Gilbert M. Khadiagala

How can Democratic Peace Work in Southern Africa?
Trends and Trajectories Since the Decade of Hope

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INTRODUCTION

Peace is more than the absence of war. In its substantive and comprehensive sense, peace entails democratic governance, civic oversight over the security sector and human development. States and societies seek to achieve these objectives through building institutions that promote political participation, guarantee citizens' security, and promote just, equitable, and humane livelihoods. In the 1990s, there was tremendous optimism about southern Africa's ability to recover from years of civil wars and apartheid destabilization through democratization, security sector reforms, and human development. In more recent years, however, this optimism has given way to profound concern about growing democratic recession, the inability of States to deliver public goods, the resurgence of militarism, and growing socioeconomic inequalities. Popular protests and discontentment emerged across the region as groups contested political and economic marginalization and the lack of adequate affordable services. States have not been prepared to deal with these expressions of popular political will and have often reacted violently.

What are the factors that contributed to these reversals in the region's democratic development and social peace? How can Southern Africa recapture the momentum in the 1990s that unleashed democratic awakening? Who are the key actors and institutions that are going to play significant roles in constructing positive peace by broadening political participation, creating sound civil-military relations, and stimulating inclusive growth and development? The first section of this article examines the experiences of several countries in building democratic governance institutions throughout the

1990s, which provided the background for the widespread optimism of democratic breakthroughs in the region after the end of apartheid and racial domination. The second section examines the changes witnessed in the 2000s that led to the growing pessimism about regional democratic peace. The final section offers some thoughts on new political developments and their impacts on democratic peace in Southern Africa.

THE GOLDEN AGE OF CRAFTING DEMOCRATIC PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

In the 1990s, Southern Africa was characterized by crucial reforms as part of the political regeneration that accompanied the end of civil wars and the collapse of apartheid. Democratic governance entailed building institutions of accountability, participation, and representation to overcome the legacies of authoritarianism and militarism. Similarly, security sector reforms were popularized to denote the wide range of measures designed to hold security forces accountable to civilian institutions and create competent security forces beholden to the States rather than regimes. These reforms were critical adjuncts to democratic governance because they strengthened civilian institutions and rationalized security sector expenditures to redirect resources towards social sectors. Equally vital is the concept of human development, which refers to policy shifts meant to address questions of livelihood vulnerabilities, particularly poverty, inequalities, and social marginality. Thus, for the region, building peace was closely connected to popular participation, security sector reforms, and fostering human

development. Determination to expand political space, enshrine human rights, and economic prosperity were considered the driving forces behind dignity and liberation that Southern Africa yearned for three decades after the initial liberation from the fetters of colonialism. Moreover, the conviction that regional civil conflicts had arisen from bad governance, political intolerance, and social marginalization gave more credence to the importance of political renewal that informed the transformations. Civic actors and social movements were the major actors that drove these processes and provided the organizational impetus for change. Contrary to the past, these actors were also inspired by the belief that democratization of the State required vigilant civic action. Alongside social movements and civil society were emergent political parties that served as the agents of participation. In addition to the rise of civil society, the legalization of new political parties in most countries of the region symbolized the fresh stirrings for change. International actors were also key players in the democratic renewal, providing pressures that prodded recalcitrant regimes to allow political pluralism. With regard to security sector reforms and human development, the role of donors was equally pertinent to jumpstart these processes by furnishing resources.

Democratic Governance for Peace in the 1990s

The global demise of the Cold War coincided with end of white minority regimes and civil conflicts in Southern Africa. In the majority of these countries, these events offered solid grounds for important political changes that reversed the postcolonial decades of authoritarian regimes and ushered in the era of competitive politics, periodic elections, and

the expansion of civil liberties. Fortuitously, the decolonization of **Namibia** in April 1990 permitted the emergence of a democratic State with a model constitution that was lauded for ensuring basic freedoms and respect for human rights. The Namibian transition signified that pluralism was indispensable to political renewal as the new State sought to overcome years of colonial racism. From the outset, the broad trends in regional democratic governance encompassed the expansion of pluralism, the rotation of leaders, the ascendance of new political parties, and growing tolerance for social pluralism. Despite the liberation legacy of strong and dominant political parties, the expansion of pluralism witnessed significant shifts in leadership in some of the region's countries. Unlike other parts of Africa, Southern Africa has a long legacy of liberation movements led by strong individuals. In the era of democratization, one of the key tests of change in these countries was whether the dominant parties would countenance opposition forces, particularly those that did not participate in liberation struggles or, as in Namibia and Mozambique, those parties that had allied with the oppressive white regimes (Kadima & Booysen, eds., 2009).

After Namibia, **Zambia** led the regional democratization wave when Fredrick Chiluba's Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) defeated Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP) in the 1991 elections. Zambia's transition initiated the era in which civil society organizations, notably organised labour, mounted pressure for democratic rule, a trend that came to dominate the rest of the region. Through various leaders, the MMD dominated Zambian politics for almost twenty years before it was ousted in 2011. **Malawi** underwent its democratic transition in 1994, which saw the long-serving leader Kamuzu Banda deposed and

the inauguration of a multiparty dispensation. Banda's demise was important because he had been one of the most unapologetic supporters of white minority regimes in the region. In his first act as President, Bakili Muluzi released political prisoners and permitted freedom of the press, signalling the close of the era of dictatorships (Chihana et al., 2008; Chirambo, 2009; Kabemba, ed., 2004).

South Africa witnessed the most extensive changes that symbolized political triumph for the entire region. With the first democratic elections in 1994, South Africa continued on the journey that had begun with Nelson Mandela's release in February 1990 and the sanction of opposition parties. Although the 1990-1994 period was marked by violence and tensions, negotiations for democratic order yielded remarkable compromises that led to a non-racial constitution. With the African National Congress (ANC) assuming power, there was widespread optimism for political and economic transformations in South Africa and the region. Similarly, in the early 1990s, **Mozambique** emerged after a bitter civil war with a constitution that allowed for multiple parties within its framework for liberal democracy. In the 1994 elections, the ruling party, FRELIMO (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*), retained power while its opponent, RENAMO (*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*), obtained a good number of parliamentary seats and municipalities. Throughout the decade, consistent with the strong legacy of liberation movements in Southern Africa, FRELIMO was able to prevail in all elections, even though new opposition parties emerged.

Botswana, Southern Africa's longest continuous multiparty democracy, entered the 1990s with its exemplary record of adherence to human rights, freedom of speech, rule of law, and competent government. Despite the existence of many political parties, Botswana continued to be dominated by the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), in power since independence in 1966 (Maundeni, ed., 2005). The power rotation that sees new leaders every ten years places this dominance in check. In 1997, approved constitutional amendments limited the presidency to two five-year terms. Similarly, **Mauritius** commenced the decade with a strong democratic tradition underwritten by a constitutional framework, a transparent electoral process, and credible electoral management body. All the Mauritian elections in the 1990s were characterized by coalition and alliance building among the three major political parties (Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa [EISA], 2008).

At the other end of the Southern African democratic governance spectrum was Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe, who made slow progress in promoting popular participation and legitimacy. Throughout the 1990s, Angola and the DRC suffered civil wars that frayed State institutions, economic infrastructure, and led to large-scale humanitarian emergencies. These wars consumed the energy of regional and international actors who attempted to negotiate settlements in relentless diplomatic forays. In **Angola**, efforts by South Africa and the United Nations to mediate between the MPLA (*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*) and UNITA (*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*) failed as both sides exploited the country's rich resources to fuel the civil war, which only ended in February 2002 with the death of UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi. Although the Angolan government reached out to some elements of UNITA in the post-conflict phase, MPLA was reluctant

to fully embrace pluralism and promote civil liberties. In regard to the **DRC**, its civil war started in the mid-1990s following the collapse of the dictatorial regime of President Mobutu Sese Seko. After it was admitted into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1997, the government of President Laurent Kabila was rescued from defeat by the military intervention of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe subsequent to the invasion of Rwanda and Uganda. Diplomatic efforts led by South Africa helped end foreign intervention in the DRC and resulted in a mediated settlement in December 2002 that launched the transition to peace and stability (Brito, 2009; Tshiyoyo & Kadima, 2009).

Madagascar established a multiparty democratic system in the early 1990s, but subsequently, the country's political situation was characterized by significant democratic reversals, unconstitutional changes of government, and political violence. Major political cleavages were sparked by the highly-contested December 2001 elections set the stage for further political turbulence in the 2000s. Similarly, despite **Lesotho**'s democratic breakthrough, severe disagreements amongst the elite and military involvement in politics contributed to violence and unconstitutional government changes (Ploch & Cook, 2012). To address these instances of instability, SADC intervened in 1994 and 1998 to restore constitutional order and initiate broad institutional reforms to pre-empt the resurgence of violence. Swaziland and Zimbabwe bucked the region's trend towards democratization. **Swaziland** clings to the monarchical system that has remained relatively unchanged for decades. In **Zimbabwe**, the 1990s started with profound political promise exhibited by the Commonwealth's adoption of the Harare Declaration in 1991, reaffirming the promotion of peace, security, democracy, individual

freedom and equal rights for all. But, in the midst of severe economic dislocations and political intolerance, a new opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) emerged in 1999 to resist the hegemony of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). The MDC's defeat of President Robert Mugabe's bid to change the constitution through a referendum in February 2000 marked the beginning of political turbulence, violence, economic and social deterioration (Booysen & Toulou, 2009; Makumbe, 2009).

