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**弗里德里希·艾伯特基金会  
——北京项目执行人办公室**

**Nr. 2**

**Diskussionsbeiträge**

**讨论稿**

**2**

**Volker Perthes**

**福尔克尔·佩泰斯**

**Germany and the Middle East**

**德国与中东**

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请参阅本书结尾处的专门介绍

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## Vorwort

Den vorliegenden Vortrag hielt Dr. Volker Perthes in Peking am 16. März 2005 vor einem Kreis von Expertinnen und Experten verschiedener in Peking ansässiger außen- und sicherheitspolitischer Forschungsinstitute. Die Diskussionsveranstaltung wurde vom *China Centre for Contemporary World Studies* (CCCWS) und der *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung* ausgerichtet.

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Roland Feicht

Landesvertreter der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Peking, im Juli 2005

## 前 言

弗里德里希·艾伯特基金会与中国当代世界研究中心于2005年3月16日在北京合作举办了一场研讨会,参加者为佩泰斯博士和北京相关研究机构的外交和安全政策专家。本文系根据佩泰斯博士在研讨会上所做的报告整理而成。

福尔克尔·佩泰斯博士系德国柏林科学与政治基金会国际政治与安全所中东研究室主任。

罗兰德·费希特

弗里德里希·艾伯特基金会驻华代表

北京 2005年7月

# Germany and the Middle East

Volker Perthes

March 16, 2005 Beijing

Regarding Germany's Middle East policies, I would like to start by briefly reviewing German interests and priorities with regard to the Middle East and North African region. Secondly, I will discuss how those interests have evolved and developed during the past years, and thirdly, summarise some of the current issues that Germany as well as the EU, and probably China, are facing in the Middle East.

To start with, it might be interesting to note that as independent concepts, both German Middle East policy as well as clearly defined German interests in the Middle East are relatively recent inventions. Ten or fifteen years ago, the answer to the question whether there was such a thing as a German Middle East policy would clearly have been "no". This has started to change since the early and mid 1990s.

German interests with regard to the Middle East and North Africa consist of three dimensions. The first issue that usually comes to mind is economic interests, prominently among which features the access to safe energy supplies. Here it is important to distinguish between the control of oil supplies and safe access to them: German interests are only concerned with guaranteeing access to oil, not with controlling oil supplies.

The second dimension is security, which from a Germany perspective basically means

avoiding risks, as the region is marked by regional conflicts and problems such as terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This does not imply that we fear an armed conflict with any of the Middle East states. Rather, the concern is that existing conflicts within the region could have an impact on European security.

The third dimension is purely political, and it is mainly related to the peace process between the Arab states and the Israelis.

Contrary to what many people expect, the economy and the economic dimension of German national interests are not the driving force behind German Middle East policies. While Germany is indeed an export economy as much as China is, German trade with the Middle East and North Africa merely accounts for about 3 percent of total German foreign trade. Trade with the Middle East and North Africa is important for some industries, mainly for car manufacturers, producers of electronic goods and chemical industries. While there is room for increasing this trade, it does not drive politics. During the past few years, business has seemed to follow politics rather than the other way around.

Security fears, mainly with regard to terrorism, have lately caused public interest in the region

# 德国与中东

福尔克尔·佩泰斯

3月16日 北京

关于德国的中东政策，首先，我想简要回顾一下德国在中东和北非地区的利益和重点。其次，谈及这些利益在过去几年是如何发展变化的。最后，概述当前德国、欧盟乃至中国在中东面临的一些问题。

首先，值得注意的是，德国的中东政策以及德国在中东地区利益的明确定义都是最近才作为独立的概念出现的。10或15年前，如果有人问德国是否存在对中东政策这回事，答案是很明确的，“没有”。这种情况直至九十年代早期和中期才开始有所改变。

德国在中东和北非地区的利益分为三个方面。通常人们首先想到的是经济利益，获得安全的能源供应是其最重要的特征。因此把控制石油供应和安全地获得石油能源两者区别开来十分重要：德国的利益仅在于确保得到石油，而非控制石油供应。

