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# REVITALISING MULTILATERALISM TO REBALANCE EU-AFRICA MIGRATION COOPERATION

### **ABSTRACT**

Multilateralism is facing an acute crisis, undermined by rising nationalism, geopolitical rivalries and weaken ing commitments to international cooperation. This decline is starkly evident in migration governance between the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU), where migration has shifted from a shared development priority to a politicised and securitised issue. The consequences are severe: weakened global conventions, humanitarian aid cuts, declining development budgets, and an erosion of trust in global frameworks such as the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Meanwhile, African stakeholders and civil society remain sidelined, reinforcing perceptions of externally imposed agendas. This Policy Brief identifies three critical challenges: the drift from shared responsibility to unilateralism, the shrinking space for African agency, and the financing crisis undermining the migration- development nexus. It argues for revitalising multilateralism through renewed commitments, inclusive governance and sustainable financing, thereby rebalancing AU-EU cooperation toward people-centred, rights-based and development-oriented migration policies that benefit both continents.



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### **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

Understanding the context	4
Key challenges and recommendations	4
Challenge 1: Policy and narrative mismatch between EU and AU	4
Challenge 2: Shrinking space for African agency and civil society	5
Challenge 3: Development financing crisis and humanitarian aid cuts: The erosion of the migration- development nexus	6
Conclusion	7
Endnotes	8
About the authors	9
About FEPS	10
About Foundation for European Progressive Studies, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and European Policy Centre, Brussels	10
About Fondazione Socialismo ETS	11
About the Progressive Migration Group (PMG)	11

### **Understanding the context**

The current crisis of multilateralism – reflected in the undermining of international institutions and agreements by national self-interest, geopolitical rivalries and a lack of binding commitments – poses a fundamental challenge to global governance. This is also evident in the context of cooperation between the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) on migration.

Migration was once viewed as a shared challenge that required collective action. However, it has since become a highly politicised and securitised issue, weakening global cooperation and disrupting the shared values of the AU and the EU.

The crisis of multilateral cooperation has significantly eroded important international conventions designed to protect migrants in various situations. Notable examples include the 1951 Refugee Convention,1 as well as other relevant global and regional human rights instruments, and UN fora such as the Human Rights Council, the International Migration Review Forum (IMRF), and the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), all of which should underpin multilateral cooperation. Humanitarian aid cuts have intensified vulnerabilities. The loss of critical funding directly undermines protection systems, humanitarian responses and resilience-building efforts, pushing communities further into displacement and forced migration. In addition, diminishing development budgets, growing unilateralism, and distrust of global frameworks such as the Global Compact for Migration (GCM),2 underscore the decline of multilateralism and the post-World War II rightsbased world order. A key multilateral framework that is under pressure and that has long guided both the global and EU approach toward Africa are the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).3

The SDGs highlight the complex and sometimes contradictory relationship between migration and development. On the one hand, migration is one of the strongest drivers of development; on the other hand, it is also a consequence of uneven development, poverty, civil unrest, conflicts, lack of job opportunities, and so on. In Africa, migration is driven by multiple structural challenges: poverty (SDG 1), gendered vulnerabilities (SDG 5), climate displacement (SDG 13), insecurity (SDG 16), growing inequalities (SDG 10), and labour dynamics (SDG 8). Meanwhile, migration into the EU is increasingly driven by skills and labour gaps within the EU, education opportunities, improved socioeconomic well-being, and demographic pressure. Yet discussions often overlook these realities. In essence, there is a need to refocus migration debates on Africa and Europe's developmental priorities, giving room to promote shared interests. Without integrating development-focused perspectives and empowering non-state actors in line with the GCM's people-centred and whole-of-society approach, multilateral efforts risk being perceived as externally imposed and misaligned with the needs of local populations.

