

Policy Brief Climate Security in Kenya

Local Mechanisms in
Addressing Climate Related
Security Risks



**Climate
Security
in Kenya**

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Acronyms

| | |
|--------|---|
| A3+1 | Non-permanent members of the UNSC representing the African region and Saint Vincent |
| AMCEN | African Ministerial Conference on the Environment |
| Arria | Arria-Formula meeting |
| ASALs | Arid and Semi-Arid Lands |
| E10 | Elected Member of the Security Council |
| GBV | Gender Based Violence |
| GHGs | Greenhouse Gases |
| IEG | Informal Expert Group |
| LDCs | Least Developed Countries |
| LTS | Long Term Low Carbon Emission Development Strategy |
| NCCAP | Kenya National Climate Change Action Plan |
| NCCS | National Climate Change Strategy |
| NDC | Nationally Determined Contributions |
| P5 | Permanent Five |
| UNFCCC | United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| SDGs | Sustainable Development Goals |
| SIDS | Small Island Developing States |
| WPS | Women, Peace, and Security |

Executive Summary

Progress has been made in global climate governance in the last decade. Since 2007, when the first debate on climate-security was tabled, discussions have ensued over whether and how climate change should be addressed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Cognizant that climate change and security are inextricably linked, non-linear, and multidimensional, the policy debate on climate security, although contested, has progressed to recognising climate change as a threat multiplier. Additionally, it has led to an evaluation of security interventions in different regions particularly those linked with early warning to mitigate and transform climate related security risks.

Climate change has an unequal distribution of effects on people, disproportionately affecting the poorest and most vulnerable communities, intersecting with environmental degradation to create new vulnerabilities, and intensifying existing threats to economic success and political stability. Climate change has an impact on every part of Kenya's economy, society, and physical security as well as at the regional level. There is a growing recognition that the human security challenges brought on by climate change may influence, exacerbate, or emerge, other dimensions of 'hard' security in the country and region. Such issues, if driven by climate-change, cannot be resolved by traditional security-oriented approaches (as these do not and cannot address the climate-change dimension). The delay or failure to plan for the negative effects of climate change will continue to have devastating consequences in Kenya and its resilience against future economic, environmental, and geopolitical challenges; and its ability to respond to global peace and security.

Kenya's non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council which ends in 2022 offers an opportunity to adopt a cross-disciplinary policy response proportional to the urgency of climate threats nationally, and regionally by advocating for localisation of the climate-security agenda by integrating climate with security and peace dimensions in interventions. Therefore, this policy brief focuses on Kenya's potential contributions to the climate-security nexus during its tenure in the UNSC. It further concretizes why climate security is a key issue in the UNSC which should be pursued without abandon. The policy paper concludes with specific recommendations for consideration towards implementing climate, peace, and security policies regionally through Kenya's advocacy for greater emphasis on UN support to address the climate-change security issues in Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa.

Introduction

“Humanity faces a stark and urgent choice: breakdown or breakthrough.”

H.E. Hon. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, during the general debate of the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly, 09/2021.

Considered the most pressing global environmental challenge of our time, climate change is threatening livelihoods and progressively pushing human limits. Due to climate change, unpredictable extreme events have caused havoc and many households increasingly plunge into the poverty line across the globe. Broad consensus in the academic literature is that climate change is a threat multiplier rather than a direct driver of conflict.¹ In their latest physical science basis report for the sixth assessment report, the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)² a global warming of 1.5°C relative to 1850–1900 would be exceeded under most of the future greenhouse gas emissions scenarios by 2030–2051. The impacts and frequency of these extremities is likely to bolden, especially in the business-as-usual scenario – a scenario that assumes continued present behaviour patterns and little adaptation and mitigation efforts. Climate change consequences have far-reaching national security implications, they have the potential to intensify current stressors, contributing to poverty, environmental degradation, and political instability.³ Climate change's effects on critical economic sectors like agriculture and water, for example, might have significant implications for food security, posing a threat to global stability. Even though the debate about the precise link between climate change and security matters continues, the impact of climate change can greatly affect security risks, interventions and increases the risks of violent conflicts.⁴ As noted by the former United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon asserting that “climate change not only exacerbates threats to peace and security, but it is also a threat to peace and security.”⁵

The impact of climate change such as the increase in sea-levels, extreme weather events and rising temperatures can act as threat multipliers, aggravating factors driving conflict and security risks. For example, by intensifying existing pressures on natural resources, food security and/or livelihoods, climate change impacts may amplify various patterns of societal inequality, weaken the legitimacy of ruling authorities, and raise interethnic/intercommunal

1 Oels, A 2012, 'From 'Securitization' of Climate Change to 'Climatization' of the Security Field: Comparing Three Theoretical Perspectives' in J Scheffran, M Brzoska, H Brauch, P Link & J Schilling (eds), Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict, Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace, vol. 8, Springer, Berlin, pp. 185-205; Ahmed, NM 2011, 'The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society', Peace and Security, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 335-355.

2 IPCC, 2021: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [MassonDelmotte, V., P. Zhai, A. Pirani, S.L. Connors, C. Péan, S. Berger, N. Caud, Y. Chen, L. Goldfarb, M.J. Gomis, M. Huang, K. Leitzell, E. Lonnoy, J.B.R. Matthews, T.K. Maycock, T. Waterfield, O. Yelekçi, R. Yu, and B. Zhou (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press. In Press. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_SPM_final.pdf

3 La Shier, B., & Stanish, J. (2017). The National Security Impacts of Climate Change. <https://www.eesi.org/papers/view/issue-brief-the-national-security-impacts-of-climate-change>. Retrieved November 9, 2021.

4 Abrahams, D & Carr, ER 2017, 'Understanding Connections Between Climate Change and Conflict: Contributions from Geography and Political Economy', Current Climate Change Reports, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 233-242; Scheffran, J Link, PM Schilling J. 2012, 'Theories and Models of Climate-Security Interaction: Framework and Application to a Climate Hot Spot in North Africa' in J Scheffran, M Brzoska, H Brauch, P Link, & J Schilling (eds) Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict. Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace, vol. 8, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 91-131; Barnett, J 2009, 'The prize of peace (is eternal vigilance): a cautionary editorial essay on climate geopolitics', Climate Change, vol. 96, 1-5

5 Ban Ki-moon (July 2011) Remarks to the Security Council on the Impact of Climate Change on International Peace and Security Remarks to the Security Council on the Impact of Climate Change on International Peace and Security | United Nations Secretary-General

tensions, any of which may possibly be key drivers of conflict in a given locality.⁶ Additionally, the impact of climate can affect people's and country's resilience and vulnerability touching on food security, environmental security, and personal security.⁷ Sadly, the forementioned climate risks are likely to be complicated further in the wake of unforeseen global upheavals and other unpredicted disasters and pandemics. Given this scenario, escalating the underlying root causes of current conflicts is possibly the "twenty-first century's biggest foreign policy challenge. The outcome of the Rio Earth Summit of 1992 was the establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)⁸ which established a road map for addressing the impacts of climate. While the UNFCCC has been key in promoting adaptation and mitigation to climate successfully achieved through a series of UNFCCC subsequent global pacts such as the Kyoto protocol, the Paris Accord e.t.c, the aspect of climate security was never envisioned in the UNFCCC, the concept of climate security nexus is an emerging reality. Therefore, building effective frameworks, decision-making processes, and procedures to address increasing impacts of climate change, especially those connected to security, is an urgent need.