第二个方面是安全层面的，就德国而言主要是指规避危机的发生，因为该地区一个

显著的特征就是地区冲突和问题频仍，包括恐怖主义和大规模杀伤性武器的扩散。这并不意味着我们害怕与任何中东国家发生武装冲突。相反，我们担忧的是该地区现有的冲突可能会对欧洲的安全造成影响。

第三个方面是纯政治层面的，这主要与阿拉伯国家和以色列之间的和平进程有关。

和很多人预期的相反，经济以及德国国家利益中的经济因素并不是德国中东政策的驱动力。虽然德国和中国一样都是出口型经济体，但德国与中东、北非之间的贸易仅占其外贸总额的大约3%。德国与中东、北非的贸易对某些产业，主要包括汽车制造业，电器制造业和化工产业确实重要，而且这些贸易还有进一步发展的空间，但它并未成为政治的驱动力。过去几年来，经济看似是在跟着政治走，而不是相反。

安全方面的担忧，主要是针对恐怖主义的担忧，近来已使公众对该地区的关注有所

to increase. This is due to the geographic proximity of the Middle East and North Africa to Germany and the European Union. German citizens have been victims of terrorism in Tunisia, and there is a widespread fear of Islam, which may not be expressed publicly but nonetheless exists. It is a factor which policy makers have to take into account.

A third, structural dimension leading to heightened German interest in the region is European integration and, related to it, the changing geopolitics of Europe. What does this mean? The changing geopolitics of Europe is probably best characterised and symbolised by the so-called Schengen Agreement, which is tantamount to the disappearance of internal borders in most of the European Union. In geopolitical terms, this implies that Germany as a state in Northern Europe has moved much closer to the south, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It has even been argued that Germany has become a Mediterranean state itself because the Schengen area now borders Mediterranean countries. The borders that separate us from the Middle East or from North Africa are the ports and airports of France, of Italy, of Spain and no longer the borders of Germany itself. Anybody entering Spain, France or Italy merely needs to get on a train and travel to Germany, hence not only the Foreign Ministry but also the Minister of the Interior is increasingly interested in events in the Middle East and North Africa. In consequence, the entire political community is being affected by matters in the region and will be paying attention to it.

As far as European integration in general is

concerned, the gradual emergence of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) also directly impact German and European interests in the Middle East and North Africa. The region has been identified as particularly important for the CFSP.

However, the shift of some foreign policy prerogatives to Brussels does not imply that Berlin can simply sit back and outsource its Middle East policy to the European Union. As a key EU member, Germany cannot leave these policies to Brussels alone or to the traditionally more involved countries like France and Great Britain. It needs to assume its share in the responsibility and has indeed done so. This goes along with an increased concern about an area that might become a field not only for European 'soft' foreign policies but also for intervention by EU or NATO crisis reaction forces. As a result, German policy towards the Middle East is now clearly seen as an integral part of European common foreign policies towards that region. Germany has a strong interest in strengthening the EU's foreign policy dimension, creating a CFSP that deserves its name.

I think it is important to stress at this point that Germany's support for a proper European Common Foreign and Security Policy does not entail opposition to the United States or the United States' role in the region. Rather, the opposite is true. German as well as EU policy makers have a strong interest in making the United States stay involved in the region, above all in the Arab-Israeli issue, but as part of a multilateral framework together with Europe and



增加。这是因为中东和北非在地缘上与德国和欧盟相毗邻。德国公民曾经在突尼斯的恐怖事件中成为受害者，人们对伊斯兰教存在着普遍的恐惧，虽然这种情绪可能没有公开表达出来，但它确实存在。这也是决策者必须考虑的一个因素。

欧洲的一体化以及由此带来的欧洲地缘政治的变化加强了德国在该地区的利益，这体现在第三个即结构性层面上。这意味着什么呢？消除了大部分欧盟国家内部边界的所谓的申根协定也许最好地代表并显示了欧洲地缘政治变化的特点。就地缘政治而言，其意味着作为欧洲北部国家，德国向南、向地中海和中东地区大大地靠近了。有人甚至认为，由于申根地区现在与地中海国家接壤，德国本身已经成为了地中海国家。把德国与中东、北非分开的边界已经不再是德国国界本身，而是法国、意大利和西班牙的口岸和机场。任何进入西班牙、法国或意大利的人，只需搭乘火车就可以到达德国，因此对中东和北非地区事务越来越感兴趣的已经不仅仅是外交部，还有内政部长。结果导致整个政界都受到该地区事务的影响，整个政界都要关注这一地区。

