From Political Liberation to Economic Dependency? Rethinking Policies of Economic Development and Social Inclusion
Cover Art

Ricardo Pinto Jorge

Raised in the capital of his motherland, Mozambique.

Ricardo is currently living his childhood dream, which was always to be an airline pilot. And when he’s not flying, he pursues his passion for art. Constantly challenging himself as a visual artist diving into multi-disciplinary projects, experimenting between illustrations, installations, and various other media. The young artist seeks to talk about typical Mozambican daily life, and as such illustrate “Moçambicanidades”. Through previously employed techniques such as stencil, graffiti, digital compositions, and new explorations such as engraving and enlarging works to a larger scale, Ricardo looks to expand dialogues and reflections that may positively influence the audience.
From Political Liberation to Economic Dependency?
Rethinking Policies of Economic Development and Social Inclusion

Edited by Neo Simutanyi and André du Pisani
# Table of contents

**About the authors**

5

**Foreword**

7

*Ana Nhampule and Tina Henneken Andrade*

**Introduction**

Economic Liberation in Southern Africa: Challenges and Prospects

11

*Neo Simutanyi and André du Pisani*

**Part One:**

**From Political to Economic Independence? Redefining African Economic Liberation in the Current Context**

31

From Political to Economic Independence: Reminiscing on the Past and Thinking about the Future

33

*Ibrahim M. Kaduma*

Economic Liberation in the Current Context of Southern Africa: Conceptual and Policy Considerations

43

*Neo Simutanyi*

When our Mozambican “Cinderella” speaks out: Participation of women in the struggle for political and economic independence

65

*Isabel Maria Casimiro*

Southern African Development Community (SADC): From the Past to the Future

91

*Nelson Ocuane*
Part Two:
Stumbling Blocks: Internal and External Limitations to Economic Independence  103
Making the future: Towards Democratic Developmental States in Southern Africa, merging desirability and feasibility  105
André du Pisani

The Nexus of Neo-liberalism and Precarity: Struggles for Alternative Societies  135
Patricia McFadden

Political Drivers, Ideology and Development in Southern Africa  161
Lloyd Sachikonye

Part Three:
Drivers for an independent, progressive and inclusive future  177
Driving socio-economic development and transformation in Southern Africa: Stimulating the Industrial and Economic Anchors  179
Oliver Maponga

External Barriers and Limitations to Economic Independence in Southern Africa  203
José A. da Conceição Chichava

Naome Chakanya

Abbreviations and Acronyms  253
About the authors

The late Ibrahim Kaduma established the influential Institute for Development Studies at the University of Dar es Salaam, subsequently became the Vice Chancellor of that University and Foreign Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania. He published extensively on education, politics and the international relations of his country.

Neo Simutanyi is a political economist and Director of the Centre for Policy Dialogue in Lusaka, Zambia. His research interests include economic history, the political-economy of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and Africa in the global economy.

Nelson Ocuane is the Managing Director of NOC Consulting, and former Chief Executive Officer of the National Oil Company in Maputo, Mozambique.

Isabel Maria Casimiro works in the Centre of African Studies at Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo, Mozambique. She is one of the pre-eminent sociologists and feminist scholars in Mozambique.

José A. da Conceição Chichava has a PhD in Economics and is Assistant Professor and Deputy Dean for Post-Graduation Courses in the Faculty of Economics at Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo, Mozambique.

Lloyd Sachikonye researches and lectures on Development Studies at the University of Zimbabwe in Harare. He is widely travelled and has published numerous scholarly papers and research reports.

Patricia McFadden is a distinguished radical ecological feminist and critical scholar with an impressive publication and research record. Over many decades she has defined the conversation around feminism and feminist scholarship in southern Africa. She leads a modest life of self-reliance on a piece of land near Mbabane, ESwatini.
**André du Pisani** is Emeritus Professor of Politics at the University of Namibia (UNAM) in Windhoek, Namibia. He is a photographic artist, researches rock art and has published widely on the politics of his country and the political economy and security of SADC. Since 2000 he has been involved in the Southern African Defence and Security Network (SADSEM).

**Oliver Maponga** is an economist who works for the Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in Lusaka, Zambia.

**Naome Chakanya** is associated with the Labour and Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe, in Harare, Zimbabwe.
Foreword

During the founding summit of the regional community in 1980 the member states put it clearly on the agenda: “Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation” was the title of the historic SADCC-Declaration, which committed to harmoniously integrate the economies and gradually reduce their foreign dependence – at the time, especially from Apartheid South Africa. Other goals were the promotion of popular welfare, of justice and peace in the region through regional cooperation, which should do the dreams of the pan-African progressive thinkers – Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Amilcar Cabral, Thomas Sankara, among others, – justice. There was a strategic vision, that independence is not achieved by overthrowing oppressive and racists colonial governments alone, but by creating the conditions of an autonomous socio-economic and political development.

However, roughly 40 years later, the stock taking is rather sobering. Despite considerable economic growth for the last decade, the region is still characterized by tremendous social and structural inequalities, by the lack of quality social services and of regional integration. The liberal shift during the 90s – privatization, trade liberalization – took the states out of the driver’s seat of economic development and did not produce the promised trickle-down effects. Southern African economies are still highly dependent on commodities, foreign direct investment, and volatile international supply chains. They are vulnerable to external shocks, produce wealth for the few and much less employment than needed to really turn the tables.

The recent impacts of the climate crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic further exacerbated these trends. They underline that Southern Africa needs a fresh approach to comprehensive economic transformation. A transformation, which aims at tackling poverty and inequality, which creates an economy, that works in the interest of the majority and allows all people a life in dignity independent from their gender, race, and class.
Against this backdrop, the Fretilin Central Party School and the Mozambique office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) decided to facilitate a series of reflections during their regularly held regional policy forums. The gatherings exist since 2006 and intent to foster critical debate around joint political and economic challenges in the SADC region among representatives from the ruling political parties, scholars, and civil society.

The idea to this book emerged in 2018, when – on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of Karl Marx – a policy forum was dedicated to revisit the thinkers of the left and the liberation era, to inspire new visions for an independent development path and a more just and inclusive society in Southern Africa. What does the notion of political and economic liberation mean today? What compromises the achievement of an autonomous and socially just development path in the region? How can ruling parties foster change towards social, economic, environmental and gender justice?

The rich discussions were deepened during the policy forum in 2019 and captured in policy papers by selected experts in the field of economy and political science as well as by members of the ruling parties in the region. This book is a compilation of these papers revised and submitted to peer review before the edition.

We would like to thank all participants of the forum for very fruitful and rich debates with critical openness and mutual respect. We are especially grateful to the authors of this book, who provoked with their inputs to the forum important reflections and thoroughly reworked their original papers to include the collective discussions. The contributions of the book look into challenging questions of freedom, justice and solidarity from different angles and name some very concrete factors, which are perpetuating poverty, inequality and economic dependency as well as the institutional and structural reforms needed to overcome them. A special thanks goes in this context to our editors, Neo Simutanyi and André du Pisani, for bringing these rich debates together in this compilation, with vision, passion and patience.
We hope, the readers will enjoy the book and that it can contribute to a collective reflection towards strategic options for a more autonomous, solidary, socially and economically just future in Southern Africa.

Ana Nhampule (Frelimo Central Party School) and Tina Hennecken Andrade (FES)
Southern Africa is characterized by high levels of poverty, unemployment and social inequality. In several cases poverty and inequality have been on the increase over the last decade, as contributions to this collection show. Indeed, while most countries of the region managed to achieve some measure of progress immediately following their national independence, such as in the area of education and expanded social service provision, denied during the colonial era, this was not sustained over the long term to the extent that most countries’ social indicators can be said to be depressing. For example, more than 60 per cent of the population of the region lacks access to adequate supply of safe water; close to half of the population lives in abject poverty and about 40 per cent of the labour force is either unemployed or underemployed. Admittedly, there has been little systemic transformation of economic structures and, consequently, an enclave economy persists throughout much of the region. A typical enclave economy is characterized by a relatively small and well-resourced formal sector that exists in isolation from a large, poverty-stricken informal economy and subsistence agriculture which absorb more than two-thirds of the region’s population. The divide between urban and rural also reveals serious income disparities, where the majority of the poor happen to


3 ILO, op. cit.
reside in rural areas. With the exception of a few countries: South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Mauritius, at least 65% of the population live below the poverty line. In the case of other SADC-states, at least 80% of the population live below the poverty line.

When measured by the Human Development Index (HDI), such as life expectancy, education and standard of living, seven of southern African countries fall in the medium category, while six are in the low HDI group. Further, the level of income inequality in the region remains amongst the highest in the world. How has this happened, when the region was the hotbed of national liberation struggles inspired by radical socialist visions at least initially? Five of the countries in the region achieved independence (or political freedom) by waging wars of national liberation that were prosecuted by national liberation movements. While the rest was led by nationalist political parties, that achieved independence by negotiation. However, by the end of the 1990s there was not much difference in the political and economic trajectories taken by the countries of the region. They pursued almost similar development strategies and the political complexion of the governance systems reflected more similarities than differences. Namibian scholar, Henning Melber, has summed up the nature of the political leadership in southern Africa thus:

Frantz Fanon had already expressed his…disgust for the emerging new elites he witnessed in independent African countries… [by] demonstrating that the pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric of the representatives of the new state power was a misleading façade. His scathing attack on a new hegemonic nationalist elite project, with its particular blend of populist nation-building, questioned the extent of meaningful social change for the majority of the previously underprivileged colonized population in the wake of decolonization. In contrast, many countries of the region] endured decades [of

4 Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe.
poverty and deprivation], [but] have despite many shortcomings, much to offer most of their people. [But]...also failed to meet some of the more substantive and essential original ideals, ambitions and aims that were once articulated by the same social forces and their leaders who now exercise political power.⁵

The struggle for liberation in southern Africa was, justifiably, a cause for celebration towards the close of the second half of the 20th century. Governments in the region attained political freedom giving meaning to Nkrumah’s call, ‘seek ye first the political kingdom, and all else shall be added unto you.’⁶ In his understanding, political independence was only the prelude to social development and reconstruction. After political independence several thinkers and scholars warned of the hollowness of political freedom in the absence of economic freedom. For example, Nkrumah said that political independence was meaningless without economic independence.⁷ While this dictum was to be repeated by several other African leaders, such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Leopold Senghor of Senegal and Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda, real economic transformation did not take place. If anything, after a brief experimentation with socialist options by some of the countries,⁸ almost without exception, there was a wholesale adoption of neoliberal economic policies in the 1980s and 1990s, which did not lead to economic growth or reductions in poverty and inequality. Most southern African societies remained doggedly unequal.

---


⁸ Saul, op.cit, 32-42.
While liberation struggles in southern Africa ended in defeat for racial minorities and victory for the principle of democracy and social inclusion, an historic triumph was won. Looking back on the last three decades, however, it is now a ‘widely held view that national liberation movements as governments have proved to be a disappointment not only to their many sympathisers internationally, but above all, to the majority of the people over whom they now rule’.

Indeed, whereas national liberation movements at one time represented an answer to southern Africa’s problems, they are now increasingly viewed as part of the problem. This chapter locates the discussion of economic liberation in southern Africa that John Saul aptly termed, the ‘next liberation struggle’ or Mills & Herbst’s idea of ‘Africa’s third liberation.’ Our focus in this chapter is on the central theme of this volume, namely: ‘From Political independence to economic dependency: Rethinking policies of economic development and social inclusion – challenges for the ruling parties in Southern Africa.’ The chapter frames the contributions in this volume that comprise of revised papers originally presented at the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) and FRELIMO Central Party School Regional Political Parties Forum held in Maputo, Mozambique from 29-30 May 2019. The chapter is divided into five coherent and interlinked sections. Following the introduction, the second section examines visions of economic liberation from African thinkers and liberation heroes. The third section discusses in broad outline the development experience in southern Africa.


The fourth section considers development options towards a socially just and sustainable development, followed by the conclusion.

**Visions of economic liberation from African thinkers and liberation heroes**

Kwame Nkrumah warned that political independence was meaningless without economic independence or economic liberation. He warned of the dangers of neocolonialism, which he saw as the ‘last stage of imperialism’. Economic freedom has often been defined as freedom to conduct business unhindered, freedom to enjoy property rights and of course to have a free market economy. In this chapter we view economic liberation, as freedom from want. Specifically, economic freedom involves notions of fulfilment of economic and social rights, such as the right to adequate food, right to work and a decent income and the right to social protection. Economic freedom does not only end with sovereign control of the economy by indigenous people, as suggested by some scholars, it does not necessarily mean that the economy works in the interests of the majority of the population. Thus, economic policies are expected to address distortions that produce or reproduce poverty, inequality, unemployment and under-employment, as well as generalized social deprivations and concerns of social justice. It is not the intention of this chapter to debate the merits or demerits of the capitalist system Vis-à-Vis a socialist system. Some contributions to this volume, such as the insightful and historically rich notes by a veteran of the liberation struggle in his country Tanzania, the late Ibrahim Kaduma attempted to do that. This is not only because a discussion of socialism has become so discredited in the region, but also due to the eclectic and hybrid ideological perspectives followed by governing parties in the region it would be quite difficult to arrive at a consensus on the coherence and efficacy of any ideological vision.

While there may be a debate on what is meant by economic liberation, broadly speaking it could be viewed as a process of seeking emancipation from political economies characterised by poverty, graft, crony capitalism, rent-seeking, elitism and widening social inequality. Put simply, economic liberation presupposes economic freedom, including freedom from want (hunger and the basic necessities of life), freedom from social deprivation and meaningful social justice. The right to economic freedom has come to be considered as a human right and is advocated by the United Nations (UN) and other international advocacy organizations as a universal value in its own right. For example, the right to employment, freedom from hunger and right to social protection are now universally acknowledged as goals for every nation to attain and have been incorporated in the United Nations’ Development Goals. Ray Bush and Patrick Bond concur that economic liberation should necessarily involve freeing citizens from the ‘chains of an exploitative world economy and power elite, who treat the continent without respect.’

13 Mills, G. and Herbst, J, op. cit.

14 Right to work is enshrined in article 23 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Part III, article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and article 15 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.


16 Social protection is a human right enshrined in article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) and other major UN human rights instruments.

In a radical rendition of what she calls, ‘ecofeminism’ the eminent scholar, Professor Patricia McFadden, argues that nationalism, the very ideological lubricant of liberation, and neo-liberalism have by-and-large extinguished women’s voices and agencies. Moreover, the manner in which the global system colonizes all forms of life, inclusive of all forms of biodiversity, by placing ourselves “above our life source—the natural environment—is a replication of how men colonize women in a hierarchical manner, and how white people colonise black people” contribute materially towards inequality and injustice (*Mail and Guardian*, November 27 to December 3, 2020, p. 9). From her perspective, economic liberation would not be possible without a radical restructuring of globalisation in its present form, the death of patriarchy and addressing the precarity/vulnerability of women caused by the unholy interface between nationalism, neo-liberalism and globalisation from above.

Frantz Fanon advances a profound indictment on Africa’s middle classes’ ability to promote sustainable economic development and break clear from the chains of colonial domination. For Fanon, decolonization is a process that begins with the mind and involves the attitudes and mentalities of the middle classes or the so-called *petit bourgeoisie* who act as intermediaries between foreign capital and local capital. According to Fanon, the national middle class that seizes power at independence was a self-serving lot and was required to commit ‘class suicide’ to prosecute a programme of genuine economic development.\(^{18}\) He observed that this middle class had no real interest of the country nor the plight of the poor majority at heart as it engaged in ‘scandalous enrichment’ and ‘immoderate money making’, and enmeshed itself into ‘the mire of corruption and pleasure.’\(^{19}\)


\(^{19}\) Ibid, p.122.
It was Amilcar Cabral of Guinea Bissau, more than Nkrumah or any other African leader, who concretized African realities into a theory of liberation. Cabral developed not only the theory and strategy of wars of liberation against colonial rule, but also was one who looked beyond the seizure of state power.\textsuperscript{20} He argued, for example, that the chief goal of the liberation movement was not only national independence and the crushing of colonialism, but the ‘complete liberation of the productive forces and the construction of economic, social and cultural progress of the people.’\textsuperscript{21} In short, early leaders of the national liberation imagined a better and prosperous future for their societies, a future in which their citizens had opportunities for employment, had decent wages to afford the basic necessities of life, had decent housing, access to quality education and health care and were above all well governed. While there was general agreement on what a future continent would look like and on the root causes of underdevelopment such as dependent centre-periphery relations, there were diverse solutions to Africa’s development predicament.\textsuperscript{22}

Kenneth Kaunda, of Zambia, adopted humanism, defined as ‘a man-centric society’ and envisaged a society devoid of class antagonisms, where there ‘was no exploitation of man by man.’\textsuperscript{23} He dreamt of a country in which every child had an egg a day, a pint of milk a day, no-one went bare feet and in which every household would


live in a burnt brick house with iron roofing.\textsuperscript{24} Julius Nyerere, from Tanzania, on the other hand, believed in community living through collectivized villages, he called ‘ujamaa’ (family hood), where the people shared what they produced equitably and where leaders governed according to a clear code of conduct.\textsuperscript{25} But these strategies were far from transformative. John Saul describes Kaunda’s humanism as having been ‘neither socialist nor democratic’.\textsuperscript{26}

Many scholars\textsuperscript{27} expressed optimism that countries led by national liberation movements showed more promise in constructing more equitable and socially just economies and societies. This was partly because almost all national liberation movements had embraced socialist visions inspired by either the former Soviet Union or the People’s Republic of China (PRC). But the socialist hopes that they embodied have since succumbed to political degeneration and weak governance. In Mozambique, one commentator has observed that ‘corruption and the pursuit of individual self-interest have undermined the legitimacy of ruling party leaders,’ while the election of some wealthy leaders, such as former president Armando Guebuza in Mozambique and Cyril Ramaposa in South Africa as presidents of their countries signalled an unabashed commitment to neo-liberal economic orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{28} Where civil wars persisted, such as in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),


\textsuperscript{26} Saul, op. cit. p.34


it was in many cases a struggle for access to and control over natural resources, such as oil, uraninite and diamonds. The DRC continues to display elements of a ‘war economy’, with rival elites competing to control and benefit from the rich natural resource endowment of that country. The irony of national liberation parties is that former socialists and now powerful party elites live in luxury often disregarding the abject poverty of the majority of the population.

Why has this happened? While it is acknowledged that the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Western governments pressured the countries in the region to adopt neo-liberal economic policies of economic stabilisation and structural adjustment, the absence of resistance by local elites to pursue home-grown policies tailored to poverty reduction and redistribution of wealth is most revealing and unsettling. The ready acceptance by regional leaders of structural adjustment policies signals the apparent inevitability of capitalism, as being the only strategy capable of bringing about national development. It fits into the problematic notion of the ‘end of history’ as posited by Francis Fukuyama. As it turned out almost without exception, national liberation movements and nationalist ruling parties opted for reformist versions of capitalism hoping that it would generate the necessary economic growth and financial resources to allow the implementation of social policies capable of alleviating hunger, disease, unemployment and social inequality. However, while this option could have worked in countries such as South Africa, it did not make much sense in other countries of the region as cogently argued by Neo Simutanyi, Ibrahim Kaduma, Isabel Maria Casimiro, José A. da Conceição Chichava and Austin Chirisa. The incorporation of the economies of the region into the global capitalist economy, made it difficult for independent economic strategies to be devised, as da Conceição Chichava, shows in his insightful contribution. In the circumstances, it is unsurprising that political leaders, including those from

national liberation movements opted to use state power to enrich themselves. Thus as Fanon has aptly observed, national liberation movements and nationalist parties developed into instruments of political and economic domination and funnels of elite economic accumulation. It can therefore be argued that claiming to be the authentic representatives of the people, promoted by independence parties and national liberation was only a façade that masked important political realities, such as party factionalism, contested visions of an alternative society and the self-interest of party leaders.

Development paradigms

As pointed out above, the dominant traditional development strategies to foster economic growth in the region as promoted by the IMF, World Bank and Western countries have evidently been insufficient to address current economic challenges as several contributors to this volume point out. There has been less emphasis placed on laying institutional and social foundations for structural transformation of the economies so as to facilitate a meaningful development trajectory. Instead, most countries of southern Africa are still locked in the mistaken belief that the market-driven logic and the private sector should be the engine for growth and creator of wealth, as Austin Chirisa, David Masondo, Patricia McFadden and José A. da Conceição Chichava, among others argue. According to this paradigm, the government’s role in the economy is supposed to be that of ‘referee’ or creator of an enabling or conducive investment climate for private sector investment and participation. But despite more than two and a half decades of implementing this economic strategy, in most countries in the region, poverty levels have worsened. Neither agricultural economies, such as Tanzania and Malawi nor resource-rich ones, such as South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Zambia and Zimbabwe have been able to significantly and sustainably reduce poverty and inequality in the last two and a half

30 Fanon, op. cit, p.134-35.
decades. For example, Botswana’s average growth of 13% between 1970 and 1994 failed to eradicate the high levels of poverty in that country: The structure of global trade, mounting foreign debt and political expediency have conspired to de-prioritize social investment and social protection in fighting poverty and inequality. There is no doubt that the region’s inherited structural legacies have played an important role in shaping and reproducing poverty and inequality which has led to what can be described as a crisis of development.

Some governments adopted another development paradigm, that of state-led development – the developmental state, for short. This approach placed the state at the centre as a promoter of economic development and an engine of growth. This saw the nationalisation of private enterprises and the creation of a number of state-owned enterprises. However, the experience with nationalization and state-led development did not produce the desired economic benefits to national populations. State-owned entities were inefficient, over-employed staff and largely unprofitable and had to be bailed out with large unsustainable state subsidies. By and large the developmental state paradigm promoted by ruling party elites was often predicated on cronyism and patronage, not on creating wealth for redistribution, as André du Pisani argues in this volume. In important respects, such experiments lacked the necessary local state capacity and democratic culture to make them work.

The other related policy to a developmental state is the direct empowerment of a section of the population, considered ‘historically disadvantaged,’ such as the black people or economic disadvantaged sections of the middle classes. In South Africa, this found expression in the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (BBEE), in Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, there are various forms of such empowerment. What this policy did was to create

and consolidate a new property-owning class, a new bourgeoisie. It did not in any meaningful way help address the issue of economic disempowerment of the poor, meaningfully reduce poverty and promote redistribution of wealth. Reviewing this experience in southern Africa, Roger Southall concludes that ‘BEE simultaneously facilitated a rapid expansion of crony capitalism constructed around political connectivity.’

While Henning Melber observed that: ‘BEE (in Namibia) has become far less a vehicle of legitimate redress than a morally dubious tool for serving the class interests of the bureaucratic elite.’

Income inequalities in the region reveal the failure of economic policy to redistribute wealth. While South Africa is the wealthiest country on the continent, it is also the most unequal. Of all the most unequal countries in the world, five are in southern Africa, and include, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Lesotho. Income distribution tends to be skewed in favour of the white racial minority (South Africa and Namibia) and tiny wealthy elite in other southern African countries. In South Africa, for example, 5% of white nationals own 80% of the land in that country. Namibia, too, displays a comparable pattern of land ownership. A similar pattern was also found in Zimbabwe, which forced the Zimbabwean government to forceful seize white owned land/farms for redistribution to historically disadvantaged Zimbabweans. However, the redistribution did not only place productive farms in the hands of peasants who had no material means to develop them, but most of the productive farms were shared by the political elite and members of the security establishment.

32 Southall, op. cit, p.347.


The problem of development in the region could also be illustrated by the persistence of gender inequalities. Despite signing up to international protocols and conventions on gender equality, there is widespread gender inequality in the countries of the region in virtually all spheres of life from customary practices, in the labour market and in access to services and economic resources, such as land, assets and financial resources, e.g. loans. Widening gender disparities have evidently increased a sense of social injustice and deprivations in many countries. While there are positive developments in increasing women participation in politics and decision making in countries such as South Africa, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania and Namibia, there is still a lot to be done. Six countries in the region, Madagascar, Malawi, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe have below than 30% women representation in their legislatures; a far cry from the African Union’s vision of fifty per cent female gender representation in decision making organs.35

There is no doubt that southern Africa needs a fresh approach to address the current social and economic crisis. An integral part of such an approach must fully value and utilize the agency of women, for women have been marginalized and their voices silenced during and after the liberation struggles in the different countries of the region, as the compelling contributions by Patricia McFadden and Isabel Maria Casimiro argue.

It is a notorious fact that substantive gender equality is still a long way off in southern Africa. But it should be recognised that it should be considered a central feature in the fight against poverty, social deprivation, poverty and inequality. Despite substantial achievements towards gender equality in some countries, already pointed out above, in terms of legal equality and women’s representation in representative bodies, patriarchal structures, gender discrimination and barriers in access to economic resources

still remain widespread and entrenched throughout the region. Thus, the focus of development strategies should be to move women out of poverty and liberate them from the shackles of patriarchy, disempowerment and inequality. There is no doubt that poverty and inequality have an extremely severe and disproportionate impact on women. Women suffer under patriarchal structures and customs, are victims of gender-based violence (GBV) and their prospects for improving their quality of life is often limited. Since women’s work in the home and workplace tends to be undervalued and face tremendous obstacles in social advancement, especially as regards access to resources, such as education, facilities, land and loans, there is a need for ruling parties and governments in the region to pay particular attention to gender equality. As articulated by liberation heroes, gender equality can only be achieved if the structural impediments that limit women’s full participation in political and economic life of their countries are addressed.

**Development options: towards a socially just and inclusive future**

Scholars, such as the late Samir Amin, John Saul and Patrick Bond, are optimistic that a socially just future is possible for Africa in general and southern Africa in particular. Inspired by the writings of revolutionary theorists and liberation heroes, they argue that the starting point is to understand the nature of the incorporation of countries of the region into the world capitalist system and use innovative strategies to transform the societies to reflect the values of social inclusion and social justice. National independence and national liberation struggles were inspired by a larger vision of economic prosperity, equitable redistribution of wealth and social justice for all. These noble goals remain as relevant today as they were then. While development plans and strategies of ruling parties retain these goals for a socially just society, most are only paying lip-service to the goal of comprehensive economic transformation that aim at tackling poverty and inequality. The use of terms such as
‘inclusive growth’ or ‘leaving no-one behind’ are now found in the lexicon of almost every country’s development strategies and yet poverty and inequality remain at unacceptable levels.

In conversations at the Maputo conference and in various contributions to this volume, the challenges of crafting a development identity, the following emerged as factors perpetuating poverty, inequality and underdevelopment:

♦ External dependence on foreign trade (especially Western markets), foreign capital, technology and information. The digital divide, too, plays an increasingly important part in deepening global inequality, as posited in the contributions of José A. da Conceição Chichava and Nelson Ocuane.

♦ Unequal access to productive assets and formal markets, particularly where such assets have been privatised and sold to foreign owners, for example in the case of the extractive industries of the region.

♦ Lack of integration between economic and social sectors, such as agriculture and manufacturing, rural and urban sectors, thus limiting adaptations that can be made to production techniques.

♦ Dominance of extractive industries has fuelled inequality and poverty, as it has perpetuated an enclave economy, where there is an uneasy co-existence between a highly developed urban-based political-economy on the one hand, and an underdeveloped, backward and almost traditional rural, agricultural-based economy dominated by low productivity subsistence production. Despite plentiful supplies and export of minerals, such as diamonds, oil, copper, gold, platinum, chrome, gas and bauxite, among others, unemployment, especially youth unemployment, is on the increase, while poverty and inequality remain daunting challenges in all the countries of the region as Nelson Ocuane shows in his chapter.
A study of inequality in southern Africa identified the main challenges facing the region as the absence or inadequacies of structural interventions to deal with the region’s unacceptable levels of poverty and inequality. As there is a close association between inequality and poverty, it is important that issues of poverty and inequality are prioritized in all aspects of social and economic policy. Further, resources set aside for poverty reduction, job creation and social protection will need to be properly accounted for and not end up being misapplied or stolen through corruption and misappropriation. Cases of millions of dollars meant for poverty reduction being stolen abound in the region. In Zambia, in 2018 at least US$3.5 million of donor funds meant for the social cash transfer programme, targeting individuals in extreme poverty, were stolen by government officials. The diversion of funds meant for poverty alleviation that ended up in private pockets should be a familiar story in many countries in the region.

What ought the role of ruling parties in promoting a socially just, economic transformation that ensures inclusive growth and the redistribution of productive resources, be? There is no doubt that development strategies adopted by ruling parties must of necessity be informed by an overarching ideology of social inclusion and distributive justice, as argued by Lloyd Sachikonye, with his emphasis on the key role of social classes in the equation. It is important that ruling parties pay attention to the ever-growing poverty and inequality in their countries and put in place development programs that are long term, and not tied to the electoral cycle. Further, they could emulate the counsel of liberation heroes who advised against the temptation of using political power to promote personal

36 ILO, op. cit.

interests. A leadership code ought to be adopted in every state of the region. There is no doubt that the current and future challenges in fighting poverty and inequality will remain daunting. What is clear is that orthodox economic policies that have been followed uncritically by governments in the region have been insufficient to redress inequality and poverty.

Instead, far more emphasis will need to be placed on identifying institutional and social barriers to economic structural transformation that will facilitate meaningful and inclusive development and a systematic redistribution of national resources. This will require interventions regarding improved governance and participatory democracy, a rights-based approach to development, a firm commitment to social justice and a different approach towards the world capitalist system. It is not enough to shout loudly about the effects of ‘white monopoly capital’, as has been the case in South Africa, without concretely devising a development strategy that is aimed at redistribution of wealth and poverty alleviation. Leaders should also be exemplary and take their responsibilities seriously. The importance of governance cannot be over-emphasized. It does not help to have development plans or policies that emphasize poverty reduction and reducing inequality (‘leaving no-one behind’), while ignoring self-enrichment and corruption of political leaders and politically-connected elites at the national and local levels. There are many endogenous development frameworks that have been developed by African scholars, such as the 1988 African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment\(^{38}\) and the ‘Alternatives to


\(^{39}\) Deglobalisation could be an opportunity for EU-Africa cooperation, by Manfred öhm, Hendrik Maihack, 30.10.20 in International Politics and Society, Berlin: FES, pp. 1-5.
Neoliberalism in Southern Africa’ (ANSA), which could form a basis for a conversation on the way forward. But these proposals should involve broad-based consultations and public debate in their formulation and implementation, if they have to address themselves to the core problematic of development, ending poverty and inequality.

Conclusion
Informed by the contributions to this edited volume, it is clear that Southern Africa should craft and advance a new social contract between the respective governments and their citizens. Global warming and the more recent corona pandemic have accelerated various trends to which no region or country will remain immune. One such a trend is the diversification and growing importance of regional supply chains. For SADC and the African continent, this means that the regional and sub-regional development framings such as Vision 2030 and Vision 2063 should be implemented as a matter of urgency. Regional supply chains such as those being envisioned in the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA) are significantly more resilient than global supply chains.

It is clear that global supply chains as a development model that many SADC states seemingly uncritically put their faith in, may become obsolete, as such supply chains are subject to considerable volatility and unpredictability. Moreover, it is clear that global supply chains deepen and have deepened import and export dependencies, accelerated higher levels of employment in the informal economy and undermined the ability of states to fund their social security systems. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has expressed the fear that, over the long term, one of the most negative effects of the pandemic could be that the demand for African goods may be reduced, which in turn, would affect African integration into global supply chains and investment in the continent that favours economic diversification and meaningful developmental regionalism.
In summation, the five key drivers of economic development on the continent are those listed by the African Development Bank (ADB). These are:

- ‘Light up Africa’ – supply electricity and other sustainable forms of energy.
- ‘Feed Africa’ – continue to invest more in agriculture and ensure food security at household and national level.
- Industrialize Africa with the extractive sector as a key driver.
- Integrate Africa by means of ICT and transport infrastructure, and
- Improve the quality of life of citizens, especially in terms of social services, water supply, primary health care and sanitation.

Gender equality and gender justice as an integral part of development, sound governance and social justice, must be meaningfully actualized throughout the region. This is a non-negotiable imperative for sustainable human development and democracy.

Finally, the SADC Member States must collectively seek more meaningful trade justice from their principal trading partners, while at the same time, elevating intra-regional trade to a more meaningful level than hitherto.
Part One: From Political to Economic Independence? Re-defining African Economic Liberation in the Current Context
Introduction

What were actually the motives of our forefathers when they launched the struggle for independence? Before and immediately after independence, radical scholars, nationalist leaders and leaders of national liberation movements had grand ideas and visions about an economically liberated Africa. They were not only opposed to colonial domination, but envisaged a just, equitable and egalitarian society. Many were opposed to capitalist economic system and propagated societies that were more caring and where the interests of the weak were paramount. Visionary leaders, such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sekou Touré of Senegal, Patrice Lumumba of Belgian Congo (Zaire, now Democratic Republic of Congo), Leopold Sedar Senghor, Amilcar Cabral of Guinea Bissau and Eduardo Mondlane of Mozambique espoused radical visions of a society they envisioned to create.¹ They were moved by the injustices of their time and the equal distribution of wealth and opportunities. Other theorists, such as Frantz Fanon² and Samir Amin³, provided a radical re-interpretation of independence

² Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 1963.
³ Samir Amin, Unequal Development, 1976.
and analysed the challenges that faced African leaders after attaining national independence. Principal among the challenges was economic development, especially considering an inherited economic system that was not designed to serve the local people. Thus, many of our forefathers were strongly opposed to foreign economic control, which they referred to as ‘neo-colonialism.’ In various ways, they propagated visions of indigenous control, or localization of the national assets for the benefit of the people. In this chapter I briefly outlined some visions of national liberation leaders towards economic liberation. While I discuss the ideas of other leaders, my focus will be on the vision of late president of Tanzania, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere.

**Visions of liberation heroes**

Do we see from their agitations any element in their thinking of economic Liberation for Africa? At best, their idea was to liberate their countries from foreign political domination. Here we can only single out President Nassar of Egypt who rightly nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956. Patrice Lumumba, that hero of Congolese independence struggle and the first leader of his country, stated in 1960 that: ‘political independence has no meaning if it is not accompanied by rapid economic and social development’ (Lumumba, 1960). This statement was popularized by Kwame Nkrumah in his book *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, where he declares that political independence is meaningless without economic independence (Nkrumah, 1964). Other founding African leaders, such as Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal and Sekou Touré of Guinea were unequivocal in the opposition to colonial rule and articulated a vision for Africa and their own countries, in which the indigenous people lived in dignity and were both culturally enslaved by dominant European or colonial cultures. Negritude, for example, espoused by Leopold Senghor, called on people of Africa to be proud of being, of their black African identity and culture.
I may be accused of being biased in favour of my countryman, Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere, who tried to classify the struggle for liberation as having three stages of Political Liberation or Flag Independence; Mental Liberation of the ex-colonial people and enable them to rediscover themselves; and Economic Liberation, to ensure that the riches of their countries benefitted their people. For the majority of our African leaders the struggle at the time and to some of them even now – the struggle was and is about controlling or strengthening the hands of indigenous leaders in the leadership of their countries, towards self-enrichment. That is why a person like President Mobutu Tsetse Seko of the former Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo - DRC) had no desire of ensuring that the mineral wealth of his country benefitted the ordinary Congolese. The Belgians and their European colleagues harvested the wealth of DRC as they liked. To blind the thinking of Mobutu, they just bribed him with the riches they got and encouraged him to have personal palaces in Europe. At the time of his overthrow in 1997, Mobutu is reported to have had amassed as much as US$7 billion, at a time when his country was among the poorest in the world (*Washington Post*, 26 May 1997).

