorist group. In this regard, Howcroft (2016:33-34) argues that:

(...) Terrorists can be quite open in laying out their strategy. It is useful for counter-terrorism (CT) professionals to examine and analyze these strategies whenever possible. They communicate their grievances, identify whom they hold responsible, and tell their followers what they should do about it. Terrorist strategies also provide insights into the group’s goals, likely targets, tactics and the audience they are trying to recruit.

Even though it has the ability to produce propaganda content and express its grievances, ambitions or political demands, the group operating in Cabo Delgado does not make that kind of appeal. Despite this lack of information, several analysts have enumerated a series of factors which they regard as the causes of VE in Cabo Delgado. In some cases, they have resulted from field research in the region or from interviews carried out with detained terrorists.

According to these analysts, a combination of internal and external factors facilitated the advent of VE in Cabo Delgado. They only differ about their weight. While some highlight domestic factors, others emphasise external factors. Even assuming that foreign links contributed to the growth of VE in Mozambique, authors such as Habibe, Forquilha and Pereira (2019) as well as Maquenzi and Feijó (2019) suggest that the main causes of VE in Cabo
THE DYNAMICS OF PCVE IN CABO DELGADO

Table 1: Causes of VE in Cabo Delgado

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Root causes</th>
<th>Drivers</th>
<th>Triggers</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural conditions</td>
<td>Conjurctural conditions</td>
<td>Instrumental conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High levels of poverty</td>
<td>Poor governance</td>
<td>Perception of a predatory economy that depletes the province's resources without compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High levels of economic exclusion</td>
<td>High levels of migration in resource-rich areas</td>
<td>Discontent with the government's apathy towards local complaints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong regional imbalances between south and north</td>
<td>High levels of investment and proliferation of companies</td>
<td>Expectations created by the 'Natural Gas Boom' not met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High levels of youth unemployment</td>
<td>Weak presence of defence and security forces</td>
<td>Discontent about high levels of investment and low levels of local development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor economic opportunities</td>
<td>Weak border controls in relation to illegal immigration and drug trafficking</td>
<td>Feelings of marginalisation and discrimination in respect of job offers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government failure to provide basic services (health, education, water, electricity)</td>
<td>Strong presence of international trafficking networks in drugs, wood, precious stones and poaching</td>
<td>Feelings of sociopolitical exclusion due to ethnic differences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High levels of illiteracy, which make people more vulnerable to extremist messages</td>
<td>Removal of citizens such as artisanal miners to pave the way for megaprojects and the extraction of rubies and graphite by private companies</td>
<td>Complaints about land grabbing and forced resettlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low levels of investment in infrastructure</td>
<td>Weak state structures, allowing the region to become a sanctuary for criminal networks and terrorist groups</td>
<td>Discontent created by violent repression of illegal miners involved in the illegal mining of rubies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence of 'ungoverned' or 'forgotten' spaces due to years of disinvestment and absent state</td>
<td>Legitimacy of state institutions eroded by gangsterism</td>
<td>Dissemination of extremist narratives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic-religious cleavages</td>
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Delgado are largely domestic including various political, economic, social, cultural and religious factors, and a lack of public security. They agree that some external factors have played a role, but regard them as secondary. Internal factors cited by them are listed in Table 1.

These factors are divided into three categories: root causes, drivers and triggers. The root cause is the core issue that sets in motion the entire causal chain that ultimately results in the problem of VE (ASQ, n.d.) The root causes
are mostly embedded in the fabric of a given society, and result from structural conditions. Structural conditions refer to the broader political, economic, social and environmental conditions that exist for a long period and compose that society. Drivers are the key factors that accelerate or aggravate structural problems. They are conjunctural, because they refer to specific historical events, processes and conditions that combine to forge favourable circumstances for worsening the problem. They inform people that something must be done to change the situation, but people avoid doing it without a clear-cut justification. Triggers are immediate events that are used as pretexts or justifications for acting against structural and conjunctural problems. They are instrumental by nature because they set the VE process in motion – the crucial elements, agents, and tools that make it happen. They are necessary for events to happen.

There is no consensus among academics, journalists, religious leaders and politicians about the role of internal factors. Many contest the idea that they are playing a dominant role, favouring external factors instead. The government prefers the idea that VE is caused by a contest for control of the province’s natural resources by greedy external role players rather than internal factors. In an address at a school for sergeants on 13 November 2020, President Filipe Jacinto Nyusi spoke about Mozambique being a victim of ‘envy’, and about being ‘assaulted’ by external forces (Omar 2020). While addressing parliament on 16 December 2020, Nyusi said terrorism in Cabo Delgado had a ‘foreign hand’. On this occasion, he said the leadership of the terrorist movement was mostly foreign, including ‘citizens of Tanzanian, Congolese, Somali, Ugandan, Kenyan origin, and individuals from other parts of the world’ (DW 2020). Likewise, the CNDS believes the country faces an ‘external aggression perpetrated by terrorists’ (Visão 2020). However, the majority of those involved in VE are Mozambicans.

**Government responses, and attempts to address VE in Cabo Delgado**

The fight against VE in Mozambique began before 2017. However, this analysis will focus on the period from 2017, when the government’s response began. It can be divided into four phases:

- The first phase comprised an incipient, unprepared and often incoherent response, based on a traditional security approach, and featuring the use of force by the defence and security forces;
• In the second phase, the security approach continued, with the support of private military companies (PMCs);
• In the third phase, the government continued the security approach, but also began to display a ‘reluctant openness’ to bilateral rather than multilateral or international arrangements. This is evident from the engagements with Rwanda and later SAMIM, as well as the EUTM-Moz and American missions. It increased collaboration with various national and international stakeholders, and recognised the need for a more holistic approach to the problem, more oriented towards combating VE. Despite these positive developments, the government still regards the military as the main instrument of combat.
• In the fourth phase, a more holistic and multidimensional approach begins to emerge, demonstrating a potential movement towards CVE rather than a mere counter-terrorism approach.

From avoidance to a counter-terrorism strategy
VE essentially took Mozambique by surprise. At the beginning there was no clear situational awareness in support of strategic and tactical decision-making. The paucity of intelligence about the VE group’s behaviour, objectives, structure, strategy and tactics indicated that the security forces were not in a good position to fight the enemy. The absence of comprehensive and systematically analysed information was detrimental to supporting security forces in developing the most efficient and effective response to the threat. This means that security forces were ill-prepared to prevent attacks or limit their consequences.

During the initial phase of the terrorist aggression, the Mozambican government sought to cooperate with Tanzania to stop the flow of terrorists along the Rovuma River border. Evidence seemed to show that, following counter-terrorism operations in Kibiti in 2017, a significant number of insurgents came from Tanzania. In this context, the Inspectors General of Police (IGP) of Tanzania and Mozambique, Simon Sirro and Bernardino Rafael, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Dar es Salaam on 15 January 2018 in which they agreed to cooperate on curbing terrorism, drug trafficking and other cross-border crimes (Club of Mozambique 2018). However, given the porous border, the agreement did not succeed in arresting the flow of illegal immigrants and terrorists into Mozambique.
When the attacks continued to escalate, the government decided to send the FADM into the area to help the police and work under its command. Operational command remained with the police even when violence escalated and continued to spread (Chingotuane et al 2021). The idea behind this was to maintain the impression that Mozambique was not fighting a war, but an action against ‘banditry’ that deserved a police response and not a military one. Despite the worsening situation, the national authorities refused to acknowledge that they were witnessing the advent of terrorism. To avoid naming it a military engagement, as demanded by civil society and the national press, the government declared that the state response was not dominated by any service, but involved the cooperation and collaboration of all the security forces, comprising the police, military and state security.

The initial FDS strategy was defensive and reactive, relying on its physical presence to inhibit insurgent activity. Tactics included increased vigilance, mounting roadblocks to deter enemy movement, and interdicting circulation in the most problematic areas and villages. This strategy was largely ineffective. Insurgents gathered more arms, mainly from the FDS itself, and began to attack heavily guarded villages and towns. Next, they turned their attention to bigger targets, including district capitals. By April 2020 insurgents were threatening strategic areas such as Pemba, but were pushed back by the South African-based Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) (Global Risk Insights 2022). In the meantime, the FDS changed to an offensive/proactive strategy based on search and destroy operations (Chingotuane et al 2021). Operations were conducted against enemy camps and bases, ambushes were laid along circulation routes, and capture actions were launched. This counter-terrorist approach also involved combat missions aimed at stopping terrorist attacks on villages, roads and barracks; combat missions to protect political institutions, infrastructure, towns and barracks against terrorist attacks; and missions to pursue terrorist groups responsible for attacking villages, towns and barracks.

Calls for mercenaries and equipment from international partners
Several international actors, including the US, France, Portugal and South Africa, presented proposals for supporting the fight in Cabo Delgado, notably by providing military personnel. However, the Mozambican government resisted these proposals, regarding itself as the only security provider in the country. International pressure on Mozambique to accept the offers increased daily, but the government was reluctant and unyielding. It intended to fight the
According to Martin Ewi of the Institute for Security Studies, ‘There was a serious misreading of the situation, a miscalculation that this was a small domestic problem, well within Mozambique’s capacity to snuff out’ (Chinaka, Wroughton & Warrick 2020). In fact, the FDS was facing huge challenges in tackling the insurgency. The Mozambican military and police was no match for the militants. A lack of equipment, low levels of training, logistical and supplies shortfalls, intelligence-gathering difficulties, poor counter-terrorist strategy, a lack of financial resources and corruption played against the FDS in its fight against the terrorists. Consequently, it was unable to prevent the group from controlling strategic areas in the nine districts along the coast of Cabo Delgado (Chingotuane et al 2021).

Eventually, the Mozambican government was forced to ask for help from various international actors, including the option of contracting PMCs (essentially mercenaries). The government was aware of Machiavelli’s advice to avoid mercenaries and auxiliaries, but resorted to this as a transitional solution, seen as a middle ground and less risky and problematic than a foreign military presence. This short-term measure would end once Mozambique had secured the kind of military support it wanted.

The government first turned to Russia. In August 2019, President Nyusi visited Russia. Following discussions with President Vladimir Putin, about 200 Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group arrived in Mozambique to contain the advances of the insurgents in Cabo Delgado in September of the same year (Opperman 2019). However, some say the Wagner Group was originally deployed to provide presidential security for the October 2019 elections, and its mission expanded afterwards as it began to undertake counterinsurgency operations (Faulkner 2022). After losing some officers in ambushes in Muidumbe, Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia, the Wagner Group withdrew in November, but returned to the conflict zone a month later. In March 2020, however, the Russian mercenaries finally withdrew from Mozambique, after failing in their mission to fight the terrorists.

Next, the government hired the South African Dyck Advisory Group (DAG), led by the Zimbabwean veteran Leonel Dyck (Nhamirre 2020). DAG began to operate in Cabo Delgado in April 2020. It was tasked with supporting security
operations in Cabo Delgado, mainly by providing air support (Cherisey 2021).

DAG helped to prevent major terrorist incursions, and forced the terrorists to retreat in some areas, but could not prevent them from attacking and occupying district headquarters in Mocímboa da Praia, Quissanga, Macomia and Muidumbe. DAG’s contract was not renewed, and it withdrew after a year, in April 2021.

In the meantime, the Mozambican government began to invest in improving Mozambique’s armed forces, thus enabling them to take over from PMCs. To this end, Mozambique sought the support of the Paramount Group, a South African contractor that provides defence equipment, training and advice (Zitamar News 2021). According to Cherisey (2021), from mid-2020 onwards, the Paramount Group and the Dubai-based group Burnham Global began to provide training, equipment, and advisory services to Mozambique. Paramount also trained Mozambican air crews in South Africa.

Mozambique also launched a diplomatic campaign to secure financial, material and logistical support from various international development partners, among them the French government. This was a logical move, as the huge Mozambique LNG Project in Cabo Delgado is operated by the French multinational energy and petroleum company TotalEnergies. In early 2021, growing instability in Cabo Delgado forced Mozambique LNG to withdraw all its personnel from its sites in Cabo Delgado, effectively bringing the project to a standstill. This threatened a huge loss to TotalEnergies as well as broader French interests.

In February 2020, the French minister for Europe and foreign affairs, Jean-Yves Le Drian, visited Mozambique. He was granted an audience with President Nyusi, during which they discussed the French interests in Cabo Delgado and the Mozambique Channel. Following this, the Mozambican government expressed its willingness to cooperate with France on maritime security, in the context of an agreement on military cooperation reached in 2004.

In the meantime, other southern African states became increasingly concerned about the situation in Mozambique. SADC member states, mainly the troika countries of the Organ for Cooperation on Politics, Defence and Security, met twice to devise a way to support Mozambique’s security forces. After its first meeting, on 19 May 2020, the SADC Extraordinary Organ Troika Summit of Heads of State and Government asked Mozambique to prepare a roadmap for addressing insurgency in Cabo Delgado, and asked SADC member states to support Mozambique in its fight against terrorist groups (Chikohomero
2020). The second meeting was the Extraordinary Organ Troika Summit plus Force Intervention Brigade-Troop Contributing Countries (Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa), the DRC, and Mozambique, held in Gaborone in Botswana on 27 November 2020, where Mozambique was represented by its minister of defence, Jaime Bessa Augusto Neto.

Besides these efforts, in a letter dated 16 September 2020, the Mozambican minister of foreign affairs, Verónica Macamo, asked the EU for logistical support and specialised training to combat the terrorist insurgency in Cabo Delgado (Lisboa 2020). In October 2020, the EU confirmed that it would provide training, logistics, and medical services to support the Mozambique military (Chingotuane et al 2021:13).

**The involvement of international and regional actors**

This third phase was triggered by two attacks on the town of Palma within three months. The first attack occurred on 1 January 2021, about five kilometres from the site where the LNG plant is being built on the Afungi peninsula. Because of the close proximity of the attack to the project implementation area, Total was forced to evacuate its foreign employees and send Mozambican workers back to their areas of origin, suspending its activities until security was guaranteed (VOA 2021). Following the attack, the SDF carried out operations that culminated in the expulsion and pursuit of the attackers. The second attack happened on 24 March 2021, the same date when Total announced that it would resume its activities in Afungi at the end of March.

Nyusi realised that Mozambique could not fight terrorism alone, and immediately sought the support of the US. The next day, on 25 March 2021, the US government and the government of Mozambique launched a two-month Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) programme, under which US Special Operations Forces trained Mozambican marines for two months (US Embassy Maputo 2021a). On 9 August 2021, both governments launched a second Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) military programme, under which US Special Operations Forces trained more than 100 Mozambican commandos and rangers (US Embassy Maputo 2021b). On 31 January 2022, they launched the third Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) programme (US Embassy Maputo 2022). The US government also provided medical and communications equipment.

The CNDS met on 9 April 2021 to discuss the situation in Cabo Delgado and the need to accept military support from external partners (Beula 2021). On
33 April 2021, Nyusi met with the Council of State to request advice on the possibility of admitting foreign forces into Cabo Delgado (Mozambican Presidency 2021). The Mozambican government was forced to acknowledge that it urgently needed international support. It faced a difficult choice: it could either open itself to a coordinated, cooperative and collaborative partnership with outside players, or it would have to greatly increase its own investment in security. Given the interest shown by states like Rwanda, the US, Portugal and others, as well as international organisations such as SADC, the UN and the EU, in providing material, financial and technical support, Nyusi decide to ask for additional international assistance.

Two weeks after the attack on Palma, on 8 April 2021, the ‘Double SADC Troika’ met in Maputo to discuss joint measures for combating terrorism in Cabo Delgado. It ordered a fact-finding mission to be deployed to Mozambique, the convening of an Extraordinary Meeting of the Ministerial Committee of the Organ by 28 April 2021, and another Extraordinary Organ Troika Summit to be held in Mozambique on 29 April 2021 (Madzimure 2021). After several postponements, the Mozambican government interpreted SADC’s decision-making on VE intervention in Mozambique as slow and hesitant, while Mozambique was in desperate need of support. After months of deliberations and disagreements, a SADC Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Maputo on 23 June 2021 finally decided to deploy a peacekeeping mission to Mozambique (Southern African Research and Documentation Centre 2022).

In the meantime, after the attack on Palma on 28 April 2021, Nyusi flew to Rwanda and asked President Paul Kagamé to assist. Just ten days later, a reconnaissance team of Rwandan officers arrived in Cabo Delgado, and a second delegation of 35 Rwandan officers arrived in Pemba on 23 June. Soon afterwards, the Rwandan National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) and Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) started operating in Cabo Delgado, in close cooperation with FDS.

On 9 July 2021, Rwanda sent in its first force – a contingent of 1 000 personnel from the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) and the National Police of Rwanda (RNP). Within two months, they had driven al Shabaab out of most of Mocímboa da Praia and Palma. It should be noted that the problem was not eradicated – rather, the rebels were displaced to other areas. Some analysts questioned the Rwandese deployment on the grounds that SADC was preparing to send its peacekeeping mission to Mozambique. The SADC Mission in Mozambique
(SAMIM) was approved on 23 June 2021. After some delays, it eventually began to arrive in Mozambique on 26 July, and the mission was formally launched on 9 August 2021 (Chingotuane et al 2021:18).

Following the appeal for support by Veronica Macamo, the European Council decided to create a military training mission in Mozambique (EUTM-Mozambique) in July 2021 (EC 2021). The mission was officially launched in Katembe on 3 November 2021. Ten EU members (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Finland, Estonia, Austria, Belgium, Greece, Romania and France) are involved in the mission, and have sent soldiers to Mozambique. The mission has a two-year mandate and its central strategic objective is to build the capacity of units of the Mozambican armed forces that will form part of a future Rapid Reaction Force (allAfrica 2022). EUTM Mozambique will train 11 companies: five companies of navy marines, and six companies of Army special forces (EUTMission-Moz 2022).

