

Mali-Mètre 10, political survey “What do the Malians think?”

**N° 10
13 to 27 October 2018**

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ISSN: 978-99952-75-02-0

PRÉFACE

Mali-Mètre is a tool for socio-political analysis that not only aims to compile Malians' perceptions and political opinions, but also to bring them to the attention of policy makers. Opinion polls are suited to guide political decisions and to encourage people to engage in the implementation and monitoring of public policies.

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) launched this survey in November 2012 as its contribution to the search for solutions to the crisis and to find ways to improve Mali's global governance.

This edition of Mali-Mètre took place from 13 to 27 October 2018, with a comprehensive sample of 2,156 people aged eighteen and over, spread throughout the Bamako District and in all regional capitals, including Kidal, Ménaka, and Taoudénit.

Just as in previous editions, it has surveyed the challenges and priorities on a national and regional level; it has reviewed the adoption and implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, derived from the Algiers process, security (Mali Defence and Security Forces, the BARKHANE Operation, MINUSMA, the EUTM, the EUCAP Sahel Mali), justice and good governance, reconciliation and the electoral process. The survey has included for the first time the Ombudsman of the Republic and the Espace d'Interpellation Démocratique in Mali as well as the EUCAP Sahel Mali.

Furthermore, this edition highlights Mali's key challenges, particularly with regard to justice in terms of trust and awareness of how it performs. Corruption and impunity, the perception of that which has not changed since the last survey, have also been taken into account. Compared with the previous edition, however, the baselines have shifted considerably with regard to several aspects that have been investigated.

Given that Mali-Mètre is a survey of perceptions by the Malian population at a given moment in time, its findings cannot be regarded as absolute truths.

The survey was approved by the National Institute of Statistics of Mali (INSTAT).

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung wishes you an enjoyable read and would like to express its thanks for your constant interest in the Mali-Mètre's findings.

Philipp M. GOLDBERG
Resident Representative

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

KOULI = Koulikoro

TOMB = Tombouctou/Timbuktu

MKA = Ménaka

TAOUD = Taoudénit

BKO = Bamako

ENS = AVG (average)

NSP = NE SAIT PAS Don't know/without an opinion

SUMMARY

The 10th edition of Mali-Mètre, just as with all the previous ones, aims to compile Malian's opinions on current and decisive outstanding issues for the present and for the future of the country: national and regional concerns, challenges and priorities, assessment of institutions, justice and good governance, implementation of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement emanating from the Algiers process, national security, elections, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, and future prospects for the country.

The survey was conducted from 13 to 27 October 2018, with a global sample of 2,156 people aged 18 and over, spread throughout the Bamako district and from all regional capitals, including Kidal, Ménaka, and Taoudénit. It was conducted by the GISSE Bureau of Studies, which involved 66 interviewers and supervisors in the field.

The sampling is based on the quota method, taking into account the following demographic characteristics: place of residence hereinafter referred to as locality, gender, age, and level of education. The findings' salient points are outlined over the following pages.

GENERAL SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY AND IN THE REGIONS

General situation in the country: Regarding the last 12 months, 42% of the population consider that the general situation in the country has deteriorated; 30% think that it has improved, and for 28% it has remained unchanged.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the population's assessments are in the same proportions.

Mali's major challenges: Primarily, they comprise "combat youth unemployment" at 49%; "combat poverty" at 47%; and "combat food insecurity" at 45%.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the three principle challenges were: "solve the crisis in the North" (53%), "combat poverty" (49%), and "combat unemployment" (46%).

Women are more numerous than men in citing to combat poverty and to combat food insecurity as the country's major challenges. In contrast, men are more numerous than women in citing to combat youth unemployment.

Challenges for the regions: Combating insecurity constitutes the first major priority for Taoudénit (84.4%), Tombouctou (82.7%), and the localities surveyed in the North of the country: Gao (76.8%), Kidal (73.3%), Ménaka (62.5%) and Mopti (56.4%). In contrast, for the other localities in the country, the priorities are, on the one hand, "construction of infrastructures" for Sikasso (69.5%) and Kayes (62.4%), and on the other, "combat youth unemployment" for Koulikoro (84.5%) and Ségou (52%) and "combat food insecurity" for Bamako (59.2%).

Priorities for Mali over the next six months: The majority of interviewees (56.1%) believe that "to combat unemployment" is a priority action that the President of the Republic and the Government should take in the next six months; this is followed by other priorities such as "to ensure food security" (38.3%); "to combat the high cost of living" (33.4%); and "to improve education" (28.8%).

TRUST IN THE INSTITUTIONS

Level of satisfaction with the President of the Republic in governing the country: 55% of interviewees are satisfied with the actions of the President of the Republic as against 44% who feel dissatisfied.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of those satisfied has increased by 6 points.

Level of satisfaction of with the Government's management: Citizens' opinions are almost equally divided between those dissatisfied (49%) and those satisfied (47%) with the Government's management of the country. *The proportion of dissatisfied citizens has declined 3 points compared with Mali-Mètre 9.*

Level of satisfaction with regard to MPs in the National Assembly: Overwhelmingly, at 60%, citizens are not satisfied with the members of parliament, as against 30% who are satisfied, and 10% who are without an opinion.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of those dissatisfied has increased 7 points.

Level of satisfaction with opposition parties: The majority of citizens (65%) are dissatisfied with the actions of the opposition parties, as against 22% who are satisfied, and 13% without an opinion.

In comparison with Mali-Mètre 9, the level of those dissatisfied has increased nearly 22 points.

The most dissatisfied citizens have been documented in Kidal (86%), Bamako (79%) and Kayes (74%); men (71%) are more dissatisfied than women (59%).

The level of those dissatisfied increases with educational attainment.

OMBUDSMAN OF THE REPUBLIC

Awareness concerning the Ombudsman of the Republic of Mali: The majority (57%) of citizens declared not being aware of the Ombudsman of the Republic as against 43% who declared the opposite. By locality, this institution is particularly well-known in Bamako (60.4%), Koulikoro (50.8%) and Ménaka (50%) and much less so in Taoudénit (93.7%), Kidal (90%), Tombouctou (78.6%), and Mopti (73.9%). Women (69%) are more likely than men (45.1%) of not being aware of the Ombudsman of the Republic.

The proportion of those who declare having heard of this institution increases with the interviewees' educational attainment.

Assessment of the Ombudsman of the Republic's actions: Opinions are divided between those who are satisfied (44%) and those who are dissatisfied (40%) with the actions of the Ombudsman of the Republic, without any significant impact in terms of gender, of educational attainment, or of age. Those without an opinion comprised 17%.

Those satisfied with these actions are recorded in greater numbers in Ménaka (68.8%), Kayes (63.8%), Gao (55.6%) and Sikasso (53%). Those dissatisfied are particularly to be found in Tombouctou (61.9%), Kidal (55.6%), and Bamako (52.4%).

Awareness of the Espace d'interpellation démocratique, hereinafter referred to as the EID: The EID is well-known by 35% of interviewees as against 65% who declare the opposite.

By locality, EID is particularly well-known by a significant minority of interviewees in Koulikoro (48.2%), Sikasso (41.2%), Bamako (40%) and Ségou (37%).

Assessment of the EID's performance: Among those aware of EID, 48% are satisfied with its performance, as against 44% who hold the opposite opinion. EID is appreciated by a majority of the population in Kayes (73.9%), Ménaka (63.2%), Gao (53.5%) and Ségou (53.1%). In contrast, residents of Bamako, Tombouctou, and Kidal are more likely not to value its performance with 61%, 60%, and 50% respectively.

JUSTICE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

Level of trust in the justice system: The majority of citizens (60%), place no trust in the justice system, as against a minority (36%) who trust it, without any significant impact in terms of gender, of age, or of educational attainment.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of citizens who distrust the justice system has increased by more than 5 points.

Level of awareness of how the Malian justice system functions: The vast majority of citizens (83.2%), declare having "no" awareness (49.8%) or a "poor" awareness" (33.4%) of how the justice system functions.

Assertion that the justice system is corrupt: The vast majority (85.1%) of interviewees at least agree with this assertion as against a small minority (9%) who do not agree, with no impact observed in terms of gender, of level of education, or of age.

Assertion that the justice system is geographically distant from the populations: This is shared by 57% of citizens, particularly those located in Ménaka (89.6%), Kidal (88.9%), Taoudénit (83.2%), Mopti (80.1%) and Kayes (72.6%). However, it is principally in Sikasso (66%) and in Gao (61%) that interviewees do not agree with this assertion.

Assertion concerning the population's lack of awareness of justice procedures: The vast majority (88.4%) of persons surveyed concur with opinion, as against 9% who are of the opposite opinion. This view is held in all the cities surveyed by at least 80% of the population, particularly in Mopti (97.7%), Tombouctou (93.8%) and Sikasso (93.5%).

Assertion concerning the complexity and length of justice procedures: More than nine citizens in ten (90.5%) share this view as against 5% who are of the opposite opinion. The localities of Mopti (98.5%) and Bamako (95%) have the highest percentage of inhabitants who agree with this assertion.

Assertion concerning the high cost of justice: This assertion is shared by 84% of citizens, particularly in Kayes (95.3%), Kidal (94.4%) and Mopti (89.1%). Impact in terms of gender, of age, or of educational attainment is not substantial.

Assertion that justice serves the rich/ those in power: The vast majority (87.9%) of persons interviewed agree with this assertion, as against 10% who hold an opposite opinion. Kayes (94.5%), Mopti (92.3%) and Bamako (92.1%) are the localities that feature the most favourable opinions to this assertion.

Level of corruption: For the vast majority of the population surveyed (91.1%), the level of corruption in Mali is high whereas 8% believe it is not high, with no impact to be observed in terms of gender, of age, or of educational attainment.

This proportion of the population surveyed who believe that the level of corruption is high has scarcely changed if compared with Mali-Mètre 9 (90%).

Principal reasons for the existence of corruption in Mali: They are predominantly “poverty of the populations” (48.6%); “low salary and income levels” (39%); “poor example set by leaders (31.6%); and “greed/avarice” (25.3%).

Areas affected by corruption: From the findings of the survey, it emerges that the areas most affected by corruption are the justice system (55.4%), the police (49.9%), other public services (32.3%) and the customs (27.6%). Other areas cited include health (20.6%), Mayor (18.8%), and Gendarmerie (14.1%).

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the three areas most affected by corruption have remained unchanged and in the same order of citation.

Measures needed to be taken to combat corruption: The interviewees recommend as measures to be taken: “severely punish the perpetrators and their accomplices in corruption (53.1%)”; “raise salaries in the public-sector and in public bodies (36.8%)”; and “oblige leaders to set a good example” (31.9%). Other measures cited include “demand transparency in the management of public affairs” (29.3%); “educate citizens on their rights and their duties” (20.7%); and “elect directors of public administrations according to merit (and not according to their political affiliation)” (20.2%).

Frequency of impunity: For the vast majority (88.3%) of citizens, impunity is very frequent (54.1%) or frequent (34.2%), without any impact in terms of age, of gender, or of educational attainment. Only 12% of interviewees think that impunity is not frequent in Mali.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of citizens who believe that impunity is frequent has increased 9 points.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION AGREEMENT

Source of information on Peace and Reconciliation Agreement: The principal sources of information for the population on the Agreement are the radio (65.6%) and the television (58.4%). The grin (29.2%), the family (21.2%) and the Internet (social media, online newspapers, etc.) (17.2%) are also cited by a significant proportion of interviewees.

The number of women for whom the family constitutes a principal source of information on the Agreement is higher than the number of men, 24% as against 10%.

Impact in terms of educational attainment is minimal, with the exception of television, which constitutes the most important source of information as educational attainment progressively increases.

Aspects of the Peace Agreement to be rapidly implemented: The majority of interviewees (56.3%) are without an opinion concerning which aspects of the Agreement to implement rapidly. The persons interviewed who held an opinion predominantly cited “disarmament and reinsertion of ex-combatants” (25.8%); and “the redeployment of armed forces” (19%).

In comparison with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of those without an opinion dropped 16 points and those favourable to the disarmament and reinsertion of ex-combatants has increased 12 points.

Assessment of the level of progress in the Implementation of the Peace Agreement: 60% of citizens believe that the process has made progress, while 24% judge the opposite, and 16% are without an opinion.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, opinions of citizens concerning the level of progress in implementing the Agreement have scarcely changed.

Awareness of actors in the Peace Agreement: For a great majority of interviewees (72.1%), the Malian State is the actor in the Agreement that they know best. Armed groups, notably the CMA (34.4%) and the Plateforme (21.5%), the international community (19.9%) and civil-political society (15.2%) are the other well-known principle actors.

In comparison with Mali-Mètre 9, concerning Regions of the so-called North, interviewees' awareness concerning the Plateforme armed groups reached 98% in Ménaka, 71% in Tombouctou, 66% in Kidal, 58% in Taoudénit, and 34% in Gao.

Concerning interim authorities: 63% of the persons interviewed declare not having heard of the interim authorities as against 37% who are aware of their existence.

The proportion of citizens not having heard of the interim authorities has increased 3 points compared with Mali-Mètre 9.

Assessment of the establishment of the interim authorities in order to bring peace to Mali:

Among the populations aware of the establishment of interim authorities, 61% think that they could bring peace to Mali, as against 30% who are of the opposite opinion, while 10% are without an opinion.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of those who value the establishment of the interim authorities has increased 4 points.

Satisfaction rates with the level of progress in establishing the interim authorities: 43% of persons aware of the measure do not appreciate the level of progress of its implementation, while just as many (43%) are satisfied, and 14% are without an opinion.

Trust in the Agreement to bring about stability, peace and security in Mali: 58% of persons aware of Agreement “partially trust” (37.5%) or “totally trust” (20.4%) in it to bring about stability, peace and security to Mali as against 35% who think the opposite.

In comparison with Mali-Mètre 9, a certain degree of stability in opinion levels should be noted.

Trust in the Agreement to lead to development in Mali: 58% declared that they “partially trust” (36.9%) or “totally trust” (21.2%) in the Agreement to lead to development, as against 35% who think the opposite.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of those who are trust that the Agreement will lead to the country's development dropped 3 points.

Trust in the Agreement to combat youth unemployment in Mali: 57% express “partial trust” (38.5%) or “total trust” (18%) in the Agreement to combat youth unemployment, while 36% think the opposite.

The proportion of those who are trust that the Agreement will combat unemployment has increased nearly 12 points, in comparison with Mali-Mètre 9.

Level of awareness concerning the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement: 85% of interviewees indicated having “no” awareness (56.7%) or a “slight” awareness (28.3%) of the Peace Agreement. Those who declare possessing a “good” awareness (1.4%) or a “moderate” awareness (9.3%) merely represent 11% of interviewees.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of those who declare not being aware of the Agreement has increased 2 points.

Recommendations for a better assimilation of the Agreement: 40% of interviewees declare not having any recommendations to make to the State and the actors in the Agreement for a better assimilation of the Agreement by the population. A minority suggest: “to inform them on the Agreement/translate the Agreement” (37.7%) and “to respect/to implement the Agreement” (10.9%).

SECURING STABILITY IN MALI

Assessment of the level of insecurity at home at night: 53% of persons surveyed declared not feeling secure at home at night, as against 47% who affirmed the opposite. This feeling of insecurity at home at night is particularly pronounced in Kidal (100%), Ménaka (97.9%), Taoudénit (80%), and Bamako (73.7%).

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of citizens who do not feel secure at home at night has clearly declined by more than 17 points.

Assessment of the level of insecurity going out alone at night: 64% of interviewees expressed not feeling secure going out alone at night, as against 36% who affirmed the opposite.

The number of citizens who feel secure on going out alone at night has declined nearly 13 points if compared with Mali-Mètre 9.

Assessment of the level of insecurity on going out alone by day: 60% of those surveyed judged that they did not feel secure on going out alone by day, as against 40% who affirmed the opposite.

The percentage of those who feel secure on going out alone by day has increased 25 points if compared with Mali-Mètre 9.

Assessment of the level of insecurity on visiting neighbouring villages: 65% of persons surveyed indicate that they do not feel secure at gatherings in public places, as against 35% who affirmed the opposite.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the opinion of the population in this regard has increased 20 points.

Assessment of the level of insecurity at gatherings in public places: 65% of persons surveyed indicate that they do not feel secure at gatherings in public places, as against 35% who affirmed the opposite.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the opinion of the population in this regard has increased 20 points.

Fear of terrorist attacks: 88% of interviewees declare fearing terrorist attacks, while 12% are of the opposite opinion. This fear is very strongly felt nearly everywhere by more than 80% of interviewees, except in somewhat lower proportions in Kidal (65.6%), Kayes (69%), and Taoudénit (55.8%).

Progress in the level of security in the region: 41% of citizens indicates that the level of insecurity has diminished, as against 30% who think that it has increased, while 28% think that it has remained the same.

The actors whom citizens trust to ensure security in the regions: A majority (68.9%) of Malians declared having trust in the Malian Armed Forces (hereinafter referred to as the FAMA) to ensure security in the regions, followed, in order of significance, by the Gendarmerie (56.8%), the Garde Nationale, hereinafter referred to as the Garde (44.3%), the police (42.6%).

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the number of citizens who place trust in the defence and security forces has increased 10 points for the armed forces, 8 points for the gendarmerie, of 3 points for the Garde, and 5 points for the police.

Level of satisfaction with MINUSMA's performance: 42% of citizens are satisfied with MINUSMA, as against 46% who are not, while 12% are without an opinion.

The proportion those dissatisfied with MINUSMA's performance dropped 7 points and those satisfied has increased in the same proportion if compared with Mali-Mètre 9.

Principle criticisms made against MINUSMA: They include "not protecting the population against violence from armed groups and terrorists" (59.0%), followed by "being in cahoots with armed groups" (32%); "contributing to the high cost of living" (29%); "protecting themselves" (21.7%); and "its mandate is not sufficiently known" (20.9%). These constitute the principle criticisms made against MINUSMA.

These major criticisms of MINUSMA are practically the same as those in Mali-Mètre 9.

Impact of MINUSMA's withdrawal from Mali: The opinions of the interviewees are divided along the following lines: 35% think that it would have a negative impact; 23% believe that it would have a positive impact, while 31% don't envisage it having any impact. It should be noted that the proportion of those without an opinion is 11%.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of citizens who think that the withdrawal of MINUSMA from Mali would have a negative impact has increased nearly 13 points.

Assessment of MINUSMA's length of stay in Mali: Concerning the length of stay that MINUSMA should remain in Mali, those interviewed who believe that it should be for "less than one year" are more numerous (38.2%); as against 22% for those who believe that they should remain for between "1-3 years," and 15% for "between 4-5 years".

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of citizens who believe that MINUSMA's length of stay should be "less than one year" has diminished 6 points, as against an increase of 7 points and of 6 points, respectively, for proponents who believe that they should stay for "between 1-3 years" and for "between 4-5 years."

Levels of satisfaction with the BARKHANE Operation: 47% of citizens are satisfied with BARKHANE's performance in Mali as against 44% who think the opposite, while 9% are without an opinion.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the opinions of those interviewed have scarcely changed in relation to their assessment of Barkhane's performance.

Criticisms of BARKHANE: BARKHANE is criticized for "being in cahoots with armed groups" (57.4%) and for "not protecting the population against violence from armed groups and terrorists" (41.6%). Other criticisms cited by a substantial minority of interviewees include: "not being interested in the country's development" (21.5%); "contributing to the high cost of living" (21.1%), and "protecting themselves" (21%).

Progress in the level of trust in BARKHANE: 45% of persons surveyed think that the level of trust in BARKHANE has dropped since the onset of France's military intervention, as against 29% who believe that it has remained the same and 18% that it has increased.

However, compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of those who believe that trust in Barkhane has dropped declined 2 points, whereas that who believes that this trust has grown has seen an increase of the order of 3 points.