In a similar vein, the Climate Change Strategy of the African Union (AUCCS, 2016) The AUCCS acknowledges Africa's sensitivity to climatic variability and change, which is exacerbated by the interaction of 'multiple stresses,' such as a high reliance on rain-fed agriculture, widespread poverty, and a lack of adaptive capacity. The African Union Climate Change Strategy aims to strengthen Member States' and Regional Economic Communities' (RECs') adaptation skills and resilience in order to reduce their vulnerability while following a low-carbon growth path.

An Unequal Crisis

It is worthy to note that although global warming is a global crisis, its effects are not felt evenly around the world. The worst effects of the climate crisis – for example extreme heat, flooding and crop failures – are disproportionately experienced by different countries and communities around the world. For instance, Africa may not be the leading contributor of greenhouse gas emissions, however, it is the continent that is most affected by climate change, with many countries experiencing extreme weather patterns such as intense heat, severe downpours, floods, and droughts have all increased in frequency and intensity.⁹ Some of the recent extreme phenomenon such the locust invasions witnessed in Kenya and its neighbouring countries, wreaking havoc on communities' livelihoods, ecosystems and infrastructure¹⁰ are but a few examples. Many African countries' social economic development agendas have been severely harmed while socioeconomic tensions¹¹ have increased as a result of these disruptive consequences attributable to climate change.

6 Jon Barnett, (2016). 'Environmental security,' in: Contemporary Security Studies, ed. Collins, A., Oxford University Press, 229-246

7 Mohamed Behnassi & Katriona McGlade (2017). 'Environmental Change and Human Security in Africa and the Middle East,' Springer International Publishing

8 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2020, June). Climate Change Is an Increasing Threat to Africa. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Retrieved January 4, 2022, from <https://unfccc.int/news/climate-change-is-an-increasing-threat-to-africa>

9 Shepard, D. (2019, December). Global warming: Severe consequences for Africa. Africa Renewal. Retrieved November 9, 2021, from <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2018-march-2019/global-warming-severe-consequences-africa>

10 McConnell, T. (2021, May 4). A locust plague hit East Africa. The pesticide solution may have dire consequences. National Geographic/Environment. Retrieved November 9, 2021.

11 WFP. (2021, June). Climate change in southern Africa – a position paper. UN World Food Programme. Retrieved January 4, 2022, from

12 <https://www.wfp.org/publications/climate-change-southern-africa-position-paper>

Meyer, L. H., & Roser, D. (2010). Climate justice and historical emissions. Critical review of international social and political philosophy, 13(1), 229-253.

Climate justice¹² involve giving those who have been most impacted by the climate crisis a meaningful voice in climate policy negotiations, which have for too long been dominated by the interests of wealthy corporations and countries.

It needs to be re-emphasised that, while climate crisis is pointed to have direct link to global peace and security, such security concerns are also disproportional depending on individual country's security situation and investment. Poor countries with weak security systems and low investment would have double effort in managing insecurity arising out of climate crisis. In these countries, many drivers easily combine in differing ways to raise tensions to a breaking point. The global community therefore require concerted international efforts while recognizing differentiated needs of countries, communities and regions including gender considerations and social inclusion.

Leadership and key voices at the national and global arena must become pivotal in turning the scales in the fight against climate change as recognised by the UN Secretary-General António Guterres who noted that "keeping our planet's warming to well below 2 degrees is essential for global prosperity, people's well-being and the security of nations."¹³ Of worthy mention is that climate-related security issues are addressed in the Paris Agreement, Agenda 2030, and the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. In this paper, we present the background to climate change and unpack Kenya's voice for climate change in the UNSC, the roadmap of the paper is three-pronged; Firstly, analysing why climate security is a key issue in the UNSC; Secondly, outlining reasons why Kenya should advocate for climate-security in the UNSC; Thirdly, policy options for the action of climate-security nexus.

Why Climate Security is a key issue to the UNSC

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has faced increased pressure to respond to the effects of climate change to fulfil its responsibility of preserving international peace and security. Most recently, the UNSC Draft Resolution on Climate Change and Security drafted by penholders Ireland and Niger on December 13, 2021.¹⁴ It demanded that information on climate change's security threats be included in the Council's policy on conflict resolution, political missions, peacekeeping operations, and other conflict prevention initiatives. The draft resolution identified climate change as a threat to international peace and security. It received the support of 12 of the 15 members, with India and Russia voting against and China abstaining. Furthermore, 113 of the 193 member countries of the United Nations General Assembly voted in favour of the draft resolution.¹⁵ This portrays that most member countries recognise the importance of the climate change-security nexus. The UNSC, in recent years, has discussed other climate-related tensions, ranging from the dangers of sea-level rise for small island states to tensions among Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia over the Nile. Yet it is precisely because climate dangers are so complex that it will be useful for the Security Council to act as a focal point for detailed discussion of conflict risks and potential

13 United Nations Secretary-General. "Secretary-General's remarks on Climate Change, September 10, 2018. <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2018-09-10/secretary-generals-remarks-climate-change-delivered>

14 United Nations. (n.d.). Security Council fails to adopt resolution integrating climate-related security risk into conflict-prevention strategies | meetings coverage and press releases. United Nations. Retrieved January 4, 2022, from <https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14732.doc.htm>

15 Gladstone, R. (2021, December 13). Russia blocks U.N. move to treat climate as security threat. The New York Times. Retrieved January 4, 2022, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/13/world/americas/un-climate-change-russia.html>

responses, bringing together climate scientists with experts on political violence, humanitarian issues and development to share ideas. Indeed, as Niger's Ambassador Abdou Abarry retored "the force of the veto can block the approval of a text "but it cannot hide our reality," Climate security advocacy ought to be championed.

Kenya's voice to the UNSC – Insight

"Humanity faces a stark and urgent choice: breakdown or breakthrough."

H.E. Hon. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, during the general debate of the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly, 09/2021

Kenya which joined the UNSC as a non-permanent member in January 2021 for a two-year term (2021-2022),¹⁶ and taking over from South Africa and concluding the rotating Presidency of the UNSC in October 2021, has a golden opportunity and moral duty to voice concerns from the standpoint of developing nations and on behalf of the African content. Although halfway through its term as an E10, Kenya still has an opportunity to further strengthen and advocate for climate-security and multilateralism. Additionally, as part of the A3+1 (the non-permanent members of the UNSC representing the African region and Saint Vincent and Grenadines), Kenya must continue to advance the African Common Position on Climate Change. This gives her a stronger voice in international affairs, as well as expressing Africa's peace and security agenda.

