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FOREWORD

In 2020, Africa continues to face significant threats to peace and security that require the active engagement of the African Union and its key partners. The primary underlying structural challenges to achieving lasting peace and security in the countries of the African continent that continue to find themselves in crises include political and socio-economic marginalization and exclusion; lack of national cohesion, and a national identity that supersedes the need for divided interests; weak governance institutions and public services, including with regard to the administration of justice and the rule of law, human rights, the delivery of basic services, the equitable and sustainable management of state resources as well as natural resources; and the effects of climate change and food insecurity. These issues have, over the years, been compounded by external interference and proxy conflicts, violent extremism and terrorism, proliferation of illicit arms and ammunition, violations of arms embargoes, organized crime, corruption and the absence of effective State authority in many of the countries in crises on the continent. The COVID-19 pandemic has, on the one hand, resulted in commendable demonstrations of unity, solidarity and leadership with the African Union leading the mobilisation of resources to fight the pandemic. Indeed, some member states such as Rwanda, Seychelles and Mauritius have made significant strides in combating Covid-19. However, progress in this regard has been uneven and there are serious concerns about the rapidly rising infection rates across the continent and the stress this is likely to cause on already weak public health systems; the impact of the pandemic on African economies; the impact on countries that are net food importers; and how these issues will collectively affect political stability, peace and security across the continent.

The AU Theme of the Year, “Silencing the Guns: Creating Conducive Conditions for Africa’s Development” provides the opportunity for greater reflection and action towards strengthening existing mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution, building capacities of the Member States, the AU, RECs/RMs to ensure that early warning leads to early action; addressing the problem of proliferation of illicit arms, ammunitions and financial flows, human trafficking and organised crime; addressing issues of political governance, including inclusive, credible, free and fair elections; strengthening economic governance and natural resource management, including curbing illicit financial flows and addressing access to natural resources and critical infrastructure; as well as tackling the challenges of climate change and its impact on peace and security. Additionally, we need to constantly be mindful of the imperative to promote the involvement of women and youth through established mechanisms such as Fem-Wise, the African Women Leaders Network, and AU Youth for Peace programme and other initiatives that promote the increased participation of women and youth in governance, peace and security. There is the need to enhance and strengthen international partnerships towards attaining these objectives.

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of the African Union provides several mechanisms to address the challenges and priorities outlined above. It is important for us to reflect on how to adapt the APSA as well as the African Governance Architecture (AGA) mechanisms to the changing political, peace and security realities and trends, while ensuring that the AU continues to strengthen its capacities and capabilities to respond to emerging or on-going threats in a timely and effective manner. It is equally important to ensure that our collective endeavours on the national, regional, and continental level are well-coordinated and mutually reinforcing.

The United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) is supporting the African Union Commission in these endeavours, and while acknowledging the enormity of this daunting task we have a strong commitment to the visions laid out in Agenda 2063 and in the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. UNOAU is working closely with its partners at the AU, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the AU Member States towards a peaceful and prosperous Africa whose people can realize their full potential and thrive. To realize this vision, crucial steps as enumerated above, and as already outlined by the African Union at the highest levels are required. I am pleased that, within the context of the AU-UN Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, some progress has been made. Much remains to be done and I am encouraged by the steadfast commitment of the AU leadership, the UN and other partners towards that end.

I would like to commend the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) for its valuable contribution to the discussion on the future of APSA. This report takes a long-term approach, allowing for a fundamental evaluation of collective security. By mapping out alternative development paths leading up to four distinct scenarios for the year 2040, stakeholders are challenged to think outside the box. The scenarios are not a look into the future, but rather they seek to raise questions that need to be answered. This publication is not offering easy solutions, it is not a step-by-step guideline on which concrete decisions need to be taken. Instead, it is thought-provoking and hopefully inspires us to think creatively about collective security in Africa.

In this regard, I commend FES for this work. I wish you interesting and insightful reading and I hope that this encourages you to rethink how those of us committed to the African continent respond to the need to strengthen our efforts towards the achievement of our goal of a peaceful and prosperous continent.

Hanna Tetteh,
Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the African Union and Head of UNOAU
"Violence is unnecessary and costly. Peace is the only way." The former president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, in whose honour the Peace and Security Department (PSD) building of the African Union (AU) was named, started with a view to keeping African citizens safe and secure and free from harm. Only in a peaceful environment are citizens able to unfold and develop their talents and potentials to the fullest, to engage in economic activity, contribute to a strengthening of the social contract and positively impact the development of their societies. African Heads of States and Government understood this all too well when they laid the foundations for the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2002. Facing rampant conflict and mass atrocities in Africa in the 1990s, they decided to transform the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the AU, thereby building on the OAU Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, and put the issue of peace and security at the very heart of its raison d’etre. The principle of non-interference was enshrined and reinforced by the principle of non-indifference. No longer did AU Member States intend to stand by and gaze on as simmering conflict broke out in violence in one country and spilled over to entire regions, threatening Africa as a whole.

Twenty years later, the documents laying down the institutional structure of the APSA still serve as a superb example of how collective security can be systematised in the 21st century. Since its inception, however, its endeavours have produced mixed results: On the one hand, APSA has shown its mettle in preventing crises and mitigating violent conflict in a wide number of cases. On the other, the institution and its constituent parts have fallen short of expectations in a number of conflicts, whether because its instruments were not functioning properly, or its intervention regime was simply ignored, compliance mechanisms were not adhered to, or because the Union was sidelined and outmanoeuvred by other actors. At the present juncture, it is difficult to predict in which direction the APSA will evolve in the coming years: new security threats are on the rise (the Covid-19 pandemic is a prime example), a crisis of multilateralism is increasingly gripping the globe and constraints on the financial resources needed to ensure its effectiveness are becoming ever more severe in spite of ongoing reforms and efforts to secure funding of the Union. If ever there was a moment in which a strategic discussion on how the APSA can fulfil its task in the long-term in a rapidly changing world was needed, that moment is now.

It is in this setting that the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) has initiated a scenario-building process on the possible future of APSA. Over thirty leading African thinkers, practitioners and decision-makers have taken part in this endeavour, contributing their experience and knowledge from the five African sub-regions to the effort. In this creative and intellectually challenging process, the group first identified alternative development paths for this collective security system. At the end of the process, four coherent and plausible scenarios were mapped out of what APSA could look like in 2040 and what consequences this would have for peace and security on the continent. The scenarios are not meant to be a forecast of what the situation will be in 2040, but rather to merely outline various possibilities. Basically, scenarios are a planning tool that trace out multiple perspectives while describing different plausible future trajectories. This approach allows us to evaluate various possibilities and identify challenges and highlight opportunities that the African continent, the African Union and her Member States are already facing today - as well as future imponderables and uncertainties. The scenarios underscore the need for crucial decisions to be taken today. Although this publication offers an abundance of thoughts and insight, its most important finding lies in the strategic relevance of a collective security system for the African continent: Independent of how it will look in 2040, an Africa lacking such a system will be prone to violent conflict within and between states, not to mention meddling and intrusions by outside actors.

We would like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations to the African Union, Madame Hanna Tetteh, for taking over the role of patron for this this process, for her support for this undertaking and for the insightful discussions. We would furthermore like to thank Dr Jair van der Lijn from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for guiding the whole group through the process, for structuring our thoughts and perspectives and shepherding all this into an insightful and cohesive publication – a challenging task that has been admirably accomplished. And last but not least, we would like to thank each of the participants for their willingness to contribute their insight and perspectives, to challenge long-held beliefs on all sides and to think outside the box. This whole process would not have been possible without them.

We hope that you will find this work stimulating and thought-provoking, and that it will perhaps change the way you think about collective security on the African continent.