Assessment of BARKHANE's length of stay in Mali: 39% of citizens believe that the French armed forces should remain "less than one year" in Mali; some 24% think that they could still remain for "between 1-3 years" and 15% for "between 4-5 years." However, note should be made that 12% of persons interviewed declare not knowing how long their remaining stay should be.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of those who support a stay of "less than one year" dropped 4% and proponents of "between 1; and 3 years" and for "4 in 5 years" have increased 9 and 3 points, respectively.

Awareness that the European Union Training Mission, hereinafter referred to as the EUTM, have been training the Malian army: About a half of respondents (50.2%) replied in the affirmative and almost equally as many (49.8%) in the negative.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of citizens who declare being aware of this training dropped 11 points.

Efficacy of the EUTM's training of the Malian armed forces: The majority of interviewees (68.6%) "greatly" appreciate this training, a quarter (24.9%) appreciate it "a little" and 4% who don't appreciate it "at all."

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of Malians who "greatly" appreciate the efficacy of this training has increased 6 points.

Growth in the level of trust in the National Army: 78% of citizens believe that the level of trust in the national army has increased as against 16% who think that it has remained at the same level, while 6% consider that it has dropped, without impact in terms of gender, educational attainment, or age.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the level of trust in the Malian army has increased by 15 points.

Establishment of the G5 Sahel Joint Force: 64% declared being aware of the establishment of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, as against 34% who declare the opposite.

In comparison with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of interviewees aware of the establishment of this force has increased by 13 points.

Assertion that the Malian army alone can secure stability in Mali: 66% of Malians agree with this assertion whereas 34% are of the opposite opinion.

Assertion that the Malian army can, with MINUSMA, secure stability in Mali: 55% of persons surveyed agree with this assertion, as against 40% who do not, while 5% are without an opinion.

Assertion that the Malian army can, with BARKHANE, secure stability in Mali: This assertion is supported by 55% of persons surveyed. 40% think the opposite.

Assertion that the Malian army can, with G5 Sahel, secure stability in Mali: 75% of persons surveyed agree with this assertion, as against 17% who do not agree, while 9% are without an opinion.

Assertion that the Malian army can, with ECOWAS, secure stability in Mali: 69% of persons surveyed agree with this assertion, as against 25% who support the opposite viewpoint and 6% are without an opinion. A large proportion of interviewees concur with this assertion, except in Kidal and Taoudénit where the majority supports the opposite opinion, with 68% and 56%, respectively.

Assertion that the Malian army can secure stability in Mali, with the assistance of MINUSMA, BARKHANE, and G5 Sahel: This assertion is supported by 63% of interviewees, as against 34% who hold the opposite opinion.

Awareness concerning the European Union Capacity Building Mission (hereinafter referred to as EUCAP) Sahel Mali's efficacy in training the police, the gendarmerie, and the Garde Nationale: 72% of interviewees declare being unaware of the participation of the EUCAP Sahel Mali and 28% declare the opposite. Inhabitants of the cities of Ménaka (42.7%), Ségou (41.3%), Sikasso (39.3%), Koulikoro (39.2%), Bamako (27.9%) and Gao (19.2%) are the best informed concerning the presence of the EUCAP Sahel Mali.

Efficacy of the EUCAP Sahel Mali's the training of the police, the gendarmerie, and the Garde Nationale: Among those informed about the EUCAP Sahel Mali, 69% declare "greatly" appreciating the training given to the police, to the gendarmerie, and to the Garde Nationale, as against 26% who appreciate it "a little"; and 3% "not at all."

Awareness of reform in the security sector: This reform is well-known by barely 17% of interviewees (16.9%) as against 83% who declare the opposite.

Assessment of reform in the security sector: Among the minority of citizens aware of this reform, 58% "greatly" appreciate its inclusive and participative nature and its contribution to improving the sector; 35% appreciate it "a little" and 4% don't appreciate it "at all."

ELECTORAL PROCESS

Assessment of preparations for the 2018 elections: 73% of citizens are satisfied with preparations for the 2018 presidential election, as against 26% who hold the opposite opinion. Women (77%) are predominantly more satisfied with preparations for the presidential election than men (69%). It should be noted that the number of those dissatisfied increases with educational attainment.

Assessment of the organisation for 2018 elections: 70% of interviewees are satisfied with the organisation for the presidential election, as against 28% who are of the opposite opinion. Women (76%) are more satisfied with the organisation for this election than men (65%). The proportion of those dissatisfied increases with educational attainment.

Assessment of the monitoring for the 2018 presidential election: 69% of Malians are satisfied with the monitoring of elections, as against 24% who are dissatisfied, while 7% are without an opinion.

Assessment of security arrangements for the 2018 presidential election: Three-quarters (74.9%) of persons surveyed are satisfied with the security arrangements for the presidential election as against 24% that are not.

Recommendations for good management of the next legislative and regional elections: “Organise transparent elections” (26.7%) and “secure and peaceful elections” (19.2%) constitute the two recommendations made by the interviewees for the good management of the next legislative and regional elections. Of note is that 31% of those surveyed could not formulate any recommendations.

Willingness to vote at the next legislative elections: 80% of interviewees declare intending to vote at the next legislative elections, 13% are of the opposite opinion, while 7% are undecided, without any substantial impact in terms of gender, of age, or of educational attainment to be observed.

Reasons interviewees don't intend to vote at the next legislative elections: Fundamentally, they are along the following lines: “I've yet to obtain my voting card” (37.9%); “candidates are not credible” (35.6%); and the “lack of trust in the voting process (11.5%).”

Reasons for the interviewees' indecision to vote in the next legislative elections: For the undecided, the reasons most frequently cited are: “I've yet to obtain my voting card” (34.5%), “candidates are not credible” (20.9%) and “undecided on the candidate” (14.8%).

TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION

Awareness of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (CVJR): 34% of citizens declare being aware of the establishment of the CVJR, as against 66% who say they are not aware.

The proportion of citizens aware of the establishment of the CVJR saw a decline of 3 points, compared with Mali-Mètre 9.

Importance of the CVJR's Actions: 81% among those aware of the existence of the CVJR consider that the actions that the CVJR executed are “important” as against 16% who judge them “not important.”

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, interviewees' opinions on the importance of the CVJR have scarcely changed in terms of the importance of actions executed by the CVJR.

Priority Actions for Reconciliation: For the majority of interviewees, the priority action to implement for reconciliation in Mali is to “organise intra-inter community dialogue” (55.3%). This is followed at some distance by other actions such as “to contribute toward reconciling the State with the local populations” (30.8%); “Simply pardon (without seeking to judge those responsible)” (16.6%); “compensate victims of the rebellions” (14.3%); “establish the truth on the exactions committed against the people” (14.1%); or “identify and judge those responsible for the exactions committed in the North by armed groups” (13.3%).

These priority actions are the same as those cited in Mali-Mètre 9 albeit in different proportions.

Enquiries and judgements of actors guilty of crimes and violence against the local populations: 74% of citizens consider the enquiries and judgements on the actors guilty of crimes and violence against the local populations as important, while 25% are of the opposite opinion.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of interviewees who judge these “very important” or “important” has increased 27 points.

Awareness about the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation: Only 14% of interviewees are aware of the Charter, as against 85% who declare the opposite.

Well-known aspects of the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation: Among the interviewees who declare being aware of the Charter, the quasi-totality (95.1%) are not familiar with any aspect of this Charter.

Assessment of the contents of the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation: Among those who declare being aware of the Charter, 60% have no opinion on its contents, 26% are satisfied and 15% are of the opposite opinion.

Government negotiations with Malian jihadist/terrorist leaders such as Iyad Ag Ghaly or Amadou Koufa: 65% of interviewees are favourable of this negotiation whilst 34% are against them.

Reconciliation between the President of the Republic and Soumaïla Cissé: 84% of interviewees (84.2%) believe this reconciliation to be important, as against 14% who find it unimportant, without substantial impact in terms of gender, of age, or of educational attainment to be observed.

FUTURE PROJECTIONS

Projections for Mali in six months: The majority, some 67% of citizens interviewed, believe that the situation in the country should improve within six months, 18% think that it will remain at the same level, while for 9% the situation on the ground will deteriorate, without substantial impact in terms of gender, of age, or of educational level.

Greatest wishes for Mali over the next five years: 75% of interviewees wish that within five years Mali will enjoy “peace and security” and 50% expressed a wish for “youth employment.” Other wishes cited, albeit in less significant proportions of the population, include: “good harvests and food security” (37.9%), “the end of poverty” (20.7%), “better access to healthcare” (18.9%).

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the ranking for the greatest wishes expressed has practically not changed.

1. Context and Justification

Mali-Mètre was initiated at the close of 2012 against the background of the multi-dimensional crisis that Mali is experiencing, the scale and severity of which threatens to destabilize the country and the entire sub-region.

With an average of two editions per annum, Mali-Mètre has ever since been a barometer of Malian opinion on current issues, reflecting the population's needs, concerns, and expectations. Mali-Mètre aims to be an instrument for compiling opinions, helping to fill the public opinion poll deficit in the country, and to regularly provide scientifically elaborated data to decision-makers and their collaborators, project managers and development programs, researchers and students.

For the tenth edition of Mali-Mètre, the object is to compile opinions around themes linked to current issues, notably the 2018 presidential election, the establishment of interim authorities at a level local, and so forth.

1.1. Survey's Objectives

Its key objective is to compile opinions encapsulating the entire spectrum of Malian society on various current outstanding issues or those decisive for the country's present and future. More specifically, this edition focuses on the following key points:

- National and regional concerns, challenges, and priorities,
- The assessment of the institutions,
- Justice and good governance
- The implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation,
- Securing stability in the country,
- The forthcoming elections,
- The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission,
- Prospects for the future.

1.2. Methodological Approach

1.2.1. Targeted Population and Survey Technique

Area Covered

As indicated in the Terms of Reference, the areas concerned by this survey are the nation's ten regional capitals, in addition to the District of Bamako.

Targeted Population and Sampling

The targeted population is the totality of persons aged eighteen years or over who are to be found in the regional capitals or in the District of Bamako at the time the survey is conducted. Hence, the survey is representative in terms of the regional capitals and of the District of Bamako.

In the interpretation of data, "the population, the citizens or even the Malians" refers to the entire population of the regional capitals and the District of Bamako.

The size of the sample has been fixed according to the estimate of a domain proportion. However, the final size of the sample takes into account two other aspects:

- Adjustment of low density regions: Some regions notably Kidal, Ménaka, and, Taoudénit will have somewhat weaker densities when applying a proportional breakdown of the sample between the regions; a positive adjustment is therefore needed in favour of lower density regions;
- Anticipation of a non-response: One of the important aspects of sample surveys is the anticipation of a non-response. For example, if we start on the basis of exactly 1,000 persons to interview, it is probable that at the end of field operations that we will have less than 1,000 questionnaires at our disposal (loss of questionnaires, questionnaires incorrectly completed, and so on.) To avoid this pitfall, we have proceeded with a mark-up of nearly 5% of the size of the initial sample.

The formula of the size of the sample to estimate a domain proportion is as follows:

$$n = \left\lfloor \frac{p(1-p)t_a^2}{d^2} \right\rfloor$$

In which:

P: is the proportion of the main variable sought. Given the previous formula, setting P at 50% corresponds with the maximum size of the sample that should be drawn from it.

ta: is equal to 2.326 for α fixed with a threshold of 98% (bilateral test);

d: accuracy level of P, here set at 2.85%;

This generates an initial number of 1,666 persons to interview. The final size of the sample is fixed at 1,989. This size takes into consideration all the concerns for the breakdown of the sample.


Breakdown of the Sample between regions

Région	Population	Région %	Taille initiale	Taille ajustée	Taille réponse	+non
Bamako	1 809 106	12,46%	208	208	218	
Gao	474 120	3,27%	54	75	79	
Kayes	1 996 812	13,75%	229	229	241	
Koulikoro	2 418 305	16,66%	278	278	291	
Mopti	2 037 330	14,03%	234	234	245	
Ségou	2 336 255	16,09%	268	268	282	
Sikasso	2 625 919	18,09%	301	301	316	
Tombouctou	672 691	4,63%	77	77	81	
Kidal	67 638	0,47%	8	75	79	
Ménaka	70 000	0,48%	8	75	79	
Taoudénit	9 000	0,06%	1	75	79	
TOTAL	14 517 176	100%	1 666	1 895	1 989	

The spread of 1,666 persons between the 11 geographical layers gives at least ten persons to survey for the regions of Kidal, Ménaka, and Taoudénit. These sizes are too low to estimate indicators by region. We determined that the minimal number of persons to survey at seventy-five individuals per region. Hence, those regions having less than seventy-five persons were brought up to seventy-five.

After this adjustment, the size is 1,895 persons to survey, with a minimal threshold of seventy-five persons per region. We could thus interview at least thirty men and thirty women by region (thirty being the minimal size for being able to apply the Law of Large Number (LLN)).

We subsequently increased this sample by 5% to take into account the risk/possibility of a non-response, which gives a final size of 1,989 individuals. The following table shows the breakdown of the sample between the 11 layers.

Table 1: Sample Breakdown between the 11 Layers

1.2.2. Statistical Implication of the Adjustment of the Sample Size

With a proportional breakdown, the sample size should be eight persons in the Kidal region. With the well thought out breakdown, however, (in order to be able to calculate the statistics by region) we anticipated interviewing nearly 79 persons in this region. This adjustment is not without statistical consequences on the calculation of indicators in terms of all the zones. In fact, it is as though one attributed to Kidal a significance that it doesn't really merit. Statistically, during the analysis, an adjustment factor enables us to give to every layer its veritable significance.

Formula for calculating the adjustment factor: In considering a zone i (for example, the Kadal region, this zone adjustment factor is calculated using the following formula:

$$\Pi_i = \mu_i / a_i$$

Π_i is the adjustment factor calculated for zone i ;

μ_i is the size that should be applied in the case of proportional breakdown;

a_i is the size that was applied in well thought out breakdown.

1.2.3. Procedure involved in drawing the sample


The sample draw is executed in such a way as to ensure the representativeness of the population with regard to its demographic structure. For this purpose, we employed the quota method with gender, age, and educational attainment as the quota variables. For more rigour, this method was completed by a drawing procedure involving a household before drawing the individual corresponding to the quota criterion. For this purpose, we first divided the sample between neighbourhoods in the chosen regional capital before choosing individual households in the neighbourhoods. Once the household was chosen, we took into account the quota criteria for the choice of persons to interview. The interviewer explains the purpose of his/her visit and asks if there is an individual in the household who meets his/her quota criteria in order to undertake an interview. However, the following cases may arise:

- No member of the household responds to the quota criteria: In this case, the interviewer exits this household and chooses the household immediately adjacent to the previous household (to the left).
- Several persons respond to the quota: If several persons respond to the quota, the interviewer shall choose one person at random.

1.2.4. Interviewed Sample

In total, 2,156 persons aged eighteen and over were surveyed (most interviewers executed a little more than they had been asked in order to avoid having to return to the terrain if ever the questionnaires were invalidated). The adjustment factor was calculated based on the 2,156 individuals surveyed. The sample breakdown of those surveyed by region is presented in the following table.

Table 2: Breakdown of the sample of those surveyed by regional capital and the District of Bamako



• Specificity for Taoudénit:

As against the other regional capitals, Taoudénit presents the specificity of not yet having a regional capital. In fact, this Region covers a very sparsely inhabited desert zone and the zone chiefly comprises the commune of Salam. Hence, according to the authorities (contacted by the team working in the field), the region's cartography is still at a conceptual level and the regional capital has not definitively been established. It was thus a question of selecting two large villages in the region (**Agouni** and the chief-town of the commune of **Salam**).

1.2.5. Mobilisation and Training of Interviewers and Supervisors

Interviewers were recruited on the basis of experience, awareness of the field, and the area's local languages. The training that mobilised thirty-one agents took place between 6 and 12 October 2018 in Bamako at the GISSE office. Training was executed in two groups: (1) the interviewers of the first group, for the cities of the so-called North, namely Tombouctou, Gao, Kidal, Ménaka, and Taoudénit; it involved thirty interviewers and supervisors during three days; (2) as for training interviewers in the second group, for the other regional capitals and the District of Bamako, it involved thirty-six interviewers and supervisors during three days. This pooling of interviewers and the time lag in the training takes into account security constraints and transport in regions in the so-called North and particularly the significant time management in the context of this survey.

Furthermore, many interviews are carried out in local languages. In fact, for a good understanding of the questionnaire in the local language, the questionnaire has been translated by experts in the main languages spoken in Mali, especially Bamanakan, Sonrháï, Tamasheq, and Foulfouldé. Hence, training for the interviewers is given both in French and in these languages.

The survey was approved by the National Institute of Statistics of Mali (INSTAT) and the compilation of data took place from 13 to 27 October 2018.

1.3. QUALITY CONTROL

Quality control of the collected data is based upon on the entire team's conscientiousness and experience (of interviewers and supervisors alike) in terms of the survey, awareness of the zone surveyed, in particular recent awareness for particularly difficult regions in the North, the follow-up, the control and the verification of questionnaires filled in by supervisors in the field. Moreover, the assistants (statisticians and programmers) ensure the coherence and quality of the filling up of questionnaires with all the data collected. Lastly, as an ultimate control procedure, 10% of those surveyed were contacted at random by means of their telephone numbers by the Bureau GISSE from Bamako to verify that the interviewers had actually visited them.

1.4. DATA ENTRY AND AUDITING

This process was not necessary due to the fact that the survey was conducted with tablets. However, the open questions were codified after the survey and then (re) entered by an experienced team of operators. The date entry mask was made on the CS Pro software. It enables efficient data entry and data transfer into the SPSS software for statistical analysis. Finally, an auditing program was carried out in Stata, which corrected some inconsistencies.

1.5. PRODUCTION OF OUTPUTS

The survey's findings led to the production of an interim report drafted by a consultant committed to this purpose and subject to validation by the client. Comments, criticisms, and suggestions made by the client were taken into account during preparations for the final report, including a full report and a summary of the key findings. In addition to the summary, the report is divided into two parts: the first part deals with the survey's context and methodological framework and the second part presents the results themselves through a general and detailed analysis of the answers. These finding furnish insights into the frequency and/or importance of the responses given, based on the proportion of respondents for each question. Almost all of them are represented in the text as tables.

It should be noted that these finding are calculated on the basis of the adjusted sample. Some questions require conditions (skip) to answer them. For example, the satisfaction with the level of progress of the establishment of the interim authorities is posed only to those who answered that they aware of the establishment of the interim authorities in the first instance. Hence, the number of people answering such questions may be small (below 30) for cities such as Mopti, Kayes and Sikasso.

The percentages calculated are therefore not, in these instances, statistically interpretable. Findings of the impact in terms of gender, age and educational level are mostly presented as graphs, should they be significant. They are mentioned as insignificant or not very significant if the relationship with the respondents' answers is not sufficiently established. Finally, it should also be noted that the total of the answers is always greater than 100% for the case of those questions whose modalities for answering are multiple.

2. THE STUDY'S FINDINGS


2.1. GENERAL SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY AND IN THE REGIONS

2.1.1. Assessment of the general situation in the country

For more of 41% (41.5%) of interviewees, the general situation in the country has deteriorated over the last 12 months, as against less than a third (30.1%) who believe that it has improved, and 28% who judge that it has remained the same, as indicated in *Table 3*.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, opinions tend to be almost identical (43% in Mali-Mètre 9 as against 42% in 2018).

Table 3: Breakdown of interviewees according to their assessment of the general situation in the country




By locality, the opinion that the general situation in the country has deteriorated is particularly prominent in Bamako (57.9%) and Mopti (49%), and to a lesser extent in Ségou (45%), Taoudénit (44.2%) and Koulikoro (42.1%). The situation has improved for a majority of the population in Ménaka (57.3%) and, in a lower proportion, in Sikasso (42.7%) and Gao (41.4%). In contrast, it has remained the same for a relatively high proportion of citizens in Kidal (47.8%) and Kayes (36.5%) over the last 12 months.

