

# YOUNG PEOPLE IN SERBIA 2015

Situation, perceptions, beliefs and aspirations



SMILJKA TOMANOVIĆ AND DRAGAN STANOJEVIĆ



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
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# FOREWORD

This new youth study examines the civic and political perceptions as well as the individual experiences of young people in Serbia today. It explores attitudes, beliefs and expectations of a younger generation which mainly grew up in a transition country fifteen years after the democratic change.

The study was commissioned by the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation Belgrade Office as a concluding contribution to a series of FES youth studies in South-East European States such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Romania and Slovenia. These youth studies were published individually from 2011 to 2014. Their main findings were recently put together in a FES Policy Paper entitled "Youth in South East Europe. Lost in Transition". ([www.fes.rs](http://www.fes.rs))

The FES Youth study of Serbia, which I have the honour to present to you, is based on empirical data collected from April to June 2015 by face-to-face interviews of 1200 young people aged between 15 and 29 from all over Serbia. This representative survey covers material status and living conditions, education, work and employment, family and leisure, trust, attitudes and beliefs, future aspirations as well as politics and EU-Accession of Serbia as its main research topics.

It shows in general terms that young people in Serbia still face strong constraints such as inefficient education, high unemployment, financial and living dependencies and a deep feeling of exclusion from politics. And yet, their individual perception of their own future and their satisfaction with life are rather optimistic. Towards Serbia's accession process to the EU many young people in Serbia do have their reservations, but at the same time show a very pragmatic attitude to its necessity. As all former youth studies of FES, our survey also includes recommendations to policies and decision makers in Serbia on how to improve the living conditions of young people and to show to the younger generation of today that they are much needed in order to build a better future in a country still in transition, but also one on a long road to Europe.

I am deeply grateful to SeConS, the Development Initiative Group, represented by Olivera Vuković and Dr. Slobodan Cvejić, the expert and research team Dr. Smiljka Tomanović and Dr. Dragan Stanojević for their excellent work in carrying out this study, to Prof. Dr. Klaus Hurrelmann, Hertie School of Governance Berlin, for his much-valued advice and last, but not least, to the FES team in Belgrade, especially to my colleague and project coordinator, Ana Manojlović.

Heinz Albert Huthmacher  
Director, FES Belgrade

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# INTRODUCTION: FRAMING OF THE RESEARCH

## The social construct of the youth in the context of challenges of modern society

Originating as a social construct of civil society in the modern era of western civilization (Milić, 1987), the concept of youth in itself carries one of the key values of the Modern - the idea of progress. Society invests in its future by using children and young people as projects, ensuring the continuity of rational progress. The social category of youth carries the symbolism of optimism and faith in a better future - embodied in the empty phrase "young people are our future", as well as the potential of their actions, and even revolutionary potential – "rebels without a cause". Bearing in mind this "mission" of the social construct of youth, it is not surprising that great importance was given to it in twentieth century social sciences - whether it is attributed the connotation of a problem (e.g. a "lost" generation between the wars - Manheim, 1952), or a resource (e.g. the youth counterculture movement of the late sixties, Roszak, 1978).

The end of the twentieth century, however, brings a very different constellation of global social relations, trends and processes. A "risk society" (Beck, 2001; Beck, Beck Gernsheim, 2002) in a world that is constantly changing (Giddens, 2005; Bauman, 2010) brings a fundamental social shift of focus from the idea of development and progress to the idea of purpose (Jenks, 1996). The multidimensional and fundamental contemporary social changes raise the question of the place and role of youth within them. Rather than at this point showing the possible theoretical and epistemological solutions to the study of youth: is the most appropriate concept post adolescence (Arnett, 2001. 2006) or emerging adulthood (Bynner, 2005), or generation approach (e.g. Wyn, Woodman 2006; Goodwin, Connor, 2009; Furlong, Woodman, Wyn, 2011; Woodman, Wyn, 2015), transition (e.g. Bynner, 2001), (sub) cultural identity (Cohen, Ainley, 2000), and the polemics between them (e.g. Roberts, 2007; Wyn, Woodman, 2007; Woodman, 2009; 2010; Roberts, 2010; 2012), we will address briefly the specifics of the risks that are put before young people in contemporary society, as well as the specifics of the strategies that are developed in the face of these risks.

The most important global social changes: in the labour market, changes in government regimes and policies resulting from the collapse of socialist regimes, the crisis of the welfare state and neo-liberal regimes, and the process of European integration, essentially affected the lives of young people. Changes on a global level in the seventies of the last century brought growing unemployment and hindered the younger generation from entering the labour market, and also brought structural changes in the labour market which force young people to accept unsafe and uncertain - the so-called precarious jobs - temporary and contract work, working below their qualifications, and in several places simultaneously, etc. The transition from education to employment is increasingly losing its standard form and is becoming elongated and fragmented (Du Bois-Reymond, Chisholm, 2006: 4). Disruptions in the labour market have, besides uncertain and turbulent transitions, produced some new forms of inequality alongside the old ones which still exist (Furlong, Cartmel, 2007). Low-skilled young people have fewer opportunities to improve their social position – the reproduction of inequality is being reinforced, because for many from minority ethnic groups in migratory Europe one of the key channels of social promotion – education – remains inaccessible. However, a university education and high qualifications guarantee less and less a stable and secure professional career. Young people face constant working and professional challenges that require continuing education, thus creating new risks of deprivation and limiting their life opportunities.

What were previously standard biographies supported by the state systems of different social orders (Wallace, Kovatcheva, 1998), in addition to now being less preferred (Roberts, 2010), are also becoming less possible. In this sense, individualisation, as a new active management of life, is more a demand for those who have the least resources, than it is a privilege for those who have the most (Woodman, 2010: 738).

The global economic crisis that occurred at the end of the first decade of the twentieth century only increased the volume of risk and strengthened uncertainty, which became a basic framework of life for the majority of young people. Such a constellation of global social relations puts before young people, on the one hand normative choices, e.g. the need to make a large number of decisions and plans, while on the other hand, the altered structural conditions of existence-not allow the prediction of the outcome of these choices (Leccardi, 2005). As a result of these conflicting influences, an increasing number of young people are opting to live in the so-called "extended present" (Brannen, Nielsen, 2002), with no long-term view of the future, made up of short-term plans which present a type of "navigation" (Leccardi, 2009) or risk management. One of life's plans which is becoming less certain is starting a family. Delaying marriage and childbearing, as well as reducing the number of children - are common features in all European societies, regardless of the type of transition into adulthood (Galland, 2003), family transition (Iacovo, 2002) or transitional regimes (Walther, 2006; Walther et al. 2009).

Economic and political changes in the structural environment, as well as the altered patterns of family formation, are associated with changes in intergenerational relations within the family (Biggart, Kovacheva, 2006), which involved shifting from relationships (and their corresponding concepts) of autonomy and dependency towards relationships of cooperation and interdependence (Gillies, 2000). Young people today rely on the various types of help and support they can get from their parents, and there is a reciprocal relationship and a sense of responsibility and intergenerational solidarity (Togouchi Swartz, Bengtson O'Brien, 2009).

## Young people in the context of Serbian society

Research on young people in Serbia has a tradition that is long several decades, and with its topics and goals it has followed the systemic changes and changes of social context. The post-war period of the fifties and sixties in Yugoslavia was characterized by the dogmatic character of theoretical and research studies of various social phenomena, including the youth. Social turmoil expressed in the student revolt of 1968 and the nationalist movements in the early seventies showed, however, the broached monolithic nature of the social and ideological projects of self-governing socialism and brotherhood and unity, which, among other sociological topics caused increased interest in the study of youth during the seventies and eighties. Perceived on the one hand as a problem, and on the other as a resource (Ilišin, Radin, 2007), the youth were placed under a magnifying glass in order to ascertain the causes of their discontent, but also to prove their commitment to socialism and confirm the legitimacy of the system. In addition to the dominance of this type of research, there are some new research topics, such as informal groups and youth subcultures (Joksimović et al., 1988), as well as the first theoretical studies (Milić, 1987). In the period of the blocked post-socialist transformation in the nineties, studies of youth were at a standstill, and the only ones to keep the continuity were the socio-psychological studies of values and attitudes. In addition, there were studies of young people who entered the social scene as a political generation active in protests from 1991 to 2000 (Milić, Čičkarić, 1998). After the political changes in 2000, there was a need to introduce a youth policy, which resulted in the revitalization of research. In addition to public opinion, as well as the studies of specific aspects of the lives of young people (cultural consumption, political participation and civic activism, practices of leisure, attitudes, preferences, choices, values, ideals, etc. research has been carried out on large, nationally representative samples of the youth. The results of two multidimensional surveys - conducted in 2003 (on a sample of 3180 young people aged 17 to 35; Mihailović et al. 2004) and 2011 (on a sample of 1627 young people aged 18 to 35; Tomanović et al. 2012) make up the evidence basis for comparison in this study.

Besides the above-described characteristics and risks of everyday life, which are increasingly bringing young people from languishing neo-liberal and social-democratic capitalist systems and those from post-socialist social orders closer together, young people in Serbia are facing some specific risks originating from the social context of the extended and in many ways anomie post-socialist transformation. It is common for it to be separated into two distinctive periods on the basis of the results of extensive and detailed analyses: *blocked transformation* during the nineties and *extended transformation* from the political changes in 2000. Both phases of transformations are "path –dependent" and depart from the model of "successful post-socialistic transition" (Lazić, Cvejić, 2004)<sup>2</sup>.

Contemporary structural trends point to social differentiation - the polarization of the social structure of Serbia into a small group at the top and a larger proportion of the population at the bottom of the social ladder. Extended transformation leads to increasing social inequality in terms of impoverishment of the lower social strata and risk of impoverishment of parts of the middle classes, for example, educated young people who are long-term unemployed (Cvejić, 2006: 31). Education as one of the key mechanisms of social reproduction is privatized, in the sense that it largely depends on the resources of private stakeholders and the capital of the family. It appears that education is also the most important factor - a resource that affects the orientation and action of young people, which in different ways shapes their social biographies, thus diversifying them (Tomanović et al. 2012). One indicator of the mechanisms of the reproduction of inequality is unequal opportunities, and thus closing the social structures for young people to gain a higher level of education than their parents, and the inequality of chances increases with the decrease of stratification positions (Stanojević, 2012: 68).

The context of the extended anomie post-socialist transformation creates major structural obstacles to the integration of young people into Serbian society, and analysis of previous research clearly shows a low level of integration of young people into the system (Tomanović et al. 2012). Indicators of the low social integration of young people are associated

<sup>1</sup> More about the genesis of studying young people/youth in Yugoslavia/Serbia see in Tomanović (2012a).

<sup>2</sup> More on the features of social transformation and the current social context in Serbia see examples. in: Lazić, Cvejić (2013).

with the key domains of the functioning social system. Due to high unemployment and insecure employment, young people are excluded from the labour and social spheres of economic reproduction. Postponement of starting a family also presents postponement of integration into the process of social reproduction. The low level of political and civic participation is an indication of the lack of integration into the political system of society (Ibid: 281).


Unlike their parents' generation and predecessors, whose standard biographies were supported by systemic measures of social integration and homogenization of youth in socialist Yugoslavia, young people in Serbia today "navigate" through the uncertainty of everyday life in the prolonged social "crisis". This "navigation" ("coping") involves developing flexible and temporally fragmented strategies, which not allow the possibility of the long-term planning of biographies. During this process, young people mostly rely on their own competencies, resources and action, as well as the resources, support and help from informal networks, mainly parents and friends (Ibid: 274). All past research speaks mostly about the unfavourable material position of young people, who are largely dependent on the financial and housing resources of their parents (Mihajlović *et al.*, 2004; Tomanović *et al.* 2012). The systemic support of the familistic (sub-protective) socialist regime collapsed in the post-socialist period, and so the young people-not count on it. Individual atomized practices - actions constitute the specifics of the life of young people in Serbia, which has repercussions on their transition to adulthood as well as their internal integration as a social group (Tomanović *et al.* 2012: 284).

## Young people in Serbia in comparative perspective

In order to outline the framework for further analysis of the results of research on young people in Serbia in 2015. we will present the key features of their position by putting them in a comparative perspective in a European context at the present moment.

According to the last census, there was a total of 1.322.201 of young people aged 15 to 29 and they accounted for 21.07% of the Serbian population in 2011 (Figure 1). This is a slightly larger share than in EU-28. where the youth account for 18.7%, which is 7% less than the world average (Eurostat, 2015: 21).

**Figure 1: Youth population of Serbia by age and sex (in %)**




Source: RSO 2011 Census

That is why Serbia is a "young" European country, where the share of youth categories is higher than one fifth, together with Cyprus, Slovakia, Malta and Poland (from the EU countries). Given that the share of children under 14 in these countries is less than the share of young people, it reflects the trend of further decline in the birth rate that will lead to an aging of the total population, as in the rest of Europe (Eurostat, 2015: 30), which is a process faced by Serbia.

The gender structure of the cohort of 15-29 year olds which we observed in Serbia is uniform: in each age group there are slightly more men than women (Figure 1).

With a rate of 1.4 in 2013. Serbia is among the European countries with the lowest fertility rates, ranging from 1.2 in Portugal to 2.1 in Turkey and 2.0 in France and Ireland. Of the countries in the region – Romania has the same rate, Croatia , Slovenia , Macedonia and Bulgaria have a slightly higher rate – 1.5. while in Montenegro, the fertility rate is 1.7 (source Eurostat)..

Figure 2: The share of young people 16 – 29 years old living with parents (in %)




In addition to belonging to the so called slow transition to adulthood countries (Galland, 2003), where young people stay longer in the parental home (Figure 2), in Serbia there is a characteristically large difference in gender: 90.1% of males and 70.3% of young females of this age live with their parents (source: Eurostat). The explanation lies in the Southern European (Mediterranean) type of family transition, in which young people leave the parental household for the sake of marriage (Iacovo, 2002), and while the average marrying age of women in Serbia is 27.4 years, the average age for a first marriage for men is 30.7. According to this feature, Serbia belongs to the European countries with strong gender differences and gaps of more than 3 years between the average age of marriage for women and men, which is the highest in Romania (3.8 years) and in Bulgaria and Greece (3.3 years) (Eurostat, 2015: 46). Further characteristics of the south-European type of family life Serbia belongs to are the small presence of alternatives to the classical family, such as the low representation of cohabitation (8.5% of the population older than 15 who are not married), divorce (rate 1.1) and single-parent families (17.3%), and a moderate representation of non-marital births (24.7%), all according to the 2011 Census.

The education structure of young adults in Serbia aged 25 to 29 for whom we assume have completed the process of education, is as follows: Elementary school education and lesser accounts for 6.5%, secondary school education - 69.7%, while tertiary - 22.7% of young people.


According to Eurostat data, at one end of the continuum there are European countries with an unfavourable educational structure, such as Portugal and Turkey, where almost half of young adults have completed only primary education, while there are countries, such as Austria, the Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovakia, which have almost no young people in this education category. At the other end of the continuum there are countries with a high share of over 30% of young people with a completed tertiary education: Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, The Netherlands, Sweden, the UK, Iceland, while Lithuania stands out with a share of 43.3% (Figure 3).

Figure 1.3 The share of young people aged 25 to 30 with a completed tertiary education (in %)



In a comparative perspective, Serbia is among the countries in which the share of tertiary education in this age group is between 20 and 30%, and primary about 5%. Looking at the countries in the region, the educational structure of youth in this cohort in Serbia is more favourable in relation to Croatia, Romania and Kosovo, and less favourable compared to Slovenia, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Montenegro.


Figure 4: Activity status by age (in %)



Source: RSO - Labour Force Survey, 2014

In the entire observed population of young people aged 15-29 the inactive dominate, but the structure of young people who belong to the active population (are not at school) is unfavourable, since 38% of them are unemployed (Figure 4). The youth unemployment rate observed by Eurostat (15-24 years) is high - 47.1%, which means that Serbia, together with Spain, Greece, Croatia and Italy, falls into a group of European countries where almost every second young person is unemployed (Chart 5)


Figure 5: The unemployment rate in the age group 15-24 (in %)



Source: Eurostat 2014

High unemployment poses a serious structural obstacle to the social integration of young people, as well as the risk of social exclusion. A special measure of deprivation is the index of material deprivation constructed for the research purposes of the European Quality of Life Survey (EQS 2012), which found that the unemployed and inactive young people are more often materially deprived than others (Eurofound, 2014: 12)<sup>3</sup>. According to Figure 6. which shows the average values, young people in Serbia cannot afford an average of 1.46 of the 6 listed goods, thus joining the group of countries in the middle of the scale, with index values of 1 and 2.

Figure 6: Index of material deprivation of young people aged 18 - 29 (in %)




Source: EQS 2012

<sup>3</sup> Material deprivation is defined as the inability to provide household essential goods and EQS singled out six basics: the maintenance of an adequately warm home, a one-week paid vacation away from home, a meal with meat, chicken or fish every second day, the replacement of worn-out furniture, buying new (not used) clothing, inviting guest for a drink or meal at least once a month (Eurofound, 2014: 11).


The following are used as indicators of extreme material deprivation: the inability to maintain an adequately warm home, buy clothes, and provide a meal of meat (fish) every other day if they so wish. A comparison of European countries with the latest indicator is shown in Figure 7.

**Figure 7: Participation of young people who are unable to provide a meal with meat (chicken, fish) every other day if they so wish (in %)**



Material status and deprivation are directly and indirectly associated with stable employment. The evaluation of the stability of employment - young people who believe that there is a huge possibility of losing their jobs in the near future – varies significantly among young people in different European countries, ranging from 0% in The Netherlands to 35.6% in Cyprus (Figure 8).


**Figure 8: The percentage of employed young people aged 18-29 who believe that there is a huge possibility of losing their jobs within 6 months (in %)**



According to this data, there is not a huge number of employed young people who perceive the risk of losing their job in Serbia, besides Montenegro it is the least in all countries in the Balkan region, and the number is significantly lower than in Bulgaria and Macedonia, and in particular Kosovo and Croatia. This subjective feeling of employment security deserves special analysis, and we can assume that it probably comes from the legacy of the socialist regime of work in state enterprises and nepotistic channels of employment, rather than the institutional framework of the systematically regulated labour market.

That employment is not a safe basis for a certain manner of existence is unequivocally indicated by the data shown in Figure 9: 14.9% of employed young people in Serbia have an income below the relative poverty line<sup>4</sup> and therefore are at risk of deprivation.


**Figure 9: The rate of employment of young people aged 18 - 24 years who are at risk of poverty (in %)**



<sup>4</sup>This measure expresses the participation of people who are employed and who have an equivalent disposable income below the threshold of poverty risk, which is set at 60% of the national median of equivalent disposable income (after social transfers).


According to Internet use indicators, Serbia is among the countries where almost all young people use the Internet, like in all countries that emerged from former Yugoslavia, while in the region, according to the share of young people who never use the Internet, Bulgaria and Romania stand out (Figure 10).

**Figure 10: Participation of young people who never use the Internet outside of work (in %)**



According to the frequency of regular participation in social activities, young people in Serbia are somewhere in the middle, while in the countries of the region Croatia stands out with a high participation and Bulgaria with a very low level of participation (Figure 11).


**Figure 11: Participation in social activities, clubs, associations - almost every day / at least once a week (in %)**



Let's look at some indicators of subjective well-being (SWB) that are good indicators of various structural constraints and risks, as well as changes in trends in different countries.

The young people in Serbia, in comparison with their peers, belong to a third of the European countries in which respondents expressed a lower level of general life satisfaction (Figure 9) - the average score for Serbia is 7.07. while the European average is 7.26.


**Figure 12: General life satisfaction of young people aged 18 to 29 in European countries (in %)**



When examining job satisfaction, Serbia again belongs to the countries of Eastern and Southern Europe in which this satisfaction is lower: the average for Serbia is 7.07. while for Europe it is 7.33. With regard to family life satisfaction, young people from Serbia belong to the group of countries, which includes Cyprus, Montenegro, Malta, Romania and Croatia, where scores are the highest: 8.48 in Serbia, compared to the European average of 8.04. Young people in northern and western European countries expressed an intermediate level of family life satisfaction, while young people from some eastern European countries (Estonia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Kosovo and Bulgaria) expressed the

lowest levels. A very similar distribution of countries is shown if we consider social life satisfaction: with an average of 8.69 Serbia belongs to the countries that again expressed the highest satisfaction, together with Cyprus, Croatia and Montenegro (the European average is 7.78) (EQS 2012). The data indicates that overall life satisfaction correlates with job satisfaction, while lower levels of satisfaction in these domains compensate for the higher levels of family and social life satisfaction.

**Figure 13: Optimism about the future (answer: "I fully agree that the future will be better") - young people aged 18 to 29 (in %)**



The distribution of European countries according to the share of young people who expressed great optimism about the future is very interesting (Figure 10). Among those where more than one third of young people expressed a positive attitude, are countries with a stable economy, including some "Yugo-sphere" countries which are facing serious economic, political and social issues (Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia), as well as those countries where young people are significantly more sceptical about the future (Greece, Slovakia, Portugal and Italy).

In regards to, among others, the above objective indicators of material status: employment, the risk of material deprivation and the relative poverty of employed young people, as well as the overall socio-economic situation, young people in Serbia expressed an unexpected level optimism when considering their future - more than one third (34.7%) are very optimistic.

The discrepancy between objective living conditions and subjective perceptions and expectations makes research focused on young people, such as this research in which we hope we will provide some answers as well as bring up new research questions, particularly important.

## Research methodology

Determining the population of young people by age, in itself carries the risk of setting the boundaries either too low or too high. Bearing in mind the social and cultural dependence of transitioning into the world of adults, young people will, in different social contexts, be faster or slower to acquire the attributes of adulthood. In studies on national samples (2003 and 2011)<sup>5</sup> the researchers defined young people as 18-35 year olds, bearing in mind the quite often delay of key events (particularly financial independence and starting a family) to the third decade of life, due to structural and cultural conditions of growing up (Tomanović, 2012a). In this study, because of the comparability with other Shell research in the region, young people were defined as being aged 15-29.

Research of young people in 2015 is part of an international project sponsored by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the Shell Youth Study, which has been carried out since 1953 and in the region of Southeast Europe since 2011. The research methodology, which was developed by Professor Klaus Hurrelmann, was adapted, in consultation with him, to the national context in Serbia by the authors of the study - Smiljka Tomanović and Dragan Stanojević, taking into account the importance of data comparability. By translating it from English, and adapting and supplementing some questions due to their relevance to the context and comparability with previous research in Serbia, a survey questionnaire was designed and tested in a pilot study. The questionnaire with the frequency response is attached to this study.

