

LABOUR AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

# WAGE BARGAINING AND THE POTENTIAL OF WAGE DYNAMICS IN HUNGARY

**Zoltán Pogátsa and Máté Ruben Jengibarjan**  
February 2023



The research aims to identify longer-term wage trends and the role of trade unions in Hungary.



The impact of labour shortages, migration, government policies and trade unions' collective bargaining on wage increases in Hungary is evaluated.



The study offers insights to restore reputation, engage employees, and increase the influence of trade unions in Hungary.

LABOUR AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

# WAGE BARGAINING AND THE POTENTIAL OF WAGE DYNAMICS IN HUNGARY

POLICYSOLUTIONS



# Content

	<b>THE AIM OF THE RESEARCH</b>	4
<b>PART 1.</b>	<b>THE PROBLEMATIC METHODOLOGY OF MEASURING PRODUCTIVITY</b>	5
1.1	Background: The Debate around the Minimum Wage .....	5
1.2	Methodological Issues .....	6
1.3	The Evolution of Productivity and Wages in Hungary.....	7
<b>PART II.</b>	<b>THE REASONS FOR LOW TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP AND STRIKE ACTIVISM</b>	15
1.1	The TOP10 Reasons behind Low Union Membership .....	16
1.2	Recommendations .....	18
	<b>APPENDIX I. – DATABASE OF STRIKES IN HUNGARY IN RECENT YEARS</b>	20
	ABOUT THE AUTHORS .....	26
	IMPRINT .....	26

# THE AIM OF THE RESEARCH

The aim of this research has been to identify the longer-term potential of the Hungarian wage trends, as well as the role played by trade unions in these trends. We have undertaken the following:

## 1. Past wage dynamics

- Numerically elaborate recent wage trends in Hungary, in terms of the minimum wage, the average wage, the median wage and wage inequalities.
- Compare these wage trends with neighbouring countries in the region, as well as with Western Europe.
- Elaborate productivity trends in Hungary, broken down by firm size (large, SME and small), industry and geographical region.
- Compare these productivity trends with neighbouring countries in the CEE region, as well as Western Europe.

## 2. Problematising productivity

To demonstrate the questionable results of the productivity index, we shall

- Describe how the productivity index is calculated,
- Demonstrate how this is distorted by transfer pricing and tax optimisation by firms of various sizes,

- Demonstrate how alternative data (profitability and wealth dynamics, bank savings, etc.) shows that Hungarian firms produce enough value added to enable higher wages, exhibiting that official productivity figures are misleading.

## 3. Trade union participation

In order to establish the reasons for low trade union density we shall

- Carry out structured interviews with trade union leaders and members of firms where successful attempts to push for higher wages have taken place (strikes, threats of strikes)
- Carry out structured interviews with trade union organisers, members and non-unionised employees in firms where it has proved impossible to form trade unions, or where trade unions do exist, but with few members.
- Our aim is to establish patterns and motivations for staying away from unions as opposed to joining unions.

## PART 1.

# THE PROBLEMATIC METHODOLOGY OF MEASURING PRODUCTIVITY

### 1.1 BACKGROUND: THE DEBATE AROUND THE MINIMUM WAGE

There has by now been decades of debate around the issue of wage dynamics in Hungary. On a cautious side liberal economists and business leaders, have continued to argue that Hungary's wage trends are too fast, exceed the productivity trends, and will therefore result in serial bankruptcies and dramatic negative consequences for the labour market. Left-leaning economists, trade unions and the long serving right-wing government have all argued from different angles that wage trends in Hungary are in fact too slow. In addition, left leaning economists have argued that a low wage economy is unsustainable. It does not allow for enough demand in the economy, and too many firms have relied on cheap labour rather than technological improvements to compete. Left wing sociologists have added that it has a negative effect on social and political processes as well, since an underpaid society cannot sustain a democracy, and is forced into clientalistic relations.

The empirical data have vindicated the left leaning side overwhelmingly. There have been many waves of minimum wage increases in Hungary in recent decades, and in no instance have they resulted in a collapse of the labour market, or indeed even sizeable increases in unemployment. In the case of earlier increases there was a minor negative employment effect to go with the massively positive upside in the living standards, as in 2001-2, when even this could have been alleviated by more active labour market policies. In the case of more recent increases of the minimum wage, there have been cases of actual expansion of the labour market corresponding to an enormously positive and widespread impact on the living standards, as in the rises in the minimum wage in the years prior to the Covid crisis. In addition, there has also been a marked and sustained rise in the average wage in Hungary, even though it is still far away from Western European levels.

In not a single case have the dramatic negative effects foreseen by the liberal side materialised. Yet the two sides are still entrenched, the empirical developments remain-

Figure 1  
The evolution of the net average wage in Hungary (Source: Eurostat, 2022)





Figure 2  
The evolution of the gross average wage in Hungary (Source: Eurostat, 2022)



ing inconsequential. The liberal side continues the very same rhetoric regardless of having been wrong in so many instances.

The rapid wage increases over the last decade have not been led by trade unions. Collective bargaining is very weak in Hungary both at the national level and at the plant level and is effectively absent at the industry level. The long-time right-wing government has curtailed the rights of trade unions with numerous waves of legislation, including, not exclusively, the new Labour Code and the infamous “Slave Law”, while at the same time initiating a series of hikes in the minimum wage for political gain. The membership rate of the Hungarian trade union movement has decreased to below 9%, in comparison to around 30% in Western Europe and significantly above 50% in Scandinavia.

The process of wage increase has instead been driven by three factors: labour shortage, labour movement to Western Europe, and vote seeking by the government. Hungary has had an extremely tight labour market for long years now, which has pushed up wages, although mostly not through the collective bargaining efforts of trade unions, but through employees being attracted to higher paid jobs on an individual basis, both domestically and abroad. Labour migration to Western Europe (predominantly Austria, Germany and the UK), has also played a part as a viable alternative. In addition, as a third very important factor, the government has consciously sought to increase the minimum wage to gain the votes of low earners towards the end of parliamentary cycles.

This does not mean that there have not been important victories by trade unions in specific cases. However, as a general trend, the picture looks bleak.