Kenya can therefore continue to advocate during its tenure in the UNSC through diplomacy with the 80 blockers (member states) which were not supportive of the rejected draft resolution. The importance of providing a platform from which to pursue the continent's climate change initiatives cannot be overstated. The UN resolution would send a signal to the rest of the world that climate change is being taken seriously – this could potentially have a ripple effect on the African Union and Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Kenya could also take the lead in these forums to push this agenda and draft resolutions with the same goal as the draft UN resolution to encourage and lead the way at continental level.


Kenya's membership in the UNSC and the African Union Peace and Security Council (2020 -2022) provides a link between the two bodies in prioritizing Africa's security issues and finding lasting solutions to conflicts and crises in various parts of the continent. In this position, Kenya must emphasize Africa's security issues and make them a top priority in global discussions about risks to global peace and security. A view stressed by the Cabinet Secretary, Raychelle Omamo that Kenya will "remain a strong and consistent voice for Africa, and the Global South, including Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in the pursuit of representative climate and security solutions."¹⁷ Therefore, Kenya should amplify its efforts in advocating for climate change internationally.

¹⁶ United Nations. (2020, June 18). Kenya wins final contested seat on Security Council | Africa Renewal. Africa Renewal. Retrieved November 9, 2021, from <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/kenya-wins-final-contested-seat-security-council>.

¹⁷ Vidija, P. (2021, September 24). Use realistic approach to deal with climate change, Kenya tells United Nations. The Standard. Retrieved January 4, 2022, from <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001424397/use-realistic-approach-to-deal-with-climate-change-kenya-tells-united-nations?ref=gazetiapp>

While it may appear that Kenya has not been able to take a stronger stand on climate-security issues at the global level, the dynamics of the UNSC dictate that unless a country is in the Permanent Five (P5) – then it cannot veto by blocking agendas presented if it not aligned to its national interests. This means that P5 member states can push their national interests solely, in comparison to the E10 members who focus and champion regional and continental interests. For instance, in 2021, the migration and COVID-19 issues, particularly the uneven distribution of vaccines took precedence as witnessed by the adoption of Resolution 2565 (2021) on COVID-19¹⁸ which meant that climate security issues took a backstage. However, given the global impact of climate change, finding an amicable way of advancing localisation of the climate-security agenda through nation state specific commitments is critical.. This would therefore be reflective of local dynamics within a country rather than a standardised, one size-fits-all approach to climate security. Moreover, as part of the A3+1, Kenya must work with other African countries and any stand taken must reflect the African Union position. This does not mean that additional measures cannot be taken at the nation state level to improve national structures, for example the Kenyan Arid and Semi-Arid Lands policy.

This does not mean that additional measures cannot be taken at the nation state level to improve national structures, for example the Kenyan Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) policy Hwhich aims to improve the climate resilience of communities in the ASALs and assure long-term livelihoods. This takes into account the local context in order to comprehend the multifaceted implications of climate change, as well as its impact on the intensity and distribution of risks and vulnerabilities in the ASAL region, in order to support and expedite sustainable development. This is also acknowledged in Kenya's 2010Constitution, which enshrines the imperatives of fairness, inclusion, and affirmative action as a foundation for tackling significant obstacles to ASAL development, such as those that have weakened ASAL communities' drought resilience.



18 United Nations. (2021). Security Council calls for increased global cooperation to facilitate COVID-19 vaccine access in conflict areas, unanimously adopting resolution 2565 (2021) | meetings coverage and press releases. United Nations. Retrieved January 4, 2022, from <https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14454.doc.htm>

Climate-Security Nexus

“Rather than wait for a future tipping point, we must redouble the efforts to direct all the resources and multilateral frameworks of our rules-based international order to mitigate the effects of climate change”

H.E. Hon. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, virtual meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council, 03/09/2021

Beyond climate change and localized or transnational armed conflict, the practice of climate and security encompasses a wide range of issues. National security, border control, military defence, and sovereignty issues have all been associated with the term "security" in the past. Security has steadily broadened beyond traditional security threats to include a broader and more comprehensive notion of human security during the previous few decades. In this sense, security is viewed from the standpoint of reducing a wide range of social, political, economic, environmental, and physical risks to a person as a result of physical insecurity and governance failures. Various national governments, international organizations, and forums have attempted to mainstream climate-security concerns, highlighting a variety of issues such as resource competition, humanitarian emergencies, food security shocks, migration, transboundary water management, and the risks of unintended consequences from climate policies.

Climate-related security risks can present themselves when the effects of climate change intensify the drivers of violent conflict and insecurity. Although a variety of factors influence fragility and the likelihood of conflict, climate change impacts may influence several of these aspects. The impact of climate change may alter resource allocation between groups, increase strain on already-stressed governance structures, or erode institutional legitimacy if agencies fail to implement climate adaptation measures. Existing political structures may be destabilised because of this. As a result, the precise relationship between climate change consequences and conflict is variable and debatable, there is context-specific evidence that climate change can influence conflict drivers in some cases.

Relative differences in wealth obtained from natural resources strain governance structures and exacerbate patterns of inequality; climate-induced relocation of people altering intergroup interactions; or changed tactical concerns of armed organisations (structured and unstructured) capitalising on new grievances for recruiting. The circumstances under which underlying fragility dynamics transform into (violent) conflict are complicated, but perceptions of inequity or exclusion of particular groups in comparison to others can contribute to violence¹⁹ as is illustrated in Figure 3. According to the World Bank²⁰ and the United Nations, “policy domains relating to access to political power and governance; land, water, and extractive resources; delivery of basic services; and justice and security,” hence it is critical to address growing concerns on inequitable resource distribution.²¹




Figure 2 : climate security nexus (Source 22 Security Council Research Report)

19 United Nations and World Bank (2018) 'Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict'

20 Steve Brock et al. (2020). 'The World Climate and Security Report 2020' product of the Expert Group of the International Military Council on Climate and Security, ed. Francesco Femia and Caitlin Werrell, The Center for Climate and Security

21 Ibid

22 Adger, W.N., Pulhin, J.M., Barnett, J., Dabelko, G.D., Hovelsrud, G.K., Levy, M., Oswald Spring, U. and Vogel, C.H., 2014. Human security. Cambridge University Press. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781107415379.017

United Nations Security Council priority on Climate Security Agenda

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the only UN body with the authority to impose enforceable coercive measures, has resisted acting on climate change so far. However, as the effects of climate change on peace and security become more obvious, the question of whether the UN Security Council should and will address the security implications of climate change more explicitly in the future becomes more pressing. The United Nations is mandated by Article 1(1) of the UN Charter to "keep international peace and security, and to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace."²³ However, in practice, the UNSC focuses mostly on crisis management and harsh security operations, with limited operative work on prevention.²⁴ Notably, the Council's growing openness to accept non-traditional security threats, as well as its broad concept of conflict avoidance, provide a potential foundation for incorporating climate change and security more directly into its future agenda. The Security Council first discussed climate change as a threat to peace and security during a 2007²⁵ open debate, where Member States argued that it can 'exacerbate some of the core drivers of conflict'. In 2011, the Council expressed concern that climate change's possible adverse effects, 'may, in the long run, aggravate certain existing threats to international peace and security.' in 2014 The Security Council determined (somewhat controversially) that the Ebola crisis constituted a threat to international peace and security in UNSC resolution 2177. Moreover, the 2016 Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Resolutions outlined a wide notion of conflict prevention aimed at tackling the core causes of conflict, as well as rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development.