Security Sector Reforms for Peace in the 1990s

Since the popularization of security sector reforms (SSR) in the 1990s, the depth and quality of these reforms have been contingent on participatory and representative institutions, broadening the notion of security, and the involvement of non-state actors in security. At its core, SSR has five basic principles of interrelated activities: 1) democratic control and oversight of security services by parliaments and civil society actors; 2) inclusive, non-partisanship and a flexible, transparent, long-term process; 3) effective and accountable security forces that are loyal to the State and its citizens, not to particular regimes; 4) close links between the delivery of security and justice; and 5) local ownership of the reform process. Among the SSR's core activities are demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR); reforms in public sector institutions responsible for internal and external security; and strengthening of civilian institutions charged with the oversight, management, and control of security institutions (Bryden, 2007; Hendricks & Musavengana, 2010; Stanley, 2008).

With the democratization trend and the end of armed conflicts, Southern African States prioritized SSR because it was important to combine democratic governance with the frequently difficult decisions on security forces reform. Some elite groups were also interested in security services that responded to their needs. Donors played disproportionate roles in SSR, postulating reforms as mechanisms to support the use of resources to promote development and poverty reduction. From the outset, the uneven nature of regional democratization reflected the disparity in SSR implementation. Zimbabwe and Namibia provided the formative DDR models the post-liberation phase, reconciling the competing cultures and interests of former opposition armed forces into national armies. In both instances, the British military provided most of the integration expertise of disparate forces into cohesive national armies. In the **Zimbabwean** case, DDR entailed the merger of Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) into a newly-trained force of Zimbabwe National Forces (ZNF) of about 45,000 troop, transforming most of the guerrilla forces into reservists (Hendricks & Musavengana, eds., 2010, p.147-174).

In **Namibia**, the process of integrating the South African apartheid security structure (e.g. the South West African Territorial Force [SWATF], the South West African People's Organisation [SWAPO] army, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia [PLAN] into a Namibian Defence Force [NDF]) presented initial difficulties because of cultural, linguistic, and organizational differences. Military assistance provided by Britain included force integration planning, training, and the reinforcement of principles of civilian supremacy. The Defence Force Act of 1990 delineated the institutional roles of a civilian-led Ministry of Defence with

a professional, politically neutral army. In the end, this compromise assisted in solidifying a new and cohesive Namibian identity within the defence forces. Most of the former combatants that benefitted from the DDR obtained jobs in the public sector (Knight, 2009).

South Africa pioneered security sector reforms that went beyond the narrowness of DDR to strengthen civilian oversight of institutions and nurture participatory and inclusive security sector transformation. In a sharp contrast from the apartheid legacy where security services were major instruments of repression, the Mandela administration transformed them into vehicles to promote national and human security. In a lengthy process that started in 1994 and culminated in the 2002 Defence Act, South Africa emphasized a transparent and participatory process of downsizing security services, integrating former foes into a new South African National Defence Force (SANDF), and empowering oversight from civilian institutions (Hendricks & Musavengana, eds., 2010, pp. 117-144). With regard to DDR, South Africa opted for compulsory programmes to upgrade the skills and expertise of the ANC's military forces so that they could serve effectively in the SANDF. Although white officers from the South African Defence Force (SADF) continued to occupy senior staff position in the SANDF, most of them retired in 1998, permitting newly-trained ANC forces to be promoted and lead the security sector transformation. Generally, South Africa established a wide range of oversight mechanisms that entrenched civilian control of the security sector, most of them under the supervision of line ministries such as Defence, Police Correctional Services and the judiciary. The reforms also created systems of democratic control, accountability and professionalism to ensure that the security services could not be used to oppress the population. The 1996

Defence White Paper was developed using an inclusive process; it focused on democratic control and established a human security approach to domestic security (Bryden, 2007, pp. 14-15). South Africa's comprehensive defence review informed regional practices on SSR in cases for democratic advancement and durable peace agreements to end civil wars.

Partially to address the political crises stemming from unstable civil-military relations in the 1990s, **Lesotho** launched incremental reforms in the security services. The reforms included clear delineation of security forces in the 1993 Constitution. The same Constitution also created a civilian authority to manage the affairs of the military and ensure accountability to the people, the establishment of the Ministry of Defence in 1994 whose objective was to depoliticise the armed forces, and the enactment of the Defence Force Act in 1996 to streamline the army's role. As more conflicts involving the army erupted in the late 1990s, SADC engaged several governments in Lesotho on deepening security sector reforms that would restore healthy civilian-military relations (Hendricks & Musavengana, eds., 2010, pp. 81-97; Matlosa, 2005).

In **Mozambique**, the end of the civil war ushered in political transformation and constitutional reforms that affected the security forces. A core part of the 1992 peace agreement between FRELIMO and RENAMO was the demobilisation of both forces as a preliminary step in the creation of a new national army. Although there were delays in completing the integration, by 1995, the demobilization process had been concluded and allowed fresh conscription for a new Mozambican national defence force. Subsequently, through donor support, Mozambique embarked on other SSR components such as recruiting and training a new police force, judicial

reforms that targeted capacity-building of legal training, documentation, and judicial administration and prison reforms. Although FRELIMO continued to disproportionately influence the re-organization of the security forces, the post-war Government established a parliamentary oversight committee that was tasked with aspects of the reforms (Hendricks & Musavengana, eds., 2010, pp. 99-103; Hutton, 2010, p. 18).

Although the interface was recognized between SSR and democratic consolidation that drove policy initiatives in Southern Africa in the 1990s, only South Africa was able to institute wide-ranging institutional measures to bring this relationship into reality. Most countries in the region opted for easier forms of SSR, particularly DDR and police and defence reforms, without connecting them to broad efforts to build democratic and accountable civil-military relations. In large part, lukewarm SSR stemmed from the fact that most of the new regimes that came to power found it difficult to shed past practices of ethnicization and politicisation.

One failure of the SSR processes was that even countries that conducted DDR initiatives did not have robust reintegration schemes, which resulted in the impoverishment of former combatants, forcing many of them into criminal activities. South Africa was the exception since some demobilized soldiers joined the growing ranks of private security and mercenary forces. The other vital challenge was that despite democratization, most States promoted SSR practices that did not encompass access to justice, protect human rights and reform prisons. The regional reticence for comprehensive SSR mirrored the common dilemma of liberation movements and parties that were still beholden to militaries and security forces for their survival. Hence, in

the absence of strong opposition parties and civil society groups, the dominant ruling parties had no pressing need for security institution reforms (Hutton, 2010, pp. 1-2).

Human Development for Peace in the 1990s

Alongside SSR, human development prominently featured in Southern Africa's political and economic transformations in the 1990s because livelihoods and development were acknowledged as vital to sustainable peace and prosperity. Widespread human development advocacy in the region coincided with the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report objective that expanded security to encompass human prosperity and sustainable development. Thus, as Southern Africa was transitioning from war to peace, frontal approaches that focused on the vast issues of poverty, social marginalization, and economic inequality were recognized (Cilliers, 2004). For this reason, the notion of peace dividends was linked to democratic governance and human development. Development as the advancement of human security was tied to questions surrounding the capacity and efficacy of Governments to formulate policies that would promote inclusiveness and equity without alienating groups that had stakes in the former systems of repression, marginalization, and exclusion.

Following the end of the Cold War, ruling parties in Southern Africa that had experimented with socialism gradually adopted pragmatic policies to balance equity and growth objectives. At Independence in 1990, the **Namibian** Ruling Party SWAPO jettisoned its socialist orientation and embarked on economic management policies that attempted to confront analogous challenges inherited from apartheid: low economic growth, high poverty rates, inequitable distribution of wealth and income, and high unemployment. To meet these challenges, the Government articulated major policy frameworks throughout the 1990s that stressed efficient administrative structures to promote economic and social development. The policies mainly pivoted around revival of economic growth as the vehicle to alleviate poverty, reduce income inequalities and create employment opportunities. Additional to the overall effects of economic growth, the Government launched initiatives to address unemployment problems such as land resettlement schemes, labour intensive works programmes, and fiscal policies to reduce income disparities. During the 1990s, Namibia's economy grew at an average rate of 3.5%, allowing its Government to make inroads towards prosperity for all, particularly through the expansion of social safety nets (Melber, 2005; Wren, 1990).

Most countries in the region that had faced tremendous economic doldrums in the 1980s embarked on economic reforms that sought to conform to political liberalisation and democratic governance in the 1990s. With the decline of political and economic monopolies that had coalesced around authoritarian one-party States, the new democratic regimes tried to build new coalitions with the proliferating civic organizations. These groups advocated for programmes that would enhance development and human security by rewarding economic producers and encourage social policies to improve education, health, and infrastructure. In **Zambia**, for instance, the MMD Government inherited a stagnant economy characterized by excessive debt, high unemployment, and poverty.

To reverse this, the MMD came up with a manifesto containing a programme for radical social and economic transformation with several initiatives: liberalization of key markets, rationalization of the external debt, reorganisation and reduction of public service, privatisation of State-owned enterprises (SOEs), revitalisation of the mining sector, and reconstruction of physical infrastructure. The economic reform policies entailed selective economic disengagement of the State and creating an environment where the private sector would play a vital role in growth and development. By the early 2000s, these reforms had yielded mixed outcomes. Despite notable reductions in rural poverty and inequalities due to agricultural market reforms, there were minimal reductions in urban poverty. Regardless of the uneven results, the reforms implemented in the 1990s laid the foundation for a shift from a State-oriented to a market-based economy. Many critics, however, point to the debilitating nature of these reforms, including deepening donor dependence and decimating local capacity for independent development (Hill, 2000; McCulloch, Baulch, & Cherel-Robson, 2000).

Likewise, in the early 1990s, the **Malawian** Government embarked on economic reforms supported by World Bank structural adjustment loans and International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilisation programmes to increase fiscal discipline, public spending cuts, greater accountability and privatisation. In rural areas, where the majority of the population live, the primary focus of the economic reform programme was to redress policy bias against small farmers that was prevalent in previous decades. Consequently, the reforms resulted in significant positive increases in food production between 1994 and 2000. At the same time, there was some decline in rural inequalities because of donor programme

support for distributing fertilizers and free seed packets of high-yielding maize and legumes to small farmers (Sen & Chinkunda, 2002).