As is evident from the above, there are numerous actors involved in combating VE and improving security in Cabo Delgado. However, the fighting remains quite intense in the districts of Nangade and Macomia, which are under SAMIM control. In May 2022, these were the only districts of Cabo Delgado thought to remain unsafe due to the presence of terrorists (Achá (2022). Despite reports of sporadic attacks, the situation in the districts of Palma and Mocimboa da Praia – which fall under the Rwandan forces – has improved (Hanlon 2022). Nevertheless, the problem has not been eradicated – rather, the insurgency has shifted in character. The region cannot be considered completely safe, as in some areas violence still prevails. Terrorist groups have lost the initiative and the ability to make major incursions, but they remain alive and active, and have adopted the tactic of blending in with local populations. In the short term, the security approach has achieved satisfactory results. However, it does not guarantee security in the medium and long term, as the causes, drivers and triggers of the conflict are still present and, in some cases, have become more serious as the conflict has unfolded. The question that arises is: To what extent has the security approach managed to reduce VE in Cabo Delgado? And can VE be eliminated with a security approach alone? The answer is simple: extremism and VE cannot be eliminated by force alone.

**Moving from counterterrorism to CVE?**

The Mozambican government is well aware that force alone will not eliminate VE in Cabo Delgado. However it is not yet applying a CVE strategy that would deal explicitly with extremism, radicalisation and VE. Although the military
approach clearly plays a vital role, one should recognise that it cannot prevent or eliminate the spread of ideas and the radicalisation process. It also cannot pacify communities with deep-seated grievances, due to structural or conjunctural problems. It cannot erase the dissatisfaction created by unfulfilled promises, and perceptions of marginalisation and social exclusion. It is not effective in dealing with highly motivated people who were taught to believe in martyrdom. Any viable attempt to deter home-grown extremism and Islamic radicalism must centre on CVE strategies.

Therefore, the current counterterrorism strategy must be shifted to a CVE strategy – put differently, counterterrorism should just be a small component of a broader CVE strategy. Counterterrorism is focused on stopping acts of terrorism by those who have already achieved the Jihadisation phase, while CVE addresses every step of the radicalisation process. The latter conception is not widely supported by scholars and experts. Some believe the initial phases of radicalisation are suitable for a PVE strategy. Mirchandani (2017:4) argues that although some believe the two terms have different meanings, with PVE seen as proactive and CVE as reactive, they are fairly synonymous, as both include preventive measures that aim to address structural social, economic, and political grievances that lead to radicalisation. The main difference is that the term ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ gained traction within the UN and among European countries, while the term ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ is mostly used in the US. In this chapter, Mirchandani’s position is regarded as the most appropriate.

Assuming Mirchandani’s position, we believe CVE involves actions such as those defined by the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2015. The plan states that it is necessary to adopt a more comprehensive approach that encompasses not only ongoing and essential security-based counterterrorism measures, but also systematic preventive measures that directly address the determinants of VE. The plan argues that the fight against VE will only be effective if national development policies are aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Furthermore, it advocates the need to strengthen governance, inculcate respect for human rights and the rule of law, empower youths, involve communities, empower women through gender equality, improve education, and create jobs.

Strategies for preventing/countering violent extremism have been designed by scholars, governments, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In 2016, the UNDP released a document
titled ‘Preventing violent extremism through promoting inclusive development, tolerance and respect for diversity: A development response to addressing radicalisation and violent extremism.’ It contains a series of ‘Building Blocks’ for strategies to prevent VE. The document advises actors to focus on increasing economic opportunities; improving participation in decision-making; strengthening the rule of law; fighting corruption; strengthening institutional capacity at the local level to provide better public services and greater security; improving awareness of respect for human rights; the development of an alternative discourse through traditional and social media; and the adoption of programmes to strengthen the resilience of communities. Other UN documents highlight the importance of using education, sport, culture, and other means to prevent and counter VE. Taking all these perspectives into account, it is obvious that many strategies have been applied to PCVE. They can be summarised as a large wheel of approaches, presented in Figure 2.

We need to ask whether the Mozambican government is using any of these elements or approaches in its campaign against extremists in Cabo Delgado. The answer is that most of the approaches presented in the wheel are entirely absent from the efforts to combat terrorism adopted to date, and awareness of their importance still remains hazy. Despite this, the Mozambican government has made an effort to adjust its highly centred security approach to CVE. Although far from a full CVE strategy, some decisions and actions show that the government is heading in that direction. In fact, many initiatives are under way that could be included in the CVE concept, such as:

**Institutional development:**
- On 12 May 2020, the Council of Ministers created the Northern Integral Development Agency (Agência de Desenvolvimento Integral do Norte, or ADIN) to boost economic development in Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula and promote job creation for young people, as a way of discouraging them from joining terrorist groups. ADIN recognises the need for a holistic and multidisciplinary approach to the armed insurgency in Cabo Delgado, and has four main pillars: 1) humanitarian assistance, 2) economic development, 3) community resilience; and 4) communication
- In 2021, the government instructed the National Fund for Sustainable Development (Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento Sustentável, or FNDS) with coordinating projects for the recovery of Cabo Delgado, in partnership
with ADIN. FNDS seeks to promote and finance programmes and projects that guarantee sustainable, harmonious and inclusive development, with particular emphasis on rural areas.

- Another important actor engaged in humanitarian assistance is the National Institute for Disaster Risk Management and Reduction (INGD), created on 28 December 2020 by Presidential Decree nº 41/2020. INGD receives and channels support to victims of terrorism, contributes to the process of social reintegration of those affected in the communities, and assists communities in resettlement villages and other places where there are internally displaced persons. This institution is tasked with implementing the Internally Displaced Management Policy and Strategy (Política e Estratégia de Gestão de Deslocados Internos, or PEGDI).

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**Figure 2: Approaches to CVE suggested by several UN documents**

*Source: Developed by the authors.*
Strategies and plans:
- On 21 September 2021, the Mozambican government adopted the Cabo Delgado Reconstruction Plan (Plano de Reconstrução de Cabo Delgado, or PRCD) for the period 2021–2024, which aims to create the humanitarian, social and economic conditions for normalising life in the affected areas. The plan involves the regeneration of public administration, health facilities, schools, energy, water supply, sanitation, telecommunications, access roads, civil identification, psychosocial support and self-employment, especially for young people (Anacleto 2021).
- On 8 September 2021, the government announced a Policy and Strategy for the Management of Internally Displaced Persons (PEGDI), aimed at mitigating the adverse effects of armed conflicts, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights, and natural or man-made disasters. IDPs in vulnerable situations benefit from assistance.
- On 21 June 2022, the government approved the Northern Resilience and Integrated Development Programme (PREDIN), formerly known as the Northern Resilience and Integrated Development Strategy (ERDIN) created in November 2021. This has three pillars, namely (1) Support for building peace, security and social cohesion; (2) Reconstruction of the social contract between the state and the population; and (3) Economic recovery and resilience (Beula 2022). It aims to address the roots of poverty, exclusion, inequality, deficient human capital, and the lack of developmental gains in the North (Republic of Mozambique 2021).

Development projects:
Besides the above, the Mozambican government is implementing several specific projects in Cabo Delgado and the neighbouring provinces of Nampula and Niassa. They include the Mozland Project (Terra Segura), financed by the World Bank within the scope of the Emergency Response Plan in Northern Mozambique, and under the aegis of ADIN; and the MOZNorte Project (or Rural Resilience Project in Northern Mozambique), aimed at improving the socioeconomic conditions of the populations living in the north of the country. Many other projects are currently under way, implemented either by the state or undertaken by partnerships between the state and the private sector, international role players or local NGOs.

All these initiatives demonstrate that the government has accepted, albeit tentatively, that the solution to VE in Cabo Delgado involves the adoption of
multisectoral, multidimensional and multilateral approaches. The remaining problem is that these approaches are not being integrated into a single strategy, resulting in a wide range or dispersed and uncoordinated initiatives and projects. For instance, several international intergovernmental agencies and local and international NGOs are undertaking separate and individual projects committed to improving the living conditions of the inhabitants of the districts affected by the insurgency. PREDIN can be seen as the CVE Master Plan for Cabo Delgado and other northern provinces, but is still in its infancy. Its approval took too long, and financing is still unrealistically poor.

The approaches adopted so far lack various key elements of an effective PCVE strategy:

- These programmes and projects are not active in communities at risk of VE. While regions and communities most at risk of recruitment and influence to VE have been identified, no specific programmes have been introduced to reach these vulnerable communities;
- They do not take advantage of working with and employing civil society’s capacity to fight VE;
- The current approach seeks to respond to current needs and do not promote long-term solutions;
- There is no knowledge-sharing between government agencies created to Combat VE and CSOs, universities and the private sector;
- There is no effective collaboration between government agencies created to Combat VE and CSOs, universities and the private sector;
- There are no efforts to improve stakeholder coordination in respect of PCVE approaches;
- There is no alignment between national development strategies and programmes with PCVE initiatives;
- Programmes for reaching young people are still undeveloped;
- Programmes for promoting ‘inclusive’ inter-ethnic dialogue are not regarded as important; and
- There is little interest in funding independent studies that could provide better data and propose more effective interventions against VE.

Conclusion

Over the past five years, Mozambique has been combating ASWJ with a predominantly military or ‘hard’ security approach based on the concept of counterterrorism. While extremely important, this approach has not taken into
account the many causes, drivers and triggers that have made it possible for ASWJ to gain a foothold in Cabo Delgado. The military or security approach adopted is a simple solution to a complex problem. It has failed to stop the problem and, to some extent, helped to fuel the conflict. The steps taken by the Mozambican government have been slow, and require a degree of investment at the local level. Learning from its mistakes, as well as the experiences and strategies of other countries, the Mozambican government should change its approach into a proper CVE strategy – in other words, a multidisciplinary, multidimensional and multisectoral approach. A new, holistic perspective will have to be conceived and implemented.

Looking closely at Mozambique’s response, it is evident that many elements of effective CVE approaches are missing from the government’s strategy. Its response thus far is centred on addressing socioeconomic issues, by way of programmes designed to create jobs, build employment skills, fund productive activities, and improve local livelihoods. While these initiatives can be seen as a quick fix in an environment of economic inequality, they are unlikely to resolve problems related to incitement to hatred, religious manipulation, feelings of revenge because of the civil war, and other non-economic problems associated with radicalisation and VE. Moreover, these approaches place more emphasis on donor support, thereby making them subject to foreign interests. Mozambique’s resources for addressing the problems in Cabo Delgado are obviously limited, but high levels of dependence on external actors is not desirable or strategically feasible. Domestic solutions need to be found in the short, medium and long term.

Transformational changes can be made on three levels. The first is at the public policy and development strategy level, aimed at reducing regional imbalances. The second is at the governance level, aimed at bringing political actors together and providing space for participative governance. The third is at the level of inter-religious dialogue.

Although the government has begun to recognise internal factors that have helped to fuel VE, some figures in and around government still refuse to do so. Instead, the government must fully recognise the causes of VE and the potential risks of radicalisation, in order to improve its strategies for combating VE where it has flourished, and to prevent it from taking root in other areas. It needs to recognise that the causes, drivers and triggers of VE must be dealt with by means of credible, sustainable and long-lasting initiatives. Cosmetic changes undertaken for reasons of political expediency will ultimately produce
negative results. For instance, SAMIM and the Rwandan contingent are conducting purely military operations, neglecting the non-military aspects of VE. However, for a cooperative, collaborative and coordinated solution to succeed, it will also need to attend to non-military initiatives.

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Implementing a regional response to violent extremism and terrorism: the SADC Mission to Mozambique (SAMIM)

William John Walwa and Gabriel Malebang

SOUTHERN AFRICA was first hit by terrorism in 1998 with the bombing of the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. Since then, radical elements have continued to expand. The region now harbours notable terrorist groups, such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the DRC and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jammah (ASWJ) in Mozambique, operating in the historically unstable eastern DRC and northern Mozambique respectively (Cawthra 2008; Rich 2022).

On 15 July 2021, upon the approval of the Mozambican government, SADC deployed 2 000 troops from eight SADC member states to the province of Cabo Delgado in northern Mozambique, in the form of the SADC Mission to Mozambique (SAMIM). Its purpose was to neutralise the extremist insurgency within Mozambique and prevent it from spreading to other SADC member states. A week earlier, Rwanda, a non-SADC member, had deployed 1 000 troops to Cabo Delgado following an agreement with the Mozambican government (Zitmar 2022).

The SADC region has a history of war and conflict, during the struggle for independence and in the post-independence period. Apartheid and the proxy Cold War delayed the independence of South Africa and Namibia; these two SADC member states were the last two African countries to achieve independence (Massangaie 2018; Albuquerque & Wiklund 2015; Desmidt 2017). The persistence of the apartheid regime in South Africa triggered instability in several neighbouring countries, such as Angola and Mozambique. The DRC joined SADC in 1998 after the fall of Mobutu Sese Seko, and has been unstable since then. Other member states, for example, Madagascar and Lesotho, have wit-
nessed military takeovers of government despite the adoption of democratic governance in the 1990s (Cawthra 2008).

Even though the proxy Cold War and apartheid ended more than three decades ago, sustainable peace has yet to be achieved. Previously, conflicts and wars in the region were driven by political and ethnic factors. However, these conflicts have now become ideological, so much so that extremist elements have started to manifest in the existing conflicts and historically unstable areas.

SADC has its origins in the Frontline States, an informal political coalition of independent southern African countries bordering on South Africa and Rhodesia. Formed in the 1960s, it was committed to ending apartheid and white minority rule. The FLS included Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. Following Rhodesia’s independence in 1980, Zimbabwe became a prominent member.

In the late 1970s, the Frontline States agreed to collaborate on economic development as well, resulting in the formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), also in 1980. Membership grew to nine, with the addition of Malawi and Swaziland. Its founding declaration was titled ‘Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation’. As this title suggests, its main goals were to lessen dependence on apartheid South Africa and to stimulate economic development throughout the region.

In the early 1990s, SADCC decided to consolidate itself into a fully fledged regional coordinating body, the SADC. Membership was expanded with a newly independent Namibia. South Africa had not yet joined, but was expected to do so after its impending transition to democracy, and did so in 1994. Since then, SADC’s membership has increased to 16.

The transition to SADC was intended to address the joint security and economic problems facing the region in a new, post-liberation era (Hammerstad 2003; Gosa 2014; Van Nieuwkerk 2011; Hull and Derblom 2009). The idea was to establish a regional organisation with a broad mandate that encompassed political and security cooperation, economic integration, democratic consolidation and conflict resolution (Massangaie 2018; Mbuende 2001; Vanheukelom and Bertelsmann-Scott 2016; Cawthra 2008). This could also be conceived as a transition from ‘old regionalism’ to a ‘new regionalism’, which recognises economic development in the pursuit of regional integration (Mittelman 1996).

Therefore, both political and economic factors played a role in SADC’s genesis and formation. Politically, its emergence can be explained in terms of the history of liberation struggles in the region, developing into formal regional
cooperation. From an economic perspective, SADC should be understood in the context of markets, economic relationships, and factors of production. SADCC was largely formed to address the economic vulnerabilities of member states via increased economic coordination, and SADC to further advance regional economic integration (Nayoo 2013).

Regional security arrangements like SADC can also be explained via the concept of a multi-layered security community, which holds that security cooperation in a given region develops on different layers (Franke 2008). This concept is biased towards explaining security cooperation in the North, in the form of NATO and the EU, for example. But emerging security cooperation in Africa could also be understood in the same way, and could provide a helpful conceptual framework for tracing the slow path towards deciding on SAMIM and its eventual deployment in July 2021.

This chapter outlines SAMIM's origins, and examines its effectiveness, relevance and impact. The next section analyses its genesis and composition. The subsequent section examines the dynamics around a regional response to VE and terrorism in a specific member state. This is followed by a concluding section which summarises lessons learnt thus far, and records key issues facing SADC.

**The origins and nature of SAMIM**

SAMIM is a regional response to terrorism and/or VE. Even though the threat differs from traditional ones, SAMIM was conceived along similar lines. Any SADC peacekeeping deployment is preceded by a series of technical assessment missions and statutory meetings conducted by the SADC Defence Subcommittee and the Ministerial Committee of the Organ, supported by the Secretariat, with an ultimate report to the Summit of Heads of State and Government (SOHSG). Following the Summit’s approval of the deployment of a SADC Standby Force (SADC-SF), a number of technical documents such as the Concept of Operations (CONOPs) and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) are signed with the country in which the operation is to take place. Afterwards, SADC informs the African Union Commission (AUC), which presents the SADC decision to the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) in turn. Simultaneously, SADC informs the UN of its decision to deploy through the UN Secretary General. Such deployments are in line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which provides guidance on deployments by regional organisations.

SAMIM can be traced back to the SADC Organ Troika Extraordinary Sum-
mit of Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) plus the DRC and Mozambique, held in Maputo on 26 November 2020. The meeting was convened to discuss emerging security concerns in the region. Prior to deployment, a series of technical and statutory meetings were held, culminating in the 23 June 2021 SADC Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government which authorized the deployment of the SADC-SF, constituted as SAMIM, to Mozambique on 15 July 2021. The deployment was consistent with the requirements of the 2007 MoU establishing the SADC-SF, and the troops have been deployed in line with the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security. SAMIM has been deployed in terms of Scenario 6 of the African Standby Force which allows this in grave situations that require urgent intervention, and where one of the parties refuse their consent (Svicevic 2021).