## 1.2 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

The liberal side bases its arguments on the concept of productivity. They argue that an economy cannot continuously increase wages in excess of productivity increases. In the terminology of economics, productivity refers to the volume of value added per unit of time (usually hour or year) or per person employed. Since wages are paid out of value added (the remainder being profits), it is obvious that wage dynamics cannot exceed productivity dynamics in the longer run.

The problem is that productivity dynamics are mismeasured. Since productivity is based on aggregated measurements of value added, the latter must be measured accurately. However, this is not the case currently. There are two sets of reason for this.

### **One reason for inaccurate measurement of productivity is the purposefully distorted reporting of value added by companies.**

Hungary has what is often referred to as a dual economy, consisting of large multinational enterprises and domestic SMEs. It is well known that large multinational firms engage in transfer pricing, the manipulated shifting of value added and therefore profit (and therefore the tax base) to affiliates in jurisdictions where tax rates are lower. The other part of the economy consists of small and medium sized enterprises. Due to the availability of a very wide range of options to write off expenditure against revenues, the accounting profit of Hungarian SMEs is shown to be modest in official statistics.

A high percentage of primary agricultural producers do not even file tax forms. Although they are mostly self-em-

ployed, this does have some effect on wage trends as an alternative in the agricultural sector.

It is therefore justified to believe that the real as opposed to the accounting profitability of Hungarian firms is significantly higher than what is being reported to the tax authority, and what appears in value added statistics of the Central Statistical Office.

**The other reason for the inaccurate measurement of productivity has to do with an endogenous circularity of the productivity-wage relationship.**

As Martin Myant of the European Trade Union Institute had argued already back in 2016<sup>1</sup>, the measurement of productivity suffers from a serious flaw of endogenous circularity. Whereas mainstream neoclassical theory argues that it is higher productivity that enables higher wages, it fails to recognise that in fact local wages are part of measurements of local productivity.

As we have already mentioned, measuring productivity in an economy relies on measuring aggregate value added (i.e. GDP), which in turn relies on measuring value added at the firm level. However, firm level value added is equal to sales price minus all material costs. This differential, remarkably, includes wages!

The example Myant uses is a German carmaker shifting the production of a car seat from high wage Germany to low wage Romania. Same car seat, same technology, but significantly lower wages in Romania. The value added of car seat production now shows up in the statistics of the Romanian plant, and in turn in Romanian GDP. However, due to lower wage costs, the value added of the very same seat, produced with the very same technology, suddenly shows up as being significantly lower. This is the reason for the lower cost (sales price, be it intrafirm or interfirm) that the car manufacturer is trying to achieve within its transnational production chain by shifting production to a lower cost location.

Once we recognise the logic of the above example, we must also see that any increase in local wages must also show up in the value-added statistics. Higher wages make the sales price of the final product more expensive, and

since the value added, as we have outlined, is equal to the differential between the sales price and the sum of material costs, the (ceteris paribus) increase in wages automatically causes this value-added differential to increase as well. Since productivity is currently measured as value-added divided by employee, or alternatively as value added divided by working hours, the eventual productivity statistics will seem to improve as well, even though in fact nothing has changed except wages. The seat is still being manufactured with the same technology and material inputs.

Thus, wages are not only the variable that is explained by productivity, but they are also an explanatory variable of productivity under current rules of measuring the latter.

What this means is that other things being equal, a sustained upward trend in wages will result in a sustained upward trend in productivity. As we shall soon see, this is in fact what has happened in Hungary.

## 1.3 THE EVOLUTION OF PRODUCTIVITY AND WAGES IN HUNGARY

In the following pages we compare Hungarian wages and productivity to different countries. Relevant comparisons might include less developed economies to the Southeast of Hungary, such as Romania and Bulgaria. They might include the Visegrad<sup>4</sup> (V4) countries, which are at similar levels of development: Poland, Slovakia and Czechia. Finally, they might include more developed economies to the West of Hungary: France, Germany and Austria as well as the Nordic economies of Sweden, Finland and Denmark.

### 1.3.1 Minimum wages

The minimum wage has been steadily increasing in Hungary. When compared to the minimum wage trends to other European economies the Hungarian minimum wage is still lower than in the regional V4 economies. However, when the minimum wage is measured at purchasing power parity, Hungarian minimum wages can be said to be average in a regional comparison.

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.etui.org/publications/working-papers/unit-labour-costs-no-argument-for-low-wages-in-eastern-and-central-europe>

Figure 3  
**The evolution of minimal wages in Hungary (green=gross monthly, orange: annual increase) (Source: Portfolio 2021)**




Figure 4  
**Hungarian minimum wages in euros in a European comparison (Source: Eurostat, 2021)**







Figure 5  
Hungarian minimum wages at purchasing power parity in a European comparison (Source: Eurostat, 2021)





### 1.3.2 Productivity differential between small and large firms in Hungary

To study productivity, apparent labour productivity is used. Apparent labour productivity is defined as value added at factor costs divided by the number of persons employed.

In Hungary, the general trend is that larger firms are far more productive than smaller ones. By comparison, the German economy displays a similar trend, but the differentials are significantly lower.

Figure 6  
Apparent labour productivity by enterprise size in the Hungarian economy, in euros (Source: Eurostat, 2022)





### 1.3.3 Productivity differential between Hungary and other countries depending on firm size

Hungarian firms in general are much less productive than Western European and Nordic firms. Hungarian firms are also less productive than firms in the Visegrad Four econ-

omies, except for Slovakian firms with up to 9 employees. In all other categories Hungarian labour productivity is lower.




Figure 9  
**Hungarian small firms show somewhat lower productivity than V4 small firms, but significantly lower productivity than Western comparisons, in euros (Source: Eurostat, 2022)**




Figure 10  
**Hungarian middle-sized firms show somewhat lower productivity than V4 comparisons, but significantly lower productivity than Western comparisons, in euros (Source: Eurostat, 2022)**




Figure 11  
**A similar trend is demonstrated even among larger firms, in euros (Source: Eurostat, 2022)**






Figure 12  
**A similar trend can be observed even amongst very large firms, in euros (Source: Eurostat, 2022)**



All in all, productivity in Hungary and in the V4 region is considerably lower than in Western Europe in all enterprise size categories, in spite of historic efforts at convergence. Hungary displays somewhat lower productivity


than the regional average. As for trends, what we see in wages in Hungary is stagnation until around 2016, after which a sharp rise begins.