The members of the Steering Committee:

Michelle Ndiaye, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) and Head of the Mission to the African Union Liaison Office in DRC, former Director of the African Peace and Security Programme at the Institute of Peace and Security Studies

Ulf Engel, Professor for “Politics in Africa” at Leipzig University

Manfred Öhm, head of the FES Africa Department

Elisabeth Braune, head of the FES Middle East and North Africa Department

Markus Awater, head of the FES office for African Union Cooperation
The debate on the future role and functioning of APSA has been intensifying over the past few years. This suggests that in-depth thought about tomorrow’s challenges to, and potential for, APSA warrant discussion already at present. Shocks to the international system, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, underscore this importance. Scenarios are a tool of strategic thinking and planning, available to state and non-state actors that engage in decision- and policy-making processes. They cannot predict the future, but they can describe plausible alternative trajectories and different development paths. At the same time, they raise questions and seek to spark discussions and reflection. The four scenarios for ‘the APSA we want’ in 2040 are intended to serve as a starting point for international debate at various levels on what APSA should and could be. These scenarios raise relevant policy questions that need to be dealt with while offering a foundation upon which policymakers, practitioners and academics can derive policy recommendations.

The scenarios were developed at scenario-building meetings respectively held in Kigali, Rwanda, and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in October and December 2019. They were elaborated by a group of leading African thinkers; policymakers, practitioners and military personnel from AU Member States, RECs/RMs, AU and the UN, as well as representatives of civil society (16 men and 18 women). The make-up of group participants exhibited a balance between the different regions of Africa and AU Member States. The resulting four scenarios are beset with two key uncertainties at their core:

1) Will AU Member States have the political will to fully implement APSA or not?

2) Will APSA be adapted to the challenges on the Continent or not?

Four scenarios for 2040

Scenario 1—Igloo in the Desert: During the 2020s, in face of increasing transregional and non-traditional security challenges, AU Member States reformed APSA and operationalised the ASF. These interventions were militarised and state-centric by design and in their implementation, however, with key non-state stakeholders needed to deal with non-traditional security challenges which are generally not military in nature being excluded. Moreover, APSA’s main instruments remained predominantly reactive in essence. Consequently, in 2040, although Member States have the political will to deal with the challenges facing the Continent, APSA is not adapted to the new context. Member States still disagree on the nature of the challenges and on what the best responses should be. Due to this disagreement and competition, they are seeking solutions—ad hoc operations and coalitions, add-on solutions and unilateral interventions—that are not effectively integrated into APSA or controlled by the AU and the RECs/RMs. Although some RECs/RMs still function, others are dormant, and coordination between them and the AU at the central level is limited. The UN frequently carries out operations without proper consultation of AU institutions. Interventions depend heavily on external actors, who also frequently get involved to promote their own security interests in Africa. Some external actors proactively encourage the further proliferation of intervention initiatives and, as such, alternative structures suit them better. The absence of an effective APSA has fuelled a surge in interconnected security challenges on the continent, together creating a pressure cooker of non-traditional security threats. Democratic freedoms, human rights and civil society space suffer due to militarised and repression-based responses.

Scenario 2—Lighthouse in the Storm: While globally speaking, multilateralism has suffered, in Africa a counter-trend has emerged. In an environment marked by a divided UN Security Council and budget pressure, the UN has been constrained in its actions, forcing APSA to tackle the challenges. A new generation of leaders has pursued African solutions to the many transnational challenges. They were committed to the vision of Silencing the Guns and viewed pan-Africanism as the only viable solution. By 2040, APSA and AGA have been integrated in the African Peace, Security and Governance Architecture (APSGA), which is a global example of a well-functioning collective security system. APSGA is a reasonably coherent and effective state-centred collective security system. The ASF is now fully operational and being utilised, while disaster management and cyber capabilities have been developed. Many Member States have domesticated and are implementing most AU instruments relating to governance, human rights and other issues. The PSC’s decision-making is timely, proactive, consensual, coordinated and efficient. While the capabilities and effectiveness of different RECs/RMs still vary, the weaker ones are gradually catching up.
up. In partnership with the UN, and depending upon their comparative advantages, the RECs/RMs or the AU serve as the vehicle for African involvement. The resulting improvement in continental stability and greater accountability and transparency of governments mean that, despite increased stress due to climate change, population growth and urbanisation, economies are flourishing, and livelihoods and governance have improved. However, with more limited external funding and Member State inability to mobilise sufficient funds, APSGA is being overstretched and is considering how to refocus more effectively.

Scenario 3—Sanctuary in the Sky: Towards the end of the 2020s, successful AU reforms lost momentum. Different views over the way forward and toxic debates in the wake of violations of APSA norms crippled the organisation’s decision-making capabilities. In addition, the AU and the RECs/RMs proved unable to deal with the new security challenges, becoming overextended and instrumentalised by some Member States and external actors. In 2040, while APSA would appear to be near-perfect on paper and at a rhetorical level, in practice it is an empty shell and its ostensibly shared values are not being implemented. The PSC has been restructured, but it has limited clout. Subsidiarity works for the stronger RECs/RMs, as they are playing leading roles in an equal partnership. In some regions the RECs/RMs operate hand in hand with civil society, while in others there is no political will to move forward and collaborate internationally. The main modus operandi is non-action and, when Member States feel forced to act, they prefer to forum shop outside APSA. Civil society and the private sector have gained space in APSA. In most regions and at the central AU level, this is primarily because Member States pay no heed to APSA and take relevant decisions outside the APSA framework. The AU Commission takes a pragmatic approach and quietly works for peace and security outside the spotlight. APSA has lost legitimacy with donors, and its budget is limited. In some regions, civil society ensures APSA checks and balances. Here, with more efficient mediation and conflict-prevention capacity, peace and security can improve, and economic growth picks up due to growing regional integration, with ‘islands of stability’ emerging. In other regions autocrats are not kept in check. There, in the absence of international scrutiny and intervention on human rights, governments have a free hand in how they treat their populations, violence is not contained, conflicts rekindle and spill over into other areas. Violent extremist groups benefit from this, as they thrive on the grievances of repressed groups and lack of international cooperation. This also offers space for external actors to interfere and undertake activities in pursuit of their own interests.

Scenario 4—Abandoned Village: During the 2020s, the crisis of multilateralism intensified, with the global system slowly turning more multipolar, with abounding geopolitical competition. African leaders were no different than most leaders elsewhere. Rather than being visionary, they focused more and more on inward-looking individual and national interests. In 2040, although APSA still exists, the rump remaining is on life-support from a few idealistic donor governments and NGOs. AU Member States are unable to mobilise additional funding, and external actors have lost interest in supporting an obsolete architecture. The PSC is weak and, while it meets on occasion, it struggles to find a consensus. The AU is dysfunctional, and some RECs/RMs are increasingly instrumentalised as the main source of legitimacy. In the absence of any functioning collective security system in Africa, stronger Member States are taking matters into their own hands, but they often violate international norms. Loose-knit opportunistic ad hoc coalitions are also utilised when interests overlap. If non-African governments provide bilateral assistance or funding, or when they intervene militarily, they focus on their self-interest: keeping refugees and ‘terrorists’ out, maintaining access to resources, and building geopolitical influence. A ‘new scramble for Africa’ is unfolding, in which zones of influence are being carved out in large parts of the Continent. The securitisation and militarisation of national politics and external engagement and interference on the Continent mean that little attention is afforded to development, governance and human rights. Consequently, security and rule of law in large parts of the Continent have deteriorated, resulting in dramatic humanitarian crises and frequent flight and migration to safer areas on the Continent, to Europe and to the Gulf region. Violent extremist and transnational organised criminal networks thrive in the absence of effective international collaboration. A counterterrorism is manifesting itself, however, with a debate beginning over the revival, reform and reinvention of African institutions.

The main messages

The scenarios show that, at a time of increasing interregional, non-traditional security challenges cropping up in Africa—e.g. violent extremism and terrorism, transnational organised crime, environmental degradation and climate change, irregular migration and pandemics—, creeping multilateralism and budget pressures, APSA finds itself at a crossroads. Regardless of how the COVID-19 pandemic affects Africa, in the period leading up to 2040, the Continent will face formidable challenges, while there are also great opportunities that can be capitalised on—ranging from Africa’s riches to its populations, civil society and technology. These scenarios underline the strategic importance of a well-functioning APSA. They make a strong point for adapting APSA to the new realities instead of creating new arrangements. They show that, if adapted and shaped responsibly, APSA has the potential of functioning as a full-fledged collective security system that contributes significantly to the enhancement of African peace and security in 2040. How the future ultimately looks will depend to a large extent on how AU Member States and their international partners deal with the following questions:

- How can the Continent best deal with non-traditional security challenges that do not stop at national boundaries, tend to become increasingly trans-regional and cannot be solved without international cooperation? How can we move from short-term symptom-focused policies to long-term root-cause-oriented approaches? Should ASF concepts and composition be adjusted?
• How can APSA gain more legitimacy? How can APSA contribute to more legitimate solutions to conflicts: by inclusive processes, by more ‘presence on the ground’, or by obtaining solutions which are consistent with the norms enshrined in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) and the AGA?