SAMIM’s deployment has also been guided by the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity. The former provides that subsidiary organisations such as RECs closer to conflict situations should be given the right to intervene first as they are not only closer, but also more aware of the dynamics and nuances of the conflict. The principle of complementarity encourages regional formations to complement the efforts of continental and international bodies to promote peace and security. As will be discussed, the efficacy of these two principles largely depends on the availability of resources, both internal and external.

SADC has intervened in northern Mozambique largely because the extremist group was threatening the government’s authority and that of other SADC members. The extremist group active in the area claims it wants to establish a Caliphate. It has capitalised on the pre-existent sociopolitical and economic problems, such as the capacity constraints of the Mozambican security forces. Exposure to other extremist groups in the region – notably Al-Shabaab, ADF and the Islamic State (IS) – has helped the group to receive recruits from other countries. In 2019, IS acknowledged the affiliation of the Mozambican group, stating that it was part of its Central African Province. The group’s attacks in northern Mozambique have had severe political and socioeconomic repercussions, including the displacement of people and the disruption of the local economy. In November 2020, the number of internally displaced people was estimated at 400,000 (Rich 2022).

The attacks subsequently expanded to some areas in Tanzania. In October 2020, for instance, the extremists waged attacks on the Tanzanian border villages of Kitaya, Kilambo, Michenjele, Nanyamba and Mihambwe. By November 2022, the attacks had claimed the lives of 4,398 persons in Mozambique,
including fatalities from organised political violence (Cabo Ligado Weekly 2022). More than 70 per cent of those attacks targeted civilians. In December 2020, the attacks intensified and expanded to the natural-gas-rich district of Palma, forcing the LNG project to be suspended. Overpowered, the Mozambican government relied on local militia groups and private security companies to contain the threat (Cheatham, Long and Sheehy 2022; Bynum et al. 2021). This has been discussed extensively in chapter eight.

Extremist security threats in northern Mozambique started to occupy media attention during the last quarter of 2017. They were first reported in the province of Mocimboa da Praia, but then spread to more than five districts and parts of neighbouring Tanzania. Civilians, police stations, military bases and government installations were targeted (Bynum et al. 2021). The Mozambican government admitted in November 2020 that it needed external military support (ibid).

There are two possible reasons for the delayed regional response to the Mozambican crisis. The first is the Mozambican government’s decision to adopt a bilateral approach, notably engaging with Rwanda and contracting a private military company, the Wagner Group. The second is SADC’s failure to make effective use of its early warning system.

The SAMIM deployment was approved by an Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government on 23 June 2021. The troops constituting SAMIM are drawn from eight SADC member states, namely Angola, Botswana, Tanzania, South Africa, Malawi, Lesotho, DRC and Zambia. SADC statutory meetings which make decisions to deploy troops are attended by Organ Troika (incumbent, incoming and outgoing) member states, plus the country that will host the intervention. In subsequent meetings, Personnel Contributing Countries (PCCs) may also be invited to statutory meetings where details of the deployment are discussed. The Extraordinary Summit held in Maputo on 23 June 2021 was attended by all SADC Heads of State and Government and/or their representatives, except for the Seychelles.

SAMIM’s deployment was approved on 15 July 2021 for an initial period of three months subject to extension, depending on the operational situation on the ground. As noted previously, SAMIM troops have been committed by eight SADC member states. Nevertheless, the three months authorisation seemed unrealistic. This could partly be explained by the mistaken belief that SAMIM would address the problem very rapidly, or the need for individual countries to provide support to their troops. The deployment started with the establish-
ment of the Regional Coordination Mechanism in Maputo, and achieved full operational capability on 30 August 2021. SAMIM was expected to create a safe place for displaced persons and for humanitarian agencies to reach and support persons affected by the war.

SADC should be commended for its commitment to deal with the security situation in Mozambique at a time when national, regional and global economies were weakened by the Covid-19 pandemic, and the spike in the prices of fuel and food due to the Russia–Ukraine war.

SAMIM was also expected to help prevent the conflict from spilling over to other member states in the region. By late 2022, it had achieved this to a degree. Writing in June 2022, Cheatham, Long and Cheehy reported that the military intervention of SADC member states and Rwanda had disrupted the Islamist insurgency. ‘Security in key areas of Cabo Delgado and neighbouring provinces has stabilised, giving the Mozambican government – and its international backers – an opportunity to foster reconciliation leading to an enduring peace.’

SAMIM and the Rwandan forces managed to restore a degree of security in areas such as Mocimboa da Praia, Nangade Afungi, Mueda, Palma, and Macomia and Nangade by recapturing bases, seizing weapons, and pushing the extremist group out (SADC 2022). When they controlled these areas, extremist fighters could easily stage attacks in the neighbouring country of Tanzania. As noted earlier, before the deployment of SAMIM, numerous attacks had been reported in Tanzania. These included the attacks on Kitaya Village in Mtwara District and Michenjele Village in Tandahimba District on 14 and 18 October 2020 respectively. A few small-scale attacks were reported in 2021, but did not match the magnitude of the attacks on Kitaya and Michenjele. The attack on Kitaya, for example, left more than 150 families without homes; it was orchestrated by more than 100 armed extremist fighters that had crossed the border into Tanzania. Nevertheless, despite the progress made, Nangande and Macomia remain highly volatile (Pindula 2022), which created the impression that it would take longer for SAMIM to adequately address the problem.

SADC’s Extraordinary Summit on 12 April 2022 approved the transition of the SAMIM from Rapid Deployment Capacity to a Multi-dimensional Force (SADC, 2022). To this end, SADC started implementing a peacebuilding support programme, aimed at building the capacity of different stakeholders, including the police, prisons and NGOs. This programme was funded by the EU through the AU Commission Emergency Response Mechanism (ERM). It focuses on three areas: building the capacity of the police and correction cen-
trens, empowering and capacitating youths and women, and improving democracy and governance. Some US$300 million is required for the reconstruction plan in Cabo Delgado, of which US$100 million has already been secured (SADC 2022). This approach is similar to those adopted in other areas in Africa affected by terrorism and VE, notably West Africa, the Horn and the Sahel. Nevertheless, based on experiences in other subregions, the effectiveness, impact and sustainability of such programmes in Mozambique remain in question.

**SAMIM’S relevance**

The deployment of SAMIM conforms to various international, continental and regional policy instruments and frameworks, namely:

- The UN Charter, which provides the constitutional basis for the involvement of regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security.
- The AU Constitutive Act, which commits the organisation to promote and maintain peace, security and stability on the continent. Crucially, while recognising the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, it recognises the AU’s right to do so in the case of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, and the right of member states to request interventions from the union in order to restore peace and security.
- The AU Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council, which mandates the council to promote peace, security and stability in Africa; anticipate and prevent conflicts; promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction; and coordinate and harmonise continent efforts to prevent and combat international terrorism. It reiterates the right to intervene in the affairs of member states under certain circumstances, and the right of member states to request intervention.
- The SADC Treaty, which mandates SADC to consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability in the subregion. It provides for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, and a Ministerial Committee of the Organ.
- The SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, which provides for the protection of the people and safeguarding the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict, and inter-state conflict and aggression.
The SADC Mutual Defence Pact, 2003, which states that ‘no action shall be taken to assist any State Party in terms of this pact, save at the State Party’s own request or with its consent, except where the Summit decides that action needs to be taken in accordance with the Protocol’.

The MoU establishing the SADC Standby Brigade of 2007.

However, while this is not widely understood, SAMIM is not a formal SADC Standby Force, and did not start off as a force sanctioned by the AU under its APSA. SAMIM and its purpose is best described in a statement on the SADC website dated 10 November 2021. It states that the mission was deployed on 15 July 2021 following approval by the Extraordinary SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Maputo on 23 June 2021 ‘as a regional response to support the Republic of Mozambique to combat terrorism and acts of violent extremism’.

Its mandate was to support Mozambique to combat terrorism and VE in Cabo Delgado, restoring and maintaining peace and security, restoring law and order in affected areas; and assisting Mozambique, in collaboration with humanitarian agencies, to provide humanitarian relief to people affected by terrorist activities, including internally displaced persons (IDPs).

SAMIM comprised troops from eight SADC Personnel Contributing Countries, namely Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia, working in collaboration with the Mozambican defence force and other troops deployed to Cabo Delgado. It was supported by SADC’s Regional Coordination Mechanism (RCM), which reported to the Head of Mission and the SADC Executive Secretary.

The statement went on to say: ‘Since its deployment, SAMIM has registered a number of milestones, including recapturing villages, dislodging terrorists from their bases and seizing weapons and warfare material, which has contributed to create a relatively secure environment for safer passage of humanitarian support. Additionally, members of the community have developed confidence in SAMIM forces, feeling more secure and allowing internally displaced persons to return to their normal lives.’

Notably, SAMIM is not described as a Standby Force, and no mention is made of the AU or the APSA. In fact, when it was constituted, it was a purely regional initiative that was not sanctioned by the AU. It was only recognised as an ASF deployment by the AU’s PSC at a later stage. This raises a series of issues that will be discussed later. In the meantime, it is clear that SAMIM’s deploy-
ment was an attempt to address a compelling security threat within the jurisdiction of a SADC member state. In so doing, SADC was fulfilling its regional, continental and international security obligations.

**Timing of the deployment**

The fact that troops from a non-SADC member state, Rwanda, was deployed a week before SAMIM might seem to have detracted from SAMIM’s legitimacy. However, in the context noted above, SAMIM’s deployment was and remains consistent with a raft of international, continental and regional laws and policy frameworks, while the Rwandan deployment resulted from a bilateral arrangement between Mozambique and Rwanda.

There were behind the scenes dynamics surrounding the timing. According to Hanlon (2022), SADC attempted to deploy its troops before Rwanda, but the Mozambican government only allowed SAMIM to deploy after Rwanda had started operating in the gas-rich districts of Palma and Mocimboa da Praia. It is not clear why Rwandan troops have been deployed to these richly resourced areas, and SAMIM to less important areas.

According to Manadi Africa (2022), the Rwandan, SAMIM and Mozambican forces have not been optimally coordinated, making the terrorists appear to enjoy more freedom of movement in northern Mozambique than has actually been the case.

Troops from various SADC member states were separated during the SAMIM deployment because of the presence of Rwandan forces. These divisions have continued, and there are sentiments that SADC has been undermined. President Nampula Nyusi landed in Kigali in April 2021 for talks with the Rwandan president, Paul Kagame. Three months later, Rwanda deployed troops in northern Mozambique, before SADC could do so. According to Rich (2022), SADC regards the presence of Rwandan troops as a threat to its legitimacy, and the regional approach has to some extent raised questions about the relevance countries attach to SAMIM.

Historically, SADC has not been on good terms with Rwanda because of claims about the latter’s support to rebel groups in the DRC. Those tensions were more visible in 1998 and 2013, when SADC helped the DRC government to neutralise rebel groups. Differences between SADC and Rwanda were also felt in 2019 over the election results in DRC.

SADC member states have met several times to discuss the deployment of SADC troops in Mozambique. However, Rwanda has not been invited to attend
those meetings. This casts doubts on whether there is sufficient coordination
between SAMIM and Rwandan troops on the ground (Louw-Vaudran 2022).
Nonetheless, SADC has claimed that it has coordinated its activities with
Rwanda, and that they have shared information (Campbell 2022). There have
been discussions between Mozambique and Rwanda about extending the
Rwandan operation. It is not clear how whether this will happen, for how long,
and whether Mozambique has communicated those plans to SADC (Pigou
2022).

Actors beyond the regional level have also played a role. In the build-up to
the Rwandan and SAMIM deployments in early 2021, French President Emma-
nuel Macron is alleged to have held a number of meetings with Presidents
Nyusi of Mozambique, Kagame of Rwanda and Ramaphosa of South Africa.
During one of these meetings, in May 2021, Macron is alleged to have informed
Ramaphosa that France was prepared to participate in maritime operations,
but would otherwise defer to SADC and other regional powers. When, on 8
August 2021, Rwandan forces recaptured the port city of Mocimboa da Praia
near the LNG fields being developed by the French energy giant TotalEnergies,
France seemingly got what it wanted, namely to secure the investment of its
energy company (Prashad 2021).

Apparently, both Mozambican government figures and LNG investors
feared that deploying SAMIM near the gas fields would extend South Africa’s
influence over the area. This is why Mozambique was reluctant to give SAMIM
control over both gas-rich districts. Thus it was hoped that the presence of the
Rwandan force would dilute South Africa’s influence over the region. Nonethe-
less, South Africa has maintained its influence, since it has contributed more
troops to SAMIM than any other member state, and injected more funds into
the deployment through SADC’s assessed member states contribution formula.

In the meantime, the gas-rich areas have largely been restabilised. Rwandan
forces have retaken some key areas seized by the extremist group, for exam-
ple, the Port of Mocimboa da Praia as well as the Palma area. Yet this stability
is not sustainable, given that the attacks have extended southwards and into
the neighbouring province of Niassa. Sentiments about the marginalisation of
SAMIM also have the potential to reduce the morale of SAMIM forces. This is a
challenge that requires international and regional dialogue and intervention.
The SAMIM deputy force commander has refuted allegations of a lack of coor-
dination by explaining that SAMIM and Rwandese troops have separate areas
of responsibility, with the Mozambican defence force playing a coordinating
role. He claimed that there were no coordination challenges, although efforts to facilitate the joint deployment of SAMIM and Rwandese troops could be improved (SABC 2022).

Despite these successes, the situation on the ground in Mozambique is still not good enough for community members to go back to their normal lives (DefenseWeb 2022). More needs to be done to consolidate stability and to create a conducive environment for the resettlement of the population and to facilitate humanitarian assistance and sustainable development. The section below analyses the relevance, impact and effectiveness of the SAMIM deployment thus far.

**SAMIM’s impact**

Since its deployment, SAMIM troops have flushed out extremists from the forests, killed and captured insurgents, and handed over captives to local authorities. They have also rescued civilians who were kidnapped by the insurgents, and retrieved and confiscated materials such as weapons, vehicles, documents, computers, telephones and memory sticks. They then analysed the electronic equipment to gain intelligence and insights into the communications between the extremists and their financiers (SABC 2022).

At the same time, SAMIM faces challenges in respect of its conception of security. As is evident from its treaty and other key instruments, SADC has formally embraced aspects of human security, and incorporated this into its policy and other frameworks. However, in practice, it has tended to adopt a traditional, state-centric conception of security. As such, it has predominantly relied on military deployments in conflict situations in member states. While this may help to restore order, it does not provide long-term solutions. Military interventions have been launched in similar conflict situations, as in Libya, Mali and Nigeria, but have not produced the intended results because they do not address the drivers of those conflicts (Mlambo and Masuku 2020). Moreover, its early warning system, which is meant to articulate with other sub-regional and regional systems, and detect rising grievances, among others, is not working effectively. Among others, the EWC in Maputo is relatively new, underfunded and ineffective.

SAMIM is unclear about two issues – or at least seems to be in public. One is the number of insurgents killed and the whereabouts of remaining insurgent forces, which were initially estimated at 2,500–3,000. By January 2022, SAMIM estimated that only a few hundred were still active, and an unknown
number had moved to other areas of Cabo Delgado, infiltrated back into the civilian population, and moved north into Tanzania (Zitmar 2022). The second is equipment. SAMIM was meant to comprise 2,916 soldiers including two special forces squadrons, four military helicopters, two surface patrol ships, one submarine, and one maritime surveillance aircraft and support personnel. China donated another batch of military aid to the AU, to be shipped directly to Mozambique (Amani Africa: 2022). While no indication was given whether all of this materialised, as well as the contributing countries, this was significant for SAMIM to make an impact.

Until now, SADC has invested very little in peacebuilding efforts and human security issues after its peacekeeping missions depart from the war-torn areas (Nagar and Malebang 2016). No wonder, then, that some of those conflicts, such as the one in Lesotho, have been recurring. Since March 2022, SADC has initiated peace-building efforts in the area of human rights, democracy, and capacity-building for the police, prisons and CSOs. Nonetheless, the sustainability of this programme is questionable because it is donor-dependent (Louw-Vaudran 2022). One of the SADC’s weaknesses is that it has not been able to develop a sustainable funding mechanism for its peacebuilding efforts. Though well-intentioned, its peacebuilding initiatives may not be sustainable in the absence of a SADC Peace Fund.

Poverty, unemployment, human rights abuses and undemocratic governance have been cited as the main sources of insecurity (Lisakafu 2014; Cawthra 2008). According to Cawthra (2008), about 40 per cent of the population in the SADC region earned less than one US dollar a day, and 70 per cent less than two US dollars a day. In fact, security threats in the region are largely due to poverty, unemployment and other human security-related problems. Put differently, many security problems in the region are internal and related to human security (Hammerstad 2003). Even so, SADC’s interventions have largely been military rather than seeking to address the underlying factors causing conflicts in these countries.

Research has shown that the main drivers of terrorism and VE in Africa are poverty, unemployment and the marginalisation of local populations (Wignaraja, Collins and Kannangara 2019; UNDP 2017). This is certainly the case in northern Mozambique, where economic and political marginalisation and poverty have created a conducive environment for extremists to gain ground and recruit a marginalised youths (Morier-Genoud 2020). Following independence, northern Mozambique was a battleground between the ruling party,
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Frelimo, and the rebel movement, Renamo. This civil strife lasted for nearly 15 years (1976-1992), and claimed the lives of about one million people (Morier-Genoud 2020).