Figure 13  
**After years of stagnation there is a sharp rise in the unit labour cost from 2016 onwards (Source: Eurostat, 2022)**



When we take a look at productivity in Hungary, we find a similar pattern: stagnation until 2016, followed by a period of rising productivity:

Figure 14  
**Productivity per employee follows the same trend as wages: stagnation until 2016, followed by a rise (Source: Eurostat, 2022)**



This pattern begs the question of what causes what? Does rising productivity enable rising wages, as standard neoclassical explanations would suggest? Or do rising wages cause the statistical measurement of productivity to increase, as our methodological critique would explain?

The problem with the first explanation is that we see no reason why productivity should suddenly increase independently after 2016. All traditional explanatory factors of productivity were negatively influenced by government policy in the period prior to 2016. Sectors such as education and healthcare had suffered from long term under-

funding. There were no sudden inflows of high value added foreign direct investment, or outward migration of low value-added labour that could explain the sudden shift of gear in productivity dynamics.

In fact, it is much more likely that the causality is in the opposite direction. Due to the gradual saturation of the labour market, employees began to experience rising wages. Hungary advanced from a country of labour surplus to a country of labour shortage. The rising wages in turn showed up in the productivity statistics for the reasons explained in the methodological section.

## PART II.

# THE REASONS FOR LOW TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP AND STRIKE ACTIVISM

The second section of the study concentrates on explaining the low trade union membership rate in Hungary, as well as the low willingness of Hungarian employees to take part in the struggle for higher wages and better working conditions. The trade union membership rate of Hungary, currently at around 9%, is very low in an international comparison. In addition, there has been a long-time declining trend. Strikes are also rare in Hungary, although whenever they do occur, they are generally successful. In fact, employees do not even need to actively engage in strikes. Even the threat of strikes seems to be powerful enough to incentivise employers to grant concessions. However, even these encouraging general trends do not motivate Hungarian employees to join unions and engage in strikes.

To explore these paradoxical phenomena, qualitative analysis has been used, based on interviews with trade union


leaders and activists, in order to arrive at a detailed understanding and interpret the non-quantifiable data. The next section will outline the methodology and sampling of the research, after which the findings will be discussed. Finally, some recommendations for the trade unions will be elaborated.

### Sampling

The interviews were conducted with labour union leaders and members at several levels of the union organizations, including local, regional, and national levels. These structured consultations allowed the researchers to gain an in-depth understanding of the characteristics of the current functioning of the unions, revealing how union leaders and members see their role in society, as well as the difficulties they face during their activities.

Figure 15

**Hungarian trade union membership is extremely low in a European comparison (Source: Eurostat, 2022)**



Even though in general Hungarian labour unions are declining in membership, and their internal functioning is not well organized, there are some labour unions which are able to sustain or even increase their membership. Some are also able to engage in an effective bargaining process with their employer, and can even organize strikes with a very high participation rate. In these specific cases their internal dynamics are effective. We have aimed to compare these 'effective' unions with the less effective ones relying on the *most-similar case* design. This involves finding a 'pair' for the effective union and examining what is done differently in the less effective one.

## Ethics

We have conducted the interviews anonymously. Our interview subjects were more willing to express their problems openly, as they were made aware that this would not have a negative impact on their reputation within the organization, and they will be not held accountable for their statements by other members of their unions.

## Analysis

Through the interviews, the researchers have gained a comprehensive understanding of the internal dynamics, practices, and challenges of the Hungarian labour unions. This was then contrasted with the practices and dynamics of Central and Western European labour unions. Therefore, our analysis relies on two-fold comparisons. First, between effective and less effective Hungarian labour unions, based in the same cultural, economic, and regulatory environment. Secondly, between Hungarian and Central and Western European labour unions. Here we considered society wide, political, cultural, attitudinal differences between the countries and between the environments the unions operate in.

### 1.1 THE TOP10 REASONS BEHIND LOW UNION MEMBERSHIP

The interviews have uncovered several reasons for the low commitment to trade unions. Some of these reasons are societal and some operate at the individual level. We shall start with the societal ones.

We found the following issues that explain the low union participation. There are several reasons, some are historic, some are contemporary political, and some are due to current structures.

#### 1.1.1 Negative historical association

In countries where the development of the trade union movement had been organic, there is nationwide awareness of their roles. Widespread membership, institutional-

ised mechanisms of functioning, media coverage and frequent (often nation-wide) strikes facilitate this awareness. In Hungary, this is not the case. The trade union movement during the Soviet-style regime was a mere rubber stamp on the will of the party, where bottom-up initiatives were discouraged. With the change of regime, the institutions of social partnership were created, with a continued role for the trade unions. However, social partnership was so far from the focus of transition, that entire generations have since been socialised into democratic politics without an understanding of their roles. Even nominally left-wing governments often ignored trade unions and social partnerships. Interviewees have stated that many employees still view trade unions as a relic from the past, as a "commie thing", a "left-wing thing". Further Hungarian politics still takes the transition and the previous regime as its point of reference, even though over three decades have passed. This association is negative for the majority of voters who vote right wing, and is usually treated as a comical and rather embarrassing part of the country's past by others.

The association of trade unions with the political Left is unfounded because in fact the neoliberal policies of nominally left-wing political parties after transition had also been anti trade unions when they were in power. This also deterred many from joining unions. Until today, the trade union movement is wary of signing any formal agreement with left wing political parties, given that much of their membership does not sympathise with these parties.

It does not help that the united political opposition to the Orbán regime is not interested in trade unions. Reregulation of their roles did not feature prominently in the final version of the opposition programme during the 2022 parliamentary election, which was dominated by a right-wing candidate and his liberal economic advisors. This is a grave failure, as their reinstatement as important social partners would be a crucial element of a sustainable post-Orbán socio-political consensus.

#### 1.1.2 Association with unpopular Left wing political parties

It is an indication of the convoluted and confusing nature of Hungarian politics that while, as we have described above, the political opposition parties by and large are not interested in trade unions, paradoxically many employees are reluctant to join unions exactly because they are associated with nominally Left-wing political parties. The distribution of political sympathies amongst potential union members is unlikely to be significantly different from the distribution of political sympathies in Hungarian society in general. In the present political conditions, this means that over half of them are likely to be Fidesz voters, with a significant further share of additional right-wing voters. Amongst these voters nominally Left-wing parties, who had mismanaged the country while in power, are highly unpopular and often outright detested.