Attempts at economic liberation were not always smooth. Sekou Touré of Guinea faced the wrath of France when he chose independence to remaining in the French economic community in 1958. The French government withdrew its administrators and financial support in return, which seriously affected the capacity of his government to provide public services. Mwalimu Julius Nyerere was to face the same fate following his country’s principled stand on colonialism. For example, West Germany and the United Kingdom took measures to suffocate Tanzania economically by withdrawing economic assistance they had promised the country in 1964 and 1966 respectively. This forced Nyerere to decide that the best economic policy for Tanzania was the route of socialism and self-reliance. Hence the nationalization of the economic heights of the economy in 1967 after the Arusha Declaration. The original objective of the Arusha Declaration was state ownership of major
means of the production, to ensure that the corporate sector of the economy was in the hands of citizens. Before nationalisation, the control of the economy was either in the hands of foreign investors or the racial minorities that enjoyed business dominance upon independence. At that time, the economic policy assumed that public enterprises would perform in an environment of market accountability, corporate autonomy and efficiency.

The focus of economic development under Nyerere was on rural development. People were encouraged to live and work on a co-operative basis in organized villages. The idea was to extend traditional values and responsibilities around kinship to Tanzania as a whole. In a policy booklet on Socialism and Rural Development, Nyerere explained more clearly the way the Arusha Declaration was to be implemented as a rural development strategy to fight hunger, ignorance and poverty. He stated thus:

It is particularly important that we should now understand the connection between freedom, development, and discipline, because our national policy of creating socialist villages throughout the rural areas depends upon it. For we have known for a very long time that development had to go on in the rural areas, and that this required co-operative activities by the people . . .

. . . All too often, we persuaded people to go into new settlements by promising them that they could quickly grow rich there, or that Government would give them services and equipment which they could not hope to receive either in the towns or in their traditional farming places. In very few cases was any ideology involved; we thought and talked in terms of greatly increased output, and of things being provided for the settlers.

. . . Ujamaa villages are intended to be socialist organizations created by the people, and governed by those who live and work in them. They cannot be created from outside, nor governed from outside. No one can be forced into an Ujamaa village, and no official – at any level – can go and tell the members of an Ujamaa village what they should do together, and what they should continue to do as individual farmers (Nyerere, 1968).
It can be seen from this quote that there was a commitment to raising basic living standards a principled opposition to conspicuous consumption and large private wealth. The socialism Mwalimu Nyerere believed in was ‘people-centred’. To him, humanness in its fullest sense rather than wealth creation must come first. Societies become better places through the development of people rather than just the gearing up of production for sake of production. Nyerere’s vision was to attain a self-reliant, egalitarian and human-centred society where all members have equal rights and equal opportunities; in which all can live in peace with their neighbours without suffering or imposing injustice, being exploited, or exploiting; and in which all have a gradually increasing basic level of material welfare before any individual lives in luxury (Nyerere, 1968, p. 340).

One has to acknowledge that these moral standards cannot be challenged even in today world where unregulated free market philosophy and a number of post-modernist tendencies are not empowering poor people to improve their socioeconomic well-being. As seen from the policy on socialism and rural development, Nyerere argued that: ‘the development of a country is brought about by people, not by money. Money, and the wealth it represents, is the result and not the basis of development’ (Nyerere, 1968, p. 243). Similarly, he identified the prerequisites of development as people, land, good policies and good leadership.

Mwalimu being a very close friend of president Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, greatly influenced him to propagate the philosophy of Humanism. Informed by this philosophy, Zambia, like Tanzania, also decided to nationalize its major industries and copper mines in 1968 and 1969. Up to that point, Nyerere and Kaunda, were the only two leaders who pioneered the idea of putting the economic heights of their countries in the hands of their governments on behalf of their people.

Nyerere, like Kwame Nkrumah, did not only concern himself with economic liberation which he understood as bringing the national economy into state control and promoting rural development through
ujamaa, but also strongly believed in the complete emancipation of the African continent from colonial and racist minority rule. For example, the role played by Mwalimu Nyerere in supporting national liberation movements is well documented (Chachage & Cassam, 2010; Legum & Mmari, 1995). The emergence of organised popular liberation movements throughout Africa towards the end of the Second World War was a crucial factor in achieving national independence for many African countries. Tanzania played an important role in assisting these movements and acted as a consistent opponent of colonial rule in Africa. In particular, late president Nyerere was a key figure in the struggle against foreign domination and helped popularize the idea of pan-African unity.

Julius Nyerere is remembered as a central figure in the drive for independence and Tanzania's involvement in liberation movements across the continent. He strongly believed that Tanzania had a responsibility to actively assist other nations to achieve freedom and the idea of national liberation struggles became a central issue of Tanzania's foreign policy (Chachage & Cassam, 2010). For example, speaking at the TANU National Conference in 1967, Nyerere declared that: ‘total African liberation and total African unity are basic objectives of our Party and our Government...we shall never be really free and secure while some parts of our continent are still enslaved.” The Arusha Declaration of 1967, was unequivocal on Tanzania's involvement in the liberation struggle as it outlined principles on national liberation that compelled the government to cooperate with other nationalist movements and liberation movements and worked with other countries in promoting African unity.

But we are proud of Tanzania’s support for liberation movements, as it often was beyond rhetoric and was instrumental in forging African unity and solidarity. The country offered itself as a base for those fighting for liberation, hosting the forces of many liberation movements, including the African National Congress (ANC), the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), Zimbabwe African Nation Union (ZANU). Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), and the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO). These movements greatly benefited from the safety and stability offered to them by the Tanzanian government, as well as the experience and guidance they received from those who had already achieved independence. Tanzania also welcome tens of thousands of refugees from fleeing persecution and violence across Southern Africa, providing a safe space for those endangered by war or colonial oppression (Kamuzora, 2009).

Significantly, my country was involved in the efforts that promoted continental unity, to which both Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere devoted so much of their energies culminating in the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Nyerere was a strong proponent of the establishment of the continental body and was among the founding leaders in 1963. The OAU had ambitious goals, which alongside freedom from colonial rule, included the total eradication of white minority rule in Southern Africa. Thus, an organ of the OAU to look into the issue of fighting white minority rule was formed named the African Liberation Committee (ALC). The Committee which was solely focused on the liberation struggle had its headquarters in the Tanzanian capital, Dar es Salaam, throughout the duration of its existence. The ALC had several key objectives, principal among which were the channelling of financial aid and material assistance to liberation movements. It also worked to unify liberation forces against a common enemy and diplomatic efforts to seek global legitimacy of the cause for freedom by liberation movements (Yousef, 1985).

**Economic liberation in the current context of Southern Africa**

Indeed, while ujamaa may have helped give a specific direction to the newly independent country of Tanzania and imbued Tanzanians with a greater sense of national identity, it is now acknowledged that
some of the elements of its policy, particularly collectivisation and state control of the commanding heights of the economy, may have contributed to the country’s economic problems and widespread corruption.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) being the region which suffered the most from the brutality and economic domination of aliens, is perhaps the best place to light the candle for the economic liberation of the continent. In my view what we need to do is to critically examine the second stage of Mwalimu’s thesis – mental liberation and see how the process can be specifically directed towards the realisation of the third stage of “Economic Liberation”; the major goal being to raise selfless leaders who are committed to developing National economies which are for the benefit of all the people.

What changes in economic strategies and political leadership are required for an autonomous, socially and gender just economic development in Southern Africa? Though women have suffered the most in our currently ill-conceived development philosophies, we should avoid putting too much emphasis on the gender issue. What we need most is to promote equitable development; self – reliance for all; control of all our resource collectively and developing them for the benefit of all our citizens; and finally, raising or promoting leaders who are selfless; just; accountable; and who are true servants of all the people. This cannot happen if we allow our leaders to embrace landlordism and appetite for personal and family wealth. This is the challenge that we face because in almost all our countries, the leaders of independence are the ones who have accumulated a lot of wealth for themselves and their families and indeed their friends.

Therefore, we need to open a new front for the Liberation of Africa which we may call the Second Liberation Struggle. This would involve the struggle for inclusive development (both politically and economically). This would require wealthy citizens to offer shares in
their businesses, through the Stock Exchanges, to ordinary citizens. In that process, our Governments may have to set up Investment Funds for lending to the poor people, to enable them to buy shares in secure and lucrative enterprises, so that they can earn their living from dividends from these enterprises. Indeed, only a small part of the dividends will be required to pay the loans while the bulk of the earnings is paid to the shareholders for their livelihood. The loans could be charged only 1% interest per annum and repaid over 50 years. Every beneficial shareholder could be required to open a bank account through which all the dividends would be paid. The bank would be given instructions to calculate the repayments for the loan or loans over 50 years at 1% interest with a grace period of 10 years.

References


Economic Liberation in the Current Context of Southern Africa: Conceptual and Policy Considerations

Neo Simutanyi

Background

On 25\textsuperscript{th} May, Africa celebrated Africa Day, a day dedicated to remember and commemorate the struggle for Africa’s political liberation from colonial rule, external oppression and economic exploitation. However, it is recognized that political independence in itself did not bring about real freedom to the majority of the African masses. Despite most African countries having won political independence more than 55 years ago (and for a few in Southern Africa, at least more than two and half decades now), the continent is still considered the poorest in the world and suffering from hunger, deprivation, gross social and income inequalities and poor governance. What obtains in most of Africa today is not what the founding fathers envisioned during the struggle for independence or the national liberation. By and large, nationalists, liberation struggle leaders and thinkers envisaged an emancipated continent in which its people were free from want, had decent incomes, had access to quality education and health care and enjoyed a high standard of living.

Kwame Nkrumah warned that political independence was meaningless without economic independence. He warned of the dangers of neo-colonialism, which he described as the ‘last stage of imperialism’ (Nkrumah, 1965). Frantz Fanon’s treatise on decolonization is perhaps one of the most profound prophecy of what was to befall the continent decades later (Fanon, 1974). For
Fanon, decolonization is a process that begins with the mind and attitude of the middle classes or the so-called petit bourgeoisie who act as intermediaries between foreign capital and the local people (Fanon, 1974: 122). But it was Amilcar Cabral, more than Nkrumah or any other African leader who concretized African realities into a theory of liberation. Cabral developed not only the theory and tactics of wars of liberation from colonial rule, but also was one who looked beyond the seizure of state power (Cabral, 1981: 856). He argued, for example, that the chief goal of the liberation movement is not only national independence and the crushing of colonialism, but the ‘complete liberation of the productive forces and the construction of economic, social and cultural progress of the people’ (Cabral 1979: 52). In short, early leaders of the national liberation imagined a better and prosperous future for their societies, a future in which their citizens had opportunities for employment, had decent wages to afford the basic necessities of life, had decent housing, access to quality education and health care and were above all well governed. While there was a general agreement on what a future continent would look like and on the root causes of underdevelopment there were diverse solutions to Africa’s development predicament (Rodney, 1972: 24-26; Amin, 1979).

Southern Africa, unlike any other region, presented an opportunity to implement radical solutions to the continent’s underdevelopment. National liberation movements articulated visions of liberation that mirrored the dreams of revolutionary thinkers, such as Frantz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral, Eduardo Mondlane, Kwame Nkrumah and Leopold Senghor, among others. It was in this region where a socialist experiment was tried and where socialist theorizing was most advanced. But one by one, former national liberation movements abandoned the socialist experiment and embraced neoliberal economic prescriptions championed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which were by and large predicated on economic liberalization and reduction in state’s role in the economy (Southall, 2013: 11). However, despite a shift in
economic policy direction, economic development of the majority of
countries in the region has not improved and the living conditions
of its people have worsened. This has led the World Bank to admit
that structural adjustment is responsible for most of the economic
decreases and pauperization of the population in the last two decades
(Bond, 2006). For example, impressive economic growth statistics
have not produced the trickle-down effect envisaged, while massive
foreign capitalist investment has not created the employment
opportunities and improved incomes that was promised, challenging
the notion of ‘inclusive’ growth that has now become the mantra of
international financial institutions. Inclusive growth refers to the
pace and distribution of economic growth among various groups in
a society. It is argued, for example, that for growth to be sustainable
and effective in reducing poverty, it needs to be inclusive of all social
groups (Ianchovichina & Lundstrom, 2009: 2). Inclusive growth has
been variously described by development practitioners as ‘broad-
based’ growth, ‘shared growth’ or pro-poor growth’. What this all
means in the face of persistent and enduring poverty levels remains
unclear.

This paper attempts to define economic liberation from the viewpoint
of liberation leaders and thinkers and its relevance to the current
context in Southern Africa. Following the introduction, the second
section considers the concept of economic liberation and the ideas
of revolutionary thinkers. Section three discusses the challenges of
implementing radical theories of economic liberation in Southern
Africa and why they may have been abandoned. The last section
which is the conclusion considers whether a radical economic vision
is possible in Southern Africa and makes suggestions on the way
forward that envisions a progressive and more prosperous future for
the region.

Economic liberation: conceptual and theoretical issues

The concept of ‘economic liberation’ presupposes emancipation
from economic domination and exploitation. It is derived from the
theories of imperialism that hold that foreign capital dominates and exploits the labour of citizens of other nations and in return, reaps super-profits which are externalized. Vladimir Lenin argued that imperialism was the last stage of capitalism, as the export of capital resolved the internal contradictions in the expansion of capitalism at home (Lenin, 1974). In Africa, imperialism was expressed in the form of colonial capitalism, which has a much more visible manifestation in Southern Africa, where it has come to be known as ‘white’ monopoly capitalism, as the region was ruled and dominated by white settlers for more than hundred years (Southall, 1980) and exploitation of the rich mineral wealth and fertile soils of the region, was partly responsible for the entrenchment of monopoly capitalism in the region (Meredith, 2012 and 2014). To understand the operation of monopoly capitalism in the region, it is important to consider it as part of a global system, that political economists Immanuel Wallerstein and Samir Amin have referred to as ‘capitalist world system’ (Wallerstein, 1974 and Amin, 1976). This globalization of capital is what ensured and still makes the economic domination of developing economies so enduring.

After the attainment of political independence in many African countries, it was clear that local economies were by and large foreign dominated and had non-indigenous ownership. This reliance on foreign economic interests was seen as economic domination by nationalist leaders and leaders of national liberation movements. It was already recognized at the time that for as long as economic power was in the hands of non-indigenous people, it would be a miracle to expect them to work in the national interest. In other words, the purpose of foreign investment was seen as aimed at maximizing profit, which would later be externalized to the home country. It was that realization which led Kwame Nkrumah to declare that ‘political independence was meaningless without economic independence’ (Nkrumah, 1965: 1). For Nkrumah, economic freedom would only be achieved through socialism and continental unity. ‘Seek ye first the political kingdom’ and then followed by economic freedom he
advised his fellow leaders. Unfortunately, following his enunciation of a radical economic program for his country, Nkrumah was overthrown in a military coup in 1966.

Walter Rodney (1972) has eloquently provided a synthesis of the process of incorporation of Africa into the world capitalist system. He explains ‘how Europe underdeveloped Africa’ and why Africa is so dependent on external economic actors for its economic survival. This was to lead to a long discussion inspired by Latin American scholars, the most influential being Andre Gunder Frank, who developed the dependency theory and advocated delinking from the world capitalist system (Frank, 1966). By the end of the 1970s, most African countries underwent severe economic problems occasioned by deteriorating terms of trade, collapse of commodity prices and a crisis in the world capitalist system. Thus, the socialist model was questioned as a viable and credible alternative to economic prosperity. The intensification of the Cold War and curving of Africa into spheres of influence by the two super-powers exacerbated the development prospects for the Southern African region. Indeed, the socialist vision in Southern Africa was tempered by liberation and later civil wars (especially in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe), which did not allow the proper implementation of the socialist experiment (Southall, 2013).

Amilcar Cabral warned of the dangers of neocolonialism and called for new nations of Africa to dismantle the capitalist system (Cabral, 1979). In doing so, he warned that it would not be easy, there would be failures, but the struggle should be resolute until victory is attained. In his advice to the cadres of the PAIGC he stated thus:

> Hide nothing from the masses of our people. Tell no lies. Expose lies whenever they are told. Mask no difficulties, mistakes, failures. Claim no easy victories’ (Cabral, 1970).

Cabral’s vision of economic liberation was of emancipation from economic domination by foreign capital. He imagined an African economy owned and controlled by the local people and acting in the
promotion of the common good. His writings and thoughts inspired nationalist leaders to adopt statist economic prescriptions, variously labelled as African socialism, state capitalism, nationalization and state ownership. Tanzania and Zambia, had the most extensive of these measures. With Tanzania, emphasizing rural development through ‘forced’ villagization programs – ‘ujamaa’ and Zambia with nationalization of strategic foreign assets under the banner of what came to be known as ‘humanism’ (Saul, 2005: 32-34). Despite many scholars describing those efforts as having been ‘socialist’, they were neither socialist nor egalitarian (Saul, 2005: 34). They only helped create a class of privileged elite, what Issa Shivji has described as a ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie’ (Shivji, 1978). The other countries, such as Malawi and Botswana adopted the private enterprise model of economic development, with Botswana recording impressive economic performance and Malawi stagnating, that by the time of Kamuzu Banda’s electoral defeat in 1994, the country was one of the poorest in the world.

Perhaps one of the most profound indictments on Africa’s development has been offered by Frantz Fanon in his theory of decolonization (Fanon, 1967). Fanon recognized that no African country can claim to be independent simply by attaining political independence; he described as paper independence. For him, political independence was supposed to be accompanied by economic liberation, which would also involve the decolonizing of the mind. Fanon was sceptical of the ability of the African middle class to lead the process of ‘radical economic transformation.’ This is because he reasoned that the African middle class aspires for pleasure, wealth and privilege (Fanon, 1967: 148-205). Therefore, state power would simply be a means to individual and private accumulation. Fanon’s prophecy has come to pass almost sixty years later. Everywhere in Africa, and this region in particular, there is a shortage of a leadership that aspires to work in the public or national interest. Most leaders now go into office to accumulate wealth for themselves and their immediate family. We now have
wealthy leaders in office, even those who went into power with nothing, get rich over-night. Zambia presents an interesting case, of a leader who came from the trade union movement professing to represent the interests of the working class, but within ten years had acquired so much wealth that he was unable to properly account for (van Donge, 2009). When there was a change of government in 2011, the former president Rupiah Banda also found himself investigated for corruption and inappropriate abuse of his position to amass wealth. In South Africa, former president Jacob Zuma was ousted by his party, the ANC, on allegations he had been captured by an influential business family, the Guptas and therefore alleged to have abused his power for private advantage (Adriaan and du Troit, 2017).

Thus, economic liberation may also mean improved governance and good and selfless leadership. Despite paper independence, African states lack effective political control over their territories. Sovereignty is all but a façade, as real and important decisions tend to be made elsewhere. Global capitalism operates in a way that undermines the ability of local leaders to make decisions that affect their own people. Mills and Herbst (2012) have contended that in Africa the problem of development, is a ‘problem of leadership.’ Southern Africa lacks the kind of leadership that is willing and capable of working in the national interest. This is what has come to be referred to as the ‘neopatrimonial’ paradigm. Thus, in many African countries, including some in Southern Africa, state power has been used as a resource for private accumulation, whereby despite growing poverty, marginalization and inequality, the political leadership engages in corruption, patronage and outright criminality (Bayart, Ellis and Eboe 1999).

While economic freedom has been defined in liberal circles as freedom to conduct business unhindered, freedom to enjoy property rights and of course to have a free market economy, the definition can be narrowed to freedom from want. By this we mean, economic freedom should involve notions of economic and social rights, such
as the right to adequate food, right to work and a decent income and the right to social protection. Economic freedom is not and does not only end with sovereign control of the economy by indigenous people, it should of necessity mean that the economy works in the interests of the majority of the population. Thus, economic policies should redress distortions that produce or reproduce poverty, inequality, unemployment and generalized social deprivations. It is not the intention of this discussion to consider the merits or demerits of the capitalist system vis a vis the socialist system. If anything, a discussion of socialism has become so discredited that no-one dares propagate its efficacy given the absence of any successes anywhere. But that is not to say, there are no successful economic paradigms that have worked for the greater good of the population. The Scandinavian welfare states are an envy of many nations, so are European social democratic advances that have entrenched the welfare state firmly in the European experience. These developments are taking place alongside the development of the capitalist system.

While there is no general consensus as to what is meant by economic liberation, it could be described as a process of seeking emancipation from political economies characterised by poverty, graft, crony capitalism, rent-seeking, elitism and widening social inequality (Mills and Herbst 2012: 7). Put simply, economic liberation presupposes economic freedom, including freedom from want (hunger and basic necessities of life), freedom from social deprivation and guaranteed social justice. The right to economic freedom has come to be considered among human rights and is advocated by the United Nations and other international advocacy organizations as a universal value in its own right. For example, the
right to employment¹, freedom from hunger² and right to social protection³ are now universally acknowledged as goals for every nation to attain. Ray Bush and Patrick Bond agree that economic liberation should necessarily involve freeing citizens from the ‘chains of exploitative world economy and a power elite who treat the continent without respect’ (Bush 2007; Bond 2006:161).

Neoliberalism and challenges of radical economic visions

As already pointed out above, the first generation of leaders of the national liberation had very good intentions. They adopted policies they believed were in the best interests of their people. They implemented versions of socialism inspired by their ideological mentors. However, the realities of the world economy conspired to render their efforts futile. They failed and subsequently lost popularity. Those who persisted with their so-called ‘misguided dogma’ were to suffer the fate of being swept out of power, like Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, others changed tact in good time to save their parties from annihilation from pro-democracy and pro-change advocates. Tanzania stands out in this respect. Julius Nyerere who had voluntarily stepped from power in 1985, advised his party

---

¹ Right to work is enshrined in article 23 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Part III, article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and article 15 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.


³ Social protection is a human right enshrined in article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) and other major UN human rights instruments.
to adopt multiparty democracy and liberalise the economy despite an apparent support for the one-party state and statist policies. His intervention helped Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) from the fate that visited the United National Independence Party (UNIP) in Zambia and Malawi Congress Party (MCP) in Malawi in 1991 and 1994 respectively.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and changes in the People’s Republic of China following Mao Zedong’s death in 1976 was a turning point. Southern African leaders, especially those that had followed orthodox Marxism-Leninism or scientific socialism had to read the changing mood and change course. The world was also changing, as neoliberalism was on the ascendency following the publication of the Berg Report in 1981 (World Bank, 1981). Thus, a new dominant paradigm of economic and political reform was to influence policy making in the region. Francis Fukuyama remarked that what we were witnessing was the ‘End of History’ (Fukuyama, 1992). Following the end of the Cold War, it was argued that socialism had been defeated and there was only one credible economic ideology that was to rule the world, and that was capitalism, now labelled neoliberalism. This of course, involved a familiar package of measures, such as free markets, private enterprise, removal of subsidies, cuts on social spending, downsizing of public sectors, control of wages, deregulation of foreign exchange and trade and so on.

Almost without exception, all countries of the region bought into this paradigm. To the extent that it resulted in new injection of capital (foreign direct investment), brought some improvements to social and physical infrastructure and contributed to positive growth rates it was heralded as a great success. But poverty, unemployment and inequality have continued to ravage the region with considerable impact on the social fabric. The Southern African region is perhaps full of paradoxes. While it has one of the wealthiest and most democratic countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is also home
to the world’s and Africa’s most unequal and poorest\textsuperscript{4} countries. For example, six of the world’s most unequal countries are found in Southern Africa. These are South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, Lesotho and Eswatini. See table 1 below.

Table 1: Income Inequality in SADC Region (2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Income inequality (Measured by Gini Index)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eswatini</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank Gini Index.\textsuperscript{5}

Despite housing Africa’s most wealthy nations, six of Africa’s poorest countries can be found in the region. These are Malawi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Tanzania and Zimbabwe (See table 2). Poverty remains one of the greatest challenges facing Southern Africa with approximately half of the population living on less than one US dollar a day, according to the International Council on Social Welfare (ICSW). In some countries, poverty and inequalities have increased instead of declining. For example, a recent study has revealed that extreme poverty is projected to increase by 45 percent

\textsuperscript{4} Measured by GDP per capita income, the following countries are amongst the poorest in Africa and the world, Malawi, Mozambique, Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

in the next 20 years. It will rise in at least seven of the region’s poorest countries (Porter, 2017).

Table 2: SADC Countries by GDP (PPP) per capita (in US$) 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>22,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>17,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>13,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>10,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>8,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eswatini</td>
<td>6,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>3,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>1,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>1,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average GDP per capita SADC region</td>
<td>6,825</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank Ranking of Countries by GDP (PPP).  

How can this paradox of poverty and inequality amidst abundant wealth be explained? Southern Africa boasts of enormous mineral resources, fertile soils and water resources and yet has intolerable levels of poverty and more than two thirds of its citizens live below the poverty line (SADC, 2008). It is easy to dismiss gross domestic product (GDP) statistics as not reflecting the real social and economic realities in the countries of the region, but the persistence of poverty, unemployment and social deprivation by the majority of the population cannot be hidden. Indeed, while most countries of the region managed to achieve some measure of progress immediately following their national independence, such as in the area of expanded social service provision, this was not

---

sustained over the long term to the extent that most countries’ social indicators today can only be described as depressing. On average, at least half of the population lives in abject poverty, more than 60 percent of region’s population lack access to adequate supply of safe water, and about 40 percent of the labour force is either unemployed or underemployed (ILO 2013).

Admittedly, there has been little or no systematic transformation of economic structures and a typical enclave economy persists throughout the region (Mamdani, 1996). The enclave economy is characterized by a relatively small, but better resourced formal sector that exists in isolation from large and poverty-stricken informal economy and subsistence agriculture which is estimated to absorb up to two-thirds of the labour force (ILO, 2013).

When measured by Human Development Index (HDI) – life expectancy, education and standard of living, seven of Southern African countries fall in the medium category, while six are in the low HDI group. This depressing picture of persistent poverty, inequality and social deprivation goes against the visions of African liberation thinkers. It challenges the current leaders of former national liberation movements and ruling parties in the region for serious and critical introspection on why and how the dream was lost.

**Conclusion: Way Forward – challenges for ruling parties**

A sense of injustice and deprivation for the majority of the citizens persists as neither statist, bureaucratic, socialist approaches adopted by radical governments, such as that of Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania nor market-driven approaches of countries such as Botswana, Namibia, South Africa Zambia, have managed to redress colonial and neocolonial legacies of inequality and social exclusion. Clearly, traditional economic strategies have been inadequate in addressing structural ownership and distribution mechanisms in ways that promote inclusive development and well-being for the majority of the citizens. IMF/World Bank stabilization and
adjustment reform policies are said to have been responsible for the current high rates of poverty in the majority of countries of the region. If anything, it is now acknowledged that poverty levels in the region worsened during the implementation of neoliberal policies in the past two and half decades. (Bond 2006).

Radical scholars argue that it is an illusion for many leaders of the region to think that the private sector or neoliberal policies should be the engine for economic growth and creator of wealth and development (Bond 2006; Saul 2005 and Amin 2011). The region seems to be going full circle. Suddenly, there is deteriorating terms of trade, GDP growth rates has slowed or is declining, while poverty, unemployment and inequalities persist. It is clear that poverty levels in Southern Africa are intolerable so are the levels of income and wealth inequality. But what can be done about it? It is not sufficient to be content with the explanation that the informal sector will provide employment to the mass of the unemployed. In Zambia, the informal sector accounts for at least 80 percent of paid employment outside agriculture, which is the reason official unemployment is only 16 percent of the labour force (LCMS, 2015). But the precariousness of informal sector employment with its attendant lack of security, low wages and unsustainable livelihoods only make its participants swell into the ranks of the poor.

The persistence of poverty, inequality and social deprivation after so many years of political independence should be a cause for concern to ruling parties in the region. It is surely not enough to hope that poverty will somehow disappear, as long as the poor do not cause problems, such as social unrest. The poor may be invisible, but like President Cyril Ramaposa recently said during his inauguration speech that:

Despite our most earnest efforts, many South Africans still go to bed hungry, many succumb to diseases that can be treated, many live lives of intolerable deprivation. Too many of our people do not work, especially the youth (Ramaposa, 2019).
That realization is what should keep political leaders and leaders of ruling parties awake at night. To find and devise policies that will provide a social safety net to the majority of the population. This will not require platitudes of revolutionary rhetoric, such as ‘radical economic transformation’, ‘pro-poor growth’ or ‘development that leaves no one behind.’ Leaders of ruling parties will need to go back to the basics – to the visions of liberation thinkers - for inspiration. It will require acting in the national interest and building a society in which the majority of the population are free from want. A society in which citizens have a right to adequate food, a right to a job and a decent income and a right to social protection and a decent pension.

The economic policies ruling parties adopt should not be top-down, but bottom-up. They should reflect the thinking and concerns of the generality of the party membership and citizens at large. There seems to be little or no premium placed on ideological and policy development in our ruling parties. Like Frantz Fanon observed a long time ago, the African middle class who end up being leaders of our countries, are so dependent on foreign knowledge and ideas that they are unable to devise local, innovative and indigenous solutions (Fanon, 1963). Their thinking is programmed by western economic interests and are simply conveyor belts for Western economic interests. They are so interested in imitating their Western masters to an extent that they despise local expertise. But they are also ‘comprador’ leaders, as many act as fronts for Western capitalist interests.

I propose a four-point economic transformation plan for the region. First, there is a need for a thorough ideological reflection on the efficacy of the neoliberal paradigm, accepting its weaknesses and strengths and its impact on the social sectors (Harrison, 2018; Mensah, 2008; Bush, 2007; Saul, 2005). While the neoliberal orthodoxy has replaced policy development in the region, the experience has been rather disappointing. It would therefore, be useful to ensure that economic policies are anchored on the vision of an inclusive, just and equitable society that had been espoused by
leaders of national liberation.

Second, there is a need to seriously address the issue of persistent poverty, unemployment and inequality in line with international human rights law, but also consistent with the visions of founding fathers and thinkers. It is unacceptable that more than 50 years after political independence, poverty is even higher than it was at independence. Apart from very few countries, poverty levels in most countries in the region are well above the Millennium Development Goal of reducing extreme poverty by 50 percent by 2015 and at the current rate eliminating extreme poverty in all its forms by 2030, as envisaged by the sustainable development goals (SDGs), appears to be almost a pipe dream (UNDP, 2005; UNDP, 2015). A holistic approach to addressing poverty will need to ensure that poverty and social deprivation are understood in all their multifaceted manifestations and economic development priorities are geared to the establishment of an inclusive and fair society, where the population is guaranteed the basic necessities of life.

Third, there should be a deliberate attempt to invigorate participation of civil society, by not only encouraging civil society debates and engagements in policy discussions, but also by addressing civil society concerns. Debates and interventions by civil society organizations under the umbrella of the World Social Forum and the Africa Social Protection Platform should find place in ruling party policy discussions and government policy documents, ensuring that ideas of social inclusion are incorporated to ensure a socially just and inclusive society envisaged by national liberation leaders and revolutionary thinkers. But it should be recognized that civil society in Southern Africa faces formidable challenges, making the task of providing services and holding governments to account even more tenuous (USAID, 2019). For example, the region’s CSOs struggled to obtain sufficient funds to meet even the most urgent needs, and were almost wholly dependent on foreign funding, which has declined in recent years.
Lastly, there is need for a leadership that is truly committed to the national interest. While such leadership may be difficult to come by, it is important to recognize that for leaders to leave behind a meaningful impact beyond their tenure, they should be able to deliver three interrelated outcomes: social, economic and political development based on a notion of good governance. Thus ruling parties should invigorate youth and women’s wings to engage in ideological discourses and challenge established policy orthodox. It surely makes little sense to continue with policies that do not work in the public interest. Ruling parties, especially those from national liberation movements, may be comfortable that they will continue to be in office for the foreseeable future. But nothing is permanent in nature. Even the Ottoman empire collapsed, the Soviet Union and its satellite socialist states eventually collapsed after 70 years. Here in Africa, 2011 witnessed popular uprisings against long-time leaders, including Zine Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya who were toppled from power following the so-called ‘Arab Spring.’ In 2019, Sudanese leader Omar Al-Bashir and Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika were forced to resign amidst popular anger at their rule. Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe was edged out of power by the military in November 2017 after 32 years in power. It is time to take stock.

References


---

7 I am grateful to Andre du Pisani for this idea.


When our Mozambican “Cinderella” speaks out: Participation of women in the struggle for political and economic independence

Isabel Maria Casimiro

Introduction

From the commitment to liberate land and men from colonialism, fascism and apartheid, to a process of building new inclusive societies, with comprehensive public policies after independence, the political and economic strategies of the governing parties in Southern Africa, have their policies wedded to the current dominant extractive development model set in a context of capitalist, colonialist and hetero-patriarchal, neoliberal economy. Experiences on the African continent and globally demonstrate that this extractive model has not delivered an inclusive and equitable development for women and men. On the contrary, it has rather strengthened social and gender inequalities, deepened the gap between an ever-smaller group of wealthy elite and a majority lacking the most elementary resources and human rights. Women and girls are typically the ones who suffer most from this inherently unfair and inadequate development model.

The participation of women in the nationalist and the armed struggle led by FRELIMO against Portuguese colonialism was a women’s initiative, led by women who, progressively established the agenda for their inclusion, at various moments in our history. However, recognition of their agency remained largely hidden most of the time or dependent on the willingness of the ruling elite to recognize their contribution to liberation (Corrêa and Homem, 1977; Katto, 2010, 2014; Kruks and Wisner, 1984; Paredes, 2015; Saíde, 2014; Santana, 2009; Urdang, 1979, 1983, 1984, 1988; Zimba, 2012).
This chapter addresses three features that link the nationalist struggle and Mozambique’s independence with the current context dominated by the skewed extractive development model. These are: first, the participation of women in the nationalist struggle in Mozambique, coupled with the continuous need for women to privilege their involvement and visibility at all phases of the anti-colonial struggle, as well as in the post-independence period. Secondly, the master narrative about women’s participation in various facets of the independence process, and thirdly, the relentless struggle for gender equality in the post-independence period, with special emphasis on the largely negative impact of the extractive development model adopted by the Frelimo Party and the Government of Mozambique on women’s lives.