2.1.2. Major Challenges for Mali

According to interviewees, the most serious challenges currently facing Mali are cited in almost identical proportions: combat youth unemployment (48.6%), combat poverty (46.6%) and combat food insecurity (45.1%) as indicated in *Table 4*. Other challenges cited in among relatively high proportions of the population surveyed include: “solve the problem of the North” (31.1%); “improve education” (29.3%); “combat insecurity” (27.2%); and “improve the health system” (23.6%).

Table 4: The major challenges currently facing Mali



Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the major challenges cited have remained the same although the ranking order is different. In Mali-Mètre 9, this ranking order was “to solve the crisis in the North (52.6%); “combat poverty” (49.2%); and “combat unemployment” (46.2%).

The challenges cited and their ranking varies significantly by locality. “Combat insecurity” or “solve the problem of the North” come out on top as the challenges cited in localities in the so-called North (Gao, Kidal, Taoudénit, Tombouctou, and Ménaka), in equal measure to “combat youth unemployment,” “combat poverty” and/or “combat food insecurity” as Mali’s major challenges in the other localities (Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Ségou, and Mopti).

By locality, the three major challenges major are ranked as follows:

Kayes : 1. “Combat poverty” (63.1%); 2. “Combat youth unemployment” (52.5%); and 3. “Combat food insecurity” (44.7%).

Koulikoro : 1. “Combat youth unemployment” (69.9%); 2. “Combat food insecurity” (46.3%); and 3. “Solve the problem of the North” (46.6%).

Sikasso : 1. “Combat poverty” (48.6%); 2. “Combat youth unemployment” (42.1%); and 3. “Solve the problem of the North” (33%).

Ségou : 1. “Combat food insecurity” (50%); 2. “Combat youth unemployment” (46.7%); and 3. “Combat poverty” (43.3%).

Mopti : 1. “Combat food insecurity” (56%); 2. “Combat insecurity” (43.6%); and 3. “Combat poverty” (42.4%).

Tombouctou : 1. Combat insecurity” (78.6%); 2. “Solve the problem of the North” (58.2%); and 3. “Combat youth unemployment” (50%).

Gao : 1. Combat insecurity” (66.7%); 2. “Combat poverty” (42.4%); and 3. “Solve the problem of the North” (42.4%).

Kidal : “Solve the problem of the North” (83.3%); 2. “Combat insecurity” (74.4%); and 3. “Combat youth unemployment” (32.3%).

Ménaka : 1. . “Solve the problem of the North” (59.4%); 2. “Combat insecurity” (42.7%); and 3. “Combat poverty” (35.4%).

Taoudénit : 1. “Combat insecurity” (83.2%); 2. “Solve the problem of the North” (60%); and 3. “improve the health system” (43.2%)

Bamako : 1. Combat food insecurity” (65.4%); 2. “Combat poverty” (65.4%); and 3. “Combat as against youth unemployment” (56.7%).

In terms of gender, an analysis of *Table 5* reveals a higher proportion of women (55.5% and 49.2%) than men (38.1% and 41%) who cite “combat poverty” and “combat food insecurity” as Mali’s major challenges. The opposite is observed in terms of the challenge “combat youth unemployment” (51.2% for men and 45.9% for women).

Table 5: Impact in terms of gender on Mali’s major challenges as cited by the interviewees






Table 6 indicates that the proportion of citizens who cite the challenges “combat youth unemployment” increases with the level of instruction. Conversely, this proportion diminishes with the educational level for the challenges “guarantee food security”, “combat high cost of living” and “improve education.”

Table 6: Impact of educational level on major challenges

The following analysis, as indicated in *Table 7*, reveals a divergence in opinions in terms of age. The challenge “combat youth unemployment” is cited as the primary major challenge by those in the young age bracket (59.2% for the 18-24 year-olds and 52.2% for the 25-35 year-olds (52.7%), and as second major challenge for those in the upper age brackets (45.3% for the 36-55 year-olds and 48.4% for those age 56 and over). Concerning the challenge “combat food insecurity”, it is cited in first position by those in the older age brackets (53.5% for the 36-55 year-olds and 52.3% for those age 56 and over), while “solve the problem of the North” is cited as a major challenge only by the age category 56 and over (4.7%). Lastly, “combat poverty” is mentioned as the second major challenge by all age categories.

Table 7: Impact of age on Mali's major challenges

2.1.3. The Regions' Three Major Challenges

The three major challenges of each region as perceived by the inhabitants of these localities are presented as follows:

Kayes : 1. “Develop infrastructures (roads, energy, water)” (62.4%); 2. “Upkeep of existing infrastructures” (49.8%); and 3. “Combat unemployment” (45.9%).

Koulikoro : 1. “Combat unemployment” (84.5%); 2. “Combat poverty” (48.2%); and 2. ex. “Combat food insecurity” (48.2%).

Sikasso : 1. “Construct infrastructures” (69.5%); 2. “Combat youth unemployment” (51.1%); and 3. “Combat poverty”(46.7%).

Ségou : 1. “Combat youth unemployment” (52%); 2. “Combat food insecurity” (49.7%); and 3. “Combat poverty” (45%).

Mopti : 1. “Combat insecurity”(56.4%); 2. “Combat food insecurity” (51%); and 3. “Combat poverty”(38.9%).

Tombouctou : 1. “Combat insecurity” (82.7%); 2. “Combat youth unemployment” (53.1%); and 3. “Solve the problem of the North” (31.6%).

Gao : 1. “Combat insecurity” (76.8%); 2. “Combat poverty” (44.4%); and 3. “Combat youth unemployment” (39.4%).

Kidal : 1. “Combat insecurity” (73.3%); 2. “Combat food insecurity” (44.4%); and 3. “Solve the problem of the North” (42.2%).

Ménaka : 1. “Combat insecurity” (62.5%); 2. “Solve the problem of the North” (33.3%); and 3. “Combat food insecurity” (31.3%).


Taoudénit : “Combat insecurity” (84.2%); 2. “Solve the problem of the North” (53.7%); and 3. Improve the health system” (46.3%).

Bamako : 1. “Combat food insecurity” (59.2%); 2. “Combat poverty” (55%); and 3. “Combat youth unemployment” (47.1%).

2.1.4. Mali's priorities over the next six months

The majority of citizens (56.1%) (see Table 8), think that the priority action that the President of the Republic and the Government must undertake over the next six months is to "combat unemployment." Other actions cited in their order of frequency are: "ensure food security" (38.6%), "combat high costs of living" (33.4%) and "improve education" (28.8%). Lastly, "improve the health system," "combat insecurity," "revive the economy," "solve the problem of the North," and so forth are priorities mentioned by a lower proportion of respondents.

Table 8: Priority Actions for the President of the Republic and the Government of Mali



Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the priority for the President and for the Government over the following six months has practically remained the same: “combat unemployment,” 59% in Mali-Mètre 9 while 56% in 2018; “ensure food security,” 36% for Mali-Mètre 9 as against 39% in 2018; “combat high cost of living,” 36% in Mali-Mètre 9; and 33% in 2018, and so on.

By locality, the priorities are as follows:

Kayes : 1. “Combat unemployment” (65.5%); 2. “Ensure food security” (46.7%); and 3. “Combat high costs of living” (43.9%).

Koulikoro : 1. “Combat unemployment” (79.6%); 2. “Ensure food security” (40.1%); and 3. “Improve education” (27.8%).

Sikasso : 1. “Combat unemployment” (53.9%); 2. “Ensure food security” (28.3%); and 3. “Improve education” (32.7%).

Ségou : 1. “Combat unemployment” (47.3%); 2. “Ensure food security” (44.3%); and 3. “Improve health system” (36.3%).

Mopti : 1. “Ensure food security” (31.9%); 2. “Combat high cost of living” (51%); and 3. “Combat unemployment” (36.2%).

Tombouctou : 1. “Combat insecurity” (62.2%); 2. “Combat unemployment” (54.1%); and 3. “Solve the problem of the North” (34.7%).

Gao : 1. “Combat unemployment” (60.6%); 2. “Combat insecurity” (36.4%); and 3. “Combat high cost of living” (27.3%).

Kidal : 1. “Combat unemployment” (56.7%); 2. “Reconcile Malians” (45.6%); and 3. “Combat corruption” (28.9%).

Ménaka : 1. “Combat unemployment” (57.3%); 2. “Improve health system” (42.1%); and 3. “Combat injustice” (34.4%).

Taoudénit : 1. “Combat unemployment” (53.7%); 2. “Improve health system” (42.1%); and 3. “Improve education” (36.8%).

Bamako : 1. “Ensure food security” (58.3%); 2. “Combat unemployment” (57.9%); and 3. “Improve education” (45%).

2.1.5. Priority for the Regions

The first three (3) priorities for the regions classified in their order of frequency and on which the President of the Republic and the Government should act over the next six months are indicated as follows:

Kayes : 1. “Construct infrastructures” (69.9%); 2. “Combat youth unemployment” (51.8%); and 3. “Combat high cost of living” (43.3%).

Koulikoro : 1. “Combat unemployment” (87.1%); 2. “Ensure food security” (40.8%); and 3. “Combat high cost of living” (35.6%).

Sikasso : 1. “Construct infrastructures” (74.1%); 2. “Combat youth unemployment” (56.7%); and 3. “Improve education” (34.1%).

Ségou : 1. “Combat unemployment” (56.3%); 2. “Ensure food security” (50.7%); and 3. “Improve education” (40%).

Mopti : 1. “Combat high cost of living” (40.1%); 2. “Combat youth unemployment” (38.5%); and 3. “Combat insecurity” (35.4%).

Tombouctou : 1. “Combat insecurity” (74.5%); 2. “Combat youth unemployment” (54.1%); and 3. “Construct infrastructures” (25.5%).

Gao : 1. “Combat insecurity” (60.6%); 2. “Combat unemployment” (53.3%); and 3. “Construct infrastructures” (33.3%).

Kidal : 1. “Combat youth unemployment” (64.4%); 2. “Improve education” (40%); and 3. “Reconcile Malians” (25.6%).

Ménaka : 1. “Combat unemployment” (41.7%); 2. “Combat high cost of living” (41.7%); and 3. “Improve education” (38.5%).

Taoudénit : 1. “Improve education” (58.5%); 2. “Improve health system” (48.4%); and 3. “Combat unemployment” (38.9%).

Bamako : 1. “Combat unemployment” (61.3%); 2. “Combat insecurity” (65.3%); and 3. “Improve education” (41.3%).


2.2. TRUST IN THE INSTITUTIONS

2.2.1. Satisfaction with the President of the Republic's Actions

Table 9 indicates that the majority of Malians (55.3%) are rather satisfied (36.7%) or very satisfied (18.6%) with the President of the Republic's actions, as against 44% who are rather dissatisfied (22.3%) or very dissatisfied (21.4%).

By comparison with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of citizens satisfied with the President of the Republic's actions has increased 6 points and those dissatisfied has dropped 6 points.

Table 9: Satisfaction with the President of the Republic's Actions




By locality, the proportion of interviewees who were rather satisfied or very satisfied with the President of the Republic's actions is particularly high in Ménaka (87.5%), Sikasso (65.7%), Koulikoro (65.7%), Ségou (59%), and Mopti (52.5%). In contrast, the cities of Kidal (14.4%), Bamako (39.2%), and Taoudénit (41%) have the lowest proportions of satisfied or very satisfied citizens.

Opinions are more mixed in Gao and Kayes, where 49% and 51%, respectively, are rather satisfied with the President's performance.

Impact in terms of gender on citizens' levels of satisfaction with the President of the Republic' actions is not very significant.

On the whole, the analysis of educational attainment shows that the proportion of those dissatisfied increases with educational attainment as *Table 10* shows: 52% and 46% respectively of the tertiary and of the secondary as against 43% and 42% for no level and primary level for those non-satisfied with the actions of the President of the Republic.

Table 10: Impact of educational attainment on the assessment of the President of the Republic's actions




2.2.2. Satisfaction with the Government

The assessment of those citizens interviewed on the actions executed by the Government in managing the country is mixed with 49% who are rather dissatisfied (26.6%) or very dissatisfied (22.6%), as against 47% who declare being rather satisfied (36.6%) or very satisfied (10.1%), as indicated in *Table 11*.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of citizens not satisfied with the Government's management has dropped 3 points.

Table 11: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according their satisfaction with the actions of the Government




By locality (*Table 11*), the inhabitants of Kidal (93.4%), of Tombouctou (64.3%), of Bamako (64.2%), of Taoudénit (57.9%), of Mopti (52.5%) and of Kayes (52.5%) are the less satisfied (“rather dissatisfied” or “very dissatisfied”) with the actions of the Government. Those who are satisfied (“very satisfied” or “rather satisfied”) are predominant in Ménaka (83.3%) and Sikasso (55.9%). It should be noted that the relatively high proportion of those without an opinion are found in Ségou (9%), Gao (6.1%) and Koulikoro (5.8%).

Impact in terms of gender and of age on citizens’ level of satisfaction with the Government’s actions is not very significant.

However, *Table 12* shows that the proportion of “very dissatisfied” with the Government’s actions increases with educational attainment (18% for no level, 21% for primary, 28% for secondary; and 33% for tertiary).


Table 12: Impact of educational attainment on the level of satisfaction of the Government’s actions



2.2.3. Satisfaction with the National Assembly Deputies

A large majority of citizens (59.8%) are “very dissatisfied” (35.3%) or “rather dissatisfied” (24.5%) with their National Assembly MPs. Those who declare being satisfied comprise 30% of whom 25% are “rather satisfied” and 5% “very satisfied,” as indicated in *Table 13*. It should be noted that the proportion (9.8%) of those “without an opinion” is very high, particularly in Ségou (20%), Taoudénit (16.8%), Sikasso (14.3%), Koulikoro (13.6%), and Gao (13%).


Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of those non-satisfied has increased 7 points.

Table 13: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their satisfaction with the National Assembly MPs

By locality, non-satisfied citizens with their deputies in the National Assembly (“rather dissatisfied” or “very dissatisfied”) are to be particularly found amongst the inhabitants of the cities of Kidal (90%), Bamako (74.2%), Tombouctou (66.4%), Kayes (66.3%), Mopti (59.5%), Sikasso (59.2%), Koulikoro (58.5%) and Taoudénit (57.9%). Only in one locality, namely Ménéka, a majority of citizens declare being satisfied (“rather satisfied” or “very satisfied”) with the actions of the National Assembly MPs with 73%.

The levels of those without an opinion are somewhat high in Ségou (20%), Taoudénit (16.8%), Sikasso (14.3%), and Koulikoro (13.6%).


Impact in terms of gender and age on the citizens’ level of satisfaction concerning actions by National Assembly deputies is not very significant. However, the proportion of those “very dissatisfied” increases with educational attainment, as indicated in *Table 14 below*.

Table 14: Impact of educational attainment on the degree of satisfaction with actions by National Assembly MPs

2.2.4. Satisfaction with the Political Opposition

A large majority of citizens interviewed (65%) are “very dissatisfied” (38.1%) or “rather dissatisfied” (26.9%) with the actions of opposition politicians in their role as members of the opposition as against 22% of those who are “satisfied”: 19% are “rather satisfied” and 3% are “very satisfied,” as indicated in *Table 15*. The high proportion of those “without an opinion” (13%) should be noted.

Table 15: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their satisfaction with opposition politicians in their opposition role




In comparison with *Mali-Mètre 9*, the proportion of non-satisfied citizens with the opposition's actions has increased 22 points. The proportion of satisfied citizens has dropped 7 points and that of those without an opinion has also declined 13 points.

By locality, with the exception of Ménaka (67.8% satisfied), a large majority of Malians declare not being satisfied with the actions of the opposition particularly in Kidal (85.6%), Bamako (78.8%) and Kayes (74.1%).


In terms of gender, men are more numerous among those dissatisfied and very dissatisfied with the opposition's actions (70.7%) as against (59.1%) among women, as indicated in *Table 16*.

Table 16: Impact of gender on the assessment of the opposition's actions



An analysis of impact in terms of educational attainment, as indicated in *Table 17*, demonstrates that the proportion of dissatisfied citizens with the opposition's actions rises with the level of education.

Table 17: Impact of educational attainment on assessing the opposition's actions




2.3. THE OMBUDSMAN OF THE REPUBLIC

2.3.1 Awareness of the Ombudsman of the Republic

The majority of citizens surveyed (56.9%) declared not being aware of the Ombudsman of the Republic as against 43% who declared the opposite (*cf. Table 18*).

Table 18: Awareness of the existence of the Ombudsman of the Republic by locality



By locality (*cf. Table 18*), the inhabitants of Bamako (60.4%), Koulikoro (50.8%) and Ménaka (50%) are more numerous in affirming that they are aware of the Ombudsman of the Republic. In contrast, interviewees in the localities of Taoudénit (93.7%), Kidal (90%), Tombouctou (78.6%) and Mopti (73.9%) are largely unaware of this institution.

In terms of gender, women (69%) are more numerous than men (45.1%) in declaring not being aware of the Ombudsman of the Republic (*cf. Table 19*).




Table 19: Impact of gender on the awareness of the Ombudsman of the Republic

Table 20 shows that the proportion of those who declare being aware of the Ombudsman of the Republic increases with educational attainment.


Table 20: Impact of educational attainment on the awareness of the Ombudsman of the Republic

An analysis of impact in terms of age, as seen in Table 21, shows that the proportion of those who declare being aware of the Ombudsman of the Republic progressively increases significantly as the age of interviewee's increases.

Table 21: Impact of age on the awareness of the Ombudsman of the Republic

2.3.2. Assessment of the Ombudsman of the Republic's actions

The opinions of interviewees on the Ombudsman of the Republic's actions are divided between 44% who are satisfied as against 40% who are dissatisfied (*cf. Table 22*). A high proportion of interviewees, some 17%, are "without an opinion."


Table 22: Assessment of actions of the Ombudsman of the Republic by locality

By locality, among those citizens who declare being aware of the Republic's Ombudsman the highest proportion of those satisfied are to be found in Ménaka (68.8%), Kayes (63.8%), Gao (55.6%) and Sikasso (53%). The highest proportions of those not satisfied are to be found in Tombouctou (61.9%), Kidal (55.6%) and Bamako (52.4%).

Impact is not significant in terms of to gender, of educational attainment, and of age.

2.3.3. Awareness of the Espace d'interpellation démocratique (EID)

Nearly two thirds of the citizens surveyed (65.1%) declare not having heard of the EID, as against 35% who declare the opposite (*cf. Table 23*).

Table 23: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to whether they are aware of the EID

By locality, the populations who have most heard speak of the EID constitute a minority everywhere, as indicated in *Table 23*. However, this minority is particularly significant in Koulikoro (48.2%), Sikasso (41.1%), Bamako (40%), and Ségou (37%).

In terms of gender, the proportion of women who haven't heard of the EID (75.6%) is clearly higher than that of men (54.7%), as shown in *Table 24*.




Table 24: Impact of gender in terms of awareness of the EID

Table 25 shows that the proportion of citizens who declare having heard about the EID increases with educational attainment.

Table 25: Impact of educational attainment on the awareness of the EID

2.3.4. Assessment of the EID's performance


A little less than half of the interviewees (48.3%) are “rather satisfied” (37.3%) or “very satisfied” (11%) of the EID's performance as against 43.6% of those non satisfied, of which 26.7% are “very dissatisfied” and 16.3% “rather dissatisfied” (*cf. Table 26*). The proportion of those without an opinion is 8%.

Table 26: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the EID

By locality, the EID is predominantly appreciated in Kayes (73.9%), Ménaka (63.2%), Gao (53.5%) and Ségou (53.1%). The inhabitants of Bamako (61.4%), Tombouctou (60%) and Kidal (50%) are those most dissatisfied with the EID. Of note is that the entirety (100%) of interviewees in Taoudénit is without an opinion and the proportion of those without an opinion is also relatively high in Sikasso (12.1%) and Ségou (11.7%).