Attempts by opposition politicians from these parties to take part in workplace struggle, or to co-opt former trade union leaders into their parliamentary fractions are therefore seen as signs of political collusion between unions and these unpopular politicians. Independent trade unions sometimes attribute their relative popularity to their strictly non-political line.

### 1.1.3 The stigma of ineffective and corrupt leadership in the recent past

Due to some trade union leaders who rather looked after their personal interests than those of the members, unfortunately all trade union leaders gained a lasting reputation for self-interest.

### 1.1.4 Political pressure by the Orbán government

The current Hungarian government actively pressures employees not to join trade unions and perpetuates a negative discourse about trade unions in general, which discourages people from becoming active members. The anti-trade union stance and legislation of the government trickles down to the level of employees. Becoming a trade union member becomes a disadvantage in the workplace, or even a politically dangerous activity.

Strike laws have severely curtailed the possibilities of industrial action in several professions, such as the police, public servants, teachers, medical staff and public transport.

### 1.1.5 Lack of understanding of the role of the trade unions

It is difficult for trade unions to stay visible outside of periods of strike or wage negotiation. It has often happened, for instance, that trade unions have managed to achieve an open ended (indefinite term) collective agreement, after which they suddenly became useless in the eyes of the employees. It is also often the case that employees are not aware that the many benefits, rules and regulations circumscribing their work had been won by the trade unions. Sadly, there is often little to no awareness of these being trade union achievements amongst those represented.

In practice, the largest waves of inflow into the trade unions usually occur whenever employees see the trade union as useful and active, especially during strikes and wage negotiations. Major exit flows often take place, however, at the end of wage negotiations, whenever employees are not satisfied with the results reached.

Thirty-two years after transition, it is still a widespread complaint that employees do not see what they get in return for their membership fees. As wages rise, the abso-

lute amount of their 1% contributions also rises, and many feel that they can save money by not remaining members. It does not help that in recent decades the local branches of the trade unions, when unable to deliver on their core functions, have taken on auxiliary roles to make themselves attractive. Thus, for generations of employees, trade union membership fees financed excursions, common celebrations (Womens' Day and Santa Claus events are often mentioned as examples), and even social assistance. Thus, many members who fail to see the core functions of the union, or no longer believe in them, expect a more immediate "return" upon their "investment". This leaves less than adequate funding for the core functions of the union.

Local branches often complain that they do not have adequate income to pool a strike fund. Other unions, however, assert that employees have proved willing to strike even without a strike fund in recent years.

For the time being, the Hungarian trade union movement is caught up in a vicious spiral. The lower their membership, the less revenues they receive in the form of membership fees. The less income they have, the less they are able to perform, and thus they become even less attractive to potential employees, leading to a further loss of membership and support. This vicious spiral can only be reversed and turned into an upwardly, virtuous spiral by concentrating more on the core functions of trade unions and making members understand why these are more important than an immediate return of their fees in the form of community events.

### 1.1.6 There has been a general increase in wages even without the trade unions

It does not help the society-wide image of trade unions that even though they have been neglected by the government, both average wages and minimum wages have increased markedly during the last decade. Employees simply do not see a role for the unions in circumstances where wages rise anyway due to the will of the government, which seeks political gain from raising the minimum wage. Others see minimum wages rising as a consequence of "market processes", nation-wide labour shortage, etc. While there is evidently some truth in these opinions, trade unions are still crucial actors in social partnership.

### 1.1.7 Inadequate visibility

There are quite simply far too many employees who are not even aware that trade unions exist or play a role.

It is difficult for trade unions to stay visible outside of a strike or wage negotiation season. It has often happened, for instance, that trade unions have managed to achieve an open ended (indefinite term) collective agreement, after which they suddenly became useless in the eye of

the employees. It is also often the case that employees are not aware that many benefits, rules and regulations circumscribing their work had been won by the trade unions, but there is no awareness of this amongst those represented.

### 1.1.8 Lack of organizational learning and memory (training)

Trade unions are often unable to adopt to the changing circumstances of today's labour market. These circumstances call for labour unions to innovate, learn and adopt to these. But the institutional structure is missing in the unions. They are not used to asking their members or the employees at the firms for their input on what they would want to see labour unions do. It is especially critical that major Hungarian trade unions have proved unable to develop a formal internal training system. Over a number of terms, trade union leaders at both the federal and the industry level have pledged to install a stable formal system of training for union staff, as well as new members. This has never materialised. Trainings are haphazard, with no institutional continuity or permanency. This critically jeopardises the institutional memory and the collective knowledge of the Hungarian trade union movement.

The above have been societal reasons for the lack of support for Hungarian trade unions. Now we shall enumerate the more individual reasons.

### 1.1.9 Individual paths to personal gain preferred to collective stance

There is widespread reluctance for common action in Hungarian society in general, not only in the domain of the labour market. This nationwide passivity and individualism also manifests itself in the case of trade unions. Employees in general, even union members, do not have much faith in collective action. Therefore, they prefer individual paths, such as:

- Attempting to achieve individual gains by maintaining a good relationship with bosses
- Accepting or actively seeking overtime work, which is often better paid, but in the long run leads to exhaustion and a rapid deterioration of one's health status
- Changing jobs often in the circumstances of nation-wide labour shortage, which weakens local trade unions due to significant fluctuation.

### 1.1.10 No sense of ownership

In contrast to Western democracies, where generations of trade union members had struggled to achieve labour rights, Hungarian workers had received them "from above" during the Communist period. This gives them no sense of ownership, of achievement. Thus, when the

rights and competencies of trade unions are rolled back or revoked, there is no collective sense of humiliation.

## 1.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on our study, a number of recommendations can be formulated in order to improve the situation of trade unions in Hungary.