The research involved a combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies. The collection of survey data was conducted by the research agency SeCons during the period of 10th April to 15th May 2015, while the in-depth interviews were conducted during the period of 10th to 30th June of the same year.

<sup>5</sup> Mihailović et al 2004; Tomanović et al 2012.

The representative data for the young population were obtained by survey on a nationally representative sample. The sample for the survey was designed by Slobodan Cvejić. The sample design was a multistage stratified sample with the principle of randomness of selection (the so called random route) of the final unit. The basic population was composed of young people aged 15-29, which according to the results of the 2011 census in Serbia (excluding Kosovo and Metohija) accounted for 1.322.201.

The basic statistical regions - Belgrade, Sumadija and Western Serbia, Vojvodina and Southern and Eastern Serbia - represented the basic strata (NUTS 2 level). In the first stage of selection, a total of 40 municipalities that had an equal probability of selection, were chosen randomly, except for the municipalities whose population exceeded 100,000 inhabitants, who had a secure representation in the sample with a proportionate representation of the population. Regarding the selected regions, 11 municipalities in Belgrade, 10 in Vojvodina, 10 in Sumadija and Western Serbia, and 9 in the Southern and Eastern Serbia were selected for the sample. In the second phase of selection, within each municipality a number of local communities in urban and rural areas were randomly selected. The total number of local communities in which the survey was conducted was 160, of which 91 were urban and 69 rural. In the third level of selection, within each local community two streets in urban areas and one street in rural areas were randomly selected. In the fourth level of the selection, the selection was systematic, with a random start of chosen households. Interviewers were instructed that in certain streets, starting from a certain number, they had to choose every fifth household in which to conduct the interviews if there was at least one person that fitted the target group. At the last stage of selection, within the households the respondents were elected if they were aged 15-29. If in the same household there was more than one person who suited the target population, the interview was conducted with only one person with the selection criterion being the date of birth (the interview was conducted with the person whose birthday was next). Survey consisted of two parts: a face-to-face interview and a written part which covered sensitive topics, whereby the subjects filled in the form and put it in a sealed envelope.

The sample size was 1.186 respondents, of which 751 were from urban areas and 435 from rural areas. The margin of error for estimating the proportion with 95% reliability (for binary variables) was 3%. The study involved 39 interviewers, and after completion of the research a verification of the field by telephone was conducted on a sub-sample the size of 10% (120 questionnaires).

Sample structure by basic characteristics - gender, educational structure, employment status (Table 1) - corresponds to a population within acceptable limits so that the sample is not weighted toward either one topic.

**Table 1: Structure of sample according to the basic characteristics of respondents (in %)**

Gender	male	50.1
	female	49.9
Place of residence	village	36.7
	city	63.3
Age	15-19	31.5
	20-24	33.3
	25-29	35.2
Education of mother	without or elementary school	10.1
	secondary school	66.8
	tertiary	23.1
Education of father	without or elementary school	8.1
	secondary school	66.4
	tertiary	25.5
Employment status	employed	18.8
	temporary employment	14.7
	unemployed	17.0
	inactive	49.4
Education of those not in the process of education	without or elementary school	2.7
	secondary school	31.6
	tertiary	16.0
	at school	49.8

To analyse the quantitative data SPSS 21 statistical software was used. The data was analysed using a degree of correlation (Pearson R and Spearman's Rho), chi square, t-test and analysis of variance. Only in those cases when there was a significant correlation between the observed characteristics at a confidence level between .05 and .001. were the coefficients shown.

The research team was trying to get to a deeper insight into the meaning that young people attach to specific topics, and therefore conducted 10 in-depth interviews with people who were pre-selected according to age (two groups of 15-22 and 23-29), education (elementary school, secondary school and university education), gender, and place of residence (according to the region in relation to whether it was a rural village or city). Secondary school pupils, students, employed and unemployed young people were interviewed. The interviews lasted about an hour, were recorded with the subject's consent, and then transcribed verbatim. For the analysis of qualitative data the program NVivo 9th was used.

The basic dimensions of the research were contained in the questionnaire, which are defined in the youth Shell survey, and represent the themes of the interviews, which are: leisure and lifestyle; trust and belonging; family and social networks; concerns and expectations; education and employment; politics and democracy; management and development. In the study they will be presented through quantitative analysis and the interpretation of qualitative accounts of the respondents in the following topics in the relevant chapters: 1. socio-economic status and living conditions; 2. education; 3. work and employment; 4. family and sociability; 5. lifestyles (including leisure); 6. trust and attitudes; 7. the perception of risk, aspirations and plans (including migration); 8. politics (including European integration).

Analysis of the results was carried out on three levels that correspond to the objectives of the analysis. At a descriptive level, the goal is to present a detailed picture of the situation, attitudes, perceptions and aspirations of young people in Serbia, according to the defined dimensions and their indicators. At an exploratory level, the objective is to examine the mutual connections and influence of factors, with special emphasis on stratification analysis - detecting and presenting the differences and inequalities among the young people. By qualitative analysis of the interviews, we will try to achieve an interpretative goal – an interpretation of the meaning that young people give to the different aspects of their daily lives.

# THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AND LIVING CONDITIONS OF YOUNG PEOPLE



## Introduction

One of the major goals of this study is to identify the structural differences in the lives of young people. Bearing in mind that the international (Brannen *et al.*, 2002; Brannen, Nilsen, 2002; Brannen, Nielsen 2005), and domestic studies (Tomanović, Ignjatović, 2004; Tomanović *et al.* 2012) indicate that the resources young people possess are very significant to their actions and their acquisition of autonomy. The studies of economic, cultural and social capital available to young people are of great importance because they represent an indispensable framework of the sociological explanation of the differentiation between young people on their path to adulthood. And while studies of youth were mostly concerned with the problem of their identity, (sub)cultures, and how they spent their free time, with the current economic crisis which has led to new social escalation and polarization, issues of social inequality have again become the focus of research interest (Furlong, 2009). The concept of social class is revitalized and gains significance because (once again) social stratification is of obvious importance in shaping the lives of young people, their knowledge, aspirations, desires and real possibilities in a world where the rules of the game are set so that they suit certain social groups (Weis, 2009). When we talk about inequality in contemporary society, one of the main research questions concerns access to quality education. This actually involves two issues. The first is the approach to education and the second whether the education provided is adequate and useful knowledge, which is in line with market demands and social life. Education alone is not equally available to everyone and the differences vary between countries. The previous study of young people in a local context pointed to the significant disparities in access to higher education, where the chances of young people, whose parents have completed Elementary school, to finish college are several hundred times less compared with those whose parents have a college degree (Stanojević, 2012). On the other hand, Weis noted that it is necessary "to look carefully who gets what kind of knowledge, in which context, to what purpose and under what conditions" (2009: 52).

The importance of family origin when it comes to the opportunities that young people will have in life is more than obvious, especially in those contexts where a large part of social reproduction takes place outside of institutions and formal channels. The effects of the financial situation of the family of origin, its class position and the education of parents can be seen in the manner in which the young person 1) is educated - to what extent, in which schools, with what content, with what kind of support, 2) is employed - how fast the transition to the labour market is, which working arrangements, how much compensation / benefits, and 3) is living independently - with the help of their family of origin or by their own resources. In a domestic post-socialist context, previous studies have shown that all three transitions are significantly influenced by the opportunities generated by origin (Tomanović *et al.* 2012). We should, however, bear in mind that access to resources is not only determined by the social origin and position of young people, as class stratification intersects other differences, such as gender, ethnic, territorial and others, which affect the chances of social advancement in life.

In this part of the study we will show a variety of resources that a young person has, and try to point out the basic differences in the access to different resources. We will analyse the cultural capital of young people and the family they belong to, their material living conditions and position in the labour market.

## Analysis

### Cultural capital

The structure of the parents' education has a normal distribution. Nearly a third of young people have at least one parent who has completed tertiary education (or more), and every twentieth young person's mother or father has completed a graduate level. The average education of fathers is slightly better than the education of mothers. Mothers, in more cases, have only completed Elementary school and secondary school, while fathers, in more cases, have completed vocational school, as well as tertiary and post-graduate level. The education of the mother and father are significantly correlated<sup>6</sup>. For the relation between the education of parents and their children, we have formed a special indicator that expresses the highest level of education of one of the parents (we used the so-called domination principle). The educational attainment of the parents (according to the denomination principle) is clearly correlated with the place in which the young people live. There are much more highly educated parents in cities than in the countryside<sup>7</sup> and much more have primary and

<sup>6</sup> rho=.644. p<.001.

<sup>7</sup> X<sup>2</sup>=80,73. p<.001. Cramer's V=.263.

three years of school in the countryside. Furthermore, the best educational structure of parents is in the Belgrade region, then Central Serbia and Vojvodina<sup>8</sup>. In the Belgrade region even 48.8% of young people have at least one parent who has completed tertiary education, as opposed to 27.6% in Central Serbia and 22.4% in Vojvodina.

Bearing in mind that half (50.9%) of the population of young people are still in the process of education, to show their educational achievements we have used the level of education for those young people who are currently out of the process of education (those who say they are not studying now). Given that one in four young people are currently at university or at secondary school, the educational structure of young people is only a broad approximation of the educational structure of this cohort.

**Figure 1.1. The level of education of young people outside the education process aged 15-29 and 25-29 (in %)**




Figure 1.1 shows the data for youth aged 15-29 and 25-29 years, with the aim to recognize the closest approximation to the educational achievements of young people (bearing in mind that they are mostly no longer in the education process) via the oldest cohorts. Research shows that there is a clear correlation between the cultural capital of parents and their children (Ganzeboom, 2000 Flere 1973 Lavrić, 2011; Stanojević, 2013). A comparison with the educational structure of parents indicates two things. Firstly, there is a significant correlation between the education of parents and their children<sup>9</sup>. Another interesting thing is that there are fewer young people who completed just at Elementary school, however, there are more young people who have completed vocational school and have received a university degree. In this age group, 38.1% of young people have a university or postgraduate degree, while less have completed four-year schooling. The results indicate a change that occurred with the introduction of market mechanisms that reduced the importance of four-year vocational schools and increased the value of college degrees and specific skills acquired in vocational schools. Young people and their families reacted to this change either by reducing aspirations and focusing on the specific knowledge and skills that can be obtained in three-year schools, or with additional investment and sending their children to college. The level of education of young people is also directly connected with the fact whether they live in the city or in the countryside<sup>10</sup>, gender, as more females than males graduated from university, and the financial position of the family<sup>12</sup>.

**Figure 1.2 The number of books in a household (in %)**



As an indicator of the cultural capital of young people and the households in which they live, they were asked about the number of books they had in their homes. Only 2% does not have any books at home, while every fifth young person has a small library with over 100 titles.

The possession of books is in connection with the place and the region in which young people live. Young people in cities have more books available to them than those from the countryside<sup>13</sup>, but also those who live in the Belgrade region have more than those in the other two regions<sup>14</sup>. Parents' education, as objectified cultural capital is, expectedly

<sup>8</sup>  $\chi^2=13.9$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.085$ .

<sup>9</sup>  $\rho=.427$ ,  $p<.001$

<sup>10</sup>  $\chi^2=33.85$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.245$

<sup>11</sup>  $\chi^2=23.13$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.199$

<sup>12</sup>  $\chi^2=17.18$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.122$

<sup>13</sup>  $\chi^2=45.73$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.198$

<sup>14</sup>  $\chi^2=77.94$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.182$

strongly related to the size of a home library<sup>15</sup>, so that even 38.3% of young people whose parents have tertiary education have a library with over 100 books, while only 1.5% of young people whose parents have the most basic education, have this number of books. This is another indicator that cultural capital is transferred generationally. Slightly more than a quarter of young people (28.2%) who have finished university have a library with over 100 titles. On the other hand, every fifth young person who has only a primary education, does not have any books at home, and not a single person has more than 100 books<sup>16</sup>.

That the different types of capital are mutually convertible suggests the fact that the number of books in the home is directly related to the financial status of the household<sup>17</sup> and the disposable income of young people<sup>18</sup>.

## Employment status

At a time when the flexibility of the labour market is more intense and when, due to the crisis, a very high youth unemployment rate exists as well as unregulated labour, employment, especially that with stable conditions, is an important resource. In our sample of young people aged 15-29, just over half of them are inactive (at school). Every fourth young person is employed (permanently or temporarily) and a certain number of young people work or study at the same time. In the sample, every sixth person is unemployed and the unemployment rate is 36.7%. When we exclude from the analysis those who are not active in the labour market, whether a young person is employed or not depends on their age, the region they live in, their family and their personal cultural capital. The first feature is expected because with age, they are gradually included in the labour market and their position on it becomes more stable and certain. Closeness to the capital city is another important factor when finding work, bearing in mind the significant centralization of the economy. The third factor that explains employment is the education attained by parents and young people.<sup>19</sup>

## The material status of the household of young people

We have examined the living standard of the household in which a young person lives using several indicators. Firstly, we asked them what the financial situation of their household was, and this measure is an approximation of the material standard, based on their perception. Only 5% of young people-not any have financial problems and they can buy whatever they want. On the other hand, a certain number of them admitted that they-not have enough money even for food, and every eighth young person does not have enough money to cover the costs of shoes and clothing

Figure 1.3 Perceptions of the material situation of the household<sup>20</sup> (in %)



The material situation of young people is connected with where they live, as the situation is somewhat better in the city than in the countryside<sup>21</sup>. because there is more employment and there are slightly better working conditions. Self-perception of the material situation is surprisingly the best in Central Serbia and the worst in Vojvodina<sup>22</sup>. Considering that the material conditions almost always correlate with education as a resource on the labour market, it is correlated to the education of parents<sup>23</sup> and to their personal education<sup>24</sup>.

<sup>15</sup>  $\chi^2=189.49$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.286

<sup>16</sup>  $\chi^2=96.08$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.288

<sup>17</sup>  $\chi^2=41.19$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.133.

<sup>18</sup>  $\chi^2=35.51$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.112.

<sup>19</sup> Više o radnim angažmanima mladih u trećem poglavju.

<sup>20</sup> Pitanje kojim smo merili percepciju materijalnog stanja mladih je obuhvatalo sledeće opcije a u grafikonu su prikazane u skraćenoj verziji: 1. nemamo dovoljno novca za hranu (najlošiji), 2. imamo dovoljno novca za hranu, ali je problem kupovina odeće i obuće (loš), 3. imamo dovoljno za hranu, odeću i obuću, možemo malo da uštedimo, ali nedovoljno za skuplje stvari (frižider, TV) (srednji), 4. možemo da priuštimo i kupovinu nešto skupljih stvari, ali ne i tako skupih kao što su npr. kola (bolji) i 5. možemo da kupimo što god želimo (najbolji).

<sup>21</sup>  $\chi^2=10.35$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.095.

<sup>22</sup>  $\chi^2=45.82$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.140.


<sup>23</sup>  $\chi^2=27.94$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.156.

<sup>24</sup>  $\chi^2=25.26$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.105.

A total of 76.2% of the households they live in own a car (60.2% one and 16% more than one), while 23.8%-not possess one. Although the value of a car remained out of reach, analysis indicates that households in the countryside<sup>25</sup> more often have cars, and have more cars, than those in the cities. Also, car ownership is related to the degree of education of the parents<sup>26</sup> and the material status of the household<sup>27</sup>.

Although a third of young people-not possess a desktop computer and an additional 17.5%-not own a laptop, these two devices in fact complement each other because most young people possess at least one of them. Exactly 4% of young people have neither a desktop nor a laptop. The number of computers (taken together desktop and / or laptop computer) is in connection with the place of residence, so that young people in cities have more computers at home<sup>28</sup>. This number continues to correlate with the level of the parents'<sup>29</sup> education, the education of young people<sup>30</sup>, the financial situation of households<sup>31</sup> and the disposable income of young people<sup>32</sup>.

**Figure 1.4 Ownership of a laptop and desktop computer (in %)**



Young people often describe their financial and material situation as average, although there are objective differences. In the narratives they are often aware of the material and financial difficulties of the family and the efforts that parents make to provide all that is needed. Some of them, while growing up lived on the edge of existence when there was not enough funds for food in the household. Their inclusion in the sphere of employment was an unavoidable factor in order to bring them from below the absolute poverty line.

**K: How would you describe your financial situation?**

I: I don't know how to describe it, neither poor nor rich, somewhere in the middle.

**K: You-occasional work in order to earn something more?**

I: Yes, to have better conditions, to have something to eat every day... well, we don't have these problems now. There's enough to eat.

(Male, unemployed, 21. Elementary school, working in seasonal jobs, a small town)

On the other hand, young people can have enough money to cover basic items and necessities, but not enough money for fun and entertainment. Long-term unemployment, precarious employment and job uncertainty perpetuate this situation.

I: Well, I don't know what to tell you. It's not brilliant, but let's say somewhere in the middle.

**K: And can you afford to buy yourself certain things?**

I: As far as anything luxurious, no. But basic things, yes.

**K: Have you been to the seaside recently?**

I: No, I haven't.

**K: When were you last there?**

I: Three-four years ago.

**K: Is there a possibility that you will at some point go?**

I: Well, it would be possible if I really strived to go, and saved some money. But at the moment it's not a priority.

(Female, a hairdresser and beautician, 22. unemployed, occasionally working unregulated at home, big city)

<sup>25</sup>  $\chi^2=15.25$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.114.

<sup>26</sup>  $\chi^2=24.93$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.104.

<sup>27</sup>  $\chi^2=95.66$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.203.

<sup>28</sup>  $\chi^2=15.41$ .  $p<.05$ . Phi=.114.

<sup>29</sup> rho=.259.  $p<.001$ .

<sup>30</sup> rho=.197.  $p<.001$ .

<sup>31</sup> rho=.192.  $p<.001$ .

<sup>32</sup> rho=.164.  $p<.001$ .

What is present in most of the narratives is the combination of jobs in order to support the family, and the intergenerational transfer of resources. Parents in many ways try to provide the proper conditions for their children and their education, but this exchange is mutual because young people feel responsible and in situations where they earn, they contribute to the family budget and help their parents financially.

**K: How would you describe your financial situation?**

I: Well, in the middle. It isn't so good nor so bad. Average. Dad works at a school, he's a janitor. In fact, he does a little agricultural work at home and I think it's really difficult for him. He works very hard and doesn't earn as much as he should because he does one job in the morning and another in the afternoon. It's too much. And he does it for me and my sisters. So I don't know ... I could work and I suppose I should, but because of my university and my obligations, it's simply not possible. It's a huge problem because of the transport- having to travel from the village to the town.

**K: What about your mum?**

I: She works in a factory. She works and at home she helps my dad, but it's not enough.

(Female, student, 22. a medium-sized town)

I currently live with my parents, they sometimes support me, and I sometimes help. In fact, we all help in the house. We eat healthy. ... We've always been fine. If we don't have something today, we'll have it tomorrow. That's the way it is with us. Families should get on well with each other and not quarrel.

(Female, 20, Belgrade, SS, employed as a shop assistant in a Chinese store)

Of course, some of them have enough money at their disposal to be able to cover almost all their needs, by saving a little.


Well, I have everything I need. I have as much pocket money as I need. I have enough to go out in the evening and to spend a certain amount of money. Enough to buy new trainers, a new phone and new clothes. We have enough for an average summer holiday. We would have to save for a certain amount of time in order to buy a new car, as we don't have enough savings. In general, we're fine.

(Female, secondary school student, 17. a suburb of Belgrade)

## The financial situation of young people

To check the degree of financial (non) independence, we asked young people to specify all the income they have and if they have no income, who supports them. The results indicate that almost two-thirds of young people are supported by their parents, and every twentieth young person additionally helps financially. Also, every twentieth young person is supported by their partners (90% of those supported are women). Every third young person has their own personal income, while other revenues are represented to a lesser extent. Bearing in mind that this relates to all possible incomes, only 32.7% of young people are fully financially independent (they don't receive any external financial support).


Figure 1.5: The income and financial (non) autonomy of young people (in %)



The strongest connection with financial autonomy is, as expected, the age of the young person<sup>33</sup>. With increasing age, financial dependence on parents declines and in the youngest age cohort (15-19) is 91.8% (only 6.6% of young people are fully financially independent), in the middle cohort (20-24) 65.3% (28.7% are fully financially independent), while in the oldest cohort (25-29), 30.4% are supported by their parents (59.8% completely financially independent). In relation to gender, a significantly less number of women have their own income and more who are dependent on their partner/spouse<sup>34</sup>.

It is interesting that when looking at the ratio of financial dependence and the financial situation of the household, we can see that with the growth of material status comes an increase in the financial dependency of the young person<sup>35</sup>. A similar result is obtained when we look at the ratio of financial autonomy and the education level of the parents, where with the growth of education comes an increase of dependence<sup>36</sup>. These results actually indicate a cohort effect in which children from financially better-off households, and children of parents with a higher education, remain longer in the process of education, and are thus, more financially dependent on their families. When we exclude the young people that are currently in the process of education, the results-not show significant differences in the degree of financial autonomy of young people with the education of their parents, or the financial situation of the household. But when we compare the degree of financial autonomy with the level of their education (those who have completed their education), different results are obtained (Figure 1.6). Young university graduates are more likely to be independent of their parents or partners than young people who have secondary or elementary school education only.

**Figure 1.6: The financial autonomy and education of young people who are in the process of education (in %)**



While young people may be financially autonomous, that still does not mean that the possibilities available to them are the same. That is why we wanted to know how much money young people have available for themselves and their monthly needs (not including the money needed to cover basic living costs, such as rent, bills and nutrition etc.). On this occasion, young people themselves cited the amount that is at their disposal. We have subsequently scaled and expressed the amounts in euros in a quarter scale: up to 25 euros, 26-50 euros, 51-100 euros and over 101 euros. The young people are evenly divided on this scale so that up to 25 euros per month is available to 25.3%, between 26-50 euros to 26.9%, from 51-100 euros to 25.6% and 22.2% have over 101 euros to spend on themselves. 4.3% of young people refused to answer this question, while another 13%-not know exactly how much money they had available per month.

The money that a young person has available per month varies depending on their sex and so young males have more money than young females<sup>37</sup>. As expected, as the person gets older they have more money at their disposal as they are slowly entering the labour market, and have the opportunity to earn a certain amount of money and spend it on themselves<sup>38</sup>. Young people in Belgrade have more money available to them than young people from the other two regions, and the least amount of money is available to young people in Vojvodina<sup>39</sup>. The amount of money available, as expected, correlates with the self-perception of the material situation of the household<sup>40</sup> and the education level of the parents<sup>41</sup>.