In 1994, the ANC launched **South Africa's** Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) as the post-apartheid era's blueprint, which symbolized the yearning for a new beginning. Crafted through a rigorous consultative process that involved the ANC, its alliance partners, and civil society, the RDP constituted the policy framework that would shape legislation and government policies to redress the legacies of apartheid oppression. Its key pillars were socio-economic programmes to improve the lives of all South Africans; sustainable economic growth to generate employment, human resources development, and a high degree of equity; public service institutional reform to make them more representative, effective, and efficient; and educational, scientific and cultural programmes based on non-racial, democratic principles. To attain these objectives, the RDP underscored optimum utilisation of government resources to prevent waste, duplication and mismanagement. Thus, the ANC optimistically aimed for fiscal discipline, re-organization of expenditure patterns, and planning.

Although the Mandela administration formally launched the RDP in June 1994 with a modest allocation of 2.5 billion rand (about 3% of the total national budget), both sides of the racial divide perceived it as a step towards undoing past scourges, in particular arranging clean water and proper sanitation, addressing the housing shortage, establishing a social security system, and improving the health system. But, the heightened expectations around the RDP were soon tempered by its effects on economic growth. Thus, although the RDP was considered the cornerstone of

the Government's development policy, it faced severe fiscal constraints that compromised its implementation. Faced with these constraints, in June 1996, the Government introduced a new macroeconomic policy framework called the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy to strengthen economic development, increase employment, and redistribute income. Combining most of RDP's social objectives with the renewed goal of reducing fiscal deficits, lowering inflation, and decreasing barriers to trade, GEAR envisaged that by the early 2000s, the combination of 6% economic growth and inflation at less than 10% would boost employment and provide resources to meet social investment needs (Jones & Inggs, 2003; Mohr, 2003).

Mozambique made the most spectacular economic gains in the post-civil war period, underscoring the significance of peace for growth and the quest for equity. Following the 1994 elections, the Government started a series of macroeconomic reforms designed to stabilise the economy and begin the arduous tasks of reconstruction. FRELIMO's manifesto emphasised integrating rapid growth with poverty reduction to reduce social inequalities, and regional imbalances. By the mid-1990s, Mozambique had met the targets of double-digit growth rates, low inflation and currency stability. The challenge subsequently translated the impressive performance in economic growth to poverty reduction and improved development outcomes. As part of its commitment to social investment, the Government significantly shifted resources from military spending after 1994. Thus, in the 1998 and 1999 budgets, the Government allocated more capital and recurrent expenditures to education and health than to military and intelligence services (Fauvet, 2000). Despite these achievements, some critics have pointed out that the neoliberal reforms came at a hefty

price for the Mozambican economy, notably the destruction of local industrial capacity, heightened donor dependence, and lack of economic diversification (Hanlon, 1991).

REVERSALS IN DEMOCRATIC PEACE

With the resurgence of authoritarian and populist features, political intolerance, and the shrinking of social and civic spaces in the early 2000s, the optimism surrounding democratization, security sector reforms, and human development as the authors and anchors of peace in Southern Africa began to dissipate. Also, the expectations of "second liberation" to enhance equality, dignity, and well-being for the majority evaporated in the face of worsening economic conditions in the region. Predictably, the democratic recession has been accompanied by declines in governance through the hollowing-out of State capacity, the criminalization of public institutions, and popular loss of faith in the stability of democratic institutions. Furthermore, the consensus around security sector reforms has declined in some countries with the increasing use of security forces for partisan political ends and the militarisation of politics. The consequences of these reversals have been growing popular discontent, political unrest, and further threats to democratic peace.

Broad explanations for the weaknesses in democratic governance revolve around the novelty of pluralism, the formidable problems of building participatory and competitive institutions in highly divided societies, and the continuing conflation of parties and States. Democratic governance promised to heal

ethnic, regional, and generational cleavages; however, in most countries, democratization has exacerbated these divides as political competition amounted to contests for political spoils. Similarly, the peace and development dividends that were supposed to accrue from democratic governance have remained elusive in light of declining State capacity to deliver public goods and services and the growing blight of corruption.

The closing of democratic space has coincided with the demobilisation of civic actors and social movements that were critical to the 90s reform agenda. As governments have clamped down on civil liberties and basic freedoms, social movements have encountered severe organisational difficulties. Increasingly as some regimes have utilised security forces against opposition parties and civil society actors, new protest movements, such as service delivery protests, have emerged. These protest movements have used violence to contest economic marginalization of States' inability to provide public services. Political parties that once held the promise of deepening participation have also become increasingly marginal to political processes, subject to overt political harassment and resource deprivation. While international actors remain engaged in Southern Africa, their enthusiasm for contributing to political change has somewhat diminished due to political setbacks in democratic governance, erosion of State capacity, economic mismanagement, corruption and illicit financial flows.

Democratic Governance for Peace Since the 2000s

For the majority of Southern African States, the 1990s ushered a period of political liberalism that permitted for political competition through periodic elections. But after the optimism that surrounded the democratic breakthroughs of the 1990s, Southern Africa commenced the 21st century with a mixed political record of democratization. On one hand, a minority of countries with a history of multiparty democracies and strong State institutions embarked on democratic consolidation through regular elections, leadership rotation, and strengthening of accountability and probity systems. On the other hand, the other regional trend was the continuation of authoritarian political practices in countries that had weathered the storms of democratization in the 90s. In these cases, ruling parties barely allowed opposition parties and in the worst cases, used violence and intimidation to maintain power. Between these two extremes, the majority of Southern African countries could be accurately characterised as fledgling democracies where the incremental efforts to erect participatory and representative institutions hardly changed political content and substance. These countries have struggled with the teething problems that are typical of transitional democracies: weak political parties and parliaments, strong executives, and apathetic mass political engagement.

Variations on regional democratic governance nonetheless conceal three major commonalities that have afflicted the democratisation process in the second decade. *First*, particularly in recent years, the widespread global democratic deficit has had a knock-on effect in Southern Africa, illustrated by the resurgence of populism, authoritarian impulses, and political intolerance in most of the countries. *Second*, the mass participation and high electoral turnouts that marked the 90s have dissipated with the ebb of euphoria from the transitions. Lower voter turnouts are now the norm and a major political concern because they diminish the legitimacy of

electoral processes and reduce mass vigilance, which is critical for accountability. Where the electorate is reluctant to participate in the choice of leaders, political cynicism ensues, weakening the levers of constraints and checks on the leadership. *Third*, decreased political participation levels since the early 2000s stem from the lack of meaningful improvements in peoples' livelihoods; thus, while democratization has become a regional norm, it has not translated into corresponding socioeconomic transformations. As democracy has failed to bring political participation, accountability, and economic growth, the majority have lost faith in democratization.

The minority of countries with strong patterns of democratization- Botswana, Namibia, South Africa- reveal the contrasting trends that characterize the entire region. Despite a remarkable record of stable democratic rule under the dominant BDP, **Botswana** witnessed some of the region's major political shifts in governance. Upon taking leadership of the BDP in April 2008, President Ian Khama, who has a military background, prioritized the need to consolidate democracy alongside proactive efforts to foster development, social discipline, and service delivery. Although Khama secured a second term in the 2014 elections, the BDP lost much of its core support, obtaining 32 of the 57 Parliamentary seats, the smallest majority in its history. Overall, opposition parties made vital political inroads because of President Khama's increasing authoritarianism and intolerance toward the media, civil society, and political opponents. A widely-publicized Afrobarometer survey in 2015 showed that Botswana's political system has started to display signs of stress; between 2008 and 2014, the number doubled when respondents were asked about the risks of democratic instability. Equally vital, the deterioration in Botswana's democracy under

Khama has been accompanied by accusations of corruption, mismanagement, and the abuse of governmental authority (Mosikare, 2016; Motsoeneng & Brock, 2014; Mungai, 2015). Upon leaving power in April 2008 after the expiry of his mandate, Khama left behind a much weaker democracy than the previous Botswanan leaders.

No less dramatic changes transpired in **South Africa** during the second decade since the successful transition to a multiracial democracy. Under the leadership of President Mbeki, South Africa optimistically approached the 2000s with the notion that was popularized by the African Renaissance. On the basis of its Constitution that promotes human rights and the rule of law, South Africa, through the ANC, sought to consolidate democracy by expanding political participation and legitimacy. The 2004 elections boosted the ANC's unrivalled electoral mandate and strengthened Mbeki's position in the party and Government. Nonetheless, President Mbeki's was ousted at the December 2007 party convention and the election of President Jacob Zuma in the 2009 elections signalled the emergence of deep fissures in the ANC that have since had dire repercussions on governance, leadership, and institutions. Although Zuma momentarily managed to hold factional conflicts at bay, his draconian and opaque leadership and patronage networks eroded the institutional foundations of the post-apartheid democratic experiment. The ANC's 2016 electoral loss in local government elections was a referendum on President Zuma's poor management style but also a testament to the ANC's declining legitimacy. Throughout the decimation of governance and accountability systems, the judiciary, civil society, and opposition parties have staunchly defended South African democracy. Although Zuma's departure from the ANC's leadership following the

December 2017 elections holds the potential for democratic renewal, the system he entrenched over ten years will take long to dismantle (Chipkin, 2017; Jacobs, 2010).