- a. Most importantly, the federal level of the unions should engage in a large-scale **awareness raising campaign** about the role of social partnership and trade unions in a Western democracy.
- b. Equally important, the federational level of the unions should undertake the task of institutionalising **regular, systemic, formal and permanently institutionalised training** for functionaries. This would ensure an even preparedness of trade union staff in areas such as the role of social partnership, legal issues, communicational skills, public relations, etc. We estimate the cost of such a centralised, formal, permanent institution to be around HUF 40-50 million per year. It should be financed by contributions from the branch unions and should be accountable to them.
- c. Trade unions should conduct **surveys** regularly to assess the needs and opinions of its members.
- d. Trade unions should also revive the successful **research institute** they had operated in the 1990s. The legal foundation behind the institute still exists. Western trade unions all rely on such research institutes, which gives them both a better reputation for professionalism, as well as more visibility in the media. Such an institute would better counteract the neoliberal dominance of the Hungarian economics profession in domestic public debates.
- e. Collective agreements currently are automatically applicable to non-members as well. The trade union movement refers to this as the freeriding problem. The system could be improved if all those covered by the collective agreements would have to pay an annual **collective agreement fee** of 1% - equivalent to a membership fee. (No trade union should be allowed to undercut this rate.) This would incentivise employees to enter the union, as in this case payment would enable them to influence decisions, while the alternative of staying outside would not.
- f. The financial independence of the federal level, which plays a central role in national institution and reputation building. At the moment, this level is financially dependent on state financing. Many employees (correctly) believe local staff are paid by the employer, and top leaders by the state. It would be worth considering paying all union staff at all levels directly from the union budget.

## APPENDIX I.

# DATABASE OF STRIKES IN HUNGARY IN RECENT YEARS

Kik sztrájkoltak	Mikor volt	Mit csináltak a sztrájk keretében	Hányan vettek részt	Fő követelések	Mennyire volt sikeres
Tungsram dolgozói mind az 5 telephelyen	2022.02.24.	Sztrájk		Kollektív szerződés felmondása ellen, 3 legfontosabb pont: a felmondási időt, a végkielégítést és csoportos létszámleépítés esetén a vállalatnál dolgozó házastársak védelmét	
Pedagógusok Demokratikus Szakszervelete (PDSZ)	2022.január.31	A sztrájkoló tanárok nem tartották meg a tanítási nap első 2 óráját	26 782	Magasabb bérek, munkaterhek csökkentése, Ne küldjék fizetés nélküli szabadságra azokat a dolgozókat, akik nem oltatják be magukat koronavírus ellen	Nem volt sikeres. Nem érték el semmilyen érdemleges változást a sztrájkoló tanárok. Emellett a Fővárosi Ítéletábla, első fokon, jogellenesnek találta a sztrájkot.
Vegyipari Dolgozók Szakszervezete (VDSZ) a GE Aviation gyárban	2021.06.10	2 órás figyelmeztető sztrájk	Az épp dolgozó 200 alkalmazott 10 százaléka csatlakozott a munkabeszüntetéshez.	Magasabb éves bérnövekedést.munkavállalói érdekképviselet szerint az éves szinten mindössze 2 százalékos béremelési ajánlat nevésségesen kevés. A 2% helyett a munkások 4%-ot követelnek.	Sikeres volt, megállapodtak, a munkások megkapták a 4%-os béremlést
B.Braun Medical kft gyöngyösi gyárában a Vasas Szakszervezet	2021.03.10	három napon át, március 10-től 12-éig minden műszakot érintve, kilenc alkalommal 2-2 órás sztrájk		Bérek növekedése és satbil munkahelyi körülmények. Részletesebben: a munkabeszüntetésre „azért kerül sor, mert a február 23-án szinte 100 százalékos részvétellel megtartott eredményes figyelmeztető sztrájkot követően sem vette a munkáltató figyelembe a munkavállalók elégedetlenségét, azóta sem tett új ajánlatot, az álláspontok érdemben nem közeledtek.” A szakszervezet meggyőződése ugyanakkor, hogy a munkáltatónak is figyelembe kellene vennie, „a COVID nemcsak a gazdaságot érintette hátrányosan, hanem a munkavállalókat is, így nem várható el, hogy csak a munkavállalók viseljék az azzal járó terheket. Az infláció a korábbi éveknél jóval magasabb, így a nettó bérek nem érnek már annyit, mint akár tavaly ilyenkor és további emelkedő inflációval számolhatunk. Nem hárítható minden gazdasági kockázat a munkavállalókra.”	Nem volt sikeres, a gyár kitarzott az eredeti bérajánlata mellett
Makói Continental gumigyárban a munkások	Feb.21	előbb kettő, nyolc majd huszonnégy órás sztrájkot, míg végül márciusban határozatlan idejű sztrájkot tartottak a gyár dolgozói	1600 ember dolgozott összesen a gyárban	Jobb munkakörülmények, a 2020 nyáron egyoldalúan felrúgott kollektív szerződés visszaállítása és újratárgyalása	A sztrájk végén a munkáltató abban állapodott meg a munkavállalókkal, hogy év végéig visszaállítja az általa tavaly nyáron egyoldalúan felrúgott kollektív szerződést, és új kollektív szerződés tárgyalásába kezd a szakszervezetekkel.