The climate crisis continues to pose a significant threat to global peace and security. It amplifies conflict triggers such as livelihood insecurity and socio-political grievances by acting as a risk multiplier. Climate change has the potential to exacerbate and prolong conflicts, making peace difficult to achieve and maintain. As the entity with the mandate to uphold and ensure international peace and security, addressing climate change should be central to UNSC's mandate. Climate and security have been constantly highlighted in a series of Arria formula meetings²⁶, briefings, and a statement by the Council President,²⁷ and

23 United Nations. (n.d.). United Nations charter. United Nations. Retrieved November 9, 2021, from <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text>.

24 The UNSC is mandated by Article 24 of the UN Charter with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. However, beginning in the early 1990s, the UNSC began to show greater willingness to prescribe measures in internal humanitarian emergencies, articulating a broader approach to what constitutes a threat to international peace and security (as stated in Presidential Statement S/23500, 31 January 1992). Since then, the Council has acted in a variety of internal situations, and it has become increasingly aware of the interconnections between its peace and security agenda and concerns related to development and human security.

25 Security Council Research Report, 2021. The UN Security Council and Climate Change Report. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/climate_security_2021.pdf

26 Security Council Report. "Arria-Formula Meetings." August 17, 2020. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/arria-formula-meetings.php>

27 United Nations. General Assembly. Security Council. Statement by the President of the Security Council. S/PRST/2011/15. July 20, 2011.

the matter was prominent among the objectives of two non-permanent members—Sweden and Germany—during their respective terms (2017-2018 for Sweden, and 2019-2020 for Germany). Climate and security have emerged as a top issue for several non-permanent candidates for the 2021-2022 term, including Norway, Kenya, and Canada, by 2020.²⁸ Since March 2017, the Security Council has issued seven resolutions acknowledging the importance of climate change to peace and security.²⁹

Several Council decisions on regions and nations where the UNSC is already operating have recently emphasised the role of climatic and ecological change in maintaining stability. The first resolution, 2349 on Lake Chad in 2017,³⁰ acknowledged the negative effects of climate change and ecological changes, among other factors, on regional stability, including water scarcity, drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity as well as linking these conditions to the emergence of violent extremism. Consequently, it emphasised the need for suitable risk assessments and risk management approaches by governments and the UN concerning these factors. Following that, a series of resolutions on Somalia (Resolution 2408 (2018)), Mali (Resolution 2423 (2018)), and Darfur (Resolution 2429 (2018)) were passed.³¹

These resolutions demand that nations and the UN conduct sufficient risk assessments and risk management procedures. They also re-affirm the UNSC's desire and capacity to deal with the issue, and for the first time, they invite nations to take action to address it. Their importance, however, should not be exaggerated. They do not imply that the Council will devote more resources to combating climate change, nor have they identified any specific threat to international peace posed by climate change. The resolutions are limited to dealing with the consequences of climate change rather than the cause. Furthermore, given that both the Sahel region and Somalia are locations with ongoing war, they are heavily framed in terms of the UNSC's current work. The Small Island Developing States (SIDS), for example, are unlikely to find them useful. There was also a Presidential speech on West Africa and the Sahel in 2018 that mentioned climate change, as well as references to climate change's impact on African stability in Resolution 2457 'Silencing the Guns.' These are the Council's first clear acknowledgements that there is a link between climate change and regional and national stability.³²

28 Toufanian, Melissa T. "Climate Change at the UN Security Council: Seeking Peace in a Warming World." United Nations Foundation. June 29, 2020. <https://unfoundation.org/blog/post/climate-change-a-un-security-council-seeking-peace-warming-world/>

29 Climate Security Network. "Short history of UNSC engagement on climate-related security risks." <https://climate-security-expert-network.org/topic-5>

30 United Nations. General Assembly. Security Council. Resolution Adopted by the Security Council at its 7911th meeting, on 31 March 2017...S/Res/2349(2017). S/Res/2349(2017). March 31, 2017.

31 Godfrey, Dominic. "Pacific climate expert to brief UN Security Council." Last modified July 24, 2020. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/421966/pacific-climate-expert-to-brief-un-security-council>

32 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). (2020, June 19). Addressing the risks of climate change. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). Retrieved November 9, 2021, from <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020RP06/>.

However, a number of member states continue to raise reservations about the appropriateness of the Security Council deliberations on climate, expressing fears about the erosion of national sovereignty. China, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia have greatly pushed back and overtly showed concern over sovereignty.³³ The fears stem from the possibility of international regulation and monitoring expanding into areas that were previously regarded to be under the exclusive domestic competence of states.³⁴ Additionally, when the state is the focus of the equation, determining the subjects of the responsibility of sovereignty becomes extremely difficult. Severe weather events, such as drought in the Horn of Africa, demonstrate that developing countries are to a great extent more vulnerable to climate change impacts, despite their trivial part to the atmospheric GHG concentrations.³⁵

Analytically, there are various, non-linear channels of accountability for the problem reflecting in part government policy choices. Determining causation for any climate change impact is challenging and cannot be allocated to a single state. Whatever the final distribution of responsibility for GHG emissions, the atmosphere itself cannot be partitioned along arbitrary national borders. Once emitted into the atmosphere, GHGs give rise to a number of global climate processes, resulting in a diverse range of climate change impacts around the globe. Attempts to incorporate environmental concerns into debates about expanding the scope of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) have also been criticised, with arguments that reflect those made by civil society organisations in the 2000s.³⁶

In so far as it provides a more complete framework for the UN's prevention efforts, the 2030 Agenda is a significantly more appropriate framework for organising actions aimed at tackling climate and security issues, particularly for nations that are outside the Security Council agenda. "Climate change is a significant threat to humanity and Mother Earth," Bolivia's UNSC representative said when Germany raised the issue in 2011, "but the security implications of climate change should be dealt with in a forum where the guilty parties do not have seats for life or the right to veto."³⁷ Four of the five countries having veto power (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Russian Federation) are Permanent 4 with historical responsibility, while the fifth (China) is the world's leading emitter of GHGs. Secondly, frequent attempts to label climate change a 'developing country syndrome' reduces the universal character of the problem/symptom.