Of the three democracies, **Namibia** fared best, managing to retain large electoral majorities in the 2004, 2009, and 2014 elections. Despite a 2007 split in SWAPO, the party has continued to dominate political space partly because of its continued investment in infrastructure and efforts to provide free primary education. Moreover, SWAPO has had three peaceful Presidential transitions. In the 2014 transition, Hage Geingob from the minority Damara ethnic group rose to power. To consolidate his power, President Geingob established the Poverty Eradication Ministry and has campaigned on the platform of eradicating poverty by 2025, the end of his expected second term. However, beneath the democratic façade, there have been concerns about the shortcomings in democratic participation and the rule of law. For instance, SWAPO's overwhelming strength has weakened Parliamentary control of executive power, particularly in the face of small and splintered opposition parties. Furthermore, SWAPO's total dominance has blurred the lines between the State and Party, weakening accountability systems. In recent years, there have been widespread concerns about Namibia slipping into corruption (Melber, 2009; Melber, 2014).

Malawi and Zambia, the region's pioneers of democratisation, have faced enormous complications to enact stable participation rules and find leaders that can predictably transform the political systems. In **Malawi**, the second decade of democratization has led to fragmentation and volatility in the Party system; continuous splits of both ruling and opposition parties have frequently paralysed

decision-making and unleashed instability. The phase of instability started in 2002 with Parliament's defeat by then President Muluzi and the United Democratic Front (UDF) to alter the Constitution to extend the presidential mandate. The defeat polarized the ruling party in the lead-up to the 2004 elections that were won by Muluzi's chosen successor, Bingu wa Mutharika. As the new incumbent, President Mutharika launched an anti-corruption campaign against key UDF leaders, provoking Parliamentary to impeachment attempts. As a result, President Mutharika formed a new party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which he used to win power in the 2009 elections. Facing opposition from diverse sources, the Government resorted to heavy-handedness toward the media, NGOs (non-governmental organisations), and opposition forces. In a clampdown on opposition groups in July 2009, the security forces killed 20 protesters who demanded accountable governance. Following the sudden death of President Mutharika in April 2012, Vice-President Joyce Banda assumed leadership but she was defeated by Peter Mutharika, brother to the former President, in a closely fought Presidential contest in May 2014. Despite efforts by President Banda to annul the elections, public outcry dissuaded her. President Mutharika has yet to demonstrate any leadership on the many problems facing Malawi, including ethnic politics, growing poverty, and endemic corruption (Cammack, 2014; Chihana et al., 2008).

Through political persistence, **Zambia** has managed to build the foundations for a pluralistic political system, but ethnic polarization, the deaths of two Presidents, and prevalence of populist leaders has hampered the consolidation of democratic governance. MMD's era of dominance ended with the September 2011 elections when the Patriotic

Front (PF), led by President Michael Sata, emerged triumphant. Prior to Sata's victory, Zambia underwent political turbulence when opposition parties contested the 2001 and 2008 elections through legal and extra-legal means. During the MMD's rule, one of its Presidents, Levy Mwanawasa died in office in August 2008 due to ill-health. While in power, President Sata was ineffective because of poor health; he died in office in October 2014. Before his death, President Sata used violence to intimidate opposition parties, civil society, and the media. In the Presidential by-election in January 2015, the new PF leader, Edgar Lungu, defeated the MMD's Nevers Mumba and the United Party of National Development's (UPND) Hakainde Hichilema. In the lead-up to the 2016 elections, Zambia went through a difficult period, with increased incidences of electoral violence and intimidation meted out against opposition parties and their supporters. After the elections, the UPND candidate Hichilema challenged the results in the High Court, but the court did not hear the petition. Like President Sata, President Lungu has persisted in draconian colonial laws to detain opposition figures and muzzle the media and civil society organizations (The Economist, 2015; Luyando, 2017; Redvers, 2013; Sishuwa, 2017).

Southern Africa's countries that were engulfed in conflicts during the 1990s and early 2000s—Angola, the DRC, and Madagascar—have made some strides toward recovery and reconstruction; yet, the scars of war continue to weigh heavily on their attempts to build democratic governance. In **Angola**, rather than marking a new democratic beginning, the civil war's end in February 2002 emboldened the MPLA to hold onto power, postponing meaningful steps toward pluralism. Although remnants of the defeated UNITA opposition were permitted political participation, the Government placed severe constraints on UNITA as an opposition party. Exacerbating governance problems was the MPLA's reluctance to conduct democratic elections; thus, the MPLA postponed parliamentary elections scheduled for 2006 until 2008 when it obtained a landslide victory. The MPLA also won the 2012 legislative elections. Several times the MPLA reneged on holding Presidential elections until its parliamentary majority changed the Constitution in January 2009 to abolish direct Presidential elections. The new amendment gave President José Eduardo dos Santos the jurisdiction to control political, administrative, and judicial organs, thus whittling the fundamental division of power in a democratic system.

Angola's slow transition to democratic governance only began when President dos Santos chose a successor, former Defense Minister, João Lourenço, who took charge in September 2017. In spite of this change, President dos Santos guaranteed that into his retirement some of his family and patronage networks firmly remained. In addition to remaining the head of the MPLA, dos Santos passed decrees to freeze appointments of military, security and intelligence chiefs until 2025, guaranteeing that his close allies retain control of State security. President Lourenço has partially dismantled the dos Santos economic and security networks by disencumbering the dos Santos children from major government and economic positions, but it will take time for Angola to undertake a clear path to democratic governance (Cascais, 2017; Jensen, 2017).

The **DRC's** democratic transition has also proceeded in fits and starts since the end of the civil war in 2002. Through prodding from regional and international actors, the DRC's transitional government wrote a new

constitution that was approved through a national referendum in December 2005. In July 2006 the DRC held its first Presidential and legislative elections in forty years, elections that marked the beginning of the democratization process. Despite this optimism, the run-off Presidential elections in December 2006 and the flawed 2011 Presidential and legislative elections illustrated profound divisions in the DRC that have continued to cast a shadow on building democratic institutions. Under President Joseph Kabila, who has been in power since 2001, the DRC has been unable to overcome the combination of authoritarianism and a weak State that have characterized most of its post-colonial period. Moreover, the failure to end insecurity in the Eastern Congo and the proliferation of rebellions in other parts of the country has adversely affected peace, stability, and reconciliation. As his mandated second term was coming to a close, President Kabila invoked all measures to delay the holding of elections in December 2016 amidst opposition suspicions that he was trying to amend the constitution to secure a third term. The Government repressed mass protests that contested President Kabila's foot-dragging on the elections. As a result, the Catholic Church sought to mediate a settlement that would restore order and chart a way out of the crisis. However, Kabila essentially ignored major provisions of the December 2016 agreement for an inclusive government and national elections in 2017. Instead, the electoral commission announced December 2018 as the new date for the Presidential elections. Uncertainties abound about whether the DRC will hold elections in 2018 and the first peaceful democratic transfer of power or whether, the DRC will revert to widespread violence and instability, with no elections and a continuation of the political stalemate that started in early 2015 (Burke, 2016; Shepherd, 2016; Vlassenroot & Berwouts, 2016).

Like Angola and the DRC, **Madagascar** faced turbulent times at the start of the new millennium when a political stand-off between the political elites forced the military to intervene on the side of Andre Rajoelina in March 2009. The 2009 coup and the dissolution of Parliament ignited sanctions from SADC and the African Union (AU). SADC also engaged in a relentless three-year bid to mediate the return to constitutional order, efforts that paid off when Madagascar held elections in 2013 that led Hery Rajaonarimampianina, a former Finance Minister, to become the first post-coup, democratically elected President in January 2014. In further efforts aimed at national reconciliation, the new President invited four of his Presidential predecessors, including Rajoelina and Marc Ravalomanana, to meet for talks in December 2014 supported by the SADC.

While the elections were meant to bring stability to Madagascar, a political crisis pitting the executive against the legislature emerged in May 2015, placing national reconciliation and economic reconstruction at risk. The crisis was sparked when 121 members of the 151-member National Assembly attempted to impeach President Rajaonarimampianina due to alleged incompetence. The President, however, rejected the vote, claiming that that there were not enough parliamentarians present for the vote. In June 2015, the High Constitutional Court (HCC) ruled in favour of the President. The military, a key arbiter of political conflicts, voiced its concern and warned Parliament against the attempted impeachment. Apart from the conflict between the President and Parliament, the volatile political situation was demonstrated by the fact Madagascar has had three different Prime Ministers since 2014 (IRIN, 2010; World Politics Review, ed., 2016).

Since the early 2000s, **Mozambique** commenced steps to consolidate democracy and peace, but in recent years, it has shown signs of political fragility. Building on its continued practice of power transferring within FRELIMO and tolerance of opposition parties, FRELIMO won the 2004 and 2009 under President Armando Guebuza. In both elections, opposition parties steadily lost significant votes in Parliamentary and Presidential contests because FRELIMO's strong patronage system made it difficult for opposition parties to recruit members. National and international observers criticized the 2009 election for lacking transparency, integrity, impartiality, and independence. At the same time, Mozambique experienced the rise in authoritarian tendencies under President Guebuza in which opposition parties and the media were, at times, subjected to restrictions, unlawful arrests, and intimidation (Astill-Brown & Weimer, 2010; Orre & Rønning, 2017). The consolidation of political and economic power around FRELIMO deepened opposition resentment that resulted in RENAMO's leader, Afonso Dhlakama, abrogating the 1992 peace agreement in October 2012. In reverting to armed struggle mostly in its traditional strongholds of Tete and Sofala provinces, Dhlakama demanded more representation in electoral bodies before the 2014 elections, integration of his supporters into the armed forces, and a large share of coal and natural gas revenues.