<sup>33</sup> X<sup>2</sup>=322.79, p<.001. Cramer's V=.374.

<sup>34</sup> X<sup>2</sup>=42.51, p<.001. Cramer's V=.192.

<sup>35</sup> X<sup>2</sup>=21.69, p<.05. Cramer's V=.097.

<sup>36</sup> X<sup>2</sup>=24.41, p<.001. Cramer's V=.103.

<sup>37</sup> X<sup>2</sup>=8.17, p<.05. Cramer's V=.093.


<sup>38</sup> X<sup>2</sup>=54.60, p<.001. Cramer's V=.155.

<sup>39</sup> X<sup>2</sup>=72.31, p<.001. Cramer's V=.195.

<sup>40</sup> X<sup>2</sup>=27.88, p<.001. Cramer's V=.121.

<sup>41</sup> X<sup>2</sup>=54.60, p<.001. Cramer's V=.155.

Figure 1.7: The disposable income of young people according to their sociodemographic characteristics (in %)



Viewed according to the employment status<sup>42</sup> of young people, those who are studying and working simultaneously have the most money available for their own personal use. This dual status, on the one hand, still makes them dependent on their parents who are likely to bear most of the living costs, while the money they earn is for their own personal use. Following them, the highest amount of money have those who are employed (permanently and temporary) and in the worst situation, as expected, are the unemployed and inactive. Similar results are obtained when disposable income is compared with the level of financial autonomy of young people<sup>43</sup>. Young people who combine their own income with that of their families, are in the best position. Due to the fact that they rely on the support of their parents, they spend most of their money on themselves. Young people who support themselves have a little less money to spend on themselves because they have to participate in meeting household expenses. In an equally unenviable position are those young people who are dependent on a parent or partner.

<sup>42</sup>  $\chi^2=65.89$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.152.

<sup>43</sup>  $\chi^2=32.37$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.107.

## The housing situation of young people


Two-thirds of young people (66.9%) live with their parents. The remaining percentage live outside the parental household in the following order: 8.4% in an inherited house / flat, 7.1% in a space that their parents bought, 5.8% in an rented apartment rented and pay for themselves, 5% in a rented apartment whereby someone else bears the cost of rent, 3.4% in an apartment that was purchased alone or with a partner / spouse, 1.6% with friends or relatives, 1% with a spouse / partner, 0.3% in student accommodation and 0.3% in some other type of accommodation. This research coincides with previous results (Stanojević, 2012) and confirms that the most common way to gain access to property is inheritance, purchase by parents and finally independent investment, which very few young people have the opportunity to do.

The level of housing dependency on parents, as expected, decreases with age. In the youngest cohorts (15-19), 85.7% of young people live with their parents, the middle group (20-24), 67%, while half (49.9%) of those aged 25-29 are still in the parental home.

Young people in rural areas (71.7%), are more likely to live with their parents than young people in the city (62.7%)<sup>44</sup>. Given the dominant patriarchal pattern, which includes patrilocal living after marriage, a greater number of young males (71.5%) than young females (60.5%) remain in the parental household, which is the basis of the total difference<sup>45</sup>. Living with parents is connected with household resources, because young people who live with their parents are more often those who have a worse<sup>46</sup> perception of their material status, implying the importance of family material resources necessary for the independence of a young person.

The living autonomy of young people has very strong links with their degree of financial autonomy<sup>47</sup>. Every fourth person who is supported by their parents also shares a living space with them. If it is possible for the person to earn enough for themselves, in half of the cases, they will establish their own household, but just as many young people continue to live with their parents, sharing the household expenses. The situation is similar when young people earn their own money, but it is not enough to fully meet their needs. Supporting a partner most often means sharing space with a partner, independent of their parents.

Figure 1.8: The housing and financial (non) independence of young people (in %)



In 3.9% of households in which young people live, there is only one room shared by all members of the household. Every fifth young person (19.7%), lives in a house with two bedrooms, 27.4% in households with three bedrooms, while the others live in housing that has four or more rooms. The number of rooms in the household is clearly related to the place of residence, and households with young people in the countryside have more room than those in the city<sup>48</sup>. Lack of housing is primarily an urban problem from the era of socialism, and this is implied by the following findings relating to the housing situation in relation to the desirability of living in certain regions. The worst housing structures are in the Belgrade region (considering that migration to this region is the most common) and the cheapest in Central Serbia<sup>49</sup>. In Belgrade, 28.6% of young people live in households that have two or less rooms, as opposed to 26.4% in Vojvodina and 18.7% in Central Serbia. The residential structure is clearly related to resources, and so correlates with the self-perception of financial status<sup>50</sup>, the education level of parents<sup>51</sup> and the level of education of the young person<sup>52</sup>.

Four out of five young people have their own room, while almost one in five share a space with some of the occupants. Similar to household size, owning their own room is connected with the perception of material status<sup>53</sup>, however, it is interesting that the space more often is shared by young females rather than males<sup>54</sup>.

<sup>44</sup>  $\chi^2=9.96$ .  $p<.05$ .  $\Phi=.092$ .

<sup>45</sup>  $\chi^2=16.21$ .  $p<.001$ .  $\Phi=.117$ .

<sup>46</sup>  $\chi^2=23.05$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.141$ .

<sup>47</sup>  $\chi^2=173.22$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.387$ .

<sup>48</sup>  $\chi^2=110.66$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.307$

<sup>49</sup>  $\chi^2=50.90$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.147$ .

<sup>50</sup>  $\chi^2=110.66$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.307$ .

<sup>51</sup>  $\chi^2=27.76$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.109$ .

<sup>52</sup>  $\chi^2=19.68$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.130$ .

<sup>53</sup>  $\chi^2=14.77$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.114$ .

<sup>54</sup>  $\chi^2=4.55$ .  $p<.05$ .  $\Phi=-.063$ .

## **Discussion**

Previous analysis indicates significant differences in the amount of basic resources among young people according to a number of lines of demarcation. The level of education of young people firstly largely depends on the education level of parents, which indicates a reproduction mechanism of the social position through the reproduction of cultural capital. Bearing in mind that education is the most important channel of social mobility, the evaluation of education, involvement in the education process of children and investment in the education of children, will not be equal among children and young people whose parents have different levels of education. In addition to the education of parents, reaching a certain level of education is also related to material status, whether the young person lives in the city or in the countryside, but also to the sex of the young person as the duration of the education of female children is an important strategy of parents. However, we should bear in mind that the previous results, which indicate that the transfer of material resources and the use of social capital often go from parent to male child, actually reproduce a different gender strategy of socialization, which are still under the influence of a patriarchal cultural matrix (Stanojević 2012).

In a similar manner, the differences in the labour market are demonstrated. The education of young people and the education of their parents is associated with the length of time a young person will wait until they start earning. The search channels and the gaining of employment (as other studies suggest) can be formal or informal. In both cases, children with more economic, cultural and social (personal and family) capital are more likely to quickly and successfully make the transition to the labour market. With a higher education it is easier to find a job, and with higher education there are wider social networks (parents and children) that can offer information or employment. With the intensification of market competition, the difference between regions increase and the economy is centralized so that the region around the capital is in a somewhat more privileged position compared to the other regions (especially Central Serbia).

The financial situation of the household of young people is, as expected, in connection with their education and the education of their parents. It is an alarming fact that there are young people who are (according to their own testimony) below the absolute poverty line because they cannot cover their daily expenses of food, and it is also alarming that a significant proportion of young people cannot cover the cost of clothing and footwear. The financial situation of young people indicates that they are still significantly dependent on their parents and that even when they are employed, there are intergenerational transfers. Given that there are not any significant programmes to support young people during the education process, they are almost entirely dependent on the resources of their family of origin. The amount of money they have available, once again significantly correlates with the material status of the household in which they live, the education of their parents, and their gender, because more money is available to males than young females.

In line with the high degree of dependence of young people, the results indicate a very high level of housing dependency on the family of origin (which is influenced by the financial situation of the household). However, the results reveal another side to the coin. Even when young people earn enough to provide for themselves, in half of the cases they continue to live with their parents. This result may be an indication of the detraditionalization of family relations, in which living in the same space does not present a serious obstacle to young people when it comes to realising a sense of personal autonomy, or an indication that in this case there is a change of direction in the transfer of money from children to parents, through which intergenerational solidarity is reproduced by inclusion of the children.





## Introduction

The meaning and importance of education in contemporary society has experienced significant changes. Education undoubtedly remains the most important mechanism of social reproduction and promotion. From the perspective of young people, however, formal education paradoxically is becoming more central and more marginalized (Wyn, 2009: 103). On the one hand, it is still highly valued because it represents the cultural capital that is necessary to ensure employment, but it proves to be insufficient because in the strategies of transition from education to employment it is necessary to include the knowledge and skills acquired in the informal processes of education, which is increasingly valued.

The survey of young people in Serbia in 2011 showed that education is a factor that largely influences the orientation (perceptions, attitudes, aspirations and plans) of young people and their agency – their activities and strategies in different domains of life: work, family, leisure time, political and civic participation (Tomanović *et al.* 2012). It also showed that education is a resource that most directly affects the financial status and financial autonomy of young people (Mojić, 2012b: 109; Stanojević, Tomanović 2013), but it is not equally available to all. The process of closing the social structure in Serbia began in the late seventies by narrowing the channels of educational mobility, and the process of completely shifting educational reproduction into the family came full circle with the crisis of socialism in the late eighties (Stanojević, 2012: 66). The family becomes the basic bearer of financial resources for education and thus life opportunities for young people. This pseudo-meritocratic model of social reproduction (Cvejić, 2006: 78) continued during the post-socialist transformation of society. After a period of stagnation of education opportunities in the nineties, there was an increase after the political change in 2000, as evidenced by an increase in the share of young people who graduate from secondary school and enter university (the latter is about 40%). The commercialization of higher education, as well as the regime of schooling which does not offer the possibility of combining work and study present, however, significant structural constraints for young people from lower social classes to study. On the other hand, such a transitional regime makes young people during primary, secondary and university education almost completely financially dependent on their parents. Scarce systemic support measures - state scholarships and loans, are causally related to the acquired cultural capital (estimated through academic achievement), and therefore less accessible to those who come from underprivileged backgrounds (Mojić, 2012b: 100). Instead of ensuring equality of opportunity to realise the potential of education, the social system in Serbia excludes young people from poor families from villages and small towns whose parents are uneducated - a state of social exclusion (Tomanović, Stanojević, 2012: 276). Research has shown that the acquisition of additional knowledge and skills is in positive correlation with the cultural and economic capital of the young person and their family, their inherited social capital, as well as the size of the place in which they live, which further increases the reproduction of inequality through education (*Ibid*: 276). Inequalities in education are themes which we will address specifically in the analysis of the results of this research.

The subjective perception of education does not correspond completely with its described importance since the analysis indicates a steady decline in the significance to social promotion the young people of Serbia attribute to education (Mojić 2004; 2010; 2012a; 2012b). Pragmatically-oriented, based on the perception of a ruined quality of education, inadequate knowledge and usefulness of formal qualifications, as well as the perception of the "real" versus the "desirable" order of social advancement, young people in Serbia view the quality of education as one of the factors (after "hard work" and before "ambition") in their strategies for education-to-work transition (Mojić, 2012b: 104).

Previous research has shown that the educational aspirations and plans of young people in Serbia are positively correlated with their cultural capital (educational attainment) and their family (the education level of parents) (Mojić, 2012b: 107). Their perceptions of education and the quality of the education system, as well as educational orientation will be the theme of analysis in this study, and in this way will realize the possibility for longitudinal comparisons.

# Analysis

## Educational status and inequality

Our respondents were aged 15 to 29 and consequently the majority is in the process of schooling: 27% in secondary school, 27% at undergraduate level and 5.8% at postgraduate (Masters and PhD) studies, while 40.2% were not in education. Gender differences in relation to participation in the educational process do not exist, but there are differences according to the place of residence: there are less young people from rural areas compared to those from cities on studies studying (primary: 18.5% versus 32%, and in particular postgraduate 3.1% vs. 7.4%), to a significantly greater extent, are not involved in education (48.1% versus 35.4%)<sup>55</sup>. There are six times less young people whose parents have primary education doing postgraduate studies (1.5% vs. 9.5%), four times less basic studies (8.8% vs. 37.5%), and they are almost 3 times more often (70.6% vs. 24.7%) out of schooling compared to young people whose parents have higher education<sup>56</sup>. These findings lead us to unequal opportunities of education.

Figure 2.1: The achieved level of education of parents and young people who are not educated (in %)




Figure 2.1 shows the highest level of education achieved so far by young people, their mothers and fathers. The table also includes the educational status of parents according to the domination principle - the status of education is that of the parent whose education is higher, as this indicator will be used in further analysis. The variables for the education of parents includes all the young people, while the variables for youth education includes only young people who are currently not attending school. It can be seen that young people who have completed their education have a better education status than their mothers and fathers, and the education structure would further improve if the 27% of young people who are at undergraduate level were included as if they had a university education, which bearing in mind the high degree of completion of studies, will become a reality in the near future.

The sample includes 49.8% of inactive people and 50.2% active, most of whom have a secondary school education (62.6%), followed by college, higher and more (32%), and 5.4% had primary school and lower. The difference in relation to the aforementioned data accounts for 10% of young people who work and go to school, suggesting that this kind of strategy - combining work and education is neither widespread nor supported by Serbian society.

Table 2.1: Education of parents (according to the denomination principle) and education of the child (in %)<sup>57</sup>

		Education of active young people			Total
		Primary and less	Secondary	College and higher	
The education of parents – the domination principle	Primary and less	20.4	69.4	10.2	100.00
	Secondary	4.9	69.1	26.0	100.00
	College and higher	1.4	42.6	56.0	100.00

The data in Table 2.1 clearly shows the narrow channels of the upward mobility in education: every fifth young person whose parents have a primary education completed only primary school, and only one in ten managed to finish college or university. The downward mobility is also interesting: almost half of the children of those with higher education have a lower educational status than the one of their parents. It is evident, however, that children whose parents have

<sup>55</sup>  $\chi^2=40.77$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.188.

<sup>56</sup>  $\chi^2=85.39$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.194.

<sup>57</sup>  $\chi^2=73.96$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.253.

that level of education have a far greater chance of achieving a tertiary level of education than the children of parents with secondary, and in particular those with a lower level. The chances of education mobility clearly show another measure - the quotient of education opportunities:

**Table 2.2: Education chances odds**

		Education of young people	
Education of parent		Secondary	College/higher
	Primary and less	4.2	79
	Secondary	3.5	3.5

Table 2.2 shows that young people whose parents have a primary school education are 4.2 times less likely to graduate from secondary school than children whose parents have a secondary school education, and 79 times less likely to complete college or university compared to a child with higher educated parents. Young people whose parents have a secondary school education are 3.5 times less likely to complete school or university, compared to young people whose parents have higher education.

**Figure 2.2: The evaluation of financial status according to the education of young people (in %)**




Figure 2.2. shows once again how the achieved level of education is associated with the resources of the family, this time material: young people who have completed only primary school education, in significant numbers, live in households that have a poor material situation, while the household of those who have finished university, secondary school and are students, have a significantly better material situation.


The material position of young people in education is almost totally dependent on the material situation of their parents' household, because for 94.1% of high school students, 80.1% of undergraduate students and 43.9% of postgraduates, the only source of finance are their parents. Self-support are 4.6% of secondary school students, 15.9% of students and 51.5% of postgraduate students, while an additional 1 to 2% of young people in education receive assistance from their parents in addition to their own source of income.

Given that forms of state support of education in the form of grants and loans is used by only 7.1% of young people in education, it is clear that the costs of their studies is financed by their parents. Young females are twice as likely than males<sup>58</sup> to use scholarships and loans. And so the meager state support measures for education are not properly targeted to be a source of help for the most vulnerable students: not one person whose parents have a primary education use them compared to 9.7% of young people whose parents have higher education. These findings confirm the findings of our previous studies (Mojić, 2012, Tomanović, Stanojević, 2012): since they are linked almost exclusively with the criteria of selection via education attainment, and have very little to do with social measures, the measures of state support do not help young people with low economic and family cultural capital and thereby contribute to the reproduction of inequality.

Education inequality is also generated from the inequality of possession of materialized elements of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) - goods that are also elements for the acquisition of cultural capital, such as for example, computers and books.

<sup>58</sup> X<sup>2</sup>=5.85. p<.05. Cramer's V=.092.

Figure 2.3: The possession of a personal computer according to the education of young people (in %)



Young people who have completed primary school are extremely underprivileged, as almost half do not possess a personal computer (*desktop*) or laptop. When comparing data on the possession of a computer, it can be concluded that young people with higher education and those who study, would rather buy a laptop than a *desktop* computer, and this may explain the finding that almost a quarter of them do not possess a desktop computer (Figure 2.3). It is interesting that the possession of two or more *desktop* or laptop computers is more or less equal (about 10%) among young people of different levels of education, with the exception of students.

Almost one fifth (19.4%) of young people who have completed primary education does not have a single book in the home, almost half (48.4%) have fewer than 20 books, and not one person has more than 100 books in the home. On the other hand, there are no young people with tertiary education who do not have books at home, and more than half have over 50 books (24.9% from 50 to 100, and 28.1% over 100)<sup>59</sup>.

## Education practices and perceptions of the education system

Young people who are in education have an average grade of very good achievement: university students slightly lower (7.28) than secondary school students (4.16) and postgraduate students (8.62). In contrast to success at school, secondary school students on average spend the least amount of time studying daily (2.12 hours), followed by university students (3 hours), and postgraduate students the highest (3.27). In relation to academic achievement and practices, significant gender and stratification differences among young people do not show.

Young people in Serbia who are in education do not have a particular resistance to the institutions they attend: the majority said they were very happy or happy (17.5% and 28.6%) and a significant number that they were sometimes happy and sometimes reluctant to go to school or college (43.6%), while only a few said it was a problem (2.7%). As the level of education gets higher, there is a more positive attitude towards the educational institution<sup>60</sup>, and young females have a more positive attitude than males<sup>61</sup>.

On the other hand, there is a much greater number of young people in schooling who perceive every day at school/university as stressful: very 5.3%, significantly 13.6%, and somewhat 49.3%, while 31.2% do not find it stressful (4.1% very easy and stress-free). Every day school life is more stressful for secondary school students than for postgraduate students<sup>62</sup>. Significant differences are shown in relation to self-assessment of the material status of the household: young people who live in households with poor economic conditions far more often experience everyday school life as stressful, and in general do not perceive it as completely stress-free. As the material status of the household grows, so does the share of a positive perception of everyday school life<sup>63</sup>.

In assessing the quality of education in Serbia, young people appear to be critical: the majority (45.6%) were partially satisfied, while the share of those satisfied (27.7%) and dissatisfied (25.6%) was almost the same. Males are less satisfied with the quality of education than young females<sup>64</sup>. Young people who have only finished primary school and do not further their education - are significantly less satisfied than those who have completed secondary school and university<sup>65</sup>, and there is a significantly higher number of dissatisfied (51.4%) or very dissatisfied (18.5%) among young people whose material status is the worst and poor than among those whose material status is good and the best (38.0% dissatisfied and very dissatisfied 12.5%)<sup>66</sup>. These findings suggest that education and material frustration are combined, and among other things, mark young people's perceptions and their attitude toward education.

<sup>59</sup>  $\chi^2=96.08, p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.288.

<sup>60</sup>  $\chi^2=38.84, p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.120,

<sup>61</sup>  $\chi^2=11.92, p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.130,

<sup>62</sup>  $\chi^2=153.19, p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.273.

<sup>63</sup>  $\chi^2=42.25, p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.123.

<sup>64</sup>  $\chi^2=14.14, p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.110,

<sup>65</sup>  $\chi^2=94.17, p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.111.

<sup>66</sup>  $\chi^2=24.32, p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.103.

Qualitative analysis of the interviews reveals some general criticism of the education system in Serbia, which may be the cause of dissatisfaction with education. Given that over half (57.1%) of the young people have had no practical experience during their schooling, it is understandable that their most common criticism of education refers to the lack of practical work – no link between the theory and the skills and activities of the profession:

N: Well, it's not good, there is nothing without practical work. The book is one thing, practice is a different matter.

**I: Do you feel you are ready to work after secondary school or higher education?**

N: Well, I'm not. Especially after higher education – definitely not then.

(Female, 27, a larger town, agricultural secondary school, private management college, working 7 years under contract as a salesperson)

**K: Do you think school prepares you sufficiently well for work?**

I: Essentially, yes. Especially when it comes to law only practical work is missing, because we learn a lot of theory and there is little practical work. I think much more practical training could be introduced. I heard a lot of universities, especially those with natural sciences, have a lot of practical work.

(Male, legal intern, 24, small town)

Young people expressed satisfaction with their faculty if there was adequate practical training, whether or not it was part of the curriculum:

I had a good practical work. And really everything interested me.

**K: How did they organise the practical work in your college?**

I: We had it in kindergartens. We went there for four or five hours and the teacher involved us in various activities, worked with the children and observed, and so on. We have a month of practice, two or three weeks, it depends.

(22, female student at a teacher training college in a medium-sized town)

or the faculty they chose differed from others in this:

I: At private universities, Singidunum specifically, they address concrete problems and I am there from that viewpoint to have more [more practice]. The question is how much of the huge amount of information learnt at state universities is necessary. Here they concentrate on the essence and the practical work. That is their advantage. They work with audit firms, marketing agencies, and they take us there, we do our practical training there and are taught concrete problems...

**K: And do you feel that you will after completing this private college, feel confident enough to go somewhere and know at least part of the job?**

I: Well, with the practical training, yes. Absolutely, yes, very

(A male student of economics at a private university, 24, Belgrade)

Students in particular expressed dissatisfaction with shortcomings of study according to the so-called "Bologna" process: the discrepancy in the education process:

The books are huge, the system is such that you pass all preliminary exams and then you pass them all over again. ...The old professors do not want to give up the system they've been using for 20, 30 years, they won't reform, and that's it.

(Student of economics at a private university, 24, Belgrade)

and constant changes of the rules:

Me, for example, I enrolled in college for three years plus two for master studies, and now, when I should be a final year student, finish my third year with two left for my master's, they have introduced a fourth year and one for master's, a fifth. I also have to pay for the fourth year, as there is no scholarship, its self-financing, as is the master's. I enrolled in one system, now they've suddenly changed it. And many colleagues have protested, but there was nothing we could do.