Kik sztrájkoltak	Mikor volt	Mit csináltak a sztrájk keretében	Hányan vettek részt	Fő követelések	Mennyire volt sikeres
Önkormányzati dolgozók	2020. 09. 02	háromnapos sztrájk		Bérenövedést és az életpályamodell hiányának pótlását. Emellett az önkormányzati forrásokat érintő kormányzati elvonások az önkormányzati intézményekben dolgozó szociális, kulturális, oktatási, egészségügyi és hivatali alkalmazottak foglalkoztatási biztonságát is veszélyeztetik.	Nem volt annyira sikeres
Ortopéd Cipőkészítők Szövetsége	2020.08.17	munkalassító sztrájk ugusztus 17 és 23 között	Felhívni a figyelmet a szakam alulfinanszírozottságáról, mivel 10 éve megszábotott hatáskörrel kell dolgozniuk		
Pedagógusok Szakszervelete (PSZ)	2019.11.30	Utcai tüntetés és sztrájk fenyegetés		többletterhek, pedagógus óraszámok csökkentése, minden iskolai dolgozóra – pedagógus és nem pedagógus végzettségűre – kiterjedő béremelés, a bérek vetítési alapjának minimálbérhez kötése, túlmunkák kifizetése, kiszámítható jogalkotás. Nagyobb együttműködés a kormány és a pedagógus szakszervezet között.	Nem tudtak változásokat elérni a tanárok
Baleseti sebészek / Péterfy Kórház Manningér Jenő Baleseti Központ	2019.05.03.	Részleges sztrájk	84	béremelés	n.a.
Légiforgalmi irányítók a HungaroControlnál	2019.04.17	2 órás sztrájk, és további sztrájkfenyegetés		21 pontos követelések a munkakörülményeikkel, illetve munkaidő beosztási kérdésekkel kapcsolatosak	Sikeres volt, megállapodtak a munkások és a vezetőség és ezért elmaradt a további sztrájk
CONTROL Magyar Légiforgalmi Irányítók Szakszervezete /Hungarocontrol	2019.04.17.	Figyelmeztető sztrájk	n.a.	Munkakörülmények, munkaidő- beosztás	megállapodás
Metro áruházak dolgozói	2019.04.17	déltől 4-ig sztrájkolnak a dolgozók	10 áruház, 180 fő, 50%/2400	Bérendezés	
KASZ / Metro áruházak	2019.04.12.	Figyelmeztető sztrájk	90%	béremelés	sztrájk
VDSZ / Sanofi	2019.04.09.	Figyelmeztető sztrájk	98,6%, 783 fő/2000	béremelés	megállapodás
Chinoi dolgozói a cég budapesti, csanyik-völgyi és veresgyházi telephelyén	2019.04.09	2 órás figyelmeztető sztrájk	termelési részen a munkavállalók 98,6%-a sztrájkolt.	Bérendezés: a szakszervezet minden munkavállalónak 30 000 ft béremelést szeretne elérni	a munkáltató meghallgatta, komolyan vette, a felek érdemi tárgyalást folytattak és megfogalmazták szándékukat a közös megállapodásra
MKKSZ / Kormány	2019.03.14.	Sztrájk	7500/17 000	jogszabályok, munkafeltételek	tárgyalás
Köztisztviselők sztrájkja	2019.03.14	munkabeszüntetés	7500	terheket növelő új törvény ellen tiltakoznak	
PDSZ	2019.03.14.	Szolidaritási sztrájk	1 iskola	MKKSZ sztrájk mellett	
Operaházi Dolgozók Szakszervezete / Opera	2019.03.14.	Sztrájk (20 perc)	a férfikórus 70, a női kórus 50 százaléka, illetve pár zenekari zenész	Kollektív szerződés, 35% béremelés.	
Wescast kipufogógyár	2019.03.12	határpatlan idejű, de csak 1 nap volt	300/1200 összesen	béremelés	Sikeres volt

Kik sztrájkoltak	Mikor volt	Mit csináltak a sztrájk keretében	Hányan vettek részt	Fő követelések	Mennyire volt sikeres
Hankook dolgozói	2019.03.12	10 napos sztrájk		bérendezés, minden alkalmazott béremelése	Sikeres volt, megállapodtak
VDSZ / Hankook Dunaújváros	2019.03.06.	Figyelmeztető-sztrájk	Majdnem mindenki	bértárgyalás	sztrájk
Vasas / Wescast	2019.03.06.	Figyelmeztető-sztrájk	291/297	Béremelés	sztrájk
Életre Tervezett Munkavállalók Szövetsége (ÉTMosz) / SEGA (Starters E-Components Generators Automotive Hungary)	2019.02.13	Sztrájk	50/1600	alpbér-emelést, lojalitási és karácsonyi bónuszt, öt év munkaidő esetén jubileumi jutalmat követelnek a kínai tulajdonú cég vezetésétől.	Egyoldalú béremelés, több embert kirúgtak
Győri Tesco	2019.02.07	munkabeszűntetés		béremelés	Részben sikeres, voltak a végén tárgyalások, de a sztrájk közben a kötelező egészségügyi adatszolgáltatások elmaradtak. Ezért kijötték a hatóságok
Életre Tervezett Munkavállalók Szövetsége (ÉTMosz) / SEGA (Starters E-Components Generators Automotive Hungary)	2019.02.07.	Figyelmeztető-sztrájk	10%	Béremelés	sztrájk
Starters E-Components Generators Automotive Hungary Kft. miskolci gyárában	2019.02.06	2 órás figyelmeztető sztrájk		béremelés	
Kereskedelmi Dolgozók Független Szakszervezete (KDFSZ)	2019.02.06.	Sztrájk	100% 40 fő	átképzési hozzájárulás, végkielégítés és félévi bér	n.a.
Kereskedelmi Dolgozók Független Szakszervezete (KDFSZ) / Tesco Győri bérszámfejtő részleg	2019.02.05.	Figyelmeztető-sztrájk	100%, 40 fő	átképzési hozzájárulás, végkielégítés és félévi bér	sztrájk
Győri Audi gyár	2019.01.28	6 napos sztrájk	4000	béremelés	Sikeres volt, megállapodás született
Audi Hungaria Független Szakszervezet (AHFSZ) / Audi	2019.01.18.	Figyelmeztető-sztrájk	100%, 4000 fő/ 13 200	béremelés	Sztrájk
ELTE / EMMI	2018.11.14.	Sztrájk (Információs sztrájk)	n.a.	a társadalmi nemek szak megszüntetése miatt, a tanszabadság, az egyetem függetlenségének megőrzése érdekében	semmi
Multinacionális Cégek Dolgozóinak Szakszervezete (MCDSZ) / Villeroy & Boch Magyarország Kft.	2018.04.06.	Sztrájk (54 óra)	30%	12 százalékos béremelés	tárgyalás
Hódmezővásárhelyi Villeroy & Bochnál	2018.04.03	általános sztrájk		béremelés	Tárgyalás volt a szakszervezet és a munkáltató között
Hopi Hungária gépkocsivezetői	2018.03.09	általános sztrájk		béremelés	Sikeres volt, a kamionosok kiharcolták az év elejére is visszamenőleg a béremelést
Mérnökök és Technikusok Szabad Szakszervezete (MTSZSZ) / CabTec Kft.	2018.03.08.	Figyelmeztető-sztrájk	Több, mint a fele / 450 fő	béremelés	Egyoldalú béremelés (10%-ból 5%)
MKKSZ / Kormány	2018.02.15	Sztrájk (3 nap)	112 hivatalban 7312 fő	béremelés	semmi
Miskolci Bosch gyárában	2018.02.15	több napos sztrájk		béremelés	