就欧洲一体化总体进程来看，共同外交与安全政策（CFSP）以及欧洲安全和防御政

策（ESDP）的逐渐出台也直接影响到德国和欧洲在中东和北非地区的利益。该地区对欧洲的共同外交与安全政策而言尤为重要。

将外交政策的一些特权交给布鲁塞尔并不意味着柏林将只会袖手旁观，把自己的中东政策完全交由欧盟处理。作为欧盟的一个主要成员国，德国不能把这些政策全部交给布鲁塞尔，或者交给像法国、英国这样一些历来在该地区有很大投入的国家。德国需要承担起自己的责任，而且它也确实这样做了。随之而来的是对该地区与日俱增的担忧，人们担心这里可能成为欧洲“软”外交政策以及欧盟或北约危机反应部队干预的战场。由此导致的结果便是，德国当前的中东政策显然已经成为了欧洲对该地区共同外交政策的有机组成部分。德国对于加强欧盟的共同外交政策以及创建一项名副其实的共同外交与安全政策有着强烈的兴趣。

我认为有必要强调的是，德国支持一项适宜的欧洲共同外交与安全政策并不表示一定要反对美国或者美国在该地区的作用。情况正好相反，德国和欧盟的决策者们对于使美国参与该地区事务有着强烈的兴趣，尤其是在处理阿拉伯-以色列关系方面，我们希望美国作为多边框架的一部分，与欧洲及其他有关各方如联合国等一道共同努力。请注

other players such as the United Nations. Note that we are speaking of multilateralism, as Europeans generally tend to do, not of multipolarism. This interest and approach is most obviously embodied in the so-called "Middle East Quartet" and its road map for peace between Arabs and Israelis, a format that actually allows the United States to be at the helm, based on ideas developed by European policy-makers. The road map and the Quartet are in a sense the German Foreign Ministry's foster children, yet it is also part of that policy to leave the Americans to adopt them as their own creations, as long as this helps in implementing them.

Of course, within the common European approach, each member state has its own priorities. France has traditional post-colonial ties to countries like Lebanon, Syria or Algeria. Britain has an affinity towards Jordan and even Palestine. Germany of course has its own very special relationship with Israel, which Germans always have to explain when they visit Arab countries or in dealing with Arab partners.

There are different views in Germany as to whether the special relationship with Israel is an asset or a liability for Germany's policies towards the Middle East. I would argue that the answer depends on what one does: used in a constructive manner, this special relationship can be an asset. It can be helpful in moving the peace process forward and in incrementally building multilateral structures in the Middle East, which is what Germany's current foreign minister Joschka Fischer is trying to do.

Moreover, Germany has a unique interest in

resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict that is separate from shared general humanitarian concerns or a European interest in stability in the Middle East. The end of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians would also resolve what sometimes appears as a conflict of interests between the special relationship with Israel on one hand, and improved and tightened relations with the Arab world on the other.

So far, four main dimensions shaping Germany's relations with the Middle East have been identified: security and economic interests, EU structures and priorities, a willingness to cooperate with the United States, and a special concern with the Arab-Israeli conflict and its peaceful resolution within a multilateral framework. Against this background, German foreign policy initiatives on specific issues should be more easily comprehensible. Let me discuss three of the key issues at the forefront of the debate in Berlin today.

The first issue is the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians. For Germany, solving this conflict peacefully necessitates strong and ongoing support for the Palestinian state building process. This is now a priority issue for German foreign policy. Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, Germany has been its main aid donor. German aid to the Palestinian entity surmounts the aid of any other actor, a fact often recalled with some pride in the foreign policy environment.