Women joined the fight¹ - the participation of women in the nationalist struggle and the urgent need to recognize their role throughout the anti-colonial struggle

The movements for women’s liberation and their political participation, in countries of the Global South² were spawned in the context of nationalist struggles. Such struggles were about attaining political independence, constructing national identity as well as modernizing society (Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World, 1986). In the period before independence, many women gained visibility in the African political arena by participating in the nationalist and anti-colonial struggles, being active in unions, as


2 Santos e Meneses (Orgs) 2010. The Global South is not a geographical designation but “… a metaphor for exploitation and social exclusion, adding struggles for alternative projects of social and political transformation. The term Global South has been increasingly used to refer to the peripheral and semi– peripheral regions of countries of the modern world system, formerly called the Third World.”, developing world. Maria Paula Meneses, in: https://www.ces.uc.pt/observatorios/crisalt/index.php?id=6522&id_lingua=1&pág=7851, access to 20052019
political leaders, as wives and mothers. The background of the Pan-African Movement in Africa, which emerged in the 1900s, and was somewhat unexpectedly influenced by Africans from the diaspora, especially those in the United States of America (USA), agreed on the participation of men and women, but the central objective of the movement was the liberation of Africa. There is no indication that in the first Congress the issue of women’s liberation was discussed concurrently with and as integral to, the liberation of the continent. It was only during the 6th Congress, held in 1974, at the height of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa that a resolution was made:

To support the political struggles for equality carried out by black women and rally States and organizations participating in the Congress to start working vigorously on the problem pertaining to the oppression of women (Roy-Campbell, 1995: 88).

Since the early 1960s, there were women who took a more radical position against colonial rule and the oppression of the black majority of the population. Some women were arrested as a result of their participation in strikes. Their involvement was also significant for the creation of Women’s Leagues in the liberation movements, aiming at engendering the liberation struggle, and drawing attention to the issue of women and the social and power relations between women and men, which was not considered to be a major contradiction for most nationalists. Another group of women who may or may not have joined the women’s and feminist movement included older women, who were active in Women’s Clubs and Women’s Associations or Societies of Religious Denominations and churches, who advocated a non-confrontational stance on issues of gender oppression. Some of these older women took a liberal position towards women in their respective societies, stating that women’s liberation could be attained through changes in legislation and the use of existing political structures, for the benefit of women. This more conservative strand considered men to be heads of families, and thereby, ultimately accepting the subordination of women in
general. This is a position that is still considerably common, both on the African continent and in other parts of the world. With the decline of economic and social conditions, in most African countries, this position continues to be accepted, coupled with religious fundamentalism – Evangelical, Christian and Muslim – thus confirming and replicating the internationalization of heteropatriarchal oppression experienced by women.

Meanwhile, it was only during the 7th Congress, held in April 1994, in Kampala, Uganda, shortly after the victory of the African National Congress (ANC), in the first democratic elections of South Africa, that women appear as a much more significant force. Gender issues were then firmly placed on the agenda. The perception of women in this more recent movement is that, despite African leaders, members of the Pan-African Movement, having committed to the liberation of the continent, once in power, they seem to have forgotten to make a concomitant commitment to improving the living conditions of the majority of citizens, particularly women. As such, African women residing on the Continent and in the diaspora (Caribbean, USA and Europe), decided to create the Pan-African Women’s Liberation Organization (PAWLO), with the purpose of developing a space and uniting the voices of African women around the world\(^3\). This more recent movement believes that despite women’s active participation in the national liberation struggles, albeit alongside men, gender oppression has continued, with structures and laws in society that maintain and reproduce the oppression of women (Roy-Campbell, 1995: 88-89).

In Mozambique, women participated in resistance movements against colonialism and played a key role during the armed liberation

---

\(^3\) Not to be confused with the Pan-African Women’s Movement, which is part of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and consists of wives of Heads of State and other elite women. PAWLO considers itself an umbrella organization that fights for women’s liberation from all forms of oppression of which they are victims, through a feminist empowerment and non-democratic approach.
struggle. Their greater or lesser integration into the FRELIMO liberation movement⁴ and their consideration for male comrades dictated the advance or the setback in the struggle against colonial-capitalism (Mondlane, 1995).

Eduardo Mondlane, first president of FRELIMO, in his literary work *The Struggle for Mozambique*, refers to the involvement of women in the struggle against colonialism and against their double exploitation to which they have been subjected. Mondlane emphasizes and recognizes the full participation of women in Mozambique’s development process. However, he presents the struggle of women as a challenge and sees a perpetual tension between women and men, and between women and the FRELIMO leadership; a mental and discursive struggle that in itself is an indication of the need to transform existing concepts, and not simply to subordinate these to other social and political imperatives. He acknowledges that women’s action forced FRELIMO to reassess and reorganize (Mondlane, 1995).

The same held for other liberation movements on the African continent, specifically in the former Portuguese colonies (Paredes, 2015; Urdang, 1979, 1984). Amilcar Cabral, President of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, PAIGC, assassinated in January 1973, for example acknowledged:

….When we started the guerrilla bases, the Party never summoned women. It was the girls who unified in groups and came to live at the bases. “We also want to fight” they said. The parents protested, the comrades wanted to throw them out, but they resisted and stayed. For a while it was good, but then problems arose, because the men started wanting the girls and that triggered disputes. Then the Party had to restructure the presence of women in our struggle.

---

⁴ FRELIMO - Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, created on June 25, 1962 with the joining of movements that fought against Portuguese colonialism.
There are still problems. Many people have to accept it, because there is no other alternative. We have noticed in young Cape Verdeans who study in Portugal or reside in Cape Verde an increasing interest for the Party. In Guinea, this interest on the part of women in the countryside was one of the greatest assets of our struggle. There were areas in our land (some of our comrades can testify to the veracity of this) where men wanted to give up, but the women moved ahead and refused to give up. A concrete example is Banta El Silá that was attacked and burned down. There were people who wanted to run, but a group of women decided to face the Portuguese, and some female party activists raised the courage and patriotism of our people. Therefore, the party cannot boast that it recruited women. In general, women joined the fight, which gives much more value to the presence of women in the Party.\(^5\)

It was women who forced their participation at different times in the history of Mozambique, particularly since 1962. Such agency spawned several tensions, resulted in misinterpretations, cultural shocks, perspectives and modalities of the struggle and the future.

The last decades have witnessed some paradigmatic shifts, combining the struggle against capitalism, colonialism, racism and heteropatriarchy, while aiming for a solidarity society in terms of gender. Young women around the world have played and continue to play a pivotal role, harnessing technological advances in ICT and a combination of art and activism, called cultural activism, daring to defy the established order, to experiment with different forms of dialogue among themselves and at the international level (FRIDA/ AWID, 2016). Against this brief historiography of the agency of women in anti-colonial resistance in Africa, the focus now turns to the role of women in the independence process in Mozambique and how this is portrayed in the master narrative.

The master narrative about women’s participation in various phases of the independence process

‘Women’s liberation is, first and foremost, the task of women themselves.’

Written history has omitted or manipulated the participation of women in liberation struggles, and reflected selectively on their societal role and their view of equality. However, the twentieth century provides space for debate on women’s role in society. The Suffrage and Feminist movements (XIX-XX-XXI century), despite not always directly related to the women’s liberation struggle, within the framework of the struggle for the liberation of the entire society, made a vital contribution to the modification of heteropatriarchal conceptions that by-and-large continue to dominate society. More recent discourses have it that women are not just a “sexual entity”, naturally equipped to conceive children, be a wife and a mother; but the Socialist and the International Feminist Movement have exposed the structural relationship between the progress for women’s liberation and the struggle to eliminate exploitation in society that passes inevitably through the transformation in social relations and the relationship between human beings and nature.

It should be noted that in this process, at various times, it was women who prepared for and created the various organizations within the Front: LIFEMO – Mozambique Women’s League (*Liga Feminina de Moçambique*), the first women’s organization, created by women, in Tanzania in 1963 - has been omitted from the master narrative and official history. Its President was Celina Simango, wife of Urias Simango who was Vice President of FRELIMO, later considered a traitor after the crisis of 1968 that led to the assassination of Mondlane.

One aspect that deserves further reflection is that of the single story, the unique story, addressed by the Nigerian feminist writer Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie (2013), or the script on Liberation in the History of Mozambique (Assubuji, Israel, Thompson, 2013; Coelho, 2013). We refer to the myth surrounding the history of the liberation movement. Moreover, there are various important omissions in the official narrative; as well as to contested statements, in relation to specific historical and political events. The liberation script is, according to João Paulo Borges Coelho (Coelho, 2013: 20-31; Israel, 2013: 11-18) a narrative of the nation’s creation marked by a set of characteristics that are rooted in mythical historical phases; it follows an orderly linear progress in neat consecutive phases; it is based on a set of binary oppositions and on specific notions of experience and subjectivities; it is simple and direct; it is flexible because it is based on verbal history but at the same time it is based on a monopoly of explanations by the ruling Frelimo party and therefore closed from external interference. It is a device located at the intersection of power and knowledge, which has legitimized the exercise of authority in the post-colonial period. What is the place of women in this narrative? The answer is: invisible or follows FRELIMO’s political line of thinking. Advances have been and are being made in the daily struggle, often creating conflicts due to the fact that differences of opinion are not accepted as a fundamental democratic human right.

Our interviewees and various documents from the FRELIMO Archives, substantiate that it was the women who asked the FRELIMO administration for a more active role, through military training. The first group of Female Detachment (DF - Destacamento Feminino), was trained in 1965 even if the official history refers to the creation of the DF by the Central Committee only in 1966.8 It is the date celebrated on 4 March and is the beginning of the Women’s month for OMM.

---

7 For example, see Bragança (1986), Depelchin (1993) and Israel (2013).

8 This is the date celebrated on 4 March and is the beginning of the Women’s month for OMM.
was women who won their liberation, on their terms. However, in the period after independence, as often mentioned in the interviews we conducted in Maputo and Niassa, the role of women was subservient to the needs and precepts of the Frelimo Party, while their participation was overshadowed by the ruling group, made up mainly of men.9

There were no women involved in the Mozambican peace processes, the only one and for a brief period, was the legal expert Benvinda Levi.10 She was appointed by the President of the Republic in 2016 as a member of the Joint Commission between the Government and RENAMO. After the so-called 16-Year War, women combatants and those with patents were demobilized as private soldiers, a situation confirmed numerous times by the Mozambican association of demobilized soldiers (AMODEG – Associação Moçambicana de Desmobilizados de Guerra), and later by the association PROPAZ. The militarization of life during the armed struggle and the involvement of women in the ranks did not change the concept and practice that war is a male-dominated activity. The civil war was a brief phase of just over 10 years in a much longer colonial and heteropatriarchal period, reproduced and maintained in post-independent Mozambique.

In Mozambique, and as a historical subject, women obtained recognition through the nationalist movement, combined with the creation of FRELIMO party, in June 1992. Despite women’s active participation as guerrilla soldiers, in the Female Detachment, as teachers, nurses, peasants, and through their participation in the

9 When discussing the future of OMM during its I Congress in 1994 and, after 4 years as an independent association – decision taken during the IV Conference, held in Maputo, from 29 November to 5 December 1990 - the Frelimo party influenced OMM to remain a feminine league within the party and not an independent league, despite the 3 proposals discussed pointing in that direction. During deliberations, interventions drew attention to the Frelimo party as the progenitor of OMM.

10 Then Counsellor to the President of the Republic Filipe Nyusi.
Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM), women’s social representation was dependent on the needs of the nationalist movement and, at a later stage, on the Frelimo Party “guide of the People and the Mozambican Revolution”, since OMM is defined as “an arm of the Party”, and operates as a communication channel between the Party and the People. Its policy is Frelimo’s policy, most of which does not fit into gender-specific struggles (Arnfred, 1988). In the post-independence period, the situation remained unchanged with specific gender interests being postponed due to the destabilization war, or else not being considered by the dominant view regarding women’s liberation (Arnfred, 1988 and Reis, 1987).

In the post-independence period, FRELIMO advocated a perception of development as a successful application of science, technology and planning to a country with a low level of material development. The production battle privileged industrial development and the allocation of large financial resources for the mechanization of state-owned enterprises, while disregarding community or family production. It was, therefore, a struggle between men and nature and between classes of men, resulting in an alliance between industrial workers (men) and farmers (men). What was problematic in this formulation was not only the fact that women’s work was disregarded, but that the battle for production was conceived as a relationship and opposition between heroic and male leadership, and female passivity, due to its connection with nature and with pre-capitalism (Scott, 1995). For contemporary Marxist-Leninist thinkers, the concept of household is backward, doubly oppressed by feudal-colonial and capitalist society, and the solution is its entire modernisation. This design articulates women and the household with pre-capitalist production structures. Frelimo’s discourse about women as ‘doubly oppressed’, led to the definition of concrete roles and activities for women, seen as victims largely without agency, that could only escape this situation through the class struggle, industrialization and a revolutionary modernization policy. This structure has been used by the World Bank and other international
financial institutions in their strategy to incorporate women into structural adjustment programs (SAPs), that is, in capitalist development (Scott, 1995: 105-119).

As of the 1980s, the women's cooperative movement, around the General Union of Cooperatives, was one of the few voices that opposed Frelimo’s and OMM’s official discourse, instead defending an approach that focuses its origins in Mozambican and African reality, based on the African productive unit, and the protection of women's traditional economic position, with the struggle for a new gender identity (Arnfred, 1988).

The women’s movement in Mozambique created and powerfully shaped by the nationalist movement, with a socialist vision and a political modernization program that excluded gender struggles, was characterized by a difficult relationship with nationalism and its politicians, particularly after independence (McFadden, 1997; Reis, 1987). Loyalties forged during the nationalist struggle, on the one hand, and challenges arising from the creation of new female identities and different relations with the State and with society, after independence, on the other hand, can be seen as the source of this troubled relationship. A contradictory relationship also related to women's intervention, with the acceptance or not of women as social players and with the issue of the conversion of personnel into politicians. Any critical remark to the specificity of women was considered as disloyalty to the community and the party and, as an attempt against the preservation of what was built and considered, by male leaders, as African authenticity, defined as altruism, as a permanent disposition for women to give and care for others (McFadden, 1997).

Even the liberation movements considered bolder in relation to the issue of women’s liberation, such as the case of FRELIMO (that considered women as a vital part of the global liberation process and, in which the progress of the struggle was assessed by the level of women’s participation and, where collaboration between
the people and the nationalist movement was continuous), failed to advance beyond the theoretical frameworks instituted at the level of nationalism, Marxism and modernization theories. The analysis of changing female and male identities was missing; the conceptualization of different groups of women and, in particular, of women farmers; as well as issues related to the impact of colonialism on the lives of women and men; with the political economy of different regions; characteristics, division of tasks and power relations within African households; the relation with the land, considered a communal asset. The alliance of social classes - worker-farmer - has not protected, nor has it helped to protect women's interests, to date. This is a criticism that African women that participated in the Armed Struggle throughout the continent - Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Uganda, Eritrea - have been voicing to post-independence nationalist politicians (Amadiume, 1997: 113).

The society in which we live in nowadays is heteropatriarchal, as was the society of women who preceded us and who fought the nationalist and anti-colonial struggle. Women and feminist movements have exposed women's oppression by uncovering oppressive gender relations at all levels, in all institutions, from family, schools, and religious denominations. Much progress has been made; the United Nations (UN) has organized several conferences focusing on women's rights and their situation around the world. In addition, international instruments have been approved and ratified, also in Mozambique, as well as public policies that consider women's human rights. Legislation opposing international instruments was revoked, and currently there are more women in decision-making roles. However, the world of politics, economics, justice, and the military, remains male dominated (Finossolo, 2017).

---

11 When the Organization of Mozambican Women, OMM, was created in 1973, the then FRELIMO president, Samora Machel, delivered a stimulating speech in relation to the established heteropatriarchal order, stating that “The liberation of women is a requirement of the revolution, an assurance of its continuity, condition of its victory”.
vital role played by women in these movements – their participation in anti-colonialist associations, their affiliation to the liberation movements, their participation and contribution to changing the existing hetero-patriarchy – movements and politics continued to be led by men before and after independence. Up until 2015, or even presently, it is impossible to get 50% of women in positions of power, as per decision of the SADC Gender and Development Protocol\textsuperscript{12}.

The adoption of an extractive development model, exclusive and destructive for society, particularly for women and girls, and devastating to nature, is one of the characteristics and consequences of the capitalist, colonialist and heteropatriarchal society in which we live.

The chapter examines further the current struggle for gender equality in post-colonial Mozambique, with special emphasis on the political economy of extraction.

‘Nobody sleeps …. Because we don’t know if (our husbands) will return safe and sound’\textsuperscript{13}.

The struggle for gender equality in the post-Independence period - with special emphasis on the enforcement and impact of the extractive development model, on the livelihood of women.

The political, economic and social struggles of women in the “post-colonial” context in Mozambique stemmed from the experience of

\textsuperscript{12} This Protocol, approved and ratified by Mozambique in 2008, states in Article 5, that “State Parties shall enact affirmative action measures, with particular reference to women, with a view to eliminating all barriers that prevent them from participating significantly in all life domains and create an environment favourable to such participation.”. Paragraph 1 of Article 12 on Representation claims that “State Parties shall endeavour to ensure that by 2015, at least 50% of decision-making positions in the public and private sectors are held by women, including, inter alia, the use of affirmative action measures, as provided for in Article 5.”.

\textsuperscript{13} Sitoe, Cacinda, Velasco, 2018.
the Liberated Zones, mostly in rural regions and transported into urban spaces and social relations. FRELIMO’s vision, and later the Frelimo party, was to develop the country, industrialize it, following trends on the continent and in other parts of the world. Women, mostly farmers, the main producers of the food consumed, both in the rural and urban areas, were not consistently considered as part of the economically active population, and their liberation was regarded through participation in production, but outside the household. Women and men felt marginalized, because they were not called upon to occupy positions in the cities, they felt forgotten. It is a feeling of accomplished duty that is incomplete in terms of the liberation of women and men.

Surveys carried out over the last ten years by different associations, among these: WLSA Moçambique, Centro Terra Viva, CIP, Sekelekani, Cruzeiro do Sul – and monitoring activities conducted by the Civic Coalition on Extractive Industry – indicate that the extractive development model followed by Mozambique was the genesis for the systematic degradation of living conditions for women, men, children and the elderly living in exploration regions, with particular critical consequences for women and girls. The erosion of living conditions - housing, work and well-being - has included the exclusion of their activities and livelihoods, resettlement with distribution of new non-fertile land often distant from water sources, markets, and usual social living. Pollution, increased gender violence, girls dropping out of school, prostitution, sexually transmitted diseases, namely HIV/AIDS all form part of the reality for countless women in the country. Another factor to consider is that, despite the existence of legislation on the resettlement process resulting from economic activities, approved by Decree Nr. 31/2012, of 8 August of that year, most exploration companies and activities do not comply with the legislation.

The surveys carried out expose gender differences in all regions of the extractive industry. These differences relate to sexual division of labour, with the subordinate role played by women; and include
cultural issues that prevent women from carrying out certain activities. Women are twice as affected in extractive industry regions than men: large-scale mining operations are sites dominated by male labour, it is a capital intensive and masculine industry and there is widespread disregard for informal and small-scale practices carried out by women and children. Moreover, trade is dominated by men. It is men who go to the cities of Montepuez or Pemba to buy products to resell on the local market. The few women involved in the business mainly sell water to artisanal miners, commonly known as prospectors. While women from Namanhumbir say they do not have access to paid work at Montepuez Ruby Mining Company (MRM). They had expected to improve their living conditions with the job opportunities publicised during community consultations. Most women employed so far by MRM come from Nampula and Montepuez and are mostly employed for kitchen work, first aid and security services.14

Surveys carried out in Mozambique and on the continent also reveal severe problems of human rights violation, community resettlement without the compulsory consultations required by law and without respecting all rules, militarization of mining areas, fear, kidnapping, prison, disappearance, murder of individuals (Osório and Silva, 2017 and 2018; Cunha and Casimiro, 2019).

For example, Conceição Osório and Teresa Cruz e Silva from the organization WLSA Moçambique15 conducted a study in 2016 entitled: Economic Corporations and Expropriation: the case of resettled communities in the Moatize district. The study intended to assess the impact of the extractive industry on communities, mainly the


populations affected by the establishment of Vale\textsuperscript{16} and ICVL.\textsuperscript{17} Its approach sought to reveal the structure of power relations between women and men, expressed in the form of women’s participation in decisions made in the resettlement process and the latter’s impact on women’s lives (Osório and Cruz e Silva, 2016).

Research showed that mining legislation in Mozambique is insensitive to gender relations, leaving various avenues open to reproduce and perpetuate inequality, even though laws on land and the environment reveal concern about the inclusion of women. In everyday practice, the impacts of mining are not being taken into consideration, neither is the perpetuation of social injustice. Another aspect is that the legislation in force, namely that which guides the resettlement process, once communities have been displaced by force, does not consider the specificities.\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, most of the legislation in force, focusing on the mechanisms that guide the resettlement process, does not consider the specific features in the social construction of male and female identities, nor the difference in the division of labour and access to rights. This situation results in a deterioration of women’s lives, both in terms of their economic independence (in a way accomplished in the areas of origin) as in terms of access and defence of rights (Osório and Cruz e Silva, 2016).

Forced displacement alters or destroys the population and communities’ way of life, but women and men are unequally affected by resettlement. This inequality has its origin in two factors: the constant invisibility of women as bearers of rights, accepting

\textsuperscript{16} Vale is a Brazilian multinational mining company that extracts coal in Moatize, Tete province, Mozambique.

\textsuperscript{17} International Coal Ventures Private Limited, mining company that acquired shares of the then Rio Tinto in 2012 to operate in the province of Tete.

\textsuperscript{18} Osório and Cruz e Silva (2016) Corporações Económicas e Expropriação: o caso das comunidades reassentadas no distrito de Moatize. WLSA Mozambique, Maputo.
violence, hiding particular forms of human rights violations and. On the other hand, women as a service and care provider and, in the impossibility, in a new unknown and strange space, of being able to continue to perform the roles assigned by the sexual division of labour, suffers new occurrences of violence (Osório and Cruz e Silva, 2016).

The organization DAWN (Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era) created in 1985 by women from the Global South at the United Nations Conference on Women held in Nairobi – and CODESRIA (Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa) co-organized a seminar in Addis Ababa on 26-27 May 2019 on ‘Corporate Accountability, Public Private Partnerships and Women’s Human Rights’. At this seminar, the extractive development model adopted in our countries and its impacts and consequences were extensively debated. There is no record of success stories on our continent.

Other regional initiatives have been implemented to research, reflect, challenge and present alternatives in relation to this main extractive model. WOMIN (Women in Mining Industries, African Women Unite against Destructive Resource Extraction), an African regional organization, established in October 2013, is an African network on gender and extractivism, working with national and regional movements and popular women’s organizations, communities and women farmers affected by mining, in partnership with other support organizations. Its objectives include: to research and publish the impacts of extractivism on women farmers and working women; support women’s organization, movement building and solidarity; advocate and campaign for reforms that go beyond short-term reformism and that contribute to essential long-term structural changes; develop, as a network with other organizations and individuals, an alternative to the dominant and destructive post-extractive development model, that is ecologically fair and focussed on women.
Over the past three years, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Mozambique, has organized what are called ‘Feminist Labs, Feminist Laboratories’, with several feminist scholars and activists from Sub-Saharan Africa, to reflect on the dominant economic model and feminist alternatives to it. In her article, Zo Randriamaro analyses the process of raw material extraction and industrial forms of production involving all kinds of looting of resources, including art. The conditions for the extraction process are based on unequal and violent relations of capitalist extraction of resources from the Global South to the Global North, emphasizing the colonial nature of extractivism (Randriamaro, 2018).

**A reflective conclusion**

In conclusion, many cases of women’s exploitation could be cited. A few such examples will suffice. The exploration of heavy sands by a hardly known Chinese company, on Olinda Island, in the Inhassunge district, in the city of Quelimane. As in most cases, this company, with the support of the Mozambican authorities, did not consult the local communities. After the community’s reaction and their demand for compliance with community consultation and resettlement law, the community was forced to receive what was offered to them, without any explanation as to how compensation would be determined. Olinda Island felt the intervention of a force from the Rapid Intervention Unit after the first protests. A child was murdered and the women – those most affected by megaprojects and without any benefits - say that “they don’t sleep because they don't know what can happen to their husbands.”

During the 1st Congress of Resettled Communities held at the beginning of 2019, in Maputo, a man from a displaced community asked, “Do we have development projects or military projects?” Others said that, during the few community consultations, they were told that the project is beneficial and would bring jobs to the
community and that "men will end up having big bellies." 19

The experiences of Tete with coal, Namanhumbir with ruby, Balama and Ancuabe with graphite, gas in Palma, heavy sands in Angoche and Moma, Chockwé, Inhambane, and elsewhere in the country, have not been in accordance with the law and have produced greater poverty and, above all, the militarization of mining regions leading to general fear, murders, disappearances, and arbitrary arrests.

The province of Cabo Delgado is the classic case of this model of extractive, exclusive and neo-colonial development. Women and men have not slept since October 2017; they cannot work on their agricultural plots, have nothing to eat, while children do not go to school. Women and men await the insurgents’ next attack, often hiding in the bush.

But women and men try to understand what is happening around them, anticipating with different words and acts, ways of existing and resisting individually and collectively (Cunha and Casimiro, 2019). Hope seems to be the last virtue to die.

References


Arnfred, S. (1988). “Women in Mozambique: Gender Struggle and

Politics”. In: *Review of African Political Economy* 41 (Socialism, Democracy and Popular Struggles), pp. 5-16.


Finossolo, N. A. (2017). “Relações de género e poder: participação da mulher no processo de tomada de decisão nas Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (2005-2013), Mestrado em Administração Pública e Governação, Universidade...
Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo.


Santos, B. de S. (2014). “Para além do Pensamento Abissal: Das linhas globais a uma ecologia de saberes”, Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais, v. 78, p. 3-6,


The construction of SADC

Africa is a recent socio-political construct. The Pan African formula derived in part from Kwame Nkrumah’s idea for the formation of the United States of Africa. The African regional blocs were founded on discrimination based on the criterion of neighbourhood. Bearing these two assumptions in mind, we will analyse SADC.

The Southern African Development Community has existed since 1992 as a result of the transformation of SADCC (Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference), created in 1980 by nine of the member states. This transformation, which took place on 17 August 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia, was motivated by the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa.

In 1980, the Organization of African Unity adopted the Lagos Plan (Nigeria) in which African leaders committed themselves to establishing ties of cooperation and economic interdependence at the regional level as a way to create an African common market and, later, the African Economic Community (AEC). The adoption of this plan has stimulated the proliferation of regional groups across the African continent. As a corollary to the Lagos Plan of Action, the countries of Southern Africa (Frontline countries) signed the Lusaka Declaration that created the now defunct SADCC, in April 1980, whose main objective was to reduce economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa (RSA) during the apartheid period.

The Lusaka declaration was called the Declaration on Economic Liberation. The first five front line states (Frontline States - FLS)
were: Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. Later, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe joined. From a political-military point of view, the cooperation consisted in the creation of a security complex with the objective of guaranteeing the collective security of the member states (the so-called Frontline countries). These states were facing threats from the RSA, which not only destabilized the entire region militarily, but also projected its power and economic influence. For the reasons explained above, it can be said that political and security reasons (high politics) were more relevant in this period of regional cooperation (context of confrontation and bipolarity of the cold war) than economic reasons (low politics). However, this situation had a turning point in the post-Cold War period as the changes in the context of globalization forced the restructuring of SADC to adapt to the new regionalism.

Since the 1990s, the region has undergone a profound process of political (democratic convergence) and economic reforms (structural adjustment programs). The political reforms consisted in the introduction of political pluralism and the democratization of most countries of the region. In the global scenario, the reforms were made possible by the loss of strategic interest in the region, with the end of the Cold War and the low-intensity conflicts promoted by the two superpowers in the context of the Cold War. In the regional scenario, the fall of the apartheid regime had an impact on the democratization process of RSA and the regional pacification, which took place with the independence of Namibia (1990) and the peace process negotiations in Angola (1991) and Mozambique (1992).

Today, SADC encompasses 15 countries in southern Africa. Namely: South Africa, Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Seychelles. The SADC headquarters is in Gaborone, Botswana, and its official languages are English, French and Portuguese. Its main objectives are the promotion of growth and economic development, poverty
alleviation, increasing the quality of life of the population, peace and security, sustainable development, strengthening and consolidation of the cultural, historical and social affinities of the region, among others.

The population of SADC countries is over 360 million, unevenly distributed, with territories under 100,000, such as the Republic of Seychelles and other larger territories with almost 100 million people such as the Democratic Republic of Congo; on average, the SADC population is around 25 million. The graph below presents the distribution of the population by territory.

**Population 2019 in Millions**

Source: WEO 2019

SADC has a GDP of approximately 715 billion dollars, the distribution of income between the territories is very unequal, highlighting South Africa which has more than half of the GDP of SADC, about 380 billion dollars, followed by Angola with 13% of the GDP of the region. The graph below shows the distribution of the GDP of the SADC countries.
In terms of economic development, the region is quite poor, with only a few economies with an average level of development; in this respect, the following countries stand out: Seychelles, Mauritius, Botswana and South Africa, as illustrated by the GDP per capita of the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SADC Countries</th>
<th>GDP 2019 (in Billion USD)</th>
<th>2019 Population (Million)</th>
<th>GDP per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>$ 92.19</td>
<td>30.128</td>
<td>3,060.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>$19.65</td>
<td>2.378</td>
<td>8,263.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>$48.46</td>
<td>97.879</td>
<td>495.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eswatini</td>
<td>$4.66</td>
<td>1.109</td>
<td>4,203.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>$2.81</td>
<td>2.048</td>
<td>1,372.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>$12.73</td>
<td>27.055</td>
<td>470.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>$7.44</td>
<td>20.289</td>
<td>366.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>$14.81</td>
<td>1.267</td>
<td>11,690.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>$15.32</td>
<td>31.157</td>
<td>491.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>$13.96</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>5,675.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>$712.93</td>
<td>360.555</td>
<td>1,977.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>$1.65</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>17,229.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>$371.30</td>
<td>58.643</td>
<td>6,331.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>$61.03</td>
<td>52.067</td>
<td>1,172.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>$24.62</td>
<td>18.321</td>
<td>1,343.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>$22.29</td>
<td>15.658</td>
<td>1,423.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WEO 2019
Natural resources

Almost 10% of the annual production of the countries in the region and 50% of their exports come from non-renewable natural resources. Natural resources are one of the main exports in about 11 of the 15 countries of the region. Of these, Angola is the only oil exporter; in the other ten resource-rich economies, at least a quarter of export revenues come from mining. Gold, diamonds and other precious stones are the main exports of products from most non-oil-rich economies in the region. Some of them, however, rely heavily on base metals and uranium (Zambia) or benefit on a broad mix of products (Democratic Republic of Congo).

The region has shown a very high volume of mining exports, highlighting South Africa and Angola in the period 2001 to 2016, as illustrated by the graph below.

Source: United Nations

The prevalence of the political dimension over economic requirements

Since its inception, SADC has had the political component as the strongest and most structured regional economic grouping. On the other hand, the achievement of integration and consolidation of the economic region has been taking slow steps. From an economic
point of view, SADC has designed a program of action that has covered key areas of development such as: agriculture, industry, energy, human resource development as well as transport and communications. At the same time, a sectoral integration model was adopted, in which each country functionally coordinated a specific thematic area.

From an institutional point of view, SADC grew quantitatively from nine members in 1992 to fourteen in 2010. From a qualitative point of view, it did not succeed in deepening integration beyond the Free Trade Area. The lack of significant progress in regional integration is due to several constraints, namely:

♦ the difficulties of inserting SADC into the international system in the globalized context;
♦ the rather deep regional asymmetries between member states; and
♦ the competition among member countries that results from multiple affiliations to the various regional blocks, namely: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and East African Community (EAC).

The different trade interests of SADC member states have created divisions within the bloc. States join other blocs as a way of attracting investment and obtaining trade gains through the negotiation of agreements with external partners. A concrete example of this is the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with the European Union (EU). This practice has resulted in the division of the bloc into groups that reflect the multiple affiliations of member states.

On the one hand, we have the group called SADC-EPA, on the other, ESA-EPA- (Eastern and Southern Africa-EPA). The SADC EPA group is composed of Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and four other SACU countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland), with the exception of South Africa, which is an observer.
The ESA-EPA group consists of SADC and COMESA countries. The SADC countries that have chosen to negotiate the agreement in this block are: Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The adoption of the trade protocol and the free trade area brought expectations regarding gains from trade. It was expected that the model of a strong and consolidated region would have results with dynamic effects (economies of scale, increased competition and investment) and static effects of integration (gains in trade through the creation and diverting trade). These objectives, however, were not achieved.

Trade in SADC had little impact on regional development for several reasons:

- First, there is a lack of clarity or uncertainty as to how the gains from integration will be distributed equitably among member countries, resulting in the fragile commitment among states in the region that have joined other blocs to maximize their trade gains.

- Intra-SADC trade has had little impact on the economies of the group’s countries because the flow of regional trade is tiny compared to that of other blocs worldwide. The trend towards multiple memberships of SADC countries has raised questions about member countries’ commitment to building the integration project based on a common agenda in the region. The accession of SADC member countries to other regional blocks has resulted in division, overlapping agendas and weak progress in deepening regional integration.

The incompatibility between multiple memberships and the deepening of regional integration can be explained as follows:

- Competition among SADC countries, resulting from the existence of various regional arrangements;
Different perceptions of gains; as well as (iii) difficulty in implementing regional agreements and harmonizing policies.

When observing the trend of affiliation of member states to other regional blocs, we find that almost all 14 SADC countries belong to more than one regional bloc, with the exception of Mozambique. It is also possible to observe that out of the 14 SADC members, five countries belong to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) namely: Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland and Lesotho; eight countries belong to (COMESA): Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, DRC, Swaziland, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe; one country belongs to EAC-Tanzania; and Mozambique is the only country belonging to one regional bloc (SADC).

Is economic union a mirage? What paths can be followed to achieve this goal by making SADC the power in Africa?

The triangle of incompatibilities and restrictions on monetary policy - one of the main theoretical frameworks

Due to the existence of divergent commercial interests, countries join the other blocks to attract investments and solve their internal problems. In this context, each member country perceives integration as a way to pursue its interests. For example, the failure to establish the Customs Union demonstrated that the countries of the region were not prepared to give up the capacity to act alone and share sovereignty in accordance with the Windhoek Treaty and other relevant instruments for regional integration. South Africa, an economically dominant country at the regional level, has committed itself to the goals of regional integration for the establishment of the Customs Union and the Common Market.

The success of the integration process depends, to a certain extent, on the political commitment and cooperation among countries for
the implementation of their agreements and protocols. Although SADC has made progress in signing agreements, it has not made significant progress in implementing them for the following reasons:

- Slowness of the protocol negotiation process and non-fulfilment of the goals established in the regional plans;
- The existence of many protocols and the lack of interest of member states in ratifying them, which is even more difficult in countries belonging to several blocs due to the number of agreements that parliaments need to validate. In addition, some countries sign agreements without intending to ratify them. One example of this process is Angola, which has not ratified the trade protocol in force since 2000, and
- Institutional fragility, especially of the secretariat, an executive body without powers because of the resistance of member states to give in to sovereignty. The fragile implementation of regional agreements reveals that SADC countries show little interest in deepening integration or sharing their sovereignty. National interests prevail over regional ones.