Impact in terms of gender or educational attainment is not very significant. However, *Table 27* indicates a link in terms of age: the number of non-satisfied (“very dissatisfied” and “rather dissatisfied”) tends to increase with age, whereas that opposite holds true for those satisfied (“very satisfied” and “rather satisfied”) whose number diminishes with age.

Table 27: Impact of age on assessment of the EID




2.4. JUSTICE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

2.4.1. Trust in Justice

Overall, the survey’s findings show that the majority of Malians (59.8%) “do not at all trust” (30.2%) or “distrust” (29.6%) the justice system, as against a minority (35.9%) who “partially trust” (26.8%) or totally trust” in it (9.1%). As indicated in *Table 28*, those without an opinion represent 4.2%.

Table 28: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their level of trust in the justice system



Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of citizens who are not trust in the justice system has risen by 5 points.


By locality (*cf. Table 28*) the citizens who distrust the justice system (“distrust” and “totally distrust”) can be particularly found amongst inhabitants of the cities of Taoudénit (83.1%), Kidal (78.9%), Bamako (73.8%), and Mopti (66.9%). This proportion is also largely predominant in Koulikoro (61.2%), Kayes (60%), Tombouctou (58.2%), and Sikasso (56.7%) and, to a lesser extent in Gao (50.5%) or Ségou (47%) with 14% without an opinion. The city of Ménaka is an exception with a majority of interviewees (52.1%) who declare trusting in the justice system.

Gender, age, or educational attainments have no significant impact on Malian's level of trust in the justice system.

2.4.2. Awareness of the Functioning of Justice

The vast majority of citizens (83.2%) declare having “no” awareness (49.8%) or a “poor” awareness (33.4%) of the functioning of justice. A small minority (14.8%) declare having a “moderate” awareness (12.3%) or “good” (2.5%) about its functioning, as presented in *Table 29*.

Table 29: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their awareness of the functioning of justice



In all localities, the proportion of interviewees with no awareness or a poor awareness of the functioning of justice exceeds 75%, with the exception of Bamako and Tombouctou where this figure is 74% and 72%, respectively.

By gender, the proportion of men who declare having an awareness of the functioning of justice (“good” and “moderate”) (21.8%) is higher than that of women (7.6%) (*cf. Table 30*).



Table 30: Breakdown of interviewees by gender and according to their awareness of the functioning of justice


Table 31 indicates that the proportion of citizens surveyed who declare having a good or a moderate awareness of the functioning of justice rises significantly with educational attainment. It is 7% among those who have received no schooling, 12% among those with a primary education, 22% among those with a secondary education, and 39% among those with a tertiary education.

Table 31: Impact of educational attainment on the awareness of the functioning of justice

Conversely, impact in terms of gender or age is not very significant.

2.4.3 Assertion that the justice system is corrupt

As evidenced in Table 32, the vast majority of interviewees (85.1%) “totally agree” (48.6%) or “agree” (36.5%) with the assertion that the justice system is corrupt as against a small minority (9%) of citizens who “disagree” (7.3%) or “totally disagree” (1.7%). The proportion of those without an opinion is 6%.

Table 32: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the assertion that the justice system is corrupt

By locality, this opinion is universally shared by more than 75% of citizens, with the exception of Taoudénit (71.6%). The localities of Kayes and Bamako, with 92%, are those that have the highest proportion of inhabitants who agree with this assertion.


Impact in terms of gender, educational attainment, and age is not very significant.

2.4.4. Assertion that justice is geographically at a distance from the populations

The assertion that “the justice system is geographically at a distance from the populations” is shared by 56.7% of persons surveyed of whom 18% “totally agree” and 39% “rather agree.” A minority of citizens (40.5%) “disagree” (34%) or “totally disagree” (6.5%), as indicated in *Table 33*.

The proportion of those without an opinion (2.9%) is relatively small.

Table 33: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the assertion that the justice system is geographically at a distance from the populations




By locality, the cities that record the highest proportions of citizens who agree with this assertion are Ménaka (89.6%), Kidal (88.9%), Taoudénit (83.2%), Mopti (80.1%), and Kayes (72.6%). This assertion is also the opinion of a large section of the population of Tombouctou (69.4%), Bamako (68.8%), and Koulikoro (59.5%). Sikasso and Gao distinguish themselves from other localities in that 66% and 61% of interviewees do not share this opinion, respectively.

In Taoudénit, the proportion of those without an opinion is particularly high (14.7%).

Impact in terms of gender, of educational attainment, or of age in assessing this assertion is not very significant.

2.4.5. Assertion that the populations are unaware of judicial procedures

The vast majority (88.4%) of Malians find that “the populations are unaware of the judicial procedures,” which, if broken down, comes to 41% who “totally agree” and 47% who “rather agree.” Those who “disagree” represent 9%, as indicated in *Table 34*.

Table 34: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the assertion that the populations are unaware of the judicial procedures

By locality, all the cities surveyed agree with this assertion with 80% or more in agreement, and with particularly high proportions in Mopti (97.7%), Tombouctou (93.8%) and Sikasso (93.5%).


Impact in terms of gender, of age, and of educational attainment is not substantial.

2.4.6. Assertion that judicial procedures are lengthy and complicated

More than nine out of ten citizens (90.5%) agree with the assertion that “judicial procedures are lengthy and complicated”; (44.3%) “totally agree” and (45.2%) “agree.”

A small minority (4.9%) does not agree with the assertion and those without an opinion represent 5%, (*cf. Table 35*).

Table 35: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the assertion that judicial procedures are lengthy and complicated




Nearly all localities surveyed featured a very high proportion (exceeding 80%) of citizens who concur with this assertion, with particularly high levels in Mopti (98.5%), Bamako (95%), Kayes (91.8%), Kidal (91.1%), Sikasso (91%), and Tombouctou (90.8%).

Taoudénit (77.9%) has the smallest proportion of interviewees who agree with this assertion and the highest proportion of those without an opinion (22.1%).

Impact in terms of gender, of age, or of educational attainment is not very significant.

2.4.7. Assertion that the justice system is too costly

The vast majority of interviewees (84.3%) “totally agree” (43.9%) or “agree” (40.4%) with the assertion that “the justice system is too costly,” as opposed to only 7% who do not agree, while 9% are without an opinion, as indicated in *Table 36*.

Table 36: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the assertion that the justice system is too costly


By locality, the proportion of citizens who agree with this assertion is very high, particularly in the cities of Kayes (95.3%), Kidal (94.4%), Mopti (89.1%), Bamako (86.7%), Ménaka (86.5%), Sikasso (84.1%) and Koulikoro (82.5%). In the other localities, namely Tombouctou (78.5%), Taoudénit (73.7%), and Ségou (73%), the majority of inhabitants are equally favourable to this assertion.

Impact in terms of gender, of age, or of educational attainment is not very significant.

2.4.8. Assertion that the justice system serves the rich and/or those in power

The vast majority of persons surveyed (87.9%) “totally agree” (57.8%) or “agree” (30.1%) with the assertion that “justice serves the rich or those in power” as against 9.6% who have an opposite opinion, while 2.4% have no opinion (*cf. Table 37*).

Table 37: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the assertion that the justice system serves the rich and/or those in power




By locality, the proportion of opinions favourable to this assertion (“agree” and “totally agree”) universally exceeds 80%, with the exception of Tombouctou and Kidal where it nonetheless represents 75%, respectively. The localities of Kayes (94.5%), Mopti (92.3%), and Bamako (92,1%) are those that have the most favourable opinion of this assertion.

The proportion of those without an opinion is very high in Taoudénit (17.9%) and Tombouctou (11.2%).

Impact in terms of gender, of educational attainment, or of age is not very significant.

2.4.9. Level of Corruption

For a large majority of the population surveyed (91.1%), the level of corruption in Mali is “very high” (63.5%) or “high” (27.1%) as against only 8% who consider it is “slightly high” (7.2%) or “not high” (0.8%), as indicated in Table 38.

Table 38: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the level of corruption in Mali


Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of citizens who consider that the level of corruption is “very high” or “high,” is nearly identical (90%).

By locality, the proportion of citizens who find the level of corruption “very high” or “high” is the same everywhere or exceeds 84%, with the exception of Taoudénit (66.4%) where the proportion of those without an opinion is also “very high”, with 17%. In the cities of Kidal, Bamako, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Ménaka, and Mopti, more than 90% consider that the level of corruption is “high” or “very high,” (cf. Table 38).

Impact in terms of gender, of age, or educational attainment is not very significant.

2.4.10. Reasons for the Existence of Corruption

Overall, the key reasons cited by citizens for corruption are: “the poverty amongst the populations” (48.6%); “the low salary and income levels” (39%), “the poor example set by leaders (31.6%), and “greed/avarice” (25.3%). Other reasons cited include “impunity” (20.4%), “the population’s ignorance of their rights and duties” (19.9%), “the influence of social relationships” (18.8%), (cf. Table 39).

Table 39: Breakdown of the reasons for the existence of corruption

By locality, the three primary reasons for corruption are given as follows:

Kayes : 1. "Poverty amongst the populations" (61.2%); 2. "Low salary and income levels" (33.7%); and 3. "Poor example set by leaders" (32.2%).

Koulikoro : 1. "Low salary and income levels" (68.3%); 2. "Poverty amongst the populations" (55.7%); and 3. "Poor example set by leaders" (44.7%).

Sikasso : 1. "Poverty amongst the populations" (40.8%); 2. "Poor example set by leaders" (30.6%); and 3. "Greed/avarice" (34.9%).

Ségou : 1. « La pauvreté des populations » (48,7%) ; 2. « L'avidité/cupidité » (32,3%) and 3. « Le bas niveau des salaires et des revenus » (32%) ;

Mopti : 1. "Poverty amongst the populations" (52.1%); 2. "Poor example set by leaders" (39.3%); and 3. "Low salary and income levels" (39.3%).

Tombouctou : 1. "Impunity" (75.5%); 2. "Population's lack of awareness of their rights and duties" (49%); and 3. "Low salary and income levels" (44.4%).

Gao : 1. "Low salary and income levels" (44.4%); 2. "Impunity" (38.4%); and 3. "Influence of social relationships" (38.4%).

Kidal : 1. "Population's lack of awareness of their rights and duties" (72.2%); 2. "Poverty amongst the populations" (62.2%); and 3. "Poor example set by leaders" (42.2%).


Ménaka : 1. "Poverty amongst the populations" (62.5%); 2. "Poor example set by leaders" (61.5%); and 3. "Population's lack of awareness of their rights and duties" (36.5%).

Taoudénit : 1. "Impunity" (52.6%); 2. "Poverty amongst the populations" (38.9%); and 3. "Low salary and income levels" (24.2%).

Bamako : 1. "Poverty amongst the populations" (47.9%); 2. "Low salary and income levels" (42.9%); and 3. "Greed/avarice" (33.3%).

In terms of gender, *Table 40* shows that men consider “low salary and income levels” (40.1%), “poverty amongst the populations” (40.1%) and “poor example by the leaders” (34.7%) the principal causes for corruption. The same reasons are cited by women but in different proportions: “low salary and income levels” (57.1%); “poverty amongst the populations” (37.9%); and “poor example by the leaders” (28.4%).

Table 40: Impact of gender on the principal causes of corruption




Impact in terms of gender, of educational attainment, or of age is not substantial in the order of citation for the reasons given for the existence of corruption.

2.4.11. Areas affected by corruption

Overall (*cf. Table 41*), citizens consider that the areas most affected by corruption are: justice (55.4%); the police (49.9%); other public services (32.3%) and Customs (27.6%). Other areas are also cited such as health (20.4%), local government/ the Marie (18.8%), the Gendarmerie (14.1%) and education, including universities (11.8), and so on.

It should be noted that 6% of interviewees are without an opinion.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the three areas most affected by corruption remain unchanged, and in the same order of citation: justice, the police, and other public services

Table 41: Breakdown of interviewees according to their opinions on the areas affected by corruption

By locality, the areas the most affected by corruption are the police, the justice system, other public services, the Gendarmerie, and the Mairie. By locality, the three principle areas cited are as follows in their order of frequency:

Kayes : 1. "Police" (59.2%); 2. "Justice" (58.4%); and 3. Customs" (38.4%).

Koulikoro : 1. "Justice" (57%); 2. "Other public services" (46.9%); and 3. "Police" (37.2%).

Sikasso : 1. "Other public services" (50.2%); 2. "Justice" (49.2%); and 3. "Police" (41.7%).

Ségou : 1. "Police" (51.7%); 2. "Justice" (46%); and 3. "Other public services" (28.7%).

Mopti : 1. "Police" (64.2%); 2. "Justice" (57.6%); and 3. "Customs" (35%).

Tombouctou : 1. "Justice" (80.6%); 2. "Police" (79.6%); and 3. "Gendarmerie" (37.8%).

Gao : 1. "Justice" (57.6%); 2. "Police" (50.5%); and 3. "Customs" (26.3%).

Kidal : 1. "Justice" (70%); 2. "Customs" (65.6%); and 3. "Mairie" (35.6%).

Ménaka : 1. "Justice" (54.2%); 2. "Gendarmerie" (52.1%); and 3. "Mairie" (52.1%).

Taoudénit : 1. "Customs" (54.7%); 2. "Justice" (50.5%); and 3. "Police" (30.5%).


Bamako : 1. "Justice" (58.3%); 2. "Police" (40.4%); and 3. "Customs" (27.5%).

2.4.12. Measures that need to be taken to combat corruption

Overall (*cf. Table 42*), the three primary measures that citizens recommend to combat corruption are in their order of frequency: "severely punish the perpetrators and their accomplices in corruption (53.1%)"; "raise salaries in the public-sector and in the public bodies (36.8%)"; and "oblige leaders to set a good example" (31.9%). Other measures suggested include: "demand transparency in the management of public affairs" (29.3%), "educate citizens on their rights and their duties" (20.7%), "select directors of public administrations according to merit (and not according to political affiliation)" (20.2%)", and so forth.

The identical three primary measures were recommended in Mali-Mètre 9 yet in a different order: “severely punish the perpetrators and their accomplices in corruption (55.6%)”, “oblige the leaders to set a good example” (41.8%) and “raise salaries in the public-sector and in the public bodies (32.5%)”.

Table 42: Breakdown of interviewees according to their opinions on the measures to be taken to combat corruption



By locality, the measures recommended to combat corruption run along the lines of: “raise salaries in the public-sector and in the public bodies”; “severely punish the perpetrators and their accomplices in corruption”; “oblige leaders to set a good example”; “demand transparency in the management of public affairs”; “select directors of public administrations according to merit”; and “educate citizens about their rights and their duties.”

By locality, the measures recommended are:

Kayes : 1. “Demand transparency in the management of public affairs”(47.8%); 2. “Oblige leaders to set a good example ” (42%); and 3. “Severely punish the perpetrators and their accomplices in corruption” (40%).

Koulikoro : 1. “Severely punish the perpetrators and their accomplices in corruption” (65.4%); 2. “Raise salaries in the public-sector and in the public bodies” (58.3%); and 3. “Select directors of public administrations according to merit” (24.6%).

Sikasso : 1. “Severely punish the perpetrators and their accomplices in corruption” (46.1%); 2. “Encourage leaders to set a good example”(34.3%); and 3. “Educate citizens on their rights and their duties” (24.3%).

Ségou : 1. “Severely punish the perpetrators and their accomplices in corruption” (50%); 2. “Demand transparency in the management of public affairs” (35%); and 3. “Oblige the leaders to set a good example ” (34.7%).

Mopti : 1. “Severely punish the perpetrators and their accomplices in corruption” (51.4%); 2. “Demand transparency in the management of public affairs” (45.9%); and 3. “Raise salaries in the public-sector and in the public bodies” (43.2%).

Tombouctou : 1. “Severely punish the perpetrators and their accomplices in corruption” (77.6%); 2. “Educate citizens on their rights and their duties” (49%); and 3. “Oblige the leaders to set a good example ” (43.9%).

Gao : 1. “Severely punish the perpetrators and their accomplices in corruption” (63.6%); 2. “Raise salaries in the public-sector and in the public bodies” (39.4%); and 3. “Select directors of public administrations according to merit” (37.4%).

Kidal : 1. “Educate citizens on their rights and their duties” (76.7%); 2. “Severely punish the perpetrators and their accomplices in corruption” (65.6%); and 3. “Oblige the leaders to set a good example” (52.2%).

Ménaka : 1. “Select directors of public administrations according to merit” (56.3%); 2. “Raise salaries in the public-sector and in the public bodies” (50%); and 3. “Educate citizens on their rights and their duties” (37.5%).

Taoudénit : 1. “Severely punish the perpetrators and their accomplices in corruption” (56.8%); 2. “Select directors of public administrations according to merit” (25.3%); and 3. “Raise salaries in the public-sector and in the public bodies” (23.2%).


Bamako : 1. “Severely punish the perpetrators and their accomplices in corruption” (56.3%); 2. “Select directors of public administrations according to merit” (44.2%); and 3. “Raise salaries in the public-sector and in the public bodies” (38.3%).

Impact in terms of gender, of age, or of educational attainment on the measures needed to combat corruption is not substantial.

2.4.13. Frequency of Impunity

A very large majority of citizens (88.3%) believe that impunity is “very frequent” (54.1%) or “frequent” (34.2%) as against only 12% who think that it is “infrequent” (9.7%) or “not frequent” (2%), as indicated in *Table 43*.

Table 43: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the frequency of impunity



Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of citizens who believe that impunity is frequent has increased 9 points and those who think that it is infrequent or not frequent has dropped 5 points.

By locality, the proportion of Malians who believe that impunity is frequent (“very frequent” or “frequent”) is almost universally very high, but more so in the cities of Koulikoro (96.5%), Kidal (95.6%), Ménaka (93.7%), and Mopti (90.2%).


Impact in terms of gender, of age, or of educational attainment is not very significant in assessing impunity.

2.5. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT ON PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN MALI EMANATING FROM THE ALGIERS PROCESS

2.5.1. Sources of Information on the Agreement

For citizens who declare being aware of the contents of the Agreement, their principal sources of information are predominantly radio (65.6%) and television (58.4%). The “grin” (29.2%), the family (21.2%) and the Internet (social media, online newspapers, etc.) (17.2%) are also cited by a significant proportion of interviewees (*cf. Table 44*).

Table 44: Breakdown of interviewees according to their principal sources of information on the Peace Agreement



The principal sources of information mentioned by locality are:

Kayes : “Radio” (73.3%); “TV” (59.6%); and “Grin” (29.8%).

Koulikoro : “Radio” (79.9%); “TV” (28.2%); and “Family” (28.2%).

Sikasso : “Radio” (68.2%); “TV” (63.2%); and “Grin” (33.6%).

Ségou : “TV” (50%); “Radio” (40.7%); and “Grin” (23.7%).

Mopti : “Radio” (69.6%); “TV” (57.2%); and “Family” (32.7%).

Tombouctou : “Radio” (79.6%); “TV” (63.3%); and “Grin” (54.1%).

Gao : “Radio” (65.7%); “TV” (57.6%); and “Family and Internet (21.2%).

Kidal : “TV” (58.9%); “Other” (53.3%), “Internet” (53.3%) and “Radio” (50%).


Ménaka : “Radio” (81.3%); “TV” (56.3%); and “Family” (49%).

Taoudénit : “Family” (55.8%); Imams/Dignitaries (46.3%); and “Radio” (44.2%).

Bamako : “Radio” (56.7%); “TV” (45.4%); and “Grin” (35%).


Impact in terms of gender (*cf. Table 45*) shows that the proportion of men for whom radio, television, the “grin,” the Internet, or the family constitute the principal source of information about the Agreement is higher than that of women.

Table 45: Impact of gender on the principal sources of information about the Agreement



Impact in terms of educational attainment on the principal sources of information is mixed, for it significant only for television and for the family. Television incrementally constitutes the most important source of information with an increasing educational attainment (*cf. Table 46*).


Table 46: Impact of educational attainment on the principal sources of information



Impact in terms of age is not very significant.