German policy makers have always been adamant that support for a Palestinian state is

意我们这里讲的是多边主义，这也是欧洲人通常愿意做的，而不是多极主义。这种兴趣和主张在所谓“中东四方”机制及阿以和平路线图计划中体现得最为明显，路线图计划以欧洲决策者们的设想为蓝本，却由美国主导实施。和平路线图和中东四方机制从某种意义上说产生于德国外交部，然而我们的政策却使得美国人把它们当作自己的发明而加以采纳，只要它有利于这些办法的执行。

当然，在实施欧洲共同的方案时，每个成员国都有各自的侧重点。法国与诸如黎巴嫩、叙利亚和阿尔及利亚等国家存在传统的后殖民关系。英国与约旦甚至巴勒斯坦关系非常亲近。当然德国本身与以色列的关系极为特殊，当德国领导人访问阿拉伯国家或与阿拉伯伙伴打交道的时候总是需要对此做出解释。

对于德国和以色列之间的特殊关系，德国国内存在各种不同的观点，有人认为它是德国对中东政策的资产，另一些人把它视为债务，我认为答案在于我们如何做：如果以一种建设性的态度来加以利用的话，这种特殊关系就可以成为一种资产。这将有助于推动和平进程的前进，以及加强中东多边结构的构建，这也是德国现任外长约什卡·费舍尔正在努力做的。

此外，除了共同的人道主义的关切以及欧洲国家对中东地区稳定的关注之外，德国对解决阿以冲突还有自己独特的兴趣。结束巴以之间的冲突也就解决了德国在这种特殊关系中有时面临的利益冲突，即一方面顾及以色列，另一方面改善并加强与阿拉伯世界的关系之间的冲突。

迄今为止，构成德国与中东关系的四个主要方面已经明确下来：安全与经济利益、欧盟机构与优先权、与美国合作的意愿，对阿以冲突以及在多边框架内和平解决该冲突的特殊关注。在此背景之下，德国对某些特定问题的外交政策倡议便很容易理解了。请允许我谈谈目前在柏林人们争论最激烈的三个主要问题。

第一个问题是阿以冲突，尤其是以色列与巴勒斯坦的关系。德国人认为，为和平解决这一冲突，需要对巴勒斯坦的建国努力给予强有力的、持续的支持。这是当前德国外交政策优先考虑的问题。自巴勒斯坦权力机构建立伊始，德国始终是它的主要援助者。事实上，德国对巴勒斯坦的援助超出了其他任何一方，这常常令德外交界引以为荣。

德国决策者一直坚持一条原则，即对巴勒斯坦国的援助不是没有条件的。其目的是

not unconditional. The goal is to build a democratic state that respects human rights and cooperates peacefully with its neighbours. I think the latest Palestinian elections as well as the assertiveness of the Palestinian parliament have vindicated this approach and have underlined the necessity of investing in institution building, civil society support and state building in Palestine. In my view, there is reason for optimism about resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly if Israel withdraws from the Gaza strip. Naturally, this can only be a first step and needs to be followed up by negotiations, which should be strongly supported by the Quartet - the European Union, the United States, the United Nations and Russia - within a multilateral framework. Germany has clearly expressed its readiness to support major reconstruction programs for the new Palestinian state once Israel has left parts of the Palestinian region.

The second issue is Iran, particularly the current conflict about Iran's nuclear program. Iran has been a focal point of German foreign policy in the past, to the extent that since the Iranian Revolution took place in 1979, Germany has played a lead role in shaping European policies towards Iran. This has been the case even where other actors, especially the United States, have been trying to isolate the country. It is Germany's as well as Europe's position that Iran is too important to be left alone, a policy that goes by different names and has been termed 'critical dialogue' or 'constructive engagement'. But regardless of different labels the bottom line is that Iran must not be isolated and needs to be engaged in dialogue.

In the ongoing negotiations between the 'EU 3' - France, Germany, and Great Britain - and Iran the European Union shares the United States' and the United Nations' concern that Iran must not develop a military nuclear capability. Europeans, however, also recognise Iran's legitimate national interests such as economic and technological progress, political acceptance as a major player in the region, as well as security, by which Iran understands both regime security and national security.