Northern Mozambique was also marginalised during Portuguese colonial rule, and received less investment in social services and infrastructure. Northern Mozambique is very rich in natural resources like gold, timber, rubies and natural gas, but this has not improved the lives of local people. Security in Cabo Delgado has been weakened by this history of marginalisation, and this fragility further weakened the capacity of the Mozambican government to act against the extremist fighters (Mlambo & Masuku 2020).

It is against this backdrop that SADC deployed about 1 500 soldiers to neutralise the threats from VE and terrorism in Cabo Delgado on 15 July 2021. Three hundred troops from South Africa were added in 2022, bringing the total to 1 800 (Pigou 2022). The size of the SAMIM force is still relatively small compared to the magnitude of the problem, which has spread through five districts. Since this is the first intervention aimed at neutralising terrorism in SADC’s history, the regional body ought to have deployed more troops (Rich 2022). SAMIM troops on the ground are about a third of the number recommended by the Technical Assessment Mission in April 2021, and nearly one third come from South Africa (Pigou 2022). The contribution of troops is based on the SADC-SF roster and pledges from SADC member states.

There are two perspectives on the limited contributions to SAMIM of SADC member states. One is that this is due to financial distress caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. The other is related to the perennial issue of political will. SADC member states have not demonstrated a clear and consistent commitment to pledging troops and equipment. This relates to the number of countries as well as military personnel. As noted previously, SAMIM comprises troops from eight SADC member states. By contrast, Rwanda, a non-SADC member initially deployed about 1 000 military personnel (Hanlon 2021) and later increased this to nearly 2 000 (Louw-Vaudran 2022). In other words, a single non-SADC member state has contributed more troops than 16 SADC member states. If each member state had contributed 250 military personnel, there would be 4 000 on the ground. This would clearly have had a far greater impact. At the same time, analysts have noted that Rwandan troops enjoy external support from western powers, specifically France (Prashad 2021).

The case of SAMIM is akin to previous interventions by SADC. In practice, interventions in conflict situations in SADC member states have been the busi-
ness of only a few member states (Desmidt 2017). Troops that controversially intervened in the DRC in 1998 came from three countries only, namely Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. In the same year, only Botswana and South African troops intervened – as controversially – in Lesotho in the absence of any formal guidelines on how interventions in the internal affairs of member states should be undertaken. The Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security was only ratified in 2001.

Again, in 2012, only three SADC member states, namely Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa, deployed 3 000 troops to neutralise the M23 rebels in the DRC (Nagar & Malebang 2016). This intervention was significant in that the troops managed to flush out the rebels within a short period of time and to stabilise the situation. Generally, the impact of SADC interventions can be gauged in terms of their duration, and the degree to which the problem has been resolved.

SAMIM’s relatively small size has reduced its capacity to deal with the problem. As Pigou observes: ‘The few hundred troops that are in the field are thinly stretched over several affected districts, and lack adequate air support. While they have made progress in several areas, they lack capacity to build adequate intelligence and respond to ongoing attacks in affected districts’ (2022).

This has made it impossible to address the changing dynamics of the war, especially the movements of extremist fighters from one area to another to escape SAMIM and the Mozambican forces. For instance, while the security situation has stabilised in Mocimboa da Praia, Palma, Nangade and the northern part of Macomia, attacks have reportedly shifted southwards towards Pemba, the capital of Cabo Delgado. Other areas, such as Nampula, are also on high alert. Recent reports indicate that attacks are now taking place in areas near Pemba where SAMIM is less present (Louw-Vaudran 2022). On 5 September 2022, terrorists attacked villages in the Erati and Membia districts in the northern province of Nampula (Nyusi 2022). In March 2022, areas in Nangage district on the border with Tanzania experienced attacks. When SAMIM responded, the attackers left the area and moved southwards. The jihadists may take over the town of Pemba if SAMIM and the Rwandan forces are not properly coordinated.

In sum, SAMIM has been seen and felt, but should be significantly enlarged with additional troops and equipment to cover the vast area in which the extremists are operating, and eluding SAMIM and Rwandan forces. This should be done alongside the operationalisation of the de-escalated SAMIM Scenario 5 mandate, which focuses on humanitarian assistance, human security, and
other peacebuilding activities. The insurgents are now employing different strategies which require strengthened intelligence, early warning, and counter-terrorism capabilities from SAMIM troops.

**SAMIM’S effectiveness**

SAMIM’s effectiveness should be assessed in the context of the global recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic. Securing resources during the pandemic was a major obstacle to SADC’s ability to deploy sufficient troops. Previous interventions depended on foreign support, but this time around the international community itself was struggling to recover from economic hurdles caused by the Covid-19 pandemic (Paquete 2021). SADC has been commended for raising internal resources from assessed member state contributions. This has demonstrated a technical ability to deploy a basic military force, but questions about its long-term efficacy remain.

Like SADC itself, SAMIM depends on donor support. In 2015, for example, about 76 per cent of SADC’s budget of US$83 million came from donor contributions, with member states only able to contribute 21 per cent (Desmidt 2017). In July 2015, the executive secretary of SADC, Stergomena-Lawrence Tax, revealed that 71 per cent of SADS’s budget was funded by donors in Europe, North America and Asia, with member states supplying the remaining 29 per cent only. Donors contributions are meant to supplement those of member states, but remain SADC’s main source of funding (SADC 2014). This makes it difficult to achieve effective and sustainable military and diplomatic interventions in the region, as demonstrated by SAMIM’s personnel and equipment shortages. This also means that, should external support cease for any reason, the problem in question will remain unresolved or only partially resolved.

Due to these financial constraints, SAMIM’s sustainability is uncertain. In particular, it may also be very difficult to increase the number of troops on the ground (Amani Africa 2022). Initially, SADC calculated that it needed US$12 million, meant to come from contributions of member states as well as its Contingency Fund. The plan was to deploy 3 000 troops, but only half were deployed in 2021 (Paquete 2021). As the independent African policy think-tank Amani Africa has noted (2022):

> There is a considerable gap between the total budget of the mission (US$35 million) and the amount of money raised by SADC, which stands at less than US$13 million. The budget deficit is expected to widen further with the latest mandate extension
and the allocation of an extra US$29.5 million, according to media sources. This is in addition to logistical challenges that the mission is currently facing.

Given this, SADC asked the AU for additional funding. In March 2022, it received 2 million euros from the EU through the AU’s Emergency Response Mechanism, and 15 million euros under the European Peace Facility. The latter was granted for camp fortifications, vehicles, boats, and medical and other equipment. EU support was not meant to sustain SAMIM troops (Amani Africa 2022), but rather to help civilians recover from the humanitarian crisis (Crisis-Group 2022). SAMIM’s deployment was extended in January 2022 and March 2022 (Louw-Vaudran 2022), and in August 2022 for an unspecified period.

SAMIM’s effectiveness can be assessed in terms of the extent to which it has managed its deployment challenges in the context of its financial constraints. In the course of 2022, SADC promised to find solutions by increasing the number of soldiers on the ground. Personnel contributing countries and other SADC member states would be expected to pledge more troops. Speaking during a visit to bases in northern Mozambique, the SAMIM force commander, Major General Xolani Mankayi, said SADC was working to address complaints about the welfare of soldiers as well as the small number of soldiers on the ground (DefenseWeb 2022). Some personnel contributing countries, notably Lesotho, have indicated that they may find it difficult to continue honouring their commitments because of financial constraints. South Africa, Namibia, Zambia and Malawi have indicated a willingness to extend their support (Pigou 2022). However, unless more SADC member states pledge additional troops and equipment, it stands to reason that SAMIM’s effectiveness would largely rely on the support of international cooperating partners.

SAMIM’s effectiveness on the ground has been demonstrated by its ability to find and overrun insurgent bases, evict the insurgents, and in some instances kill. In September 2021, SAMIM established a Joint Intelligence Task Team to study material collected at insurgent bases. This enabled SAMIM to gain further insight into the leadership, membership and organisational structure of the insurgency. This information informed subsequent SAMIM operations aimed at disabling remaining insurgent bases in the Macomia area in November and December 2021 (Zitmar 2022). Judging by the drop in attacks and killings by extremists, this strategy appears to have been effective.

In sum, SAMIM, together with the Rwandan forces, have achieved a degree of success in containing the extremists. Previously, extremist fighters easily
mounted cross-border attacks in neighbouring Tanzania. Notable incidents included attacks on Kitaya Village in Mtwara District and Michenjele Village in Tandahimba District on 14 and 28 October 2020. A few attacks were reported in 2021, but they were far smaller. The attack on Kitaya, for example, was orchestrated by more than 100 extremist fighters who had crossed the border into Tanzania, and left more than 150 families without homes.

At its summit on 12 April 2022, SADC commended SAMIM for progress made in stabilising northern Mozambique. As a result, member states approved the SAMIM’s transition from Rapid Deployment Capacity to a Multidimensional Force (SADC 2022). Following this transition, SADC started to implement a peacebuilding support programme, among others by building the capacity of the police, prisons, and NGOs to deal with security threats. This programme is funded by the EU through its Emergency Response Mechanism (ERM). It focuses on three areas: building the capacity of the police and correctional centres; empowering and capacitating youth and women; and promoting democracy and good governance.

It is hoped that these interventions will begin to address some of the root causes of the problem in Cabo Delgado. SADC and the Mozambican government would then need to concentrate on stepping up development in northern Mozambique. This would need to be financed on a sustainable basis, ideally from contributions by member states. Some US$300 million is required for the reconstruction plan in Cabo Delgado, of which US$100 million has already been secured (SADC 2022b). However, despite these successes, the situation has not improved to the point where community members can return to their homes and resume normal lives (DefenseWeb 2022).

**Lessons learnt, and key issues for SADC**

SAMIM is the first instance where regional troops have had to contend with a faceless opponent using unconventional methods and VE as a weapon of choice. To avoid a relapse, SAMIM and its partners have the monumental task of detaching the insurgents from their communities. Among others, this will require training in unconventional methods.

Since SAMIM’s deployment, life has begun to return to normal in some parts of Cabo Delgado. Under its Scenario 5 mandate, SAMIM should assist the Mozambican government to undertake a process of Security Sector Reform, notably by professionalising the sector and improving its capacity. This process would need to incorporate some indigenous and context-specific reforms.
which will enable security sector personnel to fight faceless opponents when needed in the future. One way of achieving this would be to create local peace committees throughout Cabo Delgado, incorporating traditional leaders, religious leaders, youths, women, disabled people, government officials, private sector representatives, politicians, and security sector representatives. Peace infrastructure should be created at a higher level than elsewhere in Africa, where problems have not been resolved in the long run.

As done elsewhere in post-conflict settings, local peace committees should be set up in each ward in the province, tasked with defining the threats to the security of their communities, and formulating durable ways in which these problems could be resolved. This means that security threats would be addressed by communities themselves, instead of via methods dictated by outsiders. Ultimately, this would help to transform the dynamics surrounding conflict situations in Africa, as well as their resolution. Flowing from this, SADC should expedite the deployment of other SAMIM structures needed for Scenario 5, including the head of the civilian component and the police component, as well as the envisaged appointment of personnel to support SAMIM’s leadership.

SAMIM should roll out an elaborate ‘strategy to win hearts and minds,’ in order to strengthen relations between itself and local communities, as an essential longer-term goal. This is vital, because local people support insurgents largely out of fear (Zitmar 2022).

SADC should make a bigger effort to complete the SADC-SF Regional Logistics Depot in Rasesa village, north of Gaborone in Botswana. Work on the depot has been dragging on for more than five years. On the one hand, member states seem to lack the political will to commit the required funding. On the other, they remain choosy about the international cooperating partners from which they are prepared to receive funds for peace and security.

The pledging gaps for personnel and equipment by member states need to be closed. Member states need to explicitly pledge for the SADC-SF rapid deployment capability, and finalise pledges for the strategic airlift capability. Rostering for the police and civilian components of the SADSC-SF need to be completed, and its logistical, equipment and counter-insurgency capabilities need to be strengthened. The SADC-SF needs to finalise and put in place its Command, Control, Communication and Information System (C3IS). Similarly, SADC needs to finalise the establishment of the Peace Fund, thereby ensuring predictable funding for future operations and missions of the SADC-SF.

Ultimately, SADC needs to consider giving preference to non-traditional
and non-military approaches to resolving asymmetrical security threats. These should include the methods outlined above which privilege the role of local communities and stakeholders in peacebuilding efforts, thereby allowing the root causes and drivers of conflicts to be decisively addressed.

The defence sector of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Affairs should work more closely with the state security sector in providing early warning and counter-terrorism intelligence from open community sources as opposed to an over-reliance of intelligence from the closed state-sponsored sources which currently feed the REWC. This can be achieved by creating a regional peacebuilding network akin to the West African Network of Peace-building (WANEP) which produces and shares intelligence and early warning information from communities in conflict situations around the region, compiled by civil society. The intelligence sent to the ECOWAS Commission fills a vital niche, and helps to reduce the blind spots and grey areas in regional conflict prevention efforts.

**SAMIM and its articulation with the APSA**

As noted previously, SAMIM was initially launched as a purely regional initiative and was only endorsed by the AU PSC in January 2022, six months after its deployment. Despite the AU not having command and control of SAMIM, and the mission not being required to adhere to the AU PSO Doctrine, the PSC confirmed that the SAMIM had been deployed ‘within the framework of the ASF’. As noted by the ISS PSC Report (2022), this does not conform with the PSC Protocol, which requires the AU to be in full command and control of ASF missions through a special representative, force commander and police commissioner appointed by the AUC chairperson.

In response to these issues, the Report states, AU policy actors have been discussing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on the ASF with RECs and regional mechanisms (RMs). ‘Experts hope the MoU will clarify the division of labour and respond to questions about the political, legal and operational decision-making process of deploying the ASF.’

All this points to a continued lack of clarity about how RECs and specifically regional peace support operations should articulate with the APSA. While this issue will not be pursued further in this chapter, it clearly has an important bearing on the future peace support operations of all RECs, including SADC, as well as the ideal of an integrated African peace and security system operating under the AU.
Conclusion
It is evident from the above that SAMIM has helped to stabilise Mozambique, a country with a long history of civil strife which is now battling with VE. Historically, SADC troops have never previously addressed regional security threats so vigorously. While ultimate success is still not guaranteed, SAMIM has bought the Mozambican government time to work at attaining durable and sustainable peace in its northern province.

The importance and relevance of the SADC-SF cannot be overemphasised. Regional peace and security depends on effective preventive and corrective measures such as the SADC-SF. The state of readiness of the SADC-SF is determined by a combination of factors such as the availability of equipment, trained personnel, easy mobilisation procedures, and practiced or exercised contingency PSO measures. This can be achieved through the collective support of member states, the AU, and international cooperating partners. An effective and impactful SADC-SF, currently deployed as SAMIM, is vital for realising SADC’s Vision 2050.

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REGIONAL RESPONSE: THE SADC MISSION TO MOZAMBIQUE


Preventing and countering violent extremism: African experiences and lessons for the region

Rasul Ahmed Minja

Africa is a leading theatre of experimentation and execution of a whole gamut of PCVE-related policies, strategies and programmes, especially since the adoption of the UN’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (2015). Whether the problem at hand is conceived as VE or ‘networked terror’ (Crenshaw & Cusimano Love 2003), the threat has an inherent transnational dimension that will always warrant solutions beyond unilateral state responses. Since 2008, as Menkhaus (2015:399) has rightly remarked, Africa has been in the spotlight in respect of counter-terrorism strategies and approaches simply because ‘Al-Qaeda’s affiliates are now considered to be a greater global and regional security threat than al-Qaeda itself. Many of these affiliates – Al-Shabaab, AQIM, Boko Haram, Ansar Dine – are in Africa.’ More or less the same can be said about the prominence of VE incidences, since the dual set of threats, i.e. terrorism and VE, are bedfellows. A cursory look at the spatial spread of transnational security threats in Africa will reveal that, in most cases, the hot spots of terrorist activities correspond with areas where reports of VE have surfaced.

The purpose of this chapter is threefold: to synthesise similar experiences elsewhere in Africa in preventing and countering VE; draw lessons for southern Africa and Mozambique; and offer recommendations to governments, CSOs, SADC and other partners. It does not provide a systematic comparative account of PCVE initiatives across African regions. Subsequent discussion may permit some comparative analyses, but that would be a secondary, unintended goal. Neither does it provide a systematic review of the active engagement and inaction by extra-regional actors (see chapter seven), including the A’s involvement via its security architecture (see chapter six). Also excluded is the spe-
cialised coverage of an array of legal frameworks adopted by African countries (see chapter five). It will, however, feature what has worked and what policies, strategies and programmes, if any, have fallen short of delivering tangible positive results in state-led, non-government and collaborative responses to VE in Africa.

These responses can be classified into five categories: deterrent methods (involving mainly military means, which can also be referred to as kinetic strategies); use of the criminal justice system (i.e. pursuing the extradition, prosecution and incarceration of suspects); legislative and policy-oriented methods (passing amendments to legislation, including tightening provisions to counter-terrorism and VE); negotiation methods (i.e., making concessions with Non-States Armed Groups [NSAGs] in exchange for the groups’ renunciation of violence); and other methods (i.e., employing all the previous approaches at the same time but also in addition to strategies that do not neatly fit into any of the preceding four typologies).