**Monetary policy in the context of the economic area: the primacy of monetarism and its influence**

The lack of political will to surrender sovereignty translates into the absence of relevant supranational institutions in the region. The reluctance to surrender sovereignty is due to the fact that states do not want to lose autonomy to supranational institutions (with binding decisions). For this reason, the countries have opted for a model of decision-making by consensus, which in practice renders the bloc incapable of taking decisions against the interests of member states. For example, the SADC Court’s decision to condemn the Zimbabwean government in relation to the land reform process or expropriation of land from white farmers for redistribution to the black population culminated in the suspension of this court in
In fact, one of the problems for the functioning of the court institutions and other regional institutions is the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. However, we believe that many of SADC’s security problems can be overcome if there is greater cooperation between states, as well as by shifting the focus from the classical (military political) security perspective to a multidimensional perspective that considers the other (non-military) security dimensions. The perspective advocated by the group composed of Mozambique, Botswana and South Africa is the most appropriate for regional stability as it emphasizes dialogue and mediation to prevent and resolve regional and intra-state conflicts.

The challenges of SADC and the position of SAN

The greatest challenge for Southern African countries lies in articulating and harmonizing regional integration schemes and promoting the alignment of national policies among member states in order to reverse some of the constraints that prevent the progress of integration, namely the reduction of regional asymmetries, the reduction of dependence on the South African economy and on external donors.

SADC countries have deep economic asymmetries, with the Republic of South Africa being the country with an above average level of economic development in the region in terms of GDP compared to other countries whose level of development is low. In this situation, market opening and competition between countries with different degrees of development in the regional context may, if not properly controlled, widen the gap between the most advanced and poor countries and further marginalize the poorest economies in the region, especially in a situation where tariffs are a source of revenue for public spending.

For the integration process to be successful, it is essential to eliminate disparities between member countries in terms of levels of socio-economic development. In this sense, the support or willingness of
states is important to the success of integration. In addition to the disparities that exist between economies in terms of the degree of development and endowment of resources and capacities, the main challenges are the integration of infrastructure, the consolidation of development corridors, and institutional strengthening capable of guaranteeing the implementation of regional projects.

In general, the future of SADC will depend on the capacity of member states to rationalize and harmonize the multiple existing agendas in order to form a single regional bloc within a common vision of development. In this sense, cooperation can be made possible through convergence and harmonization of policies, as well as the rationalization of different regional arrangements.

The creation of the tripartite Free Trade Area that will encompass 26 countries from three regional blocs, namely SADC, COMESA and EAC and the merger of these blocks could be an important step towards the harmonization of trade arrangements between the three blocks, expanding markets, leveraging productive potential, increasing the volume of intra-African trade, and jointly implementing interregional infrastructure programs, as well as create institutional arrangements on the basis of which the three RECs can promote reciprocal cooperation. (Although there is much expectation surrounding this initiative to make the integration process in Africa viable by 2028, as well as to solve the problems of multiple affiliation, the attainment of this goal can be achieved by mitigating the problems that make the integration process impossible: regional asymmetries, multiple affiliation, trade disputes and institutional fragility).

In this sense, the process of economic integration requires minimum conditions for its successful implementation, which can be summarized as follows: regional political stability, regional macroeconomic stability, trade creation, distribution of benefits, and political will to share sovereignty.
References


Part Two:

Stumbling Blocks: Internal and External Limitations to Economic Independence
Making the future: Towards Democratic Developmental States in Southern Africa, merging desirability and feasibility

André du Pisani

“When the tasks of creating a national future and creating a national past are undertaken at the same time, there is always the danger that the present might be caught in between.” (Ali A. Mazrui, *On Heroes and Uhuru-Worship*, 1967: 151).

“Men make their history but they do not make it under circumstances chosen by them, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past” (Karl Marx, 1852, ‘Eighteenth Brumaire’, in *A Handbook of Marxism*, 1935: 116.)

**Introduction**

The quotation from Ali A. Mazrui’s book *On Heroes and Uhuru-Worship*, published during the First Decade of African independence, rings remarkably true in 2019. Mazrui, reminds us that the twin tasks of ‘creating a national future’ and ‘creating a national past’ is not uniquely African. The author then invokes the experiences of George Washington as the first president of ‘the first modern nation’, the United States of America (USA), and that of Ghana under the enigmatic Kwame Nkrumah. Mazrui reflects, with commendable insight, on the nexus between iconic leadership and the capacity to organize political life around common values and purposes. He argues that in Africa, as indeed was the case elsewhere, there has since the founding of new states, been a desire and need for ‘a splendid past and a splendid future’ (Mazrui, 1967: 150).

In southern Africa, various scholars have undertaken a critical rethink of the fruits of liberation. One such scholar is John S. Saul (2014), who writes of ‘a flawed freedom’. In some cases, newly spawned nationhood, while the desire for Mazrui’s ‘splendid
future’, that accompanied more recent transitions to independence, seems to have all but evaporated. At the very least, the past, the present and the future form part of the political-economy and the postcolonial. Historical legacies continue to shape the postcolonial in profound ways such as trade patterns and the structure of the labour market. This is the result of a messy and increasingly more powerful confluence between external (global) and internal factors, many of which resulted in, what Saul calls ‘a disfigured transition’ accompanied by new forms of ‘recolonization’ (Saul, 2014: 6-7).

This cursory chapter focuses on some of the arterial internal factors, while recognizing that these are often linked in complex ways to external factors such as the system of global capital, with its ideology of consumerism and the politics of the strong, the negative consequences of free trade as opposed to fair trade, the role of Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) as trans-national actors, the loss of manufacturing jobs as a consequence of globalization, climate change, the further erosion of social protection as part of a more general movement away from state provision of social services and programmes and the further impairment of the construct of social rights, particularly of the poor (Teeple, 2000: 111; see also: Stiglitz, 2000 & 2006: 61-102). These, the politico-historical terrain, and other external factors that lie beyond the scope of this impressionistic contribution can and often do, limit the policy space of states to pursue a relatively autonomous development strategy. Arguably, it has become much harder to fashion ‘developmental states’ modelled on those of the first wave of Newly-Industrialized Countries (NICS) of the 1980s.

Politics and Economics unbound

The confluence between politics and economics in respect of the ruling/ governing parties, in southern Africa, more especially those who were galvanized in the white heat of liberation politics, need to be unbound from a diversity of internal mentalities, habits, practices and policies so as to facilitate greater social inclusion,
popular participation and sustainable human development within a
democratic developmental state. The start of such a project, should
vest in the quality and relevance of new thinking about institutions,
parties, policy, the social bases of national/trans-regional political
calculations that need to be built to undergird the states of the region.
In important respects, the politics of the ruling or governing parties
have entered what I have called elsewhere, a ‘Post-Imagination Age’
(du Pisani, 2019: 10). Such a condition is characterized by a failure
to address deep structural inequalities, creating quality jobs and
diminishing the conspicuous consumption of the wealthy elite. In the
cases of Namibia and South Africa, their transitions to democracy
were based on ‘elite pacts’ and not on a deep ideological calculus of
transformation (Bond, 2000; see also Saul & Bond, 2014).

This rather apocalyptic reading of the politics of my own country,
Namibia, and with qualification that of other states in the region,
implies that the governing elites have all too easily resigned
themselves to the narratives and policies of others, while at the same
time, social justice is being eroded by the mantra and practice of
‘free trade’, rising public debt, corrosive forms of corruption, the
politics of state capture, recycled ideas and elites and the politics of
‘appearance’ and mimicking. In some states, a form of ‘corporatized
liberation’ has emerged, while in others, a more extreme form of
‘privatized liberation’ came to characterize their politics. Both these
patterns of politics provided the raw material for the rise of a ‘shadow
state’ and enabled the ‘politics of state capture’ a phenomenon of considerable complexity. These two forms of post-liberation politics mark a ‘partial retreat from humanity’, to invoke a phrase from Achille Mbembe (2017: 179-183).

In this chapter, the term ‘corporatisation’ does not refer to the institutional form of converting a state-owned or controlled industry or enterprise into a corporation or independent commercial company, but rather to the way the ANC-government and state in South Africa have incorporated the core features and practices of a corporation and thus ensured that much of that country’s political economy (i.e., its ‘liberation’) mirrors and represents those features. In the words of McKinley: “The ANC’s corporatized state is constitutive of a triangle of power: class, organisational and


For an insightful analysis of the politics of state capture in South Africa, see: Ivor Chipkin & Mark Swilling et al. (2018). Shadow State – The Politics of State Capture. Johannesburg: Wits University Press. State capture has to be distinguished from corruption. The latter, corruption, is often an individual action that occurs in particular cases, facilitated by a loose network of corrupt actors. It is mostly informally organized, fragmented and opportunistic. State capture is systemic and well organized by people who have an established relationship with one another. It involves repeated transactions, often on a larger scale. Structurally, ‘state capture’ involves the power or political and economic elite, it repositions the state and it involves extensive patterns of rents, rent seeking and patron/client relations result in a symbiotic relationship between the constitutional and the shadow state. See: Ivor Chipkin & Mrk Swilling et al. (2018). Shadow State – The Politics of State Capture, Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2018, pp. ix-xiii.

The construct of ‘state capture’ needs to be used with considerable circumspection. The liberal notion of the State as being neutral is seriously flawed, for states do have interests of their own; while the State under a capitalist economy is shaped by capital.
institutional. This does not mean that corporate capital controls the state; it simply means that the ANC has corporatized its politics and organisational form in a way which is reflected in the three components of state power and how that power is exercised and deployed” (McKinley, 2017: 6; Pithouse, 2016: 172-175).

Extended to a society-wide level and under the conceptual frame of the ANC’s National Democratic Revolution (NDR), the motor of societal development has been the party-state-capital nexus. In this framing, the party becomes the most important agency of the various capitalist interests that drive it, and of capital itself, with the state as the main vehicle for ‘implementation’ and with the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programme as one of the main driving forces.

In the case of ‘privatised liberation’ that, Horace Campbell argues, has come to characterize the politics of post-independent Zimbabwe, there is a clear nexus between the party-state and the material needs, desires and demands of the political and security elites who control the state. This happens at the expense of national, societal development. The interest of the state class and their relationship to capital becomes the preeminent concern of the state. This happens at the expense of ‘social Zimbabwe’ with low or declining levels of investment in public health and social welfare, more generally.

Recently, I wrote on ‘Post-Imagination Politics’ in my own country:

In three decades, politics failed the task of healing what history has broken and distorted. Politics is morbidly suspicious of the mind. There cannot be a new dawn amidst the lifeless liberalism, where justified criticism is unwelcome and where the new radicalism of young Namibians with little social capital – save a good education in a few cases – is being rendered unknowable to the political elite. There is too much silence, but for how long? (du Pisani, 2019: 10).

Notwithstanding these critical remarks, it has to be emphasized that the economic/material/social substructure that can effectively
and sustainably underwrite the political superstructure of the State, is significantly more demanding to construct, than the formal institutions of the State itself, for the latter, the State is a political project. This seems especially true in the case when societies transition from war to some form of formal and more demanding forms of social peace\textsuperscript{2}. In the case of southern Africa, notwithstanding the specificities of particular cases, such a generalization has considerable traction, for example, in the cases of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.

The achievement of sustainable economic independence during the mid-1970s up to 1990 was seriously constrained by a complex mix of political, economic and social factors. At the political level, incoming elites were preoccupied, and understandably so, with consolidating their newly-won power within the rubric of the State as a prerequisite for the project of nation-building, even if the latter, nation-building, took different forms, it was essentially a political and not a cultural or social project. In some cases, the distinction between government and the State became blurred, giving rise to what some analysts have called ‘party states, partocracies or liberation aristocracies’, ‘democratic authoritarianism’ and mostly to ‘state nations’ as distinct from nation-states (du Pisani & Lindeke 2010a: 53-80; du Pisani, 2010b: 78-88; du Pisani, 2013: 132-148; du Pisani, 2019: 10; Melber, 2011; 2014, Bauer & Taylor, 2005). Most of their political energy was spent on building the superstructure of society, of which the State and the security system were arguably the most important. Peace and the search for stability became overriding concerns of the political elite and their network of support, often at the expense of social justice. In some cases, such as Angola, peace came recently. Other states, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mozambique, in the country’s Northern provinces, continue

\textsuperscript{2} The construct of ‘social peace’ comes from the work of Johan Galtung the founder of Peace Studies and denotes a sustainable outcome in post-conflict politics that is sensitive to the rights and needs of people and implies the existence of mechanism to resolve conflict.
to experience forms of low intensity conflict. States did attempt to control investment decisions, but in virtually all cases, their autonomy was limited as they had virtually no independence from foreign and local capital and from their Overseas Development Partners (ODPs) and key trading partners. Most states saw their policy space diminished and invaded by expatriate consultants, while the important role of Multi-National Corporations (MNCs), mostly in the extractive sector, further undermined their autonomy. This made state-directed economic and social development in the periphery and the semi-periphery much harder to achieve.

Global finance has always been and continues to be a central challenge to economic and political decision-makers, the global explosion of unregulated financialization at the end of the twentieth century posed a challenge of a different order of magnitude. The spread of democracy in the developing world created its own set of challenges. This was accompanied by a wider understanding of development and of security – replete with the construct of ‘human security’3 – which had the implication that states had to deliver much more than increased output of consumable commodities and basic services to be considered successful (Williams, 2014: 24).

During the 1980s and into the next decade, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), further eroded the capacity of states and public institutions to act, by new constraints and conditions imposed from outside. On balance, such Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in their different forms – left the economies and social structures of many states that drank from the

elixir of the IFIs - maladjusted. Conditionality weakened the State and its public institutions and contributed towards the erosion of their legitimacy, as some citizens felt betrayed by their own states. Given the historic hegemony of the United States over IFIs, these were widely seen as an integral part of the foreign policy of that country. The ideology was called ‘The Washington Consensus’ and in its more perverse form, ‘regime change’ (Ake, 2000; Stiglitz, 2000 & 2014: 12). Within the IFIs at the time, little weight was given to the voices and concerns of the developing economies of the South, as voting power in the IMF, for example, was/is determined largely on the basis of economic power and political influence.

By the turn of the century, states and governments found it much harder to deliver enhanced human capabilities that could propel them into a more competitive position globally and regionally. In many cases, ecological sustainability was not even identified as a problem to which states had to find viable policy responses.

In the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which emerged as a potential new regional market, with over 200 million people, the prospect for enhanced cooperation and integration in trade, services, and over the longer haul for political - and security regionalism, the principal challenge in terms of economic independence/interdependence lies at the national, country-level: forging country-specific development that takes seriously local conditions, social needs and demands from a complex bow of class forces and domestic politics. Domestic politics matter more than ever – perhaps the era of ‘models’ is over? Perhaps not? SADC is simply too linear in its approach to regional cooperation and integration, with a near-exclusive emphasis on trade and economic integration, with trans-national and trans-regional development and project and cultural integration an all too infrequent occurrence.

The ideology of economic development began to shift as early as the 1980s as globalization made inroads into the idea of a Keynesian welfare state and social democracy. As monetarism – with its fetish to
combat inflation, intended to deliver price stability - was increasingly at variance with Keynesian economics, social reform was slowed down in a great many countries. Monetarism came to represent the policies required by internationalized capital in a globalizing economy, an arena in which political compromise with the national working classes became far less important, and in which the cost of production became pre-eminent and the costs of reproduction of the working class completely subordinate. In political terms, it represented – over time – changes in national economic and development policies designed to maintain national bourgeoisies in positions of national dominance, and the introduction of laissez-faire policies conducive to international capital, and to competition at the international level (Teeple, 2000: 76).

In the case of post-apartheid South Africa, the argument has been made that that country was unlike most social democracies in that public policy was driven by the additional goal of transforming the racial composition of the economic elite. Forcing capital to create a black middle class and new wealthy elite (novo riche) that based on the analysis of Seekings and Nattrass, ‘was neither neo-liberal nor social democratic’ (Seekings & Nattrass, 2017: 23). (Emphasis added). The late Claude Ake (2000: 184-185), and Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo (2005) among other scholars, offer a profound critique of ‘liberal democracy’ in Africa. Ake (2000) is clear in his preference for what he calls ‘social/developmental democracy’ as opposed to the ‘liberal democracy’ that most African states have adopted either willingly or have been compelled by class interests to do so.

Mindful of the historic and social particularities that characterize South Africa, it has to be acknowledged, that the legacies of apartheid were consequential for the framing of public policies after the transition to democracy in 1994. In important respects, some public policies were de-racialized, without being meaningfully transformed, providing for a growing number of Black South Africans in mid-level management and jobs traditionally reserved under apartheid for whites (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005). To a significant extent,
policy became ‘path-dependent’, taking its cue from a trajectory initiated after 1994, when that country democratized. In important respects, the same generalization also holds for Namibia, as the two countries share a common history.

In the case of South Africa and other countries of the region, like Namibia, poverty and inequality were (and remain) rooted in the labour market. In comparison to many other developing countries, the South African labour market after apartheid was characterized by “the shrinkage of low-wage formal employment opportunities, and hence high unemployment rates among the less skilled. Even in the informal sector there were many fewer people doing low-earning work than in most other developing countries”. For most low-earning working people, earnings did not change significantly after 1994, but for higher-earning working people – that is, workers with above-median earnings – earnings rose. The highest earners – professionals and managers – benefited the most, but most black, white- and blue-collar workers with skills experienced rising real wages and improved benefits and conditions of employment. (Seekings & Nattrass, 2017: 23-24). Mindful of the limits in the wage data, the mean real wages among wage-earners rose from 1994 to 2011. The average growth rate between 1994 and the end of 2011 was 2.2 percent per year. (Seekings & Nattrass, 2017: 60).

In considering the viability of Democratic Developmental States in the SADC Region, the depth and scope of socio-economic inequality across the Region must be considered. As Tables 1 and 2, below show, the Region hosts some of the most unequal societies in the world. These are: South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, Eswatini and Zambia. See table 1 below.
Table 1: Income Inequality in the SADC Region (2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Income Inequality by Gini Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eswatini</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank Gini Index.¹

Table 2: SADC countries by GDP (PPP) per capita (in US$ per head), 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP p/capita 2018 (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>3691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>8124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>1492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eswatini</td>
<td>3764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>11160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>5985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>16378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>6382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC region</td>
<td>2081</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SADC Selected Economic and Social Indicators, 2018.

The SADC region registered an estimated average growth rate of 1.8% in 2018 compared to 2.1% in 2017. In 2019, the average growth rate for the region declined further to about 1.5%. The manufacturing sector, identified as the prioritized key engine of growth to drive the industrialization process in SADC for the coming decades, grew modestly by 4.3% in 2018 compared to 4.6% in 2017. (SADC Selected Economic and Social Indicators, 2018:1).

At country-specific level, economic growth rates varied considerably, with Seychelles registering a high overall growth rate of 7.9%, followed by Tanzania (7.0%), whilst Angola and Namibia registered negative growth rates for three consecutive years (SADC Selected Economic and Social Indicators, 2018:1).

Total External Debt stock at the end of the 2018 fiscal year in US$ million, for SADC as a whole increased on a year-on-year basis, with Angola (48 169), Mozambique (21 294), Namibia (8 338), South Africa (174 547), Tanzania (21 669), Zambia (20 088) and Zimbabwe (7 700), the most heavily indebted. The total External Debt Stock at the end of 2018 for the SADC region stood at US$ 324 979, a dramatic increase from US$ 124 571 in 2008 (SADC Selected Economic and Social Indicators, 2018: 20).

Against this impressionistic backdrop, and recognizing the ideological and political tenor of the debate, the question has to be asked if the end of the democratic developmental state has arrived in southern Africa and beyond - to this question - analysts have given different answers to the question. In a recent offering, edited by Kanyenze, Jauch et al. (2017), there is consensus that a ‘democratic developmental state’ is not just possible, but highly desirable in southern Africa. Such a development would hinge on a diversity of structural and policy choices, that would among others, require meaningful empowerment of women in the economic, social and political life of the region, as Alice Kanengoni (2017) elegantly argues, reconfiguring the institutional architecture of the state in terms of capacity, employment equity and meritocratic recruitment,
addressing the issue of youth unemployment, dealing meaningfully with the ‘unfinished business’ of land dispossession, restitution and service delivery, and in the policy realm, recalibrate economic, social, and labour policy.

Other analysts, such as Williams and her co-authors (2014) are more sceptical of replicating the successes of the earlier developmental states of East Asia, pointing to a different, more unforgiving global environment, emphasizing the less than democratic nature of the earlier generation of ‘developmental states’, questioning the embedded autonomy of the States in southern Africa and state capacity, more generally, while positing that the policy menu has become more constrained when compared with the choices that the New Industrial Economies (NICs) had at the time (Evans, 2014: 220-240).

Even in the case of China, arguably one of the preeminent manufacturing economies in the contemporary world economy and with its own brand of development, employment in manufacturing peaked at about one worker in seven in the mid-1990s, and it had already begun to decline at the end of the decade. An independent analysis by economists at Alliance Capital Management found that between 1995 and 2002, China lost on net 15 million manufacturing jobs (Carlson, 2003). Since the 2008 fiscal crisis, the impossibility of relying on the market for manufactured exports in the case of the United States as the foundation of broad-based income growth was made painfully obvious, as unemployment rose in that country, some companies relocated and the manufacturing sector lost some of its competitiveness in relation to rapidly-rising manufacturing capacity in China.

In southern Africa in which manufacturing employs a shrinking minority of the population, while most depend on agriculture and the service sector undercuts the twentieth-century story of increased general well-being built around machine production. To determine what new narrative makes sense, one should go beyond shifts in
the structure of employment to the changes in the distribution of economic opportunities and returns that underlie those shifts.

On the analysis of Peter Evans, one of the leading theorists of democratic developmental states, the changing profile of economic activity has made much more obvious the centrality of growth driven more by ideas and information (both as means of production and objects of consumption) than by the physical transformation of nature, what might be called ‘bit-driven growth’ (Evans, 2014: 228). Bit-driven growth’s growing importance corresponds to the theoretical propositions of the ‘new growth theory’ of differential returns in the late twentieth century, which show that growth and productivity as driven primarily by changes in the stock of ideas and people’s capacity to take advantage of them (i.e. appropriate and contextual level of education and training). From the perspective of ‘bit-driven growth’, ideas are non-rival goods – an indefinite number of people can use them at the same time.

Ensuring maximum possible access to ideas that are tools for the further expansion of knowledge requires active state involvement, sometimes in opposition to the private owners of those ideas. Following Peter Evans’ argument, to facilitate twenty-first century ‘bit-driven growth’, “the state must be agile, active, resourceful and able to act independently of private interests whose returns depend on restricting the flow of knowledge.” Moreover, the question is not whether the state must take on board an aggressive role if development is to succeed: “the question is whether there are plausible paths for the emergence of states with the institutional capacity and political character that will enable them to play the role required for developmental success” (Evans, 2014: 231). Evans, however, sounds a salutary warning, namely that arguments for the

---

2 The term is from Nicolas Negroponte’s (1996) observation that economic activities are less and less driven by the rearrangement of atoms (i.e. the physical transformation of goods) and more and more driven by the rearrangement of ‘bits’—that is to say, information, ideas and images.
desirability of transformation are quite different than arguments for
the feasibility of such transformations, [adding that] the question of
feasibility ‘is inescapable’.

**Bringing desirability and feasibility together**

A close reading of the diverse and often highly contested body of
literature on ‘democratic developmental states and social democracy
in different contexts, shows that the key theoretical and practical
question is how to bring the desirability of such states and their
political and practical feasibility together. It is to this question that
the paper next turns.

The debate is about much more than the logic of state theory.
Successful democratic developmental states face different and much
more demanding circumstances than that of the 1980s and 1990s.
Both the political and economic challenges to constructing twenty-
first century democratic developmental states are formidable.
Political obstacles such as uneven or weak state autonomy, brain
drain, predatory elites, state capture and high levels of public debt
are magnified by global geo-political dynamics. Global networks,
especially global financial networks, increasingly determine the
choices and preferences of private capital. Global capital has no
compelling reason to support allocating resources to building strong
states and supporting national projects of ‘capability expansion’, to
invoke the language of Peter Singer (2014, p. 236), than national
capital. But there is a window of opportunity – a number of
developmental states in the Global South have resisted following
the Anglo-American ideological mantra – even if global policy
regimes, like the interests of global capital, work against those who
actively work for creating democratic developmental states.

In concluding, Peter Evans (2014: 236) in an admirable piece of
reflective writing concludes:

> Given these circumstances, no state is likely to fully achieve the
level of transformation required to become a twenty-first century
developmental state, not even those that best met twentieth-century requirements. Partial accomplishments are the most that can be expected in a reasonable time frame. Partial success, however, will still be success…

None of this should be used as an excuse for abandoning the analysis and pursuit of possibilities for constructing twenty-first-century democratic developmental states. The existence of a coherent convergence of theory – on both development and the state – and historical experience negates prevailing neo-liberal or market-driven models of development and opens up space for rethinking development and the state. Harking back to the salutary advice of two preeminent dependencia theorists, Cardoso and Faletto who wrote that meaningful and largely unexpected change can result from “collective action guided by political wills that make work what is structurally barely possible” (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979: 176). This, one should add, requires an open and vigorous intellectual and policy conversation on the character and effects of different forms of developmental states and how these could harness the possibilities of the twenty-first-century. The basis of all of this should be efforts to construct an ‘ethical commons’ – a number of virtues that guide policy and political activity in the different states. There is a need to go beyond what Sen (2009: 53) calls, ‘disengaged toleration’, transcending the easy and intellectually lazy answer: ‘you are right in your community or party and I am right in mine’ (Emphasis added). Public reasoning and impartial scrutiny are essential, since fairness is a key element of justice.

Sen’s argument that we should evaluate development in terms of the ‘expansion of capabilities of people to lead the kind of lives they value—and have reason to value’ (Sen, 2007: 25), [Emphasis added] offers a sound starting point for the conversation. Because it rejects the reduction of development success to a single metric (such as an increase in income levels of different classes and workers), the ‘capability approach’, identifies ‘public deliberation’ as the only analytically meaningful way of ordering capabilities and puts
political institutions (inclusive of political parties) and civil society at the heart of developmental goal setting.

To Sen's compelling argument, it would be advisable to fortify the integrity of the policy process itself, by making it more democratic and deliberative through the use of a more contextual set of ideas to inform policy with. These can be itemized in terms of a construct that I call the six “Is”, namely:

- What interests should be served by the policy? How were such interests derived at? Who defined these interests? How does one distinguish between core and more marginal interests? Which interests are the most pressing – which interests are immediate, short-term, medium-term, long-term?

- What economic, social, political impacts does a particular policy wish to achieve and in which space and over what time-frame? And, I suppose, at what cost and to whom?

- Which institutions would be responsible for policy design, monitoring and implementation? How can such institutions be invested with the capability to formulate, implement and evaluate policy?

- What ideas/ideology should guide public policy? How would a policy that claims to be ‘pro-poor’ look like? What normative foundation should support policy: public deliberation; accountability; transparency (openness); equality; difference or proportionality. Governing or ruling parties have a unique opportunity and responsibility to engage in ideological discourse. This is an ever more compelling demand as comparative evidence clearly shows

---

3 The ‘equality’ and the proportionality’ of ‘difference’ principles come from Aristotle’s Nichomacian Ethics and have been further refined by John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice, originally published in 1971. Basically, it means that one should treat ‘equal cases’ equally and ‘unequal cases’ in proportion to their inequality.
that the neo-liberal experiment – lower taxes on the rich, deregulation of labour and product markets, financialization, and globalization – has in the words of Stiglitz (2019: 1), ‘been a spectacular failure’. On Stiglitz’s (2019: 1-4) analysis, the world faces three ‘major political alternatives: far-right nationalism, centre-left-reformism, and the progressive left [with the centre-right representing the neoliberal failure]’.

- What information would be needed to craft and design policy? Normally, information relates to two complimentary policy domains: information of policy (knowing which policy is pursued) and information for policy (gathering information for new policy in a particular policy domain). In the post-policy making phase, feedback and information should be provided to relevant constituencies. [Own emphasis]

- Initiating policy networks at the level of policy issues – investigate and understand the structure of dependency within policy networks and identify the main variety of networks (actors) and how they interact with the State at local, regional and central level. This is critical in the domains of social policy and service delivery, where consensual policy networks can focus on a sectoral or sub-sectoral aspect of policy (Parsons, 1995).

The above primer on the policy process can usefully be enriched with a clear meta-policy making stage. Where the tough ethical, normative questions, can and in my view, should be asked. Questions such as:

- Processing interests;
- Processing reality;
- Processing problems (since policy develops in a context of disequilibrium caused by specific problems, connected or singular);
- Surveying, processing, and generating resources;
Designing, evaluating and redesigning the policy-making system and processes;

Allocating problems, values and resources – aligning these with appropriate institutions with capacity, and

Determining policy-making strategy

It seems advisable that the actual policy-making stage should in all cases be preceded by such a meta-policy making stage. It is also important to emphasize, that the post-policy making stage – which is often neglected by policy-makers and political parties – should ideally begin with motivating the execution of policy (governing/ru ling parties have an important role in this), proceed onward to executing the policy, evaluating policy-making after executing the policy and providing communication and feedback to different constituencies, especially to those for whom the policy was designed.

The policy menu of Democratic Developmental States (DDS) – here understood to mean states that practice deliberative democracy, participatory planning and socially-responsive governance- in southern Africa and beyond must engage creatively with at least four key conditions for sustainable human and social development. These are: the structure of the economy and the need to restructure the economy, ‘good enough governance’ (as opposed to ‘good governance’), epistemic shifts in the global economy and the ecological crisis (Kanyenze, Jauch et al. 2017: 347).

All of the above pose particular challenges to governing parties in the region, and there seems to be an emerging consensus at the level of national and regional policy agendas, such as the Regional Indicative Development Plan (RISDP) of SADC and the more ambitious and longer-term Agenda 2063 of the African Union (AU) that these policy issues are at the heart of such policy framings.

The perspective put forward in this working chapter, however, makes a case for meaningful convergence around an ‘ethical commons’ comprising of key virtues and values such as human solidarity, self-reliance, community, needs and rights, and for revisiting public policy as a social process that is guided by a normative corset comprising of specific meta-policy questions so as to align desirability and feasibility. This is even more compelling, if one considers that only two countries in the SADC are in the high category of human development (Mauritius and Seychelles), with four in the medium category (Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia) and the remaining nine in the low category (Jauch and Muchena, 2011).

In terms of technological innovation and new forms of investment, it is suggested that significantly more public and private resources should be invested in the following projects and activities that already have a footprint in some SADC-countries:

- Mindful of the impacts of Climate Change and resultant variability in rainfall, Conservation Agriculture (CA) that focuses on small-scale farmers with the purpose of building their resilience deserves to become one of the investment priorities.

- Improved decentralized Internet connectivity through Smart Phones to access knowledge specific to particular economic sectors.

- Enhanced decentralized planning and political governance at the local and regional/provincial levels.

- Expanding and strengthening existing communal conservancies. In the case of Namibia, that country’s

---

5 Conservation Agriculture (CA) is a set of soil management practices that are based on three key pillars: permanent soil cover, minimum soil disturbance and diversification of plant association. CA has many aspects to it, among these: Smart Agriculture, climate change adaptation, market access, seed varieties and seed multiplication and integrated pest management (such as scouting, crop rotation and inter-cropping).
communal conservancies have grown to 86 over the past two years, covering 166 045 square kilometres and benefiting either directly or indirectly, over 277 941 people.

- Ongoing curriculum review, especially at the level of Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) to embrace creativity, innovation, alternative modes of learning, and skills needed for the Forth Industrial Revolution that interfaces digital trade with robotics and artificial intelligence.

- Tailoring the protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), especially of new patents, within a robust legal framework as integral to innovation and further Research & Development (R&D).

- Ameliorating the ‘resource curse’, for those who control the natural resource wealth often appropriate for themselves a large fraction of the country’s resource endowment. Resource-rich countries should and could be more egalitarian than countries without natural resources, but that is by no means the case (Stiglitz, 2006: 157). Sadly, the distribution of wealth is not determined by a fair balancing of equity-efficiency trade-offs. It is also not determined by reference to principles of social justice; rather it is the result of power. Wealth generates power, the power that enables the power elite to maintain their wealth.

- Maximizing the potential of capital-intensive sectors, such as the extractive sector, along the lines suggested by the *Africa Mining Vision Report* of 2008, through building resource linkages with the rest of the economy comprising of revenue linkages, backward linkages (supply chains), forward linkages (value addition/beneficiation), and

---

6 Community conservancies are self-governing entities established under the Ministry of Environment and Tourism’s *Community-Based Natural Resources Management* (CBNRM) programme. Community conservancies are important for mitigating the impacts of climate change, the loss of biodiversity and land degradation.
knowledge and spatial linkages to create new industries associated with mining.

- Developing the resources of the Blue Economy in a much more integrated and sustainable manner, bearing in mind that the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans are the most productive in terms of fish, shellfish, seaweed and other proteins. Even if there are clear signs that too many fish are being taken from the oceans, there still is considerable potential for both processing and eating of fresh fish, for employment creation, for the processing of fishmeal, oil, and various seaweeds and for coastal tourism. If one considers that about 80 percent of goods by weight are transported by sea, that about 12 million people travel by sea, then, port infrastructure along one of the world’s most important shipping routes – around the Cape of Good Hope and along the East Coast of southern Africa - forms an integral part of the Blue Economy. States should, however, build capacity for protecting their marine resources.

- Democratizing globalization as a matter of politics. This requires, among other aspects, improving the prospects for unskilled workers, mitigating the impact of globalization on inequality; addressing the democratic deficits in International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). As a key political agency, the United Nations (UN), too, should be further democratized.

- Investing in water and energy security by means of mature technologies such as an Integrated Water and Power Plant (IWPP) technologies for the desalination of sea water and

---

7 The Blue Economy includes all economic activities in the ocean. These include: fisheries, marine mining, marine energy, maritime transport, marine and coastal tourism, and emerging areas such as marine biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and marine resources such as seaweed. Personally, I do not support any form of marine mining, inclusive of marine diamond and phosphate mining, on environmental grounds.
the generation of electricity, and locating these within the national and regional energy and water governance policy frameworks⁸ - alternative energy sources, such as solar, wind and wave energy, too, should be taken significantly more seriously by the leaders of the SADC member states.

- Supporting the largely under-developed potential of the creative economy through training, art fairs, and the marketing of art and craft regionally and globally.

- Significantly reducing trade tariffs through regional and continental integration, such as under the provisions of the *Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement* (AFCTA). Such reduction, however, would only be possible if intra-regional trade itself goes up meaningfully to around 40% of all foreign trade.

**The role of governing/ruling parties**

In addition to the normal roles of political parties, mentioned below in this contribution, governing/ruling parties have special responsibilities, for they organize and control government. Given the history of the region, they are also key political signifiers that link government to the electorate and the people/masses in special ways. This link, if not properly managed, however, can easily regress into unhealthy forms of triumphalism and sinister power. When this happens, the key signifiers ‘party’ and ‘masses’ become invested with a statist charge and the party becomes near synonymous with government and the state. This opens the path to nepotism, corruption and in more extreme cases, state capture. Worst, still, is that the original mobilization of the ‘masses’ in the name of justice and liberty end in a form of an opaque statist/party construction (Badiou, 2005, p. 70).