### **Key challenges and recommendations**

# Challenge 1: The shift from shared responsibility to national egotism

The rise of nationalism and increased geopolitical rivalry poses significant threats to multilateralism, including global migration governance. Countries are increasingly restricting cross-border movements, mounting strict visa regimes and limiting regular pathways for migration. Global migration frameworks, such as the GCM, have lost traction because they lack enforceability, perceived legitimacy, and political commitment from member states. The EU, while affirming its support for multilateralism, is redirecting its funds towards defence and security rather than development and cooperation. This funding cut signals the de-prioritisation of global development and its impacts on migration. The March 2025 EU Council Resolution reaffirmed support for the UN in principle, but it yielded no new funding commitments for development cooperation.<sup>4</sup>

In essence, there is a growing disconnect between rhetorical commitments and resource allocation, with migration treated more as a threat than a unique opportunity for development and structural transformation for both the EU and Africa.

### **Addressing Challenge 1**

To counter the shift towards unilateralism, AU-EU cooperation must prioritise migration as a shared development opportunity, not a security threat. This requires:

- Renewed financing commitments: The EU should recommit to financing development, including through mechanisms such as the Global Gateway, ensuring that funds support mobility and local resilience rather than strengthening border externalisation.
- Foresight tools: Strengthening existing joint AU-EU foresight tools to enhance evidence-based projections on migration patterns and multilateral risks, helping policymakers navigate future complexities in a more aligned way.<sup>5</sup>
- Leverage development cooperation to prevent forced migration and displacement: Initiatives that combine migration management with socio-economic development – for

example, supporting youth entrepreneurship, skills-talent exchange programmes or climate adaptation – can create local alternatives to displacement while strengthening regional cooperation.

- Bringing migration into development debates without jeopardising migrants' rights:
   State and non-state actors need to start emphasising the unique role of migration in advancing both regional and national developmental priorities, especially in AU-EU migration cooperation. This means reiterating the significance of migration in achieving global SDGs, promoting climate adaptation, and enhancing shared prosperity.
- Promising practice: Despite criticism, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa demonstrated how pooled resources can address root causes. A redesigned model could include civil society and diaspora more directly in decision-making.

## Challenge 2: Shrinking space for African agency and civil society

African stakeholders are increasingly perceiving EU migration policies for Africa as imposed, rather than co-created. This perception breeds mistrust and limits genuine cooperation between the two regions. This is particularly notable as EU countries continue to favour bilateral negotiations with individual African countries, leaving the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) marginalised. Civil society actors – key to shaping inclusive migration strategies – are similarly sidelined with very limited opportunities to engage state actors on critical migration and development issues. Without their inclusion, local perspectives are lost, particularly those of young people, women, and migrants themselves.



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This is further compounded by the growing influence of private corporations and migration intermediaries who support the recruitment of foreign labour on migration governance in Africa, and who often bypass democratic or consultative processes. While local governments and cities are rising actors in migration management, they remain poorly integrated into AU-EU cooperation frameworks, leaving out a critical voice in these complex migration relations.<sup>7</sup>

However, it is important to note that the fragmentation of migration governance, as well as the limited engagement of civil society, is primarily due to the lack of sustained support, access and consultative processes within African member states and the AU Commission (AUC). African institutions, including the AUC, have generally not been sufficiently open or inclusive towards civil society organisations in migration policy processes, contributing to a persistent participation gap.

### Addressing Challenge 2

Rebalancing power in migration cooperation demands an explicit strategy to strengthen African leadership and civic engagement:

 Institutional reform: The AU should formalise mechanisms that ensure consultation over migration policymaking between its member states, civil society, private corporations, cities, youth and diaspora. Non-state actors should have advisory status in AU-EU migration dialogues.

- Strategic bilateralism: African states with stronger capacity (for example, Kenya, South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal) can act as "norm entrepreneurs", promoting regional positions within global negotiations. Cooperation with RECs can enhance bargaining power and policy coherence.
- Diaspora and youth engagement: Harnessing the expertise, remittances and advocacy networks of the African diaspora can amplify policy effectiveness and local accountability. The youth, as a significant population on the move, has lived experience and insights that could meaningfully drive transformational migration engagement with the EU and other multilateral actors. Structured engagement strategies must go beyond financial remittances to include skills and knowledge transfers.
- Promising practice: Cities such as Accra and Dakar have piloted participatory migration governance models, integrating local communities in policy design. These could be replicated and scaled regionally.