The next section will examine the implementation of these approaches in four regions, namely the Horn of Africa (HoA), the Sahel, North Africa and Central Africa.

**Preventing and countering VE in four African regions**

**THE HORN OF AFRICA**

The HoA, also known as the Somalia Peninsula, is the easternmost extension of the African land mass. For our purposes, it includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. The HoA is of special interest because it was one of the first terrorist and VE hotspots in Africa. The region has likewise witnessed a beehive of PCVE activities corresponding to the threats posed by violent extremists. The Horn has been tormented by Al-Shabaab, which had established a foothold in Somalia despite sustained military operations by regional and extra-regional actors. The region has also witnessed a spate of sectarian violence from 1995 to date within Muslim, Christian and protestant-evangelical communities. Somalia and Kenya have borne the brunt of Al-Shabaab’s atrocious attacks. By the end of 2019, Al-Shabaab was responsible for five major terrorist attacks, including those directed at the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi; the DusitD2 business complex, also in Nairobi; Garissa University College in Garissa, Kenya; and the coastal Kenyan town of Mpeketoni (Shire 2021a).
Predominance of deterrent methods

Deterrent methods through militarism and counter-insurgency (COIN) have taken centre stage in responding to the threat posed by Al-Shabaab. This group initially declared allegiance to Al-Qaeda in 2012 and ISIS (‘Da’esh’) in 2016, and established links with Boko Haram (Nigeria). Attempts to open up dialogue between Al-Shabaab and the Somali government have received little scholarly attention. It has been noted that the Al-Shabaab group, under one of its most prominent founding members, Adan Hashi Farah Ayrow, appeared more inclined to conduct dialogue with the Transnational Federal Government (TFG), subject to two main conditions: the removal of Ethiopian forces, and the imposition of Sharia law (Shire 2021a). At that stage, the TFG was still maintaining a no-negotiation policy, until a new administration took over and changed its stance on negotiating with the enemy (Al-Shabaab). Shire (2021b) notes that despite the Ethiopian forces leaving the scene in 2009, and the Somali parliament’s unanimous endorsement of Sharia law in April the same year, no open and formalised negotiations took place. Instead, the Al-Shabaab leadership changed its pre-negotiation conditions: talks with the government could only start once the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had replaced the Ethiopian forces, and the TFG had ‘repented’ for its ‘apostasy’ and returned to the fold of Islam (Shire 2021a:10).

This does not mean that negotiation as a method did not take place in less formalised, secretive and indirect settings. Scholars have documented two prominent roles played by Somali elders. First, they have acted as mediators by successfully securing the release of several abductions by Al-Shabaab. At times they have acted on behalf of state authorities and international organisations, and on other occasions they have taken on the responsibility of negotiating on their own accord. For instance, the elders’ ‘truce-brokers-cum-mediators’ role is credited for averting the public decapitation of several hundred captured government troops by Al-Shabaab in Gal’ad town in the central region of Galgadud in 2016 (Shire 2021a). Second, Somali elders have also been known to successfully negotiate access to the delivery of humanitarian aid, particularly in zones controlled by Al-Shabaab. Additionally, they constitute the most convenient ‘eye-on-the-ground’ human intelligence network or, as referred to elsewhere, ‘the best-performing early warning network’ (Gelot and Hansen 2019; Shire 2021a). They are not only the most preferred first point of contact for would-be Al-Shabaab defectors (i.e. those who wish to defect), but also the first to be tipped off about youths on the verge of becoming radicalised.
**CSOs as CVE brokers**

The use of CSOs as CVE brokers has also gained traction in the HoA region. Meinema (2021) provides a perceptive account of how Muslim-led CSOs implement CVE in the Kenyan coastal town of Malindi. Two anonymised CSOs which feature as case studies have undertaken the delicate exercise of adapting the CVE programmes to their local context and the CVE policies sponsored by western donors. Why was Malindi picked for this kind of intervention despite not experiencing any major attacks? According to Meinema (2021), this was due to the fact that Malindi had been used as a recruiting ground and a convenient sanctuary for the Al-Shabaab group.

The CSOs in question implement a CVE programme popularly known as ‘Building Resilience in Civil Society against Violent Extremism.’ In brief, the programme, which is supported by the UK Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, brings together Muslim and Christian youths who take the lead in identifying the push and pull factors which they consider to contribute to radicalisation and extremism. Besides organising inter-faith and community dialogues, the programme coordinates training sessions on entrepreneurship for Madrassa teachers, women and youths.

In an assessment of the BRICS programme by Muslim-led CSOs in Malindi, Meinema (2021:271) notes that

> ... BRICS partners generally avoided discussing sensitive issues that emphasise religious conflict or difference, including violent extremism. In the rare cases that violent extremism was discussed, Muslim participants or CSO staff strove to “demystify” the idea that terrorism or violent extremism is somehow related to Islam. ... The mobilisation of Islam to preach peace and national unity allows Muslim-led CSOs to raise donor funds, and Muslim leaders to play public roles as religious leaders (*viongozi wa dini*) who provide guidance to society. Yet, the desire to present Islam as peaceful also strongly affects forms of Islamic mobilization in Malindi, because it limits possibilities to address widespread feelings of marginalization amongst Kenyan Muslims (2021:275).

The contribution of CSOs to the PCVE sector is well documented. Nevertheless, much to their consternation, their engagement with this sector has not been all that smooth. For instance, CSOs engaged in PCVE efforts in Kenya were not pleased with the February 2019 amendments to the Prevention of Terrorism Act which, among others, entrusted the National Counter-Terrorism
Centre with authority to approve all CSOs engaging in PCVE (Mesok 2022). To some of the CSOs, the extended mandate of the centre was problematic. It posed the risk of adding a superfluous regulatory regime for CSOs, which could practically forestall their commitment to supplement government efforts in PCVE initiatives.

One of the significant contributions of CSOs in the PCVE sector, which has received less appreciation from state authorities, is monitoring PCVE implementation. By keeping a close eye on state-led responses to VE in particular, CSOs ensure that CVE responses do not become extreme, thereby generating more violent extremists, i.e. countering ‘extremism’ in state-led counter-violent extremism undertakings, which we can refer to as ‘CES-CVE’. CES-CVE is a direct response to malpractices such as extra-judicial killings, the enforced disappearance of suspects, ethnic and racial profiling, the unconventional interrogation of suspects like waterboarding, the harassment of civilians, and so on, during the implementation of CVE programmes. CSOs usually launch CES-CVE campaigns through a variety of methods ranging from open criticism via press conferences to independent fact-finding missions and the publication of reports on human rights violations during CVE operations.

Setting up deradicalisation centres is another element of CVE intervention that has been attempted in the Sub-Saharan context, particularly the HoA, albeit with mixed results and reactions. In Somalia, for instance, deradicalisation centres were set up in Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo and Belet Weyne with support from western governments, private individuals and CSOs. Gelot and Hansen (2019) note that, on the one hand, the deradicalisation centre in Mogadishu, named the Serendi Centre, was at the receiving end of a barrage of criticisms from Somali government leaders, elders, religious leaders, DDR experts and human rights activists for lack of transparency and mistreatment of inmates. On the other, facilities set up in Baidoa, Weyne Bay-Bakool, Belet Weyne and Kismayo grew in importance and were viewed as more ‘open and beneficial to the surrounding communities than the Serendi Centre’ (Gelot & Hansen 2019). They further note:

Importantly, the activities in these centres combine DDR with CVE, adjusting their activities for disengaged al-Shabaab members. They are an illustration of the type of DDR-like work that has drawn the DDR and CVE policy communities closer together. These are examples of how global militarism, through its inclusion of DDR as counter-insurgency, influences the CVE agenda (2019:569).
Equally important is that much of PCVE efforts has been directed at both types of religious conflicts (i.e. theological and inter-religious conflicts) even though we may not be able to establish which of the two types have enjoyed a greater share. Meanwhile, drawing elders and religious leaders (Sheikhs) into CVE seemed a convenient medium-term reactionary measure to government actors. Gelot and Hansen (2019) present a fascinating account of the Somali ministry of justice which began populating a list of religious leaders (Sheikhs) it deemed ‘suitable for CVE work.’ However, formalising their roles soon faced two major challenges: differing theological leanings of the selected Sheikhs, and CVE practitioners’ contrasting viewpoints of the role of religion/ideology. The selected Sheikhs have been groomed from and espouse different theological leanings (Suffi, Shafi, non-political Wahhabism), which brought the risk of upsetting simmering inter-sectarian tensions. Additionally, CVE practitioners so not uniformly the view that religion/ideology plays a significant role in triggering radicalisation (Gelot & Hansen 2019).

Kenya’s Operation Usalama Watch

Operation Usalama Watch in Kenya also was not without its critics. The manner in which it was executed was sharply criticised by CSOs and sections of the Kenyan Muslim leadership, which likened it to a ‘state-led profiling of the Kenya-Somali community’ (Lind et al. 2017:130). Shire (2021b:14) sums up how Operation Usalama Watch was launched in response to a series of attacks in various parts of Kenya attributed to the Al-Shabaab group:

In late March 2014, a series of minor attacks targeting a local church in Mombasa, and a bus stop and a food kiosk in Eastleigh, prompted the Kenyan government to launch Operation Usalama Watch, in which 6 000 security officers were deployed in Eastleigh, the Nairobi neighbourhood where most Somalis live, and parts of Mombasa. The operation ostensibly targeted ‘foreign nationals’ who were in the country unlawfully, and anyone suspected of ‘terrorist links’. However, in practice, press reports illustrated that the operation flagrantly targeted ethnic Somalis and Muslim populations in Nairobi and Mombasa.

Moreover, even to neutral observers, the security goals of Operation Usalama Watch were soon eclipsed by embarrassing revelations of extortion, bribery and flagrant human rights violations by police personnel, established by the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) in 2014 (*Daily Nation* 2014). In the north-eastern region of Kenya, ‘the sentiment that the ethnic Somali
community is being collectively punished for Al-Shabaab attacks is (was) ubiquitous’ (Shire 2021b:14).

The rehabilitation and reintegration of ‘returnees’
An element of PCVE intervention that has not received significant attention relates to the rehabilitation and reintegration of individuals who seek to leave a VE group (hereinafter referred to as the ‘returnees’). Despite the well-established fact in COIN and CVE operations that the parts make the whole, i.e., that individuals form extremist groups which then establish and affiliate with other groups to constitute larger extremist cells, addressing the subject of returnees has been accorded less attention and prominence than containment measures. As Mesok (2022:4) has rightly noted:

The abject figure of the returnee – the ultimate ungovernable subject – exposes the logic of PCVE as liberal counter-insurgency, prioritizing the pacification of populations and the containment of threats rather than the rehabilitation and reintegration of citizens who seek to leave violent extremism.

THE SAHEL
The Sahel is the geographical land of transition between the Sahara desert to the north and the Savanna plains to the south. From west to east it spans parts of Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, the CAR, Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia.

The Sahel region has been at the receiving end of a flurry of strategies and interventions. They range from hard military measures against VE organisations (VEOs) and NSAGs in the name of counter-insurgency (COIN) and military crackdowns on civilians to softer legislative and policy-oriented approaches and capacity-building initiatives. The multiplication of a whole set of complex national, regional and international strategies and measures as part of efforts to PCVE has led to the term ‘security traffic jam’ in the Sahel subregion. This is said to emerge where ‘international actors often emphasise synergies between what are commonly framed as multidimensional and comprehensive approaches, sometimes aimed at rebuilding ‘failed’ states and sometimes at stabilizing the entire region’ (Cold-Ravnkilde & Jacobsen 2020:857). Unfortunately, the security traffic jam in the Sahel and the Lake Chad subregion has not led to the envisaged peace dividend – indeed, analysts claim that some PCVE measures have inadvertently worsened the situation (Charbonneau 2021).
Nigeria: Brute force, amnesty and private military contractor deployment

Nigeria has essentially adopted a combination of military strategy and attempts at inclusive governance. When Boko Haram emerged as a destabilising factor in northern Nigeria, particularly during the past 17 years, the immediate state response was a military one, brute physical force code-named Operation Flush conducted by a Joint Task Operation (JTF) comprising the military, paramilitary and police. Even though Operation Flush led to the arrest of Boko Haram’s kingpin, Mohammed Yusuf, on 28 July 2009, the latter's death in police custody provoked allegations of extra-judicial killings by the Nigerian police, which the surviving Boko Haram members exploited to justify escalating the insurgency. Following the death of President Umaru Yar’Adua, the new administration under President Goodluck Jonathan explored optional CVE measures besides military/kinetic approaches. These included revising the anti-terrorism legislation in 2013, and adopting the national security strategy in 2014.

Interestingly, the 2014 strategy explicitly refers to the contested concept of ‘ungoverned spaces,’ which has become prominent in the literature focusing on root causes of VE. The Nigerian strategy reiterates an inclusive governance approach that addresses multiple sectors (peace, security, development, the rule of law and poverty), and precludes simmering discontent from spiralling out of control, thereby turning north-eastern Nigeria into an ungoverned space (Chukwuma 2022).

Furthermore, in contrast to his predecessor’s exclusive pursuance of the direct military option, Jonathan’s administration attempted the amnesty and dialogue approach. In April 2013, he set up a 26-member amnesty committee comprising human rights activists, religious leaders and government officials (Ojo 2020), known officially as the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North (Campbell 2013). As the name suggests, the committee focused exclusively on the security challenges afflicting the northern part of Nigeria. It was given three months to conduct a dialogue with Boko Haram. Part of the committee’s mission was to offer Boko Haram members amnesty and possible reintegration in exchange for laying down their arms. When this offer was snubbed by the Boko Haram leadership, then under Ahmed Shekau, Jonathan’s government reinforced the military approach. In collaboration with at least four other African neighbours (Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger), Nigeria created a Joint Multinational Task Force (JMTF), thereby taking military pursuit against Boko Haram beyond a single nation’s territory.
Worth mentioning also is the use of private military contractors (PMCs) which have variously been referred to as ‘mercenaries’ or ‘foreign soldiers of fortune’ (Cropley & Lewis 2015) as part of COIN measures in Nigeria. Initially, Jonathan’s administration denied reports that some PMCs had been actively engaged alongside the Nigerian Defence Forces (NDF) in mounting major offensives against Boko Haram (Clottey 2015). In a later interview with the Voice of America, Jonathan revealed that two ‘unnamed’ companies were providing the NDF with ‘trainers and technicians’. Even before his disclosures, rumours were rife that Abuja had drafted PMCs from South Africa and Russia who were receiving about US$400 a day for their services (Cropley & Lewis 2015).

In the meantime, a proposal by the South African president, Jacob Zuma, to deploy the AU’s rapid response force, i.e. the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) (Fabricius 2015) had been rejected. The Jonathan administration turned down this suggestion in favour of beefing up the Lake Chad Basin Commission force to about 8 700 troops. Faced with a crucial election, which was initially scheduled for 14 February 2015 but was later postponed for six weeks due to the instability in the north east, Jonathan was desperate to rapidly neutralise the threat from Boko Haram (Fabricius 2015; Mkandla 2017).

Besides the political rationale, did the PMC involvement offer any tactical advantages over Nigeria’s COIN campaign? Put differently, were the PMCs more effective in containing the Boko Haram threat? Defence and security analysts hold different views about the utility of the PMCs-NDF alliance to counter Boko Haram, but in the main agree that their joint operations were crucial in halting the Islamic militants’ territorial advances. Admittedly, even though PMCs’ contribution was not enough to address the long-term causes of the instability instigated by Boko Haram, PMCs brought with them vast COIN tactical experience, including ‘relentless pursuit’, ‘bush tracking’ skills and air power in the dense 60 000-square kilometre Sambisa Forest, one of Boko Haram’s strongholds (Varin 2015). In sum, the joint PMC-NDF operations proved effective in reclaiming the seized territories, but did not stop the insurgency altogether. As Varin has rightly concluded in her study of the impact of mercenaries on the conflict in the last six months of Jonathan’s administration, ‘notwithstanding the improved image of PMCs in the world, and the actual impact of contractors on the Nigerian counterinsurgency effort, the stigma of mercenaries continues to plague the industry, particularly on the African continent’ (2018:144).
Engaging youth vigilante groups and peace club projects

In 2016, similar to his predecessor’s specific focus on the north-eastern security concerns, President Muhammadu Buhari outlined his plan for the region. The seemingly well-drafted presidential initiative honestly identified leadership and institutional deficiencies as the root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency. However, reports of repressive acts and excessive use of force by the Nigerian military in the course of its counter-insurgency campaign continued to emerge (Chukwuma 2022; Ugwueze & Onuoha 2020). When the mission is to wipe out insurgents, little or no regard is given to addressing the root causes of the insurgency via longer-term measures. The direct, short-term, and often hard-pressed security approaches appear more appealing and/or desirable to state actors even when employed at the expense of the individual rights of suspects and inmates.

For his part, Buhari solicited the involvement of civilian vigilante youth groups as he skimmed through his menu of home-grown options for containing the security threat in the north east. His administration created a Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), which recorded relative success, partly because some of its members knew where the Boko Haram group was located. The CJTF was ultimately enlisted in the Nigerian army (Ojo 2020). The military approach has not managed to neutralise the group, and even with the launch of the JTF under President Y’ardua, the JMTF under Jonathan and the CJTF under Buhari, the Boko Haram threat persists.