• In a global crisis of multilateralism, what is the most effective relationship between APSA at the central level and the RECs and RMs at the regional level, and the UN at the global level? What is the best division of labour, how can interoperability be improved, and which instruments work best at which institutional level?

• How can the positive role of civil society organisations and the private sector best be maximised within APSA? How can the Livingstone Formula (2008) for interaction between the PSC and civil society organisations in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa, as well as the Maseru Conclusions (2014) on the enhancement of its implementation best be operationalised and applied?

• How can the funding obstacles faced by, and donor dependency characterising, APSA best be overcome without negatively impacting funding and the organisation’s work?

• How can the operationalisation of existing APSA pillars, such as the ASF, the Peace Fund, and Continental Early Warning Systems and REC’s/RM’s early warning systems, best be fostered and nurtured?

• How can the AU’s shared norms and values, and particularly their implementation, be placed on a more solid footing to prevent potential future backsliding? Through which mechanisms can Member States encourage each other to be the best versions of themselves? How can existing compliance mechanisms (for instance, with regard to the ACDEG and the African Peer Review Mechanism, APRM) be fully leveraged?

• How can African governments remain out in front of the technology curve in their efforts to deal with international organised criminal networks and other illicit groups.

These questions often arouse very different preferences and prompt very different answers, with many questions calling for further debate, but the choices policymakers eventually make will determine the future of the continental peace and security landscape.
SCENARIO 1: IGLOO IN THE DESERT

SCENARIO 2: LIGHTHOUSE IN THE STORM

SCENARIO 3: SANCTUARY IN THE SKY

SCENARIO 4: ABANDONED VILLAGE
The world is changing at an unprecedented rate. The multilateral system, considered rather stable a few years ago, is under pressure from various sides, while trust and confidence in international institutions is waning. The African Continent in general is negatively affected by this trend, and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in particular. The COVID-19 pandemic is only adding to this challenging mixture. Non-traditional security threats—e.g. violent extremism and terrorism, transnational organised crime, environmental degradation and climate change, irregular migration and pandemics—are putting the capabilities of APSA to respond in a timely manner to changing circumstances to the test. Some Member States prefer small-scale security arrangements that can more flexibly accommodate the needs of the states involved. Future financing mechanisms are no longer guaranteed. Transactional security interventions by individual states and ad-hoc coalitions of actors contrast with more institutionalised approaches to peace and security. This is a particularly worrying development, as a functioning and effective collective security system appears to be needed now more than ever before. While the APSA has much to offer and great potential, and Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020 has staked out ambitious objectives, the sheer scope of the security challenges in Africa may cause APSA's legitimacy to evaporate. The debate over the future role and functioning of APSA has been intensifying over the past few years. This suggests that in-depth thought about tomorrow’s challenges to, and the potential for, APSA warrant discussion already at present. The scenarios for ‘the APSA we want’ in 2040 offer a propitious starting point for an international debate at various levels on what APSA should and could be. These scenarios raise relevant policy questions that need to be addressed and offer a foundation upon which policymakers, practitioners and academics can derive policy recommendation.

APSA

APSA is an ever-evolving set of institutions, norms, instruments and practices aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa, as well as fostering and encouraging ‘democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts.’ It does so by means of early warning and preventive diplomacy, peace-making, including the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and enquiry, peace-support operations and intervention, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction as well as humanitarian action and disaster management.

APSA is based on the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) (2000) and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) (2002). With the PSC at its centre, APSA includes the AU Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund. The Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RECs/RMs) are part of this architecture. Collaboration between these continental and regional levels is guided by the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantages. The PSC also collaborates with other AU institutions—such as the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)—as well as with civil society organisations. Furthermore, it partners with the United Nations (UN) and other relevant international stakeholders.

Lastly, the African Governance Architecture (AGA) is worth mentioning as a related platform for dialogue between various stakeholders mandated to promote good governance and democracy in Africa. AGA’s principle objective is implementation of AU Shared Values, which were invoked by the AU Commission in 2010, and the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) in particular.

The scenarios and their aim

When thinking through ‘the APSA we want’, it is helpful to collect and collate thoughts and ideas relating to possible long-term developments and the different directions these may take by mapping out alternative future pathways. There are at least two reasons why this makes good sense:

First, depictions of scenarios stimulate discussions about the topic under review. They allow a more structured form of debate over what future developments may involve and hence how the current factors influencing these developments need to be addressed and shaped. As such, discussions of scenarios strengthen the dialogue and have the potential to produce commonly agreed-upon or joint solutions.
Second, scenarios are an instrument for policy-planning, as they constructively explore plausible futures and realities that require forward thinking. Planning for alternative futures increases organisations’ flexibility, as it makes them think through what they aim to achieve and what will be required in each scenario.

In order to serve both purposes, scenarios need to fulfil a number of criteria. They should be creative, but plausible. Scenarios need to “think the unthinkable” and even explore uncomfortable options. Their aim is to make the reader think about what may happen in the future and why. Yet, they should not journey into the realm of the impossible because as mere fiction they would forfeit their policy relevance. For this reason, any and all alternative future scenarios also have to be internally consistent.

The scenarios presented in this report are not predictions. Their aim and purpose is to depict what may happen by providing a 360-degree view of all alternative futures. For this reason, they try to cover the widest possible variety of potential future outcomes and developments in order to maximise the potential for discussion, helping policymakers embrace uncertainty and preparing them for the different futures that may arise. This paper presents four scenarios for APSA in 2040. As the future unfolds, it will not look exactly like any of the scenarios described below, but it is likely to include some features from some or all of them.¹

This process of plotting scenarios was undertaken to stimulate thinking about possible future trajectories for APSA in a structured and creative way. The result is meant to serve as food for thought regarding what development paths APSA might take and how things might look in 2040 – without foisting easy answers on the reader. The fact that the debate on the future role and functioning of APSA has intensified over the past few years suggests that in-depth reflection on tomorrow’s challenges to, and potential for, APSA warrant discussion already at present. The aims of the scenario project are thus to inform policymakers, practitioners and academics, to underline the crucial importance of APSA for peace and security in Africa, and to make the reader aware that steps to avoid certain negative aspects of scenarios or to encourage other aspects of scenarios need to be taken in the near future. For this purpose, the scenarios offer a wide range of starting points and approaches on how to strengthen APSA in different circumstances. Hopefully, they will serve as a thought-provoking stimulus for a debate at different levels (national, regional, continental and international) on what APSA should and could be.

**Methodology**

The scenarios presented in this paper were built using the Shell scenario methodology.² They were developed by a group of leading African thinkers; policymakers, practitioners and military actors from AU Member States, RECs/RMs, the AU and UN as well as representatives of civil society (16 men and 18 women). The group balanced participants from the different regions of Africa and AU Member States. Their core elements were based on a scenario-building workshop held in Kigali, Rwanda, on 25-27 October 2019. Input from this workshop was supplemented by additional desk research, producing draft scenarios which were then further tested and strengthened by the scenario group at a subsequent scenario workshop that took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 6-8 December 2019.

In the process, a four-step scenario-building methodology was employed.

The first step was to specify the temporal horizon for projecting the scenarios. The year 2040 was chosen because it allows for the development of sufficiently differentiated scenarios. This does not make the scenarios any less relevant to the more immediate future, however. Once the first attributes of a scenario begin manifesting themselves, these can be monitored with a view to potential policy adjustments. At the same time, the fact that this scenario-based process largely took place before the COVID-19 pandemic unfolded to the full extent does not affect its conclusions, as the scenarios are geared to the long term. Therefore, the impact of unexpected events and developments close to the time of publication may be attenuated over time in the long run.