(22, teacher training student in a medium-sized town)

Corruption in education is a theme presently discussed widely by the public, and is reflected in the perceptions of young people in education: over two thirds (69.1%) believe that it is present in the institution they attend (often - 17.1%; occasionally - 25.2%; very seldom - 26.8%). This problem within the education system is mentioned by only one respondent interviewed, who tried unsuccessfully to use informal channels when enrolling in secondary school:

I went to the principal's office with my mother; he says there is no free place. And so from September to October I didn't go to school. And then I had to get into any school that I could, otherwise it would have been a disaster. The choice was baker, cook or trader, and I like, got into trade school, and I made a terrible mistake. And after that, in the department of tourism class ten students got in because they had contacts. The director got them in and after that he was replaced and then became my form teacher. A lot goes on. I don't know what it's like in Belgrade, but here it's all about connections.


(Male, unemployed, 21, vocational school, a small town)

## The perception of their own education path, aspirations and plans

Taking into account the sceptical attitude towards the importance of education for social promotion identified in previous research (Mojić, 2012b; Tomanović, Stanojević, 2012), like the above mentioned critical attitude towards the educational system, it is interesting to note the place and importance of personal education in the social biographies of the youth tested.

The vast majority (73.3%) of young people in education enrolled / attended a school / faculty of their choice, while the rest based their choice on the pragmatic assessment of greater employment opportunities (15.7%) or estimated their chances of being admitted (9.2%), despite their wishes. Stratification analysis shows that children of parents with a low level of education often opt for schools where they can realistically enrol<sup>67</sup>, and this is also the case with young people from households with very poor material conditions. (Figure 2.4)

Figure 2.4: The choice of school according to the material status of the household of the young person (in %)



Among the young people interviewed, there are those for whom education is an important element on their CV and who are satisfied, and they are mainly those who have or are planning to continue their education at university. There are also those young people who completed secondary school and were not particularly interested in further education:

### Why did you choose that (to enrol in a private university)?

Honestly, I don't know why. I finished secondary school and then what to do, and so I chose Megatrend, because I finished three years of secondary school. I was on a food course and I had to enrol somewhere. It's not something that I really like; it's just that I didn't want to be left with only three years of secondary school. I had to enrol in something higher and I did.

(Female, 27, larger town, agricultural secondary school, higher private management, working as a salesperson, 7 years under contract)

<sup>67</sup>  $\chi^2=26.76$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.108$ .

How much instrumentally understood education is unavailable to young people from extremely underprivileged families is very eloquently shown in the testimony of a young man who lives with his parents in a family living on social welfare and doing odd jobs, with six young children living in foster homes because of poverty:

**K: Do you think that here it is easy to find work when you finish some school?**

I: No, it's difficult to find work. There are many who have a secondary school education and work illegally.

**K: Do you think that secondary school would have prepared you for some kind of work?**

I: Absolutely. I would certainly have succeeded in finding something.

**K: From what I understand, you would like to enrol in some secondary school, but...**

I: The problem is that I'd have to finance myself. If I succeeded through the unemployment bureau..., they say it's free through the bureau... I don't know.

**K: Did you try through the bureau?**

I: Yes, I did, but I haven't heard anything yet.

**K: Would you enrol in some specific school, or...?**

I: Anything to be able to get work.

(Male, 21, primary school, unemployed, does odd jobs, a small town)

Parent education and the material situation have proved to be significant stratification factors in the diversification of the education aspirations and desires of young people. And so a far higher number of young people whose parents have a primary school education would choose, if they could, to work in a state institution in Serbia (71%), while those whose parents have a higher education wish to be educated abroad – 31.9% in state-run and 19.5% in private-run institutions<sup>68</sup>.

Students assessed their employment opportunities after graduation so that they are almost evenly divided between optimistic (*I believe I will find a job soon after graduation*, 27%), realistic (*I believe I will find a job after some time*, 33.1%) and sceptical (*I don't believe I'll find a job soon after graduation* 30.1%), while one-tenth (9.7%) could not answer this question.

The optimism and scepticism of young people who are studying in relation to their future transition to employment is also mediated by their socio-economic position and origin: scepticism declines and optimism increases with the rise of the material status of the household<sup>69</sup>, as well as with the increase in the level of education of their parents<sup>70</sup>.

In the context of the stratification differences in their perceptions and aspirations, it is important to note that the findings among all of the young people, including those who are not in education, show that there are differences in the perception of control over their own life<sup>71</sup> in relation to the domination level of the education of their parents. Young people whose parents have completed primary school education more likely to say they *never* or *rarely manage to achieve what they want*<sup>72</sup>, and to *feel they have control over their lives*<sup>73</sup>, while among those whose parents have a secondary school and higher education there are no differences with respect to these characteristics.

<sup>68</sup>  $\chi^2=57.89$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.158.

<sup>69</sup>  $\chi^2=27.71$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.119.

<sup>70</sup>  $\chi^2=24.20$ , p<.05. Cramer's V=.154.

<sup>71</sup> Osećaj kontrole nad sopstvenim životom merili smo pomoću dva pitanja: *Koliko često ti se dešava da ostvariš ono što si želeo/la i Koliko često ti se dešava da osećaš da imaš kontrolu nad svojim životom*, a opcije odgovora su bile: nikad, retko, često, uvek.

<sup>72</sup>  $\chi^2=24.3$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.102.

<sup>73</sup>  $\chi^2=22.53$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.10.

## **Discussion**

The degree of involvement in the education of the studied young people in Serbia corresponds with the findings from other studies in the region, where on this topic only Slovenia stands out as there are less young people who are not in education (Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015). In relation to the motivation to attend school / college, young people in Serbia are less motivated than young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Bulgaria, but more motivated than their peers in Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia and Romania (Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015). Young people in Serbia do not perceive school as particularly stressful and can be ranked alongside young people from Romania, Slovenia and Bulgaria (Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015). Regarding the satisfaction young people from Serbia feel towards the quality of education, they are ranked between young people from Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, who are more satisfied than them, and young people from Kosovo, Romania and Albania who are less satisfied (Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015). As perceived by the young respondents from Serbia, corruption in education institutions is more present than in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia, and less present than in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia (Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015). An interesting finding is that, despite the criticism of the education system from this angle, young people in Serbia are more involved in the various practical aspects of learning and training than young people in other countries in the region (Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015).

The most important findings with regard to the education of young people in Serbia is that according to various indicators there continues to be a reproduction of educational inequality, which was previously established in research in 2011 (Tomanović *et al.* 2012). So measures of educational mobility: the social origin of young people at different levels of education (according to the educational status of the parents and the material status of the household), as well as the odds of educational chances, show the same tendency to reproduce unequal opportunities for education, as in the previous study (Stanojević, 2012; Mojić, 2012a). This research also showed that education inequalities are reproduced through inequalities in the possession of accumulated cultural capital, the possibility to access institutional support for education, as well as through educational aspirations and plans of the young people.

The familistic transitional regime, which in the education of young people relies almost entirely on family resources, on the one hand increases the dependence of young people on their parents, and on the other hand produces the reproduction and deepening of inequality in education, with further repercussions on the closure of the social structure - the narrowing of the channels of vertical social mobility, for which one of the major mechanisms is education. Tertiary education is increasingly becoming a possibility or a privilege for only the middle class, for which it is the key mechanism of reproduction and is evaluated as an intrinsic value (Tomanović, 2008; 2010). An inadequate system of secondary vocational education, which does not provide the practical knowledge and skills related to work and a profession, nor financial and employment state assistance, does not provide support for the biographies of those for whom education has an instrumental value - to lead them to secure employment, so they do not count on education when developing their life strategies.

The study system in Serbia is inflexible: there are no options for young people who might want or need to individualize their biographies, for instance, to become parents or to work while studying. In this way, the system supports an outdated form of standard biographies: education - employment – starting a family, which is becoming a less possible and desirable option for young people in Serbia.

The analysis also showed trends found in other studies (e.g., Walther *et al.*, 2009; Furlong, Cartmel, 2009) that individualisation in education has different meanings for members of different social classes: for those who have family resources – material and cultural capital, this means the ability to choose and develop aspirations, and for those who do not - individualisation implies a gradual reduction of educational and professional aspirations (cooling out), and even dropping out, because the system does not provide support on which they can count on when planning their life path.

# WORK AND EMPLOYMENT



## Introduction

The sphere of labour and employment, as well as the education-work transition of young people today, has undergone a significant transformation in comparison with the experience of their parents' generation, no matter what the social system they grew up in was. A part of these changes is of a structural nature - relating to the restructuring of the global labour market in a post-industrial society, and its inability to integrate a new contingent of young workers in the economic reproduction of society. The unemployment problem is further intensified by the current global economic crisis of capitalism and austerity measures, which in various ways affect young people, depending on the depth of the system of crisis in the country in which they live and the mechanism of the transitional regime in a particular society that make up the institutional framework of the transition from school to work. An uncertain and unpredictable labour market removes the option of a standard path of transition from education to employment, delaying and extending it - due to the need and opportunity for additional education and the acquisition of skills and qualifications, making it fragmented and flexible - based on the forms and strategies of accepting precarious employment: unregulated, unprotected, unprofessional – under-qualified, over-exploited, underpaid, and similar. The working sphere and professional career path in life also seem fragmented and flexible, even risky, with the frequent need to change occupations in order to maintain competitiveness in a changing labour market (Mortimer, 2009).

The sphere of work and working transition in Serbia was further complicated by a high rate of youth unemployment (which we covered in the introductory chapter) and long-term unemployment (Mojić, 2012b: 122), the absence of cohesion and coordination between the needs of the education and work systems, a very poor and underdeveloped mechanism for systemic employment support and further training, an unregulated labour market, a high share of informal economy, corruption, nepotism and clientelism in employment.

Reflections of such a framework for transition can be seen in the biographies of young people in Serbia in the study from 2011 (Tomanović *et al* 2012). Analysis showed that the great importance of family resources - especially economic and social capital, extends from the domain of education into the transition to the working sphere within the post-socialist variants of subprotective (familistic) transitional regimes (Walther *et al.* 2009). Young people perceive social networks as an important potential resource for employment: obtaining information about work, making contacts, recommendations, connections, securing material support for starting an independent private business (Tomanović, Stanojević, 2012: 277). Education as a key resource for young people, loses its normative significance as a factor of social promotion, which we covered in the previous section, and practically, as a factor for employment in the real strategies of young people who are forced to agree to more flexibility in terms of deprofessionalisation.

Research has also shown the specifics of the working strategies, orientation and methods of how unemployed young people find jobs in Serbia (Mojić, 2012b). A small number of them use state assistance through the national employment service and its training programmes, while a very small number count on help from the state when opting to start their own business. This orientation and action is, on the one hand, a perception of the underdevelopment and availability of government support, and on the other hand, of the constant and accumulated mistrust in the institutions of the system (Tomanović, Stanojević, 2012: 277). In such a precarious and uncertain environment, the working aspirations and motivations for youth employment are logically directed towards job security and earnings, while creativity and the possibility of training and promotion, forcibly lose significance in their perception (Mojić, 2012b: 126).

Risks of (un)employment are not, however, uniformly distributed, as education raises the level and quality of employment. In accordance with the latter, unemployment is also associated with the level of education - less education carries with it a long period of unemployment, as does the education of the parents and the household income (Tomanović, Stanojević, 2012: 277).


In relation to the outlined comparative framework, we will analyse the results of this study pertaining to employment status, work transition and the work aspirations of young people in Serbia in 2015.

# Analysis

## Employment and work status

Employment status is the first mark that indicates the extent of risks which young people are exposed to in the labour market. In particular, unemployment is considered one of the risk categories (so called NEET not in education, employment or training), but even the category of young people working while at school carries some degree of risk, stipulated by the scope and quality of the regulation of the labour market in a given institutional environment.


Figure 3.1: Comparison of activity status in EU28 countries and young people in Serbia in 2015 (in %)



Source: Eurostat and FES 2015.

In comparison with the EU 28 countries according to Eurostat data, the share of unemployed young people in Serbia is similar in the younger and middle cohorts, while unemployment is on the rise in the oldest age group (Figure 3.1). For the first time in this group in Serbia, there is a greater participation of young people who combine education and work, which although negligible in the youngest group, is half the European average in the middle group. These findings point to the specificity of education-work transition in Serbia: education extends into the late twenties, but due to family pressure and the aspirations of young people to achieve financial independence, the prolonged completion of tertiary education is combined with temporary and occasional (unregulated, risky, *precarious*) work and employment.

Figure 3.2: Comparison of activity status in countries in the region (age 16-25, in %)



Source: Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015.

Compared to the other countries in the region in which the Shell youth study was carried out, according to the schedule of activity options, Serbia is most similar to countries such as Romania, where a small number of the respondents combine school and work, more are employed than unemployed, and most are in education (secondary and university) (Figure 3.2.). Apart from Slovenia which stands out with a low participation of unemployed (i.e. NEET), a low participation of those who put themselves through school and a high participation of those who combine education

and employment, the other countries in the Balkan region show similar tendencies with variations in the proportion of employed and unemployed respondents.

According to their statements, 37,7% of the respondents are permanently or temporarily employed, with slightly more males (40.1%) than young females (35,1%). As expected, employment increases with age, with 7,7% of the youngest to over 35,9% of those aged 20-24 years, to 65% of the oldest group. Employment increases with the level of education: among those who have completed their education, 46,7% with a primary education are employed, while the figure for those with a higher education<sup>74</sup> is 77,7%. The analysis in this study, as in previous ones, shows that a higher level of education reduces the risk of unemployment.

In order to point out the differences in the socio-economic situation of the different categories of the economically active young people, we omitted from the analysis those who were at school and compared those in permanent employment, temporary employment and those unemployed. Among the employed 37,2% are permanent and 29,1% temporary, while 33,7% are unemployed. According to age, unemployment falls and stable employment rises, while temporary employment is prevalent in middle age category of young people (Figure 3.3).

Stable employment increases and unemployment decreases with higher levels of education of the young person, while temporary employment is almost invariably present with young people of different educational categories (Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.3: Categories of employment by age (in %)





Figure 3.4: Categories of employment according to completed education



Employment is connected to the material status of young people, but not unequivocally. In the category of the best well-off households, six times more people are stably employed than unemployed, but those stably employed, although twice as less as those unemployed, are also present in households with extreme deprivation<sup>75</sup>. The material standard of households, as assessed by the respondents, presents the accumulation of the resources of its members, and evidence that employment, including permanent employment, does not provide optimum living standards is present in both categories of those employed in households below the standard medium.

Although stable employment does not provide financial security, it still provides a slightly better standard for households, as shown by the results of the analysis shown in Figure 3.5.

Figure 3.5: The material status of households according to the employment status of the young person (in %)




<sup>74</sup>  $\chi^2=439.15$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.623$ .

<sup>75</sup>  $\chi^2=6.55$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.076$ .

Analysis of working hours shows that, according to their statements, the majority of employees work full-time hours and over: 63.5% are in stable employment and 51% part-time, working 40 to 49 hours per week, while 40.2% are those who work and attend school (Figure 3.6). Surprisingly, 26.4% of those in stable employment, 17.3% in temporary employment and even 16.7% of those at school, said they worked 50 hours a week or more. These findings point to two trends: one is over exploitation at work, which is evident from the above mentioned number of working hours of employees, and the other is the specifically complex and unfavourable working conditions for young people who work and attend school, because less than half of them (43.1%) work less hours than the full-time hours (so called *part-time work*).

**Figure 3.6: The number of working hours per week by category of employees (in %)**



In interviews with respondents of different educational levels from places of various sizes in Serbia, descriptions of risk and uncertain working conditions dominate. Young people do temporary work and are fired without any protection:

I: I started to work and had clients just like the other beautician. I worked three months, a little more than three months. And she called me and said that an inspector was coming and that the following day I was out of a job and she couldn't pay me, she didn't have the funds.

K: You weren't legally on the payroll?

I: No, I wasn't and I didn't get a single penny.

K: You weren't paid for three months?

I: No, No. She called me one evening to tell me that an inspector was coming and that she had no money to pay me. Surely she knew three months earlier whether or not she was in a position to pay a worker. Today, that's the way it is when it comes to certain jobs like a hairdresser, beautician, manicurist, they are the worst paid because there are so many. Wherever you go you see hair salons or beauty salons.

(Female, 22, hairdresser and beautician, unemployed, works unregistered from home, large town)

The option of work that this young woman chose, like so many young people, is to work "off the books" until they realize their plans to start their own business:

K: Did you try to work alone, to have your own clients?

I: Yes, now, since last year.

K: And you work alone at home. Do you succeed in making some money in that way?

I: Well, yes. Last week, two-three thousand.

K: Do your friends, acquaintances ask you to do their make up?

I: Friends, a few have heard and...

K: But, you are still taking a risk. Someone might report you. How do you feel about that?

I: Well, what can I say... If they come after me and not the junkies and such like, then where are we now?

When young people have some special knowledge and skills, they often go for precarious jobs and careers abroad:

I: Yes, because I play football, they pay me two thousand five hundred, three thousand euro to play in the third league in Austria. And so it's quite enough for me, here it's a lot. But I was injured and I'm here now.

K: Since when are you in Austria?

I: The last time was a year ago. Then last summer I was injured.

K: When did you go to Austria the first time?

I: Three years ago. I played football for two years and then I injured the ligaments in my knee. I've been here since then. I'll be going back in about fifteen days.

...

I: My friends who work in a factory [in his home town], they've all finished university, they've done their exams and state exams, they all do physical work there, the worst. Those who don't even have primary school finished and have connections, do the easy work, literally.

K: Do you think that your schooling will help you?

I: No.

K: And if you hadn't trained football, what would have happened?

I: Well, I suppose I would have been seven years unemployed at the bureau and would have done nothing. I would have done agricultural work at home.

(Male, 24, secondary school, unemployed, large town)

An explanation of the reasons for remaining in permanent employment, despite doing contract work below their qualifications, is given in the following testimony of a 27-year-old female with a college education who has been working in sales for seven years with her contract prolonged annually:

I: Would you like to work somewhere else?

N: Well, yes I would and probably in my field.

I: Have you tried to find work somewhere?

N: Well, yes I have, but not much. I'm here so long, 7 years. You know, when you are in the one place you literally get stuck in a rut and you don't look for anything. You know it's not good, but you are where you are.

I: OK, but you said that you're looking at the job ads on the Internet.

N: You know what I do! I check out the ads, send my CV, but of course nobody ever answers, or rarely. The last time I sent my CV was to NIS petrol station. They called me three years ago. It was through the youth organisation for a specified period of time. And so that didn't suit me. Working 3 or 4 weeks means nothing to me and after that to send me home. I am where I am.

## Work transition

The type of real work transition can be seen in whether the education acquired by a young person influences the job they are doing. The analysis shows that young people with higher education, in almost two thirds of the cases (61%), work in their profession, unlike young people with primary and secondary education, which in two-thirds of the cases, do not do jobs for which they were educated (66.7% and 59.8%). Although there is a difference between those who have a permanent job, who are more likely to work in their profession than those who are temporarily employed (40.8% versus 31.4%), it is important to note that over half (51.6%) of those temporarily employed and almost half (41.3%) with permanent employment are working outside of their field of expertise<sup>76</sup>. These findings suggest, on the one hand, a greater flexibility in labour strategies – deprofessionalization or accepting a job regardless of qualifications and possibly below them. On the other hand, this flexibility is a consequence of the nonconformity of the education system and the labour market, of which the participants themselves spoke about in the part of the interview devoted to education.

The normative aspect of job transition can be seen through the observation of the "real order" of employment, or the evaluation of the factors that enable employment. In the context of the preceding discussion, it is important to see how the young respondents attach the importance of education and skills to factors of employability. Participants stated political connections as the most important factor for recruitment of the highest rank (political capital - 30.4%), followed by social capital - acquaintances / friends (26%) and in third place expertise (17.8%) and level of education (17.5%), while happiness was by far the least (8%).

More young males than women emphasise political and social capital as factors of employment<sup>77</sup>, while more young females emphasise education and expertise. The evaluation of certain factors that enable employment varies according to other characteristics. Low-educated young people mostly believe in social capital, and then political capital. Medium-educated and highly educated young people mostly believe in the political capital, then social, and finally in expertise. Only young people who are still in school - state education, after political ties and social capital, as an important factor for employment. Consequently, the importance of education as a factor of employment decreases significantly with the age of the respondents. The origin of the respondents, the cultural capital seen through the

<sup>76</sup> The remainder consists of respondents who feel that their work to some extent matches their qualifications and those without qualifications.

<sup>77</sup>  $\chi^2=18.48$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.130$ .

education of parents, has an impact on the evaluation of the factors that are crucial in the working transition. Young people whose parents have lower education believe less in expertise and the level of education and most in social capital and political capital, they believe more in luck than in education. Young people whose parents have secondary school education believe most in political capital, and then social capital. Young people whose parents have higher education also put political in front of social capital, but compared with young people whose parents have primary school education, value education and expertise far more<sup>78</sup>. Young people also differ in relation to this issue by the status of their activities, because in addition to the usual emphasis on political connections (capital), the unemployed and temporary employed particularly value connections (social capital), those in stable employment proportionately value expertise, while young people who are studying - education.

In the second place, social capital (26.7%), education (23.5%) and expertise (20.7%) are more important than political capital (16.6%). The most striking difference is the education level of parents, since children of parents with primary education value proportionally more social and political capital, than the children of those with higher education<sup>79</sup>. In third place is happiness, expertise is in fourth, and in fifth luck is again a more significant factor than the others.

The interviewed young people very vividly described what they observed or experienced when it comes to employment in Serbia:

**K: Generally speaking, how do people get jobs in Serbia?**

I: Well, with difficulty. It's about connections, who know who. The chances are small of getting a job because of your expertise or knowledge. And those who are truly expert and stand out at university, they are immediately grabbed by foreign universities or by foreign companies, so they are guaranteed employment.

(Male, 24, university education, intern in his father's law firm, small town)

**K: Generally speaking, how do people get jobs in Serbia?**

I: Everything is through political parties and connections, only nobody will admit it. Half of them admit it, but the other half don't like to talk about it because of how they got their job. That's the way it is.

**K: What are the chances of finding any work at all?**

I: No chance. There is no chance of anyone phoning you from the unemployment bureau, the positions are already filled. Even before the ad appears, the position has been filled..

(Male, 24, secondary school, unemployed, plays professional football in Austria, large town)

**K: What are the chances of finding any work at all?**

I: Through money.

**K: What does that mean?**

I: Well, through bribery or corruption. That's my answer. Bribery means that you bribe someone and corruption that you find someone yourself.