2.5.2. Aspects of the Peace Agreement to rapidly implement

Concerning aspects of the Agreement that the authorities ought to rapidly implement, the majority of Malians (56.3%) are without an opinion. More than a quarter of interviewees (25.8%) cite “disarmament and the reinsertion of ex-combatants,” and less than a fifth (19%) cite “the redeployment of armed forces,” as indicated in *Table 47*.

Table 47: Breakdown of interviewees according to their opinions on aspects of the Peace Agreement to rapidly implement

In comparison with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of those without an opinion dropped 16 points and those favourable to disarmament and the reinsertion of ex-combatants increased 12 points.


By locality surveyed, “disarmament and the reinsertion of ex-combatants” and “the redeployment of armed forces” figure among the principle aspects of the Agreement to rapidly implement. The proportion of the population surveyed that recommend “disarmament and the reinsertion of ex-combatants” is particularly high in the localities of Tombouctou (70.4%), Ménaka (65.6%), and Taoudénit (62.1%), and to a lesser extent in Ségou (37%), Mopti (32.7%), Kidal (25.6%), and Koulikoro (24.9%). In Sikasso (14%) and Bamako (17.9%) and, in a little higher proportion, in Gao (19.2%) and Kayes (21.2%), proponents of this measure constitute a minority. Proponents of “redeployment of armed forces” are particularly numerous in Ménaka (63.5%). Lastly, it should be noted the very high proportions of those without an opinion; it exceeds 50% in Gao, Bamako, Kayes, Kidal, Koulikoro, Mopti, and Sikasso.

Impact in terms of gender, of age, and of educational attainment is not very significant.

2.5.3. Level of progress in implementing the Peace Agreement

Concerning the assessment of the level of progress in implementing the Agreement, the majority of persons surveyed (60.4%) (*cf. Table 48*) believe that the process is “not advanced” (32.7%) or “not at all advanced” (27.7%) as against a minority (24%) who believe the opposite. The proportion of those without an opinion is very high (15.6%).

Table 48: Breakdown of interviewees by locality and their assessment of the level of progress in implementing the Peace Agreement



Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the breakdown of citizens' opinions on the level of progress in implementing the Agreement has scarcely changed.


By locality, the proportion of those who believe that the process is not advanced ("not advanced" or "not at all advanced") is particularly high in Bamako (85.4%), Ménaka (77.1%), Taoudénit (73.6%), Mopti (70.5%), and Kayes (68.6%). A significant minority of the population of Sikasso (41.4%) and Kidal (35.6%) think it "rather advanced".

Lastly, It should be noted that the proportion of those without an opinion is particularly high in Ségou (31.3%), Gao (28.3%), and Koulikoro (27.7%).

Impact in terms of gender, of educational attainment, or of age on the assessment of the level of progress in implementing the Agreement is not very significant.

2.5.4. Awareness concerning Actors/Stakeholders in the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement

For a large majority of citizens surveyed (72.1%), the Malian State is the actor in the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement emanating from the Algiers process that they are most aware of. Armed groups such as the Coordination of Movements of Azawad, hereinafter referred to as CMA (34.4%) or the Plateforme (21.5%), the international community (19.9%) and the civil-political society (15.2%) constitute the other principle actors known for their role in the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. It should be noted that a very high a proportion of those surveyed (23%) are without an opinion (*cf. Table 49*).

Table 49: Breakdown of interviewees according to their awareness concerning actors in the Peace Agreement

By locality, the Malian State is the most cited actor to implement the Agreement by those surveyed in all localities, particularly in Tombouctou (92.9%), followed by Kayes (89.4%) and Ménaka (80.2%).

The international community is the second actor mentioned in Tombouctou (66.3%) ahead of Taoudénit (60%), Kidal (55.6%), Ménaka (53.1%), and Mopti (32.3%).

The CMA armed groups are cited in very high proportions in Kidal (98.9%), Tombouctou (95.9%), Ménaka (76%), Gao (67.7%) and Taoudénit (62.1%). The CMA is also mentioned in Kayes (53.3%), Ségou (30.3%), Koulikoro (29.8%), Mopti (26.1%), Sikasso (20.9%) and Bamako (17.9%).

By way of comparison with Mali-Mètre 9, specifically concerning the so-called Northern regions, the interviewees awareness concerning the CMA armed groups was as follows: (94.9%) in Tombouctou, (88.7%) in Ménaka, (87.8%) in Taoudénit, (75.5%) in Gao, and (63.7%) in Kidal.


As for the Plateforme, awareness is particularly high in Kidal (86.7%), Ménaka (77.1%), Gao (63.6%), Tombouctou (69.4%) and Taoudénit (44.2%). Awareness is lower in Mopti (22.2%), Koulikoro (19.1%), Bamako (17.9%), Sikasso (15.3%).

With reference to Mali-Mètre 9, concerning the so-called Northern regions, the interviewees awareness concerning the Plateforme armed groups was: Ménaka (97.9%), Tombouctou (71.4%), Kidal (66.3%), Taoudénit (58.2%), and Gao (33.8%).

2.5.5. Awareness concerning the establishment of interim authorities

The majority of citizens surveyed (62.6%) declared not having heard about the establishment of interim authorities as against 37% who declared the opposite (*cf. Table 50*).


Table 50: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to whether they had heard about the establishment of interim authorities




Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of citizens who had not heard about the interim authorities has increased by 3 points.

In all localities surveyed, a majority declared that they were aware of the establishment of interim authorities, with notably high proportions in Kidal (97.8%), Ménaka (79.2%), Gao (78.8%), and Tombouctou (71.4%). Men (49.1%) are clearly more numerous than women (25.6%) in having heard about the establishment of interim authorities (cf. Table 51).

Table 51: Breakdown of interviewees according to gender and according to whether they heard about the establishment of interim authorities




Furthermore, the proportion of people who have heard about the establishment of interim authorities clearly rises with educational attainment (cf. Table 52).

Table 52: Breakdown of interviewees according to educational attainment and according to whether they heard about the establishment of interim authorities

Impact in terms of age is not very significant.

2.5.6. Assessment of the establishment of interim authorities in order to bring peace to Mali

Overall, among the populations aware of the establishment of interim authorities in order to bring peace to Mali, the majority (61%) judged its establishment “good” (44.9%) or “very good” (16.1%) as against a minority (29.5%) who judged it “bad” (16.7%) or “very bad” (12.8%), while 10% are without an opinion (*cf. Table 53*).

Table 53: Breakdown of interviewees according to their assessment of the establishment of interim authorities in bringing the peace to Mali

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of those who judge the establishment of interim authorities as very good or good has increased 4 points and those who judge it as bad or very bad has dropped 5 points.

By locality, the proportion of citizens who find that the establishment of interim authorities for bringing peace to Mali “very good” or “good” is particularly high in the cities in the so-called North of the country, notably in Kidal (90.9%), Ménaka (88.1%), Taoudénit (87.3%), and Tombouctou (74.3%). It is also high in Koulikoro (63.6%), Sikasso (62.6%) and Kayes (62.5%), but slightly less so in Bamako (55.3%), Mopti (54.4%) and Ségou (53.5%). It should be noted that in Gao, the proportion of interviewees (59%) who appreciate this establishment of interim

authorities is by far the smallest of those in the so-called regions of the North, as indicated in *Table 53*.


The proportion of those without an opinion is particularly high in Ségou (16.8%), Sikasso (12%), Gao (11.5%) and Tombouctou (11.4%).

No substantial divergence is to be observed in terms of the interviewees' gender, educational attainment, or age.

2.5.7. Satisfaction with the level of progress in the establishment of interim authorities

As for the assessment of the level of progress of the establishment of interim authorities, opinions are almost equally divided between those who are satisfied, (42.8%) and those who are not (43.4%), as indicated in *Table 54*. Those without an opinion represent 14%.

Table 54: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the level of progress in establishing interim authorities



However, compared with *Mali-Mètre 9*, the proportion of those satisfied has increased 9 points and those of dissatisfied has declined 11 points.


By locality (*cf. Table 54*), the vast majority of interviewees in Kidal (85.3%), Ménaka (80.3%), Taoudénit (71%), and Mopti (54.3%) are “rather satisfied” or “very satisfied” with the level of progress of the establishment of interim authorities. The proportion of non-satisfied (“rather dissatisfied” and “very dissatisfied”) is predominant in Bamako (64.6%), Tombouctou (52.9%), and Kayes (50%). The locality of Gao distinguished itself from other localities in the so-called North with a high proportion of “dissatisfied” (42.4%), but also of “satisfied” (39.7%) and of those without an opinion (17.9%). However, the proportion of those without an opinion is notably high in Sikasso (30.7%), Ségou (22.9%), and Kayes (21.4%).

Impact in terms of gender, of educational attainment, or of age does not seem very significant.

2.5.8. Trust in the Agreement to bring about stability, peace and security in Mali

The majority of citizens surveyed (57.9%) declared that they “partially trust” (37.5%) or “totally trust” (20.4%) that the Agreement would bring about stability, peace, and security to Mali as against 35% who think the opposite, of whom 21% “distrust” and 14% “totally distrust” the Agreement (*cf. Table 55*).

In comparison with Mali-Mètre 9 (57.7%), there is a stability in opinion for those who trust in the Agreement and a slight increase (2.3 points) in those who think the opposite.

Table 55: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their level of trust in the Agreement to bring about stability, peace, and security in Mali

By locality (*cf. Table 55*), the populations who most trust that the Agreement to bring about stability, peace, and security are particularly numerous in Koulikoro (71.8%), Sikasso (67.6%) and localities in the so-called North with 70% in Ménaka, 63% in Kidal and Taoudénit, 62% in Tombouctou, and 59% in Gao. Those who think the opposite are predominant in Bamako (52.5%) and Mopti (48.6%).


Impact in terms of gender, of age, and of educational attainment is not very significant.

2.5.9. Trust that the Agreement will lead to development in Mali

The majority of citizens surveyed (58.1%) declared that they “partially trust” (36.9%) or “totally trust” (21.2%) that the Agreement would lead to development, as against 35% who think the opposite, of whom 21% are “distrust” and 14%,”totally distrust” the Agreement in this regard, as indicated in *Table 56*.

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of those who do not trust that the Agreement would lead to development in the country has dropped about 3 points. An increase is to be seen for those who think the opposite by about 8 points.

Table 56: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their level of trust that the Agreement will lead to development in Mali




By locality (*cf. Table 56*), the populations surveyed in Koulikoro (69.2%), Sikasso (67.6%) and of cities in the so-called North of the country are more numerous in trusting that the Agreement will lead to the country's development with 73% in Taoudénit, 67% in Ménaka, 64% in Tombouctou, 63% in Kidal, and 60% in Gao. The populations who think the opposite are relatively predominant in Bamako (48.8%) and Mopti (49.4%). They constitute a significant minority in Kayes (43.5%), Sikasso (30.9%) and in the localities in the North with 37% in Kidal, 33% in Tombouctou, 25% in Taoudénit, 24% in Ménaka and 23% in Gao.

Impact in terms of gender, of age, and of educational attainment does not seem very significant.

2.5.10. Trust in the Agreement to combat youth unemployment in Mali

The majority of interviewees (56.5%) declared that they “partially trust” (38.5%) or “totally trust” (18%) that the Agreement will combat youth unemployment, while more than a third (36.3%) think the opposite, with 22% “distrust” and 15% “totally distrust.” The proportion of those without an opinion is 7% (*cf. Table 57*).

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of those who do not trust that the Agreement will combat unemployment has increased nearly 12 points while the proportion of those who trust in the Agreement has practically remained stable (increase of only 1 point).

Table 57: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their level of trust that the Agreement will combat youth unemployment


By locality (*cf. Table 57*), the populations surveyed in Koulikoro (71.5%), Tombouctou (64.3%), Sikasso (64.8%) Gao (61.7%) and, to a lesser extent, in Kidal (58.9%), Ménaka (57.3%) and Taoudénit (56.9%) are those who most trust that the Agreement will combat youth unemployment. The populations who think the opposite are predominant in Bamako (52.6%) and Kayes (51%). They are equally divided in Mopti (49.1% and 49%), or constitute significant minorities in Kidal (41.1%), Taoudénit (37.9%), Sikasso (33.9%), Ménaka (33.3%), and Gao (26.3%).

Impact in terms of gender, of age, and of educational attainment does not seem very significant.

2.5.11. Level of awareness about the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement

The vast majority of citizens surveyed (85%) declared having “no” awareness (56.7%) or a “little” awareness (28.3%) about the Peace Agreement. The citizens who declare having a “good” awareness (1.4%) or a “moderate” awareness (9.3%) about the Agreement only represent about a tenth of all those surveyed (10.7%) (*cf. Table 58*).


Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of those who declare not being aware of the Agreement has slightly increased by nearly 2 points and those who declare the opposite has dropped 5 points.

Table 58: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their level of awareness of the Agreement

In terms of localities (*cf. Table 58*), the highest level of persons surveyed who declared having a “good” awareness or a “moderate” awareness about the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement are recorded in the towns of Kidal (33.3%), Ménaka (26%), Gao (23.3%), Tombouctou (23.5%) and Taoudénit (17.9%). By contrast, the highest level of interviewees who declared having “no” awareness or “little ” awareness about the Agreement was recorded in the other localities surveyed.


Impact in terms of gender and of age does not seem very significant.

However, *Table 59* indicates that the proportion of people who declare having a “good” or “moderate” awareness of on the Peace Agreement increases with educational attainment.

Table 59: Breakdown of interviewees according to educational attainment and their level of awareness about the Agreement

2.5.12. Recommendations for a greater assimilation of the Agreement

A high proportion of interviewees (39.9%) declared not knowing which recommendations to give to the State and to the actors involved in the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement concerning a greater assimilation by the populations. Other recommendations were: “inform them about the Agreement/translate the Agreement” (37.7%), “respect /implement the Agreement” (10.9%), and so forth. (*cf. Table 60*).


Table 60: Recommendations for a greater assimilation of the Agreement

2.6. SECURING MALI

2.6. 1. Assessment of the level of insecurity when at home at night

Overall, 53% of interviewees do not feel “secure” (34.1%) or “totally insecure” (18.9%) when at home at night, as against 47% who declare the opposite (*cf. Table 61*).


Table 61: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the level of insecurity when at home at night



Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of citizens who do not feel secure has declined sharply by more than 17 points.

By locality (*cf. Table 61*), it is notable that the feeling of insecurity (“rather insecure” and “totally insecure”) is particularly felt by the population in Kidal (100%), Ménaka (97.9%), Taoudénit (80%), Gao (73.8%) and Bamako (73.7%). This feeling is shared in Mopti (66.1%) and, to a lesser extent, in Ségou (50.7%). In contrast, the majority of those surveyed felt “sufficiently secure” in Kayes (67.1%), Koulikoro (63.4%), and Sikasso (53.3%).


Impact in terms of gender and of age is not substantial. By contrast, as indicated in *Table 62*, the proportion of citizens who feel totally secure increases with educational attainment, whereas the opposite is to be observed for those who feel sufficiently secure.

Table 62: Impact of educational attainment on the feeling of insecurity when at home at night

Impact in terms of gender and of age is not very significant.

2.6.2. Assessment of the level of insecurity if one goes out alone at night

For Malians as a whole, the feeling of insecurity on going out alone at night is shared by nearly two-thirds of those (63.7%) who do not feel “totally secure” (32.2%) or “not at all secure”(31.5%). A little more than one in every three citizens (35.7%) declares feeling “sufficiently secure” going out alone at night (*cf. Table 63*).

Table 63: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the level of insecurity going out alone at night


Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the number of citizens surveyed who do not feel secure on going out alone at night has declined by nearly 13 points while those of citizens who feel sufficiently secure has increased nearly 12 points.

By locality (*cf. table above*), every person surveyed in Kidal (100%) and nearly as many in Ménaka (95.8%) and Tombouctou (93.9%) as well as a big majority in Bamako (89.2%), Taoudénit (86.4%), Mopti (73.6%) declared that were “not sufficiently secure” or “totally insecure” on going out alone at night. This feeling is also shared by more than half of interviewees in Ségou (61.3%) and Sikasso (60.2%). By contrast, the opposite feeling was declared by a majority of citizens in the towns of Koulikoro (57%) and Kayes (52.2%), as indicated in *Table 63*.

Impact in terms of gender and of age is not substantial.


Table 64 here-below shows that the proportion of the population surveyed who feel “totally insecure” actually increases with educational attainment whereas those who feel “sufficiently secure” on going out alone at night incrementally increases as educational attainment diminishes.

Table 64: Impact of educational attainment on the feeling of insecurity on going out alone at night



2.6. 3. Assessment of the level of insecurity on going out alone by day

The persons who feel “sufficiently secure” on going out alone by day constitute 60% of interviewees as against nearly 40% who do feel “insufficiently secure” (26.3%) or “totally insecure” (14.1%) (*cf. Table 65*).


Table 65: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the level of insecurity on going out alone by day

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, it should be noted that the proportion of citizens surveyed who feel “sufficiently secure” on going out alone by day was 34%, which represents an increase of more than 25 points.

By locality, the proportion of those feeling secure on going out alone by day is particularly high in Kayes (85.1%), Koulikoro (73.5%), Sikasso (71.7%) and, to a lesser extent, in Gao (55.6%) and Ségou (51.3%).

By comparison (*cf. Table 65*), the opposite feeling (“not sufficiently secure” and “totally insecure” clearly predominates in Kidal (91.1%), Ménaka (84.3%), Tombouctou (77.6%), Bamako (60.9%) and, in a lower proportion, in Mopti (53.3%).

The proportion of those who “feel sufficiently secure” on going out by day tends to decline with educational attainment as evidenced in *Table 66*. The opposite can be observed amongst those who feel “totally insecure.”

Table 66: Impact of educational attainment on the feeling of insecurity on going out alone by day


Impact in terms of gender or of age is not very significant.

2.6. 4. Assessment of the level of insecurity on going to the neighbouring villages

Amongst all those surveyed, a large majority feel insecure (70.7%) with “totally insecure” (43.4%) or “not sufficiently secure” (27.3%) on going to neighbouring villages. A minority (28.2%) state that they feel “sufficiently secure” whenever they visit neighbouring villages (*cf. Table 67*).

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of citizens who do not feel secure (“not sufficiently secure” and “totally insecure”) on going to neighbouring villages has dropped 14 points.

Table 67: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the level of insecurity on going to neighbouring villages




By locality, it is to be observed that those surveyed in the North, in the Centre and in Bamako are those who most declared being “insufficiently secure” or “totally insecure” on visiting other villages with 100% in Kidal, 99% in Ménaka, 98% in Mopti, 96% in Tombouctou and 86% in Taoudénit (where the proportion of those without an opinion is also very high, 12%).


Kayes proves to be an exception with a majority of citizens (54.5%) declaring that they are “sufficiently secure” on visiting other villages.

Impact in terms of gender is not very significant.

An analysis of *Table 68* shows that the feeling of being “totally insecure” when visiting other villages drops incrementally as the interviewee's age increases.

Table 68: Impact of age on the feeling of security on visiting other villages


An analysis of *Table 69* shows that the feeling of being “totally insecure” whenever visiting other villages increases with educational attainment. Conversely, the feeling of being “insufficiently secure” whenever visiting other villages incrementally diminishes as educational attainment increases, with the exception of those with a secondary education.

Table 69: Impact of educational attainment on the feeling of security when visiting other villages

2.6. 5. Assessment of the level of insecurity at gatherings in public places

Nearly two-thirds (64.5%) of those surveyed declare that they feel “totally insecure” (33.1%) or “insufficiently secure” (31.4%) at gatherings in public places, as against 35% who state the opposite (*cf. Table 70*).

Table 70: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the level of insecurity at gatherings in public places




Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of those who do not feel secure at public gatherings has increased 20 points.

In Table 70 here-above, one can observe that the localities in which the feeling of insecurity (“not sufficiently secure” and “totally insecure” at public gatherings is higher particularly in the North of the country with Ménaka (99%), Kidal (98.9%), Mopti (95%), Taoudénit (89.5%), Tombouctou (87.7%), Gao (76.7%) and Bamako (78.3%). This feeling of insecurity is also high in Ségou (67%) and Koulikoro (61.2%). The city of Kayes again constitutes an exception with the big majority of citizens (70.2%) who feel “sufficiently secure” at public gatherings.