While the EU can help Iran in the pursuit of the first and second of these interests, that is in achieving economic and technological progress as well as international political standing, the problem of the ongoing negotiations is that it cannot deliver security for Iran. In order to achieve this, the United States needs to be at least 'silently' involved in the negotiations. A regional security regime in the Gulf region and probably a guarantee against forced regime change from the outside are issues that need to be discussed in order to reinsure Iran on the topic of security. As this is impossible to achieve without the cooperation of the United States, the EU will have to closely coordinate its talks with Iran with the Americans. Agreeing on what to do with Iran may even necessitate preliminary negotiations between the EU and the U.S. themselves.

The third issue, finally, is the so-called Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) initiative launched by the G8 at their June 2004 summit. This initiative followed on from the Greater Middle East Initiative inaugurated by President George W. Bush in November 2003,

建立一个尊重人权并与邻国和平合作的民主国家。我认为，巴勒斯坦最近举行的选举和巴议会的自信都证明了这一方法的正确性，并且强调了在巴勒斯坦建投资制度建设、支持市民社会以及建立国家的必要性。我认为，对解决巴以冲突持乐观态度是有道理的，尤其是如果以色列能从加沙地带撤军的话。当然，这也仅仅是第一步，接下来还需要进行进一步的协商，对此，欧盟、美国、联合国和俄罗斯这四方应在多边框架内给予强有力的支持。德国已经明确表示，一旦以色列撤离巴勒斯坦部分地区，它愿意为新的巴勒斯坦国的主要重建项目提供援助。

第二个问题是伊朗问题，尤其是当前关于伊朗核问题存在的冲突。自1979年伊朗革命以来，伊朗始终是德国外交政策的一个焦点，在欧洲制订对伊朗政策的过程中德国始终发挥着主导作用。即使是在其他有关方面，尤其是美国试图孤立伊朗的时候，情况仍然如此。德国及欧洲的立场是，伊朗太重要了，不能对它置之不理，这一政策也以不同的名目出现，它曾经被称为“危急对话”或“建设性接触”。但不管被冠以何种名目，其底线都是伊朗不能被孤立，需要把它纳入到对话中来。

眼下正在进行的欧盟三国（法国、德国、英国）与伊朗的谈判中，欧盟与美国及联合国有着同样的担忧，这就是不能让伊朗发展军事核能力。然而，欧洲人也认识到伊朗应享有合法的国家利益，比如经济和科技进步，在政治上被承认是该地区主要国家之一，以及在伊朗看来既包括政权安全也包括国家安全的安全利益。

欧盟能够帮助伊朗实现第一和第二项利益，即取得经济和科技进步，获得国际政治地位，但当前谈判存在的问题是这不能给伊朗带来安全。为了获得安全，需要把美国纳入到谈判中来，哪怕它保持沉没也好。为使伊朗在安全问题上放心，需要就海湾地区建立地区性安全机制，或者保证不从外部以武力颠覆伊朗政权这些问题进行讨论。由于没有美国的合作无法实现这一点，欧盟将不得不把与伊朗的对话同美国进行协调。为了就如何应对伊朗达成一致，欧盟与美国之间甚至需要进行先期协商。

最后，第三个问题是2004年6月八国峰会上提出来的所谓大中东和北非倡议。这一计划是布什总统2003年11月提出的大中东计划的后续动作，该倡议要求在中东国家实

calling for sweeping reform and substantial change in the states of the Middle East. Initially, many Europeans questioned the need for setting up such a policy. The need for modernization and change in the Middle East had long been recognised and addressed in the EU's Barcelona initiative, the EU's framework for relations towards Mediterranean and Arab Middle Eastern states.

Despite these initial doubts about the initiative and notwithstanding their different approaches towards reform in the Middle East, Europeans welcomed the Bush administration's plan. Essentially, it was viewed as signifying a willingness on the part of the U.S. to deal with structural issues such as education, institution building and development of the rule of law in the Middle East and therefore as worth supporting.