(Female, 20, BeoCity, secondary school, employed as a shop assistant in a Chinese store)

I: Except if you work for the railway company from Russia, since they are building railway lines, there are not jobs here on offer, because everything goes through the president of the municipality or you have to pay someone or have connections. Although last year I had two connections for a job in a paint shop, I didn't get it. The employer said that I was too quiet.

(Male, 21, secondary school, unemployed, small town)

And the respondents themselves used connections and acquaintances to get any kind of job:

**K: And how do you get temporary seasonal work?**

I: Well, they call me as they've known me for a few years.

(Male, 21, primary school education, unemployed, does seasonal work, small town)

**I: How did you find work?**

N: Well, accidentally through a friend. My friend is married to the boss and I came in her place when she got married.

(Female, 27, college, works as a shop assistant on contract, large town)

**K: How did you succeed in getting into that club in Austria?**

I: A friend plays there and invited me to stay with him. He arranged something like a trial game and they immediately took me on after literally ten minutes. Here nobody cares even if you score a hundred goals... Serbia is a hole.

(Male, 24, secondary school, unemployed, plays football in Austria, large town)

<sup>78</sup>  $\chi^2=23.57$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.104.

<sup>79</sup>  $\chi^2=15.75$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.085.

## Job aspirations

The aspirations connected to work will be analysed through the most important motivational factors for the acceptance of a particular job, as well as the preferred sector of employment.

The top-ranking factor for the acceptance of employment for over half of young people (56.4%) is income/salary, a much less important factor is job security (22.7%) and job satisfaction (17.1%), while the least, people in the workplace (3.6%). More females than males value job security (25.2% versus 20.1%) and job satisfaction (19.4% versus 14.8%), and less income/salary (51.9% versus 60.9%)<sup>80</sup>. In second place is job security (40.3%), income / salary (27.2%) and job satisfaction (22.2%) and people in the workplace (10.3%). Third place is as follows: job satisfaction (39%) and job security (25.7%), people in the workplace (24.4%) and finally income/salary (10.9 %). People in the working environment dominate as a factor only in the fourth (61.8%). As in the study from 2011 (Mojić, 2012b), in a hazardous working environment, young people in Serbia opt for factors from the domain of materialistic values, while individualistic (post-materialist) values in relation to employment, such as personal satisfaction and teamwork, are a luxury to them.

In the context of awareness that job security and earnings are highly valued, it is not surprising that the favoured sector for hypothetical employment is the state sector (62.1%), and much more so than the private sector (26.1%). When comparing the average responses, the private sector is more interesting for young people whose parents have higher education<sup>81</sup>, and international organizations are more interesting for young people who have a higher education or go to school in the cities, while young people from the countryside wish for employment in the state sector<sup>82</sup>.

The possibility of training with regard to employment or professional training is not represented as an option for employed or unemployed young people. Given that there are no training courses organized by the state or by potential employers, people must themselves bear the cost of additional training. It is therefore not surprising that only 12.9% of young people within the last year have attended professional training courses: more are from towns, people older and with a higher education who are in steady employment and whose parents have a higher education. Similarly, only 16% of the young people surveyed attended a language course within the previous year: more with economic capital – employees with stable revenues versus the unemployed; more young people with accumulated cultural capital: those who are studying or have completed college or university and children whose parents have a university education. Therefore, training is an individual investment for those who already have accumulated resources, instead of a strategic practice supported by the state, which would enhance the employability of young people from the underprivileged social milieu.

The aspirations and practices regarding employment and the procurement of income, which the young people communicated in their interviews, represent coping strategies rather than elaborate plans based on a combination of knowledge and the skills that they possess, the activation of social networking and the pooling of resources:

**K: What exactly are your plans?**

I: I would really love to open my own salon.

**K: Do you think it would be profitable enough?**

I: Every job is difficult to realise in the beginning. I spoke to my three friends about getting some money together to open something ourselves. If we find a good location where there aren't many businesses, maybe we could. But if it's in the centre of the town where there are thousands of businesses, we won't have any clients.

(Female, 22, hairdresser and beautician, unemployed, working temporarily from home unregistered, large town)

<sup>80</sup>  $\chi^2=13.43$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.111.

<sup>81</sup>  $\chi^2=56.72$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.157.

<sup>82</sup>  $\chi^2=14.53$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.112.

## **Discussion**

Analysis of the research shows that the high-risk situation of young people in the labour market in Serbia persists. While one-third of the economically active young respondents is unemployed, nearly one-third is temporary employed. In comparison with the countries in the region, Serbia is ranked among the countries with a high participation of young people who work fewer hours than the optimal forty-hour working week, at 44%, together with Macedonia and Slovenia (Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015). The institutional framework for temporary work in these two countries, however, is fundamentally different, and the situation in Serbia is more similar to Macedonian than Slovenia: this segment of the labour market is completely unregulated as there is no protection of job security and workers' rights, as witnessed in the statements of the respondents in their interviews. The number of working hours of those in stable employment, as well as those who are temporary employed or are both working and studying, points to a heavy workload and over exploitation of young workers.

Another aspect of the coerced flexibility of work is its deprofessionalization, often they work without the right qualifications, or more often than not they are overqualified. Compared to the 48% of young people who work outside of their profession, Serbia is classified among the countries where participation is over 40%, along with Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia and Bulgaria (Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015).

Compared with their peers in the region, young people in Serbia more often state political connections as a factor which is crucial to obtaining employment, and only young people in Macedonia have a similar opinion (Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015). Acquaintances and friends were proportionally less cited as the most significant factor in obtaining employment, while education and expertise were mentioned more than by their peers in Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, while only education was cited in Serbia by more young people than in Slovenia and by less than in Kosovo, Albania, Romania, Croatia and Bulgaria.

The dominance of political connections, which is perceived as a significant factor in obtaining employment, is a reflection of public opinion in Serbia and the propagation of membership privileges of the party which has monopolized the political scene in recent years. The order of factors by which employment is obtained, indicates a high level of corruption within the system – nepotism, political clientelism and financial corruption. The description of how the interviewed young people find employment further supports the conclusion that not only has this order been "noticed", but it is a reality of everyday life for young people in Serbia – the strategies are accepted and practiced in an attempt to ensure material existence.

# YOUNG PEOPLE AND THEIR FAMILIES



## Introduction

Young people in the context of family can be viewed in several ways: in relation to the family of origin – parental, starting their own family of choice and through the process which connects the two contexts - through family transition. All of the above apply to the processes marked by socio-cultural characteristics and experience a minor or major transformation in the context of contemporary social changes. Global trends are associated with extended and fragmented education to work transition (Furlong, 2009), as well as the changing patterns of family transition – delayed parenting (Corijn, Klijzing, 2001), which affects the patterns of housing transition (Mulder, 2009). Regardless of the type of transitional regime (Walther, 2006; Biggart, Kovacheva, 2006), global economic and political changes of the structural environment give special importance to family resources in the transition to adulthood (Togouchi Swartz, Bengtson O'Brien, 2009), making them increasingly important to the "navigation" that individualisation in such an environment of late modernity implies (Wyn *et al.*, 2011: 4). In addition to material support for family transition, housing support and assistance in childcare, which well-off members of the "baby boom" generation provide their children, are crucial (Brannen *et al.* 2004). The inevitable consequences of these processes are changes in intergenerational relations within the family, which are also an expression of contradictions between the individualistic norms of the autonomy of the young person and the significant importance of parents to adolescents and young adults. The changes are reflected in the move from relations of autonomy and dependence, and their corresponding concepts, to relations of cooperation and interdependence (Gillies, 2000; Turtianen *et al.* 2007). The new relations of interdependence bring into question the very concept of transition into adulthood as a linear path to achieving independence from parents: from dependence, to semi-dependence, to full independence, because different forms of dependence and independence, as well as semi-dependence and interdependence, occur and are negotiated between young people and their parents in different life phases (Lahelma, Gordon, 2008: 211). Reciprocal relationships, the sense of responsibility and intergenerational solidarity are more and more present (e.g. Silverstein, Bengtson, 1997; Kalmijn, Saraceno, 2008), and are particularly supported by the latest crisis of capitalism, for which there is an opinion that in addition to class, generational differences were wiped out, pushing parents and children into a new precariat class (Standing, 2011; Bauman, 2012).

One of the most significant changes in the life of young people is the altered understanding of partner and family relations, where partner relationships, both normative and practical, are separate from parenthood, and they are increasingly viewed as different lifestyle choices, which can be incompatible in the same life phase (Daly, 2005: 385). New patterns of lifestyle include living alone, often in a household with friends (Heath, 2009), cohabitation (Sobotka, Toulemon, 2008; Kasearu, Kutsar, 2011) and a partner relationship living apart (so called LAT living apart together; Duncan Phillips 2011; Stoilov *et al.* 2014).

Family transition and consequently intergenerational relations in families in Serbia, are shaping in conjunction with several interdependent factors. The first is the socio-cultural form of family and housing transitions which places Serbia in the group of southern European countries, where the parental household is left at a later age in order to establish their own family household (Iacovo, 2002). In this form, family transition takes centre place in relation to the education-to-work transition, in both meaning and significance (Tomanović, Ignjatović, 2010). This form is supported by the institutional framework of post-socialist variants of familialistic (sub-protective) transitional regimes (Walther *et al.* 2009) - with a considerable role of the state, but with the increasing importance of family, its resources and support (Tomanović, 2012b). A further characteristic is associated with the so-called "postponement culture" (Reiter, 2009) - with the postponement of the completion of their education, housing independence and the starting of a family, characterizing most of the countries of the former Yugoslavia in the form of the so called "frozen transition" (Kuhar, Reiter, 2012a; 2012b). In Serbia, the postponement of moving out of the family home is largely associated with the adverse structural context that transitions into adulthood take place in: high unemployment, housing and financial dependency of young people on their parents (Stanojević, Tomanović, 2013).

In Serbia, extended and delayed family transition shape the intergenerational relationships of adolescents and young adults, as well as their parents in a specific way. A previous form of age patriarchy and the authority based on it, which existed during socialism, were replaced with a paternalistic protective attitude of parents towards their children (Tomanović, Ignjatović, 2004, 2006). Independence – autonomy, has different aspects conveyed by cultural forms: structural, functional, emotional and subjective, and these specifics should be taken into account in the analysis and interpretation of the relationship between parents and young people (Ljubičić, 2012). Analysis of the research of young people in Serbia, for instance, indicates that a prolonged structural - financial and housing dependence reduce the functional

autonomy of young people - independence regarding decision-making and taking action (*Ibid.*). The cultural constant of family relations in the countries in the region - the emotional connection between parent and child (Ilišin, Radin, 2002; Ule, Kuhar 2008; Lavric, 2011; Ilišin *et al.* 2013; CEPYUS-FES, 2014; Kuhar, Reiter, 2014; Mitev, Kovacheva, 2014), was also identified in the research of young people in Serbia (Ljubičić, 2012). The subjective feeling of independence of a young person, however, may not correspond to the objective indicators of their structural and functional autonomy (Lavrić, 2011; Ljubičić, 2012). The specifics of intergenerational relationships - whether they belong to the so-called *encouraging* or *non-encouraging* families (Dragišić Labaš, 2012), also affects many aspects of the social biography of young people (Tomanović *et al.* 2012).

Family transition shows specifics in the pattern of forming a family among young people in Serbia. There is high valuation placed on starting a family, marriage and childbirth, which are normatively equated with the acquisition of autonomy and transition to adulthood (Tomanović, Ignjatović, 2006). There is, however, a discrepancy between the normative and practical aspects of this transition: analysis of marital behaviour and childbirth indicates an expressed trend in its delay, especially among young people with higher education (Tomanović, 2012b: 143), as well as a decrease in the number of births. Similarly, there is normatively high support of cohabitation, while the alternative family forms - cohabitation, living alone and other alternative forms of partnership are not widespread. Family transition in Serbia has been postponed, however, there is a standard synchronicity of marriage and childbirth, and childbirth out of wedlock generally precedes formal marriage (Tomanović, 2012b). The transition to parenthood takes place in an unsupported institutional environment, so the resources of the family of origin become one of the fundamental structural contexts in which starting a family and parenthood take place, where young people choose one of two strategies: developing a strong network of informal support of parenthood or postponing childbirth, decreasing the number of children and the abandonment of parenthood (*Ibid.*: 145).


## Analysis

### Young people in the parental family

Three-quarters (74.1%) of the tested young people live with their parents: 59.9% with both parents, 11.2% with their mother and 3% with their father. Most of them, as expected, are in the youngest age group (93.4%), slightly less in the middle group (75.9%), a significant number (55.2%), in the age group 25 to 29 live in the parental home. A significantly smaller number live with a partner (11.6%), most of them are in the oldest age group (25.9%) or living alone (5.7%; 8.1% are among the oldest). Besides age, gender is a variable that determines the type of habitation, because more young males live with their parents (89.4%), while more young females live with a partner (16.4%). These data indicate a trend of young females marrying earlier than males and gender differences in age when forming a family, which is a characteristic of Serbian society, as well as some other countries in the region (Romania, Bulgaria, Greece).

Young people from rural areas live with their parents more often (82.5%) than those in towns (69.4%). One-person households of young people are more characteristic for urban areas (7.1%), as well as for those who have stable employment (Figure 4.1).

**Figure 4.1: With whom the respondent live in relation to their activity status (in%)**



If we disregard inactive young people who are at school, it is clear from the analysis that an independent life – living alone and with a partner, is connected with the material conditions that stable employment provide, which indicates differences in the types of housing among those in permanent employment and the unemployed. Temporary employees are a transitional category in terms of housing independence, because more often than the other categories they share living space with friends or relatives as they usually combine work and education.

Analysis of the relation between the material status of the household and the type of housing of young people, points to specific risks of material deprivation which young people from single-parent families are exposed to. In the two categories in the worst position, over a fifth of young people live with their mother (21.9%) or with their father (22.9%) compared to those who live with both parents (11.9%), alone (11.9%) or with a partner/spouse (14.3%)<sup>83</sup>.

The households in which young people live are mostly made up of four (31.8%) and three members (24.2%), while there is altogether a quarter of households with five or more members. The average household size is 3.75 members. It is interesting that under a fifth of young people (17.1%), regardless of their housing and marital status, claim not to have their own separate room, which speaks about the good housing conditions of the young person.

With regard to the reasons for living with their parents, the males more often than the state financial restrictions (39.9% versus 28.2%), while the young females say it is easier for the family (63.5% versus 54.1%)<sup>84</sup>. This finding can be interpreted in terms of the internalisation of different gender expectations: that the male child is more financially secure as the future breadwinner, and the female child is more devoted to the collective needs of the family, thus reflecting their expressive gender role.

For younger respondents and respondents from rural areas, the motives for living together are more pronounced, while in the oldest age group<sup>85</sup> and among young people from towns, financial restrictions<sup>86</sup>, are more pronounced. With regarding to moving out, it is interesting that very few respondents stated opposition from parents as an obstacle (2.6%).

The acceptance of the rationalization of life with parents - *I live with my parents because it is the easiest way for our family*, is more characteristic of children of less educated parents<sup>87</sup> and those who are in a dependent position - in school, while employed and unemployed young people<sup>88</sup> as well as those who are parents, put more emphasis on limited material resources<sup>89</sup>.

Most young people interviewed pointed out that the lack of material resources, or their current financial dependence on parents is the main obstacle to moving out, which they plan in the near future:

**K: Who do you live with?**

I: With my parents, grandmother and grandfather and my older sister.

**K: Why are you still living with your parents?**

I: Well, it's all about finances. I don't know...

**K: You think that if you had more money...?**

I: Well, probably if I was working, but I still haven't finished university, but I would prefer to be independent, to have my own flat, to have peace and quiet, I mean I do, but there are always conflicts, different generations and everybody has their own opinion , but it's ok.

**K: Do you feel independent regarding them?**

I: Yes and no. I mean, they still provide for me and I'm dependent on them, but I make my own decisions about many things.

(Female student, 22, medium-sized town)

When I was living alone in Novi Sad I didn't notice a difference or that anything had changed, but when I moved back home to live with my mum four years later, then I realised that I had totally changed and was more independent and mature than when I was when I left home And I feel independent. I mean, it wouldn't be a problem if I had to live alone again tomorrow.

**K: And you are actually financially dependent on them still?**

I: Yes, I am.

**K: And tomorrow when you start working, do you plan to live alone again?**

I: Well, yes, that my plan because for me it's not normal that a person of 35 or more lives with their parents, and so it is absolutely my plan. I think that when I start work my next goal will be to save and plan.

(Male, lawyer, 24, intern in a lawyer's office, small town)

<sup>83</sup>  $\chi^2=51.07$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.149.

<sup>84</sup>  $\chi^2=16.11$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.135.

<sup>85</sup>  $\chi^2=49.56$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.167.

<sup>86</sup>  $\chi^2=22.91$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.161.

<sup>87</sup>  $\chi^2=19.84$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.107.

<sup>88</sup>  $\chi^2=12.04$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.119.

<sup>89</sup>  $\chi^2=9.77$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.108.

In Serbia, the relationship that young people have with their parents is most often characterized as *getting along with the occasional difference of opinion* (50.6%) and it is predominantly expressed by children whose parents have a higher education (53.8%) than those whose parents have completed primary school (34.8%), who to a greater extent than the average (42.2%), emphasize that they get on very well with their parents (53.6%)<sup>90</sup>.

I: As I said, I get on very well with my parents. I don't have a problem. My mum is young and she understands me, and I can tell her everything. Dad too, they are great, they understand me and I understand them.

(Female, 17, secondary school pupil, suburb of Belgrade)

A small number of respondents described their relationship with their parents as conflicting (the mostly disagree and often argue - 5.3%), most common with unemployed young people (7.7%) or very conflicting (0.8%), most common with those in temporary employment (2.9%)<sup>91</sup>.

K: How would you describe your relation with your parents, you said that you're not that close?


I: Well, friendly, but not so friendly that we can talk about intimate things and so on. And we don't spend so much time together. We don't talk openly, we don't talk about intimate topics at all.

K: And if you had a problem, who would you talk to?

I: Well, to my brother. No way to my parents. I can solve everything myself.


(Male, 24, secondary school, unemployed, large town)

Figure 4.2: Who has the biggest impact on your important decisions according to the gender of respondents (in %)



Unlike their assessment of the quality of their relationships with parents, when identifying the most influential person closest to them, gender differences emerge: males mostly emphasise their fathers, and young females their mothers (Figure 4.2). The mother's influence, in relation to the average sample, was emphasised by young people from the city (44.9%), while in rural areas the father was more influential (35.7%)<sup>92</sup>. The specific affects of the patriarchal socialization form, by reinforcing the influence of fathers, is indicated by the fact that fathers are more dominant among young people whose parents have a primary education, while those whose parents have tertiary education emphasise the effect of the mother (figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3: Identification of the most influential people for young people according to the education of their parents (in %)



<sup>90</sup>  $\chi^2=19.07$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.091.


<sup>91</sup>  $\chi^2=36.63$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.181.

<sup>92</sup>  $\chi^2=19.41$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.130.

As expected with age, the impact of mothers weakens and the influence of other people increases, which is probably the partner or spouse, and this is significantly present with those who are employed (15.7%), as opposed to inactive (3.8%), and with those who have children (35%) compared to those who do not (6.3%).

When describing the way in which they make decisions, the young people from our sample were almost equally divided between those who make decisions together with their parents (48%) and those who do it alone (50.1%), while those who say that their parents make decisions about everything was very small (1.6%). As expected, younger<sup>93</sup> and inactive people (at school) make decisions in consultation with their parents, while independence is achieved through employment (but there is a difference between stable employment and unemployment)<sup>94</sup> and parenthood<sup>95</sup>.

**Figure 4.4: Decision-making and housing independence (in %)**



In addition to the clear link between housing independence and the autonomy of young people in decision-making (Figure 4.4), individualisation is associated with financial independence: almost two-thirds of those who are supported by their parents make decisions together with them (61.8%) and slightly more than one third make their own decisions (38.2%), while with those who are financially independent, the ratio is reversed (32.4% versus 67.6%)<sup>96</sup>. Young people from the region of Belgrade are more autonomous in their decision-making compared to those in Vojvodina, and in particular with young people from Central Serbia<sup>97</sup>. This aspect of individualisation is associated with the level of educational attained by the young people: those with a higher education are significantly more autonomous in their decision-making compared to those with a primary school education (especially in relation to those who are still in the process of education)<sup>98</sup>. Young people who are autonomous in their decision-making claim to have control over their lives more than those who make decisions in consultation with their parents<sup>99</sup>.

The complex relationship of cohabitation with parents and the subjective feeling of independence and functional autonomy in decision-making, despite structural (material) dependence, which in a similar form occurs with several young people, is described briefly by one of the respondent:

K: Are you satisfied to live with your parents or maybe you'd prefer something else?  
I: Well, I am satisfied, I've got no complaints.  
K: If you had a job, would you move out?  
I: No, I wouldn't.  
K: Why?  
I: There is no need. Why leave when I don't have to. I'm happy where I am. I'll have to leave sometime, but I won't now.  
K: When we talk about some kind of independence, do you think it affects your independence? Do you think you'd be independent if you lived alone?  
I: No, they allow me to make my own decisions about my life, to be independent. Although I live with them, I decide what I want to do, where I want to go and whatever I'm doing. They support me.  
K: Do you live this way because they give you money?  
I: Well, I do my best not to ask for money by doing whatever work I can. But, of course it happens to us all that our parents sometimes give us money. That's normal.  
(Female, 22, hairdresser and beautician, unemployed, large town)

<sup>93</sup> X<sup>2</sup>=128.66. p<.001. Cramer's V=.236.

<sup>94</sup> X<sup>2</sup>=31.45. p<.001. Cramer's V=.169.

<sup>95</sup> X<sup>2</sup>=68.01. p<.001. Cramer's V=.248.

<sup>96</sup> X<sup>2</sup>=65.76. p<.001. Cramer's V=.242.

<sup>97</sup> X<sup>2</sup>=41.44. p<.001. Cramer's V=.190.

<sup>98</sup> X<sup>2</sup>=86.63. p<.001. Cramer's V=.277.

<sup>99</sup> X<sup>2</sup>=8.21. p<.05. Cramer's V=.084.


## Family transition – attitudes, perceptions and aspirations

The first aspect of family transition which we will analyse is the normative aspect and it relates to attitudes to partner relationships and starting a family. Then we will analyse how these normative reflect the aspirations of young people and their plans in relation to their own family commitments.