This does not mean that other non-military measures in Nigeria have been in abeyance. On the contrary, other non-military PCVE-related measures have targeted the youth as the bulging section of the population, who are susceptible to VE recruitment by both VEOs and NSGAs. This is probably informed by the fact that many members of existing and newly formed VEOs are young people. A study by Sahgal and Zeuthen (2020)** revealed that the majority of VEOs/Rs were younger than 35 (i.e. 11 out of 15), while four out of 15 were juvenile VE prisoners younger than 18. As expected, males surpassed female members in the broader African context. Analysts have also sought to establish why young people resort to large-scale violence in Africa (Ismail & Olonisakin 2021)**

Striving to mitigate the radicalisation of youth and ethno-religious tensions, the Youth Peace Club, a project of the Peace Initiative Network (PIN), was launched in Kano on 27 May 2006 (Sidipo 2013)** The project, which drew on best practices and models from Northern Ireland, was also rolled out in Kaduna, Plateau and Gombe states. The peace club facilitators are trained
instructors drawn from schools which are members of the club, and run local NGOs and religious organisations. Furthermore, the Nigerian Counter-Extremism Programme, which falls under the Office of the National Security Adviser, has three main components, namely counter-radicalisation (focusing on creating awareness and training of religious leaders, women and youths); de-radicalisation (aimed at behavioural change of former Boko Haram associates); and strategic communication (designed to counter extremist narratives via media and public information campaigns) (Moshood & Thovoethin 2017).

From Operation Serval to the winding down of Operation Barkhane

The political dialogue approach, mainly spearheaded by efforts of regional actors, has also been attempted in the Malian case. Algeria has served as the chief mediator of the Inter Malian Dialogue since July 2014. Drawing on its own vast experience in dealing with radical groups, and propelled by its desire to oversee stability on its borders and neighbourhood, Algiers assumed the mantle of mediation in the Malian internal conflicts. Algerian mediators faced a hardline stance from the Coalition of Movements of Azawad (CMA), which would accept nothing short of autonomy. The Algerian mediators, who preferred decentralisation over autonomy, ultimately brokered an accord signed in Bamako on 15 May 2015. However, despite managing to preserve Mali’s territorial integrity, the accord could not prevent two coups d’état.

Indeed, despite massive investment in PCVE and COIN strategies, things have not improved in the Sahel, particularly in the crisis-ridden states of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Unsurprisingly, then, ‘In the Sahel, the distinctive feature of counter-insurgency governance seems to be perpetual war’ (Charbonneau 2021:1812), whether prompted by a change of government through the ballot box, coups or death of the head of state. Another general observation from the Sahel PCVE experience is that changes in presidents in Nigeria (from Y’ardua to Jonathan and later to Buhari); Chad (the death of Idriss Deby); Mali (the ouster of presidents Amadou Toumani Toure in 2012, Ibrahim Boubakar in 2020 and Bah Nd’aw in 2021 through coups d’état); Burkina Faso (the removal of presidents Blaise Compaoré in 2014 and Marc Roch Christian Kaboré in 2022, also via coups d’état), and France (from François Hollande to Emmanuel Macron in 2017) had a telling influence on the type, scale, and arguably the outcome of PCVE and COIN measures adopted in the subregion.

Mali and Nigeria stand out as countries where military operations against VEOs have been at the centre of CVE measures. In January 2013, Hollande
launched Operation Serval on the grounds that Mali had turned into a ‘destabilising threat’ not only to the West Africa subregion but also to the ‘close neighbourhood of Europe.’ The aftermath of Operation Serval was not pretty. In June 2021, possibly annoyed and fatigued by the never-ending instabilities in Mali and the Sahel subregion, Macron announced the winding down of Operation Barkhane. On 17 February 2022, France and other EU states and Canada issued a joint declaration about their withdrawal of troops from Mali. The French withdrawal was triggered by multiple factors, including mounting opposition from the local population and strained ties between Paris and Bamako after ‘the expulsion of the French ambassador to Mali following public characterization of Mali’s military junta as “out of control” and illegitimate by French foreign minister Jean Yves Le Drian’ (Doxsee et al. 2022). At one point, 2 400 of the 4 000 French troops deployed in the Sahel were stationed in Mali. The last French military contingent exited Mali on 15 August 2022. Around 3 000 remaining French soldiers in the Sahel, specifically in Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger, would cease to engage in direct combat and support and train local forces instead. The French decision to reconfigure Operational Barkhane was inevitable, due to operational shortfalls. As noted by one analyst, ‘France’s failure to define achievable objectives for Operation Barkhane beyond conducting strikes against jihadists leaders and providing Malian forces with general counter-terrorism support and capacity building meant that the mission could have continued aimlessly for the foreseeable future’ (Petrini 2022).

CENTRAL AFRICA

Central Africa in this case comprises Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the CAR, Congo Republic-Brazzaville, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and São Tomé & Principe. CAR and Cameroon are two countries of special interest in this subregion, for two reasons. First, they have struggled to counter VE amid lengthy domestic political crises. Second, respective state responses have largely been directed at quelling political crises rather than exclusively addressing CVE. As a result, it is a bit murky for analysts to delineate actors’ CVE-related efforts from measures aimed at resolving the broader domestic political crises. Nonetheless, interventions by state and non-state actors in the CVE sector can be discerned. Let us start with Cameroon.
Cameroon: Inter-religious dialogues, vigilantism and the reintegration of ex-fighters

Cameroon has been engulfed in an ‘Anglophone crisis’ that resurfaced in October 2016 while Boko Haram continued to pose as a constant menace in the far north, and insecurity prevailed along the eastern border with CAR. The Cameroon security forces have been combating ‘well-armed separatists fighting in the name of the country’s marginalised English-speaking minority’ (ICG 2018:1). The Boko Haram group does not receive local support from the country’s Muslims. In fact, Imams and Muslim associations held prayers for the release of abducted Catholic priests in November 2013 and April 2014 (ICG 2015).

Inter-religious dialogue initiatives have been one of the dominant responses to VE in Cameroon. Several Catholic associations have invested in inter-religious dialogues, the most prominent being the Cameroon Association for Inter-religious Dialogue (ACADIR). The National Episcopal Conference and Justice and Peace National Service (SNJP) have also sponsored and overseen several Catholic Church inter-religious dialogue initiatives. For their part, Cameroon Muslims, under the auspices of the Muslim League for Peace, Dialogue and Solidarity (LMPDS) and the Islamic Cultural Association of Cameroon (ACIC), have supervised and organised training sessions for Muslim clerics (Imams) in Douala, Yaounde, Maroua, Garoua and Foumban (ICG 2015).

Other initiatives aimed at countering Boko Haram’s contested religious narratives include awareness-raising caravans by the Cameroon Council of Muslim Imams and Dignitaries (CIDIMIC), and those organised by Muslim and Christian women’s associations (ICG 2015). The awareness-raising campaigns against Boko Haram have also featured ‘prayers and marches in support of the armed forces’ (ICG 2015:24). Two main limitations have emerged as far as these inter-religious dialogues initiatives are concerned. The International Crisis Group notes that while the inter-religious dialogue structures have excluded some groups, specifically revivalist churches and minority Islamic currents, which also support such initiatives, their activities have been confined to holding meetings and workshops for religious leaders (ICG 2015: 23-25). Another limitation is a lack of government support. Most inter-religious initiatives are funded by foreign actors (German NGOs for Christian churches and Arab donors for Muslims) (ICG 2015).

Vigilantism is another prominent CVE-related measure observed in the Cameroonian case. Some vigilante groups have been activated by state authorities, and others have been created by communities in the aftermath of the July
2015 suicide attacks (ICG 2016). Vigilante groups are credited for providing crucial local intelligence, foiling some 15 suicide attacks, and helping to secure the arrest of about 100 Boko Haram members (ICG 2016:25). The involvement of these groups is not without associated risks. There have been reported cases of complicity between some of its members and Boko Haram, and vigilantes associated with other groups have been implicated in incidences of extortion on religious grounds. Moreover, ‘cooperation with security forces is not easy: there is considerable mutual suspicion and accusations particularly in Cameroon and Nigeria. Security sources say that some vigilantes double as Boko Haram agents or resell goods stolen by the jihadists’ (ICG 2017b:14).

The military approach has also taken centre stage, especially with regard to the deployment of the Cameroonian sector of the MNJTF in October 2015. Falling in the same domain is the 2015 bilateral Operation Logone by the Cameroonian and Chadian armed forces. It should be noted that the state of emergency imposed by regional governors from 29 September to 3 October 2017 was part of the stringent security measures adopted to suppress the Anglophone crisis rather than the Boko Haram threat in the far north.

Another CVE-related measure by the Cameroonian authorities that deserves mention is the reintegration back into society of former Boko Haram associates. The presidential decree of 30 November 2018 established the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Committee for former Boko Haram fighters and armed groups from the north-western and south-western regions. Article 2(1) of the decree promotes the reintegration component, which includes three specific measures: deradicalisation of ex-fighters; sensitisation and provision of assistance to home communities; and creation of income-generating activities (Issa & Machikou 2019).

**CAR: Stabilisation missions and international mediation**

The recent history of the CAR is littered with political mediation efforts, but the resultant agreements have rarely been implemented in concrete terms (ICG 2017b:22). According to Mangan et al. (2020),** one of the factors that sustains CAR’s conflict economy is its ‘green diamond,’ namely coffee. Besides lucrative markets for cattle, timber, diamonds, gold and other minerals, handsome proceeds from coffee have created ‘disincentives for profiting armed groups to seriously participate in the peace process’ (Mangan et al. 2020:1). They further note that ‘armed groups reap up to $2.75 million in funding each year from their control of CAR’s coffee market’ (ibid).
The CAR’s political crisis has acquired an inter-communal religious dimension following the initial rebellion by the Seleka movement, which was later countered by self-defence groups known as ‘anti-Balaka’. Neither the predominantly Muslim rebel groups (Seleka) that were aggrieved by the exclusionary governance policies of presidents Ange-Fèlix Patassè (1993-2003) and François Bozize (2003-2013) nor the Christian dominated self-defence groups (Anti-Balaka) honoured citizens’ hopes for better governance (Glawion et al 2019; Mangan et al 2020). Prolonged exclusionary policies and self-enrichment by the country’s leaders, compounded by the predatory and opportunistic behaviour of the Seleka and Anti-Balaka, have dominated CAR’s bleak and tumultuous history for the past two decades.

Actors ranging from the AU to the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the International Contact Group, the EU (under President Idris Déby), the Republic of Congo (under President Denis Sassou Nguesso), and Angola have become involved in parallel international mediation initiatives on the CAR. Other interventions by international actors aimed at resuscitating the security and justice sectors include the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSCA), which took over from the AU-led support mission (MISCA) in September 2014 (Glawion et al 2019).

The French forces were also very much in the mix between 2013 and 2016. A French contingent of 2 000 troops assumed the leading military role in confronting the Seleka rebels between 2013 and 2015, while the EUFOR-RCA (the EU training mission) secured the capital from 2015 onwards (Glawion 2020). Unfortunately, as noted earlier, international mediation has had little observable impact on the country’s security quagmire. According to the ICG (2017b), the limited impact of mediation efforts on the security dynamics in Central Africa can be ascribed to four factors: the differing agendas and interests of mediators, as well as institutional rivalries; the hasty conclusion of agreements that are rarely enforced in concrete terms; a failure to draw lessons from mistakes of previous agreements; and the damaging long-term effects of the political inclusion of rebels at the national level, thereby directing attention to political concessions at the expense of stability at the local level.

Non-state actors have played a role in the mediation efforts. Non-state actors formed mediation committees during the Seleka rebellion (2012-13) to negotiate resolutions for public grievances with the respective local rebel leaders and to reduce inter-communal tensions. Unfortunately, they were largely inef-
effective, because they were unable to enforce preferred changes, and became mired in drawn-out controversies about their mandates and composition (Glawion 2020). Moreover, the Interfaith Peacebuilding Partnership is one of seven projects under the Initiative to Measure Peace and Conflict Outcomes (IMPACT-CAR) process, funded by USAID and the Center for Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) (Blum & Grangard 2018).

**NORTH AFRICA**

For our purposes, North Africa comprises Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Western Sahara. This combines the ‘Maghreb (‘west’ in Arabic), or the Atlas lands, and the UN definition, which includes the disputed territory between Morocco and the Saharawi Republic. This subregion is particularly important for our attempt to draw lessons from the experiences of regions as well as individual countries as far as PCVE is concerned. First, the region borders the crisis-ridden countries of the Sahel, which have witnessed a steep rise in VEO operations over the past ten years, forming what has come to be referred to as an ‘arc of crisis across the Sahara-Sahel region’ (i.e. the Libya/Algeria-Niger-Mali axis) (Chauzal 2015). Second, as the Sahel PCVE experience has shown thus far, a slew of short-term and long-term measures has been deployed in this subregion, which offers a much wider latitude from which to pick and choose best practices and lessons that can be exported to the southern African context. Third, it is perhaps the leading subregion on the continent that is grappling with the growing security threats associated with Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) and returnees. For instance, since 2011, more than 40 000 fighters from 120 countries have flocked to Syria and Iraq (Jawaid 2017:103). What is specifically eye-catching in these staggering figures is that a North African country (Tunisia) leads the global count with about 7 000 fighters, while Morocco has had close to 1 500 fighters embroiled in the Syrian crisis (ibid).

**Tighter security controls and states of emergency**

Tighter national security controls, including military operations, are the most favoured short-term responses to the threats posed by an array of VEOs, including AQIM, which forged a ‘marriage of convenience’ with Al Qaeda (Chivvis & Liepman 2013). Similar responses have been directed at curbing increasing recruitment by VEOs in Libya’s coastal cities of Benghazi, Tripoli, Sabratha and Derna (Taha 2017), as well as the al-Murabitoun, who are remnants of the ‘black decade’ of the 1990s, led by former members of AQIM, and Jund al-Khal-
ifa, operating in the Jur Jura mountains, which also announced its allegiance to ISIS (ICG 2017a). Algeria and Morocco are leading North African countries maintaining tighter surveillance of their respective borders.

In recent years, the Algiers and Rabat governments have overseen massive deployments of troops, border guards, gendarmerie, police patrols, and aerial surveillance (ICG 2017a; Patel 2018). This appears to have paid off for Algiers and Rabat as they have remained relatively insulated from ISIS-inspired attacks since the January 2013 al-Murabitoun attack on the In Amenas natural gas complex near the Libyan border, the September 2014 kidnapping and killing of the French tourist Hervé Gourdel, and Libya’s worsening security situation since 2014.

States of emergency are another short-term security-oriented measure adopted in this subregion. Tunisia and Egypt imposed states of emergency in 2015 after the 2011 uprisings had gripped the subregion (ICG 2017a). Since then, the state of emergency in Tunisia has been extended several times. The last round was set to end on 18 January 2022, but was extended for another month. President Kais Saied extended the state of emergency until 13 December 2022, and Egypt under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi imposed a state of emergency for three months from 19 April 2017, even though it was quietly extended beyond the initially set period.

**Legislative amendments and countering radicalisation**

Softer legislative and policy-oriented approaches have been adopted in North Africa. They include the September 2017 Egyptian passing of amendments to Law 26 of 1975 that allowed state authorities to introduce crimes against state security; and the June 2016 expansion of the Algerian Penal Code to extend criminal liability to foreign terrorist fighters, such as ‘those who support or finance foreign terrorist fighters or use information technology in terrorist recruiting, and to internet service providers’ (US State Department 2016, cited in Patel 2018:92). Morocco also changed its 2003 anti-terrorism law by imposing stricter sentences for implicated foreign fighters (five to 15 years and heavy fines) (ICG 2017a).

Countering religion-political activism is another dimension of PCVE that has received some attention from North African governments. For instance, Algeria and Moroccan state authorities closely monitor the dissemination of religious content. Algeria’s deradicalisation programmes also feature the League of the Ulema of the Sahel, which promotes the Maleki rite of Sunni Islam-a
Muslim sect, and is historically dominant in the Maghreb and Sahel sub-regions. Moreover, only Imams designated by the minister of religious affairs and endowments may pay prison visits (ICG 2017a). Furthermore, ‘Radio Quran plays lectures and sermons that align with the government’s standards of moderate Islam, as a means to counter Salafi propaganda’ (US State Department 2016, cited in Patel 2018:92).

Morocco has also embarked on promoting religious tolerance through government-controlled religious education in schools, prisons and mosques. The training organised for certified imams is firmly in place, overseen by the Mohammed VI Institute in Rabat. The Rabat Institute, which also trains male and female preachers/guides (i.e. Morchidines and Morchidates respectively), was established in 2005 (Patel 2018). Table 1 sums up specific dimensions of PCVE interventions that have been undertaken in the five categories.

**Women and CVE**

Women-led attacks and female suicide bombers are not uncommon in the HoA, Sahel and North Africa. More noteworthy is that women and their children are the most common victims of VEO attacks. Nevertheless, how much do we know about their roles as preventers and mitigators of VE? As a result, there is a shift from viewing women as combatants, recruiters and fundraisers of VEO operations to preventers and mitigators of VE.

The UN’s promotion of gender mainstreaming in the PCVE sector has gained pace over the past ten years. On 13 October 2015, following a high-level review of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325, which assessed 15 years of the women’s peace and security agenda, the UNSC adopted resolution 2242 which calls for ‘greater integration by UN Member States of their agenda on women, peace and security, counter-terrorism and counter violent extremism’ (UN 2015). Likewise, the UN’s policy agenda on PCVE calls for a holistic approach to counter-terrorism, and refers to the importance of incorporating gender as a key component of the agenda (Rothermel 2020).