On December 13, 2021, UNSC failed to adopt a resolution initially proposed by Germany in 2020 during its Presidency in the Council on climate change induced security risks that exacerbates conflict

33 Born, C. (2017). A resolution for a peaceful climate: opportunities for the UN security council, p5. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19139>

34 Rayfuse, R. G., & Scott, S. (2012). International law in the era of climate change. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, p.20.

35 Ravindranath, N. H., & Sathaye, J. A. (2018). Climate change and developing countries. Springer Science Business Media.

36 Evans, Gareth. "The Responsibility to Protect in Environmental Emergencies." Presented at the 103rd annual meetings for the American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C., March 26, 2009. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/responsibility-protect-environmental-emergencies>

37 United Nations. (2011, July 20). Security Council, in statement, says 'contextual information' on possible security implications of climate change important when climate impacts drive conflict | meetings coverage and press releases. United Nations. Retrieved November 9, 2021, from

across the geo-political fault lines. India voted against the proposed resolution as the only non-permanent member, while Russia vetoed it and China abstained. India's opposition to the proposal stems from the fact that the United Nations already has a framework (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change- UNFCCC) for deliberating climate change-related issues, asserting that the UNSC was not the opposite venue for discussing either climate change or climate justice.³⁸ Furthermore, the Global North countries had not played their part in providing one trillion dollars in climate finance, to be monitored with the same rigour as climate mitigation. India held that the statement would be a regression from shared resolve to address climate change, handing responsibility to the P5 which neither operates via consensus nor is representative of the interests of developing countries, thereby underscoring that developed nations have fallen short of their commitments.^{39/40}

Russia, which has consistently opposed the inclusion of environmental concerns on the UNSC agenda, also vetoed the proposed resolution. Asserting that, developing a new area of activity for the Council that creates a direct link between climate change and international security, might have a wide range of ramifications.⁴¹ It further maintained that politicising climate change is an attempt to draw attention away from the true fundamental causes of conflict in some of the countries on the agenda. The proposal did not attempt to help individual countries or regions, but rather took a broad approach to climate change. Furthermore, the fight against climate change is a subject of long-term development which ought to take place in the UNFCCC, the appropriate structure for climate related concerns.⁴² Russia indicated that it will pursue an all-encompassing climate-change solution recognizing a wide range of complex and interwoven concerns, namely, the impact of climate change, natural catastrophes, poverty, weak local governance based in the colonial past, and terrorism threats, which constitute an intolerable burden for some countries and areas. Surprisingly, Russia, India, and China have filed a draft UNSC resolution on the Sahel region. Unlike the drafts proposed by Ireland and Niger, Russia maintains that its proposal covers the full range of concerns affecting the region and aims to mobilise international efforts, including financial support, to help those most in need.⁴³

While the climate and security agenda has broadened incrementally but unevenly over the last decade on thematic, organisational, and regional levels, greater strategic change and leadership is required to meet the challenges ahead. Strengthening commitments to existing agreements, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Climate Agreement, is a pre-condition for improving governance in this area. However, at this critical

38 Mitra, D. (2022, January 4). In India's negative vote in UNSC, a long-standing advocacy against overlapping mandates. *The Wire*. Retrieved January 5, 2022, from <https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-negative-vote-UNSC-climate-change-overlapping-mandates>

39 Mudur, G. S. (2021, December 14). India votes against UN climate resolution. *Telegraph India*. Retrieved January 5, 2022, from <https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/india-votes-against-un-climate-resolution/cid/1843350>

40 Lakshman, S. (2021, December 14). India votes against the U.N. Draft Resolution on Climate Change. *The Hindu*. Retrieved January 5, 2022, from <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/india-votes-against-un-draft-resolution-on-climate-change/article37950604.ece>

41 United Nations. (2021, December 13). Security Council fails to adopt resolution integrating climate-related security risk into conflict-prevention strategies | meetings coverage and press releases. United Nations. Retrieved January 5, 2022, from <https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14732.doc.htm>

42 Muzaffar, M. (2021, December 14). Russia vetoes first-of-its-kind UN resolution linking climate change with security. *The Independent*. Retrieved January 5, 2022, from <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-vetoes-un-resolution-climate-change-b1975674.html>

43 Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations. (2021, December 13). Press statement on the draft UN Security Council resolution on climate and security. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations. Retrieved January 5, 2022, from https://russiaun.ru/en/news/statement_131221

leadership is required to meet the challenges ahead. Strengthening commitments to existing agreements, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)⁴⁴ and the Paris Climate Agreement, is a pre-condition for improving governance in this area. However, at this critical moment, it is essential for the UNSC to continue demonstrating strong leadership and give climate security an institutional house in the UNSC, even with the recent rejection of the draft Resolution on Climate and Security. The paper takes cognisance of all the steps that have been taken in the past to have climate change security into the UNSC as illustrated in Table 1 below.

Table 1: UNSC Formal Meetings on Related agenda to Climate and Security (Adopted from³⁴)

| Topic of discussion | Resolution No | Date | Organizer | Format |
|---|---------------|------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|
| “Natural resources and conflict” | S/PV.5705 | 25 June 2007 | Belgium | Open Debate |
| “New challenges to international peace and security and conflict prevention”, including pandemics, climate change, and transnational organised crime | S/PV.6668 | 23 November 2011 | Portugal | Briefing |
| “Conflict Prevention and Natural Resources” | S/PV.6982 | 19 June 2013 | United Kingdom | Open Debate |
| “Peace and security challenges facing small island developing states”; climate change, transnational organised crime, drug and human trafficking, and piracy were among the issues raised | S/PV.7499 | 30 July 2015 | New Zealand | Open debate |
| “Challenges in the Sahel Region” | S/PV.7699 | 26 May 2016 | Spain/Egypt | Briefing |
| “Water, peace and security”; the meeting explored such issues as the relationship between climate change and water scarcity, the management of transboundary waters, and the harmful impact that conflict can have on access to clean water | S/PV.7818 | 22 November 2016 | Senegal | Open debate |
| “Preventive Diplomacy and Transboundary Waters” | S/PV.7959 | 6 June 2017 | Bolivia | Briefing |
| “Addressing complex challenges to international peace and security”; the meeting explored nontraditional security threats, such as climate change, famine, pandemic diseases, transnational organised crime, and drug trafficking | S/PV.8144 | 20 December 2017 | Japan | Open debate |
| “The Role of Natural Resources as a Root Cause of Conflict” | S/2018/901 | 16 October 2018 | Bolivia | Briefing |
| “Contemporary drivers of conflict and instability and insecurity”; the discussion focused on the security implications of climate change and COVID-19, among other factors | S/2020/1090 | 3 November 2020 | Saint Vincent and the Grenadines | Open debate (VTC) |

44 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). IUCN. (2018, August 6). Retrieved November 9, 2021, from <https://www.iucn.org/theme/global-policy/our-work/united-nations-framework-convention-climate-change-unfccc>.