---

⁸ Such technologies, in use in various countries, can ensure water-energy -security and are built on Integrated Water and Power Plants (IWPP).
While elite formation is an inevitably part of party formations, political parties have a number of important functions in a society, chiefly:

- Goal formation – parties are key agencies for setting collective goals and, in some cases, ensure that they are carried out. Parties play this role because, in the process of seeking power, they formulate programmes of government (through conferences, conventions, meetings, election manifestos and so on) with a view to attracting popular support. Not only does this mean that parties are a major source of policy initiation, but it also encourages them to formulate coherent sets of policy options that give the electorate a choice among goals.

- Creating space for democratic reason, and an open, critical debate on ideology, based on the notion of the equality of the human person and recognizing the presence and validity of different voices and needs.

- Interest articulation and aggregation – in the process of developing collective goals, parties also help to articulate and aggregate the diversity of interests found in society. Parties, indeed, often emerge as vehicles through which the business sector, labour, religious, ethnic and other groups advance or defend their own interests.

- Organization of government – government is difficult to conceive in the absence of political parties. In the first place, parties help with the formation of governments, in parliamentary systems to the extent that it is possible to talk of ‘party government’. Parties also give governments a degree of stability and coherence, especially if the members of the government are drawn from a single party and are therefore united by common sympathies and attachments. Parties, furthermore, facilitate cooperation between the two major branches of government, the legislature and the executive.
Finally, parties provide in competitive systems at least, a meaningful source of opposition and criticism, both inside and outside of parliament. As well as broadening political debate and educating the electorate, this helps to ensure that government policy is more thoroughly scrutinized and therefore more likely to be workable.

Conclusions

Despite formidable obstacles to the creation of meaningful Democratic Developmental States (DDS) in Southern Africa and beyond, states driven by deliberative democracy, participatory planning, the building of a national consensus on development priorities and plans, social cohesion and inclusiveness and synergies between the state and civil society provided the latter is sustainable - it is not too late to embark upon such a project. The prevailing approach to the public policy process itself, however, should change to provide for important meta-policy elements and progression towards an ethical common. In all of this, governing/ruling parties have important roles to play, not least of all in organizing government, broadening political debate, developing ideas and educating the electorate.

References


Making the future: Towards Democratic Developmental States in Southern Africa, merging desirability and feasibility


In order to understand and begin to respond to the current, ongoing crises of social reproduction which have exacerbated the divides among and between humans across the differences of race, class, gender, age, ability, sexual orientation and sexual identity, as well as in terms of social location, we have to situate our analyses in the epistemic critiques and insights which the notions of neo-liberalism and precarity offer. By so doing, we hope to initiate the process of identifying new imaginaries and opportunities with which to craft alternative social formations. Both these notions lie at the heart of the challenges we face historically and in the current socio-political context.

This chapter will use ‘the binary’ of neo-liberalism versus precarity as a heuristic convenience so as to distinguish between what the ideology and practice of neo-liberalism means in terms of the multiple crises that the majority of African people face at the present time, and how the notion of precarity, when approached from a critical feminist perspective, offers important new insights and possibilities for the realization of an alternative socio-economic, political and ecological paradigm.

On the one side of the divide stand the ideas, interests and practices which underpin and drive the neoliberal project as a continuation of colonial capitalist plunder and accumulation, with all its attendant consequences for the human condition: the earth, nature and all living beings.
‘...[T]here is a wide-ranging field of concern, of political anxiety and endeavour, that focuses on the idea of a crisis in relation to nature, as a sustainable source of raw materials, as mere land for further capitalist (urban and agricultural) development, as well as a sink for an increasing stream of toxic waste.’

Neo-liberalism represents the continuation of class and race interests which inspire and sustain the claims and ideological rhetoric that capitalism is the ultimate and final stage of human progress, and that there is no alternative to the rapaciousness of profit making. In fact, the extraction of surplus from humans and from nature has been glorified as the most rational and logical practice in the human narrative to date:

Frankly, as long as we continue to view the planet as an endless ‘resource’, as long as we uphold the rights of individuals and corporations to amass infinite wealth while others go hungry, as long as we continue to believe that governments do not have the responsibility to feed, clothe, house and educate everyone – all our talk is mere posturing.

It is this fundamental obligation to initiate responsible policies and practices referred to by Roy, which those who occupy the State are required to honour, given that for centuries this instrument of power and resource management has been turned against the majority of human beings.

In the context of Africa and the other regions of the world which make up the majority South, this extractivist status quo should be anathema to the very identities of those who claim to govern on behalf of ‘the people’, and who formulate and implement socially consequential economic policies. Yet it is the very ‘heroes’ of yesteryear who have become indistinguishable replicas of the forces that captured and bound African bodies and territories as booty for

---

1 Olivier, 2020.
Nationalism has long been part of the corporate global project. The freer capital becomes, the harder national borders become. Colonialism needed to move large populations of people – slaves and indentured labour – to work in mines and on plantations. Now the new dispensation needs to keep people in place and move money – so the new formula is free capital, caged labour.3

The betrayal of the people: The South African context

Referring to the particular circumstances of ‘post-Apartheid’ South Africa, where the rhetoric of progressiveness was simultaneously sabotaged by pro-capitalist policies and practices at the moment of independence, Sagie Narsiah argues that the shift from the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) to the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR), marked a tragic historic betrayal of the people by their liberation organization, the African National Congress (ANC). The former (RDP) was touted as the ostensible policy instrument that would focus on redressing the disparities created by colonial Apartheid, and which would make inclusive what had been an extremely exclusionary racist capitalist system, designed to serve the interests and needs of an excessively privileged white minority. Instead, in the South African context of the 1990s, Sagie argued that:

The articulation of Neo-liberalism through development policy is being facilitated through a series of measures among which are fiscal austerity, export-oriented production and the privatization of public sector services. 4

This seemingly inexplicable ideological and policy shift which appeared to contradict all the claims by the ANC that it was a

3 Ibid.
4 Narsiah, 2002.
‘progressive people’s movement’, has long been treated by the Left as one of the markers of betrayal to the core principles of the Freedom Charter and the many declarations of People’s Power upon which the ANC rode on, in its ascension to state power in 1994.

As a consequence of this right-leaning ideological shift by the African National Congress and its alliance partners, including the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), despite continuing denials, such reactionary policies and practices have had devastating impacts on the lives and livelihoods of Black people in particular, across the social landscape of that society.

However, in a 2006 presentation, Stephen Gelb, a conservative economist, ‘rents the veil of duplicity’ when he argues that in actuality, the distinction which the South African Left makes between the RDP and GEAR is merely rhetorical. He claims that:

…[All the positions advanced in GEAR are to be found in the RDP…GEAR places the macroeconomic dimension at the center of policy as distinct from its position in the RDP, where it was almost an afterthought.  

He further insists that:

The policy (GEAR) encompassed most of the social objectives of the RDP but was also aimed at reducing fiscal deficits, lowering inflation, maintaining exchange rate stability, decreasing barriers to trade and liberalizing capital flows.

Gelb’s argument brings into focus an important feature of the neocolonial compromise through which people’s struggles for socio-economic and political justice were sacrificed in return for limited access to Africa’s financial and material wealth, the bulk of which remains in the hands of settler capitalists (in the cases of South Africa and Namibia) and under the control of Multinational Corporations continentally.


6 Ibid.
It is a common case of speaking with forked tongues. Everywhere, without exception, new Black elites sold the people ‘a bill of goods’ when they promised a better life for all as reward for having participated in the resistance to colonialism. Instead, they colluded with the colonials – through performances of ‘reconciliation’ and ‘negotiated settlements’ – so as to retain the economic infrastructures of capitalism.

Anyone who understands the prescience of Fanon and Cabral, who theorized and exposed the true character of the nationalist petty bourgeois, arguing that capitalism would not be dismantled at independence, but rather would be further entrenched by the new Black ruling classes, will be perplexed by the insistence of the African Left intellectuals and activists who knowingly perpetuate the fraud of critiquing liberation parties in particular, by calling out their retention of colonial infrastructures, even as they participate in neocolonial state and governmental policy making and implementation, including the re-entrenchment of feudal systems which have kept the working people (who are mainly women) at a distance from the very entitlements and rights that their kin gave their lives for. Many of those who declare themselves progressive and ‘anti-corruption’ – which is racial code for primitive accumulation – nonetheless accept positions within the state as cabinet members, directors of influential parastatals and other highly remunerative statuses. In effect, all political parties have become corporations, serving the basic economic class interests of those who occupy the state across the region and the continent.

---


8 See Fanon (1963), The Wretched of the Earth (especially the chapter on ‘The Pitfalls of National Consciousness’); Amilcar Cabral in Revolution in Guinea, speaking on the occasion of assassination of Kwame Nkrumah in Conakry shortly before his own assassination on 20 January, 1973, Cabral insisted that ‘…Nkrumah has been killed by the cancer of betrayal we should uproot’.
‘Experiences across the region (Southern Africa) show that if Governments are to deliver on their electoral promises, they must empower institutions, actively promote a culture of accountability and transparency within the party ranks and pursue economic reforms that untangle the web of party-state-business alliances. Such actions are critical for the survival of national liberation movements as the dominant force in the politics of Southern Africa – but will be difficult to implement.’

This call to transparency and accountability belies a general acceptance of capitalism as the default economic system of the continent and the world at large. The idea that capitalism has a moral or ethical code which if adhered to would result in flourishing, inclusive societies is both hypocritical and dishonest. The very essence of capitalism as a system of production, human exploitation and exchange/trade, is based on corruption and plunder.

‘From the first day of this, sheer greed was the driving spirit of civilization.’

Reiterating the critique of ANC political betrayal, and the new, obfuscating use of language to obscure economic intent, Prishani Naidoo argues that it is by focusing on the undoing of the language and content of ‘People’s Power’ and ‘Self Reliance’ at the very beginning of the Neo-colonial project, that the ANC was able to reinforce the World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS) – the most blatant anti-people policies enacted during the latter half of the 20th century across the societies of the Majority South.

These programs had been installed into the Apartheid economy during the early 1980s, as a means of systematically inserting the language and rhetoric of the ‘Market’ into that social arena, in order to facilitate the extension of privatization and the commercialization of basic services like access to water, housing, and electricity – what

9 Vandome (2019).

10 Marx & Engels, 2016: 1120.
Naidoo refers to as ‘the Social Common.’ The demand for these entitlements had inspired decades of resistance against Apartheid exclusions and led to the deaths of many working-class activists. The application of SAPS in the 1980s’ South Africa was also an anticipatory gesture towards the political and economic deals that the ANC would later make with imperialism and neoliberal capital.

In order to reverse the expectations of the people for better lives under the newly proclaimed democratic dispensation, the ANC launched a political program which translated the economic logic of neo-liberalism into normative state policy through a language and policy practice which insisted that paying for services was an expression of responsible citizenship.

More recently, the language of ‘privatization’ and ‘cost recovery’ have come to characterize the ANC government’s approach to the delivery of basic services. Under the regime of neo-liberalism, the social common fought for under apartheid has slowly begun to be eroded as water and electricity cut-offs and evictions have functioned as attacks on those life strategies that emerged under apartheid to hold the common in and through struggle.”

Liberation/Independence Parties continentally have colluded with capitalism

Everywhere on the African continent, where capitalism has been re-configured via the conservative language of ‘responsible governance and citizenship’ – African regimes are engaged in close cooperation with global capital to repress the social demands of the working people and to facilitate for the further plunder of ecological and mineral resources – fossil fuels being at the core of the Extractivist Enterprise.

There is a growing body of intellectual and activist critiques of the Extractivist economic model as it has been applied to the societies

11 Naidoo, 2005.
of the majority South, and to Africa in particular, that show the historical linkages between the colonial drive for minerals and other natural resources upon which the economies and prosperity of the West were founded and continue to rely, and the ecological, social, cultural and human degradation of peoples across the planet.

Moving from the theories of ‘manifest destiny’ and the ‘civilizing mission’ to modern day claims that countries which are resource rich are plagued by the so-called ‘resource curse’, the persistence of a racist, bigoted rhetoric continues to underpin extractivist practices.

‘The theory (of a resource curse)…downplays structural imbalances and ignores the adverse effects predatory capitalism has on resource-rich countries with export-oriented economies… It rests… on assumptions about ‘African greed’ and tropical fatalism…Africans are no more corrupt than others. In fact, there is no such thing as a ‘resource-curse’, only bankrupt choices.’

In explaining the historical and current dominance of extractivism as a fundamental capitalist/imperialist practice, radical intellectuals and activists argue that this practice of plunder is anchored in an economic model of extractivism which has become normative in all African societies:

The continent procures the world with bodies and brains, copper and cobalt, oil and gas, diamonds and gold, wood, fish, artefacts and cultural heritage…The foundations of this model were laid during colonialism, when imperial powers, through conquest and coercion, acquired sovereign prerogatives, from levying taxes and imposing customs…co-optation of a docile elite trained in colonial schools ensured continued loyalty to old colonial powers in lieu of real decolonization.

One of the key elements of Neo-colonial control over African resources is the elevation of finance capital to the status of absolute

12 Naing, 2019.
13 Ibid.
determinant of the economic and social destiny for every society. The globalization of capitalism in order to facilitate the ease with which financialized and speculative capital can move quickly across borders and extract the maximum profit especially from the economies of the South, is the modern signature of imperialism and western hegemony.

Notwithstanding extensive critiques by African intellectual during the past forty plus years, the ruse that FDIs are the panacea for development in Africa and across the economies of the Majority South has continued to function on behalf of globalized profit extraction. In the context of market dominance, this discourse has become a truism – ‘a proposition that states nothing beyond what is implied in any of its terms.’ ¹⁴ However, despite its obvious inappropriateness with regard to the declared intentions of African elites that they intend to create ‘inclusive developmental states’, virtually all the regimes on the continent have bought into the economic policy of ‘wooing’ capital through the mechanism of FDIs - an economic mechanism which originated in the moment of the dissolution of the Bretton Woods System.

According to Srinivasa – Roghavan (2004), the hype about FDI came about largely because of

...the US pumping dollars (into the global financial system) after it walked away from the Breton Woods system in 1971. These dollars have always needed investment destinations. It is this that has driven globalization, the demand for capital account convertibility and the liberalization of FDI rules. ¹⁵

This so-called free movement of capital also has profound implications for communities and nation-states in terms of the mobility of people as well as the ability of resistance movements to counter capitalist dominance and corruption.


‘The global phenomenon labelled Neo-liberalism has a discursive character. Essentially the separation between the owners of the means of production and their means of production occurs discursively through trade treaties and legislation policed and facilitated by organizations operating beyond the scale of the nation-state.’

Heralded as the triumphant moment of ‘Africa’s Rising’ – regimes are systematically working hand in hand with capitalist regimes like those of Brazil, China, Russia and India – to enable for the accumulation of wealth and power by African ruling classes, on the one hand, as well as by using newer forms of technological and military coercion, surveillance and dispossession to displace and disposes the working people of their ancestral lands, making Africa’s vast resources more readily accessible to globalized capital. Where the people resist and refuse ‘development’, these regimes flout all pretence to adhere to constitutional and human rights conventions and entitlements, isolating and often assassinating the leaders of communities, and unleashing state terror and destruction upon the people.

**African states deploy terror and repression against rebelling citizens as a matter of course**

The terror against working people is as ‘globalized’ as the mechanisms and policies of plunder and exploitation which regimes employ, as they intensify the concentration of wealth, violence and ecological destruction in fewer hands. The militarization of the police and the interfacing of excessively militarized forms of hyper-masculinity and impunity play out across all our societies, often receiving fleeting media attention as the makings of another disaster beckon in so-called hot-spots across the planet – fires, floods, droughts, massacres, mass rapes, genocide, ecocide, femicide – it is a seemingly endless

---

16 Narsiah, 2002.
drama of destruction and flagrant disregard of human dignity and life.

‘In terms of state repression, Marikana (in South Africa) remains the bloodiest stain on the accommodation between capital and the interests of the national bourgeoisies that has shaped the post-Apartheid order. But Marikana did not arrive like a thief in the night.’

The moment of COVID-19 has not only exacerbated the multiple crises that are fed by capitalist exploitation and greed, it has also amplified the rhetoric of Neoliberalist fraudulence which emphasizes the myth that everyone ‘can make it, if they work hard enough’, and that ‘the unemployed or unemployable’ present a threat to the security and stability of the system. This, given that under capitalism, keeping a certain percentage of adults who are capable of engaging in productive labour ‘unemployed’ is considered ‘normal’ and ‘rational’. In this regard, D.Wolff argues that besides providing capitalists with immense power over workers’ lives and their creative abilities,

‘The prospect of unemployment plagues workers and their families with anxieties. The experience of unemployment is associated with rising levels of depression, alcoholism, drug abuse, marital problems, child (and women) abuse, and other social ills. It is likewise associated with declining levels of worker self-esteem, job skills, personal savings, and physical and mental health.’

Therefore, COVID-19 has proven to be the instigator of a curious shift in the conventional conservative ideology which has driven the Neoliberal mantra that ‘government is bad’ and that ‘less government in the economy is best for the market’. Instead, with the huge layoffs of workers in the wake of the COVID-19 explosion everywhere, conservative ideologues have welcomed the

big handouts of government, often benefitting disproportionately from the bailouts and interest-free loans (and grants) which pro-capitalist regimes have dolled-out to their cronies, especially in the tech and financialized sectors. Instead of the stock in trade tirades corporations used to yell out at governments that directed taxes to support working communities and the retention of jobs pre-COVID-19 – as socialist leanings - one now hears of how important it is for the state to support businesses in ‘retaining jobs’ and in ‘saving the economy’. Everywhere, corporations and employers have raked in the bounty of the COVID-19 pandemic, wearing a smile.

In the context of Southern Africa, and South Africa in particular, where almost half the labour force has been retrenched and or outright fired from their jobs, the interface between COVID-19 and the ongoing socio-economic crises generated by the retention and reinforcement of capitalist inequalities and injustice, it has become clear that the very existence of humanity and its meanings and relevance to other life-forms, lies at the core of the ecological and political shifts occurring across the world.

“The pandemic is a humanitarian crisis and not a security crisis. The rounding up of the homeless and the eviction of people from informal settlements, the removal and relocation of refugees into camps is unacceptable. The harassment, beating and rape of township residents and informal settlement dwellers by police and the army must stop.”

US cities have been alight and alive with the chants and outrage of young people drawn from across class and racial divides, coalescing under the banner of the ‘Black Lives Matter’ movement throughout the summer of 2020. Besides being a response to the ever-increasing disparities between those who have too much, and those who have been jettisoned from the basic means of social and economic security (and who end up in the quagmires of debt and

destitution), the streets of US cities have been alight largely in response to the persistence of systems of incarceration and racist colonial impunity which were spawned by 400 years of slavery and genocide in that society. This latest expression of people’s power for rights and dignity in the wealthiest country on earth, and one of the most militarily belligerent imperialist bullies of our time, has finally resulted in the much-celebrated ejection of the racist authoritarian, Donald Trump, from the US presidency.

This Trump defeat will of course not necessarily change the national and foreign power trajectories of the USA as the biggest polluter and destroyer of nature and all sentient life forms, especially through its arms industry, whose products are the harbingers of violence and death, exported across the world, to support compliant dictators and or overthrow those which step out of line – (ala Muammar Gaddafi, 2011; Saddam Hussein, 2006)

The reinforcement of supremacist and repressive infrastructures which facilitate for capitalism and ‘globalisation’ will persist into the future, as African regimes continue to adopt the iniquitous practices which underpin so-called democratic governance in the post-colonial period.

‘..in South Africa…the violent state institutions germinated by the Apartheid era have been carried over since 1994 into the post-Apartheid South African state…the police kill people, the vast majority of them impoverished and black, at a per capita rate that is three times higher than that of the police in the US. The numbers are stunning, the range of violence shocking.’20

The people will always rise up against repression and oppression

Long-standing resistance to capitalism and a rejection of the daily lived humiliations and loss of dignity experienced by working people

20 Prashad, op. cit.
everywhere on the planet have formed the core of movements and alliances which reflect the breadth and depth of people’s rejection of the myth that capitalism will, eventually, provide for the needs of all humans. From the long traditions of organized labour to the movements and social clubs of women, native people and more recently LGBTIQ+ and people living with disability, those situated outside the largesse of capitalist wealth and material privilege have consistently challenged the myth of a caring and inclusive capitalist system.

‘The first lesson is that an ethical, non-exploitative and socially just capitalism that rebounds to the benefit of all is impossible (my emphasis). It contradicts the very nature of what capital is about.’

Therefore, despite the ferocious backlash by Black ruling elites, the wrath of the people, in particular, working class youth, has been erupting on the streets of their respective societies in rising numbers this past decade. From the inferno of self-immolation which took the life of 26 year old Mohamed Bouazizi, in central Tunisia in 2010, instigating the ‘Jasmine Revolution’, and quickly spreading across North Africa into a movement now known as the Arab Spring, to the raging mass protests by young people against decades of state repression and outright impunity by the Nigerian police and military forces, the working people of the continent and beyond are rising up against the decadence and contempt flouted by those who control the state and who exercise power on behalf of the odious rich. Algeria and Sudan being the latest African examples, where the masses of the people, mainly the youth took to the streets to demand regime change and where long-terms dictators were toppled from power.

In the context of African history and people’s struggles against colonial repression and plunder, the culmination of colonial capitalist social formations across the continent into neo-liberal

21 Olivier, op cit.
havens for globalized multinational capital, speaks to both the betrayal of trust on the part of the Black elites who ascended to the State at the moment of political compromise with the representatives of ‘western democracy’ – the heir to the ‘civilizing’ mission of European enlightenment – as well as to the centrality of Nationalism as an indispensable political facilitator for the emergence and consolidation of black ruling classes in neo-colonial African societies.

This distinctive feature of Nationalism as a ‘mid-wife’ of class access and enrichment is not unique to Africa. Across the world, during the past half millennium, Nationalism has served as an effective tool for the mobilization of working people against what were generally perceived and experienced as commonly shared grievances and exclusions, (of colonialism and racist genocide), whilst enabling the continuation of exploitative capitalist, racist policies and practices. This was and remains the core of white nationalist angst within the USA and across Western Europe. The immigrant bogey has worked exceptionally well in mobilizing especially poorly educated white male working class elements (in the US and the UK, and increasingly across the former Eastern Bloc), thus feeding the rise of racist anger and contempt for ‘the Other’, which remains at the very heart of darkness of the European ‘civilizing mission’ four hundred years on.

Socialist governments in Eastern Europe also fell to the demands and claims by their citizens for more inclusive and more fairly distributive social systems than those that had been imagined or implemented by the Communist and Socialist Parties of the early 20th century.

To repeat Roy’s important conceptual insight that I referred to above:

Nationalism has long been part of the corporate global project. The freer global capital becomes, the harder national borders become. Colonialism needs to move large populations of people – slaves and indentured labour – to work in mines and on plantations. Now the new dispensation needs to keep people in
place and move money – so the new formula is free capital, caged labour.  

This contradiction, which reflects the mutations and re-configurations of capitalist extractive strategies and the re-negotiated alliances that the owners of capital enter into with newly emerging ruling classes across the societies of the Majority South in particular, forms the bedrock of the nexus of struggles and new visions which have arisen to counter capitalist hegemony. Out of the refusal to relinquish the dreams and sacrifices that people made by participating in anti-colonial liberation struggles, and from their insistence that the new dispensation must be inclusive of all persons within every society, the notion of PRECARITY, which originates in the earliest anti-capitalist theorizations of workers’ resistance to exploitation, has taken on deeply radical and feminist inspired meanings in terms of its conceptual and activist relevance.

Re-defining Precarity beyond liberal appropriations

As we enter into the third decade of the 21st century, the notion of Precarity has re-surfed in various discursive sites, ranging from within the United Nations and other humanitarian and philanthropic institutions, which are using the notion in a reactionary and neoliberal sense, to new and vibrant young feminist debates and conversations in the academy and within feminist movements worldwide, which reflect a moment of shift in the meanings and applications of feminism as a political life-style and lode-star for alternative social formations.

The conventional definition of Precarity in the Oxford Dictionary is:

…a precarious existence, lacking in predictability, job security, material or psychological welfare.  


According to Sharryn Kasmir, while precarity refers to the fact that much of the world’s population lacks stable work and steady incomes,

...Precarity is a multi-stranded concept, associated with a set of terms, including precarious, precariousness, precarization, and ‘the precariat’, that make an historical argument about capitalism, pronounce shifts in class relations, and predict novel social movements and political struggles. These concepts underscore that temporary and informal work, in its myriad manifestations, is the predominant mode of livelihood in the late-twentieth to early-twenty first centuries.24

Kasmir’s definition provides an unusually broad and comprehensive scope of the more current understandings of the notion of precarity. However, it lacks deep radical feminist insights into the interfaces between labour (as an exploited, gendered phenomenon in both the formal and domestic arenas) and capitalism (as a mode of production which constantly reorganizes work and class in the interests of the owners of production and of power).

Precarious work “...is a central concept in movement discussions of capitalist reorganization of work and class relations in today’s global economy.”25

And, the feminist movement must recognize that reproductive labour (care-work) is a hidden content of work and struggle. Federici insists that feminists must recognize this as an essential political task which opens up new possibilities for a re-imagination of our future worlds and our search for alternatives to capitalist society.

The notion of precarity, which is deeply embedded in the relations of production of surplus and the extraction of value from the working class, is core to the established philosophical and theoretical tradi-


tions of the Left, particularly in Europe. There exists a vibrant critical tradition of resistance to the ways in which capitalism institutionalizes the exploitation of waged labour and constructs the existence of workers as encompassing (without remuneration) the domestic social unit (family) and the community within which they live.

Thus, labour includes the unpaid, unvalorized and unrecognized work and creativity of those who share the lives of workers – women, wives, children and the elderly. In certain capitalist industries, such as agriculture, this stretching of the concept to labour is expressed in the treatment of women and children as extensions of the cheap reservoir of labour employed by commodity producing capitalists – in southern Africa, these were and still are mainly white setter farmers.  

Communities of radical feminist intellectuals and activists, initially within the Italian context, have been insisting that precarity means much more than the conflation of women, families and communities of working people into exploitative systems. They are extending existing discourses around 'the labour reservoir', 'unemployment and vulnerability' by gendering the discourse on labour relations within Trade Unions, and by drawing direct links between the rhetoric of neoliberalism and the perpetuation of capitalist exploitative discourses and systems.

**New expressions of the notion of Precarity as a contemporary radical feminist resource**

Contemporary radical feminist applications of the notion are unambiguously making a direct connection between the entrenchment of capitalism as 'globalised production and extraction', on the one hand, and the re-emergence of the notion of *precarity* as a cutting-edge contemporary feminist critical thinking tool. This conceptual awakening is manifesting in a theoretical

and activist shift within feminism and feminist movements within the academy as well as in the context of radical alliances between workers organizations, student formations and established feminist organizations.

In a fascinating critique of the new language of neoliberal humanitarianism, Joanna Fox interrogates the concept of vulnerability and what she calls the ‘vulnerability discourse’, which she argues, is used “…in neoliberal times to describe a conceptual shift from the state as guarantor of rights to protector of private property.”

She gestures towards Gramsci’s notion of the ‘integral state’ to support her argument that the vulnerability discourse obscures the innovative ways that the State and Capital collude to consolidate class power, by blocking and or making unexplorable …”the correlation between the subjects’ vulnerability and the structures of capital that continue to produce unmet needs.”

By making ‘natural and inevitable’ the excluded existences of working people and the social reproductive crises that face women in particular, the construction of disposed people as ‘vulnerable’ and therefore in need of help – rather than being entitled to rights and lives of dignity rights and entitlement – both liberals and reactionaries can perpetuate their political and economic agendas in a normative climate.

Robin Zheng provides a brilliant intersectional feminist critique of the nexus of neoliberalism and Precarity within the US academy in particular, through an interrogation of gender and race. By exploding two myths (meritocracy and work as its own reward) which uphold the claim that the academy is a neutral space for the acquisition and production of inclusive knowledge, Zheng goes to the heart of what

27 Fax, 2012.

28 Ibid.
drives neoliberal rhetoric and the policies that sustain in.

‘Precarity is the effect of decades of neoliberalism…on the one hand, a set of economic policies (for example the privatization of public services, deregulation of markets and labour, austerity measures) reviving certain tenets of classical laissez-faire liberalism, and on the other, a cultural and moral ethos of so-called ‘personal responsibility’ in which society is seen as no more than an assortment of individuals who (ought to) gain the rewards and bear the costs of only their own and not others’ actions.’

Insisting that precarity is an injustice that is manifested most dramatically in the casualization of labour, particularly raced and gendered labour, she calls for feminist philosophies which organize against the casualization of academic work.

‘…casualization is caused by the ascendance of global neoliberalism and the subsequent corporatization of the university.’

An issue which has not yet received adequate feminist attention is the ways in which precarity in the academy intersects both with gender, race and radical politics. While it is indisputable that Black women intellectuals experience the worst forms of exclusion within the academy worldwide, it is the uses of precarity as exclusion which generates the anxiety of having to engage in a seemingly never-ending struggle against erasure, humiliation, contempt, and the denigration of one’s work, which pushes many feminists into the shadows of knowledge production, especially in departments that are dominated by white males.

Across the South African academy, for example, Black women have largely become muted subjects, tiptoeing around the most difficult

31 Magubane, 2004 and see also Khunou et al., 2019.
issues of white privilege and the priorities which continue to be extended to white women as ‘preferred others’ within that system. This intimidation has created a situation, similar to that of the USA, where radical Black feminists rarely find a safe and celebratory spaced within the academe to speak the necessary truths regarding supremacy, misogyny and impunity. Generally, Black women adopt moderate stances and use acceptable language which does not frighten the keepers of power in higher education. The result has been a weakening of feminist radical thinking and theorizing, and the haphazard emergence of strong young feminist ideas and voices.

The fear of being unable to sustain oneself; of being without that pension at the end of a professional career in the university, and or the ejection and ridicule which accompanies the backlash against radical ideas and ways of teaching and disseminating critical alternative knowledge, is the stick that the paragons of conservatism and nationalist reactionary ideology hold against radical thinking women. Life for such women – who do not know their place – becomes precarious. Thus far it has been very effective, and the absence of a dynamic and courageous feminist movement on the continent speaks volumes to this reality.

Through a deepening of the notion of precarity, feminists are also reviving crucial feminist debates relating to issues of reproductive labour, the self-reproduction of radical feminist politics in sustaining and enhancing ways; and the unresolved imperatives of sexual, racial, and generational hierarchies which are built upon the wage. 32

Additionally, in revisiting precarity from a feminist perspective, radical feminists and activists are opening up the discursive spaces within which younger feminists can express and articulate their experiences of life, and share their visions for a different future.

32 Federici, op. cit.
In a ground-breaking Special Issue of Feminist Review, published in 2007, feminists located within the Italian academy, in movements that were resisting right-wing racist backlashes against women’s reproductive entitlements and against immigrant women; and young feminists who were devising new strategies to make ‘their’ precarious lives more sustainable. At the centre of these initiatives is the struggle against the exploitation of labour and women’s domestic and personal struggles against exploitation in the domestic arena.

For Laura Fantone, the notion of precarity is linked with the issue of ‘generational exchange’ in Italian feminism, because “… precariouslyness is a constitutive aspect of many young women’s lives and precariousness is a life condition, not just the effect of job market flexibility and not solely negative.”

The re-interpretation of precarity as an opportunity for imagining new ways and strategies of resisting and living within a neoliberal context (Italy), provides a fascinating glimpse into the resistance resources that are possible when feminists engage with the moment of exclusion and repression in productive ways in order to find the pathways to an alternative society. This is what feminism is distinctively about – the crafting of alternatives to patriarchy and capitalist supremacy – through an engagement with the agencies that women bring to sites of struggle.

‘Female precariousness can be seen as a fruitful starting point for a dialogue across differences, addressing gender and reproduction, immigration, work and social welfare at the same time.’

On 8th March, 2018, Chilean feminists rallied as a coalition under the slogan ‘Against the Precaritization of Life’ in response to the negative impacts of neoliberalism and the pervasive threats posed by patriarchal violence in the lives of Chilean women.

__________

33 Fantone, 2007.

34 Ibid.
At the level of the university, young women in particular faced ongoing misogynistic violence, sexual harassment was rife and the university looked aside. The state did not respond either to the demands of the young women for protection and an effective program against sexual violation. Amongst the demands students were making, were calls for a non-sexist education; the acceptance of trans-gender and queer students; and an educational experience which was free from harassment on campuses. University students were soon joined by high school students and the feminist movement, which created a platform of solidarity that brought together radical women and working people in a resistance to neoliberalism and precaritization.

‘This strategy arose from an understanding of how precarity itself was the primary condition impeding women’s participation in traditional methods of resistance. Information workers had no unions, homemakers and caregivers received no wages and migrants risked legal consequences if they walked off the job. Therefore, the fight against precarity would also be a fight to create the conditions in which these marginalized workers could self-organise and build power.’

The Chilean experience of feminist movements creating coalitions with young feminist/student movements, migrants, care-givers and other groups of ‘casualized’ workers, created a consciousness among feminists of the critical need to build new movements – transversal feminist movements that would not only be able to resist the right-wing backlash (which is always to be expected), but also to revitalize ongoing struggles for reproductive and sexual rights, and the right to lives of dignity, free from patriarchal violence.

The Chilean example speaks to the urgent imperative of finding new strategies and imaginaries which will facilitate for the revival and renewal of feminism as a resistance politics and a solidarity platform against capitalism, racist supremacy and patriarchal impunity, in the moment of neoliberal hegemony across the world.

35 Buck, 2019.
For feminists on the African continent and in the wider Diaspora, whose politics has been deeply inflected by anti-colonial Nationalism and by the desire to be included in ‘Nations/Nation-states’ as places of belonging and affirmation as citizens, this exciting conceptual revival of a significant radical concept should be embraced as an opportunity to introspect on the meanings of our feminism, and on how we can bring its radical conceptual edge to the project of crafting the alternative to capitalism and neocolonialism.

A radical feminist understanding of how both neoliberalism and precarity interface to create and perpetuate the systems of exploitation and exclusion which are denying the majority of humans the most basic entitlements as persons and as citizens, will enable the envisioning and crafting of new possibilities for an effective response to ecological destruction, misogynistic violence and other forms of impunity and patriarchal supremacy, and for the renewal of feminist politics as a resilient foundation in building alternative social formations.

References


Introduction

The ruling parties in Southern Africa reached their high watermark in popularity in the transitional elections to independent statehood. Not only were electoral participation levels unprecedented, their legitimacy as popular liberation or nationalist movements was generally high. These movements ranged from TANU that ushered in independence in Tanzania in 1962 to Frelimo in Mozambique in 1975, from Zanu-PF in Zimbabwe in 1980 to the ANC in South Africa in 1994, amongst others. It was not an exaggeration by some analysts to characterize these epochal processes as spanning thirty years of liberation struggles and fraternal solidarity in the region (Southall, 2013: 29-43; Ranger, 2003).