Drawing on discourse analysis and interviews with Malian civil society and government representatives, Lorentzen (2021) sought, among others, to uncover how women’s roles, relations, capabilities and contexts were gendered. While women’s roles are represented as peacemakers, victims, as well as perpetrators in the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, their participation in the Malian context is cast as a solution to the ‘new’ threat of VE which has eluded the traditional security actors (the army, police, gendarmerie,
Table 1: Selective cases of PCVE approaches and dimensions in the HoA, Sahel, Central Africa and North Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approaches</th>
<th>Specific dimensions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deterrent</td>
<td>Military crackdowns (Alg; Mor)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Surveillance of borders (Alg; Mor)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Operation Usalama Watch (Ken)</td>
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<td>State of emergency (Egy; Tun)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Joint military task forces (Nig1)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vigilantism (Nig 1; Cam; CAR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legislative &amp; policy-oriented</td>
<td>Amendments to anti-terrorism legislation (Alg; Mor; Egy)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Endorsement of Sharia law (Som)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Creation of entities dealing with CVE operations (Alg; Mor; Tun)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Deregistration of human rights organizations (Ken)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negotiations</td>
<td>Political dialogues and mediation (Mal; Som; CAR)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Civil Concord (Alg)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inter-religious dialogues (Cam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal justice</td>
<td>Amnesty to defectors (Ken; Nig1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prosecutions (Ken; Nig1; Alg; Mor; Tun; Egy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Methods</td>
<td>League of Ulemas of the Sahel (Alg)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Preparation of a database of religious leaders (Som)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Training programmes for Muslim clerics (Mor)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees &amp; defectors (Nig2; Cam)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deradicalisation centres (Som)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace clubs (Nig1)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Countering online recruitment &amp; radicalization (Alg; Mor)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Elders as truce brokers (Som)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSOs as CVE brokers (Ken)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Women as mitigators (Mor)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Inter-faith groups of Muslim &amp; Christian women (Nig1; Cam)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prison visits by designated Imams (Alg)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Compiled by the author.*

Key: Alg = Algeria; Cam = Cameroon; CAR = Central African Republic; Egy = Egypt; Ken = Kenya; Mal = Mali; Mor = Morocco; Nig1 = Nigeria; Nig2 = Niger; Som = Somalia; Tun = Tunisia.
AFRICA EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS FOR THE REGION

MINUSMA, and Operation Barkhane). Put slightly differently, as the security problematique in Mali and the Sahel has eluded traditional kinetic responses, women are no longer cast merely as ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ but as ‘new security actors’ capable of playing effective roles in the PCVE sector. Lorentzen (identifies three ‘new’ tasks for women in PCVE: influencing, counselling, and informing. The following passage sums up the first two ‘new’ tasks:

Women are viewed as uniquely placed to influence their children, brothers and husbands not to join extremist movements. In the words of one interviewee, women can ‘advise their loved ones to be engaged, to disengage’. This role as counsellors to their loved ones also includes intervening to reclaim a child or relative who is being radicalized but has not yet turned violent.

As for the third role, the Malian PCVE National Action Plan refers repeatedly to the need to engage women and their organisations in, among others, training that will enable them to detect unusual behaviour among teenagers and other community members. Feminist scholars have cast doubts on the recent drive to place a premium on the role of women to inform the state of radicalised behaviour by their children and relatives. They assert that this merely down-plays the potential risks to their safety. More pointedly, it has been contended that the instrumentalisation of women’s rights groups for intelligence-gathering and other PCVE operations poses security risks, and issues of credibility and trustworthiness (Saferworld 2021) in the face of public scrutiny.

As observed for elders’ position in the HoA, women are well placed to help detect radicalisation of family and community members, and to challenge extremist narratives in homes, schools, and social environments (Bigio & Vogelstein 2019). These scholars note that women female scholars who were deployed around the Moroccan countryside to counter radical interpretations of Islam were better able to reach community members than their male counterparts because of their social ties and ability to build trust (ibid). Likewise, ‘In Nigeria, an interfaith group of Muslim and Christian women came together in the wake of an extremist attack and successfully supported community policing efforts in regions with high levels of inter-community violence’ (ibid). Still, women’s involvement in PCVE faces two inter-related hindrances, namely low levels of consideration by other actors, and funding. Bigio and Vogelstein (2019:9) explain these well:
Despite women’s vital role as preventers of terrorism, women’s groups are rarely considered relevant partners in counter-terrorism efforts, and their work remains chronically underfunded. Furthermore, when counter-terrorism officials develop policy without input from local women, they risk entrenching harmful social norms about women’s place in society that undermine women’s rights. In addition, regulations intended to cut down on terrorist financing are making it harder for women’s groups—including those that work against radicalization, to function. Women’s civil society organizations are typically smaller and less financially resilient, making it difficult for many of them to meet the compliance requirements associated with counter-terrorist financing regimes.’

The contribution of research-based approaches to PCVE should also be considered. Despite the presence of factors that make VEO recruitment more likely in South Libya (i.e., poor economic opportunities, political and social marginalisation, poor or absent governance, and VEO operations in the area), ‘yet among the two dominant tribes in that region – the Toubou and the Tuareg – recruitment is notably low, and community resilience notably high’ (Taha 2017:1). Taha further notes: ‘Gender norms play a significant role in community resilience. The relative rigidity of gender roles and the level of community resilience are strongly correlated, rigidity in norms being negatively correlated with resilience and thus the likelihood that a community will be resistant to VEO recruitment.’ Therefore, he concludes that cultural factors and social norms prevailing within the Toubou and Tuareg communities are crucial explainers of their resilience to VEO recruitment. This is a significant finding, especially for experts involved in the prevention pillar of CVE initiatives.

Lessons for the southern African region

Despite concerted national, regional and international PVCE efforts in Africa, the security situation in many areas remains precarious. For instance, 24 out of 54 sovereign African states, including Mozambique, have made it to the top fifty of countries on the Global Terrorism Index between 2017 and 2021. As shown in Table 2 below, some trends are as follows:

Two countries (Nigeria and Somalia) have consistently featured in the top ten. Except for Mozambique, the other two southern African countries featured in the list are Angola and South Africa, with their impact rated from medium (2017) to low (2021). Mozambique’s ranking has risen sharply from 40th place (with medium impact in 2017) to 13th (with high impact in 2021).
Worrying trends have been observed in the Sahel, particularly in countries in the ‘arc of crisis’ (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger). The triple Sahelian states of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, whose security situations have worsened significantly in recent years, have slumped into the top ten, recording substantial increases in terrorism deaths of 81, 174 and 74 respectively (GTI 2022:4). They are ranked fourth, seventh and eighth respectively in 2022. A

Table 2: The impact of terrorism by rank in selected African countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SN</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>VH</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>VH</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>VH</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>NI</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>CAR</td>
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<td>93</td>
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<td>Cameroon</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>Angola</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>41</td>
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<td>M</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>L</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GTI, 2018,2019, 2020, & 2022. Key: VH=Very High; H=High; M=Medium; L=Low; NI= No impact.
sharp slump in the security situation is reflected in Burkina Faso’s movement from 37th to fourth. Notably, Mozambique recorded the largest drop in terrorism deaths with 414 fewer deaths in 2021, an 82 per cent decrease from the previous year (GTI 2022:3).

The impact of terrorism has consistently been rated high in Cameroon, Egypt, and the DRC between 2017 and 2021. Remarkably, in the same period, the impact has been downgraded from high to none in South Sudan and CAR. This may be due to recent political settlements in these countries.

The depicted trends point to the fact that countries like Kenya and Tanzania, with neighbours which are highly impacted by terrorism, can easily be dragged into the top tier. As long as they border on countries with relatively active VEO operations, they remain vulnerable to violent extremists. Vigilance, especially along borders, can be a safe and cheap approach to maintaining order.

The risks associated with prioritising short-term military responses

The experiences elsewhere offer a number of vital lessons for southern Africa and for Mozambique in particular. The broader lesson is that VEOs, NSAGs and insurgent groups highlight their ability to conduct cross-border operations, thereby wreaking havoc among local populations and demonstrating the risks of employing a highly militarised approach to dealing with them. Despite different contexts, the experience in CVE and counter-terrorism in southern Africa and other subregions reveals that the militarised approach has been prioritised. The difference is that while the ham-fisted response in Mozambique has, thus far, managed to reduce the number of deaths from insurgents and VEO operations, this has been achieved at the expense of non-military approaches, as explained in chapter eight. Preventing imminent attacks and reducing the death toll may be attributed to the Mozambican government’s heavy-handed reprisals, but in the long term, such measures do not seem effective enough to address the real drivers of VE (Bekoe et. al. 2020). Therefore, Mozambique and SADC seem to be replicating the common mistake of early counter-insurgency and CVE approaches in the Sahel and HoA. An exclusive focus on the heavy-handed approach has proved ineffective in containing Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, and has ‘deeply alienated’ local communities (Hartung & Otieno 2021; Saferworld 2021). Indeed, as noted by Abbink (2020:194), ‘securitized response patterns of state authorities toward military play a role in furthering violent radicalization.’
In North Africa, however, short-term responses, which included tighter security and increased intelligence-sharing between subregional countries, were accompanied by longer-term measures including reforming the education sector, creating economic opportunities, and opening up political participation to other groups, especially youths. This has been the case especially in Morocco and Algeria.

**Averting descent into another ‘forever war’ and perpetual military training**

The Mozambican security forces and SAMIM should heed President Mokgweetsi Masisi’s caution that they might need to confront a ‘deceptive enemy which is likely to use asymmetric warfare and unconventional and underhand war tactics’ in Cabo Delgado. Addressing Botswana troops who were about to join SAMIM, he declared: ‘As professionals, you stand for much more than they do, and you must avoid emulating them and sinking to their level’ (Nyathi 2021:9). Mozambican and SAMIM forces should also desist from committing indiscriminate violence against the people they are supposed to protect. As Hansen has noted (2022):

Neglecting this will inevitably turn Mozambique into one of the ‘forever wars’ of the African continent, similar to current conflagrations in Mali, the insurgency in northeast Nigeria, and in Somalia. It becomes a problem when local security providers see themselves as protecting the state or their own positions rather than what their tasks really are to act as service providers to the local population, and we have seen this already in Mozambique.

They should also take steps to avoid a ‘security traffic jam’ in Cabo Delgado. In simple terms, this develops when ‘too many actors do similar things while ignoring other issues’ (Kfir 2022:80). Naturally, both state and international actors try to quell outbreaks of VE as rapidly as possible. A multiplicity of actors rushed to the scene to contain the worsening security situation in the Sahel, which has witnessed eight attempted coups in Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire and Niger in less than two years. As Kfir went on to note, after several years of training, ‘the Malian army was an entity in a permanent state of being’ ‘capacity-built’, yet able to organize not one but two coups d’ etat in August 2020 and May 2021, arguably embarrassing international actors and further derailing their plans for stabilizing Mali. These phenomena, i.e. perpetual military training and forever wars, should not be allowed to dominate the security discourse in Cabo Delgado.
**Broadening the consultation process**

Analysts seem to agree that disengaging the VEOs, NSAGs and insurgents alone is not a lasting solution. There is a need to move beyond ham-fisted kinetic approaches to incorporating inputs from local communities, women, youths, civil society, and religious institutions. In 2021, analysts associated with the Institute for Security Studies held that ‘No amount of private security advice, support or foreign troops and equipment can compensate for political leadership and the establishment of trust between people, the government and regional actors ... To effectively pursue counter-radicalization at the community level in Cabo Delgado, the Mozambican government should pursue broad consultations with the community, youth, women, civil society and religious institutions’ (cited in Nyathi 2021:9).

**Addressing the ‘foreign fighters’ question**

One area that has not received adequate attention in other subregions is how to address the problem of ‘foreign fighters,’ and the rehabilitation and reintegration of ‘returnees.’ Any foreign national fighting against Mozambican and SAMIM forces in Cabo Delgado would be regarded as a ‘foreign fighter.’ There is a pressing need for both Mozambican authorities and SADC countries to address the foreign fighter element of the Cabo Delgado security situation before it gets out of control. To Mozambique, they will be regarded as ‘foreign fighters’ within the scope of UNSC Resolution 2178, but once they return to their home countries, they will be received as ‘returnees.’

Adopting a heavy-handed, security-driven approach to returnees will not help to address their grievances and uproot their networks, as was the case in the early Moroccan responses. Mozambican authorities and SADC countries should desist from ‘punishing and ostracizing the offenders, rather than addressing the causes of their alienation and ultimately their exodus’ (Jawaid 2017:102). If only a fraction of Tunisians who travelled to fight in Iraq and Syria had been jailed in the already overcrowded country’s prisons, the criminal justice system would have another problem to deal with: radicalisation among inmates. Therefore, well-planned rehabilitation and reintegration programmes tapping into best practices elsewhere may be convenient alternatives to prosecutions and prison sentences. Of course, ‘No single model of rehabilitation and reintegration can be applied across cultural contexts’ (Holmer & Shtuni 2017:11).
Supporting and monitoring civil society involvement in the CVE sector

Another lesson relates to the work of CSOs in the CVE sector. The experience in Mozambique and elsewhere in Africa has highlighted four aspects. First, CSOs relentlessly pressed state actors to concede that VE had become a problem. They confronted the denials with evidence and persuasion, and employed various forums at their disposal to attract domestic and international attention. It could be recalled that ‘In an effort to downplay the threat, the government arrested and detained journalists reporting on the situation’ (Bekoe et al. 2020b:20). Second, CSOs have kept state actors on their toes as far as their CVE operations are concerned. Few CSOs, primarily human rights and activist-oriented ones, have had the audacity to counter extremism in state-led CVE operations. Even though state authorities do not fancy this ‘watchdog’ role, it helps remind them to undertake the securitised approach to CVE with maximum restraint in order to avoid generating negative counter-reactions. Third, CSOs’ engagement with CVE is not without scrutiny. CSOs tend to crop up where the funds are being channelled. The proliferation of CSOs prompted by an existential threat, as in the climate change sector, is a recent and normal trend. It is important to keep an eye on them without appearing to curtail their freedom to operate. When private individuals use CSOs to set up deradicalisation centres, do they conform to the guidelines?

Fourth, state actors should refrain from using counter-terror and CVE responses as a pretext for targeting certain CSOs deemed inimical to their interests. According to Saferworld (2021), counter-terrorism responses have had ‘significant negative impacts’ on civic space and CSOs over the past 20 years. ‘Around the world, authoritarian states have used counter-terrorism justifications to surveil, arbitrarily imprison, criminalise, torture and kill civil society advocates and human rights defenders.’ This should not happen in Mozambique.

Investing in ‘CVE by other means’

Another relevant issue is eliciting the support of the research community, think-tanks and independent research networks. Investing in what Bart Schuurman (2019) has termed as ‘counter VE and terrorism by other means’ is imperative. As the Kenyan experience has shown, research networks are increasingly relating research work to government priorities in the CVE sector. For instance, the Horn Institute for Strategic Studies, in collaboration with the Centre for Sus-
Maintaining Conflict Resolution (CSCR), is conducting a study on the nature, drivers and perception of Muslim women and girls toward VE in Kenya’s coastal and eastern regions. The survey’s findings on the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors in respect of female participation in VE are expected to complement efforts by the Kenyan government to devise better CVE responses. Creating synergy between research projects and initiatives such as the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counter-Terrorism (PREACT) and inter-governmental agencies such as the recently created SADC counter-terrorism centre would be a good starting point.

Mainstreaming gender aspects in CVE responses

Last but not least is the question of women’s involvement in VE and terrorism. As noted previously, gender should be given ample attention in all CVE responses. Three risks and pitfalls have been noted. The first is oversimplification, with female VE participants merely presented as ‘jihad brides,’ disregarding far more complex push and pull drivers that informed their involvement in VE. According to Coninsx (2019:75), women VE participants are commonly portrayed as ‘passive, easily manipulated, and emotionally driven by factors such as marriage prospects, experience of sexual violence, and family loss at the hands of ‘the enemy.’

Nonetheless, not all analysts view women as victims, and increasingly appreciate women’s agency in VE operations. Coninsx (2019:75) goes on to note that ‘we also have to be mindful of the fact that the categories of perpetrator and victim are not binary or mutually exclusive – and that women as well as men can be both.’