The second step was to identify trends and developments that might affect the future of APSA in 2040, both those which are very likely to occur—‘probabilities’—, and those which are less certain—‘uncertainties’. While the uncertainties account for the differences between scenarios, the probabilities determine what they have in common. The uncertainties and the probabilities are equally important in projecting the substance of the scenarios. Mistaken assumptions about the probabilities may lead to criticism that the scenarios are unrealistic.

The third step was to define key uncertainties, the most important and most uncertain variables that form the basis for the scenarios’ axis grid.

The final step was to build scenarios based on how the remaining variables—uncertainties and probabilities, the driving forces and actors—develop in each scenario quadrant (see figure 1 below).

**Probabilities and uncertainties**

When visualising APSA in 2040, it is important to be aware of what is probable. Participants in the Kigali workshop clustered

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a number of issues, trends and developments as probable. The most commonly accepted ones considered to be relevant were (in random order):

- Conflicts and threats will persist and become more complex, as well as more transnational or even transregional;
- Global connectivity and consequently the relevance of Africa will increase;
- APSA will not be completely financially self-reliant, and autonomous and independent in its decision-making, and
- Different Member States will have different agendas for APSA, so there will be a certain level of fragmentation and polarisation.

A number of uncertainties were identified as well:

- What will be the nature of governance in Africa; will it be predominantly state-centric, or non-state centric?
- Will APSA as a collective security system— institutions, practices and norms—still exist in its current form or not?
- Will APSA be effective and efficient or not?
- Will APSA be relevant to its Member States or not?
- Will APSA be people-centred, inclusive and legitimate from the perspective of the peoples of Africa or not?
- Will Member States implement the shared normative framework of APSA or not?
- Will Member States be able to resist ‘indifference’ by boosting their sovereignty or not?
- Will Africa be hard hit by the COVID-19 pandemic or not?
- Will APSA be in the driver’s seat when it comes to peace and security in Africa or not?
- Will APSA be predominantly African or externally funded?
- Will the role of the RECs/RMs become relatively stronger in APSA or not?, and
- Will subsidiarity between the AU and RECs/RMs work or not?

**Key uncertainties**

At the Kigali workshop, participants identified two developments that are highly important to the future of APSA in 2040, but are also very uncertain in terms of how they will develop in the future. These are the two key uncertainties:

1) **Will AU Member States have the political will to fully implement APSA or not?**

This first key uncertainty concerns the extent to which AU Member States have the political will to fully apply APSA and its underlying norms, both in terms of whether they are willing to act in the first place, and whether they are willing to use APSA for that purpose, or are more inclined to opt for other means, e.g. unilateral intervention.

2) **Will APSA be adapted to the challenges on the Continent or not?**

This second key uncertainty is the extent to which APSA is adapted to Africa’s challenges in terms of the changing nature and evolution of security, risks, threats and conflicts. Conflicts and security change over time; therefore, the tools needed to manage risks and threats may have to be adapted accordingly.

On the basis of these two key uncertainties, a grid was constructed in which the x and y axes represent the two key uncertainties mentioned above. Each quadrant represents one scenario (see figure 1).

![Figure 1: Scenarios for APSA in 2040](image)

In this report, the four scenarios in the four quadrants of the axis grid are described in more detail. These are:

1) Scenario 1: Igloo in the Desert—Member States are willing to implement APSA, but it is not adapted to challenges on the Continent;
2) Scenario 2: Lighthouse in the Storm—Member States are willing to implement APSA, and it is adapted to challenges on the Continent;
3) Scenario 3: Sanctuary in the Sky—Member States are not willing to implement APSA, while it is adapted to challenges on the Continent; and
4) Scenario 4: Abandoned Village—Member States are not willing to implement APSA, nor is it adapted to challenges on the Continent.

**Guide to the reader**

Each description of the four scenarios starts with a future history of the period from 2020 to 2040. These are written in the past tense to emphasise that they constitute a retrospective view from 2040. They are followed by a description, in the present tense, showing in broad strokes what the scenario in 2040 looks like: (a) with regard to APSA; and (b) with regard to peace and security in Africa. Each scenario is also accompanied by a box outlining its main characteristics. The paper ends with a short conclusion on the scenarios and lists a number of questions that follow from the exercise and from which policy implications are to be derived.
SCENARIO 1:
IGLOO IN THE DESERT
A future history

During the 2020s, Africa increasingly had to grapple with the impact of climate change and resulting environmental degradation. While droughts became more common in many areas, other regions were more often hit by extreme weather events, such as storms and flooding. Conflicts over pastoral migration routes became more frequent, as desertification reduced arable lands available. The regions that benefitted from climate change attracted climate-driven migrants as well as external actors buying up lands, leading to increasing instances of land-grabbing on a smaller, but also larger, scale. Throughout the Continent, climate protests and violent ‘eco-terrorism’ became more frequent.

Societies also faced other stress factors. The continent never really recovered from the COVID-19 pandemic. On top of this, economic growth could not sustain demographic pressures. Inclusivity was further limited, and inequality increased both within and between AU Member States. The technological divide within and between Member States, as well as with the rest of the world, increased. Many users of information technology—individuals as well as the private sector and state—were vulnerable to cybercrime and espionage, as they were unable to protect their data adequately. Youth were hit hardest by the lack of opportunities and poverty resulting from these challenges, and at times took their concerns to the streets. Transnational organised crime and violent extremist networks fed off these frustrations, becoming increasingly transregional in nature. Due to weak international cooperation, these and other non-traditional security challenges—such as pandemics and irregular migration—were insufficiently managed. Governments often responded with military means and repression, and democratic freedoms, human rights and civil society space suffered as a result.

In 2025, in order to combat these challenges, AU Member States agreed on a Collective Agenda for Security (ACS), which included a number of APSA reforms. Also, the ASF became operational. Both steps expressed the political will of Member States to fully implement APSA. However, the international solutions sought after in the reforms were, just like the national ones, “militarised” and state-centric by design and implementation. They excluded key stakeholders—such as civil society and the private sector—required to deal with non-traditional security challenges, which are generally not military in nature. Moreover, APSA’s main instruments remained predominantly reactive, not focusing directly or structurally on conflict and crisis prevention. Consequently, APSA was ever more poorly adapted to meet new and changing challenges and contexts. While some Member States continued to be swayed by an ‘if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail’ mind-set, others came to believe that these non-traditional security challenges required different tools. Not only did African countries not agree on the nature of the challenges, they also lacked a consensus on what the best responses should be. As a result, during the 2020s APSA-related decision-making became increasingly deadlocked, and its instruments were used more and more infrequently. Coordination between RECs/RMs and the AU became sporadic. APSA’s shared normative basis (e.g.
non-indifference and rejection of coups) was not further developed and even began to be rolled back. Due to disagreement over, and ineffectiveness of, APSA implementation, alternative solutions came into increasingly high currency. Some external actors at times actively frustrated APSA, promoting further proliferation of interventional initiatives whenever alternative structures suited them better. Moreover, following the limited UN Security Council reform in 2030 (two African Member States became permanent members, albeit without veto power), the UN experienced a boost in its legitimacy in Africa once again. Subsequently, during the 2030s the UN also frequently carried out operations and activities in Africa, bypassing the decision-making process of the AU and APSA.

The increasing ineffectiveness of APSA during the 2020s-30s was further exacerbated by challenges to reform facing the AU. The organisation and Member States lacked funding, training, and know-how on how to deal with non-traditional security challenges. The AU’s and RECs/RMs’ organisational cultures were not open to changing technical approaches successfully applied to deal with traditional security challenges in the past. Technocrats preferred to stick to blueprint solutions that were neither suitable for the context of non-traditional security challenges, nor adapted to context-specific requirements. They resisted updating tools and frameworks, and carried on their work based on the universal logic of liberal peace—including power-sharing, democratisation and elections as an exit strategy, as well as standardised disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes and security sector reform.