Some 60 years since the commencement of those struggles and solidarity, it is timely to reflect on the relationship between those political transitions and development challenges in the region. Despite gaining state power, the ruling parties have largely found development to be elusive. In most instances, economic development has been slow at best making economic independence difficult to achieve. Why have political transitions not been accompanied by development transitions in the form of sustainable growth, industrialization and social equity? How do we explain the persistence of the triple challenges of unemployment, poverty and inequality? This chapter is a preliminary modest attempt to explore these questions with reference to Southern Africa.
Context of the Transitions

The chapter observes that the composition and outlook of the social forces during the transitions were a major factor in the political choices that were made at independence. By and large, the main liberation/nationalist movements that rallied those social forces for democratic transition were ideologically ‘broad churches’ that drew from various memberships ranging from ‘nationalists’ to ‘socialists.’ They made vague commitments to a ‘national democratic revolution’ as a key stage towards a ‘socialist revolution’in those countries where liberation movements subscribed to Marxism-Leninism. Similarly, there was ambiguity about what development strategy would be adopted apart from some references to ‘mixed economy’ in some states, and ‘socialism’ in others. It is important to bear in mind that the wider context of these transitions and ideological choices was the Cold War during the 1960s to 1980s. The Cold War consisted of ideological contest between the West and East, between capitalist and socialist orders, and the ruling parties in Southern Africa could not remain unaffected by it. The legacies of ideological ambiguities and indecision over development strategy have continued to haunt ruling parties in Southern Africa. Yet there had been early warnings about the consequences of such vagueness and indecision from key intellectual-practitioners in the 1960s. Let us recall the acute observations about the tendencies of the ‘middle class’ that inherited state power at independence. Writing presciently, Frantz Fanon, a participant in the Algerian liberation struggle observed that:

the national middle class which takes over power at the end of colonial regime is an underdeveloped middle class. It has practically no economic power…Neither financiers nor industrial magnates are to be found within this middle class…The psychology of the national bourgeoisie is that of businessman, not captain of industry (Fanon, 1963: 149).

Fanon saw the character and orientation of the class that inherited state power as a weakness and hindrance to development and transformation. The new ruling elite experienced a poverty of ideas
and strategies of development. The ruling parties were not clearer in their development visions. Instead of providing leadership on a realistic agenda of development, the elite and parties stuck to vague formulas. Fanon concluded in prophetic terms thus:

A bourgeoisie that provides nationalism alone as food for the masses fails in its mission and get caught up in a whole series of mishaps. If nationalism is not enriched and deepened by a rapid transformation into consciousness of social and political needs... it leads up a blind alley... (ibid, p.204).

In other words, ideology on its own was not enough. ‘Nationalism’ and ‘socialism’ as ideological categories were not substitutes for pragmatic national development policies that were inclusive in their conception and scope.

The contribution of Amilcar Cabral of Guinea was illuminating in this respect. He argued for some originality of approach in the thinking and practice of development. He pressed for a deeper understanding of the “internal contradictions in the economic, social, cultural (and therefore historical) reality of each of our countries...since any national or social revolution which is not based on knowledge of this fundamental reality runs the grave risk of being condemned to failure” (Cabral, 1966). This was a result of what he termed the ‘ideological deficiency’ within the liberation movements that was due to ignorance of the historic socio-economic realities that they sought to transform. He argued that, objectively speaking, the goal of national liberation was ‘to free the process of development of national productive forces.’ How to formulate a realistic national development strategy was therefore one of the biggest tests for the party that inherited state power.

**Contemporary Development Context**

The relatively slow pace of development in the region needs to be explained in relation to the ideological outlook of the ruling parties, but more importantly to the constellation of classes that
existed at the transition to independence and afterwards. First, the
democratic transitions necessarily involved political settlements
that required compromise with the colonial and apartheid regimes.
The settlements were constructed around a mutual acceptance by
the major contending forces of a mix of democracy and capitalist
economics (Southall, 2013: 65). Even in the ex-Portuguese colonies
of Angola and Mozambique, resort to mixed economy followed
after a decade of flirtation with socialist-oriented economic policies.

The overall consequence of the compromises was to leave the
economic order more or less intact with large foreign capital in
major control and ownership of the economies. Although the
ruling parties wielded state power, they failed to translate that
into economic power that would have uplifted the majority of
their peoples. The middle class and nascent bourgeoisie faced the
challenge of formulating a national development project that would
prioritize the eradication of ‘poverty, ignorance and disease’. But
most ruling parties fumbled in developing strategies that nurtured
a national bourgeoisie that would gradually take over sectors such
as agriculture, mining, manufacturing, services and distribution,
amongst others.

Some 40 years or so later, development coalitions based on a national
bourgeoisie were still absent or weak except in one or two countries in
the region (for example, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia). Yet
there had been some thinking before the transition to independence
about elements of what could constitute a ‘national democratic
revolution’ (NDR). Its thrust was that because capitalism had left
the colonies in a state of backwardness, the forces of production
should be developed with a national bourgeoisie encouraged to
spearhead a process of national capitalist development (Southall,
op. cit).

Instead, there were mutual suspicions between ruling parties and
business, including local entrepreneurs. Instances of hostility between
ruling parties and national bourgeoisie hampered cooperation
in the formulation and implementation of national development strategies. A mindset lingered that viewed the national bourgeoisie as a self-seeking and exploitative class. As a consequence, a priority in economic policy was to seek foreign capital as the main catalyst of national development. How to make local investment conditions more attractive to foreign capital was a greater concern than how to nurture a national bourgeoisie.

Consequently, development strategies have not been premised in forging a compact between the ruling parties, state, business and other social classes. This has resulted in inability to harness these forces for a broad project of national development. Instead, tensions persist between the national bourgeoisie and the state, between the working class and both state and bourgeoisie, while small producers continue to be marginalized. Human resource development and industrial policies are often not in sync. National development plans are often not the result of consultative processes, and hence their implementation is often problematic. Yet genuine development strategies would require the placement of small, medium and large capital at the centre of such plans. Investment into small, medium and large enterprises is vital for growth and development. Few ruling parties pursue development strategies and visions that systematically mobilize these social forces.

Political and Ideological Drivers

Despite a gradual decline in their electoral support during the past 10 to 15 years, the ruling parties still draw upon considerable reservoirs of support especially in rural areas of Southern Africa. However, urban centres have proved to be more difficult zones to mobilize and retain support due to alienation of working and middle classes partly for reasons outlined above. Indeed, most opposition movements have gained relatively more support from such urbanized groups largely because of the weaknesses of ruling parties in catering to the material interests and expectations of those groups.
Nevertheless, a glance at some of the election manifestos of ruling parties shows their continued ideological resonance. For instance, it was spelt out that:

Zanu PF’s vision for Zimbabwe is to create an inclusive, peaceful and unified modern state with a fast-growing economy in which wealth and prosperity are equitably shared among all citizens such that no one is left behind… (Zanu PF, 2018).

The party added that it sought broad-based development and economic emancipation of the people; and pledged that by 2030, Zimbabwe would be an upper middle-income economy administered by an accountable, professional and efficient administration (ibid.).

For its part, the ANC in South Africa asserted that the Freedom Charter was the ‘living soul’ of the country’s Constitution and foundation of Vision 2030 of the National Development Plan (ANC, 2019: 6). Some of the major promises contained in its 2019 Manifesto included:

Transforming the economy to serve all people; stepping up the fight against corruption throughout society; rebuilding and renewing a capable and development state; advancing nation-building and social cohesion and putting an end to state capture and restoring integrity of public institutions (ANC, 2019).

A common thread in these party manifestos is an admission of a delayed transformation of the economy and society. This applies not only to South Africa and Zimbabwe but most other countries in the region.

For instance, in its 2014 manifesto, SWAPO began by observing that the inherited socio-economic deficit in Namibia had resulted in the country having one of the highest imbalances in income distribution in the region (SWAPO, 2014). The urgent need for land reform and access to natural resources to improve living standards and conditions of Namibians was pressing. To demonstrate its commitment to socio-economic transformation, Namibia had also carved Vision 2030 and National Development Plans.
By their nature, party manifestoes are an optimistic and attractive set of promises that are often not fulfilled. However, they also inadvertently advertise areas where parties have failed to reach their goals before. Such areas include economic transformation and reduction of poverty and inequality. However, increasingly, economic transformation was approached as a policy issue designed by bureaucrats and technocrats in the state. This was in consultation with international financial institutions (IFIs), whose role in providing development advice has grown over the years. Political mobilization specifically for development seems to have been absent in the programmes of most parties. The political will for major campaigns against corruption and ‘state capture’ has also been generally weak in most ruling parties.

Globalization and dominance of neo-liberal economic policies leave ruling parties and their states in a relatively weak position. Their autonomy in setting the development agenda is consequently much more limited. At the same time, their political base is not broad and all-embracing enough to permit the necessary social compact between key social forces.

Just as the world has been changing in economic and social terms in the past 30 years, so liberation movements and ruling parties have also adapted to shifts in ideology. The collapse of socialist regimes at the end of the 1980s had a profound impact on Southern African movements. Their discourse shifted from Marxism-Leninism and one-party state system to democratization and embrace of neo-liberal economic policies in varying degrees. Some social groups have taken advantage of their control or proximity to the state to amass not only power but also considerable wealth. [Policies of economic empowerment, such as localizing the economy, indigenization, land reform and Black economic empowerment, all aimed at rationalizing elite’s access to wealth]. Thus, shifts in ideology and policies have occurred both because of internal dynamics and external developments. The economies and politics of the region cannot therefore be explored without regard to global developments.
Nevertheless, several ideological strands that still have resonance can be identified. First, nationalism remains a potent factor in the politics and identity of these countries. The ruling parties still draw a large part of their base from manipulating nationalism; their pledge to guard jealously the sovereignty and integrity of their countries. Equally important, is the role still played by nationalism in addressing the unfinished business of ‘nation-building’. Challenges remain of addressing the concerns of groups, minorities and regions that feel that they have been marginalized in the new states. The challenges constitute a ‘national question’ that has sometimes exploded into civil conflicts in the region. For many more years to come, ‘national unity’ will continue to be a major agenda.

Second, another ideological strand that lurks in the region is populism. Sometimes related to nationalism, populism is deployed by some parties to increase their support especially during election campaigns. With appeals directed to marginalized groups, the unemployed and the poor, the radical rhetoric of these political parties promises swift transformation and redistribution. While the promises would be unrealistic, the demagogy (like that of Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in South Africa) may find resonance amongst those groups that feel abandoned by ruling parties and their state. At the same time, some leaders in ruling parties may find it strategic to assert populist visions to retain support that had begun to wane. Arguably, Robert Mugabe and Jacob Zuma during their tenures sounded more and more populist as their support base weakened.

Third, developmentalism, for lack of a better term, has become increasingly fashionable in recent years. It is an ideology that stresses a pivotal role of the state as a central actor in the development process. The pillars of this ideology are a ‘developmental state’ that harnesses the state bureaucracy (largely economic and trade ministries) and organized business groups (mainly chambers of industry, trade and farming) to implement policies that stimulate growth, competitiveness and export orientation. Drawing from the
shining example of rapid growth in East Asia including China, most ruling parties have paid homage to this authoritarian development model. It is doubtful, however, if this model can be a panacea for ruling parties. The influence of developmentalism can be gauged in the pledge of many ruling parties to set up ‘developmental, democratic states’ (DDS). By and large, however, this is a top-down development strategy that requires some compact between the state, organized business and labour.

Finally, issues of gender and generational concerns as well as those of environment and climate change impinge on the ideological outlook of the ruling parties. The interests of youth and women loom large in mobilization strategies of ruling parties. Whether the parties have sufficiently addressed these concerns varies from country to country. Most ruling parties do not appear to have quickly and nimbly addressed youth and women interests, hence the continued debates about levels of representation within the parties. Generally, there appears to be an ideological vacuum around these issues of gender, and generational issues, and environmental and ecological concerns, and more generally inequality and social justice issues. [How are ruling parties reacting to debates around SADC 30% and AU 50% representation in decision-making positions? What is the internal debate on these issues, what explains the success of Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa in surpassing the SADC and AU benchmarks on women representation?]

Towards a new accumulation model?

This chapter has shown the ideological evolution of ruling parties from the ‘socialist’ orientation during the heydays of liberation struggle to pragmatic ideology that underpinned ‘mixed economy’ development strategies following the independence and democratic transitions. It was observed that the political settlements that provided foundations to the transitions were compromised with prior colonial or apartheid regimes. Although the parties achieved their goal of state power, they remained weak and hamstrung in the
economic sector. With a few exceptions, the old order and inequalities largely remained undisturbed in most countries. Development was generally slow, sparking frustration and disillusionment with ruling parties. This explains the gradual decline in support for the ruling parties, and cynicism about their capacity to achieve transformation. As an analyst observed, ruling parties:

...espoused ideologies that prioritized ‘the capture of the state’ as the means to transform societies structurally skewed by settler colonialism in favour of white privilege, power and wealth... Notwithstanding their commitment to transformation, the transitional settlements combined with the ideological shift to induce them to implement strategies that placed severe limitations upon the ability of governments to overcome the structural inequalities of the past and planted seeds for the subsequent crisis... (Southall, 2013:33).

The crisis that faces ruling parties and the states that they preside over has origins in that transition. It required some originality on the part of ruling parties to navigate around the structures, including inherited inequalities that blocked broad development. There was no systematic approach to setting up national democratic structures that explored innovative approaches to development.

The class analytical approach articulated above by Fanon and Cabral explains why the class that inherited the state accommodated itself to positions of power and wealth, to privilege and accumulation advantages. It shows why the middle class exploited its proximity to the state to avail itself of opportunities for wealth and corruption. The ruling class did not give priority to a national compact involving other classes and groups to underpin a new model of accumulation.

What could have been the elements of that pragmatic model of accumulation? It could have been based on a sharp reading of the enclave character of most economies in the region, and the need to reorient their structure to favour small producers, a nascent national bourgeoisie, the informal operators and workers. A system of deliberate policies (including affirmative action) and incentives
would have been applied to nurture small and medium scale producers across economic sectors. A targeted development of a national bourgeoisie that worked in sync with the state bureaucracy should have been pursued. There should have been a special attention paid to Cabral’s admonition that:

...national liberation and development are the outcome of local and national elaboration, more or less influenced by external factors (favourable or unfavourable) but essentially determined and found by the historical reality of each people… (Cabral, op. cit).

Similarly, development strategy should have proceeded from existent realities of a majority of small farmers and crafts-makers (the majority of the population in most countries) and enabled their participation in a Green Revolution to raise production and productivity, and feed into small and medium scale industries. Encouraging local investment by domestic capital rather than fixation on foreign capital could have been more vigorous. A more innovative approach to nurturing the informal economy into a dynamic sector should have been attempted. Deliberate policies including affirmative action to reduce inequalities should also have been attempted from the outset during the transition.

Pursuing transformation decades after a new ruling class has accumulated wealth and power will be much more difficult. Creating an alliance of social forces for this project will be a formidable task. Yet ruling parties cannot shirk from a responsibility that was first enunciated by their founding fathers and mothers.

There will necessarily be trade-offs between various social groups and classes through processes of ‘national dialogue’; and there would be negotiations with foreign capital on terms of their participation in the development process. A different mindset would be needed to shift away from dependence on natural resources to industrialization. Copycat approaches would ultimately not work if they do not adapt to the concrete realities in the region. Just as formidable an
enterprise would be combining the processes of development and democracy in an era of globalization and rising authoritarianism.

**Discussion on Way Forward**

The issues raised in the preceding sections were subjected to intense discussion during a workshop session in Maputo in May 2019. Thematically, the issues related to ideological clarity within parties; the role of leadership in articulating ideology; and the symbiotic relationship between ruling party and state bureaucrats. In addition, the role of Party Schools in contributing to inculcation of ideology, national ethos, as well as development vision was highlighted.

**Parties and ideological clarity**

Parties were pre-eminent drivers of ideology, a role that they had historically played from liberation era struggles to the present. The ideologies formulated and articulated in different national contexts ranged from nationalism (as a unifying creed) to socialism (as a radical mobilizing tool) to humanism (as a nation-building ethos) to populism and neo-liberalism in the current era as a response to economic stagnation, migration and international pressures. While some of these ideologies were resonant during nationalist and liberation struggles, others have weakened their role in the present era.

There were temptations for parties to ‘pick and paste’ ideologies instead of defining and adopting them in original ways to their specific national contexts. Ideologies need to reflect national realities and regional priorities. There should be periodic intra-party dialogue on ideology in which all strata (including women and youth) of a party should be actively involved. The ideological basis of party policies and state policies should be debated extensively. Ideology should serve as compass to party orientation and policy positions. Parties should be defenders of ethical values, standards and their respective ideology.
Leadership and Ideology

If it is accepted that ideology serves as compass and vision of a party, its leadership should be deeply conversant and knowledgeable about it. Ideology should serve as an asset to leaders in their role in pursuing the vision of the party and national development (as in the various Vision 2030s). Ideology should enable an insightful interpretation of that vision for the present as well as for the future.

The collective vision as articulated by party leaders should be spelt out clearly in such instruments as party manifestoes and other key party publications. However, it is necessary and important to simplify a particular ideology so that everyone would understand it, and see its relevance for society. It was particularly imperative for the party leadership to demonstrate their commitment to transparency and accountability so as to lead by example.

Party, State bureaucrats and national development plans (NDPs)

The relationship between parties and state institutions like the bureaucracy is a symbiotic one. This is particularly striking in those countries that underwent liberation struggle. In these countries, the relationship between party and state is very close, making the distinction between them difficult. Some view the relationship as an organic one. From that perspective, policies are conceived by the party and implemented by the state. Parties are thus drivers of ideology as well as policies; their personnel drive the state institutions and policies.

However, while the symbiotic relationship between state and party contains some advantages, it can also have some disadvantages. Accountability to both party and state can be problematic to serving officers and leaders. There is a temptation for party officials to draw power and wealth from state institutions for individual advancement in a situation of ‘state capture’. 
While party officials should closely work with state officials especially in development matters (as in formulation and execution of national development plans (NDPs), their division of responsibilities should be clear enough so as to avoid possible conflict of interest. Parties should encourage various levels in the party to participate in the formulation and monitoring of local development plans (LDPs).

**Mental liberation, national ethos and Party Schools**

The present era is one of globalization, neo-liberalism and growing ambiguity over ‘ideology’. In some quarters, ideology is viewed as anachronistic. This is despite the fact that neo-liberalism and globalization are motivated by ideology. There is therefore necessity to revive teaching on Ideology in Party schools. In addition to teaching on the party’s ideology, there is need to familiarize participants with other prevailing ideologies. The approach should not be to treat ideology as a formula, but as a living and innovative socio-economic and political vision.

Teaching on ideology should be accompanied by attention to the national ethos of a particular country. The national Constitution defines the broad national ethos, and that should be the starting point. In sum, an elucidation of ideology and national ethos considers each country’s specific history and cultures. An innovative teaching programme on these themes will contribute to a process of mental liberation and decolonization in a broad sense.

The learning tools in the Party should increase participants’ knowledge about socio-economic policies and NDPs. Technical competence in these specialized fields should also be sharpened. Finally, exchanges of curricula and experiences should be encouraged between Party schools in sister states. Workshops or panels on their comparative experiences would be invaluable to participating parties.
Ruling Parties, Opposition Movements and Civil Society

Ruling parties do not exist in isolation from other political and social forces in a particular society. They cannot insulate themselves from them. They should encourage new blood and new ideas to infuse their ranks and outlook. Opposition movements and parties can provide competing ideas and ideologies as well as perspectives about development and politics. These sometimes provide fertile ground from which to borrow ideas and solutions. The same can be stated about civil society, especially those engaged in development and governance issues. A mindset change is needed to move from one that views opposition parties, movements and civil society as ‘enemies’ of development, stability and ruling party.

This is why, in some countries, inter-party dialogue is viewed as a healthy process that contributes to democratic governance and inclusive development. Each country will need to define its own terms of reference to provide a framework for its own inter-party or national dialogue. In these processes, ruling parties can draw upon resources such as academic experts and think tanks to sharpen their development thinking, planning and evaluation.

References


Part Three:

Drivers for an independent, progressive and inclusive future
Driving socio-economic development and transformation in Southern Africa: Stimulating the Industrial and Economic Anchors

Oliver Maponga

Introduction

From neoclassical economic theory, economic transformation, through production and a rise in productivity, derives from the combination of land, labour, and capital (including technology). The availability of land anchors all land-based productive activities, including agriculture, mining, forestry, animal husbandry and tourism. Labour provides the skills which combine with technology and capital for transformation and financial capital resources that oil investment. For Southern Africa, the natural resources-based sector, mainly agriculture, mining and tourism, are key drivers of socio-economic transformation and development. The region’s comparative advantage lies in the natural resource endowments in land as well as the embedded potential. For example, the region hosts the world’s largest resources of platinum group metals, chromium, manganese, phosphate, and other base and industrial minerals key for industrialization.

Agriculture and mining possess the potential to drive economic development and transformation in the region. That agriculture plays a strategic role in economic development and has historically made a significant contribution to the prosperity of advanced economies is well known. For example, the agricultural revolution preceded the industrial revolution in England and in the United States and Japan, prosperity of the agricultural sector underpinned industrial take-off. Similarly, the take-off of East Asian economies
and the rise in China as an economic giant owe in significant part to growth in the agricultural sector where land reform resulted in increased agricultural production and productivity, a rise in per capita incomes of the rural communities, industrialization and urbanization and leading to an increase in industrial production. Thus, industrial growth and the expansion in agricultural production are complimentary activities in spurring economic take-off and transformation as they support each other through inputs and outputs. In this relationship, agriculture can be an economic driver through the provision of food to the non-agriculture sector, the creation of demand for goods produced in the other sectors as employment and incomes rise and the provision of investible surplus from savings and taxes as incomes rise and earning foreign exchange for exportable agricultural produce. Similarly, the extraction and processing of the abundant minerals provides opportunities for transformation through beneficiation, value addition and the development of backward, forward, fiscal and sideways linkages. Linkages in the resources sector are key to job creation, the increase in domestic incomes and the reduction of poverty. The experiences of Australia, Canada and Chile, for example, illustrate how minerals exploitation can anchor industrial take-off, especially where value addition and beneficiation of minerals takes place domestically and creates linkages and economic multipliers with the rest of the economy. Furthermore, the experience in Asia from agriculture and in minerals sector development from Australia, Canada and Chile all demonstrate the critical importance of supportive policy and regulatory frameworks in facilitating growth and development. The abundance of fertile land and the high prospectivity for various minerals though key for development, require a supportive transparent and stable operating environment for the sectors to anchor industrialization and growth.
The Industrial and Economic Drivers: Agriculture and Mining

The endowment of diverse land-based and oceanic natural resources in Southern Africa has historically anchored regional development and economic transformation. The region’s colonial history is indeed intertwined with access to and control over these natural resources, especially minerals, to quench the appetite of the North. This link with external markets remains part of the development model in most countries in the region due to the limited evolution of value chains and linkages at national and regional levels. A compelling case for resource-based industrialization in the region has been made primarily anchored on resource endowment and the inherent comparative advantages they present to member States (Jourdan, 2011; Christensen et al, 2019). Overall, the economies of the SADC region are dependent on either minerals, agriculture, tourism or oceanic resources, albeit to varying degrees. Agriculture and mining account for significant shares of GDP, employment (especially agriculture) and export earnings along their various value chains. For example, mining accounts for 10 percent of regional GDP, 25 percent of total regional exports, 7 percent of direct formal employment and 20 percent of government revenues. The dependence varies markedly across the region. For example, over 80 percent of Zambia’s export earnings are from copper, agriculture accounts for 30 percent of Malawi’s GDP, 90 percent of the country’s export earnings and employs 65 percent of the country’s total labour force, mining (diamonds) accounts for 20 percent of Botswana’s GDP and over 90 percent of exports and travel and tourism accounts for 24 percent of Mauritius’s GDP.

The African Development Bank’s (AfDB) High 5 Priority adapted in Table 1 provides a respectable starting point in analysing the key industrial and economic drivers in Southern Africa and their impact

---

1 Includes hard rock mining and oil and gas exploitation
on socio-economic development. The framework is comprehensive and aligns the economic drivers to development objectives including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Agenda 2063. Energy, agriculture, mining, rural development, quarrying and water supply are all anchored on natural resources and underlie the five objectives of power, food, industrialization, quality of life and integration.

Table 1: Socio-economic development objectives and anchors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SDG Alignment</th>
<th>Socio-Economic Development Objectives</th>
<th>Economic and Industrial Drivers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SDG7</td>
<td>Light Up and Power Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>SDG1, SDG10, SDG 12, SDG15</td>
<td>Feed Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>SDG 8, SDG 9, SDG12, SDG13</td>
<td>Industrialize Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>SDG 9, SDG14, SDG15, SDG17</td>
<td>Integrate Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>SDG2, SDG6, SDG7, SDG8, SDG10, SDG14</td>
<td>Improve the Quality of Life for the People of Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from AfDB, various years.

Southern Africa\(^2\) remains poor and one of the most unequal regions on the African continent, despite the abundant natural resources and the long history of exploitation of minerals and other land-based resources (UNECA, SRO-SA, 2017). This has become apparent during the last decade, where despite the generally impressive economic growth, inequality among citizens has worsened and the poverty gap between the rich and poor has widened (Table

---

\(^2\) Defined to include members of the Southern African Development Community – Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
2). Consequently, the attainment of the developmental aspirations elaborated in various national Visions which themselves are aligned to Agenda 2063 and Agenda 2030 remain distant. In Zambia, for example, although the country recorded steady economic growth during the period 1990-2015, poverty trends show that overall income poverty prevalence was reduced between 1991 and 2015 by 24.6 percent but increased in the late 1990s. Poverty reduction was more significant in urban areas, where it declined by 25.6 percent, from 49 percent in 1991 to 23.4 percent in 2015. On the other hand, income poverty in rural areas decreased from 88 percent to 76.6 percent during the same period (7th National Development Plan, 2018). Similarly, the percentage distribution of the population by level of poverty in 2015 showed that 40.8 percent of the population was extremely poor while 13.6 percent was moderately poor. The proportion of the non-poor was 45.6 percent. With an estimated population of 15.9 million in 2015, almost half or 8.5 million people lived in poverty, with 3.5 million (22 percent) of those living in extreme poverty. It is clear therefore that, overall, economic growth did not translate into significant poverty reduction, especially in rural areas due to the capital-intensive nature of the sources of growth of construction, mining and transport, the geographical distribution of growth skewed towards urban areas and concentration in labour-intensive agriculture sector. As Table 2 shows, inequality and unemployment remain high in the region.
Table 2: Economies of the Region – Selected Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Key economic sectors</th>
<th>HDI value</th>
<th>Poverty</th>
<th>Unemployment, total (% of labour force)</th>
<th>Gini coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Oil and gas</td>
<td>0.581</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>0.717</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Agriculture and Livestock</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0.477</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Services and Tourism</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0.437</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>0.647</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eswatini</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0.588</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>0.699</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Mining and Tourism</td>
<td>0.588</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Mining and Agriculture</td>
<td>0.535</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although mining and agriculture are arguably the main economic drivers for most countries in Southern Africa (Table 2), economies face many challenges to fully realize the benefits from both sectors. For example, constraints in the agriculture sector include; limited access to land, low levels of mechanization, limited skills among farmers, limited knowledge of markets, lack of financial capital (finance, poor levels of technological innovation, barriers to trade and shortage of skilled labour.

Limited access to land remains particularly the major impediment to the growth of small-holder agriculture in the region. Yet, as noted in Rukuni (2011), for Southern Africa, small holder agriculture is central to poverty reduction given that in most countries most citizens are involved in the sector. Furthermore, the consumption basket of the poor, who are mainly rural, is directly derived from...
agricultural output and thus food security becomes an imperative for strategic development purposes including the pursuit of SDGs and of the aspirations of Agenda 2063 as well as of National Visions.

The transformation of the agriculture sector to anchor development remains central to the uplifting of livelihoods and addressing poverty and inequality as the sector preoccupies about 70 percent of the regional population. Strategies to transform the sector and enhance productivity include; the development of non-traditional and often export-oriented sectors; change in the diversity of products produced by farmers; scaling up of production through mechanization, use of fertilizers and skills upgrade and the promotion of value addition to products to facilitate the development of linkages within the local economy, smart agriculture and conservation farming.

Agrarian reform is critical to boosting the agriculture sector and supporting the large rural populations in Southern Africa. As noted by Byamugisha (2013), when agricultural growth raises the income of farmers, they spend disproportionately high proportion of their income on domestically produced non-agricultural goods and services, creating strong consumption linkages between the two sectors. Thus, it can be argued that when growth is led by agricultural productivity, farmers who adopt high productivity farming practices benefit from the growth, while rural net buyers and urban households benefit from lower food prices, and so increase their demand for both agricultural and non-agricultural goods. Lower food prices benefit non-agricultural sectors by lowering labour costs (Rukuni, 2011).

Due to this important consumption linkage and the direct impact on employment and poverty reduction, many countries in the region consider agriculture as key for structural transformation. It is instructive to review some of the impediments to an elevation of the role of the sector as a growth fulcrum. Agro-processing and agribusiness deepens linkages with other economic sectors, generates jobs and raises incomes and boosts the industrial sector
due to increased demand. In this manner, agribusiness offers opportunities for inclusive economic development as GDP growth originating from agriculture is more effective at reducing poverty than growth coming from other economic sectors (UNIDO, 216). As noted in UNIDO (2016), there is a positive correlation between human development and the agribusiness-to-agriculture ratio, the higher the agribusiness to agriculture ratio, the higher the impact on human development. The development of agro-industries in the region enhances intra-regional and export trade, industrializes local economies, grows rural enterprises, creates job opportunities and directly addresses rural poverty.

Similarly, the highly diversified regional minerals resources base (Figure 1) presents opportunities for value chains development through beneficiation and value addition and for minerals to be critical feedstocks into various economic sectors. Southern Africa produces over 100 different minerals/metals and compounds and the sector is diverse ranging from highly mechanized and integrated mining operations to formal and informal artisanal and small-scale operators. In 2015, the region hosted 92 percent of the global platinum group metals (PGMs) reserves and produced close to 60 percent of world PGMs output and hosted 55 percent of cobalt reserves and produced 60 percent of world cobalt output. Chromium, diamonds and manganese production and reserve bases were of comparably high magnitudes. The various minerals are important feedstocks into manufacturing, energy/power, infrastructure and agriculture sectors, for example, as shown in Table 3. The various mineral value chains could be developed to provide feedstocks for industrialization and industrial take-off. However, all the region’s mineral wealth is currently exported as ores, concentrates, alloys or metals with very little transformation into fabricated products (Jourdan, 2011; Maponga, 2016). Overall, the sector remains an enclave with limited domestic linkages and is poorly integrated into the local economies, thus denying regional economies of the full benefits and multipliers.
Figure 1: Estimated World Shares of SADC Reserves and Production

Source: USGS: Mineral Commodity Summaries 2016

Table 3: Minerals as inputs into regional development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Sector</th>
<th>Mineral Inputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>Steel (iron ore), polymers (from coal and hydro carbons), base metals (copper and aluminum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy/power</td>
<td>Oil, coal, natural gas, limestone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Steel, copper, cement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Nitrogen (from coal gas), phosphate, potassium, conditioners (e.g., limestone)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SADC (2015)

The regional mineral resource base presents opportunities for a coordinated approach to value chains development through beneficiation and value addition and as feedstocks into the various economic sectors (Table 3 and Fig. 2). The potential in the mineral value chains development could be exploited as an integral part of the regional industrialization strategy (SADC, 2015). In this endeavour, the most important base metal feedstock into manufacturing (and infrastructure) are copper and aluminum, for example, and these could be targeted as a gradual strategy for development.

Figure 2: Mineral Value Chains
The challenges to the development of regional mineral value chains in Figure 2 include, among others:

- the lack of coherent regional mining supply chains development strategy and the absence of regional strategies and instruments to address “variable geometry” among member States;
- the small market sizes of member States to achieve scale economies for backward linkage industries to support domestic deepening of the mineral value chains including beneficiation and value addition;
- the serious energy constraints facing regional member States, mineral value chains development and value addition are energy intensive activities;
- the poor transport infrastructure with high logistics and transit costs, especially for land-linked regional member States;
- the existence of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to intra-regional trade in mining inputs and other inputs for industrial growth;
- the poor minerals technology research, development and
innovation capacity and inadequate science, technology, engineering and mathematics skills formation and mobility within the region to service a skills-intensive beneficiation and value addition sector;

- the limited incentives to mining companies to add value to mineral outputs before export due to the weak and unharmonized local content regulations/instruments that do not provide the required support to value chains development;

- the weak mining regimes and weak mineral sector governance frameworks which do not provide competent instruments to enforce the required value addition within member States; and

- the lack of member States mining regimes alignment with the regional mining vision and hence the Africa Mining Vision providing the required policy direction on linkages and value addition.

Furthermore, the development of value chains for both agriculture and mineral commodities requires a larger economic space and deeper economic integration to provide the required impetus. It is instructive to explore how regional integration in Southern Africa allows for the growth of the value chains and how the region has factored regional value chains into the industrial development framework.

**Economic Integration and Regional industrial and economic drivers**

Economic integration is an essential pre-requisite for the development of regional value chains and integration in global value chains (Mkandawire, 2011; Ngwenya, 2011). As noted in Ngwenya (2011), regional cooperation and integration in Africa has its origins in the struggle for decolonisation and was informed by economic determinism as evidenced by the Lagos Plan of Action
Among other macro-economic benefits, integration creates a larger economic space and overcomes the development constraints faced by individual countries. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) are the regional economic communities spearheading regional integration and development in Southern Africa in line with continental aspirations.

To spur industrial development, member States of SADC adopted an Industrialization Strategy and Roadmap (2015-2063) in April 2015 and an Action Plan for implementation in 2017 paving the way for a coordinated approach to industrialization and socio-economic transformation building on the aspirations of the SADC Common Agenda and the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (SADC, 2017). Similarly, the COMESA Industrial Policy adopted in 2015, the Regional Industrialization Strategy (2017-2026) adopted in 2017 and the Draft Action Plan of 2019 prioritize industrialization as an anchor for regional development. Both frameworks are aligned to continental development policy frameworks including: the Africa Industrial Development Action Plan, the Africa Mining Vision, Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme, the Program on Infrastructure Development for Africa, are all anchored on the aspirations and priorities of Agenda 2063, Agenda 2030 and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The AfCFTA presents opportunities of expanding intra-Africa trade underpinned by industrial development, beneficiation, value addition and the resultant expansion of commodity value chains.

The SADC Industrialization strategy aims to enhance value addition and is anchored on three pillars which seek to exploit the comparative and competitive advantages offered by the resource endowments, including land (agriculture) and minerals. The pillars of the strategy are; industrialization as champion of economic and technological transformation; competitiveness as an active process to move from comparative advantage to competitive advantage; and regional
integration and geography as the context for industrial development and economic prosperity. Frontloading industrialization and focusing on the three mutually compatible growth paths of agro-processing, minerals beneficiation and downstream processing and enhanced participation in value chains at the national, regional and global level, the strategy is expected to gradually industrialize and transform the region from pure commodity dependence to a manufacturing-based region where beneficiation and value addition anchor growth of manufactured products.