The second risk to be avoided is sensationalisation. Sensationalising women’s violent roles while downplaying their non-combat roles, which have proven vital for the sustenance, survival and legitimacy of VEOs and terror groups, is risky. Promoting one set of roles while neglecting others that women play would lead to blind spots that can prove costly in CVE responses. The third risk relates to stigmatising women who return from terrorist groups. Women who exited a terror group but faced stigmatisation upon returning to their local communities’ settings are likely to feel alienated and isolated, ‘thus undermining rehabilitation and reintegration efforts and potentially contributing to (re)-radicalization and recidivism’ (Coninsx 2019:75).
Recommendations

- Rehabilitation and reintegration efforts should be designed and implemented in tandem with programmes designed to address the structural conditions and community dynamics that pushed and pulled youths and other community members to radicalisation.
- After rolling out counter-radicalisation interventions over time, they will need to be evaluated. Impact assessments should apply to groups in custody as well as communities.
- There is a need to identify and capitalise on social norms and cultural practices within communities that either inform or contribute to community resilience in the face of VE in other parts of Mozambique, and in the face of overwhelming vulnerability.
- There is also a need to devise tailor-made rehabilitation and reintegration programmes that consider gender-specific needs. This will require the Mozambican authorities to solicit the expertise of behavioural therapists and psychologists, to identify the drivers and motivations behind individuals’ decisions to become violent extremists.
- A ‘follow-the-money’ approach should be adopted to cut off the financial and logistical support of VEOs. Everything possible should be done to sever their economic lifelines.
- Even though online recruitment has not featured prominently in Cabo Delgado, there is a need to reduce the utility extremists gain from media attention. Local media should be encouraged to restrain themselves when covering VE and terror-related incidents.
- Research should be utilised to inform the formulation of better, more effective, gender-sensitive CVE responses.
- Role players should avoid depicting every security concern as an international security problem, and rather embrace consultations with various social groupings. Countering radicalisation requires a full spectrum of initiatives, including active engagement of youth groups, CSOs, and community and religious leaders.
- Muslim clerics play a positive role in countering the misinterpreted jihadist narratives online and in prisons, schools and communities. Where possible, the message in Mozambique should be that there is no single version of Islam. Whether considered ‘moderate’ or ‘radical,’ selecting Muslim clerics for such a role will always be a tricky exercise. The Building Resilience
Conclusion
Our review has shown that despite the consistent employment of security-based approaches to CVE in various African subregions, the problem persists. The continent continues to lose its youths to radicalised groups. This necessitates a change of tack by government actors from an exclusive focus on aggressive approaches to a combination of both military and non-military responses. Deterrent approaches are useful in making terrorism and VE too costly for those who seek to use them, and can stop the displacement of civilians. However, this is not enough to end the problem. In Mozambique, responses remain lopsided towards a military approach. If current efforts continue to focus on exclusively on military, defensive and deterrent approaches, VE in Cabo Delgado may not be curtailed. There is a need to take a much broader view of the situation, since VE drivers are complex and appear to be evolving. As noted by Bekoe et al. (2020a, b), VE in Mozambique ‘has overlapping roots in historical disenfranchisement and notions of relative deprivation.’ Without addressing these underlying vulnerabilities, and the push and pull factors of what VEOs and NSAGs are instigating, it will be difficult to contain the VE threat.

In fighting VE and terrorism, Mozambican and SAMIM forces should be careful not to overreact and behave like their opponents who are likely to resort to asymmetric warfare, including unconventional and underhand tactics. Behaving like extremists will make them less able to address the underlying vulnerabilities and grievances. By the same token, is the situation in Cabo Delgado ripe for negotiation? According to Crenshaw and Cusimano Love (2003), negotiations can be pursued when two conditions are present. First, the government should enjoy a strong popular mandate to fend off criticism from political opponents that it is ‘giving in’ to terror groups by negotiating. Second, the terrorist organisation should undergo a ‘period of self-evaluation,’ which would provide the government with an opportunity to ‘split off pragmatists from hard-line terrorists’ (ibid:138). The second condition does not seem present in Cabo Delgado as yet, and thus the situation may not be ripe for negotiations.
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PART FOUR

The way forward
Conclusions and recommendations

Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, Lucy Shule and Stephen Buchanan-Clarke

This publication focuses on African experiences of VE, defined as the beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or sociopolitical goals. This includes terrorism and other forms of politically motivated and communal violence.

The idea of exploring VE beyond the superficiality of current affairs reports was born from the realisation that southern Africa was experiencing an upsurge in VE. The DRC, Mozambique and Tanzania have experienced attacks, with events in Cabo Delgado province in Mozambique being the most challenging and disconcerting. In the course of this project, the editors also realised that a broader discourse than one of military force and counterterrorism was required if the region and the continent were to make any progress in dealing with this complex phenomenon.

This publication offers a critical exploration of these dimensions through an African lens. It addresses three aspects of VE: it provides conceptual analyses, examines state conduct towards VE, and provides detailed coverage of the Cabo Delgado crisis, drawing on in loco research. In what follows, we review the findings of our contributors, followed by our recommendations.

Part one: Drivers of violent extremism in southern Africa

Part one focuses on the drivers of VE in the southern African context, with a particular focus on factors that promote the emergence of VE and help to sustain VE organisations over time. In Chapter two, David Matsinhe argues that, in order to move beyond purely military interventions and develop policies that prevent and counter VE more holistically and effectively, it is vital to understand and address the complex structural factors that give rise to it. Those analysed include state fragility, poor governance, political and social marginalisation, the marginalisation of young people, and predatory global economics.

This chapter surveys the historical and current characteristics of African
states, and argues that governments themselves play a significant role in the emergence of VE by configuring physical, social, and political conditions in ways that produce certain behavioural outcomes.

Going beyond the structural factors commonly highlighted in the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism and similar policy frameworks, the chapter explores the role of transnational corporations within the extractive sector, and the unequal global economic system in which African states have to function, arguing that these endogenous and exogenous conditions cannot be separated from one another.

The chapter makes a call for states to respect and promote the rights of citizens as a fundamental means of preventing and countering VE, based on the principle of non-discrimination in respect of race, religion, ethnicity, political affiliation, sexual orientation, or any other characteristics.

In chapter three, Abdi Aynte explores the factors that tend to sustain VE organisations, with a particular focus on the nexus between transnational organised crime (TOC), corruption, and VE activity. The conflict in Cabo Delgado – an environment characterized by high levels of both corruption and organised crime – is used as a case study. The chapter explores an inseparable link between TOC and corruption, with organised crime syndicates relying on corruption, usually within government but also within the private sector, to diminish risk or even facilitate their operations. It also provides evidence of the ways in which VE organisations engage in illicit trade activities and/or interact with transnational crime syndicates, in order to sustain their operations.

In the case of Cabo Delgado, the chapter explores the indirect relationship between TOC, corruption and VE, which work separately and together to weaken the state and generate social grievances. The chapter calls for major political reforms, strong moral leadership, and rigorous anti-corruption oversight mechanisms, particularly in relation to recently funded development initiatives such as the North Integrated Development Agency (ADIN) which are vulnerable to corruption. The chapter also outlines what needs to be done to formalise the economy in northern Mozambique to make it less susceptible to exploitation by both TOCs and VE organisations, as well as the role of regional organisations in addressing the transnational nature of the challenge.

In Chapter four, Jaynisha Patel explores trends surrounding the radicalisation of African youths and their recruitment by VE organisations, with Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya used as a case study. It provides insight into common methods used by VE actors to recruit African youths, both within a community
setting and online, and how these have changed over time in response to law enforcement strategies. It also reviews the major narratives used in extremist propaganda to attract young people, and analyses the key themes within these narratives that must be addressed to counter them effectively.

The chapter calls for governments to create more capacity for detecting and countering online recruitment and radicalisation, working with major technology companies to counter the spread of extremist narratives online, developing counternarratives and promoting moderate Islamic voices, and updating or crafting new legislation to address the problem.

**Part two: African and International responses to VE**

Part two focuses on the formal ways in which the AU and RECs respond to VE. It also explores the interests and roles of outsiders, including UN agencies, international cooperating partners, and non-western interests.

In chapter five, Amanda Lucey examines the genesis, status, successes and failures of the NAPs that African governments are meant to develop and implement as a key response to VE. It finds that little progress has been made. It recommends that governments and RECs should in fact develop NAPs, but that this should be done in collaboration with communities. Indeed, civil society should be engaged in from the outset, to ensure that these plans are legitimate and are accepted by the general population. Communities play a vital role in earning warning as well as reintegration, and can help to prevent recidivism.

Action plans should detail focal points, roles and responsibilities, as well as mechanisms for coordination. They should avoid duplication with other action plans to prevent a waste of resources or ‘plan fatigue’. They should address governance issues including human rights abuses by state actors, and should not be used for intelligence purposes that stigmatise communities.

Finally, there is no NAP on VE in Mozambique. Bilateral discussions with specific actors in Mozambique such as the minister of defence are under way to put this on the table. The government has been very busy trying to understand how it can work with this strategy, which has now been approved. It is also important to have a NAP on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). Instead of many NAPs, there should be one NAP on VE, incorporating WPS.

In Chapter six, Clever Chikwanda examines whether the AU’s APSA is appropriate for PCVE. It finds that several adjustments are required to make it more effective and efficient. To start with, the AU needs a policy that strengthens its partnerships with civil society, other non-state actors, academia, and research
institutions/think tanks in order to utilise available knowledge of peace and security.

APSA needs to include a new, responsive mechanism for managing VE, based on human security instead of traditional, military conceptions of security. It needs to transform how it characterises terrorism as a state security problem. This will allow a deeper appreciation of the root causes of VE, and ways to address them. Finally, the AU should develop and adopt a policy of engaging ‘terrorists.’ These are victims of acute marginalisation, exclusion, poverty, inequality and joblessness, with poor or no access to education and basic services. Failure to engage them has contributed to their radicalisation, thereby strengthening their resolve to turn to violence.

In chapter seven, Theodora Thindwa explores foreign involvement in PCVE, as well as partnerships with local actors. It finds that, while international actors profess to support African PCVE programmes, they prioritise their own interests, whether security, political or commercial. Therefore, this chapter identifies the need for African scholars and think-tanks to continue to conduct evidence-based research on the drivers of VE, which would help to define VE in the African context. Such findings could form the basis for policy interventions relevant to Africa, but also help to define relevant forms of foreign assistance.

It recommends that RECs should play leading roles in ensuring that VE programmes are monitored and evaluated from a Security Sector Governance perspective, and that local realities are considered in the process. It further recommends that the AU should refine clear terms of reference for guiding the engagement of African states and foreign actors in PCVE programming. Finally, it recommends that the AU and its RECs should activate early warning systems for countering VE, such as addressing structural grievances.

Part three: The southern African response to VE in Cabo Delgado

This last part focuses on VE and terrorism in southern Africa. It examines three key aspects: VE in Mozambique, challenges associated with implementing regional responses to VE and terrorism, and lessons that southern Africa can draw from other African subregions in preventing and countering VE.

In chapter eight, Énio Chinguane and Egna Sidumo traces Mozambique’s efforts to manage VE, notably its transition from countering terrorism to countering VE. Among others, it outlines the origins and reasons behind the mushrooming of VE in Cabo Delgado, and the Mozambican government’s attempts and strategies to address VE. It further discusses in detail the role of the various
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actors involved in addressing security concerns in Cabo Delgado as well as the formulation of the CVE strategy.

Among others, it finds that the government’s strategies for addressing VE have moved from prevention or avoidance to an attempt to counter terrorism. Moreover, the government – in collaboration with the international community – has adopted measures to prevent youths from being involved in VE and terrorist activities. However, these initiatives seem largely similar to those adopted elsewhere in Africa.

The chapter recommends that the Mozambican government should consider moving to a higher level of managing VE by improving its relationship with intra-state actors such as communities, CSOs and religious institutions. It further recommends that the Mozambican government consider developing home-grown national and local strategies for PCVE that will take into account local realities, the country’s history, and community dynamics. Lastly, it recommends that military intervention should be complemented with a well-defined and coordinated long and short-term investment in human security. This will help to address economic, political and social drivers of radicalisation.

In chapter nine, William John Walwa and Gabriel Malebang concentrate on the SADC Mission to Mozambique (SAMIM). It specifically looks into the extent to which SAMIM remains relevant and effective in an environment where Rwanda and other international actors simultaneously operate in managing the threat. The chapter also assesses SAMIM’s efficacy in meeting its goal of preventing VE from spilling over to other countries. Among others, it finds that despite the registered SAMIM successes, the situation on the ground has still not been stabilised to the point where people can return to their normal lives. It recommends that SADC should take the lead in developing a regional strategy on PCVE and terrorism. This will encourage member states to develop their own strategies.

It advises that SADC should consider working together with the other sub-regions including the EAC, COMESA, ICGLR, IGAD, North Africa and even the Middle East in preventing and addressing VE and terrorism. This is largely because the threats are cross-border in nature, and recruits come from both SADC and non-SADC regions. In addition, the roots of radicalisation in southern Africa can be traced back to non-SADC regions.

SADC should further consider investing in home-grown sustainable human security initiatives. Member states should be encouraged to invest in peace-building initiatives to make them sustainable, and less susceptible to foreign
influence. Finally, the chapter recommends that concerted efforts should be made – by means of international and regional dialogues – to address the sense of marginalisation among SADC member states, which to some degree has made them lose interest in participating in SAMIM.

SADC and its member states should work towards creating a synergy between inter-governmental agencies such as the SADC counter-terrorism centre, the academic/research community, and independent think-tanks. This will help to produce findings, informed recommendations and implementation strategies on PCVE and terrorism.

In chapter ten, Rasul Ahmed Minja explores the C/PVE experiences in other African regions – notably the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, Central Africa and North Africa – with a view to extracting lessons for southern Africa, and particularly Mozambique. It further assesses the role of women in PCVE and terrorism, and provides recommendations to actors at different levels ranging from the Mozambican government to SADC.

Among others, it finds that in some regions, such as the Horn of Africa, women are particularly well placed to detect radicalisation among family members, as well as within their local communities. In West Africa, particularly Nigeria, women play a key role in sustaining community policing in areas with high violence rates. It recommends that PCVE strategies should be expanded to incorporate the participation of local communities, women, youths, civil society and religious institutions. Southern African governments should ensure that PCVE laws, policies and programmes are in place, including mainstreaming the role of women as key stakeholders beyond perpetrator-victim classification.

Finally, the Mozambican authorities should devise reintegration programmes that consider gender-specific needs. This would require soliciting the expertise of behavioural therapists and psychologists to establish the drivers and motivations behind an individual’s decision to join a VE or terrorist organisation. It therefore recommends that the region and governments should enhance the formulation of rehabilitation and counter-radicalisation interventions. Deradicalisation programmes should apply to targeted groups in custody as well as the community at large. Interventions must be regularly evaluated in order to establish whether they meet the intended goals, given that the nature of the threat can change very rapidly.
FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The Mozambican government and society at large should:

• Develop home-grown national and local strategies for PCVE that consider local histories and current realities. These strategies should be comprehensive, and incorporate measures to prevent and counter threats emanating from recruitment, radicalisation and de-radicalisation.
• Move to a higher level of managing VE by improving the relationship between government and intra-state actors such as communities and CSOs, particularly religious institutions.
• Formalise the economy in northern Mozambique to make it less susceptible to exploitation by both TOCs and VE organisations.
• Complement military intervention with a well-defined and coordinated long and short-term investment in human security. This will help in addressing economic, political, and social drivers for recruitment into radicalisation.
• Devise reintegration programmes that consider gender-specific needs. This will require soliciting the expertise of behavioural therapists and psychologists.

Southern African governments and civil societies should:

• Ensure that states respect and promote the rights of citizens as fundamental to preventing and countering VE. All forms of discrimination should be avoided.
• Establish strong moral leadership and rigorous anti-corruption oversight mechanisms.
• Address capacity challenges in detecting and countering online recruitment and radicalisation by VE organisations. More human and financial resources should be dedicated to addressing this issue. Governments should work closely with major technology companies to counter the spread of local extremist narratives online, develop counternarratives and promote moderate Islamic voices. Legislation to address the problem should be drafted or updated.
• Ensure community engagement in developing and implementing NAPs.
• Ensure that NAPs address governance issues, including human rights abuses committed by the state, and are not used for intelligence purposes.
• Encourage African scholars and think-tanks to conduct evidence-based research on the drivers of VE. This could form the basis for policy interven-
tions relevant to Africa, but also help to define appropriate forms of foreign assistance.

- Enhance the formulation of rehabilitation and counter-radicalisation interventions. Deradicalisation programmes should apply to both targeted groups in custody and in the community.

**The African Union should:**

- Strengthen its partnerships with civil society, other non-state actors, academia, and research institutions/think tanks, aimed at improving knowledge on peace and security and VE.
- Craft a new, responsive mechanism for managing VE, based on human security as opposed to traditional forms of state security.
- Develop and adopt a policy of engaging with ‘terrorists.’ A failure to do so thus far has contributed to hardening and radicalising them, thereby strengthening their resolve to turn to violence.
- Define clear terms of reference to guide the engagement of African states and foreign actors in PCVE programming.
- Allow RECs to play leading roles in ensuring that VE programmes are monitored and evaluated from a Security Sector Governance perspective.
- Adapt early warning systems to the early detection of VE.

**The Southern African Development Community should:**

- Take the lead in developing a regional strategy on PCVE and terrorism. This should result in member states developing their own strategies.
- Work with the EAC, COMESA, ICGLR, IGAD, North Africa and the Middle East in preventing and addressing VE and terrorism. This is largely because VE threats are cross-border in nature, and recruits come from both SADC and non-SADC regions.
- Invest in home-grown sustainable human security initiatives. Member states should be encouraged to invest in peacebuilding initiatives to make them sustainable, and less susceptible to foreign influence.
- Work towards creating synergy between the SADC counter-terrorism centre, the academic/research community, and independent think-tanks in respect of research on PCVE.
- Ensure that PCVE laws, policies and programmes are in place, including mainstreaming the role of women as key stakeholders beyond the perpetrator-victim classification.
Southern Africa is experiencing an upsurge in violent extremism (VE). The DRC, Mozambique and Tanzania have experienced attacks by extremist groups, with events in Cabo Delgado province in Northern Mozambique in particular making international headlines. Among others, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been called on to support the Mozambican government and has deployed a Standby Force to the area. But while a military intervention may help to limit violent attacks, it cannot bring lasting peace. In this edition of the Southern African Security Review – the fifth in the biennial series – academics from across the region provide an in-depth analysis of VE, and the complex dynamics surrounding preventing and countering VE in African settings. Based on a series of workshops on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE), organised by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies at Joachim Chissano University in Maputo, the Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADSEM) network, and the Maputo office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, this timely and ground-breaking work deepens our understanding of this disturbing new feature of the southern African security landscape.