By deciding to embrace the U.S. approach European policy makers also ensured their say in the process and, consequently, secured an opportunity to try and shape the policy in the spirit of the existing Barcelona initiative. At the same time, both the Iraq war and the Greater Middle East and BMENA initiatives, respectively, served as wake-up calls for Europe and caused it to reexamine its own Middle East policies. The Iraq war once again dramatically pointed up the necessity of developing a common European approach if Europe is to be taken seriously on the international political stage. Positive results of this wake-up call are both the development of a European security

strategy, which has served to unify European thinking not only towards the Middle East, as well as the common approach taken by Great Britain, France and Germany towards Iran, which demonstrates that Europe has learned a lesson from the Iraq war and acted in coordination on this important issue.

Thus, the Broader Middle East Initiative may help to revitalise the EU's own policy instrument for the Mediterranean and the Middle East, namely, the Barcelona process. During the past two or three years this process had been rather dormant. However, the EU and its member states now seem to have realised that talk of building a zone of stability in the Euro-Mediterranean region does not suffice because a zone of stability might just as well be a zone of stagnation.

On the other hand, the Arab states have realised it is in their best interest not just to cooperate with Europe on economic issues, but to also get involved in a closer political and probably security partnership with the EU if they are going to avoid exposure to America's unilateral moods in the region. They are also aware that they need to be prepared for gradual political change if they seek a strong and institutional political cooperation with Europe. So by the time Barcelona celebrates its 10th anniversary in the fall of 2005, there might be a call for building a Euro-Mediterranean community of democratic states within the next 10 years, which certainly is a novelty for Arab states to accept.

行大规模的改革和实质性的改变。最初，许多欧洲人质疑该政策的必要性。欧盟巴塞罗那倡议很早即认识到并提出了在中东实行现代化和变革的必要性，这一倡议是欧盟处理与地中海和中东阿拉伯国家关系的框架。

尽管人们最初对这一倡议持怀疑态度，对中东改革也存在不同看法，但欧洲人还是对布什政府的这一计划表示欢迎。实质上，这一计划被视为美国方面愿意处理一些结构性问题，比如中东地区的教育、制度建设以及发展法治的表现，因此值得支持。

在决定支持美国方案的同时，欧洲决策者也确保了自己在这一进程中拥有发言权，从而得以在现有的巴塞罗那倡议的精神下制订有关政策。与此同时，伊拉克战争、大中东计划以及大中东和北非倡议分别提醒欧洲，并促使它重新审查自己的中东政策。伊拉克战争再次强烈表明，如果欧洲想在国际政治舞台上得到重视的话，它必须形成共同的欧洲立场。这一警示产生了积极效果，包括发展了欧洲安全战略并形成了英、法、德对伊朗的共同立场，欧洲安全战略使欧洲不

只在中东问题上统一了思想，对伊朗的共同立场显示欧洲从伊拉克战争中吸取了教训，并开始在这一重要问题上协调行动。

因此，大中东计划可能帮助欧盟重建其地中海和中东政策工具，即巴塞罗那进程。过去两、三年里，这一进程基本处于休眠状态。然而，欧盟及其成员国现在似乎已经意识到仅仅谈论建立稳定的欧洲—地中海区域是不够的，因为一个稳定的地区可能也只是停滞的地区。

另一方面，阿拉伯国家已经认识到，为了避免遭遇美国对该地区实行单边政策，不单与欧洲进行经济合作，而且与欧盟保持密切的政治乃至安全伙伴关系最符合他们自身的利益。他们还意识到，为了与欧洲进行有力的、制度性的政治合作，需要为渐进的政治改革做准备。所以，2005年秋天在庆祝巴塞罗那倡议出台十周年之际，可能会产生在未来十年内建立欧洲—地中海民主国家共同体的要求，这对阿拉伯国家来说肯定是一个需要接受的新事物。