APSA in 2040

Although Member States have the political will to deal with the challenges on the Continent, the ASF—which is operational—and other aspects and instruments of APSA are not suitable to dealing with non-traditional security challenges, such as environmental degradation, pandemics, organised crime and terrorism. Decision-making on the Continent is polarised and fragmented, and Member States are unwilling to transfer sovereignty to the African Union. Member States move discussions to those forums where they believe they have most influence. This disagreement and competition have led Member States to seek solutions within the architecture at times (“add-on”), but for the most part outside (ad hoc). There is a proliferation of institutional structures that duplicate APSA. These unilateral Member State initiatives, ad hoc coalitions of the willing, and frequent UN operations are neither effectively integrated into APSA, nor controlled by the AU and RECs/RMs. APSA has fragmented into different blocs. Although some RECs/RMs still function, others are dormant, and different regions and even different Member States have different approaches. Cooperation between these different structures and interventions is therefore a scarce commodity.

The existing intervention system remains very dependent on external actors, who frequently meddle. Donors have lost faith in the effectiveness and operationalisation of APSA. Where APSA solutions have mostly been absent, ad hoc solutions frequently do deliver in the short term, although in the long run they do not offer any sustainable solutions, either. Nonetheless, external funding and technical support have shifted away from APSA and the ASF towards non-APSA initiatives that are deemed more relevant by donors. However, some RECs/RMs remain active and effective alongside these ad hoc solutions. Moreover, motivated by the sunk cost fallacy, external funding for APSA and the ASF continues and is enough to foot its core operational activities. Yet, funding is insufficient for programmatic activities and structural change to the system.

Shared values are disconnected from the decision-making processes in, and implementation of, APSA. The norm of non-indifference is highly valued and shared in Africa and wherever possible lived up to. The lack of a coherent and joint approach means, however, that intervening actors are less constrained by common norms. Adherence to norms varies by region and by norm. Human rights norms are, for example, not everywhere strictly lived up to, with interventions often being primarily guided by the national interests of the intervening actors. The support and legitimacy of APSA and non-APSA interventions among the general public correlates with their success. This means that while Member States still view APSA as a way to legitimise their actions, as a result of APSA’s modest results, it has lost legitimacy in the eyes of African citizens. There is some continued civil society engagement in APSA and non-APSA interventions, while the private sector does not engage with interventions at all.

Peace and Security in Africa 2040

Old-fashioned reactionary and military interventions are not suitable in the face of non-traditional security challenges facing the Continent, making APSA unsuitable for the job. Frequently African states are in competition and disagreement with each other, which only further complicates solutions to complex, dynamic, interconnected and transnational security challenges and threats. Consequently, the Continent has turned into a pressure cooker. Climate change, pandemics, demographic pressure and migration, and a disconnect between youth and government elites have further fuelled an environment in which violent extremist and transnational organised crime networks thrive. This in turn has mixed with existing intercommunal conflicts and "warlordism", while other non-traditional security challenges, such as in the cyber area, have dramatically risen in salience.

Individual states in general have few answers to these complex challenges. When their institutional structures are weak, non-state actors such as vigilantes, the private sector and social movements fill the vacuum. When their structures are somewhat stronger, they feel less constrained by norms that hold them back, as compliance mechanisms are weak. Therefore, they often seek to solve their problems through repression, while external actors are often eager to support them by selling them surveillance technology. At that moment when the Continent itself is weak, more than ever before these external actors engage in dealing with the challenges at hand. They do so in collaboration with some AU Member States that benefit from this, but primarily with their own security and interests in mind.
SCENARIO 2: LIGHTHOUSE IN THE STORM
A future history

While during the 2020s Africa had to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic fallout, and the number and intensity of conflicts increased, the Continent also faced other growing security challenges. Particularly the Sahel and North African regions had to deal with a toxic mixture of terrorism, violent extremism and transnational organised crime, feeding off increasing poverty, irregular migration and climate change. Throughout Africa, populations followed global examples and took their concerns to the street in massive demonstrations. The resulting ‘second African spring’—the first referring to the democratic transitions of 1990-94—that started in 2018-19 with the protests against Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir slowly gained ground during the 2020s, leading to the downfall of autocrats and a strengthening of inclusivity in existing democracies. Unlike the Arab Spring of 2011, these democratic revolutions and the demise of ruling autocrats gave way to a real democratic wave. Initially, while these fledgling democracies still had to stabilise, the demise of ancien regimes caused conflicts to multiply. However, the new generation of African leadership was driven by more democratic and responsible ideas and values of leadership and governance, and was constantly checked and pushed by an increasingly vibrant civil society. It committed to the vision of silencing the guns, and managed to guide most of these democratising countries through uncertain and chaotic times. Did this mean the Continent as a whole became democratised? No. A significant number of autocrats were able to weather the storm, but they also had to reduce corruption and direct more attention to good governance.

While multilateralism was under threat globally, on the African Continent a countertrend prevailed. The UN Security Council was often divided, and resolutions were often vetoed. In combination with shrinking budgets, this meant that the UN was less able to act, forcing APSA to take on the challenges. During the second half of the 2020s, a handful of key players led the way in strengthening APSA. They felt the pressure to deal with transnational challenges, such as terrorism, organised crime and climate change, as these acute threats would have otherwise become too overwhelming.

Pan-Africanism was increasingly seen as a way to deal with these non-traditional security challenges. Leaders and the groups they represented often saw that rather than fighting over a bigger slice of the pie, increasing the size of the whole pie would render conflict irrelevant. Internally, more people refrained from playing ethnic or tribal cards. Internationally, more people became aware of the dangers of violence and discord, with leaders therefore setting out to strengthen collective security and improve their early warning tools. They reformed and used the instruments of APSA to their utmost in order to prevent conflicts from escalating. In 2029 these reforms culminated in the integration of APSA and AGA in the African Peace, Security and Governance Architecture (APSGA).

During the 2030s, the Global North faced shrinking and greying economies which because of their networked inter-
dependency were vulnerable to environmental shocks. They were no longer able to fund APSA to the extent they had done in the past. However, due to the success of the 2018 AU Reform Agenda APSA became more effective and efficient. Also, public awareness of the AU/APSA in Africa increased. Therefore, to the tremendous delight of those who supported self-reliance for Africa, the retreat of the Global North provided an opportunity for the AU/APSA to step into the vacuum.

Most of the Sustainable Development Goals were met by 2030, as increasing development on the Continent caused a reduction of poverty and inequality. Demographic growth drove economic growth and job-creation, while migration stimulated economic development through remittances. Especially a number of African ‘lion economies’ underwent rapid economic development. Given that Africa was hardest hit by climate change, Africa’s new leaders often pursued and collaborated on sustainable development in the hope that they could combine development with energy transition. Some, for example, benefitted from solar-energy generation, which gave Africa more economic autonomy. African countries also benefited from the 2030 UN reform, as their leaders acted collectively to obtain a permanent African seat on the Security Council. As such, Africa gained a greater say in global and particularly African security.

**APSA in 2040**

Since the successful AU reform, the organisational culture at the AU and its technocrats has been efficient, proactive and attuned to Africa’s shared values and principles. With the integration of APSA and AGA, the latter have been placed on a more central stage, with legal instruments and institutions being added and combined. A relevant majority of AU Member States generally domesticate and comply with protocols and instruments on governance, human rights and standards of membership. Member States are also proactive in living up to their non-indifference principle, leaving less space for rule-breakers to commit war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Member States hold each other accountable on the basis of the AU’s new mission: ‘Choice, Opportunity and Dignity.’

APSGA is also a reasonably coherent, consistent and effective collective security system. A continental layer adding to, not substituting, national sovereignty and legislative powers. PSC decision-making is reasonably pro-active, efficient, consensual, coordinated and timely, and as Member States increasingly buy in, implementation of decisions has significantly improved. In addition to this continental level, APSGA has three more levels of mechanisms: regional, national and local. The institutional relationship between the AU at the central level and the RECs/RMs at the regional level works smoothly and effectively, as the RECs/RMs cooperate within the framework of APSGA. While the capabilities and effectiveness of the different RECs/RMs still vary, those that were weak 20 years ago have made great progress and are catching up. The ASF is fully operational and has been used several times. The AU and RECs/RMs have joint analysis, planning and evaluation processes. Depending on their comparative advantages, the RECs/RMs or the AU are used as the vehicle for African involvement. This coordination and division of labour is further supported by improved lines of communication between the AU, RECs/RMs and Member States.