As violence escalated, President Guebuza invited Dhlakama for negotiations through international mediation. During these negotiations, the parties agreed to a ceasefire and the Government conceded to amend the electoral law to accommodate most of RENAMO's demands, preventing its boycott of the 2014 elections. Although the new FRELIMO leader, Filipe Nyusi, signalled the Government's determination to seek a permanent solution, RENAMO escalated its demands from the Government. In 2015, RENAMO proposed a constitutional amendment which would grant provincial authorities 50% of mining, gas and oil revenues. Furthermore, it demanded that the provinces in which it had obtained a majority of votes in the 2014 general elections (Sofala, Manica, Tete, Niassa, Nampula and Zambézia) be made autonomous territories under its rule. But through its majority control in the National Assembly, FRELIMO resoundingly defeated the proposed constitutional amendments in April 2015.

Subsequently, Dhlakama agreed to drop his claim on the six provinces and return to the negotiating table. End of 2016 a new structure of bilateral talks between the Dhlakama and president Nyusi resulted in working groups to come up with proposals for political dezentralization and the integration of RENAMO fighters into the security institutions. The unexpected death of Dhlakama in May 2018 plunged the talks into uncertainty, even though both sides emphasize their willingness to continue the peace process. Most commentators have suggested that the best way to end the conflict is renewed efforts to rebuild trust in the country's institutions as well as gradually moving toward decentralized structures (Buchanan, 2016; Jackson, 2013; Manning, 2015; Maschietto, 2016).

Until the military ousted President Mugabe in November 2017, **Zimbabwe** epitomised the democratic governance crisis in Southern Africa. The stormy decade started with the opposition defeating ZANU-PF's attempt to revise the constitution in order to entrench the power of President Mugabe in March 2000. This defeat precipitated widespread violence against opposition and civil society actors and invasions of white owned farms. Increasingly,

violence entrenched a de facto one-party rule that centralized power around Mugabe, ZANU-PF, and the military. In the midst of its worst economic decline, Zimbabwe held democratic elections in 2008 that the opposition claimed to have won, but ZANU-PF rejected the result and called for a Presidential run-off which the opposition boycotted because of the escalation of violence on its supporters. SADC intervened in 2008 through mediating a power-sharing agreement between the MDC and ZANU-PF. The agreement brought some political respite and the economy recovered, but it did not cause significant constitutional and electoral reforms in preparation for the 2013 elections. Therefore, after the 2013 elections that ZANU-PF won, it resorted to centralizing power, curtailing diversity of opinion, political intolerance, and violence. Mugabe's political demise occurred against the backdrop of incessant factional conflicts within ZANU-PF. The triumphant faction under the former Vice-President, Emmerson Mnangagwa, was brought to power through the military action against Mugabe and remains beholden to the military and security forces. A handful of former military members have retired to take up strategic positions in Government, a trend that has dampened the prospects for democratic governance, constitutionalism and the rule of law (Marima, 2017).

Security Sector Reforms for Peace Since the 2000s

There were limited gains in SSR in the 1990s that converged around the successful DDR processes in some countries that emerged from conflicts and the rise of South Africa as a role model in the democratic control of the security services (Dzinesa, 2007; Knight, 2009). Since the early 2000s, despite the addition of Angola, the DRC, and Madagascar

to the region's post-conflict countries, there has not been a discernible improvement in SSR initiatives. Rather, the picture is one of continued failures in building civil military relations that are conducive to democratization. There are four examples that illustrate these failures. *First*, in countries such as Angola and the DRC the end of the civil wars did not lead to either meaningful DDR or SSR initiatives. *Second*, in Lesotho and Zimbabwe, the military remains entrenched as the arbiter of political conflicts, stalling reforms that would strengthen democratic government. *Third*, there have been reversals in the previously successful DDR programmes in countries such as Mozambique. *Fourth*, some countries with previously solid records of democratization such as Botswana, South Africa, and Zambia have witnessed the progressive interference by security forces in politics, whittling down the lines that separate civilian and security institutions. The majority of Southern African countries reveal the persistence of the liberation legacy where the ruling parties have, despite democratization, retained umbilical ties with the military and other security forces as conduits to survival and legitimacy.

With UNITA's military defeat, **Angola** had a unique opportunity to embark on both a credible DDR and SSR, but the MPLA was disinclined in this regard, as such the military has remained a core part of the authoritarian equation. The priority of the Government was the demobilization and reintegration of about 105,000 UNITA ex-combatants into the Armed Forces of Angola (FAA) and about 50,000 were integrated into civilian life. This significantly increased the size of the armed forces plus many other security services such as the police, the internal information services, the directorate for information and State security, military intelligence and external intelligence. As the MPLA consolidated its power, it used high ranking appointments

in the security forces to underpin a corrosive culture of political patronage; moreover, the security services have been perennially implicated in human rights abuses. The security agencies, especially the police and intelligence in conjunction with MPLA organizational structures, have systematically suppressed dissent. In addition, with a parliament dominated entirely by the MPLA and the curtailment of civil society, there were no oversight mechanisms on defence budgets that have consumed a large proportion of the national resources (Andersen, n.d.; Porto, Alden, & Parsons, 2016).

Following the signing of major peace agreements in 2002 and 2003, with donor support, the **DRC's** national DDR programme started in 2004 with the objective of demobilizing and integration about 22 groups with an estimated number of 330,000 ex-combatants into the DRC national army (*Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo*/ FARDC). By 2009, the Government had directly integrated 20,000 in the national army and the police. Between 2004 and 2008 more than 132,000 combatants, including 30,219 children, were demobilized by the State, but only 58 % of them received re-integration support. Overall, reintegration has been less successful than other countries in the region, leading most ex-combatants to re-join the proliferating militias in Eastern Congo; in a vicious spiral, poor re-integration has engendered re-recruitment of ex-combatants because many found no alternative livelihood. Modest successes in DDR, however, have been stymied by the lack of SSR with respect to building an effective national army responsive to the civilian government. To a large extent, security sector reforms toward a professional army in the DRC have dismally failed because the FARDC has remained an undisciplined and predatory entity that has been unable

to protect civilians or fulfil its basic functions. The Kabila Government has partly blamed donors for the hasty process that created an army composed of undisciplined and criminal elements, but donors have responded that the Government has not had a credible reintegration programme (Bafilemba, Hall, & Mueller, 2014; IRIN, 2014). The use of the security agencies by President Kabila to target opposition politicians, human rights activists, and the media who have criticised Government decisions on the war in Eastern Congo, the management of natural resources, and corruption has worsened the overall situation. With the resurgence of new rebellions in Kasai and other regions, the Government has all but suspended SSR and focused primarily on meeting the mounting security concerns.

Since the 1990s, SADC intervened in **Lesotho** to restore constitutional legality and encourage SSR reforms which would resolve the perennial problems of military involvement in politics. In constitutional compromises crafted in early 2000, Lesotho adopted a more inclusive electoral system in a bid to reduce political fragmentation. Yet, in the elections of the 2000s this system failed as weak politicians scrambled to form new parties and alliances that made governing impossible. Inevitably, weak civilian governments sought to shore up their increasingly fragile political position through the support of the army. As a sign of the political volatility, Lesotho held three elections between 2010 and 2017. In the elections of 2012, the parties allied to opposition leader Thomas Thabane defeated the then sitting Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili. Soon after, a faction of the military with close ties to Mosisili overthrew the Thabane's Government, sending him and some members of Government into exile in South Africa in August 2014. Although the SADC thwarted the coup and returned the Thabane's Government to power, South Africa

called for a new election in February 2015 to strengthen Government legitimacy.

Following the elections, the Thabane coalition was defeated and Mosisili took power again. Subsequently, the commander of the armed forces under Thabane was killed in events that triggered an SADC commission of inquiry. The report recommended a raft of security and political reforms to restore long-lasting stability, including prosecution of army officers implicated in the murder of the army commander, but the Mosisili Government reneged on implementing them (Hendricks & Musavengana, eds., 2010, pp. 81-97). Lesotho continued to experience profound instability after Mosisili's coalition Government collapsed leading to new elections in June 2017. The elections were marred by the deployment of the army at polling stations in an attempt by Mosisili to intimidate voters. Once Prime Minister Thabane returned to power following these elections, however, there was a resurgence of political tensions in September 2017 when rival officers of the LDF killed the head of the army and were in turn killed by his bodyguards. The killings occurred amidst speculations that the Thabane Government was preparing to implement SADC's SSR reforms in order to loosen the military's stranglehold on politics, angering members of the army allied to Mosisili's former Government. The renewed instability forced SADC to authorize the deployment of troops to restore order in September 2017.

Lesotho's inability to get out of the vicious cycle of violence speaks to the problems of achieving functional SSR. At heart, the constant replay of military intervention stems from the hurdles civilians have faced in evolving credible and durable political coalitions. In these circumstances both the militarization of politics and the politicization of the military have had debilitating effects on democratic governance.

Like Lesotho, **Zimbabwe** illustrates the continuity of military intervention in politics to the detriment of secure civil military relations. But unlike Lesotho, the dominant ZANU-PF had always forged close relations with the military since the liberation war, making the military indistinguishable from the party. During the decades of President Mugabe's rule, the military performed the key function of repressing opponents to maintain the party's dominance. Over the years, it also carved a niche in the economy, running mining enterprises and other strategic businesses to the extent to which, in the face of economic collapse, the military run a parallel economy that benefitted those in the higher military and party echelons. The coup that ousted Mugabe from power in November 2017 has fundamentally elevated the military to the centre of power; in determining the outcome of the power struggle within ZANU-PF, the military's role is much stronger than before. In helping President Mngangwa's rise to power, the military has guaranteed that it would have a place in major decisions; this was further illustrated by the appointment of key military veterans into the cabinet, including Constantino Chiwenga, the former army general and leader of the coup, to the vice-presidency. In effect, the politicization of the military has ended up producing the militarization of politics. This trend is likely to worsen in the post-Mugabe era (Hamill, 2017).