Kenya's Climate-Security Mandate: A repertoire of reasons for the need to mainstream the Climate-Security Nexus in the UNSC

"Our window of opportunity to prevent the worst climate impacts is rapidly closing,"

António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, COP26

The following are reasons why Kenya should continue to push the climate-security agenda at the UNSC cognizant of the trajectory of developments on the issue. For instance, since 2007,⁴⁵ the Security Council held sessions on climate change and its implications for peace and security. In the last five years, these debates, which were formerly irregular, have become far more frequent and connected to realities faced by developing nations and SIDS.

Kenya is the leader in climate policy in the region

Kenya must claim its historical position as the leader in climate policy formulations, being the first regional country to develop a national climate change strategy, national climate change action plan (NCCAP), and even the first to develop and submit their nationally determined contributions (NDC) and presently leading in the development of the national LTS (Long term low carbon emission development strategy).

Cognizant of the importance of a transboundary climate change response, Kenya has taken on an active role in regional climate change activities, such as the development of the East African Community's (EAC) Climate Change Policy, Plan and Strategy, all of which are incorporated into this National Climate Change Framework Policy. Additionally, Kenya's Climate Change Act, which took effect on May 27, 2016, made it one of the few African countries to implement explicit climate change law. The Act established the National Climate Change Council, which would be responsible for providing policy direction on climate change and will be chaired by the President of the republic.

Kenyan position at the UNSC should be the moment to demonstrate by evidence that it can lead as it has always led in its commitment to climate change mitigation and adaptation. This leadership history also makes Kenya have a voice in commanding other regional forces towards a common course for the good of climate change mitigation.

Continued pursuit of climate change advocacy

Although it may seem that the recently rejected draft resolution on climate security symbolises waning of the Council's effort, it provides an opportunity to continue driving momentum despite evident divisions. This could be achieved through organising Arria Meetings to pique the interest of countries such as Russia, India, and China in climate security. These informal meetings and dialogues, which can be initiated by any member of

⁴⁵ Mazo, J. (2010). Climate conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it. Routledge, p. 31

the council, provide a transparent and interactive venue for meeting and consulting with other UN entities and civil society organisations on critical issues. Non-permanent members, like Kenya, might use the informal sessions to pursue their top priorities. In 2021, Kenya, Norway, Ireland, and Niger spearheaded discussions on the German 2020 draft resolution. Twelve Council members took part in the discussions. China, Russia, and India were the three non-attendees. Kenya already has experience in organising and supporting such engagements which can be ramped up to reel in the three outlier states and its allies.

Kenya could kickstart the process of advocating for a resolution which addresses regional challenges. The resolution's purpose would be to establish a baseline for systematic discussions on how climate change – as manifested in droughts, sea-level rises, floods, and other extreme weather occurrences – is influencing the Horn of Africa and by extension, global peace, and conflict. In many countries where the United Nations (UN) operates, the link between these elements and instability is becoming more obvious. Land degradation brought on by climate change has prompted conflict between farmers and herders in the Sahel region. Cycles of catastrophic flooding in South Sudan have exacerbated severe food and economic insecurity, displacing over half a million people, driving pastoralists south, and fuelling conflict in the Equatoria region, where UN forces are tasked with protecting civilians. Millions of people in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia are facing starvation and famine due to drought. These are just a few examples of the accumulating evidence that climate change creates instability and worsens suffering, particularly in conflict-affected and fragile states. This relationship, however, has yet to be established in the Horn of Africa concretely through a resolution. While the UNSC has acknowledged these issues in some circumstances, it lacks conventional methods for anticipating, assessing, and responding to climate-related threats in particularly susceptible areas. It gives Kenya the chance to start discussions and lobby for a potential resolution that addresses the Horn of Africa's climate-security threats.

Kenya would also be picking up the baton from where other states left off in their concerted efforts to mainstream climate security internationally. In 2018, Sweden (at the time a Security Council member) contributed financing for a new Climate Security Mechanism - a team of staff from the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the UN Development Programme, and the UN Environment Programme – to develop improved risk analyses.⁴⁶ In 2020, Germany teamed up with Niger to establish a new Informal Expert Group on Climate and Security (IEG), to serve as an avenue for thorough discussions of these problems among members. Germany championed climate issues during its 2019-2020 term on the Council. This mechanism lacks formal Security Council status, and Russia refused to participate even as an observer in 2021, reflecting Moscow's broader reservations about the climate security agenda.⁴⁷ Despite these constraints, the IEG has already talked about the

46 The UN Security Council and Climate Change. Security Council Report. (2021, June 21). Retrieved November 9, 2021, from <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/>.

47 The UN Security Council and Climate Change. Security Council Report. (2021, June 21). Retrieved November 9, 2021, from <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/>.

Sahel, Somalia, and South Sudan.⁴⁸ The UN also sent a climate security adviser in 2021 to its Somalia mission to assess climate-related threats and coordinate UN measures.⁴⁹ As Somalia and South Sudan have been a topic of discussions for previous council members it would offer a smooth transition to climate security threats affecting the region given that Kenya hosts the largest number of refugees from these two countries.

Given the Council's current focus on climate security in Africa in areas such as the Sahel and Lake Chad basin, with Niger at the frontline bringing to the fore climate change challenges in its neighbourhood.⁵⁰ The UNSC's position is critical. It will refute any likely accusations that the Global North members of the Council are driving this agenda. Additionally, Kenya has served as an ambassador of climate change threats to African states, notably in the Horn of Africa by hosting the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN), to coordinate their regional viewpoints and national policies on climate change and to boost their response with a number of regional and global agencies.⁵¹ Kenya has also hosted a number of international conferences such as the Blue Economy and Stockholm+50 among others showcasing its dedication to climate-security matters globally. Kenya should use its diplomatic wisdom and human resources through the A3+1 (Kenya, Niger, Tunisia and St Vincent and the Grenadines) Framework on the UNSC to push the climate-security agenda for the African Union, Afro-Caribbean & South-South Cooperation.

Kenya through climate diplomacy could also push for more progressive commitments towards addressing climate-security and its unique dynamics in different member states. In the urgency to scale climate change measures, international standards or priorities could leave the least well-off populations in rural areas behind. A one-size-fits-all methodology that fails to consider the specific limitations and needs of different nations. Perhaps the reason India gingerly assessed that sanctions could be imposed against it and other emerging or developing nations under UNSC, if they did not reach their climate mitigation targets. Majority of its population live in rural areas and therefore the calculus is different. Localisation therefore becomes important giving UN member states the choice to commit to addressing climate change based on its resources and capabilities preventing ecocide while maintaining state sovereignty. A concern shared by some which allows each country to adopt its own model. For example, Kenya's ban on single-use plastics in 2017 to address plastic pollution, a first in Eastern Africa. Similar steps have also been taken by other countries in the region, such as Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda, to phase out non-biodegradable plastics.