# Challenge 3: Development financing crisis and humanitarian aid cuts: The erosion of the migration- development nexus

Global development cooperation is in retreat. Major donors, including the US and EU, are slashing their aid budgets, causing uncertainty in the global development landscape. The dismantling of USAID contracts and the end of US development financing threaten to paralyse many humanitarian and development operations, which may worsen vulnerability in already fragile contexts while increasing displacement and migration (both regular and irregular) globally.

A recent global modelling study estimates that over the last two decades, USAID support has averted nearly 91 million deaths worldwide, and warns that if current cuts persist, more than 14 million excess deaths could occur by 2030.8 This stark projection underscores the scale of the human cost of declining aid and its destabilising effect on global mobility. Without renewed investment in the migration-development nexus, unsafe mobility will intensify, while externalisation approaches will further undermine rights. Rather than facilitating legal pathways or leveraging diaspora potential, current approaches demonise migration and may risk forcing people to either remain in deteriorating conditions or, due to a lack of alternatives, resort to irregular and dangerous routes.

### **Addressing Challenge 3**

The withdrawal of traditional aid requires innovation in financing and governance. Examples include:

- Localised funding models: Redirect a portion of international funds to community-based organisations and local governments that directly support vulnerable communities. This approach has demonstrated success in the health and education sectors and can be adapted for migration.
- Accountability mechanisms: Monitor how development and migration funds are spent and whether they align with SDGs and human rights standards. Using a monitoring taskforce

   one that comprises independent audits, civil society, EU representatives and national accountability bodies when allocating funds to enhance transparency and accountability.
- Strategic partnerships: Leveraging new partnerships with ethical private actors, diaspora investment funds and philanthropic

initiatives can diversify financing while maintaining public accountability. However, regulatory safeguards must mitigate the risks of corporate capture.

- Humanitarian safeguards: Protect core humanitarian budgets from political bargaining on migration and ensure needs-based allocation.
- Worst practice warning: Top-down projects driven by donor agendas – for example, externally run border controls or repatriation centres – have historically failed due to a lack of local buy-in and sustainability. These should not be replicated.



The crisis of multilateralism is not merely procedural; it is a crisis of imagination, solidarity, and political will.



#### Conclusion

The crisis of multilateralism is not merely procedural; it is a crisis of imagination, solidarity and political will. Rebalancing EU-AU migration cooperation requires centring African agency, revitalising the development-migration nexus, and opening multilateralism to inclusive, people-centred and future-oriented models. The costs of inaction – intensified displacement, democratic backsliding, and lost generations – are too high to ignore. By shifting from fear to hope, from control to cooperation, and from tokenistic dialogue to meaningful partnership, both continents can build a migration regime that serves people and politics alike.

### **Endnotes**

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### **About FEPS**

The Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) is the think tank of the progressive political family at EU level. Its mission is to develop innovative research, policy advice, training and debates to inspire and inform progressive politics and policies across Europe.

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Fondazione Socialismo ETS (Socialism Foundation ETS) was founded in Rome by a group of political activists and intellectuals led by Gennaro Acquaviva. The Foundation aims to preserve the historical memory of the collective experience of Italian socialists in the twentieth century, while simultaneously encouraging political education for younger generations and social and political research on current issues. The Foundation works closely with universities and trade unions in particular, and it publishes reflections and analyses on a variety of themes, including how Catholics integrate into Italy's progressive movement and how multireligious and multicultural Italian society is developing. Italian legislation has recognised it as a Non-Profit Organisation since 2022.



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### **About the Progressive Migration Group (PMG)**

The Progressive Migration Group (PMG), a network of African and European migration experts established by FEPS and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, examines the complex relations between the European Union and African countries of origin and transit with the aim of proposing innovative policy recommendations for progressive forces at EU, AU and national level in the field of migration management and related policy areas. The members of the group contributed to this policy brief.



Learn more about the PMG here.

### **ON SIMILAR TOPICS**