The resumed skirmishes between the **Mozambican** army and RENAMO in 2012-2014 was an indictment on the DDR and SSR that had occurred in the mid-1990s. While donors had employed considerable resources on DDR and SSR in Mozambique, these efforts lacked comprehensive and transparent

approaches that would have broadened military and police reforms to the wider reforms in the justice and political system. Furthermore, at the conclusion of the war, RENAMO kept some of its military forces ostensibly for the protection of its leaders until it was able to trust the national police. In effect, RENAMO maintained these forces as a bargaining chip to guarantee that FRELIMO will be sticking to the rules. When it resumed the war, RENAMO claimed that its "unfairly demobilized" troops had not been integrated into the national army and police forces. In protracted negotiations to end the conflict, the issue of reintegration has loomed large. While RENAMO has demanded that its forces be integrated in all ranks of the army and national police, the Government has demanded that RENAMO discloses the size of its military personnel. Deep mistrust has marked the DDR component of the talks because neither side believes that its partner is being honest about the size of its military forces (Guilengue, 2015). Following a wave of violent attacks by RENAMO, President Nyusi made several high-profile personnel changes in the State's intelligence and security services in November 2017, as a prelude to the resumption of negotiations. In a previous face-to-face meeting between President Nyusi and Dhlakama in August 2017, an agreement was reached to establish a working group to iron out military matters. In December 2016, both sides agreed on a new ceasefire, set up two centres in Maputo and Gorongosa to verify ceasefires, and pledged to expedite a final comprehensive agreement. These negotiations have been overshadowed by the death of Dhlakama in May 2018 (Morier-Ginaud 2018). The overall decline in democratic governance explains the weakening of civil military relations in Botswana, Zambia, and South Africa. As civilian institutions, particularly Parliaments, have lost their former governance roles, executive branches have used security services to serve selfish and partisan interests. In **Botswana**, President Khama has appointed former senior defence force officers to State positions and granted them major government contracts, often to the detriment of good governance. Moreover, the security forces have recently been accused of intimidating political opponents and involvement in politically motivated extrajudicial killings. Further, as the BDP's electoral dominance has diminished, the security forces' role has increased, not just in the electoral process, but also in societal surveillance. Some critics have pointed out that under President Khama, Botswana's security policy and resource allocation have focused on military strength, yet its key security concerns are largely internal issues that the military is not best suited to address (Ditlhase, 2012; Mungai, 2015; Phia, 2007).

In **Zambia**, electoral violence since the 2013 elections has become frequent and extreme due to the ruling party's use of security forces against the opposition. During the 2013 elections, the ruling party, the Patriotic Front (PF) was accused of training a youth militia that intimidated opposition supporters. In the 2016 elections, violence became more brazen and stark in the campaigns as the PF used security forces against the main opposition party, the UPND. During the electoral aftermath in 2017, the detention of opposition leader Hichilema and the Government imposed martial law in some parts of Zambia indicated that the PF was determined to deal harshly with its opponents, a sharp departure from Zambia's reputation as a peaceful country (Mulenga, 2013; Resnick, 2016; Smith, 2016). In **South Africa**, President Zuma's grip on power was partially accompanied by the politicization of security and intelligence agencies and the repeated deployment of security forces to threaten opposition leaders in Parliament.

Human Development for Peace Since the 2000s

From the start of the new millennium, there have been key moments that have shaped understanding of human development potential and constraint in Southern Africa. The millennium commenced on a sanguine note with the articulation of the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), seven of which directly considered human development: eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, achievement of universal primary education, promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment, reduction of child mortality, improvement of maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, and ensuring environmental sustainability. Southern Africa embraced the MDGs as inspired from the extant blueprint and vision to advance populations' livelihood by confronting the structural causes of deprivation and vulnerability.

Nevertheless, in the mid-2000s, Southern African countries were at the centre of the "Africa rising" narrative when a surge in global demand for commodities generated substantial economic benefits for natural resource-based economies. Yet the celebrations of the "Africa rising" were premature. In 2008-2009, a combined global food, fuel, and fiscal crisis interrupted the MDGs and sustaining Africa's growth trajectory. An equally serious energy crisis caused by falls in oil prices in 2014 also decreased the chances for economic recovery and the promises of inclusive growth.

How have these important events affected the pursuit of human development in Southern Africa? *Primarily*, the MDGs reaffirmed the belief promulgated in the 1990s that Governments ought to engage diverse actors in human development measures to ameliorate socioeconomic disparity, promote growth, and eradicate poverty. Throughout the region, Governments addressed these issues through strategic documents such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and various country visions to meet MDGs. As part of these blueprints, Governments made efforts since the 2000s to reduce macroeconomic imbalances, broaden market-oriented reforms, and invest more resources in the social sectors. Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia were some of the early adherents to these policies (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Southern African Office [UNECA-SA], 2006). Although donors remained important players in the articulation of these visions, the bulk of them were, unlike the 1990s, home-grown and locally-owned. Yet throughout the 2000s, these blueprints and national visions have been plagued by immense constraints, including weak market economic structures, low educational skills, social inequalities, donor dependence, political interference in bureaucratic decisions, poor infrastructure, and high HIV/AIDS infection rates.

Secondly, Southern Africa's natural resource endowment furnished a strong foundation to augment human security and prosperity. There were initial expectations that the rise in global demand for natural resources would potentially generate funds for development financing to drive industrialization, economic growth, poverty reduction and sustainable development (African Development Bank [ADB], 2007). Hence, the central part of the "Africa rising" discourse pointed to growth potential of mineral-rich countries such as Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Tanzania, and South Africa. These countries realized strong economic performance and growth rates of about 7 to 8% from 2000-2014 and bolstered the assumptions of the donor-hyped "Africa

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rising" storyline. Yet, these high growth rates concealed a trend that came to characterize these economies. As the World Bank reported in October 2013, rapidly growing economies powered by oil, gas and minerals saw poverty levels reduce at slower pace than countries without those resources. In some countries, such as Angola and Namibia, the percentage of people living in extreme poverty even increased as their growth rates spiked. Thus, when the global economic downturn set in, mineral-rich countries fell into economic doldrums, experiencing sharp economic reversals and worsening poverty levels (Coulibaly, 2017).

Third, the predominance of the resource curse has contributed to the despair about regional economic regeneration. Southern Africa has faced the spectre of the resource curse where natural resource abundance has engendered enormous governance problems such as corruption, cronyism, and criminality. Furthermore, the resource curse has fundamentally signified institutional deficits where political elites are often disengaged from the daily struggles of ordinary people. In more recent years, these deficits have been depicted as State capture, particularly in the South African case. The progress made in the 1990s against corruption which led to the formation of anti-corruption bodies and oversight institutions started to ebb in the 2000s as corruption permeated public institutions throughout the region. In large measures, the upsurge of corruption symbolizes the diminished quality of governance and responsiveness to demands for transparency and accountability in institutions that serve the public.

The interaction between economic visions for human security, the Africa rising story line, and the growth of corruption in Southern Africa can be illustrated through the experiences of Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa. In post-conflict *Angola* the unprecedented oil boom of the early 2000s made it one of the region's top economic performers. But the economic windfall distracted the Government from external and domestic pressures to reform the institutions for transparency and accountability; as a result, Angola hardly made any progress in the reconstruction of State institutions for social welfare and the delivery of public goods. Under duress from the global economic crisis of 2008 –2009, the Government worked with the IMF on some reforms that combined austerity with structural reforms and increased transparency. But despite these reforms and the Government's vision to become a middle-income country by 2021, Angola has consistently maintained its unremarkable record as one of the most corrupt and unequal countries in Southern Africa. The GDP growth rate oscillated between 8% in 2008 to 1.1 per in 2016, reflecting the sharp and long-lasting decline in oil prices. Following the 2014 oil price shock, the Government took additional reform measures including reforms to promote equitable distribution of wealth, better service delivery, investment in human capital, and acceleration of economic diversification, but they have been hampered by the lack of democratic governance. There are hopes that the transition from President dos Santos to Lourenço may assist in State capacity-building to respond to the astounding governance challenges (AfDB, 2017; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012a).

Once regarded as a model of strong democratic institutions, accountable public service, and prudent management of natural resources, **Botswana's** lustre began to wear off in the mid-2000s amidst mounting concerns about the sturdiness of governance under President Khama. The economy performed relatively

well in the 2000s, but during the slump in world demand for diamonds, the economy went through a recession, shrinking by 7.8% in 2009. There was a strong recovery of 8.6% in 2010 following the increase in world commodity prices, but the growth rate dropped to 7.2% on average between 2010 and 2013. The economy suffered another major shock when growth slowed to 3.2% in 2014, before dipping into negative territory in 2015 and only recovered in 2016 and 2017 to 2.9%.

To overcome the boom-bust cycles that have characterized the economy in recent years, President Khama prioritized reforms to promote industrialisation by accelerating economic transformation. These reforms emphasized a shift from primary sector activities to manufacturing and services. In this regard, the diamond trading company De Beers relocated its sorting and trading division to Botswana in 2013, boosting the country's position as a global diamond centre. Equally, in the context of growing inequities, poverty, and unemployment, the Government launched economic and social transformation programmes such as the Economic Stimulus Package (ESP) unveiled in 2015 (AfDB, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], UNDP, 2017, p. 245). However, with the economic decline of the 2000s, there has been a rise in social unrest for the first time in many years. Botswana was confronted by demonstrations and strikes orchestrated by tens of thousands of public sector employees in 2009 demanding better salaries and social justice. With the help of mass layoffs and heavy-handed police intervention, the Government defeated the protestors. Currently, the official unemployment rate is 25%, but trade unions and opposition parties claim that the real rate may be higher.