## Über die Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Die deutsche Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) ist ein Verein zur Förderung der politischen Bildung und des gesellschaftspolitischen Dialogs. Ihre Hauptsitze sind in Berlin und Bonn. Die FES wurde 1925 als politisches Vermächtnis des ersten demokratisch gewählten deutschen Reichspräsidenten und Sozialdemokraten Friedrich Ebert gegründet. Als eine gemeinnützige, private, kulturelle Institution ist sie den Ideen und Grundwerten der Sozialen Demokratie verpflichtet. An 14 Standorten in Deutschland leistet die FES ihren Beitrag für die demokratische politische Bildung und aktive Mitwirkung der Bürger in Politik und Gesellschaft. Sie ist zugleich auch Plattform und Ideengeber im offenen politischen Dialog zur Lösung gesellschaftlicher Probleme. In ihrer internationalen Arbeit für Demokratie, Entwicklung, sozialen Ausgleich und Frieden kooperiert die FES mit Partnern in mehr als einhundert Ländern. Sie ist mit eigenen Büros in 80 Staaten zu Gast. Die Stiftung misst der Vertiefung des internationalen Dialogs eine große Bedeutung bei. Die Weltgesellschaft und die Weltmärkte bedürfen der Einbettung in politische Verantwortung sowie sozialer und ökologischer Regulation.

Die FES nahm bereits zu Beginn der von Deng Xiaoping eingeleiteten Reform- und Öffnungspolitik Kontakte und die Zusammenarbeit mit chinesischen Institutionen auf. Eigene Büros unterhält die Stiftung seit 1985 in Shanghai und seit 1987 in Peking. Vertragspartner sind die Chinesische Gesellschaft für Internationale Verständigung (CAFIU) in Peking und das Shanghai Institut für Internationale Studien (SIIS) in Shanghai. Darüber hinaus gibt es seit Mitte der 80er Jahre eine vertragliche Kooperation mit der Freundschaftsgesellschaft des Volkes der Provinz Sichuan, die vom Büro in Peking koordiniert wird. Die Arbeit der FES ist Bestandteil der deutschen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und Außenpolitik in China.

China öffnet sich zur Welt und hat als Transformationsland wirtschaftlich und politisch die Weltbühne betreten. Der nachdrückliche graduelle und tief greifende Wandel in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft und der damit verbundene soziale Umbruch sind eine Herausforderung an die Gestaltungsfähigkeit der Politik. Die Kommunistische Partei Chinas, Ministerien, Hochschulen, Forschungseinrichtungen, Verbände, Gewerkschaften und Nichtregierungsorganisationen sind bei der Gestaltung des Reformprozesses offen für internationale Kooperation und den Erfahrungsaustausch. Ziel der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in China ist es, in vertrauensvoller Zusammenarbeit mit ihren chinesischen Partnern die verschiedenen Ebenen des Reformprozesses zu begleiten und zu unterstützen sowie die internationalen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland / Europa und China zum Nutzen beider Seiten und für eine friedliche und gerechte internationale Ordnung zu vertiefen.

Das Büro der FES in Peking konzentriert sich zurzeit auf folgende Themenbereiche:



## 关于弗里德里希·艾伯特基金会

德国弗里德里希·艾伯特基金会（FES）是一个促进政治教育和社会政治对话的社会团体，总部位于柏林和波恩。她于1925年根据德国第一位民选帝国总统、社会民主党人弗里德里希·艾伯特的政治遗愿成立。作为一个公益、私立和文化机构，艾伯特基金会信奉社会民主主义的理念和基本价值。她在德国的14个分支机构致力于民主政治教育和促进公民积极参与政治和社会。同时，她也是解决社会问题的公开政治对话的平台和智库。在促进民主、发展、社会平衡与和平的国际工作中，艾伯特基金会与一百多个国家的伙伴进行合作，在八十个国家设有办公室。她在深化国际对话中起着重要作用。国际社会和世界市场需要被赋予政治责任以及按照社会（福利）和生态原则进行调节。

早在邓小平先生推行改革开放政策伊始，艾伯特基金会就和中国有关机构建立了联系并进行合作。之后又分别于1985和1987年在上海和北京成立了办公室。在北京和上海的协议合作伙伴分别是中国国际交流协会和上海国际问题研究所。此外，80年代中期以来，艾会还与四川省人民对外友好协会保持着协议合作关系，协调工作由北京办公室负责。艾伯特基金会的工作是德国发展合作与外交在中国工作的一个组成部分。