Given the resource base, it is therefore not surprising that the SADC Industrialization Strategy identifies three priority drivers of the process; agriculture-led growth including agricultural value chains; natural resource-led growth including minerals beneficiation and processing, also linking into value chains, both regional and global, and participation in domestic, regional and global value chains. Participation in value chains is particularly important as it extends production possibilities across national boundaries and facilitates cross-border utilization of regional resources and ensures stakeholders benefit from economies of scale.

Through its three phases, the SADC Industrialization Strategy’s long-term vision is to overcome regional constraints and progressively move from factor-driven to investment-driven, then to efficiency-driven and ultimately to the high growth trajectory driven by knowledge, innovation and business sophistication.

To commence the implementation of the regional industrialization strategy, member States have profiled the various mineral value chains and identified the low hanging fruits (SADC, 2015), developed a
regional mining vision (RMV) (SADC, 2019) and profiled the various agricultural value chains (SADC, 2017). The SADC Action Plan (2017) identifies priority agriculture value chains for each member State. An important underlying aspect of the regional approach to value chains development and participation is the harmonization of sectoral policies, legal and regulatory frameworks. For the minerals sector, member States are seized with policy harmonization in alignment with the SADC RMV and as well as the alignment of national industrialization policies in line with the regional strategy and roadmap. In this sector, the desire to create a knowledge-driven mining sector that catalyses and contributes to broad-based growth and development of, and fully integrates into the regional economy through backward, forward and side stream (financial services, power, logistics, communications, skills and technology development, research, development and innovation, etc) linkages underlies the regional vision in the minerals sector. Strategies to anchor the development of backward and forward linkages include:

- development of a harmonized local content policy framework among member States to anchor local capital facilitation and introduce participation targets for local entrepreneurs, including introducing local and regional content obligations for goods and services purchased - Programmes for local content development including workforce recruitment and investment in local supplier development programmes

---

4 The Vision is to attain a transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of regional mineral resources to underpin broad-based sustainable regional growth, socio-economic development and inter-generational equity, through the realisation of all the mineral linkages, in line with the SADC Regional Development Agenda and other continental and international aspirations.

5 12 broadly defined value chains were agreed upon as value chains with potential for a regional approach to their development

could be promoted through a regional content policy which then facilitates the development of local linkages;

- introduction of minimum expenditure on science, technology, engineering and mathematics skills development to anchor value addition and beneficiation and introducing minimum domestic expenditure on research, development and innovation to support value chains development and industrialization efforts;

- introduction of mineral property auction system (region-wide) in the award of mining rights and evaluate bids against the realization of linkages targets – a bid with stronger and deeper linkage targets will create more value for the national economy and will be preferable;

- introduction of a reservation of selected key feedstock feed for future local and regional needs, for example, ensuring that a proportion of mineral output is reserved for the domestic market; and

- development of regional protocols for inputs and key feedstocks production to support value chains growth and introducing customised support schemes for local upstream and downstream entrepreneurs.

Domestication of the SADC RMV is key to the development of mineral value chains in Southern Africa as it creates a harmonized environment across regional member States. In addition to emphasizing state ownership of mineral assets as custodian on behalf of the people, the vision advocates for collective obligations to optimise the developmental impact of finite mineral extraction for sustainable growth, development, industrialisation and intergenerational equity and is anchored on alignment of mining regimes, transparency, public participation, deployment of revenues to long-term growth projects and environmental and social sustainability.
For the development of agro-processing value chains, the SADC (2017) study recommends five broad thematic policy areas requiring attention (Table 4). The most significant factors under these themes revolve around capacity, regulations, environment and infrastructure issues.

Table 4: Most Significant Factors in Developing Agro-Processing Value Chains

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sets of Policy Measures</th>
<th>Most Significant Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Developed infrastructure and conducive business environment</td>
<td>❖ Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>❖ Energy access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Regional integration and openness to trade</td>
<td>❖ Regulatory environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>❖ Standards and SPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>❖ Market access and information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>❖ Inputs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Capacity to be responsive to value chains</td>
<td>❖ Smallholder capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>❖ Processing capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>❖ Access to finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Partnerships of Government and the Private Sector</td>
<td>❖ Government capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Established policy framework – social and environment</td>
<td>❖ Environment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SADC (2017)

In both agricultural and mineral value chains, deeper regional integration supported by harmonized sectoral policies will provide a platform for supporting commodity value chains as anchors for industrialization through beneficiation and value addition. For example, in the agriculture sector, stronger linkages between farmers and agro-industry and tighter clusters of small producers across national boundaries can enhance supply-chain efficiencies, improve access to regional and global markets and increase the incomes of farmers, workers and their families.
Driving Economic Growth: The Role of Ruling Parties

Governments play an important role in driving development through the crafting and implementation of relevant policies and thus ruling political parties are a key origin and driver of policies for change in the region. A developmental perspective of the role of the State in advancing development is key in this regard and since ruling parties derive their mandate from the electorate, programmes fashioned by the State reflect the dominant national political thinking. A perusal of the Manifestos of ruling parties in the region shows that the desire for the control of productive assets and ensuring that a majority has a say in the exploitation of these resources underpinned the struggles for independence (see for example the manifestos of; FRELIMO (Mozambique), Zanu (PF) (Zimbabwe), SWAPO (Namibia), ANC (South Africa) and CCM (Tanzania)). The control of the ownership, exploitation and utilization of natural resources, mainly land and mineral resources, which as discussed above are drivers of development, remains a key objective of the socio-economic and political struggles in the region.

Three broad areas with the potential to unlock the economic value of the primary economic drivers in the region and for which ruling political parties should focus and redirect their energies are;

- land reform (agrarian reform) and enhancing access to mineral resources by indigenous entrepreneurs;
- supporting value addition and beneficiation in the agriculture and mining sectors; and
- supporting the growth of micro, small and medium enterprises including artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) ventures.

The pursuit of development anchored on these three areas should be conceived and implemented within the broader regional and continental context guided by regional integration milestones of the African Union and SADC and COMESA Secretariats.
Land reform and agricultural productivity

Limited access to land by many citizens in the region for productive use in agriculture and mining remains a major impediment to socio-economic development and it is for this reason that the land question remains an emotive issue in Southern Africa. The distribution of land ownership is a major factor influencing the transition from one socio-political order to another. A reform of the land ownership terrain providing access and rights to the landless majority and supporting modernization of the production processes on the farms in a critical strategy which ruling political parties should pursue and ensure that Governments adopt and implement to facilitate industrial take-off.

The framework for land reform should be holistic, developed in a fully consultative manner and address the needs and aspirations of all national identities and should ensure security of tenure - use rights, transfer rights, exclusion rights and enforcement rights need to be guaranteed. Furthermore, the framework to accompany land reform should include a financing strategy which requires a recalibration of the financial sector to be amenable to supporting the agriculture sector, including the smallholder farmer.

Although agricultural transformation is fraught with challenges, a key lesson from the Asian green revolution is that long-term political commitment is essential for the success of the sector and thus political parties are key drivers of the process as bearers of the mandate from the majority. Among other issues, the Asian experience emphasizes the active and consistent engagement of government in technology adoption, the transformation process through government supported public extension system, the development of agribusiness and the role of the private sector in stimulating productivity increases. This is what should inform and guide government intervention in the sector. The importance of agriculture in poverty reduction demands that political parties push more forcefully for land reform (agrarian reform) and the provision
of the attendant support to the new owners of redistributed land. Despite the debate over whether agriculture can be an engine for growth and economic transformation and on how to develop agriculture most effectively to realize its role in economic development, the sector has been shown to drive transformation in China, India and other East Asian nations following reforms and for Southern Africa, food security and poverty reduction can be assured through an efficient agricultural sector (Rukuni, 2011; ECA/20/001, 2020). The agrarian reform should deal with identity issues, including access to land by women and youth, and the tension between customary and statutory land tenure systems.

Access to and ownership of mineral resources as part of empowerment initiatives or mechanisms that facilitate this should be promoted. South Africa’s black economic empowerment framework and Zimbabwe’s indigenization policies are instructive in this regard. These mechanisms, if supported by appropriately configured financing strategies can anchor the contribution of locals to the productive sector in partnership with foreign conglomerates.

To specifically stimulate agriculture and mining as economic and industrial drivers, regional member States should collectively develop and implement industrial policies, develop infrastructure, recalibrate educational curriculum to facilitate the provision of environmental education at different levels and provide training in environmental monitoring and assessment, and reorient the public to enhance participation in sustainable development projects.

**Beneficiation and value addition and value chains**

In addition to policies for the extraction of optimal rent from the sector through resource rent taxes and ownership calibration, the policy framework in the minerals sector should anchor industrialization through the promotion of beneficiation, value addition and the creation of linkages. The promotion of policies for beneficiation and local processing should be part of the architecture
within the region to anchor transformation and propel the evolution of economic clusters. The development of backward linkages is the easiest entry point for local entrepreneurs to participate in the mineral sector value chains. Backward linkages into mining and mineral processing inputs, including capital goods such as machinery, plant and equipment, consumables, chemicals, skilled labour, analytical services and financial services, for example, offer opportunities for local and regional participation and generate more domestic multipliers and demand. Local content policies can be employed to support the growth of the minerals beneficiation sector and the proliferation of linkages.

Promotion of micro, small and medium enterprises including ASM

The promotion of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) is a key element of the region's industrialization process as these entities can occupy niche positions along the commodity value chains. Opportunities for the youth and women entrepreneurs can be created through this support. The SADC Protocol on Industry emphasizes the central role which a well capacitated MSMEs can play in accelerating growth and development in the region and help address the scourges of poverty and unemployment. The facilitation of the contribution of MSMEs in mineral value chains should include capacitating and empowering artisanal and small-scale miners (ASMs) and facilitating access to appropriate and affordable technology and access to affordable finance. The establishment of MSMEs support institutions to facilitate their integration into regional and global value chains is also important.

Therefore, ruling parties in Southern Africa are critical for progressive development and can anchor socio-economic transformation by buttressing the evolution of developmental States across the region. Specific actions that could be anchored by the political parties and pushed through Governments broadly include;
driving the transparent and inclusive development of coherent and harmonized policies and their implementation – for all domestic sectors, including the development of harmonized local content regulations – investing in intellectual work to develop such frameworks and ensuring that governments adopt them;

providing a platform for sharing experiences on policies and socio-economic development among national stakeholders (including opposition political parties, the academia, student and women’s bodies, etc) and among political parties across the region to discuss issues of interest including skills mobility and sharing of facilities;

actively seizing opportunities provided by regional agreements including the EAC-COMESA-SADC tripartite free trade area (TFTA) and the AfCFTA to shape domestic industrialization and trade policies that facilitate the development of regional value chains and linkages; and

providing leadership in the domestication of regional frameworks and ensuring that the local frameworks are aligned with regional aspirations so that member States will benefit from the larger opportunities from economic integration.

In addition to articulating the policies aligned to defined national priorities and putting in place the appropriate institutional frameworks, political parties have an important role to play in developing a cadre that understands and appreciates the importance of good governance and can provide the required leadership to overcome the paucity of good leadership which is core to failure to deliver development in the region. Furthermore, appropriately configured and resourced institutions and their structures are important in facilitating development.
Conclusion

Agriculture and mining represent major development opportunities for the region to propel economic growth and transformation based on the abundant land and mineral resources. Through the link with business opportunities along the various commodity value chains and the associated linkages, the sectors can anchor socio-economic transformation and drive inclusive sustainable, equitable growth in the region when supported by appropriate policies. Key to benefiting from agriculture is treating smallholder agriculture as a business and providing the requisite technology, skills and financial support. A reform of the land tenure system to accommodate smallholder farmers is critical in facilitating the inclusive growth agenda. For the smallholder farmers, while boosting the yields through improved technology, seed and chemicals is part of the battle, connecting the farmers to market opportunities completes the cycle and the development of agricultural value chains through further processing of commodities provides linkage economics and economies of scale across regional member States and grows business even further. Agro-processing and other value addition activities strengthen the domestic footprint of the sector as a source of growth and poverty alleviation. For the minerals sector, in addition to optimal rent collection through appropriate taxation regimes, the promotion of value addition and beneficiation will be key to developing backward, forward and side-stream linkages. Furthermore, supporting the growth and development of artisanal and small-scale mines will address poverty and unemployment.

Overall, these strategies will facilitate the transition from the commodity dependency to value-adding, knowledge-intensive and industrialized economies and enable member States to occupy higher places in the global division of labour and along the various commodity value chains. The proliferation of linkages will create jobs, raise incomes and address poverty, food insecurity and underdevelopment. The role of the resources sectors as economic drivers would be satisfied as exhaustible minerals will be transformed
into roads, rail, hospitals, schools and skills, for example. Therefore, growth paths in Southern Africa able to address poverty and unemployment can be pursued through agriculture, minerals, other natural resources and value chains participation, linkages and exports as the rise in incomes generated by growth in these sectors will provided further impetus for rising domestic demand and services which will multiply the growth effects. Deepening regional integration complimented by the building of knowledge-based capabilities and the creation of enabling environments and institutions will further advance industrialization as a champion for economic transformation.

References


Introduction

The 1960s and 1970s was a noble moment for Africa, marked by the decolonization and independence of many African countries. However, Southern Africa had another lucky moment. In this region, there was resistance from the colonizers to the process of self-determination and independence, which led to the fact that in these countries, independence (or democratic change) was attained through national liberation struggles organized by emerging nationalist movements.

In 1963, African Heads of State and Governments created the Organization of African Unity (OAU), as an instrument to promote political and economic cooperation. And in the Southern African sub-region, the OAU established the Africa Liberation Committee, based in Dar es Salaam and led by Tanzania, with the aim of supporting liberation movements in their fight against colonial occupation and domination (Murapa, 2002). Tanzania became a base of political and material support for the liberation movements, such as FRELIMO of Mozambique; MPLA of Angola; ZANU and ZAPU of Zimbabwe; SWAPO of Namibia; and the ANC and PAC of South Africa.

The political and economic disparities that existed in African countries, as well as the most varied conflicts and political interests, in particular in the countries of the Southern Africa, could not undermine the agenda assumed by the entire African continent in
1979, with the Declaration of Monrovia\(^1\), where the OAU Heads of State and Governments expressed their commitment to, individually and collectively, and on behalf of their Governments and their populations: “…promote the social and economic development and integration of our economies…; …promote the economic integration of the African region in order to facilitate and reinforce social and economic relations; establish national, sub-regional and regional institutions, which will facilitate the attainment of objectives of self-reliance and self-sustainment; …establishment of African Common Market leading to the African Economic Community.”\(^2\)

The seriousness of this commitment was demonstrated with the approval of the 1980 Lagos Plan as the unifying framework for economic integration efforts on the continent, strengthening existing regional communities and establishing other economic groups in other regions of Africa. As a continent, the Heads of State and Government should be commended, those who on 31 June 1991, about eleven years after the approval of the Lagos Plan, approved the Abuja Treaty which established in Article 4, the African Economic Community with the aim “…to promote economic, social and cultural development, and the integration of African economies in order to increase economic self-reliance and promote endogenous and self-sustained development.”\(^3\) It is in this direction that all African political forces must converge if they are, in fact, committed to the creation of economic and social well-being for their people.

As we enter the 21\(^{st}\) century, the dream of “economic liberation” envisaged by progressive Pan-African thinkers, such as Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Amilcar Cabral, Eduardo Mondlane, by the OAU, among others, is far from being achieved as African

\(^{1}\) 16th Ordinary Session of the Heads of State and Government of OAU, held in Monrovia, Liberia, 17 to 20 July 1979.

\(^{2}\) OAU Declaration and Resolutions AHG-ST. 3 (XVI) RRev. 1, 1979, p. 3-4.

\(^{3}\) OAU Abuja Treaty, 1991, p. 9
governments have yet to bring about economic gains to their populations, and socio-economic development for their nations.

The aim of this chapter is to contribute towards identifying external obstacles and limitations to economic independence, as well as to advance proposals for policies and strategies that can lead Southern African countries to achieve, albeit gradually, economic growth that supports integrated development.

**Obstacles and limitations to achieving economic independence in the past**

As mentioned in the introduction, Southern Africa is the sub-region where independence came late, for two reasons: (i) the resistance of Portuguese colonialism compared to other colonizing powers; and (ii) the existence of white minorities heavily dependent on land and minerals for their capitalist accumulation, in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia).

The independence of Mozambique (June 1975), Angola (November 1975), and later Zimbabwe (April 1980), brought about profound changes in Southern Africa. The respective liberation movements, in proclaiming independence in those countries, assumed themselves as the “only national forces” carrying out genuine nation-building projects and, to a certain extent, undermined one of the biggest obstacles in the sub-region - the military and economic power of the apartheid regime in South Africa. In fact, the transformation of FRELIMO and the MPLA from liberation movements to Marxist-Leninist parties was seen as a threat to white minority regimes in the sub-region, more particularly for the South African State Constellation Project (Castelo Branco, 1996).

Despite the ties of economic dependence on South Africa that crystallized during the colonization period, the new regimes in Angola and Mozambique introduced the system of centralized economic planning, and their parties were proclaimed leading forces of the state and society. With these measures, they experienced
a long process of national reconstruction and development which, with the involvement of all national actors, would lead to economic emancipation. The Mozambican state approved in 1979, the Prospective and Indicative Plan (PIP), as the instrument that would lead to economic liberation in the period 1980-1990, the “Decade of Victory Against Underdevelopment” (Machel, 1983: 102; FRELIMO, 2010: 68). However, the implementation of the PIP depended, to a great extent, on financial and material support from developed socialist countries, a fact that did not happen because the admission of Mozambique to the Community of Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA) was not accepted by the members of that economic-financial institution of the socialist countries because, “the Soviet Union (USSR) was not willing to subsidize the Mozambican economy, as it was already doing in relation to Cuba and Vietnam” (Castel-Branco, 1994). The young country had to resort to its insufficient resources, mobilizing the country to “count on its own forces”. It was in this revolutionary euphoria of the need to complete political independence for economic reasons, that Mozambique, in 1981, achieved the best economic year after independence considering the use of productive capacity of the national economy, which increased to 81% in 1981, as compared to 76% in 1975 (Sulemane, 2002). Not surprisingly, by 1977, the already bankrupted economy began to pick up, and there was steady growth until 1981 when, exports rising, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was double the 1997 level and well above pre-independence levels (Hanlon, 1991, p. 11). In fact, falling production levels in agriculture and industry between 1974 and 1980, were replaced with an increase, which in 1981 reached the highest value after independence for most goods for domestic consumption and export crops (Abrahamsson & Nilsson, 1995, p. 48).

Recognizing its economic and military power, and the fear of having neighbouring “communist” African states that received support from

4 Machel, 1983, p. 68
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Government of Pieter W. Botha in South Africa launched an escalation of economic destabilization, and later on, military aggression against Angola and Mozambique, under the pretext of chasing away ANC and SWAPO guerrillas who were fighting apartheid in South Africa and Namibia, respectively. South Africa’s military incursions also extended to other countries like Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia and Zambia, despite four of the countries being their allies in the world’s oldest customs union, the Southern African Custom Union (SACU).

Southern African countries had little choice in overcoming this obstacle. Virtually, the whole region was and remains dependent on South Africa on almost everything: transport and communications, exports of goods and services, imports of goods including consumer goods, and cheap labour to the mines and plantations.

It was in the spirit of fighting this and other political and economic obstacles that countries in the southern African sub-region gathered in Arusha, Tanzania, in 1979, to discuss the idea of creating a mechanism for the coordination and harmonisation of the region’s economic policies. In April 1980, in Lusaka, Zambia, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was created by Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Lusaka Declaration adopted the motto: *Southern Africa: towards Economic Independence*. SADCC’s goal was to shift the focus of the Front-Line States, from a political group to an economic one. The Lusaka Declaration established the following broad objectives for SADCC:

1. The reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa; 2. The forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration; 3. The mobilisation of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies; 4. Concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of our
SADCC represented a vision of self-confidence among the nine (9) founding member countries. It was an instrument of political survival, economic development and social advancement. SADCC was assumed by its members as an instrument of coordinating efforts, resources, policies and strategies in order to: (i) support the liberation movements that were still fighting for the independence of their countries; (ii) resist Apartheid South Africa’s aggression; and (iii) coordinate, cooperate and integrate the economies of member states in sectoral projects that would contribute to the prosperity of their economies (Murapa, 2002).

The creation of SADCC can be seen as “daring” in terms of its political agenda as any economic and structural transformation in the sub-region would be difficult, if not impossible, by marginalizing South Africa. It should be remembered that Southern African countries had deliberately been made by their colonizers to a lesser or greater degree structurally dependent on the South African economy. Indeed, South Africa had strong investments in most SADCC member countries, which made it difficult to easily sever the ties of dependence (Maasdorp and Whiteside, 1992). Chipasula and Miti (1991:161) attest to the fact that, “in 1983, South Africa handled between 65 and 70% of Zimbabwe’s imports at its ports; 50 to 60% of Malawi; 40% of Zambia’s imports and 70% of its exports.

In order to minimise dependence on South Africa, the countries of Southern Africa and their allies argued, according to Castelo Branco (1996, pp. 63-64) that the countries of Western Europe, the USA and Japan, should develop a two-pronged policy vis-à-vis the situation in Southern Africa by:

- supporting SADCC member countries in their attempt to reduce their dependence on the South African economy

---

5 Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation, SADCC Declaration, Lusaka, 1st April 1980
and protect them from aggression and destabilization by the Apartheid regime;

♦ adoption of sanctions and other measures including support for victims of Apartheid.

The support received from aid and cooperation partners, particularly the Nordic countries, enabled SADCC member countries to achieve some encouraging economic results in the period 1980-81, particularly in implementing some economic reforms. Galvanized, SADCC member countries adopted in November 1981, in Blantyre, Malawi, a strategy that would lead them to economic liberation – “From Dependent Poverty: Towards Economic Liberation”. To implement this strategy, SADCC adopted a Programme of Action that identified specific economic activities and development projects to be pursued through the project-based approach, with each member taking responsibility for a particular sector (e.g. Angola for energy, Mozambique for transport, Swaziland for human resources development). (Geldenhus, 1984). The aim was to boost the activities of the individual states in the area of infrastructure and productive sectors. Meanwhile, member states were expected to provide finance for their coordinating activities on behalf of SADCC. However, the efforts made were not directed towards solving the problems and structural weaknesses that the economies of member countries had, namely the weight of the colonial legacy in all respects, particularly the insufficient infrastructure to support production and marketing, the high degree of illiteracy and absolute poverty, the lack of cadres and technicians that had a limited management capacity, not to mention weak institutions of governance and macroeconomic management.

For example, Mozambique at the time of independence, in 1975, was considered to be one of the poorest countries in the world with an income per capita of $117. The gross production of the main sectors of the economy (agriculture, industry, construction, services of transport and tourism) suffered a substantial fall in about 21% in 1975 in comparison to 1973. There were no Mozambican owners
in any sectors and 75% of the African active labour worked in agriculture, 13% were employed in industry, construction, energy, and the harbour and railways. The remainder were distributed among various unskilled services. On the other hand, no-Africans constituted 79.5% of the employed labour force for industry, trade, banks, insurance, ports and railways and public services (CNP⁶, 1984, pp.15-16). Mozambique was a Portuguese colonial service economy where education and health for the Mozambican population were neglected and all administrative and managerial tasks were reserved for white Portuguese colonisers (Hanlon, 1991). More than 90% of the population were illiterate and only about 13% of school-age children went to school (Mondlane, 1972, p. 27; Abrahamsson & Nilsson, 1995, p. 22).

Most dramatic was the abandoning of many Portuguese professionals, farmers, industrials and businessmen who left behind a workforce without a clue as to how to manage business. As noted by Hanlon (1990, p. 49), “The Portuguese had never prepared a group of Blacks to ‘Africanize’ the administration, and many of those who had remained abroad linked themselves to other opponents of Frelimo. …Furthermore, the settlers tended to just disappear, rather than hand over power in an orderly way”.

There were very few Mozambican technicians in 1975. Mozambicans who for decades had only been allowed to work as apprentices and assistants of foreign technicians, had to suddenly assume the management of production units, departments and sectors in the state apparatus⁷. It is correct to say that they had to acquire administrative and managerial skills on the job and at the same time they had to secure the functioning of the enterprises and to act against economic sabotage. However, their good will and pooled knowledge proved not to be enough to deal with technical problems

---

⁶ National Planning Commission, 1984
⁷ National Planning Commission (NPC), 1984
and macroeconomic management challenges. As stressed by Hanlon (1990), Frelimo’s government itself had to depend increasingly on East Europeans experts because its leaders and members of the executive had little or no managerial experience despite the fact that they fought a highly successful guerrilla war against the Portuguese coloniser.

Nationalisation of land, banking, rental housing, health-care and education private institutions, marked an important step for the development strategy. The state sector was created by taking over the abandoned private properties by the foreign owners who left the country, adding to railways, ports, and the power station to enlarge the state-owned apparatus. Economic planning and the state control of all economic activity was adopted and the relevant institutions to build a nation based on popular mobilisation and popular power (Machel\(^8\), 1977; 1983; Hanlon, 1991; Abrahamsson & Nilsson, 1995).

In Mozambique, the modernisation strategy for rural development chosen after independence could never be brought to its conclusion. State farms despite giant efforts, did not reach their targets but showed stagnating production. The intensified destructive actions of civil war by RENAMO\(^9\) and prolonged drought that struck southern Mozambique at the beginning of the 1980s worsened the situation for the rural population. As shown in Table 1, an overall decline of the global social production took place in 1982, decreasing 7% in comparison to the previous year. In 1986, exports were only 27.5% of 1981 figures and they could only pay 14.5% of the needed imports. Agricultural production collapsed and the

---


marketed surplus fell dramatically from 86,000 tons of maize in 1982 to 21,000 tons in 1986.

During 1985 and 1986, the Balance of Payments of Mozambique showed a significant reduction in exports which led to the utilization of part of the reserves. To face the economic and financial difficulties, Mozambique had to rely more heavily on foreign resources, namely: (i) donations granted by several countries, the EEC and various humanitarian aid organizations; (ii) utilization of credit at medium and long term to finance projects, acquisition of food products, oil, raw materials or even to support the balance of payments; and (iii) evolution of commercial credit from socialist countries under favourable conditions in terms of repayment and interests.

Table 1: Development of Production and Foreign Trade in selected years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Production GSP (billion MT 1980 prices)</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Industry, Fishing</th>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>Exports ($ million, current prices)</th>
<th>Imports ($ million, current prices)</th>
<th>Exports/Imports (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ratilal, 1990; Statistical Reports from CNP 1975-1987

In 1984, the Mozambican total debt burden rose to $2.4 billion including debt arrears. According to IMF (1991), over 95% of the debt were bilateral. OECD countries were responsible for 46% of total lending, and the OPEC countries for 21%. The debts had a negative impact on the state’s budget deficit, with increased pressure on domestic inflation. In the same year, Mozambique decided to join...
the Bretton Woods institutions as a way to regain the confidence of its international creditors. From January 1987, the country started the implementation of an extensive structural adjustment programme, approved and partly prepared by the World Bank and the IMF (GoM, 1987)

Zambia, like Mozambique and Tanzania, entered the 1980s with a drastic economic crisis. The origins of the crises in Zambia go back to external shocks of oil and copper prices in 1973-74. As result, the country’s terms of trade fell 54% relative to 1974; the balance of payment went into deficit, with the current account being 30% of GDP; government revenues from minerals dropped to less than one-fifth of the previous level; and the budget moved from surplus, in 1974, to an equivalent deficit of 24% of GDP. Real per capita income by 1984 slumped to less than one-third the 1974 level. (Seshamani, 1992, p. 116)

In 1986, Zambia Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) was designed to restructure the economy through its transformation from one based on administrative control to one which would be guided by free market forces and prices mechanisms. However, one year later, GNP per capita had fallen from $640 in 1982 to $250; inflation accelerated to 54.3% from 13% in 1982; the productive capacity utilisation fell to 38% in 1987 from 50% in 1985, with the formal employment declining to 10.2% becoming a small fraction of the total labour force in 1987 (Seshamani, 199).

In Tanzania, the acute shortage of indigenous technical, managerial and administrative cadres, was one of the weaknesses characterising the Tanzanian economy at the time of independence in 1960. Early after independence, the economic and social policies based on “the maximisation of growth, strict adherence to macroeconomic balance and restrictions on recurrent spending so as to allow the

10 Government of Mozambique (GoM), 1987

11 A more detailed discussion can be found in Seshamani, 1990
realisation of much-needed public investment in human and physical infrastructure”, enable Tanzania to perform relatively well up to the mid-1970s (Wagao, 1992, p. 94)\textsuperscript{12}.

However, between 1978 and 1981, the GDP growth rate dropped to 2.6%, with the consequent negative growth in per capita income. Cash crop exports fell to 36% lower than 1970, and export earnings continued to be highly unstable, but imports did not drop, industrial capacity utilisation dropped to 30%, the current balance account recorded a deficit of 14% of GDP, while external debt servicing had increased from $10 million, in 1970, to $72 million in 1980, and inflation rose from 10% to 30% in the same period. Tanzanian economy was also hit by a severe drought in 1979, the deterioration of the terms of trade, aggravated by the increase of oil price in the international market. Wagao (1992, p. 98) added that “other shocks in the economy included the collapse of the East African Community (EAC) in 1977 and the war with Uganda in the late 1970s”.

Aimed at restoring macroeconomic balance and stimulating growth, Tanzania introduced a series of economic initiatives and measures such as the National Economic Survival Programme (NESP) for the period of 1981-2, followed by the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) covering 1982-86, and then a comprehensive market-based Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) for 1986-89. According to Wagao (1992), NESP was a short-lived and largely ineffective programme with most target without being met. The same may be said of the SAP, with targets that were not achieved because of continued high inflation rates, the shortfalls in external

\textsuperscript{12} Detailed empirical assessments of the impact of the external shocks in Tanzanian economy have compiled in numerous studies. See Green et al., 1980; Balassa, 1982; Balassa and McCarthy, 1984; Helleiner, 1986; Rwegasira, 1987
resource inflows, and poor performance by the government\textsuperscript{13}.

In addition to these obstacles and constraints, the increasingly disadvantageous international economic situation in terms of trade in the export of primary products, destabilization and insecurity, the chronic lack of foreign exchange, negligence in supporting family sector production, the small and weak number of private sector actors in some countries like Angola, as a result of their hostility to the growing nationalization of their economies.

Similar to other SADCC countries like Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, the period of economic liberalisation seems to have yielded few benefits, mainly for the disadvantaged groups living in poverty.

With the exception of Botswana, in late 1984, the situation in SADCC member countries deteriorated and, as a consequence, the living conditions of the populations became painful, i.e., the communities became poorer compared to the standards of living achieved in 1981.

According to Anglin (1989:175), in the mid-1980s, SADCC faced the following problems:

\textbullet\ Mistakes in domestic policies in both design and implementation. Most member countries opted for policies that aimed at positioning the state as the main actor in the economy, through institutions of control and direction;

\textbullet\ In many SADCC countries, high birth rates, low productivity and efficiency were commonplace;

\textbullet\ With the deterioration in the terms of trade, many member countries experienced foreign exchange difficulties;

\textbullet\ Population growth rates above economic growth rates worsened living standards;

\textsuperscript{13} For more discussion see Stein, 1982, Beirmann and Wagao, 1986, and Wangue, 1987
Hostile international environment. The recession in the West led the governments of these countries to increase protectionism, increased prices of manufactured goods and a deterioration of raw materials;

Destabilization of the Republic of South Africa.

In the second half of 1980, Member States introduced economic reforms to respond to the worsening crisis, with economic adjustment programmes financed by the Bretton Woods institutions\(^\text{14}\). Encouraging results were achieved but they failed to overcome the obstacles and constraints.

The high level of dependence on donors and other external funding meant that SADCC’s success or failure depended more on the level of external assistance than on local and regional capacity and efforts. Industrialization in SADCC countries was very poor and the 1989 FAO report pointed to a decline in agricultural production during the 1980s, dropping from 3.3% in 1981-85 to -0.5% in 1986-89; food production falling below population growth in quite the same period (FAO, 1990, p. 9). Cyclical natural disasters (droughts and floods), aggravated by wars of destabilization and the lack of markets for traditional export products had contributed to the fall in agricultural production (Zacarias, 1990).

In 1982-83, Mozambique’s economy\(^\text{15}\) was in collapse as a result of weak economic policies, excessive government intervention, and civil war. Macroeconomic imbalances were severe in 1985-86: the inflation rate was 41%; real GDP growth of 2.3%; the fiscal deficit before grants of 24% of GDP; the external current account before grants being three times the exports of goods and nonfactor services; and the exchange rate in the parallel market exceeding by 25-40 times the official exchange rate.

---

\(^{14}\) International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

\(^{15}\) International Monetary Fund, 1998; National Statistics Institute, Mozambique, selected years
The Economic Rehabilitation Programme (ERP) introduced in Mozambique in 1987, involved a fundamental shift to market-based economic policies and structural reforms. The major economic reforms undertaken included the unification of the exchange rate; the liberalisation of trade; the reform of the import tariff structure and of exemptions’ regime; elimination of most price controls; privatization, liquidation or leasing to the private sector of over 900 public enterprises; and the liberalisation of interest rates under the reforms in the financial sector.

In the period 1987-97, the economy made some significant gains: real GDP and exports grew on average of 6.8% and 15.6%, respectively, and the ratio of investment to GDP rose from 36.1% in 1987 to 45.2% in 1997. In the initial year of ERP implementation, inflation increased sharply as a result of the devaluation of the national currency (Metical) and price decontrols. It remained high until 1996 when it dramatically fell from 70.1% to 16.6%, reaching its steady decline in 1997 dropping to 5.8%. Growth was expressive in all the major sectors. Agriculture, one of the pillars of the Mozambican economy, grew by 5.9%; transportation, industries, and services reached 11.3%, 9.1% and 8.4%, respectively.


In the early 1990s, there were profound transformations in the world with the east-west conflict, the end of the cold war, and in Southern Africa, changes in Apartheid policy with the release of Nelson Mandela from prison (February 1990) and the introduction of democratic changes culminating in multiparty elections in South Africa in 1994, the Peace Agreement in Angola and the
independence of Namibia (March 1990), and the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique (October 1992).

The changes in South Africa created a new environment in the sub-region and nurtured hope for a bright future of regional cooperation and development. It is within this framework that SADC was created in 1992, through the Windhoek Treaty in Namibia, as the transformation of SADCC from an instrument of political and economic coordination and survival into a scheme of economic integration aimed at increasing intra-regional trade, with its eyes set on the establishment of a common market.

With South Africa’s accession to SADC, there was an awareness of the great challenges that the organization had in relation to the efforts that could be made individually and collectively. For example, with the exception of South Africa, the SADC economies are small and most of them dependent on agriculture, which without diversification and specialization offers few opportunities for the promotion of intra-regional trade, one of the necessary conditions for regional integration.