As stated at the beginning of the chapter, among young people in Serbia cohabitation is normatively accepted as a legitimate life partnership, but not generally practiced. It is therefore interesting to see how young people in this study evaluated the benefits of marriage and cohabitation. In assessing the benefits of marriage, young people almost equally chose the answers that *in marriage there is greater responsibility between partners* (28%) and *in marriage there is greater responsibility towards children* (24.7%), while over a fifth (22.2%) believe that there are no advantages, or that there is no difference. There is no gender difference in this last answer although young females emphasise responsibility towards the partner (29.5%), and young males responsibility towards children (26.6%). However, the most interesting gender difference is seen in choosing the option that *in Serbia marriage is more respected than cohabitation*, which is emphasised by more young females (11.4%) than males (7.9%)<sup>100</sup>, and shows the greater traditionalism of women through their greater sensitivity towards the legitimate impact of their environment. The influence of the traditional value system is manifested through the cultural capital of parents, because the attitude to the acceptance of cohabitation is less among young people whose parent have a basic education (11.8%), while children of parents with higher education point out, more than the average, that marriage has no advantage (24.3%)<sup>101</sup>.

According to young people, the benefits of cohabitation in relation to marriage mainly lie in the fact that it is easier to leave, but a larger share of them (mainly young females) do not see it as an advantage over marriage (or believe that there is no significant difference) (Figure 4.5)<sup>102</sup>.

Figure 4.5: The advantages of cohabitation in relation to marriage according to gender (in %)



Interesting stratification differences occur concerning the options regarding a career, which is emphasised by three times as many young people who come from families with high cultural capital (12.1%) than those from families with low cultural capital (4.4%)<sup>103</sup>, indicating a possible trend of detraditionalization.

A share of the young people could not answer the questions about the benefits of marriage, especially cohabitation (pronounced among young people with low cultural capital), which indicates a kind of ambivalence among the youth in Serbia in relation to these matters. A surprising result is that out of ten young people interviewed, not one opted for cohabitation, indicating traditionalism in their conception of family and partner relationships. Cohabitation is not understood as a form of life partnership per se, or a form of family, but as a phase preceding a marriage and in that sense it would have advantages as preparation for marriage – adapting to partner. Marriage as an institution, however, offers a sense of security in terms of partners and particularly in relation to children, regardless of the fact that children are born into common-law partnerships, as can be seen from a young participant who is an expert in the legislation of Serbia from the middle of the last century regarding equality:

<sup>100</sup>  $\chi^2=13.92$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.109.

<sup>101</sup>  $\chi^2=21.05$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.096.

<sup>102</sup> As opposed to other studies, after the pilot research we introduced the option to answer "there are no advantages, there is no difference" to the questions regarding the advantages of marriage and the advantages of extramarital life. This option was requested by the respondents. There is, however, the problem of interpretation, since this answer can, with regard to marriage, mean "there are no advantages, there is no difference", while with regard to extramarital life it can simply mean "there are no advantages", which was suggested by qualitative analysis of the data from the interviews. In any case, interpretation of these answers in the context of detraditionalization of the attitudes of young people towards family would require further analysis.

<sup>103</sup>  $\chi^2=26.93$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.108.

**K: Do you see any advantages between marriage and a common-law partnership? Which would you go for?**  
I: Well, honestly, I'd go for marriage. Though, from a legal point of view, there's no difference today. But, in my opinion, marriage is a nice institution.

(Male, intern in a lawyer's office, 24, small town)

Cohabitation is, precisely because of the individualisation of partners, seen as a less stable partnership which does not represent a safe enough environment for raising children:

I: Cohabitation with children is maybe, emm, let's say, preparation or training for future marriage... Living with someone and functioning together is very important, but if I have, if they have children and live outside of wedlock, maybe... The question is, how healthy an environment it is for children, again, I don't know...

**K: What do mean by healthy, unhealthy?**

I: In the way that it will always be in the back of the children's minds that their parents are married, let's say they are independent... I don't know how much the family is a unit, a team. If there is a split, I mean... I'm more for marriage, for marriage as a partnership... That's what I wanted to say...

**K: You think that when it's legalised and when the children arrive, then...**

I: Yes, it has more strength than if it isn't legalized, that's more from a psychological point of view...

(Male, student of economy at a private university, 24, Belgrade)

Some young people are more inclined towards traditional customs:

**K: And if you had to choose?**

I: To get married. It's a custom here, a tradition. It should be that way because of the children and everything.

(Male, 24, secondary school, unemployed, large town)

I: Well, now I don't know. I mean, that piece of paper, as a paper, I don't know how much it means, but for me it's all lovely and the wedding and the traditions, I love it all. Many people don't like it and it means nothing. My friend, for instance, she lives with her boyfriend and she would never get married and she's been living with him for ages, but it means nothing to her that she would do something like that. It's important for me, I love it all. I'd love to get married and to have a family.

(Female student, 22, a medium-sized town)

In addition, pressure from the environment they live in to conform to the traditional form is great, and it is generally rationalized as anxiety about the legitimization of the children from their perspective:

**K: What would you choose first, cohabitation or marriage?**

I: Well, maybe marriage.

**K: Why?**

I: Well, I don't know, it's ... Maybe because of the environment in which I live, because of that. Because for them marriage is normal, marriage, the proper papers, a great wedding, and a civil-law partnership, I don't know, others wouldn't accept it. Then again, if we lived somewhere where it didn't matter, then it wouldn't bother me.

**K: And where do you think it matter and doesn't matter?**

I: Well, in small communities it really does matter, for example, like where I live. Everybody notices and sees and hears everything. In larger towns, nobody cares.

(female, secondary school student, 17, a suburb of Belgrade)

I: Well, it's normal to choose marriage.

**K: And why?**

I: Well, for the children to see that their parents were married. As far as I'm concerned...


(female, hairdresser and beautician, 22, unemployed, large town)

That cohabitation is not accepted more than the normative can be seen in the findings, as only 10.5% of the respondents see themselves in the future in a partnership outside of marriage, and it is currently practiced by 3.3% of them. On the other hand, heteronormative married families with children, is accepted - by 83% of the respondents (of which 8.7% are already married) and there are no gender differences. Comparative analysis shows that only young people from Slovenia and Bulgaria have a different orientation, where about a quarter of the young people opted for a future partnership

outside of marriage (24% and 22% respectively), which corresponds with the real representation of cohabitation in these countries. In the remaining countries, the figures range from 1% in Macedonia to 10% in Albania – for those choosing a common-law partnership with the aspiration for family/cohabitation life in the future (Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015).


Among our respondents, more young people and those with higher family cultural capital, in the future would choose a cohabitation and living alone (Figure 4.6)

**Figure 4.6: Choice of future family life according to the education of parents (in %)**



The potential direction of the detraditionalization of attitudes towards the family can be seen in young people who are individualized in terms of decision-making autonomy, and who, in comparison those who make decisions with their parents help, see themselves in a cohabitation or living alone twice as much (Figure 4.7)

**Figure 4.7: Choice of future family life according to decision-making autonomy (in %)**



According to the young respondents, on average they think that the best age for females to marry is 26.5 and males 28.9. From a comparative perspective, they are placed behind Slovenia and Croatia, where the ages are higher, and Albania, Macedonia, Romania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo (referred to as declining value; Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015), where they are lower.

In assessing the optimal years for marriage for women and men, significant differences between young people on various factors appear. Considerable gender differences occur in the assessment of when women should marry, where females state a higher age<sup>104</sup>, and when estimating when a male should marry, females also state a higher age<sup>105</sup>. In this type of assessment, in addition to gender differences, there are also statistically significant differences according to age, between young people 25-29 years old, who state a higher age, and the other age cohorts: 15-19 years and 20-24 years, when it comes to the estimation of the best age for a woman to marry<sup>106</sup>. Similar differences occur in the assessment of when it is desirable for a man to marry: among all age groups – the estimated age increases with the age of the respondents<sup>107</sup>. Young people also differ according to the type of area in which they live, and so young people from the city differ significantly from young people from the countryside when estimating when women should marry<sup>108</sup>, as well

<sup>104</sup> Measured using a t test, the results show that young males ( $M=26.13$ ,  $SD=2.50$ ) significantly differentiate from young females ( $M=26.94$ ,  $SD=2.79$ ) ( $t=-5.08$ ,  $df=1096$ ,  $p<.001$ ).

<sup>105</sup> Measured using a t test, the results show that young males ( $M=28.43$ ,  $SD=3.28$ ) significantly differentiate ( $t=-5.32$ ,  $df=1097$ ,  $p<.001$ ) from young females ( $M=29.43$ ,  $SD=2.93$ ).

<sup>106</sup> A one-factor analysis of variance showed that there are significant statistical differences between the groups ( $F=6.75$ ,  $p<.05$ ). A Post hoc Scheffé test confirmed that there are significant statistical differences between, on the one hand, young people aged 25-29 ( $M=26.94$ ,  $SD=2.67$ ) and the other age groups 15-19 ( $M=26.26$ ,  $SD=2.88$ ) and 20-24 ( $M=26.39$ ,  $SD=2.42$ ).

<sup>107</sup> A one-factor analysis of variance showed that there are significant statistical differences between the groups ( $F=23.94$ ,  $p<.001$ ). A post hoc Scheffé test confirmed that there are significant statistical differences between young people of all age groups: 15-19 ( $M=28.16$ ,  $SD=3.15$ ), 20-24 ( $M=28.84$ ,  $SD=2.87$ ) and 25-29 ( $M=29.73$ ,  $SD=3.22$ ).

<sup>108</sup> Measured using a t test, the results show that young people from towns ( $M=26.93$ ,  $SD=2.49$ ) significantly differentiate ( $t=-6.48$ ,  $df=1096$ ,  $p<.001$ ) from young people in villages ( $M=25.87$ ,  $SD=2.84$ ).


as when a man should marry<sup>109</sup>. According to the level of education of parents, differences also occur between young people when it comes to assessing what is the best age for a woman to marry<sup>110</sup>, as well the best age for a man<sup>111</sup>. Differences also occur in relation to the educational achievements of the young people themselves (excluded from the analysis are those in the process of gaining an education) regarding: their estimation of the best age for a woman<sup>112</sup> to marry and a man to marry<sup>113</sup>.

The desired number of children is considered to be two (55.2%) and three (30.6%), so that the average value is 2.4. A departure from these values is reflected in the gender differences, because young females want fewer children than young males<sup>114</sup>.

Less than a fifth (17.2%) of young people do not plan to have children, 8.9% are already parents, almost three-quarters (73.9%) are planning to have a child, most of them in the age between 27 and 30 (a total of 62.5%), while thirty once again is revered as a symbolic age (Tomanović, 2012b), because it was singularly chosen by over a quarter (26.9%) of the respondents.

Analysis of the estimates of the importance of certain factors when choosing a marriage partner (spouse) can show some interesting trends in the process of detraditionalization of attitudes of young people towards the family life (Figure 4.8).

**Figure 4.8: Factors important for choice of partner (options very important and important together; in %)**



From a comparative perspective, the order of the importance of factors is similar to that of young people from different countries, with distinct specifics in the emphasis of the significance of individual factors, and young people in Serbia in their assessment are most similar to their peers in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania (Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015).

Let us start with the analysis of the factors that are related to the traditional understanding of marriage and relationships. Virginity is certainly the least relevant factor today and young people from Serbia express contemporary attitudes of young people from most of the countries studied, with the exception of Slovenia and Croatia (Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015). The significance of virginity is linked to rural of area<sup>115</sup> and lower education of the respondents<sup>116</sup>. Approval by the family is shown to be a relatively significant factor in most countries, except for Slovenia, which indicates the importance of intergenerational relationships in families, and young people in Serbia are most similar to their peers in Romania and Croatia (Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015). In Serbia, approval by the family is of more significance to young females than young males<sup>117</sup>.

<sup>109</sup> Measured using a t test, the results show that young people from towns ( $M=29.34$ ,  $SD=3.08$ ) significantly differentiate ( $t=-6.31$ ,  $df= 1096$ ,  $p<.001$ ) from young people in villages ( $M=28.16$ ,  $SD=3.12$ ).

<sup>110</sup> A one-factor analysis of variance showed that there are significant statistical differences between the groups ( $F=25.99$ ,  $p<.001$ ). A post hoc Scheffe test confirmed that there are significant statistical differences between young people according to all levels of their parents' education: primary and lower ( $M=24.46$ ,  $SD=2.96$ ), secondary ( $M=26.41$ ,  $SD=2.48$ ) and college and university ( $M=27.09$ ,  $SD=2.83$ )

<sup>111</sup> A one-factor analysis of variance showed that there are significant statistical differences between the groups ( $F=23.13$ ,  $p<.001$ ). A post hoc Scheffe test confirmed that there are significant statistical differences between young people according to all levels of their parents' education: primary and lower ( $M=26.70$ ,  $SD=3.41$ ), secondary ( $M=28.74$ ,  $SD=2.94$ ) and college and university ( $M=29.59$ ,  $SD=3.16$ ).

<sup>112</sup> A one-way analysis of variance showed that there are significant statistical differences between the groups ( $F=21.01$ ,  $p<.001$ ). A post hoc Scheffe test confirmed that there are significant statistical differences between young people according to all levels of their parents' education: primary and lower ( $M=24.22$ ,  $SD=2.39$ ) secondary ( $M=26.15$ ,  $SD=2.57$ ) and college and university ( $M=27.25$ ,  $SD=2.51$ ).

<sup>113</sup> A one-way analysis of variance showed that there are significant statistical differences between the groups ( $F=22.87$ ,  $p<.001$ ). A post hoc Scheffe test confirmed that there are significant statistical differences between young people according to all levels of their parents' education: primary and lower ( $M=26.85$ ,  $SD=3.61$ ) secondary ( $M=28.62$ ,  $SD=3.12$ ) and college and university ( $M=30.27$ ,  $SD=3.16$ ).

<sup>114</sup> Measured using a t test, the results show that young males ( $M=2.46$ ,  $SD=1.5$ ) significantly differ ( $t=.26$ ,  $df= 1042,56$ ,  $p<.05$ ) from young females ( $M=2.34$ ,  $SD=0.82$ ) when specifying their desired number of children.


<sup>115</sup>  $\chi^2=13.75$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.108.

<sup>116</sup>  $\chi^2=68.01$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.248.

<sup>117</sup>  $\chi^2=28.42$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.156.

In Serbia, the level of education of the future spouse is relatively significant in comparison with the majority of young people in the region (excluding Kosovo and Albania; Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015) and more with those who are younger<sup>118</sup> and with a higher education<sup>119</sup>. Significant gender differences are seen in the perception of the significance of the material status of the partner, which is more important to females<sup>120</sup> and appearance, which is more important to males<sup>121</sup> (figure 4.9), which is a reflection of the stereotypical patterns of gender and gender roles.

**Figure 4.9: Factors important for choice of partner by gender (options very important and important together; in %)**



The relatively high importance of religion and nationality as factors, significantly more so than that of material position, and far more than place of origin, backs up the thesis that homogamy is a trend towards which, in a society with a still high prevalence of collective - nationalist values (Pešić, 2006), a certain number of young people weights.

At the other end of the spectrum, the most preferred factor – personality of partner, which also points to a highest degree of individualisation, and is significantly more valued by young people from towns<sup>122</sup>, with a higher education<sup>123</sup> and whose parents have a higher education<sup>124</sup>.

The results of the analysis confirm the findings of previous research that those who follow the trend of detraditionalization in partner and family relationships are urban young people with high cultural capital (Tomanović, 2012b).

## Family transition – in practice

At the beginning of this chapter, we established that the majority of the studied young people live with their parents. When you look at all the data displayed in this section on the socio/economic position of young people, it becomes clear that the acquisition of independent living space largely depends on the resources of the family of origin, whether it is inherited, bought or rented by the young person's parents. Only 10.2% of the respondents themselves have acquired, purchased or rent accommodation, if we exclude those who temporarily reside in student dormitories. The given results about the huge dependence of young people on their parents for housing resources and support correspond with the findings of previous research from 2011 (Stanojević, 2012).

In the type of family transition Serbia belongs to, the main incentive for young people to move out of the parental home is to start their own family. More than a tenth of our respondents, more females than males, are married or cohabitante (Table 4.1), which is connected with the cultural rule that young females enter family transition earlier.

<sup>118</sup>  $\chi^2=21.70$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.096$ .

<sup>119</sup>  $\chi^2=65.66$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.138$ .

<sup>120</sup>  $\chi^2=49.47$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.205$ .

<sup>121</sup>  $\chi^2=43.80$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.193$ .

<sup>122</sup>  $\chi^2=10.89$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.096$ .

<sup>123</sup>  $\chi^2=56.94$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.128$ .


<sup>124</sup>  $\chi^2=27.26$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.109$ .

Table 4.1: Status of partners according to gender (in %)

	Unmarried	Married	Living together but not married	Divorced	Widowed	Total
Male	91.3	5.3	2.4	0.5	0.5	100.0
Female	82.7	12.1	4.3	0.9		100.0
Total	87.0	8.7	3.3	0.7	0.3	100.0

$\chi^2=24.65$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.145.

Figure 4.10: Housing status according to marital status (in %)




The housing status of young people who are married is significantly different from the others because they generally have accommodation that they themselves have bought, inherited or has been bought by their parents, and only 11% live with their parents and 16% rent, which confirms the thesis that starting a family is the main incentive to move out of the family home. Young people in a civil-law partnership mainly rent or buy accommodation and a tenth live with their parents. A small number of the young people in our sample are divorced, but they usually return to live with their parents.

In our sample, 9% of the young people are parents, most of them have one child (6.1%), followed by two (2.5%), and very few three (0.4%). There are twice as many young mothers than fathers, and as expected most in the oldest age group: among young people aged 25 to 29, 20.7% are parents. There are more young parents in the countryside than in towns, and there are significantly more who have completed primary school (26.9%) than those who have completed secondary school (16.3%), university (15.9%), or who are students (2.3%)<sup>125</sup>. Three times more young parents come from families with low cultural capital whose parents have a primary school education than from families where parents have higher education<sup>126</sup>. This suggests the conclusion from earlier research, that educated young people delay parenthood (Tomanović, 2012b), as well as, it seems, those who have completed secondary school.

Young parents are represented in all three categories of activities: there are more among those in stable (18.9%) than in temporary employment (13.8%), however, almost a third of young parents are unemployed: they make up 16.4% of the unemployed<sup>127</sup>. For a tenth of young parents, the only source of income is from their parents (Graph 4.11).

Figure 4.11: The financial independence of young parents (in %)



<sup>125</sup>  $\chi^2=82.13$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.273.

<sup>126</sup>  $\chi^2=13.08$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.109.

<sup>127</sup>  $\chi^2=28.89$ .  $p<.001$ . Phi=-.165.

That the structural position of young parents and their families is vulnerable is indicated in the fact that twice as many live in households of lower rather than of higher material position<sup>128</sup>. One-fifth of young parents live in the parental home, 63% own their own home which they themselves have purchased (26%), inherited (25%) or bought by their parents (8%), while a smaller number rent (13%). The housing status of young parents is better than that shown in the results of previous research (Tomanović, 2012b: 140), but it is obvious that the resources of the parents are still the key to solving the housing problem in the transition to parenthood.

The delay of parenthood is connected with a sense of existential and emotional insecurity, as expressed by the oldest respondents interviewed:

**I: What about a family?**

N: A family, of course. To marry and have a family, a child, husband. That's how I see myself. Well, I'll be 30 very soon. Yes, it's difficult, to be honest, it's a difficult situation. I have a boyfriend. We're together 4 years. You know, we drag on together. He's in Lazarevac, I'm here. Where will we go? What will we do? I don't want to leave my job here. He works there selling fruit and vegetables. That's what he does. Will we go to Belgrade or not ... You know, it's difficult to decide. We haven't decided. We're still "in session". The biggest problem is the finances, but when we sort that out, I'll be 40.

**I: Do you plan on having children?**

N: Yes.

**I: How many?**

N: Let's say two.

**I: What is necessary to make it happen?**

N: First of all, to choose the right partner. You also need to have enough money to support the family and the children.

**I: What do you need?**

N: Money, but I'll never see it happen.

**I: How long more do you plan to wait?**

N: I don't know. I've no idea. When I'm 30. That's how I see myself when I'm 30. That means in about two or three years.

(Female, 27, college, employed under contract, middle-sized town)

## Discussion

Our analysis indicates that it is necessary to observe and interpret the relationships between young people and their families - of origin (parental) and of orientation (newly formed), within the context of the complex intertwinement of individualisation and detraditionalisation.

On the one hand, relationships with parents point to a specific form of individualisation in a restrictive structural environment. Despite great structural dependencies - financial and housing, there is some degree of the individualisation of intergenerational relations within the family. For the most part, the patriarchal form of authority is outdated: a very small number of respondents claim that their parents make decisions about everything and thus Serbia is one of the least patriarchal countries in the region - immediately after Slovenia and in front of the others (Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015). And according to the participation of young people who completely make decisions independently, Serbia is behind Slovenia and ahead of the other countries studied in the region (Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015). The gained functional autonomy (in decision-making and taking action) significantly affects the subjective sense of autonomy of a young person who lives in the family home and household. However, there is more autonomy in decision-making if housing and financial independence are achieved. The results of this study confirm the findings of previous national (Ljubičić, 2012), regional (Lavrič, 2011) and international (Lahelma, Gordon, 2008) research on the complex relationships of dependence and autonomy between young people and their parents. The importance of the parental family is seen in other findings, such as, for example, that for young people in Serbia it is important to gain the support of the family in the individualized choice of marriage partner. For young people it is important to have a good relationship with and emotional support from their parents at different stages of their lives. These findings support the thesis concerning the importance of the concept of interdependence and the separation of individualisation from the transition to adulthood.

On the other hand, contrary to the detraditionalization of intergenerational relationships, young people in Serbia have expressed considerable traditionalism in their comprehension of family life, which supports the standard trajectory of family transition - from one's own family to one's chosen family, without alternative ways of life – living alone, communal living (with friends) and an alternative form of partnership - cohabitation with and without children. And this study,

<sup>128</sup>  $\chi^2=8.78$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.089$ .

as like other studies, show that cohabitation and marriage are not valued as partnerships per se, but only as a stage in the transition to parenthood (Tomanović, Ignjatović, 2006; Tomanović, 2012b). Stratification analysis, however, has confirmed the earlier findings that young people with high cultural capital from urban areas are carriers of the detraditionalization pattern in the family domain.

The family domain can be seen as a reflection of the degree of traditionalism from another angle: unlike the others - education, work, politics, etc., it is an area where the most distinctive gender differences occur. Gender differences, however, do not occur in the degree of the detraditionalization of gender roles, but precisely in the acceptance of the traditionally defined differences between the instrumental role of men and the expressive role of women. Young females only express contemporary attitudes in their assessment of the highest optimal age for entering into marriage, as well as their desire for a smaller number of children, which can be interpreted as "making virtue out of necessity". On the other hand, young females are more sensitive than young males to the opinions of other regarding the legitimacy of their choice (cohabitation, partner).