Kik sztrájkoltak	Mikor volt	Mit csináltak a sztrájk keretében	Hányan vettek részt	Fő követelések	Mennyire volt sikeres
Autóelektronikai Dolgozók Független Szakszervezete(HaDFSZ) / BOSCH	2018.02.12.	figyelmeztető-sztrájk	508/2200 (a műszak 90%-a)	béremelés	Egyoldalú béremelés
Hatvani Bosch gyár dolgozói	2018.02.05	munkabeszűntetés		béremelés és munkahangulat javító változások is megtörténtek	Sikeres volt a munkások elérték a követeléseik nagy részét
MKKSZ / Kormány	2018.01.12	Sztrájk (2 nap)	98 hivatal, 7000 fő	Béremelés	semmi
Tesco alkalmazottai	2017.09.11	általános sztrájk	Minden tizedik tesco bezárt	béremelés	Nagyon sikeres volt a Tesco megemelte a béreket
Kereskedelmi Alkalmazottak Szakszervezetének (KASZ), Kereskedelmi Dolgozók Független Szakszervezete (KDFSZ) / Tesco	2017.09.09	Sztrájk	120 áruház/ 206 üzlet van, mintegy 20 ezer munkavállaló	Béremelés, létszám feltöltése péntek 16 órától 24 óráig szombatra pedig 10 órától 24 óráig	megállapodás
Máv Start utasellátó sztrájk	2017.09.04	általános sztrájk	bérendezés	Tárgyalásokhoz vezetett a sztrájk	
Fogorvosok (Nagy Ákos, Keszthely) / EMMI	2017.09.01	Sztrájk, petíció, aláírásgyűjtés	3000 aláírás, a rendelőkegyharmada	Csak sürgősségi ellátás, a praxis pénzemelése miatt	1 m-s emelés
VDSzSz Szolidaritás / MÁV-Start Utasellátó Központ	2017.08.29	Sztrájk	n.a.	Leépítés ellen.	felfüggesztés
Opera dolgozói	2017.08.28	este 5órás sztrájk, de nem maradt el az aznapi előadás, úgyhogy nem volt teljesen sztrájk	A főigazgató tvással megszüntette a kollektív szerződést és nem hajlandó újat kötni. Bérendezés, túlórák rendes megfizetése	Mivel végül megtartották az előadást ezért részben elmaradt a sztrájk	
VDSZ / Continental Makó	2017.08.04	Sztrájk	100 kazános van összesen	Kazánosok rosszul lettek, hőség - munkakörülmények	megegyezés
MKKSZ / Kormány	2017.07.17.	Sztrájk (2 óra)	100 település 5000 Fő	25 százalékos azonnali bértörlesztés, ennek alaptörlesztés után 2018. januárjától újabb 12 százalékos emelés, a harmadik évben 7 százalékos béremelés, vagy a 9 éve változatlanul 38 650 forintos illetményalapot 60 ezer forintra emelni, július elseje legyen a Közigazgatás Napja	semmi
Vízügyi igazgatóságon dolgozók	2017.07.11	Csak Sztrájk fenyegetés volt		béremelés	Sikeres volt a KORMÁNY növelte a béreket
Vasas / Velux	2017.05.13.	Figyelmeztető-sztrájk	Összesen 1000	Bértárgyalás, béremelés	n.a.
Szakszervezet / Richard Fritz Kft., Aszód (török)	2017.02.07.	Figyelmeztető-sztrájk	n.a.	béremelés	Megállapodás, 10%
Audi motorgyár alkalmazottai	2017.01.26	2 órás sztrájk	1500	béremelés	Sikeres volt
Vasas / Mercedes	2016.11.24	Figyelmeztető-sztrájk	60	béremelés	tárgyalás
MKKSZ / Kormány	2016.09.14	Sztrájk (egész nap)	168 hivatal, 5900 fő	30 százalékos béremelés	Önkorm. illetményalap meghatározási jog egyoldalú kormányzati intézkedéssel
MKKSZ / Kormány	2016.06.22	Sztrájk (2 óra)	100 alapszervezet, 15%, 4700 fő	30 százalékos béremelés és életpályamodell az önkormányzati tisztviselők számára	semmi