Impact in terms of gender and of age on the feeling of insecurity at public gatherings is not substantial.

By contrast, Table 71 indicates that the feeling of being “totally insecure” at public gatherings increases with educational attainment. Conversely, the feeling of being “sufficiently secure” at public gatherings incrementally diminishes as educational attainment increases:

Table 71: Impact of educational attainment on the feeling of insecurity at public gatherings




2.6. 6. Individual fear of terrorist attacks

A large majority of those surveyed (88.1%) declare fearing terrorist attacks as against a small minority (11.7%) who declare the opposite.

By locality (*cf. Table 72*), the fear of terrorist attacks is felt very strongly nearly everywhere (by more than 80% of the interviewees, but in smaller proportions in Kidal (65.6%), Kayes (69%) and Taoudénit (55.8%). The number of those without an opinion in Taoudénit is also very high (18.9%).

Table 72: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their fear of terrorist attacks



In terms of gender, women (91.2%) are much more fearful of terrorist attacks than men (85.1%) as evidenced in *Table 73*.

Table 73: Impact of gender on the fear of terrorist attacks






Table 74 here below shows a slight incremental decline in the percentage of people who declare being fearful of attacks as educational attainment of the interviewee's increases.

Table 74: impact of educational attainment on the fear of terrorist attacks

As for the interviewees' age, its impact is not substantial.

2.6.7. Evolution of the region's level of security

Table 75 here-below indicates citizens' opinions on the evolution of the region's level of security over the last three months. Overall, it shows that 41% of interviewees think that the security level has declined as against 30% who think that it has increased while 28% find that there has been no change.

Table 75: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the evolution of the region's level of security over the last 3 months


By locality (*cf. Table 75*), one can observe that the perception of the decline in the region's level of security is particularly high in Koulikoro (61.2%), Sikasso (52%) and Ségou (51.3%) and in a lower proportion in Mopti (42.4%). By contrast, the proportions of those surveyed that believe that the level of security has increased are higher in Taoudénit (56.8%), Kayes (47.5%), Bamako (46.7%), Gao (39.4%) and Tombouctou (38.8%). It is judged as having "remained at the same level" predominantly in Kidal (77.8%), Ménaka (58.3%), and Tombouctou (41.8%).

Impact in terms of gender, of educational attainment, or of age is not very significant.

2.6. 8. Actors in whom citizens trust to ensure the regions' security

The majority of citizens surveyed (68.9%) declared trusting the Force Armées Maliennes (i.e. the Malian Armed Forces hereinafter referred to as the FAMA) to ensure the region's security, followed by the Gendarmerie (56.8%), the Garde Nationale (44.3%) and the National Police (42.6%). (cf. Table 76).

Table 76: Breakdown of interviewees according to their opinion of actors whom they trust to ensure the regions' security




Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the number of citizens who trust the Malian armed forces, the gendarmes, the Garde Nationale, and the police to ensure the region's security has increased nearly by 10 points, 8 points, 3 points, and 5 points, respectively.

Impact in terms of gender, of educational attainment, or of age is not very significant.

By locality, Table 77 indicates that a majority of citizens trust the armed and security forces (army, Gendarmerie, Garde Nationale and/or police) to ensure their own region's security in Kayes (78% in the police and 50% in the FAMA); Koulikoro (93% in the FAMA, 65% in the Gendarmerie and 63% in the Garde Nationale); Sikasso (70% in the FAMA and in the Gendarmerie and 53% in the police); Ségou (75% in the FAMA and 56% in the Gendarmerie); Mopti (86% in the FAMA and 50% in the Garde Nationale); Tombouctou (77% in the FAMA); Ménaka (88% in the FAMA; and Bamako (62% in the Gendarmerie). This trust is shared with Barkhane and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, hereinafter referred to as MINUSMA, by a significant proportion of people in Tombouctou (48% for Operation Barkhane and 45% for MINUSMA); Ménaka (41% in Barkhane and 29% in MINUSMA); and Gao (25% in Barkhane and 15% in MINUSMA). A Kidal, this trust goes to Barkhane (58.9%), to the Plateforme (45.6%), to the CMA (33.3%) and to the local chiefs, as well as to fraction and village chiefs (21.1%); the armed and the security forces do not feature. In Ménaka, in addition to the FAMA, 40% of the interviewees trust the Plateforme and 17% the CMA. Conversely, in Taoudénit, the local population trust local chiefs, as well as fraction and village chiefs (64.2%), the CMA (47.4%), the imams and the marabouts (33.7%), the Plateforme (21.1%), Barkhane (18.9%), MINUSMA (17.9%). The armed and national security forces do not enjoy the trust of the people of Taoudénit.


Table 77: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their opinion of actors whom they trust to ensure their region's security



2.6. 9. Level of satisfaction with MINUSMA's performance

As for the assessment of the level of satisfaction with MINUSMA's performance, *Table 78* indicates an opinion nearly shared by everyone with (46.1%), comprising "very dissatisfied" (30.4%) or "rather dissatisfied" (15.7%) while (42.3%) expressed satisfaction: "rather satisfied" (34%) or "very satisfied" (8.3%), meaning a difference of 4 percentage points. Nearly 12% of interviewees are without an opinion.


Overall, the level of those dissatisfied with the work of MINUSMA has dropped 7 points, while the level of those satisfied has increased in the same proportion if compared with Mali-Mètre 9.

Table 78: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their level of satisfaction with MINUSMA's performance

By locality (*cf. Table 78*), the highest number of dissatisfaction expressed by citizens (“very dissatisfied” and “rather dissatisfied”) with MINUSMA is recorded in Kidal (81.1%), Taoudénit (66.3%), Koulikoro (65.1%) and Bamako (56.3%). Conversely, the cities that recorded the highest proportion of satisfied citizens (“very satisfied” and “rather satisfied”) are Ménaka (73.9%), Tombouctou (66.3%), Mopti (59.2%), Gao (56.6%), and Kayes (54.5%).

The proportion of those without an opinion is particularly high in Sikasso (27.7%) and Ségou (26%).


By gender, the level of satisfaction with MINUSMA's performance (“very satisfied” and “rather satisfied”) is higher among women (49.5%) than among men (35.4%) (*cf. Table 79*).

Table 79: Impact of gender on the level of satisfaction with MINUSMA's performance

2.6. 10. Major Criticisms of MINUSMA

The citizens surveyed predominantly criticized MINUSMA for “not protecting the population against violence from armed groups and terrorists” (59.0%). In order of frequency, the other criticisms cited by a significant minority of interviewees include: “being in cahoots with armed groups” (31.6%); “contributing to the high cost of living” (29%); “protecting themselves” (21.7%), “its mandate is not sufficiently known” (20.9%), etc. (*cf. Table 80*).

By comparison, the major criticisms directed at MINUSMA are essentially identical to those formulated in the previous edition of Mali-Mètre, even if the order of frequency differs slightly from the previous criticisms: “not protecting the population against violence from armed groups and terrorists” (54.9%); “being in cahoots with armed groups” (33.7%); “its mandate is not sufficiently known” (24.7%); “protecting themselves” (23.2%), “contributing to the high cost of living” (20.2%).

Table 80: Breakdown of interviewees according to their opinion of major criticisms directed at MINUSMA

The most frequent criticism made against MINUSMA is that they “do not protect the population from the violence of armed groups and from the terrorists.” This criticism is cited in first position in Kayes (81%), Ségou (73.6%), Ménaka (68%), Sikasso (64.8%), Tombouctou (63.6%), Kidal (63%), Mopti (55.4%), Gao (54.8%) and Koulikoro (52.7%). In contrast, it is cited in second position in Taoudénit (39.7%) and in Bamako (30.4%).


The second criticism addressed at MINUSMA is that of “contributing to the high cost of living,” cited in first position in Bamako (35.6%), in second position in Ménaka (44%), and in third position in Taoudénit (39.4%), Mopti (38%), Koulikoro (35.2%), Tombouctou (30.3%) and Gao (23.8%).

Other criticisms are cited, as, for example, “being in cahoots with armed groups,” cited in second position in Koulikoro (48.8%) and Ségou (41.4%) and in third position in Sikasso (26.9%), or “respond too slowly to the challenges of stabilisation,” cited in first position in Kidal (71.2%) and in Taoudénit (46%), etc.

2.6. 11. Impact of MINUSMA's withdrawal from Mali

Taking into account all the citizens surveyed, opinions are divided as to impact in terms of gender on MINUSMA's withdrawal from Mali. For 35% of those interviewed their departure would have a negative impact, while 23% believed it would have a positive impact; and 31% thought that it would have no impact. The proportion of interviewees without an opinion (10.7%) is very high (*cf. Table 81*).

Table 81: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the impact of MINUSMA's withdrawal from Mali




Compared with the findings in Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of Malians who think that the withdrawal of MINUSMA from Mali would have a negative impact has increased nearly 13 points.

By locality, the proportion of interviewees who believe that MINUSMA's withdrawal from Mali would have a negative impact is predominant in Ménaka (68.8%), Tombouctou (57.1%) and Gao (54.5%) and prevalent in Kayes (42%), Mopti (37%), and Sikasso (30.5%). Those who think that their withdrawal would be without impact are very much in the majority in Kidal (75.6%) and numerous in Bamako and Mopti (35.4%) as well as in Koulikoro (42.4%). In contrast, the proportions of those who think that this withdrawal would be positive predominate in Taoudénit (37.9%) and Ségou (35%) ahead of Bamako (30.4%). Lastly, the highest proportions of those without an opinion are recorded in Sikasso (26.2%), Ségou (23%), and Taoudénit (12.6%).


An analysis of impact in terms of gender (*cf. Table 82*) shows that it is particularly substantial for the proportion of those who think that MINUSMA's withdrawal from Mali would have a positive impact. The proportion of men (29.9%) is clearly higher than that of women (16.7%).

Table 82: Impact of gender on the assessment of MINUSMA's withdrawal from Mali




The analysis of impact in terms of educational attainment is not very significant as can be observed in *Table 83*. Nevertheless, it shows that the proportion of those without an opinion progressively diminishes as educational attainment increases.

Table 83: Impact of educational attainment on the assessment of MINUSMA' withdrawal from Mali



Impact in terms of gender of age is particularly substantial for the proportion of those who believe that MINUSMA's withdrawal will have a negative impact. This proportion progressively diminishes as the age of the interviewees increase (*cf. Table 84*).


Table 84: Impact of age on the assessment of MINUSMA's withdrawal from Mali



2.6. 12. Desired length of stay for the UN troops (MINUSMA) in Mali

38% of persons surveyed prefer that the UN troops should stay “less than one year” as against 22% of opinions who are favourable to a period of “between one and three years” and 15% for “between four and five years” (cf. Table 85).

Table 85: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their opinion on MINUSMA's desired length of stay in Mali




Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportions of citizens who believe that MINUSMA's length of stay should be “less than one year” has declined 6 points, as against an increase of 7 points and of 6 points, respectively, for proponents of a timeframe of “between 1-3 years” and of “between 4-5 years.”

By locality (cf. Table 85), proponents of a brief length of stay for MINUSMA in Mali are recorded in Taoudénit (65.3%), Kidal (61.1%), Bamako (56.3%), Ménaka (55.2% and Koulikoro (49.5%). They are also the most numerous in Kayes (35.7%), Sikasso (34.6%), Ségou (38%), Tombouctou (35.7%), and Gao (20.2%). Those without an opinion represent 24% in Gao.

It can be observed that men are more favourable than women for a shorter stay for MINUSMA in Mali: 50% of men as against 27% of women for a stay “of less than one year” (cf. Table 86).

Table 86: Impact of gender on the assessment of MINUSMA's length of stay in Mali




Impact in terms of educational attainment or of age is not substantial.

2.6. 13. Level of satisfaction with Operation BARKHANE in Mali

The opinions of citizens surveyed are divided on the assessment of Barkhane's operations in Mali. Although 47% declared that were “rather satisfied” (36.8%) or “very satisfied” (10.6%), 44% of respondents were “very dissatisfied” (28.7%) or “rather dissatisfied” (15.1%) with Barkhane's operations in Mali. 9% of citizens surveyed are without an opinion (*cf. Table 87*).

Table 87: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their level of satisfaction with the performance of Operation BARKHANE




Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the opinions of the populations surveyed had hardly changed with respect to their assessment of Operation Barkhane: 46% were “very dissatisfied” (26.9%) or “dissatisfied” (19.4%) as against 43% of “rather satisfied” (33.2%) or “very satisfied” (9.7%) with Operation Barkhane's performance in Mali.

By locality (*cf. Table 87*), the citizens of Ménaka (92.7%), Tombouctou (70.4%), Mopti (67.7%), Gao (62.6%) and Kayes (58.9%) are “rather satisfied” or “satisfied” with BARKHANE. Those surveyed who are “rather dissatisfied” and “very dissatisfied” are largely predominant in Kidal (91.1%), Taoudénit (64.2%), Koulikoro (62.8%) and Bamako (57.1%). Ségou sets itself apart with a very high proportion of those without an opinion (26.3%), followed by Sikasso (14.3%).

Women (53%) are more satisfied with BARKHANE than men (41.8%), as indicated in *Table 88*.

Table 88: Impact of gender on the assessment of the performance of Operation BARKHANE in Mali




Impact in terms of educational attainment or of age is not very significant.

2.6. 14. Criticisms of BARKHANE

The citizens surveyed predominantly criticized BARKHANE for “being in cahoots with armed groups” (57.4%) and for “not protecting the population against violence from armed groups and terrorists” (41.6%). Other criticisms cited by a substantial minority of interviewees include: “not being interested in the development of the country” (21.5%); “contributing to the high cost of living” (21.1%), “protecting themselves” (21%), and so forth (*cf. Table 89*).

Table 89: Breakdown of interviewees according to their critical opinions of BARKHANE




Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the criticisms are practically the same and in the same order of frequency for the three main criticisms.

The two most frequently voiced criticisms made against Barkhane (“being in cahoots with armed groups” and “not protecting the population against violence from armed groups and terrorists”) are cited in most localities, in first position or in second position, respectively with: 70% and 45% in Kayes; 73% and 41% in Koulikoro; 58% and 52% in Sikasso; 48%; and 35% in Ségou; 65%; and 38% in Mopti; 28% and 69% in Tombouctou; 52%; and 39% in Gao; 44% and 26% in Bamako. In Kidal, Barkhane is primarily criticised for “not protecting the population against violence from armed groups and terrorists” (57.3%), followed by “responding too slowly to the challenges of stabilisation” (47.6%). In Ménaka, respondents are concerned about, in nearly the same order of frequency, “give less importance to serious violations of human rights” (42.9%) and “not being interested in the development of the country” (42%). Lastly, in Taoudénit, apart from “not protecting the population against violence from armed groups and terrorists” (31.1%), Barkhane is criticized for “contributing to the decline of moral values” (29.5%).

2.6.15. Growth of the level of trust in BARKHANE

For 45% of citizens surveyed, the level of trust in BARKHANE has declined between the onset of France's military intervention and today, as against 29% who believe that it has remained the same and 18% for whom it has increased (*cf. Table 90*).

Table 90: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the growth of the level of trust in BARKHANE


However, compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of those who believe that trust in Barkhane has declined (47.5%) dropped 2 points, whereas those who believe that this trust has increased (15%) have seen a gain of the order of 3 points.

By locality (cf. Table 90), the increase in the level of trust in Barkhane is particularly observable in a significant proportion of interviewees in Tombouctou (48%) and Gao (33.3%). As indicated in the Table above, the level of trust has significantly declined in Kidal (85.6%), Koulikoro (63.8%), Bamako (57.1%) and, in lower but yet predominant proportions in Taoudénit (46.3%), Sikasso (43%), Kayes (43.1%), and Ségou (44.3%). The level of trust has remained identical for the majority of interviewees in Ménaka (72.9%) and Mopti (53.3%) and in a smaller proportion in Gao (40.4%).

2.6. 16. Desired length of stay for BARKHANE troops in Mali

The length of stay for Barkhane troupes in Mali should be “less than one year” for 39% of Malians surveyed as against 24% who are favourable to “1-3 years” and 15% to “4-5 years” (cf. Table 91). It should, however, be noted that a substantial minority of persons (12.2%) declare not having an opinion on the question.

Table 91: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their opinion concerning BARKHANE's desired length of stay in Mali




Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of supporters of “less than one year” dropped 4 points and those between “1-3 years” and “4-5 years” has increased by 9 points and by 3 points, respectively.

By locality, the inhabitants of Kidal (67.8%), Taoudénit (64.2%), Bamako (59.6%), and Koulikoro (50.5%) are, in their majority, favourable to a stay of “less than one year.” The proportion of favourable opinions to a timeframe of “1-3 years” is predominant in Ménaka (51%) and also quite high in Mopti (44.7%) and Kayes (34.9%).

As for citizens without an opinion concerning their length of stay, they are particularly numerous in Ségou (26.7%), Gao (21.2%), Koulikoro (19.7%), Sikasso (18.1%), and Kidal (11.1%) as indicated in Table 91.

It is to be observed that men are more favourable than women with regard to a shorter stay for BARKHANE forces in Mali: 48% of men as against 30% of women (cf. Table 92).

Table 92: Impact of gender on the assessment of Barkhane's length of stay in Mali




Impact in terms of educational attainment or of age is not very significant.

2.6. 17. Awareness concerning the training of the FAMA by the European Union, by means of the EUTM, in order to secure the country

Overall, half (50.2%) of those surveyed declare being aware that the European Union, by means of the European Union Training Mission, hereinafter referred to EUTM, are training the Malian armed forces in Koulikoro in order to secure stability in the country, as against nearly the same amount (49.8%) who declare not being aware (cf. Table 93).

Table 93: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their awareness of the FAMA being trained by the European Union, by means of the EUTM, in order to secure the country




Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the number of citizens aware of this training declined 11 points.

By locality, the inhabitants of Koulikoro (67.6%), Bamako (59.2%), Kayes (58%), Sikasso (52.3%) and Ménaka (52.1%) are the best informed. Conversely, those surveyed in Taoudénit (4.2%), Kidal (6.7%), and, in a greater proportion, Mopti (16.7%), Tombouctou (18.4%) and Gao (21.2%) are less informed about the training.


Women (37.4%) are less aware of the training than men (62.9%), as indicated in Table 94 here-below.

Table 94: Impact of gender on the awareness of the FAMA's training by the European Union, by means of the EUTM, in order to secure the country



The number of those aware of this training greatly increases with the population's educational attainment (cf. Table 95).

Table 95: Impact of educational attainment on the awareness of the FAMA's training by the European Union, by means of the EUTM, in order to secure the country




Impact in terms of age on the level of the population's awareness concerning the training given by the EUTM to the Malian armed forces is not very significant.

2.6. 18. Efficacy of the EUTM's training of the Malian armed forces

The majority of Malians, (68.6%), "greatly" appreciate this training of the Malian armed forces by the EUTM, as against a quarter (24.9%) who appreciate it "a little" and 4% who "not at all" appreciate it (*cf. Table 96*).

Table 96: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the efficacy of the training given by the EUTM to the Malian armed forced



The efficacy of this training is "greatly" appreciated by a very significant proportion of interviewees in Ménaka (90%), Sikasso (85.7%), Ségou (74.6%), Kayes (71.6%) Koulikoro (69.4%) and Gao (66.7%). In contrast, it is appreciated "a little" by a predominant majority of the population in Kidal (83.3%) and by more than half in Mopti (51.2%). It should be noted that the proportion of those without an opinion is particularly high in Taoudénit, with 75% of the interviewees.


However, compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of Malians who “greatly” appreciate the efficacy of this training has increased by 6 points and the proportion of those who do “not at all” appreciate it has dropped 1 point.

Overall, gender, educational attainment, or age have no substantial impact on the assessment of the efficacy of the training given by the EUTM.