中国向世界开放并作为转型国家在经济和政治领域登上国际舞台。这个在经济和社会领域剧烈的、渐进的和影响深远的转型以及它带来的社会变革对政治塑造力提出了挑战。中国共产党、政府各部委、高校、研究机构、社会团体、工会和非政府组织在这个改革进程中都赞成国际合作和经验交流。艾伯特基金会在中国的目标是，通过和各领域伙伴充满信任的合作引导和支持此改革进程，深化中欧、中德的互利关系和强化一个和平、公平的国际秩序。

◆ **Rechtsstaat, Bürgerpartizipation und soziale Dimension im marktwirtschaftlichen System**

- Arbeitsbeziehungen in der Wirtschaft, Arbeitsmarktpolitik
- Gute Regierungsführung und Modernisierung der Verwaltung
- Zivilgesellschaft und Nichtregierungsorganisationen
- Korruptionsbekämpfung

◆ **Nachhaltige Entwicklung in der Provinz Sichuan**

◆ **Gewerkschaften und Interessenvertretung von Arbeitnehmern/innen**

- Interessenvertretung, betriebliche Mitbestimmung
- Deutsch-chinesischer Gewerkschaftsdialog zwischen dem Allchinesischen Gewerkschaftsbund und dem Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbund, der IG Metall und der IG Bergbau, Chemie, Energie

◆ **Politischer Dialog China - Deutschland/Europa**

- Menschenrechtsdialog
- Dialog über umfassende internationale Sicherheitspolitik
- Dialog über Regierungsführung und Rolle der Parteien in einer modernen Gesellschaft

Die Partnerschaft der FES und der CAFIU ist einvernehmlich eine Plattform flexibel gestalteter Formen der Zusammenarbeit. Kooperationspartner der FES in Peking sind in 2005:

- Chinesische Gesellschaft für Internationale Verständigung
- Internationale Abteilung beim ZK der KPC
- Parteihochschule beim ZK der KPC
- Allchinesischer Gewerkschaftsbund
- Chinesische Stiftung für die Entwicklung der Menschenrechte
- Tsinghua Universität, School of Public Policy and Management
- Universität für Politik- und Rechtswissenschaften, Institut für Arbeits- und Sozialrecht
- Chinese Centre for Contemporary World Studies

Die Zusammenarbeit erfolgt hauptsächlich durch gemeinsame Tagungen und Gesprächsprogramme in China und Deutschland, die auf einen intensiven politischen und fachlichen Meinungs- und Erfahrungsaustausch orientiert sind. Dabei wird ein breites Spektrum von Regierungsstellen, Hochschulen, Forschungsinstituten, Gewerkschaften, Verbänden und NGOs einbezogen.

艾伯特基金会北京办公室目前主要关注以下问题：

- 法制国家、公民参与和市场经济体制中的社会（福利）因素
  - 经济中的劳动关系、劳动力市场政策
  - 良治和行政管理现代化
  - 公民社会和非政府组织
  - 反腐败斗争
  
- 四川省的可持续发展
  
- 工会和雇员的利益代表
  - 利益代表、企业中职工共决
  - 中华全国总工会和德国工会联合会、五金工会和化学能源工会间的德中工会对话
  
- 中—德／欧政治对话
  - 人权对话
  - 综合国际安全对话
  - 关于执政和政党在现代社会中的角色的对话

艾伯特基金会和中国国际交流协会的伙伴关系也是其它多种合作的平台。2005年她在北京的合作伙伴是：

- 中国国际交流协会
- 中共中央对外联络部
- 中共中央党校
- 中华全国总工会
- 中国人权发展基金会
- 清华大学公共管理学院
- 中国政法大学劳动与社会保障法研究所
- 中国当代世界研究中心

合作的主要形式是在中国和德国共同举办有助于思想和经验交流的政治性、专业性会议和座谈活动。参加者主要来自政府机关、高校、研究所、工会、社团和非政府组织。

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