The transition to parenthood was not the subject of this study, nevertheless, the data we obtained in the analysis indicates similar trends seen in previous studies: that there is a delay of parenthood, especially among young people who are more educated, that the environment in which young families with children live, is not characterized by a stable existential situation, but rather by the potential economic risks that are compensated by the support and assistance from the parental family.



# THE LEISURE AND LIFESTYLES OF YOUNG PEOPLE



## Introduction

In this chapter, two questions concerning young people are intertwined: the question of lifestyle and the question of the use of leisure time. Although these two questions are closely linked in social sciences, they differ significantly. Lifestyle is a broader term and includes all activities, values, positions, opinions, and consumer trends that are characteristic of a certain individual or group, while leisure is just one of the arenas within which a lifestyle is formed and becomes visible. The first term is, in the Weberian spirit, linked to (post)modern societies characterized by mass production and the consumption of goods, and therefore greater freedom (or even the necessity) of choice, and this term opposes a stable *way of life* characteristic of premodern traditional communities (Bennet, 1999). While in traditional societies work and leisure were intertwined, with the development of the industrial method of production comes the separation of both the private and work spheres and the time devoted to earning and spending. In Marx's interpretation of this process, a separation of the *kingdom of necessity and the kingdom of freedom* occurs. With the growing importance of workers' rights comes a limited number of working hours and consequently an increase in the amount of available leisure time. Within the study of leisure there is considerable disagreement regarding the interpretation of the character of its use. While functionalists emphasize the useful aspects of leisure time, such as rest from work, the development of knowledge and skills, and the creation of alternative identities, neo-Marxists have noted that leisure time actually gives individuals very little freedom to use it as they wish, and that it is in fact significantly influenced by the ideology of capitalism, i.e. the creation of consumer habits and needs on the one hand, while it is unequally available to people of different classes, on the other. The hierarchy that exists in the sphere of work is in this way reproduced through the sphere of leisure (Best, 2010).

Contemporary, late modern society is characterized by a pronounced flexibility in working hours, which gained momentum with the start of the economic crisis and makes it increasingly difficult to define the boundaries between work and leisure. The development of technology (primarily the Internet and the personal computer), which enables remote working and often means working from home after regular working hours, further contributes to this (Rojek, 2004). Leisure time, the time that remains after regular working hours, is often used for work, either for finishing work tasks and preparation for the following day, or for constructive activities that provide an individual with new skills and competencies significant to the labour market (e.g. learning foreign languages). In Serbia, the deregulation of the labour market goes hand in hand with the high unemployment rate and leads to the fact that for a significant number of individuals who are (temporarily or permanently) employed, leisure is a privilege since they often work overtime (usually without compensation or consent), while for the unemployed leisure is a type of ill fate since they have too much of it, it represents a source of frustration, and they also cannot use it in a constructive manner since they lack the financial resources (Stanojević, 2012). With the deregulation of the labour market came not only a pronounced flexibility in labour, but also a much greater need to work longer and more on a daily basis. However, this process has also led to new social polarization in the labour market – primarily between the unemployed, those in unstable employment and those in stable employment (Rojek, 2004).

The issue of social stratification and the way leisure time is spent is a logical consequence of the aforementioned debates. Various authors prove again and again that class is still a significant concept that explains certain differences in lifestyles and the way leisure time is spent (Katz-Gerro, 1999), while others reject the significance of class and emphasize other lines of division: according to income and gender (Roberts, 1999), and yet a third group completely rejects both the idea of class and stratification, and emphasize the significance of consumption which has abolished or blurred the differences between social groups and enabled free expression of cultural styles and identities (Bennett, 1999; Maffesoli, 1996; Muggereton, 2002).

The issue of gender, which is still present in most European countries, and even more so on the periphery of Europe, should also be taken into consideration. The gendered division of labour in Serbia still involves significant differences between male and female participation in the labour market and a notable asymmetry in the distribution of housework and parenting responsibilities (Tomanović, 2010, 2012). Although men are more often involved in the labour market and perform multiple jobs, this doesn't mean that women have more free time. The situation is often quite the opposite. Men have more freedom to devote a part of their time to themselves after work, while women are often expected to spend most of their time tending to the household and the family.


A few key questions need to be raised regarding the use of leisure time. Firstly, how much time is left after the completion of obligations (work, school); secondly, how many resources does a young person have available for quality use of their leisure time; and thirdly, what kind of content do they choose and with what purpose. The last question is significant, because it raises the question of the nature of the use of different contents during their leisure time. Choices can be guided by focusing on the sphere of work and include training, courses, socializing with colleagues, etc. They can also include hobbies, socializing, involvement in the local community, and others that are related to personal preferences and are not directly related to work. This sphere can be filled with contents that require a certain degree of self-organization and time management (such as sports training, courses, etc.), or it can be marked by occasional, unstructured activities (such as watching television, browsing the Internet). Activities can also be centred around private space (homes, rooms) and can be public; they can be conducted alone or with others (Roberts, 1995, cf. Critcher, Bramham, 2004: 45).

## Analysis

### Activities during leisure time

In this part of the study we attempted to measure the extent to which young people do different things during their leisure time. The activities include those related exclusively to having fun and do not require the structuring of activities beforehand – like listening to music, watching television and movies, playing video games, socializing with friends, as well as activities that help develop certain potentials in a young person and often require a significant degree of organization and structuring – sports activities, reading, writing, painting, and playing an instrument.

Figure 5.1: Schedule of activities during leisure time (often and occasionally, in %)



Observing the activities practiced by young people, on average, most of their free time is spent on relaxation and entertainment, with music, television, and socializing with friends. Two out of five young people regularly engage in sports activities, one third regularly reads, while every tenth young person regularly engages in some manner of creative work. The table of correlation (5.1) refers to different combinations of their use of free time. It is interesting that playing video games most often excludes intense reading; just as creative work does not go hand in hand with watching television. Watching movies is most often a combined activity, while creative work in the form of writing, painting, or playing an instrument is the most exclusive and, as a form of spending leisure time, is most often combined with listening to music, reading, and watching movies.


**Table 5.1: The degree of correlation between activities conducted during leisure time**

	Socializing with friends	Reading books/ newspapers	Sports activities	Watching television	Watching movies	Writing, painting, playing an instrument	Playing video games
Listening to music	.144**	.061*	.066*	-.007	.144**	.067*	.017
Socializing with friends		.054	.187**	.023	.143**	.015	.040
Reading books/ newspapers			.012	-.048	.022	.215**	-.111**
Sports activities				.105**	.142**	.011	.216**
Watching television					.354**	-.082**	.111**
Watching movies						.094**	.194**
Writing, painting, playing an instrument							.101**

In relation to the socio-demographic characteristics of young people, multiple differences in the manner leisure time is spent are manifested. Young people in rural areas socialize with their peers<sup>129</sup> slightly less than young people in urban areas, they read books or newspapers less<sup>130</sup> and engage in creative work less<sup>131</sup>. However, they are slightly more likely to engage in sports activities<sup>132</sup> and watch television<sup>133</sup>. Differences according to gender are also confirmed in the analysis of this data. Young males socialize slightly more frequently than young females<sup>134</sup>. Young males are often more physically active, and 55.4% of them regularly engage in sports activities as opposed to 23.5% of young females<sup>135</sup>. They also watch movies<sup>136</sup> more frequently than young females and use their personal computers for playing video games<sup>137</sup> to a much higher degree. Every fourth (25.1%) young male regularly plays video games, as opposed to 5.9% of young females. This same activity is not carried out by two thirds (64.9%) of young females and slightly less than a third of young males (29.8%). On the other hand, young females more often partake in creative and intellectually more demanding activities. Young females read<sup>138</sup> much more often and somewhat more frequently engage in creative work<sup>139</sup>. Almost half of the young females (43.6%) read on a daily basis, as opposed to 22.4% of young males, while 23.4% of young males never read (as opposed to 5.4% of young females).

In adulthood, young people have less free time available. At the same time they lose certain interest and gain new ones. Age leads to more complex and more demanding roles (professional, family, and others) that are often in conflict with each other. As the figure shows, there is less time for socializing with friends, music and movies are enjoyed to a somewhat less degree and interest in video games drops significantly. Young people mostly participate in sports activities while they are in secondary school, after which these kinds of activities drop or remain constant. On the other hand, the importance of reading increases with age, while the form that involves creative work remains constant over time.

**Figure 5.2: Leisure time activities according to the age cohorts of young people (often, in %)**



<sup>129</sup>  $\chi^2=12.56$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.103.

<sup>130</sup>  $\chi^2=36.30$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.176.

<sup>131</sup>  $\chi^2=8.10$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.083.

<sup>132</sup>  $\chi^2=7.35$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.079.

<sup>133</sup>  $\chi^2=8.57$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.085.

<sup>134</sup>  $\chi^2=6.42$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.074.

<sup>135</sup>  $\chi^2=129.03$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.331.

<sup>136</sup>  $\chi^2=6.42$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.074.

<sup>137</sup>  $\chi^2=169.15$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.379.


<sup>138</sup>  $\chi^2=106.61$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.301.

<sup>139</sup>  $\chi^2=12.72$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.104.

Bearing in mind that certain habits are acquired within the family, we assume that socialization affects the way leisure time is spent. Thus, the data indicates that the ways young people spend their leisure time also differ according to their parents' level of education. Young people whose parents have a higher level of education read<sup>140</sup> more often and socialize with friends<sup>141</sup>, but watch television more rarely<sup>142</sup>.

Given that certain financial resources are required in order to use leisure time valuably, analysis shows that the amount of money available to a young person is significantly correlated with the pattern of use of leisure time upon completion of their daily commitments. With more money available, young people socialise with friends<sup>143</sup> more frequently and watch television<sup>144</sup> less often. Money mediates in the sense that socializing and going out is compensated by passively watching television. To the last conclusion the finding should be added that with a better financial situation within the household, young people go out and socialize with friends<sup>145</sup> more often, which implies that there is a significant connection between economic resources and social connections, even in informal contexts.


**Figure 5.3: Leisure time activities according to the employment status of young people (often, in %)**



As was already mentioned at the beginning of this section, with transition into adulthood, significant changes to the pattern of use of leisure time occurs. In relation to their employment status, the visible differences are clear (figure 5.3). Young people who are employed have less free time for activities than those who are unemployed or in education. Pupils and students' leisure time is the most eventful. On the other hand, those who are currently unemployed have the least eventful leisure time and spend their time in front of the television to a somewhat higher degree than others. Bearing in mind, that most activities require money, the unemployed, who have nothing but free time, often lack the means to fill that time with interesting and useful content.

Not only does the pattern change with entry into the work sphere, it also changes when they start living with a spouse/partner and having children. When they enter into marriage or cohabitation, young people have significantly less time for fun, including listening to music, playing sports, and playing video games, while the most drastic change occurs in the sphere of socializing with friends and going out (Figure 5.4). No significant differences occur in the sphere of creativity, which is mainly constant regardless of the new roles, but somewhat more time is spent at home watching television or reading something interesting.

**Figure 5.4: Leisure time activities according to marital status (often, in %)**



<sup>140</sup>  $\chi^2=16.38$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.084.

<sup>143</sup>  $\chi^2=42.91$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.150,

<sup>141</sup>  $\chi^2=34.28$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.122.


<sup>144</sup>  $\chi^2=23.06$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.100,

<sup>142</sup>  $\chi^2=26.86$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.108.

<sup>145</sup>  $\chi^2=12.65$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.074.

The situation changes in a similar manner with the arrival of children. All forms of entertainment significantly decrease: listening to music<sup>146</sup> going out and socializing with friends<sup>147</sup>, sports activities<sup>148</sup>, and playing video games<sup>149</sup>. Also, with the arrival of children there is much less time for creative work (writing, painting, and playing an instrument)<sup>150</sup> than in the period before parenthood. The only activity that becomes more dominant in this period is watching television<sup>151</sup> as a passive activity, which is related to relaxing and happens at home.

**Figure 5.5: Leisure time activities according to parenting status (often, in %)**



The content of what young people do during their leisure time varies considerably: those in the process of gaining their education can have enough free time filled with a variety of content, but there are also those who, due to obligations at university, have very little free time.

Oh, well, like all teenagers, we go out, go to cafés to some gigs, we sit at home, hang out – during the summer in the schoolyard, if it's cold we go to a café or sit at home browsing the Internet... It depends on our mood... Well, I mostly listen to music or read something. If I have scheduled training I go to the gym, do some running, just to be active, and then at night I go out with friends.

(Female secondary school student, 17, a suburb of Belgrade)

I: Well, mostly walking, I ride my bike. I trained boxing for a while. That's all. Now, I go for a walk with a friend. Read sometimes. That's all.

**K: Why don't you do any sports anymore?**

I: Well, I come home from university tired, sleep and whatnot, and that's the way it goes. It's as if I need the day to last longer. I always need more time... Yeah, and the issue of transportation, finances and that. It's all because of that.

(Female university student, 22, middle-sized town)

Unemployed young people would like to have more structured time, involving work and doing things they like during their leisure time.

I: I make jewellery, go out with friends.

**K: Why do you spend your free time like that?**

I: It fulfils me, makes me happy.

**K: What's your favourite? How do you like spending your day the most?**

I: I like to meet up with my friends and go for a walk.

**K: Would you like to do anything else during your free time?**

I: I'd like to work, to get a job.

(Female, 22, hairdresser and beautician, unemployed, large town)

<sup>146</sup>  $\chi^2=40,69$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.191.

<sup>147</sup>  $\chi^2=92,07$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.287.

<sup>148</sup>  $\chi^2=56,10$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.224.

<sup>149</sup>  $\chi^2=16,30$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.121.

<sup>150</sup>  $\chi^2=8,45$ , p<.05. Cramer's V=.087.

<sup>151</sup>  $\chi^2=9,92$ , p<.05. Cramer's V=.089.

On the other hand, employed young people often do not have enough free time to devote to some structured activities.

N: I usually rest, watch TV, go for a walk. That's that mostly.

I: Is there anything you would like to do, but don't have the opportunity?


N: I don't know, maybe some sport... Time's the issue. Yeah, time, not anything in particular.

(female 20, Belgrade, secondary school, employed as a shop assistant in a Chinese store)

## The content of the media

In order to see which programmes young people follow via digital media, we asked them to what extent (regardless of whether they follow programmes via television or the Internet) they watch the following types of programmes. The most watched content is the news, series, sports, quizzes, and foreign music. Young people are very rarely interested in shows with religious content or political debates. Reality shows have also become less popular, as less than half of the young people follow them to some extent. Young people are divided with regard to Serbian folk music, as around a third of them don't listen to this genre at all, while the difference is slightly less with regard to foreign and Serbian pop music, which is not listened to by every fifth young person.

**Figure 5.6: The frequency of content young people follow via the media (in %)**



Young people in rural areas watch shows related to folk music<sup>152</sup>, sports programmes<sup>153</sup>, Serbian movies<sup>154</sup> and reality shows<sup>155</sup> somewhat more than their peers in cities, but they watch documentaries and scientific programmes less<sup>156</sup>.

<sup>152</sup>  $\chi^2=30.43$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.161.

<sup>153</sup>  $\chi^2=15.92$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.116.

<sup>154</sup>  $\chi^2=25.01$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.147.

<sup>155</sup>  $\chi^2=47.40$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.201.

<sup>156</sup>  $\chi^2=15.92$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.116.

Young females follow Serbian pop music<sup>157</sup>, foreign music<sup>158</sup>, and TV series<sup>159</sup>, more than males, but young males, as is expected, watch sports programmes<sup>160</sup>, Serbian movies<sup>161</sup>, foreign action<sup>162</sup> and crime/thriller movies<sup>163</sup>, documentaries<sup>164</sup> and (to some extent) political debates more often<sup>165</sup>.

Interest in the news<sup>166</sup> and political debates<sup>167</sup> increases with age, while listening to folk music<sup>168</sup> and watching reality shows<sup>169</sup>, declines. With age, young people slowly shift from entertainment programmes to more serious topics and become more informed and aware of the events around them.

As with all other habits in young people's lives, the level of education of their parents is significantly related to the way they choose media content. The higher the education of young people, the less they listen to Serbian folk music<sup>170</sup>, Serbian pop music<sup>171</sup>, watch foreign action movies<sup>172</sup>, Serbian movies<sup>173</sup> and reality shows<sup>174</sup>.

The only connection between their financial situation and their use of the various content in digital media can be seen in that young people from better-off households watch the news<sup>175</sup> more often.

In relation to the level of education (of those who are presently not in the process of education), the differences occur with regard to watching action movies, which declines with the level of education<sup>176</sup>. Watching reality shows<sup>177</sup> declines in the same manner, while interest in political debates<sup>178</sup> increases.

In the narratives of young people we have noticed that when it come to the use of the Internet and television, the Internet dominates, however, television still hasn't completely lost its importance. The reasons young people give for watching television and the shows they like vary. Males mainly prefer sports, while females prefer music shows and TV series.

**K: How often do you watch television and what do you watch**

I: Oh, occasionally, some shows, if there's something related to music, or something interesting like a show about animals, or a good movie. But I'm mainly on the Internet, so I have no need for television.

(Female secondary school student, 17, suburb of Belgrade)

I: Well, I watch TV, but rarely, very rarely... I watch some informative shows, the news sometimes, and that's all.

**K: And why do you watch that?**

I: Well, with my parents, just to see what's going on and that.

(Female university student, 22, middle-sized town)

I: I watch TV, but honestly I watch more things online than on TV. If I'm interested in something I read the newspapers, I watch the news on the Internet, since it's easier and more practical, it's a faster and easier way to find what I'm interested in.

**K: And what do you watch on TV?**

I: I mainly watch comedy shows on TV, but as I said, I rarely watch TV..

(Trainee in a lawyer's office, 24, from a small town)

I: I watch TV, but not much, about an hour tops.

**K: And what do you watch most often, what shows?**

I: I watch series, Spanish series.

**K: What do you like about them? Why do you choose to watch them specifically?**

I: I like the Spanish, and I learned the language through those shows, and then, like, I improve my Spanish, so I don't just watch them for the plot, but for the language also.

(Female, 22, hairdresser and beautician, unemployed, from a large town)

On average, young people spend 3h 37 minutes online, with a standard deviation of 2h 40 minutes. Altogether 0.7% of young people don't have any access to the Internet, and only one young person (0.1%) from the sample stated that they don't use the Internet at all.

<sup>157</sup>  $\chi^2=39.03$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.182.

<sup>158</sup>  $\chi^2=22.66$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.139.

<sup>159</sup>  $\chi^2=18.44$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.125.

<sup>160</sup>  $\chi^2=274.76$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.484.

<sup>161</sup>  $\chi^2=26.06$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.150.

<sup>162</sup>  $\chi^2=96.76$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.287.

<sup>163</sup>  $\chi^2=51.59$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.210.

<sup>164</sup>  $\chi^2=15.18$ , p<.05. Cramer's V=.114.

<sup>165</sup>  $\chi^2=12.73$ , p<.05. Cramer's V=.104.

<sup>166</sup>  $\chi^2=21.09$ , p<.05. Cramer's V=.095.

<sup>167</sup>  $\chi^2=33.12$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.119.

<sup>168</sup>  $\chi^2=62.98$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.165.

<sup>169</sup>  $\chi^2=18.46$ , p<.05. Cramer's V=.089.

<sup>170</sup>  $\chi^2=62.98$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.165.

<sup>171</sup>  $\chi^2=24.55$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.103.

<sup>172</sup>  $\chi^2=29.02$ , p<.05. Cramer's V=.112.

<sup>173</sup>  $\chi^2=24.44$ , p<.05. Cramer's V=.103.

<sup>174</sup>  $\chi^2=39.39$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.130.


<sup>175</sup>  $\chi^2=20.11$ , p<.05. Cramer's V=.093.

<sup>176</sup>  $\chi^2=33.63$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.171.

<sup>177</sup>  $\chi^2=26.44$ , p<.05. Cramer's V=.151.

<sup>178</sup>  $\chi^2=20.76$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.135.


**Figure 5.7: The frequency of use of the Internet (in %)**



According to the frequency of use of the Internet there are no statistically significant differences according to the gender, age, or location (village/city) of young people, nor are there any differences according to the financial status in the household they come from. The only differences appear between young people whose parents have a university degree on the one hand, and those whose parents only have elementary or secondary school education<sup>179</sup>, on the other, where the first group use the Internet somewhat more frequently. This data indicates significant progress in bridging the digital divide (see Stanojević 2012b, Milovanović *et al.* 2005) among young people, showing that rapid technological progress makes the Internet more accessible.

However, the way the Internet is used indicates that differences among young people exist. Before we show the differences, we will focus on the activities related to the use of the Internet. Four out of five young people use the Internet to access social networks like Facebook. Two-thirds visit Internet pages that allow them to view video clips and listen to music. About half of the young people communicate via the Internet, and the same number uses the vast possibilities provided by the virtual world to inform themselves about the numerous things that interest them. Every fourth young person plays online games, while the least activity is related to monetary transactions.

**Figure 5.8: Types of activities on the Internet (in %)**



Young people can use the Internet for just one purpose, i.e. socializing via social networks, but they can also use the variety of possibilities available to them, like watching movies, listening to music, reading, etc. The results show that only 6% of young people use the Internet for only one purpose, while the majority use it in a variety of ways.

**Figure 5.9: The number of various activities on the Internet (in %)**



<sup>179</sup> The test shows significant differences between two groups. Young people whose parents have college degrees ( $M=3.95$ ,  $SD=2.74$ ) are significantly different ( $t=2.69$ ,  $p<.001$ ,  $df=1093$ ) from those whose parents lack a college education ( $M=3.49$ ,  $SD=2.63$ ). The two groups according to education have been merged due to the small number of cases in the group whose parents only have primary school education, so the analyses indicate a disruption in the assumptions equal to the variances.


The differences in the diversity of use of the Internet can be recognized by multiple principles. Firstly, young people in cities practice a more varied use of the Internet than those in the countryside.<sup>180</sup> With an increase in the cultural capital of parents, i.e. their level of education, comes a more varied use of the Internet by children.<sup>181</sup> Economic capital (measured through the financial state in the household) influences the use of the Internet in a similar way. Young people who belong to the highest group according to their financial status, use the Internet in more various ways than those from the middle and lower financial categories.<sup>182</sup> Viewed according to the employment status of young people, those in education use the Internet in a more varied manner than those who are unemployed.<sup>183</sup> The more obligations young people have, whether at school or at work, the more they can use the Internet in various ways. In relation to their own cultural capital, i.e. level of education (those not in education), analysis has shown that the higher the level of education, the more varied the use of the Internet<sup>184</sup> is.