2.6.19. Growth in the level of trust in the Malian army

Overall, 78%, of citizens interviewed believe that trust in the army has increased as against only 6% who think that this trust has declined; it has remained the same for 16% (*cf. Table 97*).

Table 97: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the growth in the level of trust in the Malian army



Compared with Mali-Mètre 9 (63%), the level of trust in the Malian army has increased 15 points.


In every locality surveyed, with the exception of Kidal, Taoudénit, and Ménaka, the proportion of interviewees who believe that the level of trust in the army has increased is largely predominant, as indicated in *Table 97*. In Ménaka, the vast majority (79.2%) think that this trust has remained the same, whereas in Kidal and Taoudénit, this trust in the army has diminished for 82% and 66% of those surveyed, respectively.

Impact in terms of gender, of age, or of educational attainment is not very significant.

2.6. 20. Awareness of the establishment of the G5 Sahel Joint Force

Overall, the majority of Malians surveyed, some 64%, declared having heard about the establishment of the G5 Sahel Joint Force as against 34% who declared the opposite (*cf. Table 98*).

Table 98: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to whether they had heard of the establishment of the G5 Sahel Joint Force




In comparison with the findings of Mali-Mètre 9 (51.2%), the proportion of interviewees having heard speak of the establishment of the G5 Sahel Joint Force has increased by nearly 13 points.


The localities in which the establishment of this force is most well known, as indicated in *Table 98*, are Gao (84.8%), Ménaka (83.3%), Koulikoro (74.1%), Bamako (70.8%), Mopti (69.6%), and Sikasso (62.6%). Awareness as to its establishment is particularly low in the localities of Taoudénit (34.7%), Tombouctou (38.8%), and Kidal (38.9%).

Men (78.9%) are clearly more numerous than women (48.2%) in declaring having heard about the establishment G5 Sahel Joint Force (*cf. Table 99*).

Table 99: Impact of gender on whether the interviewees heard about the establishment the G5 Sahel Joint Force




Furthermore, the proportion of those interviewed aware of the establishment of the G5 Sahel strongly increases with educational attainment, as indicated in *Table 100*.

Table 100: Impact of educational attainment on the awareness of the establishment of the G5 Sahel Joint Force

Age, on the other hand, has not a very substantial impact.

2.6. 21. Assessment of the establishment of the G5 Sahel Joint Force to combat terrorism in Mali and in neighbouring countries

For the vast majority of those surveyed, (78.3%), the establishment of the G5 Sahel Joint Force is judged “good” (47.2%) or “very good” (31.1%) as against 15% who believe the opposite, while 7% are without an opinion, (cf. Table 101).

Table 101: Assessment of the establishment of the G5 Sahel Joint Force to combat terrorism in Mali and in neighbouring countries

In all localities surveyed, the establishment of the G5 Sahel Joint Force to combat terrorism in Mali and in neighbouring countries is judged as “very good” or “good” by a majority of citizens, as can be observed in Table 101.

Nevertheless, this majority is less pronounced in Kidal and Tombouctou with 44% and 42%, respectively. The proportion of those who judge its establishment as “bad” or very bad” is rather high with 23% in Kidal and Gao; and 39% in Tombouctou.


Interviewees without an opinion are numerous in Kidal (32.6%) and Tombouctou (19.5%).

Impact in terms of gender, of age, or of educational attainment is not very significant.

2.6.22. Assertion that the Malian army alone can stabilize security in Mali

The assertion “the Malian army alone can stabilize security in Mali” is shared by the two-thirds (65.7%) of citizens surveyed: (37.6%) “totally agree” and (28.1%) “agree” with the statement. One third (33.8%) answered “disagree” (28%) or “totally disagree” (5.8%) with this assertion (*cf. Table 102*).

Table 102: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the assertion that the Malian army alone can stabilize security in Mali




In comparison with Mali-Mètre 9, the interviewees' opinions have scarcely changed.

By locality, the interviewees who agree with this assertion are particularly numerous in Koulikoro (77%), Ménaka (74%) and Bamako (73.4%). Those with the contrary opinion are to be found particularly in great numbers in Taoudénit (85.3%) and Kidal (70%).

Men (69.8%) tend to share this opinion more than women (61.4%) (*cf. Table 103*).

Table 103: Impact of gender on the assessment of the assertion that the Malian army alone can stabilize security in Mali




Impact in terms of educational attainment, or of age is not very significant.

2.6.23. Assertion that the Malian army can stabilize security in Mali with the help of MINUSMA

More than half of those surveyed (54.6%) agree with this assertion: “agree”(39.2%) or “totally agree” (15.4%). 40% hold the opposite view (with 26% who “disagree” or 14% “totally disagree”) (cf. Table 104).

Table 104: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the assertion that the Malian army can stabilize security in Mali with MINUSMA



Compared with Mali-Mètre 9 (50.1%), the proportion of those who agree with this assertion has increased by 4 points.


By locality, more than half of interviewees in Tombouctou (75.5%), Ménaka (75%), Mopti (67.7%), Bamako (61.2%), Gao (55.6%), Sikasso (54.8%) and Kayes (54.1%) and almost the half in Ségou (48.3%) “totally agree” (31%) or “agree” (17.3%) that the Malian army can stabilize security in Mali with MINUSMA.

In contrast, the majority of those surveyed in Kidal (66.7%), Koulikoro (56%), and Taoudénit (58.9%), do not share this opinion (cf. Table 104).

The proportion of those who “don't know” is high in Ségou (13%), Sikasso (10.6%), and Taoudénit (10.5%).

The proportion of women who “agree” or “totally agree” with this assertion is higher than those of men with 62% and 47%, respectively (cf. Table 105).

Table 105: Impact of gender on the assessment of the assertion that the Malian army can stabilize security in Mali with MINUSMA




Impact in terms of educational attainment, or of age is not very significant.

2.6.24. Assertion that the Malian army can stabilize security in Mali with the help of BARKHANE

A majority (55.5%) of those surveyed “agree” (38.7%) or “totally agree” (16.7%) with this assertion as against 40% who do “disagree” (23.3%) or “totally disagree”(16.7%), while 5% are without an opinion (*cf. Table 106*).


Table 106: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the assertion that the Malian army can stabilize security in Mali with BARKHANE



The proportion of those who do not agree with this assertion has increased by 3 points, if compared with Mali-Mètre 9.

By locality, interviewees largely agree with this assertion in most localities: 90% in Ménaka, 76% in Tombouctou, 71% in Gao, 69% in Mopti, 60% in Bamako, 57% in Sikasso, 56% in Kidal, 53% in Kayes, and 50% in Ségou. A majority of those who “disagree” or “totally disagree” with this assertion can be found in Koulikoro (55.9%) and Taoudénit (48.4%). In Taoudénit those “without an opinion” constitute 12% of respondents (*cf. Table 106*).


The proportion of women who is “agree” or “totally agree” with this assertion is higher (62.4%) than that of men (48.5%) (*cf. Table 107*).

Table 107: Impact of gender on the assessment of the assertion that the Malian army can stabilize security in Mali with BARKHANE

Impact in terms of educational attainment, or of age is not very significant.

2.6.25. Assertion that the Malian army can stabilize security in Mali with the help of G5 Sahel

Overall, three-quarters (74.6%) of those surveyed “agree” (49.7%) or “totally agree” (24.9%) that “that the Malian army can stabilize security in Mali with G5 Sahel” as against 17% who “disagree” (12.3%) or “totally disagree” (4.2%). Those without an opinion constitute 9% of respondents (*cf. Table 108*).

Table 108: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the assertion that the Malian army can stabilize security in Mali with G5 Sahel

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of those who agree with this assertion has scarcely changed.


By locality (*cf. Table 108*), everywhere, with the exception of Kidal and Taoudénit, a large majority of interviewees “agree” or “totally agree” with this assertion. In Kidal and Taoudénit, 67% and 43%, “disagree” or “totally disagree” with this assertion, respectively. However, the very high proportions of those without an opinion in Taoudénit (17.9%), Ségou (19%) and Sikasso (15.6%) should be noted.

Impact in terms of gender, of educational attainment, or of age is not very significant.

2.6. 26. Assertion that the Malian army can stabilise the security situation in Mali, with the help of ECOWAS

Overall, 69% of those surveyed agree with this assertion, with 47% “agree” and 22% “totally agree” (21.7%). Nevertheless, a quarter (25.3%) hold the opposite opinion, with 18% “disagree” and 7% “totally disagree,” while nearly 6% are without an opinion (*cf. Table 109*).

Table 109: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the assertion that the Malian army can stabilise the security situation in Mali with ECOWAS



A comparison with the population's opinions compiled in Mali-Mètre 9, shows an increase of 12 points for the number of those who agree with this assertion.

By locality, large numbers of interviewees agree with this assertion, except in Kidal and Taoudénit where the majority hold the opposite opinion, with 68% and 56% who “disagree” or “totally disagree,” respectively (*cf. Table here-above*).


By gender, the proportion those who “agree” or “totally agree” is 10 points higher among men (64%) than among women (54%).

Impact in terms of educational attainment or of age is not very significant.

2.6.27. Assertion that the Malian army can stabilize security in Mali, with MINUSMA, BARKHANE, and the G5 Sahel

This opinion is shared by nearly two-thirds of interviewees (62.7%): “agree”(31.9%) or “totally agree” (30.8%). In contrast, 34% do “disagree” (18.3%) or “totally disagree” (15.7%) (*cf. Table 110*).

Table 110: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the assertion that the Malian army can stabilize security in Mali, with MINUSMA, BARKHANE, and the G5 Sahel



The proportion of those who concur with this assertion has increased by 6 points, if compared with Mali-Mètre 9.

In all localities (*cf.* Table 110), at least more than half of the interviewees “agree” or “totally agree” with this assertion, with a higher level recorded in Ménaka (94.8%), as indicated in Table 110. The largest proportions of citizens who do not hold this opinion were surveyed in Koulikoro (48.5%) and Kayes (43.1%).

Impact in terms of gender indicates that women (70.1%) agree with this assertion more than men (55.3%), as indicated in Table 111.

Table 111: Impact of gender on the assessment of the assertion that the Malian army can stabilize security in Mali, with MINUSMA, BARKHANE, and the G5 Sahel





Table 112 shows a decline in levels as the age of respondent's increases: 68% for the 18-24 year-olds; 61% for the 25-35 year-olds and the 36-55 year-olds; and 58% for the 56 year-olds and over.


Table 112: Impact of age on the assessment of the assertion that the Malian army can stabilize security in Mali, with MINUSMA, BARKHANE, and the G5 Sahel



2.6.28. Awareness of the participation of the EUCAP Sahel Mali in the training of the Police, of the Gendarmerie and of the Garde Nationale


A large majority of interviewees (71.6%) declare being unaware of the participation of the EUCAP Sahel Mali in the training of the police, of the Gendarmerie, and of the Garde Nationale, as against 28% who declare the opposite (*cf. Table 113*).

Table 113: Awareness of the participation of the European Union Capacity Building Mission, hereinafter referred to as EUCAP Sahel Mali, in the training of the police, of the Gendarmerie, and of the Garde Nationale




By locality (*cf. Table 113*), the EUCAP Sahel Mali is well-known by a substantial minority of interviewees in Ménaka (42.7%), Ségou (41.3%), Sikasso (39.3%), Koulikoro (39.2%) and, to a lesser extent, in Bamako (27.9%) and Gao (19.2%).

An analysis of Impact in terms of educational attainment shows that the proportion of interviewees who are aware of the EUCAP Sahel Mali increases with educational attainment, as indicated in *Table 114*.

Table 114: Impact of educational attainment on the awareness concerning the EUCAP Sahel Mali

2.6.29. Assessment of the efficacy of training that EUCAP Sahel Mali gave to the police, the Gendarmerie, and the Garde Nationale

Among the minority of interviewees who have heard of the EUCAP Sahel Mali, more than two-thirds (69%) declared that they “greatly” appreciated the training given to the police, the Gendarmerie and the Garde Nationale, as against a little more than a quarter (26.4%) who appreciate it “a little”; and 3% “not at all” (*cf. Table 115*).

Table 115: Assessment by locality of the efficacy of the training that the EUCAP Sahel Mali gave to the police, the Gendarmerie and the Garde Nationale


By locality (*cf. Table 115*), this training was greatly appreciated in Kayes, Sikasso, Ménaka, Ségou, and Koulikoro. On the other hand, it was scarcely appreciated in Kidal, Bamako, Tombouctou, Mopti and, to a certain degree, in Taoudénit where 50% are without opinion.

Impact in terms of gender, of age, or of educational attainment is not very significant.

2.6.30. Awareness of reform in the security sector

A minority of interviewees (16.9%) declare being aware of reform in the security sector as against 83% who affirmed the opposite (cf. Table 116).


Table 116: Awareness of reform in the security sector by locality



By locality (cf. Table 116), a substantial minority of citizens are aware of this reform of the security sector, specifically in Ségou (29.3%), Kidal (21.1%), Koulikoro (19.4%) and Bamako (19.2%).

Impact in terms of educational attainment shows an increase in the proportion of those who are aware of this reform with an increase of educational attainment, as indicated in Table 117


Table 117: Impact of educational attainment on the awareness of reform of the security sector



Impact in terms of age is not very significant.

2.6.31. Assessment of the reform of the security sector

Among Malians who are aware of the reform of the security sector, a majority (57.7%) “greatly” appreciate this reform for its inclusive and participative nature, as well as its contribution to improving the sector. More than a third of those interviewed (34.5%) appreciate it “a little” and 4% or do not appreciate it “at all,” as indicated in Table 118.

Table 118: Assessment of the reform of the security sector by locality

By locality (Table here-above), this reform is “greatly” appreciated in Sikasso (85.4%), Mopti (71.9%), Kayes (66.7%), Ségou (65.9%), and Gao (52.9%). On the other hand, it is hardly appreciated by a high proportion of citizens in Kidal (78.9%), Ménaka (61.1%), Tombouctou, and Koulikoro (60%). In Bamako, opinion is equally divided between those who greatly appreciate it (43.5%) and those who hardly appreciate it (43.5%), while the proportion of those who do not appreciate it “at all” is notably high in Tombouctou (40%). It should be noted that there is a very high proportion of those “without an opinion” in Taoudénit (75%).


Impact in terms of gender, of educational attainment, or of age is not very significant.

2.7. ELECTORAL PROCESS

2.7.1 Assessment of the preparation for the 2018 elections

Nearly three quarters of Malians (72.6%) are “rather satisfied” (40%) or “very satisfied” (32.6%) with preparations for the 2018 presidential election, notably in relation to the availability and access to voting cards. A little more than a quarter (25.9%) is “rather dissatisfied” (15.1%) or “very dissatisfied” (10.8%), (*cf. Table 119*).


Table 119: Breakdown of interviewees according to their assessment of preparations for the 2018 elections



By locality, the highest proportions of those “very satisfied” or “rather satisfied” are recorded in Kayes (77.3%), Mopti (75.1%), Ségou (75%), Sikasso (74.8%), Koulikoro (74.2%), and Ménaka (70.8%). On the other hand, those least satisfied (“rather dissatisfied” and “very dissatisfied”) are to be found in Kidal (88.9%) and, to a lesser extent, in Gao (45.4%) and Tombouctou (35.7%).

An analysis of impact in terms of gender shows that women (77%) are more satisfied with preparations for the presidential election than men (69%).


It is to be noted that dissatisfaction (“rather dissatisfied” and “very dissatisfied”) increases with educational attainment, (*cf. Table 120*).

Table 120: Impact of educational attainment on the assessment of preparations for the presidential election

In contrast, impact in terms of age is not very significant.

2.7.2 Assessment of the organisation for the elections

It is evident from the surveys that 70% of citizens interviewed are “rather satisfied” (41.8%) or “very satisfied” (27.9%) with the organisation of the 2018 presidential election, notably in relation to the electoral campaigns and the candidates political programs, as against 28% who are “rather dissatisfied” (16.6%) or “very dissatisfied” (11.3%), (*cf. Table 121*).


Table 121: Breakdown of interviewees according to their assessment of the organisation for the 2018 presidential election

By locality (*cf. Table here-above*), those with highest proportion of citizens satisfied (“very satisfied” or “rather satisfied”) with this organisation are recorded in Ménaka (80.2%), Kayes (75.6%), Sikasso (74.8%), Mopti (73.5%), Koulikoro (71.6%), and Ségou (69.3%). The levels of interviewees satisfied are also dominant in other cities, with the exception of Kidal where the vast majority (92.2%) is rather dissatisfied (44.4%) or very dissatisfied (47.8%). In Gao and Tombouctou, the proportion of those dissatisfied is also high, with 44% and 41%, respectively. Those “without an opinion” constitute 21% in Taoudénit.

In terms of gender, women (76%) are more satisfied with the organisation of this election than men (65%).

Table 122 shows that the level of dissatisfaction (“very dissatisfied” and “rather dissatisfied”) increases with educational attainment.


Table 122: Impact of educational attainment on the assessment of the organisation for the presidential election



Impact in terms of age is not very significant.

2.7.3 Assessment of the monitoring of the presidential election

Nearly 70% (68.9%) of interviewees are “rather satisfied” (39.3%) or “very satisfied” (29.6%) with the monitoring of the presidential election as against less than a quarter (23.7%) who are “rather dissatisfied” (12.7%) or “very dissatisfied” (11%), (*cf. Table 123*).

Table 123: Breakdown of interviewees according to their assessment of the monitoring of presidential election by locality

By locality, the higher proportions of satisfied citizens (“very satisfied” or “rather satisfied”) of the presidential election are recorded in Sikasso (76.9%) and Koulikoro (73.4%). These proportions are equally largely dominant in Ménaka (69.8%), Ségou (69%), Kayes (68.2%), Mopti (68.1%) and Bamako (66.2%). Conversely, the level of dissatisfied interviewees of the organisation is very predominant in Kidal (94.5%) and less dominant in Gao (48.5%) and Tombouctou (39.8%). The proportion of those “without an opinion” is very high in Taoudénit and Kayes, with 23% and 21%, respectively

Women (74.6%) are more satisfied with this organisation than men (64.8%), as indicated in *Table 124*.



Graphique 124 : Incidence du sexe sur l’appréciation de l’observation de l’élection présidentielle


Table 125 shows an increase of dissatisfaction levels depending on educational attainment.

Table 125: Impact of educational attainment on the assessment of the monitoring of the presidential election

Impact in terms of age is not very significant.

2.7.4. Assessment of the security arrangements for the 2018 presidential election by locality

Three quarters (74.9%) of interviewees are “rather satisfied” (42.5% or “very satisfied” (32.4%) with security arrangements for the presidential election, notably for the campaigns and the voting procedures, as against less than a quarter (23.7%) who is “rather dissatisfied” (12.6%) or “very dissatisfied” (11.1%) (*cf. Table 126*).


Table 126: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of security arrangements for the 2018 presidential election

By locality, Sikasso (81.9%), Ségou (80.4%), Kayes (79.6%) and Koulikoro (77.3%) record the highest proportions of Malians satisfied with security arrangements for the 2018 presidential election. Levels are also high in Ménaka (71.9%), Bamako (70.8%), and Mopti (70.4%).

Note should be made of the particularly high proportion of dissatisfied citizens (“very dissatisfied” and “rather dissatisfied”) in Kidal (70%) and, in a lower proportion, in Gao (48.5%) and Tombouctou (44.9%). Those “without an opinion” had a score of 21% in Taoudénit.


An analysis of impact in terms of gender shows that women (72.8%) are more satisfied with security arrangements for the presidential election than men (65.1%), as indicated in *Table 127*.

Table 127: Impact of gender on the assessment of security arrangements for the 2018 presidential election



An analysis of impact in terms of educational attainment (*cf. Table 128*) indicates an increase of the proportion of those dissatisfied (“rather dissatisfied” and “very dissatisfied”) with an increase in the educational level (22% with no education, 20% with primary, 30% with secondary; and 31% with tertiary).