48 Eberle, U., Pradhan, A., & Gowan, R. (2021, October 20). Can the UN Security Council agree on a climate security resolution? Crisis Group.

49 De Coning, C., Tchier, Y. A., Rupesinghe, N., & Grand, A. O. (2021, February). Climate, peace, and security fact sheet: Somalia. NUPI. Retrieved February 8, 2022, from <https://www.nupi.no/en/News/Climate-Peace-and-Security-Fact-Sheet-Somalia>

50 World Bank Group. (2021, October 21). This is how Niger is battling climate change. World Bank. Retrieved November 9, 2021, from <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2021/10/20/this-is-how-niger-is-battling-climate-change>.

51 UNEP. (2021, September 17). Triple planetary crisis, green recovery top agenda at African Ministerial Conference on the Environment. UN. Retrieved January 5, 2022, from <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/triple-planetary-crisis-green-recovery-top-agenda-african-ministerial-conference-environment>

Climate-induced migration

Resource-based competition heightens the likelihood of conflict between diverse groups of land users.⁵² In both Kenya and the Horn of Africa, less predictable rainy seasons, increases in extreme weather events like floods and droughts, and rising temperatures have caused reductions in crop yields.⁵³ Herders are being pushed to relocate in search of natural resources to feed their cattle due to desertification. Climate change has made migration patterns less predictable, prompting herders to shift to new pastures, resulting in confrontations with farming communities. Inter-communal violence is becoming more likely as tensions between herders and farmers rise. Climate change-related violence continues to be a major cause of displacement in Kenya and across the region, pushing people away from regions of land that rely on human presence to avoid degradation.⁵⁴

In the region, climate-related migration is common, however it is only temporary. This form of migration is a response to climate-related occurrences such as droughts and severe rainfall. Empirical evidence from pastoralist communities in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) supports the link between climate change and temporary migration in Kenya, showing that slow-onset environmental stresses like droughts and land degradation shape decisions to cross administrative (though not always national) borders in search of land, pasture, or work. This migration is cyclical, with migrants intending to return to their original communities once climatic conditions improve. The fact that this form of migration is just temporary, and circular does not mean it is without friction.⁵⁵ Competition for land between nomadic herders/pastoralists and sedentary farmers/agriculturalists is a common issue⁵⁶ and it is compounded by an increasing number of climate migrants who travel ever greater distances to find adequate ground for their herds to feed.

Kenya therefore needs to advocate for inclusion of climate-induced migration in national and global legal and policy frameworks because they are not sanctioned in existing international legal frameworks. For example, Kenya's regional neighbours have in the past escaped extreme climatic events and crossed borders, however they were not recognisable as refugees and consequently ineligible for asylum, unlike people fleeing civil wars or individual persecution. This is an issue that continues to affect all countries in the Horn of Africa and an amicable way of dealing with climate stressors needs to be developed regionally.

52 Njiru, B. N. (2012). Climate change, resource competition, and conflict amongst. Retrieved November 8, 2021, from https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-28626-1_24.

53 Böhmelt, T., Bernauer, T., Buhaug, H., Gleditsch, N. P., Tribaldos, T., & Wischnath, G. (2014). Demand, supply, and restraint: Determinants of Domestic Water Conflict and Cooperation. *Global Environmental Change*, 29, 337–348.

54 ACTED. (2019, October 2). Responding to the human impacts of climate change on the African continent. ACTED. Retrieved November 8, 2021, from <https://www.acted.org/en/how-is-acted-responding-to-the-human-impacts-of-climate-change-on-the-african-continent-2/>.

55 Dellmuth, L. M., van Baalen, S., Bremberg, N., Mobjörk, D. M., Sonnsjö, H., & Gustafsson, M.-T. (2016). Climate-related security risks: Towards an integrated approach. SIPRI. Retrieved November 8, 2021, from <https://www.sipri.org/publications/2016/climate-related-security-risks>.

56 Abel, G. J., Brottrager, M., Crespo Cuaresma, J., & Muttarak, R. (2019). Climate, conflict and forced migration. *Global Environmental Change*, 54, 239–249. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2018.12.003>

Geopolitical linkage to climate-security

The fact that all references to climate and security in UNSC Resolutions have so far been in relation to African countries demonstrates the continent's disproportionate security consequences. Climate change remains a reality that necessitates answers that are proportional to the magnitude of the threat it poses to regions and nations, particularly those located in the Horn of Africa and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Due to environmental deterioration, poor governance structures, and the presence of non-state armed groups, LDCs in the Horn of Africa region, such as Somalia, face climate-related security vulnerabilities. Forced displacement and accompanying recruitment into extremist groups like Al-Shabaab has worsened the situation by blocking aid from reaching millions of people in the worst-affected areas. Kenya, as a regional leader in Eastern Africa, is ideally positioned to advocate on behalf of the region geographically and continentally during its tenure on the UNSC as climate-security threats have a ripple effect on the peace and stability of neighbouring states.

Moreover, in October 2021, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta officially opened the IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC). The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) has designated ICPAC as a regional climate center responsible for providing climate services and early warnings to 11 East African countries. A Disaster Operations Center, complete with a situation room, has been developed to monitor major risks and provide regional early warnings for drought, floods, excessive rainfall, food insecurity, and pests such as the desert locust. This showcases widespread recognition of Kenya's geopolitical role in addressing climate-security links.

Climate change is both a geopolitical and an environmental concern. As a result, seeing climate change as a global security issue that necessitates a global response could assist the region in gaining the support it requires to combat climate change. It is, however, a challenging balancing act to do so without increased securitization in fragile areas. Africa is in an unfavourable position in the broader climate change talks, which are still hampered by inequities. Kenya's stability and development, on the other hand, will be dependent on the long run-on peace and security in its surrounding region. In this context, the advent of conflict in northern Ethiopia, Sudan's coup, and Somalia's shaky state could all contribute to more instability and bloodshed. Intricately linked conflicts can exacerbate tensions in the region, eroding good neighbourliness and making the regional security cooperation arrangement ineffective. Kenya has a history of not pushing its power beyond its borders. Nonetheless, the deteriorating regional environment, combined with Kenya's non-permanent seat on the UNSC, presents an opportunity and responsibility for the country to display regional leadership.

57 Alao, A. (2015). *Natural Resources and conflict in Africa: The Tragedy of Endowment*. University of Rochester Press.

Competition for natural capital (land and water resources)

Competition for natural resources and disputes over natural resources frequently lead to conflict.⁵⁷ If these concerns are disregarded or dealt with without taking into consideration the effects of climate change, such as leaving climate change consequences out of water-sharing agreements, competition and tensions may intensify and erupt into violence. Water scarcity is a major problem in the Horn of Africa, posing daily hardships for a large number of rural and peri-urban residents, as seen in Kenya's north-east region. A long series of natural disasters in Kenya's ASALs, for example, has severely weakened people's ability to manage and recover, leading to persistent relocation. As a result, previously existing tensions and instability have been exacerbated. Breaking these vicious loops would not only benefit impacted countries and populations, but it would also relieve the international community of the burden of dealing with protracted crises within states and regionally, as climate change affects all stages of the conflict cycle. Regionally mainstreaming Kenya's ASAL policy may aid governments in reducing long-term emergencies, which are at the heart of the UNSC's agenda, as well as threats to international peace and security.