Botswana has been able to offer its citizens social benefits that are unusual in Africa, such as free health care and education, but schools and hospitals often lack quality personnel. Adding to the governance problems has been the emergence of endemic corruption, a radical departure from the past. Although Botswana was placed 35th out of 176 countries by Transparency International in 2016, corruption accompanied by an emerging culture of impunity among high-ranking politicians and civil servants, particularly Khama's allies, is a part of what many fear the degeneration toward crony capitalism. Opposition leaders have also complained that the anti-corruption institutions such as the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) have been compromised and are no longer independent (Throup, Cooke, & Downie, 2011).

Major economic fluctuations in Malawi went alongside power alternations that have worsened the lot of the ordinary people, deepening social vulnerability, and insecurity. In the first term of Mutharika's presidency (2004-2009), the Government made positive steps with respect to market-oriented macroeconomic management and the improvement of socioeconomic conditions of the population. From 2006 to 2008 Malawi achieved growth rates between 5.8 and 9.7%, while in 2007 inflation declined to its lowest level in a decade. The flagship fertilizer subsidy programme boosted agricultural production to record levels and donors, who had initially been sceptical of the programme, funded a major portion of it (Somerville, 2012). In 2006, macroeconomic reforms also enabled Malawi to qualify for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) programme. But the state of democratic

governance changed dramatically when President Mutharika's party overwhelming won the 2009 elections; the emergence of a dominant governing party invariably weakened the effectiveness of institutional checks and balances. In December 2009, President Mutharika blamed the World Bank and IMF for the severe foreign-exchange problems, citing liberalization policies as the causes of increasing woes. Subsequently, Malawi severed diplomatic ties with the United Kingdom and other key donors, culminating in the suspension of external assistance (Kimenyi, 2012).

President Mutharika's successor, Joyce Banda, reversed course, mending relations with donors and embarking on new economic reforms. However, under her administration, Malawi was rocked by a major corruption scandal. Dubbed "Cashgate," the scheme involved the systematic looting of public coffers by civil servants, private contractors and politicians to the tune of **US$31 million.** Widespread corruption and cronyism tainted Banda's short-lived presidency and drastically shrunk the Government's resource base, creating additional problems in the delivery of public services (Kainja, 2015).

After assuming power in 2014, President Peter Mutharika faced a fractured legislature, widespread discontent over high living costs, rampant corruption, insufficient capacity, and an economy that remains vulnerable to internal and external shocks. Although economic growth improved in 2017 to 7% from 5.1% in 2016 because of recovery in the agriculture sector, Malawi continues to exhibit most of the characteristics of a fragile State, particularly in terms of governance. Furthermore, Malawi has one of Africa's highest fertility rates and is one of the continent's most densely populated countries, putting enormous pressures on limited land resources, service delivery, poverty reduction, and building a resilient economy (Government of Malawi, Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, 2017). Breaking the cycle of vulnerability is further compounded by the growing cynicism of Malawian citizens regarding the ability of the Government to effectively manage public affairs. As the country approaches the 2019 elections, there are mounting concerns about deepening ethnic polarization, weak political parties, and indecisive leadership.

Since the 2000s, **Mozambique** has seen the weakening of democratic governance, a creeping resource curse, and growing concerns about corruption. The combination of these factors has led to increasing social discontent due to impoverishment, and the resurgence of violence since 2012. With about 54.7% of its population living in poverty, Mozambique has confronted enormous constraints that hamper policies that could alter the livelihoods of the majority. In the post-civil war period, the country made impressive economic gains. In 2004-2005, the Government developed its budget based on a framework agreed upon through the IMF Staff Monitoring Program (SMP) and the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF). These reforms yielded strong economic growth; in 2010, economic growth at 7.2% was stronger than the African average, compared to 6.4% in 2009. Although these policies tried momentarily to link rapid growth to poverty reduction, they did not make significant inroads into poverty reduction. Even though it was regarded as one of the African rising success stories due to the discovery of natural gas reserves, Mozambique was unable to reduce the wealth gap because economic growth has been increasingly driven by large, capital intensive public and private investment projects that have benefited only very few people living in urban areas (Guilengue, 2016).

The economic gaps were demonstrated in social protests that rocked Mozambique in 2008 and 2010, stemming from the deterioration in living conditions, particularly in urban areas. Following the increases in the price of transportation and basic food prices in February 2008, Maputo and other big cities faced severe riots. In September 2010 there were also protests after the Government increased the prices of bread, electricity and water. The riots forced the Government to impose temporary subsidies for bread production and fuel. The people (mostly the younger generations) involved in the protests seemed to vent their opposition toward the FRELIMO Government and its increasingly autocratic political style (African Peer Review Mechanism [APRM], 2010; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012b).

Mozambique is also commercially-producing minerals. For instance, it has natural gas and coal deposits estimated at billions of dollars. Amidst State collusion with multinational corporations (MNCs), these resources have increasingly fostered a resource curse where communities are impoverished and disadvantaged (Mutch, 2013; Polgreen, 2012). In the wake of natural resource exploitation, thousands of Mozambicans have been forcibly relocated to make way for extraction projects and some local communities have lost property rights.

In most of these regions, MNCs have pledged various compensation schemes, but they are often paltry and, in most cases, the compensations do not meet basic needs. Even though Mozambique has signed up to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a programme that seeks to ensure that Governments and companies are honest about natural resource revenues, the Government has not put in place appropriate measures to

guarantee the allocation of mining revenue into antipoverty programmes or to help boost agriculture, the major occupation for most of the population. In addition, Mozambique's governance has deteriorated because of the upsurge of grand corruption coupled with a deeply embedded patronage system and weak anti-corruption institutions. In June 2014, major donors slashed budget support in protest against the Government's $800-million bond to finance a tuna fishing fleet on behalf of a State company (Hanlon, 2016; Sapa-AFP, 2014). In July 2017, there was also revelation that the Ministry of Finance guaranteed loans amounting to $187 million in 2013 and 2014 to three private companies controlled by Mozambique's security services. In response, the IMF, the World Bank, and donors that provide budget support substantially decreased funding to Mozambique and put a squeeze on Government spending (AIM, 2017).

Like Botswana, **Namibia** has fared well on major democratic governance, natural resource governance, and human development indices compared to most of its African counterparts since the early 2000s. With an abundance of diamonds, gold, and uranium, and a per capita income of $4,267 in 2009, Namibia is an upper-middle-income country. In addition, it has implemented the IMF's Code of Conduct of Good Practices on Transparency to promote efficient administrative procedures, making it the leader in Africa with respect to sound financial management systems. Nonetheless, these achievements conceal fundamental weaknesses, notably economic and social disparities that have ramification for democratic governance and human security (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016; Hedden, 2015; Sims & Koep, 2012). Thus, translating its strong economic growth and a rich endowment of natural resources to improving human development and well-being has remained a formidable

challenge. For instance, 40% of its 2.3 million people still live in slums in one of the most unequal societies in the world. In 2016, only about 50% of the population had access to electricity; and only 37% had access to improved sanitation facilities.

Combined with a young population, these indices point to future instabilities in the absence of proactive public policies (Donnenfeld, 2017; Kahiurika, 2017). Adding to these problems has been the steady decline in growth rates from more than 5% in 2015, to a meagre 0.1 percent in 2016, and negative growth in 2017. Facing the immense pressure to deliver economic empowerment, President Geingob has pronounced populist policies. In 2016, he introduced an action plan to accelerate development, known as the Harambee Prosperity Plan (HPP) that contains a raft of measures to combat poverty and enhance equitable development. In mid-2017, the Government threatened radical land reforms and its Parliament introduced a draft bill called the National Equitable Economic Empowerment Framework that will compel all white-owned companies to cede 25% shareholding to black Namibians (Republic of Namibia, 2016).

South Africa's experience with such economic blueprints showcases their limits as vehicles for human development and inclusive growth. Since President Mbeki's replacement of the RDP with GEAR to combine social welfare and neo-liberal policies, the policymaking domain has been dominated by well-intentioned frameworks that ultimately do not solve major problems. Facing intense opposition from domestic groups, the Mbeki Government abandoned GEAR in 2006 and introduced the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) to address key constraints that inhibited rapid and shared economic growth. Major stakeholders supported ASGISA because of its attention to meet questions of infrastructure development, skills enhancement, the promotion of small and medium sized enterprises and State capacity-building to promote social development. These programmes had hardly taken root before an intra-ANC revolt ousted President Mbeki from power in September 2008 (Gumede, 2009).

In 2010, the Zuma administration, dissatisfied with ASGISA, launched its own blueprint, the New Growth Path, to focus attention on job creation and equitable growth, perceived as the missing links in South Africa's economic development. Enhancing both social equity and competitiveness, systemic mobilization of domestic investment to create sustainable development, and social dialogue on encouraging growth and employment were themes that dominated this initiative (Economic Development Department, Republic of South Africa, 2011). However, alongside the rhetorical invocation of building a democratic development State, none of the economic plans has delivered measurable results. South Africa has sought a tenuous compromise between economic growth and equity goals because of the extreme concentration of resources and the existence of narrow but powerful interests in the private sector.

Throughout the 2000s, this compromise has held largely because, in the perennial political battles over the direction of public policy, demands for a State that would intervene to right the historical injustices have seldom triumphed. The result has been growing inequalities that compromise the quality of the democratic enterprise. The review of trends in growth, employment, poverty, and inequality starkly illustrates that there has been no redress for the structural poverty and inequality inherited from the apartheid

regime. Apart from service delivery protests, workers' strikes have perennially paralysed the mining industry and other sectors, demonstrating the social polarization and inequities. The violent response by the police to the Marikana platinum mine strike in August 2012 underscored the severity of the social crisis (Development Bank of Southern Africa [DBSA], 2012). Further exacerbating the development landscape was the emergence of an incoherent State under President Zuma which has led to the hollowing out of public institutions and the progressive decline of the economy.