Table 128: Impact of educational attainment on the assessment of security arrangements for the 2018 presidential election




Impact in terms of age is not substantial.

2.7.5. Recommendations for a good execution of the next legislative and regional elections

Those interviewed formulated two major recommendations for a good execution of the next legislative and regional elections: “organise transparent elections” (26.7%) and “secure and peaceful [elections]” (19.2%). It should be noted that 31% of interviewees were unable to formulate a recommendation, (*cf. Table 129*).

Table 129: Recommendations for a good execution of the next legislative and regional elections




By locality, “organise transparent elections” and “organise secure and peaceful elections” are the most frequently cited recommendations in the cities surveyed, with the exception of Kidal where a very large majority of interviewees (84.4%) are “without an opinion.” Those without an opinion are also more numerous in all the cities surveyed with the exception of Sikasso, Tombouctou, Ménaka, and Bamako. The recommendation to “organise transparent elections” is the most cited suggestion in Tombouctou (49%), Ménaka (42.7%), Gao (33.3%), Mopti (30.7%), Koulikoro (30.7%), Sikasso (26.2%), and Ségou (15.3%).

In contrast, “organise secure and peaceful elections” is the recommendation cited in first position in Bamako (38.3%), Taoudénit (28.4%) and Kayes (21.2%); it emerges in second position in Tombouctou (36.7%), Ménaka (36.5%), Gao (19.2%) Mopti (15.6%) and Ségou (13.7%). Other recommendations, less frequently cited, are concerned with “improving the organisation of elections” in Koulikoro (13.6%) and Ségou (10%).

2.7.6. Willingness to vote in the next legislative elections

Concerning their intention to vote at the next legislative elections, 80% of interviewees declare their willingness to vote as against 13% who are of the opposite opinion, while 7% remain undecided, as indicated in *Table 130*.

Table 130: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their willingness to vote at the next elections


By locality (*cf. Table 130*), the proportion of those intending to vote at the next elections is particularly high in Tombouctou (88.8%), Bamako (87.1%), Ménaka (86.5%), Sikasso (85%), Mopti (80.9%) and Koulikoro (81.6%). Those not intending to vote in these elections are particularly numerous in Kayes (27.5%), Taoudénit (25.3%) and Gao (25.3%), while those undecided have been recorded particularly in Ségou (14.7%) and Kidal (11.1%).

Impact in terms of gender, of age, or of educational attainment is not very significant.

2.7.7 Reasons for which interviewees don't intend to vote at the next legislative elections

For those interviewees who don't intend to vote at the next legislative elections, several reasons are cited, of which the more frequent are: "I haven't yet received my voting card" (37.9%), "the candidates are not credible" (35.6%) and "lack of trust in the voting process" (11.5%) (*cf. Table 131*).


Table 131: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to the reasons behind their intention not to vote at the next legislative elections



By locality (*cf. Table 131*), the “non possession” of a voting card was particularly given as the reason for not intending to voting in Tombouctou (75%), Ménaka (61.5%), Ségou (54.2%) and Kayes (50%), while the candidates’ lack of credibility is particularly reported in Sikasso (63%) and, to a lesser extent, in Kayes (40%). Consequently, the “lack of trust” in the voting process was cited by an appreciable proportion of citizens in Mopti (28%) and Bamako (24.1%). It is important to note a high prevalence in a refusal to answer the question in Kidal (40%) and Taoudénit (25%).


Women (42.2%) are more numerous than men (33.1%) to cite the “non possession” of the voting card as a reason.

Furthermore, the number of interviewees not intending to vote due to not having a voting card diminishes with age (*cf. Table 132*).

Table 132: Impact of age on the key reasons for not intending to vote at the next legislative elections

2.7.8. Reasons for the interviewees' indecision to vote at the next legislative elections


For the interviewees who remain undecided about whether they will vote at the next legislative elections, the most frequently cited reasons are: "I've yet to obtain my card" (34.5%), "the candidates are not credible" (20.9%) and "undecided on the candidate" (14.8%) (*cf. Table 133*).

Table 133: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to the reasons concerning their indecision to vote in the next legislative elections

By locality (*cf. Table here-above*), the number of interviewees whose indecision is motivated by "I've yet to obtain my card" are particularly numerous in Kayes (77.8%), Sikasso (57.1%), Bamako (50%) and, to a lesser extent in Ségou (34.1%) and Gao (28.6%). In contrast, those for whom "the candidates are not credible" can be found in some number in Sikasso (33.3%), Ségou (27.3%), and Kayes (22.2%). The very high proportion of those without an opinion to be found in Kidal (80%), Gao (71.4%) and Taoudénit (66.7%) should be noted.

An analysis in terms of gender shows that men are more numerous than women in citing the candidates' lack of credibility and being undecided on the candidate; the opposite is observed for the non-possession of the voting card (*cf. Table 134*).

Table 134: Impact of gender on the reasons cited concerning their indecision to vote in the next legislative elections



Impact in terms of educational attainment, or of age, on the reasons for indecision concerning voting in the next legislative elections is not very significant.


2.8. TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION

2.8. 1. Awareness of the establishment of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (CVJR)

Only a third (33.9%) of the those surveyed are aware of existence of the Commission Vérité, Justice et Réconciliation, hereinafter referred to as the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, in Mali, as against two-thirds (66.1%) who are unaware of its existence (*cf. Table 135*).

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of citizens informed about the establishment of the CVJR was 37%, as against 34% currently, thus representing a decline of 3 points.


Table 135: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their awareness of the establishment of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission



By locality, respondents seem to be particularly aware of the CVJR in Gao and Ménaka, with (68.7)% and (65.6)%, respectively, having stated that they are aware of its establishment. Moreover, a large minority of those interviewed knows of its existence in Koulikoro (40.8%), Ségou (38%), Kidal (36.7%), Bamako (34.2%) and Kayes (30.6%). In contrast, it is less well-known in Mopti (24.5%), Taoudénit (26.3%) and Sikasso (27.1%), (*cf. Table here-above*). Men (43.1%) are more numerous than women (24.7%) on being informed about the establishment of the CVJR.


Furthermore, the higher the educational level of those interviewed, the greater the proportion of those surveyed is aware of the CVJR (*cf. Table 136*).

Table 136: Breakdown of interviewees according to their educational attainment and their awareness of the establishment of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission




Concerning age, the lower age-groups are less well-informed about the CVJR's establishment (*cf. Table 137*).

Table 137: Breakdown of interviewees according to age-group and of their awareness of the establishment of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission



2.8. 2. Importance of the CVJR's actions

Overall, among the population, those who declare being aware of the establishment of the CVJR, the vast majority (81%) consider that the CVJR's actions are "very important" (34.6%) or "important" (46.4%), as against 16% who consider them "not important" (7.3%) or "not at all important" (9.1%) (*cf. Table 138*)


Table 138: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the importance of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission's actions

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, interviewees' opinions about the importance of actions undertaken by CVJR's have almost remained unchanged.

By locality, the actions implemented by the CVJR are considered as "important" or "very important" by the majority of interviewees and by almost every interviewee in the cities of Kidal (97%), Tombouctou (96.8%), Taoudénit (96%), Ménaka (95.2%). Levels are also very high in Koulikoro (92%), Kayes (87.2%), Sikasso (86.2%), Ségou (80.7%), and Gao (79.4%). It should be noted that it is in Mopti and Bamako that 33% of citizens consider these actions as "not important" or "not at all important."


Impact in terms of gender or of age on the assessment of the actions implemented by the CVJR does not seem very substantial.

Impact in terms of educational attainment reveals that the proportion of those who judge these actions "not important" or "not at all important" increases with educational attainment (*cf. Table 139*).

Table 139: Impact of educational attainment on the assessment of the importance of the CVJR's actions

2.8. 3. Priority actions to further reconciliation in Mali

For the majority of interviewees, the priority action to implement in order to further reconciliation in Mali is to “organise intra-inter community dialogue” (55.3%). This is followed by other actions such as: “contribute to reconciling the State and the people” (30.8%); “simply pardon (without seeking to judge those responsible)” (16.6%); “compensate victims of the rebellions” (14.3%); “establish the truth on the exactions committed against the people” (14.1%), “identify and judge those responsible for the exactions committed in the North by armed groups” (13.3%); “identify and judge those responsible for the acts committed in the North by the FAMA” (5.5%), and so forth. (*cf. Table 140*).

Table 140: Breakdown of interviewees according to their opinion of priority actions to further reconciliation.

In terms of comparison with Mali-Mètre 9, the priority actions recommended were the same and in the identical order.

By locality, the three priority actions to further reconciliation in Mali are thus cited by rank and by frequency:

Kayes : 1. "Organise intra-inter community dialogue" (65.9%); 2. "Simply pardon (without seeking to judge those responsible)" (27.8%); and 3. "Contribute to reconcile the State and the people" (25.1%).

Koulikoro : 1. "Contribute to reconcile the State and the people" (37.7%); 2. "Organise intra-inter community dialogue" (21.4%); 3. "Identify and judge those responsible for the exactions" (20.4%).

Sikasso : 1. "Organise intra-inter community dialogue" (71.9%); 2. "Contribute to reconcile the State and the people" (30.2%); and 3. "Simply pardon (without seeking to judge those responsible)" (19.9%).

Ségou : 1. "Organise intra-inter community dialogue" (43.7%); 2. "Contribute to reconcile the State and the people" (35%); and 3. "Compensate victims of the rebellions" (28.3%).

Mopti : 1. "Organise intra-inter community dialogue" (77.4%); 2. "Contribute to reconcile the State and the people" (38.5%); and 3. "Compensate victims of the rebellions" (10.5%).

Tombouctou : 1. "Identify and judge those responsible for the exactions committed in the North by armed groups" (59.2%); 2. "Compensate victims of the rebellions" (48%); and 3. "Organise intra-inter community dialogue" (28.3%).

Gao : 1. "Compensate victims of the rebellions" (40.4%); 2. "Establish the truth on the exactions committed against the people" (28.3%); and 3. "Organise intra-inter community dialogue" (28.3%).

Kidal : 1. "Organise intra-inter community dialogue" (60%); 2. "Identify and judge those responsible for the exactions committed in the North by the FAMA" (50%); 3. "Identify and judge those responsible for the exactions committed in the North by armed groups" (37.8%).

Ménaka : 1. “Organise intra-inter community dialogue “ (71.9%); 2. “Contribute to reconcile the State and the people” (43.8%); and 3. “Establish the truth on the exactions committed against the people” (22.9%).

Taoudénit : 1. “Organise intra-inter community dialogue “ (67.4%); 2. “Compensate victims of the rebellions” (64.2%); 3. “Establish the truth on the exactions committed against the people” (27.6%).


Bamako : 1. “Organise intra-inter community dialogue “ (65%); 2. “Contribute to reconcile the State and the people” (29.2%); and 3. “Establish the truth on the exactions committed against the people” (22.1%).

Impact in terms of gender, of educational attainment, or of age is not very significant.

2.8. 4. Importance of the enquiries and judgements on the actors guilty of crime and violence against the local populations

Nearly three quarters of Malians (73.5%) declare “very important” (47.3%) or “important” (26.2%), “the enquiries and judgements about the actors guilty of crimes and violence against the local populations.” A quarter of those surveyed (25.4%) judge that these enquiries and judgements are “not important” (15.3%) or “not at all important”(10.1%) (*cf. Table 141*).

Table 141: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their assessment of the importance of the enquiries and judgements on the actors guilty of crimes and violence against local populations



Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the proportion of those interviewed who judge “very important” or “important” has increased 27 points.


Table 141 here-above shows that “the enquiries and judgements of the actors guilty of crimes and violence against the local populations” are considered as “important” or “very important” by a vast majority of interviewees in all localities and particularly in Gao (86.9%), Koulikoro (85.5%), and Taoudénit (81.1%).

It should be noted that a significant minority of people judge these enquiries and judgements as “not important” or “not at all important,” specifically in Mopti (42.8%).

The proportion of those without an opinion is notably high in Tombouctou (14.3%).

Impact in terms of educational attainment shows that the proportion of citizens who judge these enquiries and judgements “important” or “very important” tends to increase with educational attainment (cf. Table 142).


Table 142: Impact of educational attainment on the assessment of enquiries and judgements on the actors of crimes and violence against the local populations



On the other hand, impact in terms of gender, or of age is not very significant.


2.8.5. Awareness of the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation

A small minority (14.4%) of interviewees have heard of La Charte pour la paix et la réconciliation, hereinafter referred to as the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, as against 85% who declare the opposite, as indicated in Table 143.


Table 143: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to whether they are aware of the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation

By locality, the persons interviewed in Koulikoro (23.3%), Bamako (21.7) and Ségou (20.7) are most aware of the Charter.

Among the minority who have heard of the Charter, men (20.5%) are more numerous than women (8.3%) (*cf. Table 144*).

Table 144: Impact of gender on awareness of the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation


Impact in terms of educational attainment shows that the proportion of the population who have heard of the Charter increases with educational attainment (*cf. Table 145*).

Table 145: Impact of interviewees' educational attainment in terms of whether they are aware of the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation

In contrast, impact in terms of age is not very significant.


2.8.6. Well-known aspects of the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation

Among the interviewees who declare having heard speak of the Charter, almost the totality (95.1%) are not aware of any specific aspect of this Charter, as indicated in *Table 146*.

Table 146: Well-known aspects of the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation

2.8.7. Assessment of the contents of the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation

Among the small minority who declare being aware of the Charter, a little more than a quarter (26.1%) are "satisfied" or "rather satisfied" as against 14.9% that are "dissatisfied" or "rather dissatisfied." It should be noted that the majority (59%) is without an opinion concerning its contents (*cf. Table 147*).


Table 147: Assessment of the Charter's contents by locality

By locality (*cf. Table 147*), those recorded “without an opinion” are more numerous in Ségou (73.1%), Koulikoro (72.6%), Taoudénit (71.4%), Sikasso (71%), Kayes (66.7%), Tombouctou (60%) and Kidal (60%). The highest proportions of “very satisfied” or “satisfied” are documented in Bamako (46.2%), Gao (42.1%) and Ménaka (41.7%); conversely, interviewees in Tombouctou (42.1%), Mopti (37%) and Kidal (30%) are dissatisfied.

Impact in terms of gender, of age, or of educational attainment is not very significant.

2.8.8. Assessment of Government negotiations with leaders of the Malian jihadists/terrorists such as Iyad Ag Ghaly or Amadou Koufa

Overall, nearly two-thirds of interviewees (64.6%) are favourable to the Government’s negotiations with Malian jihadist/terrorist leaders; a little more than a third (34%) do not want any negotiations (*cf. Table 148*).

Table 148: Assessment of Government negotiations with Malian jihadist/terrorist leaders by locality


By locality (*cf. Table 148*), interviewees in Kidal (88.9%), Taoudénit (87.4%), Tombouctou (76.5%), Bamako (72.9%) and Sikasso (70.4%) are particularly favourable to these negotiations. Conversely, the majority of those interviewed in Gao (63.6%) and Ménaka (62.5%) are opposed. A significant proportion of the population in the localities of Koulikoro (44.7%), of Kayes (38.8%) and Ségou (32.3%) also figure among those opposed to negotiations with the Malian jihadists/terrorists (*cf. Table here-above*).

In terms of gender, women (70%) are more numerous than men (59%) in being favourable to the Government's negotiations with Malian jihadists/terrorists.

Neither educational attainment nor age seems to have any impact on the interviewees' assessment.

2.8.9. Assessment of the reconciliation between the President of the Republic and Soumaïla Cissé

A substantial majority of interviewees (84.2%) believe that the reconciliation between the President of the Republic and Soumaïla Cissé to be "very important" (61.3%) or "rather important" (22.9%) as against 14% who regard this reconciliation as "not at all important" or "not important" (*cf. Table 149*).

Table 149: Assessment of the reconciliation between the President of the Republic and Soumaïla Cissé

In all localities surveyed, the vast majority of the population consider this reconciliation as important, with the exception of Kidal where nearly two-thirds (64.4%) believe that it is not important, as indicated in *Table 149 here-above*.


Impact in terms of gender, of age, or of educational attainment is not very significant.

2.9. PROJECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

2.9. 1. Projections for Mali in 6 months

The country's situation should improve within 6 months for more of two-thirds (67.2%) of Malians as against 9% who believe that it might deteriorate, while 18% think that it will stay at the same level, as indicated in *Table 150*.

Table 150: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their projections concerning the situation in Mali in 6 months



Compared with *Mali-Mètre 9*, the proportion of citizens who believe that the situation will improve has increased 8 points.


For all localities, with the exception of Tombouctou, people are predominantly optimistic about the evolution of the situation of the country within 6 months: Mopti (86%), Ménaka (79.2%), Sikasso (79.1%) and Kayes (71.8%). In Tombouctou, however, only a quarter (25.5%) of interviewees think that the situation of the country will improve within 6 months, as against 32% for those without an opinion. The proportion of those who think that the situation will deteriorate is particularly evident in Taoudénit (27.4%), Tombouctou (23.5%) and Bamako (20%). In contrast, the proportion of inhabitants of Kidal (27.8%), Koulikoro (25.9%) and Kayes (22.7%) are more numerous in believing that the situation will remain the same over the next 6 months.

Impact in terms of gender, of educational attainment, or of age is not very significant.

2.9. 2 Projections for the regions in the six coming months

Two-thirds (66.4%) of citizens surveyed, irrespective of locality, believe that the situation in their Region will improve (*cf. Table 151*).

Table 151: Breakdown of interviewees by locality according to their projections for the situation in their region in the six coming months




By locality, the inhabitants of Mopti (84.4%), Sikasso (81%) and Kayes (67.1%) are more numerous in thinking that the situation will improve in their region over the coming six months. Those less optimistic are the inhabitants of Kidal (52.2%), Taoudénit (52.6%), Gao (54.5%) and Koulikoro (57%). Nevertheless, in Tombouctou, the opinion are practically equally divided for those who think that their region's situation will improve (25.5%) as against those who think it will deteriorate (24.5%). The highest levels of interviewees who think that the situation in their region will deteriorate are to be found in Bamako (19.6%) followed by Taoudénit (28.4%) and Tombouctou (24.5%). The inhabitants of Kidal (34.4%), Ménaka (29.2%), and Bamako (20%) are the most numerous among those who think that the situation in their region will be the same in the six coming months, (*cf. Table here-above*).

Impact in terms of gender, of educational attainment, or of age is not very significant.

2.9.3. Greatest wishes for Mali over the next five years

The greatest wishes expressed by those interviewed relate to "the return of peace and security" (74.7%), "youth employment" (50.1%) followed at some distance by "good harvests and food security" (37.9%), "the end of poverty" (20.7%), "better access to healthcare" (18.9%), "revival of the economy" (16.7%). "Development of infrastructures" (15.0%) and a "better education system" (11.9%) also featured among the other wishes expressed by those surveyed (*cf. Table 152*).

Table 152: Breakdown of interviewees according to their greatest wishes for Mali over the next five years

Compared with Mali-Mètre 9, the five greatest wishes remain identical, except in different proportions: “the return of peace and security” declined by 17 points, “youth employment” has increased 7 points and “good harvests and food security” dropped 4 points.

By locality, the “return of peace and security” is the primary great wish expressed by those interviewed in all localities, with the exception of Kayes and Koulikoro where it is cited as the second greatest wish.

The second greatest wish for their locality for those interviewed is “youth employment,” taking first position in Kayes and Koulikoro and second position in Sikasso, Ségou, Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao, Kidal, and Bamako.

As for “good harvests and food security,” it constitutes the second wish in Koulikoro, Ségou, and Bamako, while the “development of infrastructures” is the third greatest wish in Kayes, Sikasso, Mopti, Tombouctou and Gao, and the second in Ménaka.

Lastly “other” greatest wishes cited include: “the end of corruption” in Kidal; “better access to healthcare” and “a better education system” in Taoudénit.

Irrespective of gender, of age category, or educational attainment, “the return of peace and security” constitutes the greatest wish expressed by the vast majority of interviewees.



ISSN

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