The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, launched in September 1996 by the IMF and the World Bank helped eligible poor countries to reduce their external debt burdens to sustainable levels, as well as the elimination of any debt overhang that should be a hindrance to growth and investment. Fortunately, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia are the SADC countries among 23 which having reached their completion points in 1999, benefited by the enhanced HIPC initiative and started to receive debt relief in July 2001, i.e., writing off of billions of dollars of foreign debt to international creditors\textsuperscript{16}. In Zambia, for example, donors cancelled more than $6 billion in debt, leaving it with only $500 million in 2005,\textsuperscript{17} which put the country on a growth trajectory.

\textsuperscript{16} Abrego, L. & Ross, D. C., 2001  
\textsuperscript{17} See Bigsten et al., 2001 and Eberlei et al., 2005
The challenge for many HIPC was to ensure that effective and efficient use of all the resources available to them, putting money in priority areas like health, education, infrastructure, and other poverty reduction programmes.

In 2002, the SADC economies accelerated their economic growth to 3.2% per year, despite the slowdown experienced in other regions of the continent and the world. The SADC economies that registered high growth rates in this period and during the 2004-2008, included Angola (17%), Mozambique (8%), Tanzania (7%) and Zambia (6%) (Chichava, 2010; Da Rocha, 2015). The improvement in GDP growth in SADC member countries was due, among other factors, to the peace dividend and political stability, and the substantial improvement in macroeconomic policy management. As a result, poverty has been falling in SADC countries in the last 10-15 years. Comparisons of poverty levels and changes across countries are difficult because the years of surveys vary from country to country. Official data shows that, in Mozambique poverty fell from 69.7% in 1996 to 48.4% in 2015, but for each percentage point of economic growth between 2008-09 and 2014-15, poverty reduced by 5 percentage points, while in Tanzania and Zambia by respectively close to 4 and 7 percentage points between 2010 and 2015 (WB, 2018).

However, the performance of the SADC economies has been adversely affected by high oil and commodity prices and rising interest rates on loans. Many, if not all, SADC countries experienced some macroeconomic instability, due to high inflation rates and scarce external resources. Prices in at least six SADC countries have also been affected by natural disasters, notably droughts and floods. As can be seen in Table 2, political instability has also continued to a negative impact on growth rates in some countries in the region, namely Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo, and more recently Mozambique.
Between 2016 and 2019, economic growth in Southern Africa also declined as a result of strong dependence on exports of raw materials, notably in Angola (oil), Botswana (diamonds), and Zambia (copper) (Table 1).

### Table 2: Gross Domestic Product Growth (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRCongo</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eswatini</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>-7.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IMF (2019) Regional Economic Outlook, SSA, OCT 2019

Despite South Africa having a scientific and technological structure comparable to any country in the industrialized world, most SADC member countries face problems of a structural nature in their economies, with low competitiveness and weak diversification. This weakness can be associated with low investment in infrastructure, knowledge and technology, limiting these that make them vulnerable to external shocks. On the other hand, it has not been easy to reconcile the political and economic interests of member countries, as well as the disparity and complexity of their economies, which makes it difficult to implement the agreements that had been
approved within the framework of regional economic integration. It is enough to mention that the Free Trade Area established in 2008 still remains a dream, and that the Customs Union that should have happened in 2010, according to the official timetable, has been successively postponed for various reasons, the most visible of which is political. In fact, there is neither sufficient nor visible political commitment on the part of SADC leadership to impose the obligations of integration; political instability is still a reality, threatening the effective peace necessary for any development effort; levels of intra SADC cooperation are not sufficient and the distribution of costs and benefits of integration among countries is notoriously uneven and inequitable.

Hence, apparently, the Free Trade Area, within which all SADC member countries except Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Seychelles, “has not shown itself, at least for the time being, to be a real factor in increasing regional growth, as the Theory of Economic Integration teaches” (Da Rocha, 2015:23). Because of the structure of the majority of economies of SADC countries, such as low levels of industrialisation, heavy dependence on primary commodities, trade liberalisation in the form of intra-regional trade had little benefit for most countries as they simply do not produce tradable commodities within the region. A SADC Report estimated that the implementation of the trade protocol would expand regional income by only 0.33%18, whilst another study estimates that employment and GDP would increase by 1%.19

In conclusion, the efforts made in almost three decades since the creation of SADC have contributed little to reducing poverty that affects more than 50% of the population in the sub-region and have not even been able to achieve the goals established in the respective Strategic and Indicative Regional Development Plan (RISDP), due

---

18 SADC, 2000

19 Evans et al., 1999
to the weakness and vulnerability of most SADC member states (Taylor, 2016).

In the last ten years, the repeated acts of xenophobic attacks by South Africans in 2008, 2010 and 2018, targeting African migrants generally and specific nationals, such as Zimbabweans, Mozambicans and most recently Zambians 2019 demonstrate that South Africa, as a SADC member, has not committed itself to the joint establishment of a Southern Africa with peace, good neighbourliness, tranquillity, growth, and sustainable development. This behaviour of the country with an economy three times larger than all the rest of SADC shows the fragility in the real commitment of the leaderships to the ideas of regional cooperation and integration for the prosperity of the peoples of the respective countries.

The origins of xenophobia in South Africa are older than the outbreak of 2008, and the discourse of the underlying causes has continued intensely as unfinished research. There are arguments blaming South Africa for not making enough progress in combating xenophobic attacks following the 2008 incidences. Sosibo (2015, p. 2) argued that “it is not clear as to what extent have South Africa done to transform its society in its two decades of democracy because persistent poverty and unemployment cannot be excluded from the driving forces for xenophobic attacks”. With the same view, Fuller (2008) argues that South African citizens use immigrants as scapegoats for government failure to address domestic problems such as crime, unemployment, poverty and resources limitations.

In fact, despite lack of comparable data, poverty and unemployment in South Africa is perceived to have significantly increased democracy works foundation in 1994. In 2010, poverty was reported to have increased by 57.20% in 2006, subsequently declining to 56.80% in 2009, and then to 45.50%20 in 2011. Unemployment in South Africa averaged 25.3% over the period 2000-2015, reaching high

20 Statistics South Africa, 2014
of 31.20% in the first quarter of 2003 and a low of 21.50% in the fourth quarter of 2008\textsuperscript{21}.

The strategic changes needed for economic liberation in Southern Africa.

As discussed above, there can be no economic liberation of the Southern Africa unless the 15 SADC member countries undertake to pursue with unfailing determination the Windhoek Declaration of 17 August 1992 when SADC was transformed into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) under the motto: “Towards Political and Economic Integration”.

Therefore, the creation of COMESA, SADC and other regional economic integration organizations, including the launch of the Free Trade Area in September 2019, comprising 54 of the 55 African Union member countries, is part of the development efforts of the continent as a whole, hence the great responsibility of SADC member countries’ leaders is to realize this collective dream.

In this framework, something must be done, particularly in the modus operandi of the ruling political party leaderships to give a new and real impetus to cooperation and economic integration in the region. A paradigm shift is needed so that SADC can leverage national and regional development.

The first challenge to the change is internal. In each member country, SADC must cease to be an agenda of the ruling party or rulers alone, and become a window of opportunity for national and regional development. To this end, the ruling political parties and their respective leaders must take historical responsibility for the objectives of national liberation struggles and vigorously combat arrogance, tribalism, individualism, corruption, and respect the public and voters. Southern Africa needs leaders committed to the

\textsuperscript{21} Tradingeconomics.com, 2015
development and prosperity of their respective peoples, characterized by being not only upright and competent leaders but who accept to be first in sacrifice and last in benefit.

In Southern Africa, strategic partnerships should be achieved, for example, with academia and political parties that are non-oppositional, rather than ignoring or harassing them. The academia should be the source of knowledge and scientific studies on the development of countries on the basis of their own specificities, and should be nurtured, particularly by the ruling parties. SADC countries need to invest more in research institutions that can help find alternative solutions to the problems of low productivity and low-quality production, solutions that reduce the negative impact of natural calamities, and the most suitable medicines for the various pandemics.

The political opposition in many SADC countries is viewed as an enemy and viciously fought against. Inclusive development does not merit such treatment. Even if the section of the population supporting the opposition parties is small and considered a minority, it is important that all feel responsible for the development of their countries. We cannot deny the presence of members of the opposition and their supporters. They are as national as all those who fight them, and should not be ignored just because they disagree with some of the current government policies and have different points of view. Ruling parties in Angola, Mozambique, Malawi, Madagascar, DRC, Zambia, Zimbabwe, have been accused of some form of political intolerance and exclusion towards opposition parties, and such a situation undermines the national environment of common vision on development priorities in SADC countries.22 The lack of effective peace, dialogue and participation, and accountability ultimately makes any sustainable development project impossible.

22 Phirinyane, 2002; Ramsamy, 2004; and Akinola, 2018.
Therefore, the success of regional integration in the sub-region requires that, at the level of all SADC member countries, governing parties should establish strategic alliances with all political actors, academics, business, civil society, including signing memoranda of understanding (MoU) in the wider national dissemination of SADC’s objectives, institutional training and capacity building, participation in forums that discuss the various action plans, as well as willingness to integrate committees and other national and regional bodies charged with the participation of each country in meeting its obligations and goals. It is also important to institutionalize independent monitoring and evaluation mechanisms of government policies and plans such as the *African Peer Review Mechanism*\(^{23}\), in order to build confidence at the domestic level, and to gain sympathies at the regional and international level.

At the external level, it is necessary to mobilize friendly countries and international development partner institutions to support the institutional capacity building of the country, including the productive sector, through the approval of incentives for foreign direct investment (FDI) that primarily contribute to leverage the national private sector in order to be prepared to contribute to the increase of national production and productivity that will enable it to seize the opportunities and advantages that the Free Trade Area and the future Customs Union will bring to the sub-region of SADC.

---

\(^{23}\) Under the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), visionary plan of Presidents Thabo Mbeki, South Africa; Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria; Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algeria; Hosni Mubarak, Egypt; Abdoulaye Wade, Senegal.
Julius Nyerere 10-point Oath for nation building

1. Human brotherhood – Africa is one;
2. I will serve my country and all;
3. I will sacrifice my person to avoid ignorance, poverty, disease and exploitation;
4. Corruption is the enemy of justice;
5. A leadership position is of trust and not be used for personal gain;
6. I will educate myself to the best of my ability and use the knowledge to educate others;
7. I will cooperate with all my countrymen to build the country;
8. I will say the truth and not engage in envious deeds;
9. I will be a loyal member of my party and loyal citizen of Africa; and,
10. I will respect the president.


Ruling parties and alliances for sustainable development in Southern Africa

The role of political parties in improving the political situation in their respective countries requires the adoption of profound reforms and the implementation of broad-based and inclusive policies and strategies that envisage medium - and long-term economic and social development actions that are not only limited to government mandates. Structural reforms are needed in order to sustain the desired economic growth. On the other hand, we must always bear in mind that once elected to form the government, the governed are formed by the entire population including all those who did not give the ruling party a vote, political opponents and minorities. They all need to feel, in actions and programs, that the government of the day represents, frames and defends them. There is no doubt that in many SADC countries the existence of multi-party politics
is not the work of chance, but a project of the political parties of independence who correctly read the mood of the nation, and the regional and world political situation. These political parties of independence have the historical responsibility for the political reforms and cannot let others take ownership of this achievement.

Therefore, the ruling parties, when guided by the promotion of good governance, should invest in national alliances that privilege the creation and consolidation of strong and credible institutions that are guided by the respect of laws, instead of being dominated by influence peddling in the access to conditions, instruments and opportunities to do business in the country. State, private sector and civil society institutions must be strong because only then will it be possible to build strong societies, states and economies that facilitate economic integration and the strengthening of SADC.

Ruling parties in SADC, should invest as a priority in:

- building transport and communications infrastructure in both quantity and quality to encourage agricultural production and marketing that contribute to food security, and the promotion and diversification of exports;

- the training and development of human capital in quantity and quality, with particular emphasis on vocational technical education and girls’ education;

- scientific research that challenges national “brains” to find innovative solutions for increasing agricultural and industrial productivity, as well as reducing infant mortality and major epidemics;

- supporting the emergence and development of an African business class eager to produce wealth and transform the economies of their countries for the benefit of their populations;

- building strong institutions managed by competent nationals whose criterion for their appointment is meritocracy and
not nepotism or clientelism;

- Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) that provides intelligent alliances and partnerships with the national private sector, capable of multiplying jobs and contributing to the diversification of economies, with new products for domestic consumption and exports.

**Conclusions**

The African continent, particularly Southern Africa, has achieved significant levels of economic growth in the last 15 years, but is still a long way from achieving economic liberation. However, over the last 5 years, the performance of SADC economies has been adversely affected by high oil and commodity prices, as well as rising interest rates on loans. Many, if not all, SADC countries have experienced some macroeconomic instability due to high inflation rates and scarce external financial resources. In some countries, this situation is aggravated by less domestic policies, political intolerance, corruption, political and economic exclusion, and increased levels of poverty, causing people to become disenchanted with governments and their party leaderships.

To meet the challenges of economic independence, in an internal and external atmosphere of hostility to the historical parties of national liberation, the ruling parties need to reinvent themselves and show a strong political will to support the institutionalization and practice of good governance, the rule of law, accountability and respect for democratic rights and freedoms in their countries. Political leaders need to show their commitment to national and regional development by establishing strategic alliances with all political and social actors, the business sector and civil society, including academia, promoting the inclusion and participation of all in the sustainable national development agenda that can gradually lead to economic liberation.
At the external level, the ruling parties should put in place policies that contribute to the reduction of dependency, encouraging all foreign investment that contributes to the growth and strengthening of the productive capacity of the national business community which, hand in hand with the respective governments, will contribute to the creation of more employment and income that will ensure a growing welfare for all citizens of SADC member countries.

References:


International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2019). *Regional Economic Outlook, Sub-Saharan Africa*. October 2019;


National Statistics Institute of Mozambique. *Statistical Information from different Years (1990 to 2000)*. Maputo, Mozambique;


Ramsamy, P. (2004). *The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) as a Strategic Framework for Deeper Economic Integration and Social Development in SADC Region*, p. 149


Social Drivers for an Independent Progressive Future: How Can Ruling Parties Contribute to an Inclusive, Socially Just and Sustainable Development in Southern Africa?

Naome Chakanya

Introduction

More recently, there has been growing evidence that building alliances between political parties and different social actors is no longer a luxury but a necessity in order to establish inclusive, socially just and sustainable development in Africa (Kadima, 2005; Lodge & Fakir, 2015; Resnick, 2011). This is because social drivers and actors affect not only the outcomes of development but even more importantly, the changes that are necessary to achieve the sustainable future that Africa wants. In recent literature inclusive, participatory governance arrangements and empowerment have been recognized as important social drivers of inclusive and equitable development (UNRISD, 2013). Furthermore, there is growing recognition globally that, in order to be effective, participation must go beyond narrow consultation or dialogue with selected stakeholders. This came after the realization that in most cases social actors are elbowed out of the policy making processes due to limited understanding and misconceptions of their role as key stakeholder in national development process. This is the reason why the Sustainable Development Goals (Agenda 2030) and the African Union Agenda 2063 were crafted with various goals underscoring the need to include the social drivers at all levels as aspects of achieving a socially just, inclusive and sustainable development.
Sadly, four of the ten most unequal countries in the world are from Southern Africa, and the challenge in SADC is not only to improve growth, but to make it more socially inclusive and to affect a systematic redistribution of wealth (Kanyenze et al., 2017). Therefore, this paper will therefore debunk the social drivers and how ruling parties should utilize these in order to foster socially just and sustainable development. The paper also illustrates the stimuli for change ruling parties should provide to foster inclusive, socially just and sustainable development. The discussion on the social drivers will also be debated within the context of understanding what type of social forces and alliances that ruling parties should nurture that are critical for the change desired. Finally, the paper will also unpack the role that can these social forces alliances play for ruling parties to drive inclusive, socially just and sustainable development.

**Contextualising the social drivers**

Traditionally, macroeconomic policies have focused on economic drivers to foster sustainable development under the mistaken auspices and fallacy that economic growth will trickle down to the poor leading to reduction in poverty, resulting in the uplifting of lives of the poor people. Social drivers were neglected or taken as “odd ones” to sustainable development. Ruling and other political parties have also fallen into that same trap of neglecting the social factors and forces that are critical drivers towards inclusive, socially just and sustainable development. As emphasised by Kanyenze et al (2017):

> A defining feature of the macroeconomic policy frameworks in the region thus far, guided by the SADC macroeconomic convergence framework, has been the single-minded targeting of macroeconomic stability at the expense of social goals such as employment creation and poverty reduction.

It is important to highlight that at the heart of the social drivers are “the people” for any inclusive, socially just and sustainable development to be realised (Figure 1). According to UNRISD (2013), the social
drivers are underpinned by social structures, institutions and agency and include:

- The social structures and institutions that shape people’s preferences, behaviour and possibilities, and to agency, that is, the capacity of individuals and groups to influence change.
- The socioeconomic stratification of people by class, ethnicity, gender and location.
- The capacity of different individual and groups to influence change.
- The informal and formal institutions - “rules of the game” that shape the behaviour of people and organizations in fairly predictable ways.
- The way people and groups interact in networks.
- The ways in which individuals and groups respond and adapt to circumstances, including how they cope, innovate, organize and mobilize in defence of their interests, identity and rights.

Figure 1: Social Drivers for Sustainable Development

Source: UNRISD, 2013
Clearly, the social drivers are equally important as the governance or democratic, institutional or global drivers and they must be dealt with in a holistic manner by political parties. It can be argued that a system is legitimate only if it is able to advance the interests and basic human rights of the people. As shown in Figure 1, social drivers are about being sensitive to the most vulnerable sections of the populations such as children, women, people with disabilities, the workers, the poor peasants, refugees from neighbouring countries, minority groups, and under-privileged communities (ANSA, 2006).1

Hence, for the above analysis of social drivers it is critical to understand that the centrality of the matter is “inclusion”. According to Menocal (2017), inclusion follows two approaches, that is, inclusion in terms of process (e.g. how decisions are made), and in terms of outcomes (e.g. development that is more broadly shared). Both these approaches are important and mutually reinforcing. Ignorance of social drivers by ruling political parties has over the years resulted in exclusion, discontent and rebellion and undermining national self-determination (ibid). Ita-Imoh and Gbenegbara (2014) summarises this as political parties’ crises (Figure 2).

**Figure 2: Political Parties’ crises**

Source: Adapted from Ita-Imoh and Gbenegbara, 2014

---

1 Alternatives to neo-liberalisms in Southern Africa.
All the 5 forms of crises speak to two central issues, that is, the *people* and *their inclusion*. Ita-Imoh and Gbenegbara summarises the 5 forms of crises as follows:

(a) **The legitimacy crisis:** this refers to the problem of achieving agreement about the legitimate nature of authority and the proper agreement about the authority and responsibilities of government. Sadly, since independence, most ruling parties are being controlled by very few powerful and wealthy individuals (elites) in the party who have taken over high positions whilst the rest follow.

(b) **The penetration crisis:** the problem of political parties in reaching down into the society and effecting basic policies, as well as bridging the growing ethnic divide, hate and xenophobia propounded by some influential members of the party hierarchy.

(c) **The participation crisis:** this occurs when there is uncertainty over the appropriate rate of expansion and when the influx of new participants is constrained due to the notion of xenophobia, racism, ethnicity pushed forward by other sectors of the party machinery thereby creating serious strains on existing institutions.

(d) **The integration crisis:** this relates to how members from different ethnic groups are integrated into the party machinery. It is closely related to both the penetration and the participation crisis.

(d) **The distribution crisis:** this is how political parties are able to influence the distribution of goods, services, and values throughout the society. Unleashing a virtuous cycle of socially sustainable (inclusive) growth can be achieved through conscious implementation of integrative measures such as redistributive policies and active labour market policy interventions (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017). Hence, the important questions to answer include: Who is to benefit
It is therefore important for political parties to relook and review drivers of sustainable development integrating the social drivers together with the other drivers in a holistic manner. As supported by ACE\(^2\) (undated), “Most of the historical ruling parties, once colonialism - the original reason for the parties’ creation had ended, they came to be seen as impediments to “nation building and development” because they were seen to perpetuate ethnic differences by serving the interests of a single ethnic group rather than the interests of the country as a whole”.

**What stimuli for change should ruling parties provide?**

*The nature and structure of the party's institutions of social dialogue:* there is need to ensure that ruling parties’ institutions of dialogue (formal and informal) accommodate and involve the various social groups in the design, planning and implementation processes of programmes through open and transparent consultations as illustrated in Figure 2. These institutions should also ensure that the dialogue platforms are not ad hoc in nature but are ‘sustained, conscious, systemic and continuous’ engagement processes. Furthermore, there is need to create mechanisms that ensures that outcomes of such dialogue are binding and enforceable – moving away from a “gentleman’s agreement” approach.

*Developing an alliance policy:* there is need to ensure that a party’s alliance policy is developed through a highly inclusive and participatory process. Developing a policy ensures that building and sustaining social alliances are not dependant on who is leading the party at whatever point in time. This policy should

\(^2\) http://aceproject.org/today/feature-articles/strengthening-political-parties-for-sustainable-democracy-in-botswana/mobile_browsing/onePag
be institutionalized to avoid an “individualism” approach to social alliance building. Overall, the alliance policy should be built on class analysis, inclusion and practice, not on empty rhetoric and lip service.

Addressing the ‘gender democracy deficit’: Whilst some ruling parties have been scoring fairly well in terms of the number of women who hold leadership positions in the parties, however, apart from few exceptions (South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique and Tanzania) most ruling parties still perform poorly in terms of having women at the leadership and executive levels, although party and national constitutions are very clear on gender balancing. Historically, women issues have been relegated to the women political structure, an approach which has reinforced the gender divide. A transitional process is therefore required that ensures women’s full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership in all party structures. Literature has also shown that some political parties have employed the mixed-member proportional system in party elections as compared to having the quota system (Kapa, 2009; Mngonezulu, 2019; Matlosa, 2003). However, for this approach to be effective, it needs to be complemented by investment in change of mind-sets, from a patriarchal mind-set that predominates most political parties to one that is more gender-aware. In fact, the global community through the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially SDGs 5 and 16 underscored the importance of ensuring responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels in order to promote peaceful and inclusive societies. These SDGs provides opportunities to renegotiate women’s political power, advance gender-equality goals and thereby redefine the nature of the political parties along more socially inclusive lines (Menocal, 2017).

Addressing the “democratic deficit” though democracy education: Democracy education is critical for ruling parties especially those with young democracies still in incubators. Democracy education is essential for acquiring knowledge, skills, attitudes and democratic
values that enables supporters to exercise citizenship and foster their capacity to participate effectively and responsibly in their societies (Forje, 2005). Following on the example of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in Tanzania and FRELIMO in Mozambique, political parties should therefore establish and strengthen party schools for educating party members with these germane skills in order to regenerate the commitment to building and nurturing a democratic culture and good governance. Such party schools should endeavour to utilize opportunities created by ICTs in advancing democracy education and an engaged citizenry.

Deliberative vitality – This is defined here as the integration and participation of young members in political parties as illustrated in Figure 2. According to Kanyenze et al (2017), sub-Saharan Africa has not been able to create sufficient economic and social opportunities for its youth, failing to unlock the “demographic dividend”. Thus, harnessing the demographic dividend, together with cohesive (inter-generational) collective identities, underpins one of the power resources available to political parties to foster a socially inclusive sustainable development path that also ensures inter-generational equity.

Collaboration based on policy and ideology: The way in which ideology is unpacked and communicated can help cement the link between parties and social actors and like-minded movements. The more a party defines and communicates its policy positions, the more accountable and credible it also becomes. In fact, there is global consensus that parties that manage to maintain links with their original movements tend to be those which hold firm to their original cause, even after entering parliament (Randall, 2007; Randall & Svasand, 2002).

Resource mobilization: According to UNECA (2013), political parties that traditionally rely on fundraising for much of their campaigning, should consider ways in which fundraising binds broad groups of citizens based on transparency and accountability.
For instance, in India’s Aam Aadmi Party accepts donations as small as INR 1 (approximately EUR 0.01), acknowledging that even small donations by broad groups of citizens are symbolically empowering, especially to “poor” supporters (ibid).

**Embracing the digital factor (ICT)** – Innovations in technology are greatly affecting social, economic and political processes globally, shaping the relationship between citizens and political parties through the means and efficiency of communications. Technological developments are bringing in more dynamic interactions with larger groups of people especially the youths through social media. Given that political parties will require a regular engagement to involve not only the most committed original activists and supporters but also new members, investment in ICT is no longer a luxury but a necessity.

In addition, ICT innovations are making it easier for populist and extremist movements to mobilize support with the help of modern communication tools, such that they can mobilize quickly with relatively small structures (NDI, 2014). Investing in social media assists ruling parties to engage and inform its supporters and citizens in general about their efforts in policies they campaign on. Social media can also assist ruling parties in getting feedback from supporters and citizens about the parties’ achievements, best policies, citizen’s grievances which can assist the party in redefining their messages. Social media is also a tool to mobilise citizens to participate in face-to-face activities such as town hall meetings, policy discussion circles, and forums (ibid). Be that as it may be, there is need to take cognisance that there are other technologically deficit areas especially rural areas and they may need an appropriate approach to reach out to them.

Furthermore, ruling parties can tap into new ICTs to upgrade their information systems in order to provide supporters with up-to-date information for informed decision making.

Thus, political parties need to invest more in capacity development...
in ICT literacy and internet penetration so as to positively impact on the relationship between the party and its supporters. Additionally, social alliances, actors and movements often rely on digital communication to coordinate the mobilization of their activists and political parties can capitalize on this.

Addressing corruption: Corruption has frequently been termed a political and economic problem rather than a social issue. Corruption weakens political parties and impedes socially just, inclusive and sustainable development. In fact, at some point citizens have massaged corruption with socially “smart” words such as “tenderpreneur”, “transaction advisory fee” and “facilitation fee”. Unfortunately, corruption in ruling parties breeds mistrust among people inhibit political legitimacy (trust in government), social solidarity (trust in people) and if not adequately addressed can ultimately bring down a ruling party. Corruption also jeopardizes ruling party’s democratic stability. Along with the economic and social costs incurred, the political consequences are also serious in terms of public sector corruption, because they endanger the governments’ credibility and legitimacy. This has been the case in Zimbabwe in the “new dispensation” where President Mnangagwa’s actions to curb corruption have largely been rhetoric with a number of arrests of high profile and politically connected individuals yet, few cases of successful prosecution have materialised – “the catch and release” syndrome, thus undermining the credibility and legitimacy of him and the ruling party. [How has corruption manifested itself in ruling parties in Southern Africa? There are high profile cases that have been reported in Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe. It would have been useful to refer to them and show the extent to which they were addressed by the country’s oversight institutions, e.g. the Public Protector in South Africa, and Anti-Corruption Commissions, etc]. Discussing corruption in the abstract, without cite specific cases may not be very useful to the reader (officials from ruling parties).

Nation building and national identity: As accentuated by Menocal
(2017), in cases where the elites have used exclusionary nation-building as a rallying mechanism for selective incorporation and mobilization, based, for example, on narrowly defined group identities, this has led to biased state-building processes that have provided fertile ground for the outbreak of violent conflict. One notable example of national building strategy was that employed by President Julius Nyerere in Tanzania commonly known as the “10-point” oath (Box 1) which every government official and party cadre had to recite regularly. This mobilised the citizens to have a common vision in uplifting the country. Other examples include that of post-conflict Rwanda and lately Tanzania. For Rwanda, the President has been instrumental in harnessing the citizens through an inclusive process to develop a strong and widely shared vision for the future that is grounded on a re-invented sense of nation that considerably downplays (or even denies) the importance of group-based identities (Menocal, 2017). In the case of Tanzania, the “Magufuli Effect” resembles President Magufuli’s own nation building drive which has endeared him with Tanzanian citizens as well as those from other African countries (Musarurwa, 2016).

Additionally, the Zambia motto of “One Zambia One Nation” is a typical example of how ruling parties can reinvigorate and sustain social cohesion, national identity and nation building. This motto is regarded as Kenneth Kaunda’s legacy of “uniting the people in common beliefs, actions and values, culture fills with order that portion of life which lied beyond the people of state intervention… It fills in such a way as at the same time to integrate its society, on the basis of common attitudes and values… It creates the basis of the formulation of common destiny and co-operation in pursuing it”\(^4\)

---

3 The “Magufuli Effect” was centred on reducing government expenditure and corruption whilst pushing for Tanzania’s economic transformation and community development.

4 http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/definition-one-zambia-one-nation/
What type of social alliances are required for change and what role can they play?

For the ruling and political parties to achieve their goals, harnessing collective action through alliance building with different social actors as well as venturing into new forms of political participation and movement building cannot be undermined. Several studies globally have indicated that social alliances have proved positive and decisive, where it evolves into a process of bargaining around issues of broader public interest, bread and butter issues and where there are opportunities for a wide range of state and non-state stakeholders at different levels - subnational, national, regional, global - to participate (Global Alliance for Social Protection, 2019; Warner & Sullivan, 2004). However, where social alliances reinforce entrenched elite interests and privileges, they can have a negative effect on prospects for inclusion.

More critically, social actors are important for ruling parties as they are more connected with the groups whose interests they represent. For instance, trade unions represent workers’ interests in the forefront of their actions, which concern mainly the areas of wage bargaining and working conditions; business organizations are guided by the interests of its member corporations and their representatives; other social actors organisations focus on social or cultural issues or environmental issues, like welfare associations which focus on the production of social services (Hofmeister and Grabow, 2013). Thus, the ruling parties must be capable of learning the expectations, and implementing political programmes that meet the demands within the society as well as intensify their efforts to be in touch with these intermediate social actors so as to understand the expectations of the people, and to translate them into policies (ibid).

The following are some of the social alliances that can be fostered by political parties:

- Research and academia institutions;
Social groups, formations and classes such as women, youth, ethnic groups, People with Disabilities (PWD), among others;
Constituency based organizations such as trade unions;
Business associations;
Thematic based alliances such as those on debt, trade justice and social justice in overall.

More critically, building alliances is not a once-off, or an event but a process that needs leadership, time-frames, nurturing, assessment and evaluation along the way.

What role can social forces alliances play for change?
Social forces alliances can play several functions towards strengthening ruling political parties. These include:

- **The governance function** – social alliances can assist in putting in place the checks and balances that ensures that governance systems of the parties are adhered to. They can also assist ruling parties with ideas and strategies for the creation of a dynamic, participatory and radical democracy, which regards peoples’ mobilisation, demonstrations, open hearings as part of the struggle for an ethical and developmental state (ANSA, 2006).

- **The programming function** - setting up projects and programmes in the areas of the party’s competence. However, skills training and development will be primarily important in the areas of leadership, conflict management, fundraising, organisation and mobilisation, and negotiation (particularly with respect to forming social alliances (ACE5)). One way ruling parties can advance this cause is by establishing their own political schools as well as participating in the

---

Mwalimu Nyerere School of Leadership for SADC which is in the process of being established. The Mwalimu Nyerere School is a joint effort of six liberation movement parties are Tanzania’s Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia, the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). The aim of the School is to offer political training in leadership skills and political principles with the aim of strengthening unity and cooperation in liberating African economies.

**The policy development function** - create spaces and opportunities for empowering young people and giving recognition, visibility and credibility to their contributions. The social alliances can also add value in assisting the political parties in developing pro-poor and inclusive policies that are transformative in nature embarking on redistribution of assets, economic opportunities and income (Kanyenze, et al, 2017). Some of the social formations and actors are also critical in providing the ruling parties with demand-driven regional or international integration or grassroot-led integration as opposed to the “perverse integration” – integration that is not driven by the interests of the people but by those of imperial / colonial and new economic forces such as China (ANSA, 2006).

**The advocacy function** - disseminate publications and information material prepare and sustain campaigns and coordinate actions and programmes. In addition, social actors can also advocate for affirmative action in parties to ensure that the once marginalized social groups such as women and minority ethnic groups also effectively participate and hold key decision-making positions in the political party in the spirit of inclusivity and effective representation.
The monitoring function - Monitor and evaluate ruling party’s projects targeting and involving diversity of various groups (women, youths, ethnicity, PWDs).

It should further be pointed out that alliance building and effective participation involves more than giving people a voice; it is also about strengthening their capacity to gain control over decision-making processes. It is also about putting in place effective public policy that facilitate participation which should encompass investment in social services as well as civil and political freedoms that enhance the capacity of disadvantaged groups and social movements to organize and mobilize. In doing so, the 5 crises (Figure 2) are reduced or eliminated. As accentuated by Kanyenze et al (2017) “developmental states are not gifts, but are social constructs that emerged from social struggles”. Thus, the social drivers cannot be downplayed if ruling parties are to foster democratic developmental states.

References


Perdana, A. (2017), The relationship of civil society organizations (CSOs) and political parties in post-Suharto Indonesia: a women’s CSO perspective, https://d-nb.info/1131254627/34


UNRISD (2013). Emerging Issues: The Social Drivers of
Social Drivers for an Independent Progressive Future: How Can Ruling Parties Contribute to an Inclusive, Socially Just and Sustainable Development in Southern Africa?

Sustainable Development (E/CN.5/2014/8, 52nd session of the Commission for Social Development).

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACFTA</td>
<td>Africa Continental Free trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMODEG</td>
<td>Mozambican Association for War Demobilized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSA</td>
<td>Alternatives to Neoliberalism in Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEE</td>
<td>Black Economic Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Conservation Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBNRM</td>
<td>Community-Based Natural Resource Management, Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIE</td>
<td>Extractive Industry Civic Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODESRIA</td>
<td>Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDS</td>
<td>Democratic Developmental States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAWN</td>
<td>Development with Women for a New Era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td><em>Destacamento Feminino</em> (Female Detachment) in Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FADM</td>
<td><em>Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique</em> (Armed Forces of Defense of Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLS</td>
<td>Frontline States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td><em>Frente de Liberação Moçambique</em> (Mozambique Liberation Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWPP</td>
<td>Integrated Water and Power Plants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIFEMO</td>
<td><em>Liga Feminina de Moçambique</em> (Mozambique Women's League)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNCs</td>
<td>Multi-National Corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDR</td>
<td>National Democratic Revolution (ANC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMM</td>
<td>Organization of Mozambican Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAWLO</td>
<td>Pan-African Women’s Liberation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td><em>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana</em> (Mozambican National Resistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RISDP</td>
<td>Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development and Coordination Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPS</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>Southwest African People’s Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Patriotic Union</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The national independence and liberation struggles in Southern Africa were inspired by a larger vision of freedom, equitable redistribution of wealth and social justice for all. These noble goals remain as relevant today as they were then. Yet, the hopes of political independence did not materialize. Southern Africa is still characterized by high levels of poverty, unemployment, and social inequality. The new governments had to realize that political freedom remains hollow in the absence of economic freedom and self-determination. The articles in this anthology investigate why neither economic liberalization nor state-led-development worked so far in creating economic freedom for the postcolonial societies. The authors discuss ingredients for a more independent and autonomous development path and a just and inclusive society in the region and insist: Southern Africa must craft and advance a new social contract between the respective governments and their citizens. What does the notion of political and economic liberation still contribute in this context? What kind of transformation is needed to foster change towards social, economic, and gender justice, towards freedom and dignity?