Summarized aptly as State capture, cronyism, and corruption, the three legacies that President Zuma has bequeathed on South Africa have had an acute effect on the erosion of democratic governance and human security. These problems also eroded South Africa's leadership as a well-governed and competent State. While the global commodity downturn that started in 2008 had some bearing on the economic challenges that South Africa has confronted in recent years, most of them were home-grown and revolved around the following major areas: (1) overall economic stagnation; the poor performance of State-owned enterprises due to political interference, leading to a drain on the economy; (2) 25% unemployment rates (with youth unemployment around 50%); (3) low levels of job creation and often poor standards of educational achievement; credit rating downgrades that weakened the Rand; and (4) abuse of State resources for personal gain (Luke, 2016; Munusamy, 2017). These problems went along with the authoritarianism of the ANC, the personalization of power around President Zuma and his allies, and unprecedented popular disillusionment with the ruling elite. The ANC paid a price for authoritarianism and economic mismanagement during the local

elections of 2016, giving opposition parties control of some of the major metropolitan areas. Furthermore, at the ANC national consultative convention in December 2017, Cyril Ramaphosa was elected as the new party President on the platform of fundamental reforms to rescue the country from State failure.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In over two and half decades, contradictory trends have typified Southern African efforts to build institutions for democratic governance, for the provision of security and for human development. Comprehensive peace in the region has remained stalled because of the structural obstacles to broadening democratic governance and building equitable and just societies. The bold strides of the 1990s to construct systems based on participation, regular rotation of power, civilian supremacy over security forces, and equitable development have witnessed significant setbacks as countries have regressed into the past patterns of authoritarian governments, narrowly-based elite governance, military interference in politics, and socioeconomic inequalities since the 2000s. Yet, rather than treating the two eras as sharply differentiated moments, the most accurate approach is to view them as a part of a long continuum on the difficult path to political development from which we can draw pertinent lessons for the future. This is perhaps because the time period for assessing these changes is relatively brief for conclusive judgements. Are two and half decades since the inauguration of democratization in the region sufficient to write-off these experiments? Were observers overly optimistic about democratic and development breakthroughs in States and societies that remain too polarized and weakly-institutionalized? Were the demands for democratic and development dividends unrealistic to start with? Similarly, are analysts making too much out of the challenges that have marked regional political and economic trends in recent years? Does the blanket pessimism conceal vital areas of development that can contribute to generating resilient political economies to manage existing and future problems of peace?

These questions inject a dose of reality into our analyses, forcing more guarded and cautious assumptions about regional trends and trajectories. Equally vital, they point to vistas to overcome the multiple impediments that continue to retard a democratic, secure, and prosperous Southern Africa. Broadly, the democratic and development experiments have laid the foundations for additional institutional innovations in governance. Throughout this period, governance has been seen as the gradual process of building robust and effective States that would, alongside participation, provide public goods for peace, security, and prosperity. Southern Africa has, for most part, transcended the difficult days of institutional fragility when dictatorships dominated with little accountability, civil wars ravaged social fabrics, and economies operated as private monopolies. Furthermore, although democratization and development have proceeded against the backdrop of extensive nation-building and resource challenges, the progress made in the last two and a half decades points to avenues on how to deepen these processes.

Recent leadership changes in Angola, Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe have led some analysts to point to a resurgence of optimism about the prospects of democratic governance with potential implications for reshaping domestic politics in these countries as well as on the entire region. In Angola, there have been inklings of change within the MPLA as President Lourenço has signalled determination to embark on governance reforms. Although confined to ending the dominance of the dos Santos family on public institutions, these reforms may potentially

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begin to open up political and economic space in Angola.

In Botswana, the new President, Mokgweetsi Masisi has a leadership style that is going to differ markedly from former President Ian Khama's militaristic and autocratic style (INK Centre for Investigative Journalism, Botswana Guardian, 2018). The rise of President Cyril Ramaphosa to the ANC's leadership in South Africa has also occasioned profound optimism about arresting the worsening democratic and economic governance that characterized former President Jacob Zuma's rule. Similarly, the departure of Mugabe from the Zimbabwean political scene has reignited hopes that the country may return to its glory days as a well governed State and economic powerhouse in the region.

The elections slated for 2018 and 2019 in Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe are going to test the popularity and legitimacy of the new leaders. Although it is premature to pronounce judgement on the implications of these new leaders on regional relationships, it is conceivable that more democratic and confident leaders in Angola, South Africa, and Zimbabwe can work together to revitalize regional integration in Southern Africa. What does this all mean for the future of positive peace in Southern Africa and what can we learn from these reflections? The following recommendations may guide regional approaches for democratic peace.

Renewal of the "Second Liberation" Spirit

This spirit propelled political change in the region. It is less than 30 years old and thus, too young to be extinguished by despair and defeatism. Essentially, it grew from the conviction that it is imperative to mobilize collective energies for political and socioeconomic rejuvenation. In addition, the spirit was based on people-centeredness, the belief that democracy, security, and development ultimately pivot around people.

Learning by Doing and Doing More

Iterative learning and doing are the basis for building solid institutions of democratic governance, human development and prosperity. Setbacks should induce learning and reflection, and doing more, rather than despondency. Hence, the polarizations and divisiveness that pluralism has produced in the region can only be creatively surmounted through more pluralism, broadening of voice, and acknowledgement of the power of pluralism to resolve conflicts.

Building on Dynamic Diversities

New divisions around generations, gender, and lifestyles can be harnessed to dampen the salience of long-standing static divisions around race, ethnicity, religion, and region. The idea is to find new flexible identities that recreate the sense of common political communities that would negotiate popular participation, accountable governance, and inclusive growth. With the fading of the liberation legacy and the emergence of new and diverse groups, Southern Africa has an opportunity to promote participatory approaches based on these new identities and interests.

Strengthening National Institutions

Democratic governance is in crisis partially because of the overall breakdown of national institutions. Thus, there is a need to return to the nation-building strategies that have worked in the past, including physical infrastructures that unite peoples, education systems with national reach, inclusive political parties, and participatory socioeconomic programmes and policies. Such nation-building strategies were often premised on the fact that without investments in national institutions, people would always resort to primordial identities and affiliations.

Investment in Political Parties

Capacity building programmes for political parties are still essential because they are the main institutions for participation and representation. The quality of Parliaments is not going to improve until political parties become effective agents of participation through programmes with national outreach and mobilization campaigns. With the steady decline of ideologies as the organizational foundation for political parties, old and new parties in the region will have to reinvigorate their mandates to make themselves relevant to new constituencies and concerns.

Quality of Citizens

There has been a disproportionate focus on the quality of leaders in Southern Africa at the expense of the quality of citizens. Democratization has had a mixed record in producing leaders with national outlooks, transformative skills, and ability to take risks. A renewed focus on the efficacy of the citizens has tremendous implications for programmes and interventions on civic education, empowerment, youth, and women participation. Ultimately, engaged and informed citizens are the main authors of quality leaders.

Demilitarization of Politics and Professionalization of Militaries

The current SSR initiatives that privilege civilian control of security forces alongside competent and professional security agencies remain the templates that States should strive toward. But more critically, there needs be a steady reduction in the stakes that make politics a zero-sum game, necessitating resolution through violent means. For this reason, efforts to demilitarize politics are inseparable from strengthening participation and shared economic growth.

New Mechanisms of Natural Resource Governance

Natural resources in the region will continue to be sources of instability and strife if not managed carefully. While revenues from natural resources are predicted to increase over the next decade, weak institutional accountability guarantees that these resources remain a curse. Besides, the current global transparency regimes for resource management such as the EITI and the Kimberley Process are not functioning optimally and need to be replaced by home-grown mechanisms that emphasize national ownership, parliamentary oversight, and the citizen participation. There are immense opportunities across the region to share lessons learned on sound methods that have worked on how to use natural resources for growth and for human development.

Frontal Approaches to Equity and Inclusiveness

The widespread consensus on public expenditures for healthcare, education, and social protection needs to inform public policies along with mobilizing development financing from local resources to reduce donor dependence for long-term sustainable development. Local resource mobilization endeavours, however, are inconceivable without genuine anti-corruption measures across the region. Although most of the regional States have signed the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), similar to the MDGs, these objectives will not be met without augmented domestic resources and leaders who are committed to building equitable, just, and inclusive societies.

Get Regional Integration Right

Given the rich history of regionalism in Southern Africa, it has underperformed in integration. There is need to strengthen existing economic ties and bolster the political and normative frameworks that undergird integration. SADC will remain weak if its integration trajectories do not proceed in parallel with attempts to erect common political foundations and common citizenships. In addition, Southern African integration needs to feed into continental African objectives.

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Peace is more than the absence of war. In its positive and ambitious meaning peace entails democratic governance, civic oversight over the security sector and human development. In the 1990s, there was a tremendous optimism about Southern Africa's ability to recover from years of civil wars and apartheid destabilization through democratization, security sector reforms and human development. In more recent years, however, this optimism gave way to profound worries about democratic recession, the inability of states to deliver public goods, the resurgence of militarism and growing socioeconomic inequalities. States haven`t been prepared to deal with popular discontent and often reacted in authoritarian and violent ways.

Gilbert Khadiagala`s contribution to the FES Peace and Security Series analysis the factors behind the described reversal in democratic development. Drawing from country cases he describes the lack of political will for meaningful Security Sector Governance and the democratization of the state, which hinder the materialization of a strong regional agenda for collective security in Southern Africa. The author then asks, how Southern Africa could recapture the momentum that unleashed democratic awakening in the 1990s and offers some thoughts on the recent political changes in the region as well as the strengthening of a regional agenda towards democratic peace.

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