Gendered impact of climate change

Women, particularly those living in poverty, are more vulnerable to climate change because they make up the majority of the world's poor, their lack of economic possibilities limits their ability to adapt to climate-related problems.⁵⁸ Furthermore, patriarchal sociocultural norms and other hierarchies hinder them from participating equitably in climate decision-making. As a result, states should prioritize women's leadership and participation at all levels of planning and implementation to effectively address climate change. This includes mainstreaming gender perspectives in mitigation and adaptation efforts, such as including gender-sensitive criteria in climate financing mechanisms. The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda provides a useful framework for examining the connections between climate change and conflict, as well as their disparate effects on women and girls. As a result, Kenya should promote women's role in achieving peace. Current realities in the ASAL regions and the Horn of Africa have placed a heavy emphasis on the gendered impact of climate change.⁵⁹ Disaster-related poverty, sexual exploitation, and Gender-Based Violence (GBV) affect women and girls. Additionally incorporating climate security into NAPs would increase opportunities for localisation of gendered climate-security matters.

According to Barrow and Mogaka, the condition of women and men in pastoral communities is not static, as droughts have caused changes in pastoral cultures'

58 Asaduzzaman, M., & Momtaz, S. (2018). Climate change impacts and women's livelihood: Vulnerability in developing countries. Routledge & CRC Press.

59 Mulinge, M. M., & Getu, M. (2013). Impacts of climate change and variability on pastoralist women in sub-Saharan Africa. Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA), p.5

60 Brody, A., Demetriades, J., & Esplen, E. (2008, June). Gender and climate change: Mapping the linkages A scoping study on knowledge and gap. Retrieved November 8, 2021, from <http://www.adequations.org/IMG/pdf/GenderAndClimateChange.pdf>.

61 Dankelman, I. (2012). Gender and climate change: An introduction. Taylor and Francis.

socio-cultural and socio-economic structures.⁶⁰ Due to the loss of cattle and other animals, women play a significant role in ensuring the survival of their families by participating in a variety of income-generating activities. Women, children, and persons with disabilities are the most vulnerable, especially among pastoralists. Women are allocated the duty of managing domestic activities in the pastoralist society as part of the division of labour.⁶¹ They oversee gathering firewood, constructing homes, fetching water, and caring for children. Doing these activities exposes them to danger, such as rape, which leads to revenge rapes and deaths by her sub-clan members, who are frequently young men, intensifying violent conflict, especially during droughts when they must go long distances to gather water or collect firewood. Because men find small-scale businesses like selling milk and charcoal difficult to do in this region, women have been compelled to be the sole breadwinners of their families.

Women and men's coping mechanisms to climatic unpredictability and change are at the centre of gender issues in pastoralist communities. As a result of the impact of climate change-induced conflict, the number of female-headed households has risen.⁶² Women's vulnerability has increased because of their lack of customary rights in obtaining resources, yet this is slowly changing as women and youth are increasingly included in decision-making processes. Gender sensitivity parallel to decision-making, is critical for effective climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies. Women and men, as well as girls and boys, need to be recognized for their ability to contribute valuable knowledge and insights.⁶³ Women, on the other hand, are more prone than men to be excluded from decision-making, whether at home, in the community, or at the national or international level. This is due to a lack of time, confidence, or resources, or because their contribution is not valued. The youth have also been gravely affected by climate change, due to prolonged drought, rearing of livestock is limited leaving most without employment options. It is therefore critical for Kenya to raise climate-security nexus issues and perspectives in the debates in which it is participating to guarantee that climate change is consistently included in the work of the Security Council.

Acknowledging the complex impact of climate change on natural resources, livelihoods, and human security, calls for intersectoral, coordinated climate policy support from the highest levels of state, and local government. If the climate change and security link in Kenya and regionally is not duly mainstreamed in development processes, it may constitute an obstacle to sustainable development due to concerns about a growing population, which is not only a result of but also unavoidably exacerbates negative effects of climate change.

63 Mulinge, M. M., & Getu, M. (2013). Impacts of climate change and variability on pastoralist women in sub-Saharan Africa. Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA), p. 36

Conclusion

Climate change, often labelled as a threat multiplier, is a security problem that requires global solutions. Impacts of climate change, such as, increased temperatures, sea level rise, sandstorms, droughts, floods, wildfires, are becoming more frequent and severe. These changes have impacts beyond the environmental realm and deeply affect human security as climate change converges with other global pressures. Despite some important recent advances, current international responses to climate change are inadequate. This paper has assessed the United Nations Security Council response to emerging discussions on climate change. As well as reasons for Kenya to continue championing climate-security in its last year as an E10. The paper acknowledges the complex impact of climate change on natural resources, livelihoods, and human security, and it calls for an intersectoral, coordinated response achieved through localising of climate security policies. Broadening the scope of the UNSC to include climate-security has proven difficult with the rejection of the draft resolution which would have been the first of its kind. Notwithstanding climate-related security threats should be included as a major component in comprehensive conflict-prevention efforts.

Irrespective of climate change, there is wariness of the Council taking on too large a role within international governance. Critics of any prospective Council climate action will assert that it is overstepping its mandate, and climate change is best left to the UNFCCC. Moving forward, the UNSC will need to more publicly acknowledge that maintaining international peace cannot be achieved in isolation. Nature is not amenable to compromise. Whereas political will currently seems insufficient for an unequivocal recognition of this fact in the form of a general resolution in the future, in time, the Council needs to systematically consider that breaching these environmental thresholds means the world will ultimately suffer costs that threaten humanity's very existence.

Building on the arguments raised, this policy paper proffers the following policy and governance recommendations for Kenya to advance climate-security:

1. Leverage its UNSC position to actively participate in international policy debates and continue liaising with relevant UN bodies, including the United Nations Security Council, on climate and environmental security issues, with the goal of developing a more cohesive early warning capacity, policy framework, and operational structure for these issues within the UN system. Simultaneously, analyse potential avenues for advancing the environmental and climate security agenda in other important domains such as the African Union and international conferences. This could be further strengthened by the establishment of climate-security centres in various parts of the continent and other vulnerable regions.
2. Support and encourage action by African Union Member States in the UNSC, with the goal of building a more cohesive and effective climate and environmental security framework within the UN system.
3. Regional development of an amicable way of tackling climate stressors.
4. Building policy momentum for inclusion of climate-security aspects in high -level national security organs at country level for adequate national climate change action plans.
5. Inclusion of climate-security aspects in National Action Plans as a way of acknowledging the gendered dimension of conflicts.

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