Kik sztrájkoltak	Mikor volt	Mit csináltak a sztrájk keretében	Hányan vettek részt	Fő követelések	Mennyire volt sikeres
Pedagógus Szakszervezet (PSZ), az Oktatási Vezetők Szakszervezete, valamint a Magyar Közoktatási és Szakképzési Szakszervezet / EMMI	2016.04.20.	Sztrájk	1185 iskola 25 201 fő	Oktatás, pedagógusbérek	semmi
PDSZ / EMMI	2016.04.15.	Figyelmeztető-sztrájk	n.a.	Az oktatás tarthatatlan helyzete miatt	semmi
Vasas / Autoliv	2016.03.31.	Figyelmeztető-sztrájk	700/2400	béremelés	megállapodás
Tanítanék, Civil Közoktatási Platform / kormány	2016.03.30.	Sztrájk (1 óra)	300 iskola, 15 ezer ember (diákokkal, szülőkkel)	közoktatás átalakításáért. A Tanítanék Mozgalom szervezte polgári engedtelenséghez „Kockás nap”	semmi
Miskolci Tömegközlekedési Dolgozók Szakszervezete / Miskolci Városi Közlekedési (MVK) Zrt. akarják kikényszeríteni.	2016.02.17.	Sztrájk	n.a.	elmaradt tavalyi béremelés, az évek óta visszatartott prémium, a diszkrimináció megszüntetése, a szakszervezetekkel való kulturált, rendszeres egyeztetés	semmi
Vasúti Dolgozók Szabad Szakszervezete / MÁV	2015.10.20.	Sztrájk	n.a.	Fertőzésveszély miatt Gyékényesen leállt az éjszaka és a nappalos tolatócsapat	takarítás
ÉŐDSZ Szakszervezet / JNT Security Kft.	2015.04.21	Sztrájk	50 fő, 8,5% május 6-án 54 287 főből	béremelés	Felfüggesztés, újajánlat
ELTE oktatók / EMMI	2015.04.20.	Sztrájk(információs sztrájk)	n.a.	Szakok megszüntetése elleni tiltakozás	semmi
Élelmezéstartalék Munkavállalók Független Szakszervezete (ÉMFSZ) / Pick Zrt.	2015.02.26.	Sztrájk (5.5 óra)	200	drasztikus teljesítménynövelés, ki nem fizetett plusz munka miatt.	megállapodás
Győri buszvezetők / ÉNYKK	2015.02.11.	Sztrájk	n.a.	Üzemkedettől 5.30-ig, elmaradt bérfizetés miatti spontán leállás.	Kifizették a béreket
Élelmezéstartalék Munkavállalók Független Szakszervezete (ÉMFSZ) / Pick Zrt.	2015.02.10.	Figyelmeztető sztrájk (1 óra)	170	Béremelés, teljesítménykövetelmények csökkentése	sztrájk
Multinacionális Cégek Dolgozóinak Szakszervezete (MCDSz) / Lagermax Autótranszport Kft.	2014.07.07.	Figyelmeztető-sztrájk	110/ 200	Béremelés, bérmegállapodás	n.a.
Taxisok / Főtaxi, Főváros	2013.08.16.	Sztrájk	n.a.	Leadó emelése ellen	megállapodás
Operaházi Dolgozók Szakszervezete / Opera	2013.06.01.	Sztrájk (fél óra)	n.a.	Béremelés, kollektív szerződéskötés	n.a.
Vasas / Dunaferr	2013.02.20.	Sztrájk	n.a.	Béremelés, szociális juttatások, bérmegállapodás	megállapodás
Vasas / Dunaferr	2012.04.12.	Sztrájk	1734 / n.a.	Bér- és szociális megállapodás létrehozása	megállapodás
Vasas / Dunaferr	2012.04.02.	Figyelmeztető-sztrájk	151 / n.a.	Bér- és szociális megállapodás létrehozása	sztrájk
Szolidaritás Autóbusz-közlekedési Szakszervezet / Kapos Volán, OrangeWays	2011.12.13.	Sztrájk	42 / n.a.	Elmaradt bérek kifizetése	Bírósági perek
GSZSZ / Budairport	2011.05.11.	Figyelmeztető sztrájk (1 óra)	n.a.	Bérendezés	n.a.
Hunalpa / Malév	2011.03.23.	Figyelmeztető-sztrájk	2 / 200	Pihenőidő szabályozása	megállapodás
AKSZSZ / Orangeway	2011.03.10.	Sztrájk	70	béremelés	AB beadvány
Buszsofőrök / T&J Busz Projekt Kft.	2010.12.16.	Figyelmeztető-sztrájk	20%	n.a.	n.a.
Vasas / Ganz Röck	2010.09.03	Sztrájk	370 / 370	Elmaradt bér, kilépések lehetővé tétele, tárgyalás	Felszámolás

Kik sztrájkoltak	Mikor volt	Mit csináltak a sztrájk keretében	Hányan vettek részt	Fő követelések	Mennyire volt sikeres
Hunalpa / Malév	2010.09.03.	Figyelmeztető-sztrájk	16 / 200	Bérek megőrzése, tárgyalások, munkafeltételek	megállapodás
Munkavállalók / Pannon Szárnyas	2010.04.17.	Sztrájk	200 / 200	Elmaradt bér kifizetése, tárgyalás	n.a.
Vasas / Ganz Röck	2010.02.17	Sztrájk	370 / 370	Elmaradt bér kifizetése, tárgyalás	Részleges kifizetések
Vasas / Ganz Röck	2010.02.11.	Sztrájk	370 / 370	Elmaradt bér kifizetése	Később kifizették a béreket
VDSZSZ / MÁV Cargo	2010.01.22.	Sztrájk	n.a.	Létszámleépítés ellen	Kisebbségi elbocsátás
VDSZSZ	2010.01.14.	Szolidaritási sztrájk	3%-os részvétellel (4 óra)	BKV-sok mellett	
BKV szakszervezetek / BKV	2010.01.12	Sztrájk	cc.3000 / n.a.	Kollektív szerződés megújítása, béremelés, juttatások rendezése	megállapodás
LESZ / Malév GH	2010.01.11	Sztrájk	30-35 fő műszakonként / n.a.	Kollektív szerződés megújítása, béremelés	megállapodás



## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

**Dr. Zoltán Pogátsa** is an economist at the University of Sopron, Hungary. He specialises in political economy and economic development. He is the author of seven books and numerous professional studies and articles.

**Ruben Jengibarjan** is an MA student in Political Science at the Central European University, he completed his undergraduate studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics at University College London.

## IMPRINT

Publisher:  
Office Budapest Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung  
1056 Budapest | Fővám tér 2–3.  
Tel.: +36-1-461-60-11 | Fax: +36-1-461-60-18  
[budapest@fes.de](mailto:budapest@fes.de)

<https://budapest.fes.de/>

Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES.

## WAGE BARGAINING AND THE POTENTIAL OF WAGE DYNAMICS IN HUNGARY



The aim of the research is identifying the longer-term potential of the wage trends in Hungary and the role of trade unions in this process. Wage trends and productivity are closely connected and the study tries to answer the question if wages should be low in order to increase productivity or rather grow to promote it. In Hungary, the upward trend in wages have led to a sustained increase in productivity and not to the collapse of the labour market. However, measuring productivity is problematic; productivity is based on aggregated measurements of value added, the latter must be measured accurately which is not the case currently.



Productivity differential between Hungary and other countries depends on firm size. Hungarian firms in general are much less productive than Western European and Nordic firms. (If we can believe productivity statistics, which, as stressed above, is not the case.) Nevertheless, after 2016, a sharp rise in productivity can be observed. Due to the gradual saturation of the labour market, employees began to experience rising wages. Hungary advanced from a country of labour surplus to a country of labour shortage. Wage increases have been driven by three factors: labour shortage, labour movement to Western Europe, and vote seeking by the government and not by collective bargaining led by trade unions.



Wage increase has not been driven by collective bargaining led by the trade unions. The trade union membership rate of Hungary, currently at around 9%, is very low in an international comparison. In addition, there has been a long-time declining trend. Strikes are also rare in Hungary, although whenever they do occur, they are generally successful. The study summarises the reasons for the low membership figures and give advice on what trade unions can do in order to restore their reputation, how they could reach out to employees and increase their influence.

For more information visit:  
<https://budapest.fes.de/>