Although the system is state-centred and ownership lies with the Member States, the public is aware of the AU, APSGA, and their instruments, and engages actively with them. There is a lively public debate and the legitimacy of APSGA among the public has increased, as it is perceived to be effective. One of the topics of discussions is how to increase public participation and democratic oversight. Talks are ongoing about directly electing the PAP and providing it with some legislative powers to keep the AU Commission in check. The PAP could then also ensure financial oversight of the organisation.

In order to deal with the increased structural pressures on peace and security on the Continent, e.g. resulting from demographics and environmental degradation, APSGA mechanisms aimed at early warning, prevention and mitigation of conflict have become more prominent and effective. Situations in Member States are frequently debated by the AU Assembly on the basis of their regular reports on governance. APSGA has also established a disaster-management capability that deals with non-traditional security challenges—e.g. natural disasters and pandemics—and developed strong cyber capabilities. Consequently, these stress factors and their effects are often dealt with earlier on and in non-violent manners. However, robust mechanisms for humanitarian response in order to mitigate once prevention has failed remain relevant as well.

The success of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has contributed a good deal to Africa’s increased confidence. It made great progress in leveraging technology to improve trade and integration. Thanks to the AfCFTA, the volume of intra-African trade grew from 16.6 per cent of all African trade in 2017 to 56 per cent in 2040. The resulting increased importance of the Continent to the global economy means Africa’s partners have a great interest in guaranteeing peace and security on the Continent. At the same time, it has sharpened Africa’s awareness that the Continent can take its destiny into its own hands, and it is no longer dependent on external actors in its actions. The AU therefore has a position of equality in all its strong partnerships with the UN, EU, China, India and Russia, as well as with non-state actors.

APSGA is a global example of a well-functioning collective security system, setting standards for other regions. There are, however, also great challenges facing APSGA. African security is a global responsibility, and therefore international partners still contribute ten percent to the overall budget. This is a great

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achievement, as APSGA’s greater financial self-reliance gives it more independence. However, AU Member States struggle to raise sufficient funds to replace external funding. APSGA is predominantly financed through levies and voluntary contributions to the Sovereign Trust Fund for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, as well as a Pan-African Peoples Peace Fund to which citizens and the private sector donate. More funding is required for APSGA to maintain its broad approach and continue its many efforts and responsibility in the field of peace, security and governance. As APSGA currently faces overstretch, AU Member States have decided it requires greater focus, and talks are ongoing on how to achieve this.

**Peace and Security in Africa 2040**

APSGA is more effective in dealing with challenges such as authoritarianism, “warlordism”, transnational organised crime, cyber security, violent extremism, natural disasters and pandemics, and as a result governance, peace and security on the Continent are improving. Although national interests and armed conflicts over resources and their allocation still exist, and population growth, urbanisation and environmental degradation exert tremendous pressure on systems, governments realise that striving for collective security often reinforces their national or group interests. In addition, many of the challenges governments face are regional or even inter-regional in character, calling for international solutions.

In turn, the increased continental stability and improved accountability and transparency of governments have contributed to flourishing economies and improved livelihoods. Obviously criminal and terrorist networks do not stand by idly, either, but with the strengthening culture of peace and social justice in tandem with decreasing inequality, social and local resilience has strengthened. The donor industry of the past is less pronounced, as Africa is better able to sustain its own growth. At the same time, although the number and intensity of conflicts has often decreased, experience with democracy in several countries is still mixed, and social unrest is on the rise as an outlet for frustration.
SCENARIO 3: SANCTUARY IN THE SKY
A future history

Until mid-2020s, great progress was made on AU reform. The Continent managed to weather the COVID-19 pandemic reasonably well. As a result, the AU and RECs/RMs started to address many non-traditional security challenges and vulnerabilities head on, particularly in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel regions, and took upon itself greater conflict-prevention responsibilities. However, in 2029, under different leadership, the AU reforms lost traction. In that same year, the PSC became paralysed over its response to the coup d’état in a major country. The different views and the toxic debates on the way forward after this clear violation of APSA norms crippled the organisation’s decision-making effectiveness. In addition, with all the new tasks, APSA became overstretched and instrumentalised by external actors and Member States. This contributed to Member States’ growing avoidance of AU-level solutions. In addition, many African leaders became more focused on their individual self-interest and that of their identity group. They preferred to play down accountability and minimise foreign ‘interference’ in any country, as it might come back to haunt them someday. With the shift away from ‘traditional’ donors who had emphasised the need for African leaders to follow a normative approach towards much more pragmatic ‘new’ donors, norms and practices such as liberal peace, human rights, elections and non-indifference became increasingly ignored. Autocrats were more and more able to play the ‘sovereignty card’. During the early 2030s this trend continued and intensified in some regions and at the AU level. As a result, by the mid-2030s, although on paper APSA was still driven by non- indifference, in practice, with the exception of some regions, leaders in large parts of Africa had rolled back this norm to non-interference.

Running counter to these trends, Member States in other ‘more progressive’ regions were increasingly fed up with paralysis at the level of the AU and turned to their REC/RM to confront challenges. For example, in 2032, following a coup d’état in another country, the REC of which this country was a Member State made a statement by taking forceful action against the military putchists, at the same time ruling out AU involvement to avoid getting bogged down in discussions. Driven by civil society action, some ‘progressive’ RECs/RMs invested particularly in conflict-prevention efforts, which because of societal involvement started to pay off in these regions. Following the example of the global campaign against the LRA, civil society organisations also campaigned for immediate global action to end the human suffering as a result of violent extremism in the Sahel and West African regions, particularly Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Boko Haram.

APSA in 2040

On paper and at a rhetorical level APSA is nearly perfect. It is a multilateral system, with coherent and codified values and principles for the whole Continent. In the AU reform, the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC Protocol and the African Charter
on Democracy, Elections and Governance have been further expanded on. Improvements in the representativeness of the PSC and the role of civil society have also been registered. What is on paper and what is put into practice differ greatly, however. Often there is only a limited political will among Member States to cooperate in the area of security, and continental cooperation is further complicated by the fact that different regions face different challenges and therefore require different solutions. As a consequence, although the PSC has been restructured and now represents the Continent more equitably, in practice its clout is limited. Its decision-making processes are circumvented through unilateral or ad hoc decision-making, and non-implementation of PSC decisions is the norm. As compliance mechanisms are generally not followed up, APSA’s shared values have also become an empty shell. The domestication and implementation of AU instruments on governance, human rights and other issues have often been abandoned.

In general, Member States have more interest in regional cooperation, but they often prefer to have the RECs/RMs focus on economic and monetary affairs before security cooperation. Moreover, there is great variance between the strength, efficiency and effectiveness of the different RECs/RMs.

In some regions, however, Member States and in particular the most powerful ones do indeed have an interest in regional security cooperation. They attach greater value to a strong REC/RM, but prefer to keep the AU at a distance. As such, these RECs/RMs are leading an equal partnership and subsidiarity works for them, as the power balance has clearly shifted and the EU has accepted its more subordinate role. This in turn has allowed the working relationship between the AU Commission and these RECs/RMs to improve. REC/RM activities are implemented hand in hand with civil society.

In regions where there is no political will to move forward, neither through the AU nor through the RECs/RMs, the predominant modus operandi is non-action. If Member States feel forced to act, they prefer to forum shop. They favour multilateral forums or club governance—comparable to the Shangri-La dialogues—to ensure that the decision-making process to act is unilateral and with the fewest strings attached. As these forums are outside APSA, there is a disconnect between Member States in these regions, their RECs/RMs and the AU. This further complicates interregional cooperation at the AU level, which therefore only takes place very occasionally.

At the same time, with the operationalisation of the Livingstone Formula and the Maseru Conclusions as part of the 2020s AU reforms, civil society, including youth and women, traditional leaders, diaspora and the private sector, have gained influence in APSA. The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) has become more relevant and civil society representatives support PSC decision-making processes and are invited to meetings. However, while civil society may be important at the central level, given the little influence still wielded by the PSC, it is not very effective. In fact, Member States pay no heed to it, as all relevant decisions are taken outside the (continental) APSA framework.

Member States in some regions have further built on the realisation that there are no military solutions to many of the non-traditional security challenges they face and that there is a need for soft tools to strengthen resilience of local societies. Such progressive RECs/RMs have continued to open up to civil society and have given civil society actors real and effective roles, allowing them to some extent political space to influence decision-makers. In addition, in these RECs/RMs civil society is playing a stronger role at the local level. In other regions as well, civil society has been achieving more at the local level, where it has claimed space vacated by the state. At the local level, civil society views are afforded more attention, with this perspective often being taken into account in the execution of activities, such as political dialogues, mediation, conflict-prevention and supporting peace infrastructures. Additionally, the private sector fills in gaps by supporting peace and security with communication technology, financing and building infrastructures.

Similarly, while APSA along with AU reforms have improved citizen engagement and accountability feedback mechanisms, in practise these are not very relevant. Ordinary citizens perceive APSA as irrelevant to their needs, because compliance with, and implementation of, policies and decision are on a limited scale. Also, discussions at the AU level and most RECs/RMs are detached from the public debate. Apart from popular support for the strong RECs/RMs, public trust and confidence in the architecture is at a low level.

In this changing political environment, the AU Commission has taken a pragmatic approach to African peace and security, as it has mainstreamed low-key direct and structural conflict-prevention approaches to quietly work toward peace and security outside the spotlights. When a country plays the sovereignty card to avoid having to discuss root causes, the AU Commission continues the discussion by taking up gender and other issues.

All partnerships with the UN, the EU and other international organisations are still in place, but they are not often utilised, in part as most aspects of APSA have lost legitimacy with donors. The multiplicity of different RECs/RMs and other forums are deemed too complex and confusing, and donors demand streamlining. Donors, together with Member States, still fund the costs of APSA primarily at the continental level, but this budget is limited. Stronger RECs/RMs have larger budgets, but these are mostly covered by Member States.

The constrained external funding for APSA does not mean that external actors are not involved in funding African peace and security activities. France and the US, for example, remain very active, but particularly China has become more energetic and assertive. However, these actors mainly fund and instrumentise activities that are in their own, narrowly defined interests, and they focus on the security-development nexus. Moreover, non-action of the AU and many of the RECs/RMs has offered space to a variety of external actors to undertake activities that are not based on shared interests, but that increase their own influence and gains.
Peace and Security in Africa 2040

The effects of the lack of political will by Member States to use APSA differs on the Continent, depending on the strength and progressiveness of the REC/RM.

In some regions, such as West Africa, the REC/RM is strong and civil society ensures checks and balances in the system. There, with more preventive and efficient mediation, conflicts have less opportunity to erupt and spread. Consequently, peace and security are improving, and economic growth is proceeding due to growing regional integration.

In other regions, RECs/RMs are weaker, or autocrats are not kept in check. There corruption is persistent, and leaders primarily attend to their own interests. Moreover, with weak international scrutiny on human rights and in the absence of an effective continental APSA or other forms of intervention, governments have more or less a free hand in how they treat their populations. Repression is the main form of conflict management. In a number of countries where government has been captured by a particular identity group, this power has been used to suppress other groups. In a few cases this has even led to what might be considered genocide.

These failures to prevent deleterious developments have produced ambiguity in Africa when it comes to the importance of previously shared values, such as human rights. With a continental level too weak to contain violence, conflicts relapse and spill over into other areas. There is an ongoing structural vulnerability of peace and security in many parts of Africa. Violent extremist groups have benefitted from this, as they thrive on the grievances of repressed groups and the lack of international cooperation. This also creates space for external actors to take up activities in their own interests. At times they undertake bilateral or unilateral military interventions in support of or to undermine African governments, at others they take the lead in, for example, mediation processes.
SCENARIO 4: ABANDONED VILLAGE

THE ABANDONED VILLAGE
A future history

The crisis of multilateralism that was already discernible in the 2010s continued and intensified during the 2020s. The COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting economic crisis just put another spanner in the works of international collaboration. Slowly the global system turned increasingly multipolar, replete with geopolitical competition. African leaders were no different from most leaders elsewhere in the world. They were not able to inspire their populations, and rather than showing signs of visionary leadership, they focused on their individual and national interests. In order to gain or maintain support, leaders often exploited nationalist sentiments.

Particularly the most capable countries remained inward-looking, unwilling or unable to support countries in their regions beyond the minimum required in their national interests. Some North African countries, for example, in effect withdrew from APSA as they became overstretched when already facing growing internal security pressures, unable as they were to handle the greatly increased influx of migrants. Yet, the challenges the African Continent faced as a whole were formidable and transnational or even transregional in their scale. Demographic growth continued to outpace economic growth by far, meaning that on the whole poverty increased. Climate change and a lack of inclusivity added to a toxic mix that proved fertile ground for violent extremists and organised crime. Large parts of the young population felt no commitment to their nations, were susceptible to radicalisation, and joined the ranks of violent extremists. Their networks were able to grow increasingly trans-regional, even continental. As a consequence, state fragility increased even where states had previously been relatively strong.

The impact was dramatic. A conflict between two major African countries was a first key blow to African unity and multilateralism, as it degenerated into a full-blown war in 2025. Different AU Member States chose different sides, leading to increasing inter-state tensions on the Continent. In addition, the conflict attracted external involvement, with the great powers taking different sides. A second blow was some countries imploding or splintering into different new states, at times destabilising entire regions.

Despite the resulting chaos, a minority of countries still remained relatively stable and showed resilience. Nonetheless, in the absence of strong actors championing the AU and APSA, the African integration agenda evaporated completely. The AfCFTA was never implemented and for all effective purposes intra-continental trade collapsed.

APSA in 2040

Although APSA still exists, the core of what is left is on life-support from a few idealistic governments and a number of NGOs. AU Member States are unable to generate sufficient funding, but also external actors lost interest in supporting an obsolete architecture. The PSC is weak and while it does meet
at times, it struggles to find a consensus to frame joint statements on most issues and the most important topics do not even make it onto the agenda. The AU is weak and only some RECs/RMs are still to some extent functional. The others are rendered powerless, as their Member States have gone different directions due to conflicting interests, goals and aspirations. A limited number of countries have sought and received ‘refuge’ by becoming a member of a ‘functional’ REC/RMs. Member States do not cooperate or coordinate in a structured manner at the continental level, there is little alignment between the AU and the RECs/RMs, and the practices of the RECs/RMs are inconsistent. As the continuation of APSA is not driven by any institution or member state, either, the Architecture is rarely used and has become redundant.

African governments have become preoccupied with their own stability, meaning that they do not feel they are in the position to help others. Governments frequently hide behind the principle of non-interference, which has gained in importance, as non-indifference would also subject them to the scrutiny of others. When stronger states take matters into their own hands—and they frequently do—they often violate international norms if need be to protect their own interests. Such interventions are generally unilateral and without supervision or coordination, but loose opportunistic ad hoc coalitions are also resorted to when interests overlap. Only in some regions is the cover of the RECs/RMs or APSA instrumentalised to provide a cloak of legitimacy, when Member States have a rare moment of convergence. However, faced with an onslaught of challenges that they have to deal with on their own, even the strongest of states find themselves overwhelmed.

External support for unilateral interventions or at times ad hoc coalitions is conditional. If non-African governments provide bilateral assistance or funding, they do so only when it allows them to gain influence or for other geopolitical reasons. Consequently, a number of countries have effectively become ‘vassals’ to their external ‘hegemon’ and are even drawn into proxy wars for external actors competing for economic resources and global political influence. The share of funding accounted for by traditional donors has decreased and has been replaced by China, Russia and the Gulf countries. Like some ‘traditional’ donors, these ‘new’ donors try to manipulate interventions in and outside this defunct APSA in pursuit of their national interests. Countries like France, Russia and the US themselves also unilaterally intervene militarily to protect their own interests. The securitisation and militarisation of national politics, migration, and development on the Continent means that little attention is afforded by external actors to actual development, governance and human rights. The political marketplace rules.

Peace and Security in Africa 2040

What remains of APSA is not able to deal with the challenges. In the absence of a functioning collective security system in Africa, security and rule of law on the Continent have deteriorated. Sustainable peace is further away than ever. Structural instability is omnipresent, and the number of protracted conflicts has increased. The Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes, the Lake Chad and the Sahel-Saharan regions have become structural, inter-locking, inter-regional and long-term conflict systems.

In some countries, elites hijack political institutions for their own private purposes. In these places, governments have become more authoritarian, adept at exploiting populations, repressing dissent and leaving peripheral areas to their own devices. Such governments often rely on private military companies—hybrids between state and mercenary armies. In other places on the Continent, state authority has crumbled altogether, with sub-state units or self-help determining what characterises security at the local level: militias and self-defence groups. Private military contractors help warlords live off natural resources and carve out fiefdoms. Human rights do not fare well, as warlords do not attach any value to such things, while the increasing use and presence of local militia has led to the spread of inter-communal violence and gross violations of human rights.

In the absence of international cooperation and structural collective security measures, illegitimate transnational actors—e.g. violent extremist and transnational organised criminal organisations and syndicates—make use of the abundant opportunities to evade state control. They exploit the near absence of border management, allowing illegal cross-border trafficking and other activities to flourish. They have also outpaced African governments in their use of (information) technology, permitting them to funnel funds, communicate and do harm with only limited repercussions for themselves. In large parts of the Sahel-Saharan region terrorists have effectively established their own de facto states. Governments and communities seek answers in militarisation, while in lieu of international cooperation, environmental degradation and diseases become additional challenges. Whole societies lose their resilience as social cohesion declines. Populations take flight into radicalisation and civil unrest. In the worst cases, the result is despondence and loss of hope for a better future. As a result, economic development and continental trade have suffered dramatically.

This state of insecurity, absence of rule of law and all the consequences associated with it has led to dramatic humanitarian crises and frequent flight to safer areas on the Continent, to Europe and the Gulf region. Countries on the Mediterranean and Red Sea feel the pressure of migrants transiting or getting stuck in camps. At the same time, conflict and instability have also spilled over into previously stable regions, such as in southern Africa. The Continent has seen a massive influx of weapons. These include large numbers of mini drones that have changed the nature of the African battlefield dramatically, but also social media has a great impact in triggering outrage and generating support.

In the meantime, external actors have not been idly biding their time, either. External interference on the Continent is frequent and intensive. The EU and Gulf states have put up a maritime wall to keep migrants out. In addition, global geopolitics have a great impact on the Continent. As African unity
and stability have decreased, this has offered space for what some refer to as the ‘new scramble for Africa.’ Large parts of Africa have been carved up into zones of influence by China, France, the Gulf countries, Russia, Turkey, the UK and the US. These actors are not concerned with the suffering of African peoples. They focus on their own self-interest: keeping refugees and ‘terrorists’ out, managing instability and maintaining access to resources. Some stronger African states are taking part in this ‘scramble’ and have carved out their own sphere of influence.

There is, however, a countertext. As Africa is rapidly aging, young people are critical of how their parents have abandoned the Continent to external actors. They push for African political and security cooperation, Pan-Africanism and Africa First. In response to their demands, the debate over how to revive, reform and reinvent African institutions has resumed.
CONCLUSIONS

The four scenarios described above are intended to provide a picture of how the APSA might look like in 2040 in the four quadrants of the scenario grid (see figure 2) given two key uncertainties:

1) Will AU Member States have the political will to fully implement APSA or not?
2) Will APSA be adapted to the challenges on the Continent or not?

The scenarios show that, at a time of increasing interregional non-traditional security challenges in Africa—e.g. violent extremism and terrorism, transnational organised crime, environmental degradation and climate change, irregular migration and pandemics—, threatened multilateralism and budget pressures, APSA finds itself at a crossroads. Regardless of how the COVID-19 pandemic affects Africa, in the period leading up to 2040, the Continent faces formidable challenges, while there are also great opportunities to capitalise on—ranging from Africa’s riches, its populations, civil society to technology. These scenarios underline the strategic importance of a well-functioning APSA. They make a strong point for adapting APSA to the new realities instead of creating new arrangements. They show that, if modified and shaped responsibly, APSA has the potential to function as a full-fledged collective security system that contributes significantly to the development of African peace and security in 2040. What the future ultimately look like depends to a large extent on how AU Member States and their international partners deal with the following questions:

- How can the Continent best cope with non-traditional security challenges that do not stick to national boundaries, tend to become increasingly trans-regional and cannot be solved without international cooperation? How can we move from short-term symptom-focused policies to long-term root-cause-oriented approaches? Should ASF concepts and composition be adjusted?
- How can APSA gain more legitimacy? How can APSA contribute to more legitimate solutions to conflicts: through inclusive processes, through more ‘presence on the ground’, or by producing solutions which are consistent with the norms enshrined in the ACDEG and AGA?
- In a global crisis of multilateralism, what is the most effective relationship between APSA at the central level and the RECs and RMs at the regional level, and the UN at the global level? What is the best division of labour, how can interoperability be improved, and which instruments work best at what institutional level?
- How can the positive role of civil society organisations and the private sector best be maximised within APSA? How can the Livingstone Formula (2008) for interaction between the PSC and civil society organisations in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa, as well as the Maseru Conclusions (2014) on the enhancement of its implementation best be operationalised and applied?
- How can funding obstacles to, and donor dependency of, APSA best be overcome, and funding and workings of the architecture be maintained?
- How can operationalisation of existing APSA pillars, such as the ASF, the Peace Fund, and the Continental Early Warning Systems and RECs/RMs' early warning systems best be stimulated?
- How can AU-shared norms and values, particularly their implementation, be placed on a more solid footing to prevent potential future backsliding? Through which mechanisms can Member States stimulate each other to be the best versions of themselves? How can existing compliance mechanisms (for instance, with regard to the ACDEG and the African Peer Review Mechanism, APRM) be fully utilised?
- How can African governments remain ahead of the technology curve in their efforts to deal with international organised criminal networks and other illicit groups.

There are often very different preferences and answers to these questions, and many require further debate, but the choices policymakers eventually make will determine the future of the continental peace and security landscape.
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About this publication

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of the African Union (AU) is facing an uncertain future. Traditional security threats in Africa are intensifying and new challenges arise. At the same time, the external environment is changing rapidly, an unprecedented crisis of multilateralism is evolving while new state and non-state actors have appeared on the stage. In this context, the reform process of the AU and especially of APSA is of strategic importance for Africa to safeguard peace and the security on the continent in the long run.

Against this background, crucial questions to the functioning of APSA need to be answered: How to adapt APSA to new security threats? Which actors need to be involved in decision-making and implementation? How to increase the cooperation and coordination between regional, continental, and global bodies in the field of peace and security?

To tackle these questions, 35 leading African decision-makers, practitioners, academics, and civil society representatives designed four distinctive scenarios of the APSA in 2040 to explore alternative futures for collective security in Africa. This process is highlighting policy implications of decisions taken today and their consequences in the years to come.

About FES

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has been promoting the values of Social Democracy in Africa for over 40 years. We work for social justice, democracy, peace and international solidarity on the continent. It has encouraged and nurtured political exchange between Africa, Germany and Europe for many years, acting as partner to regional and continental organisations, political parties, trade unions, civil society groups and the interested public.

In joint programs with our partners, we strive to enable and strengthen social and democratic political participation. Together with young people, we develop ideas for shaping a better future. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung contributes to the dialogue on peace and security, migration and processes of economic transformation. We act towards strengthening the representation of workers’ interests by means of political education and international networking.

We can only confront global challenges such as climate change, illicit financial flows or migration by acting jointly with the countries of Africa. Therefore, we are committed to global partnership with the countries of Africa.

For more information on FES and the APSA Scenario process, please visit www.fes-au.org www.fes.de/en/africa-department