In order to see in which specific contexts there is a difference among young people, we have analysed the use of the Internet for different purposes in relation to the socio-demographic characteristics of young people. Differences firstly exist according to where young people live. Young people who live in cities use the Internet more often for reading the news<sup>185</sup>, informing themselves about a variety of content<sup>186</sup>, using e-mail<sup>187</sup>, online shopping and financial transactions<sup>188</sup>, watching videos and listening to music<sup>189</sup> and downloading movies and books<sup>190</sup> in relation to young people who live in the country side.

Young males use the Internet for playing online video games<sup>191</sup> more often, while young females use the Internet more often for searching for a variety of information (i.e. related to school, work, travel, entertainment, etc.)<sup>192</sup> as well as communicating via Skype and similar software<sup>193</sup>.

In relation to the financial status of young people, statistical differences occur in the use of the Internet for work<sup>194</sup>, searching for information<sup>195</sup>, communication via software designed for that purpose<sup>196</sup>, watching videos and listening to music<sup>197</sup> and online shopping<sup>198</sup>. The figure shows that young people from households with a higher financial standard use these functions of the Internet more often. Analysis shows that no differences occur in relation to the use of social networks, playing video games, downloading movies, or reading the news, which are all mainly forms of entertainment.

**Figure 5.10: Types of activities on the Internet according to the financial status in the household (in %)**



<sup>180</sup> One-way analysis of variance shows that there are significant statistical differences between parents in different educational groups ( $F=20.71$ ,  $p<.001$ ). Using the Post hoc Scheffe test a statistically significant difference has been found in the variety of uses of the Internet between young people with parents of all educational levels: primary school and lower education ( $M=3.68$ ,  $SD=2.15$ ), secondary school education ( $M=4.66$ ,  $SD=2.4$ ), and higher education ( $M=5.41$ ,  $SD=2.45$ ).

<sup>181</sup> One-way analysis of variance has shown that there are significant statistical differences between three groups of young people according to their financial status ( $F=12.38$ ,  $p<.001$ ). Using the Post hoc Scheffe test, a statistically significant difference has been found in the variety of uses of the Internet between young people from the lowest category ( $M=4.18$ ,  $SD=2.35$ ) in relation to the middle category ( $M=4.69$ ,  $SD=2.4$ ) and highest category ( $M=5.21$ ,  $SD=2.45$ ).

<sup>182</sup> One-way analysis of variance has shown that there are significant statistical differences between three groups of young people according to their employment status ( $F=6.87$ ,  $p<.05$ ). Using the Post hoc Scheffe test, a statistically significant difference has been found in the variety of uses of the Internet between young people who are still gaining their education ( $M=5.10$ ,  $SD=2.39$ ) in relation to those who are unemployed ( $M=4.36$ ,  $SD=2.32$ ). Young people who are employed don't statistically differ from any other group ( $M=4.69$ ,  $SD=2.59$ ) in the variety of ways in which they use the Internet.

<sup>183</sup> One-way analysis of variance has shown that there are significant statistical differences between three groups of young people according to their level of education ( $F=16.19$ ,  $p<.001$ ). Using the Post hoc Scheffe test, a statistically significant difference has been found in the variety of uses of the Internet between young people of all levels of education: with (un)finished primary school ( $M=3.00$ ,  $SD=2.75$ ), secondary school ( $M=4.33$ ,  $SD=2.34$ ) and college ( $M=5.41$ ,  $SD=2.52$ ).

<sup>184</sup>  $\chi^2=13.17$ ,  $p<.001$ ,  $\Phi=.105$ .

<sup>192</sup>  $\chi^2=5.03$ ,  $p<.05$ ,  $\Phi=.065$ .

<sup>185</sup>  $\chi^2=25.90$ ,  $p<.001$ ,  $\Phi=.148$ .

<sup>193</sup>  $\chi^2=15.02$ ,  $p<.05$ , Cramer's  $V=.114$ .

<sup>186</sup>  $\chi^2=25.51$ ,  $p<.001$ ,  $\Phi=.147$ .

<sup>194</sup>  $\chi^2=18.86$ ,  $p<.001$ , Cramer's  $V=.127$ .

<sup>187</sup>  $\chi^2=6.69$ ,  $p<.05$ ,  $\Phi=.075$ .

<sup>195</sup>  $\chi^2=6.90$ ,  $p<.05$ , Cramer's  $V=.077$ .

<sup>188</sup>  $\chi^2=6.47$ ,  $p<.05$ ,  $\Phi=.074$ .

<sup>196</sup>  $\chi^2=28.36$ ,  $p<.001$ , Cramer's  $V=.156$ .

<sup>189</sup>  $\chi^2=5.69$ ,  $p<.05$ ,  $\Phi=.069$ .

<sup>197</sup>  $\chi^2=12.17$ ,  $p<.05$ , Cramer's  $V=.102$ .


<sup>190</sup>  $\chi^2=41.82$ ,  $p<.001$ ,  $\Phi=-.294$ .

<sup>198</sup>  $\chi^2=29.54$ ,  $p<.001$ , Cramer's  $V=.159$ .

<sup>191</sup>  $\chi^2=22.06$ ,  $p<.001$ ,  $\Phi=.136$ .


Differences related to the cultural capital of the family are manifested in a similar way. Young people whose parents have a higher level of education use the Internet more often for work<sup>199</sup>, reading the news<sup>200</sup>, informing themselves about various events and other things<sup>201</sup>, e-mail<sup>202</sup>, watching and listening to online content<sup>203</sup>, downloading movies<sup>204</sup>, various online purchases<sup>205</sup> and control of their bank account<sup>206</sup>. The cultural capital of parents makes more of a difference with regard to the way young people use the Internet, than their financial situation. The biggest differences appear in the use of e-mails for communication, at work, for downloading movies, and for online financial transactions and services, indicating that, in relation to their family background, these functions are more or less necessary to young people on a daily basis.

**Figure 5.11: Types of activities on the Internet according to the level of parents' education (household principle, in %)**



However, the biggest differences occur in relation to the level of education of the young person. With the next level of education, the Internet is used more frequently and more diversely. The biggest differences are displayed in the level of use of the Internet for more modern means of controlling finance and online payments, but also in the use of the Internet for professional means, i.e. for work and electronic communication. Over half of the young people with university degrees use the Internet for work, while in the group with a secondary school education the same is true for every fourth young person, and only for each twentieth young person with a primary school education. Approximately two-thirds of the young people with university degrees use the Internet to inform themselves and to read the news, while the same is true for half the young people with a secondary school education and a quarter of those with a primary school education. More than a quarter of those with university degrees use online shopping, indicating, among other things, that new Internet products are first accepted and used by those young people with a higher level of cultural capital.

**Figure 5.12: Types of activities on the Internet according to the educational level of young people who have gained their education (in %)**



<sup>199</sup>  $\chi^2=29.54$ ,  $p<.001$ , Cramer's  $V=.159$ .

<sup>200</sup>  $\chi^2=12.45$ ,  $p<.05$ , Cramer's  $V=.103$ .

<sup>201</sup>  $\chi^2=10.58$ ,  $p<.05$ , Cramer's  $V=.095$ .

<sup>202</sup>  $\chi^2=44.97$ ,  $p<.001$ , Cramer's  $V=.197$ .

<sup>203</sup>  $\chi^2=7.76$ ,  $p<.05$ , Cramer's  $V=.082$ .

<sup>204</sup>  $\chi^2=29.99$ ,  $p<.001$ , Cramer's  $V=.161$ .

<sup>205</sup>  $\chi^2=12.68$ ,  $p<.05$ , Cramer's  $V=.104$ .

<sup>206</sup>  $\chi^2=10.46$ ,  $p<.05$ , Cramer's  $V=.095$ .

Respondents point out the advantages of using the Internet over other media. The most essential is the size of the network, the amount of information it offers, the level of democracy which allows two-way communication and offers the opportunity to establish and maintain contact with close or less close individuals.

Because it makes life easier, it provides scope and all the information we need, there's no need to search for other literature. I mean, there's the question of how smart it is to rely on just that source, but, but, umm, that's just how it is today.

K: And how different is it in relation to TV and radio... What do you consider its advantages and disadvantages?

I: Well, in relation, well I mean, it's the largest technological improvement and the Internet owns all the information. It's difficult, I think the television sometimes informs us about the things they want to inform us about, but on the Internet we can find what we are looking for...

(Male student of economics at a private university, 24, Belgrade)

The disadvantage of television is that it shows various stupid content, like "Couples" but there are also shows that you can learn from, and it's the same on the Internet. The advantage of the Internet is that we can watch what we want, that's one of the biggest advantages.

(Female, hairdresser and beautician, 22, unemployed, large town)

K: And what do you use Facebook for?

I: Well, I stay in touch with some friends who are not from here. There's a group related to university, and we all communicate there. But I'm not really addicted to Facebook in the way that I couldn't live without it, really.

K: And what are the advantages? What's good and what's bad about Facebook?

I: Well, we can stay in touch with friends, some of which we couldn't stay in touch with normally via phone.

(Female student, 22, middle-sized town)

I: I stay in touch with my brother-in-law, my friends, my cousin who I haven't seen for nearly two years.

K: So you mainly use it to stay in touch with people who live elsewhere?

I: Yes, and with those who don't have time, who work like I do, and then they find some free time to chat with me. When I have work to do I disconnect the Internet. I mainly use it at home, and even then not much. Occasionally I start staring at the screen and then it's half twelve, half one, and I say it doesn't matter, just a little more.


(Female, 20, Belgrade, secondary school, employed as a shop assistant in a Chinese store)

## Lifestyle patterns

In order to recognize the dominant trends among young people, we asked them to assess to what extent something is currently in, i.e. modern and fashionable, or out, i.e. unfashionable. On the one hand, their assessment represents a perception of the situation (since the question doesn't directly measure what is *in* or *out* in their opinion) and in that way represents an approximation of the dominant values and activities among the young. On the other hand, bearing in mind that the respondents determined their values according to social phenomena, this scale can be interpreted as an approximation of their preferences.

In Serbia, professional success, i.e. success at work, good looks usually accompanied by a healthy lifestyle (healthy diet) and sports activities, personal autonomy, responsibility, the importance of a university education, and providing for the family and married life are currently in. It is interesting to note that the first and most desired trait (professional success) is very problematic, bearing in mind the high rate of unemployment, uncertain employment, low income, and the very limited options for advancement at work. Independence, which is also in, can be interpreted in a similar way, given that the financial autonomy, housing autonomy, and consequently the psychological autonomy of young people are at a relatively low level (Ljubičić, 2012). In this interpretation, in and out represent widespread values, which do not necessarily correspond to real life practices. The least amount of support is given to risky behaviour (consummation of marijuana) and public engagement in the political field (politics in the narrow and broad sense). The perception of politics as a field, which is mainly marred by personal interests and widespread clientelism, lowers the level of trust in organizations and institutions, and heightens resentment towards them.

Figure 5.13: What is in and what is out among young people in Serbia (in %)



In the next step we wanted to determine in which way in and out traits are grouped, i.e. to identify typical lifestyles among young people. Therefore, we conducted an analysis of the main components and allocated four typical patterns which explain 51.83% of the variants (Figure 5.2).<sup>207</sup> The first pattern, which we called the traditional pattern, includes a correlation of indicators of a healthy diet and sports activities, the significance of married life, faithfulness (fidelity), personal responsibility, civic activities, and a pronouncedly negative attitude towards the use of marijuana. The second pattern, called the hedonistic pattern, is composed of indicators that assert the significance of the impression left on others, whether through looks or clothing. This pattern involves a renouncement of personal responsibility and faithfulness (towards a partner, friends, employer). The third pattern focuses on work, a career, and independence, and is composed of a combination of activities that are focused on professional achievements. The last pattern, activism, includes both indicators of activism (broad and narrow political activism), but also the acceptance of marijuana and the importance of branded clothes. The combination of the last two traits with public activities points to the answer as to why political life received such a low quota.

Table 5.2: Analysis of the main components in the young peoples' lifestyles – typical patterns of what is currently (un)desirable

	Traditionalism	Hedonism	Independence	Activism
Healthy diet	.618			
Marriage	.610			
Fidelity	.596	-.418		
Sports activities	.569			
Good looks	.322	.711		
Wearing branded clothes		.672		.352
Taking responsibility	.486	-.497		
Having a career			.809	
Graduating from university			.772	
Being independent			.478	
Being politically active				.746
Participating in civic actions / initiatives	.354			.683
Consuming marijuana	-.433			.493

Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization

<sup>207</sup> The KMO adequacy value is .673, and the Bartlett sphericity test showed a statistical significance of .001.

The first pattern is somewhat more pronounced in females<sup>208</sup> than males, it increases with age<sup>209</sup>, with marriage or cohabitation<sup>210</sup> and with the arrival of children<sup>211</sup>. It is more pronounced in those who are religious<sup>212</sup> but declines with the level of education of parents<sup>213</sup>. Hedonism is somewhat more pronounced in rural areas<sup>214</sup>, in males<sup>215</sup>, it declines with age<sup>216</sup> and, surprisingly, it is more commonly present with those who define themselves within the boundaries of one of the religions<sup>217</sup>. The third pattern is related to the gender of the young person, and is more characteristic of females<sup>218</sup> as well as cultural capital, and it increases with the educational level of parents<sup>219</sup> and the educational level of the young person in question<sup>220</sup>. The final pattern is characteristic of young people who see themselves as atheists or agnostics (non-religious)<sup>221</sup>, its significance declines with the increase of the young person's financial status<sup>222</sup> and it is more pronounced within the ethnic minority segments of the population<sup>223</sup>.

As we have seen, most young people stressed the importance of good looks as a desirable trait, and most are also satisfied with how they look. Every fifth young person is very satisfied, approximately half are satisfied, around one-fifth are somewhat satisfied, while only 4.5% are (very) unsatisfied about the way the look.

**Figure 5.14: The level of satisfaction with their own physical appearance (in %)**



Only the level of financial prosperity is connected to the level of satisfaction with physical appearance, both in the perception of the financial status of the household<sup>224</sup> and the amount of money available to the young person for their own needs<sup>225</sup>.

## Risky behaviour among young people

Risky behaviour among young people reveals what youth often entails – engagement in activities that can be harmful to the health and development of the young person. Besides the directly adverse effects of risky behaviour, it also leads to problems regarding the integration of young people into society, i.e. obstructing or preventing adequate transition through education, the sphere of work, and family life. We have examined risky behaviour through 1) the use of harmful substances: cigarettes, alcohol, and marijuana, as well as attitudes towards the acceptability of these substances, 2) engagement in violent activities, and 3) sexual activity and young people's attitudes towards contraception.

Research shows that the consumption of cigarettes is a very significant cause of multiple illnesses, and consequently death; young people on average start smoking around the age of 18, and the rate at which addiction to nicotine occurs in young people is much higher than in adults (due to physiological differences). Consuming cigarettes, like other forms of risky behaviour, on the one hand gives young people the sense that they are grown up, and on the other makes them feel accepted among their peers (Currie *et al.*, 2012: 141). Nearly half of the young people in Serbia consume cigarettes either regularly or occasionally. Young males consume cigarettes more than young females<sup>226</sup>, and the rate of consummation increases with age<sup>227</sup>; smoking is significantly more widespread in Central Serbia than in Vojvodina, while it is least present in Belgrade<sup>228</sup>. The use of cigarettes decreases with improvements in the financial status of the household<sup>229</sup> but increases with the level of income available to the young person<sup>230</sup>. 19.6% of secondary school students smoke regularly (16.3% occasionally), 28.1% of university students smoke regularly (13.8% occasionally), while 35.6% of those who have finished their education and are active in the labour market<sup>231</sup> smoke on a daily basis (15.4% occasionally). This last figure is alarming, since it indicates that by the time they finish gaining their education already half of them have started consuming cigarettes.

<sup>208</sup> rho=.085\*\*.

<sup>217</sup> rho=.103\*\*.

<sup>226</sup>  $\chi^2=7.47$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.080,

<sup>209</sup> rho=.078\*\*.

<sup>218</sup> rho=.156\*\*.

<sup>227</sup>  $\chi^2=21.45$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.096.

<sup>210</sup> rho=.094\*\*.

<sup>219</sup> rho=.085\*\*.

<sup>228</sup>  $\chi^2=27.35$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.109.

<sup>211</sup> rho=.075\*.

<sup>220</sup> rho=.205\*\*.

<sup>229</sup>  $\chi^2=19.01$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.096.

<sup>212</sup> rho=-.129\*\*.

<sup>221</sup> rho=-.086\*\*.

<sup>230</sup>  $\chi^2=17.02$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.096.

<sup>213</sup> rho=-.113\*\*.

<sup>222</sup> rho=-.092\*\*.

<sup>231</sup>  $\chi^2=28.61$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.113.

<sup>214</sup> rho=-.070\*.

<sup>223</sup> rho=.108\*\*.

<sup>232</sup>  $\chi^2=1.70$ . p>.05. Cramer's V=.001.

<sup>215</sup> rho=-.069\*.

<sup>224</sup> rho=-.081\*\*.


<sup>233</sup>  $\chi^2=1.70$ . p>.05. Cramer's V=.001.

<sup>216</sup> rho=-.151\*\*.

<sup>225</sup> rho=-.178\*\*.


The situation regarding the use of alcohol is similarly alarming. Alcohol is the cause of over 60 various illnesses and is often connected to other forms of risky behaviour, like injuries, violence, dangerous driving, and sexual relations without protection (Currie *et al.* 2012: 151). Almost half (45.2%) of young people consume alcohol on a regular basis (at least once a week – during the weekend) while only one in six of young people do not consume alcohol at all. 14.7% of young people consume alcohol more than once a week, which is especially worrying. The use of alcohol is more pronounced with males than females<sup>232</sup>, more common in Belgrade than in Vojvodina, and the least common in Central Serbia<sup>233</sup>. It becomes more pronounced with a higher level of income<sup>234</sup> and increases surprisingly with the educational level of parents<sup>235</sup>.

**Figure 5.15: The use of marijuana and alcohol (in %)**



We can explain the relatively high level of acceptability of alcohol consummation in a similar way. Slightly less than one-fourth of young people do not consider alcohol acceptable, one in ten consider it an essential channel for socialization and conforming to peer pressure. It is interesting that alcohol is more acceptable to young people in cities than those in the countryside<sup>236</sup>, significantly more acceptable in the Belgrade region than in Central Serbia and Vojvodina<sup>237</sup>. As expected, a somewhat higher number of young males consider it acceptable to consume alcohol<sup>238</sup> than young females, and the level of acceptability increases with age<sup>239</sup>. The connection to cultural capital is also interesting, as a higher level of education among parents<sup>240</sup> and a higher level of education among young people lead to a higher level of acceptance of alcohol<sup>241</sup>. Although secondary school students consider alcohol somewhat less acceptable (56.4%), this group also contains the highest number of individuals who consider alcohol necessary in order to be accepted by others (13.8%), as opposed to university students, among whom there is the highest number of those who consider alcohol acceptable 78.6% (5.9% considers it necessary for an individual to be accepted), as well as among those who have finished their education 67.2%.

**Figure 5.16: The acceptability of alcohol consummation (in %)**



One in six young people (14.9%) consume marijuana, of which 4.6% consume it regularly, that is at least once a week (at least during the weekend). The consumption of marijuana is almost twice as high among young males than among young females<sup>242</sup> and is significantly more pronounced around the capital city<sup>243</sup>. The use of this substance increases with age, but after a certain age (around 25 years old) it loses popularity and declines<sup>244</sup>. Like with the consumption of other risky substances, the use of marijuana also increases with the level of income available to a young person<sup>245</sup>, and like the consumption of cigarettes, it is mainly a habit among young people who come from households with a lower financial standard<sup>246</sup>.

<sup>232</sup>  $\chi^2=93.99$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.285$ .

<sup>240</sup>  $\chi^2=13.05$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.076$ .

<sup>233</sup>  $\chi^2=39.99$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.131$ .

<sup>241</sup>  $\chi^2=13.81$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.111$ .

<sup>234</sup>  $\chi^2=47.06$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.131$ .

<sup>242</sup>  $\chi^2=20.03$ .  $p<.001$ . Phi $=-.134$ .

<sup>235</sup>  $\chi^2=22.025$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.098$ .

<sup>243</sup>  $\chi^2=32.74$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.168$ .

<sup>236</sup>  $\chi^2=9.55$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.091$ .

<sup>244</sup>  $\chi^2=6.42$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.074$ .

<sup>237</sup>  $\chi^2=43.49$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.137$ .


<sup>245</sup>  $\chi^2=23.23$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.158$ .

<sup>238</sup>  $\chi^2=8.05$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.083$ .

<sup>246</sup>  $\chi^2=13.49$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.109$ .

<sup>239</sup>  $\chi^2=28.42$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.111$ .

**Figure 5.17: The consummation of marijuana according to the socio-demographic characteristics of young people (in %)**




All the forms of consumption of harmful substances are interconnected (Table 5.2). An increased rate of smoking cigarettes goes hand in hand with increased consumption of alcohol, marijuana, and the acceptance of alcohol. The situation is the same with regard to the consumption of alcohol and marijuana.

**Table 5.3: The degree of correlation between types of risky behaviour**

Rho	How often do you use marijuana	How often do you drink alcohol	The acceptability of alcohol
How often do you smoke	.250**	.343**	.191**
How often do you use marijuana		.289**	.145**
How often do you drink alcohol			.481**

A particularly risky form of behaviour among young people is participation in violent events. Violence can have significant effects on the physical and psychological well-being of an individual, and can also lead to lagging behind in school and the labelling of a young person, and this type of behaviour is significantly correlated with interpersonal problems (Currie *et al*, 2012: 185). Among the young people in Serbia, 16.4% were involved in at least one form of violent behaviour. The most common form of expressing aggression is directed towards peers and happens in clubs and cafes, within neighbourhoods, in schools and at sports events. There is very little chance of getting into a conflict with the police or individuals with different political views.

**Figure 5.18: Violent behaviour among young people in various situations (in %)**



Analyses show that violence is primarily a part of the masculine milieu, bearing in mind that almost one out four young males (23.9%) participated in some form of violent behaviour last year as opposed to one in every ten young females (9%)<sup>247</sup>. Growing up in a predominantly patriarchal culture, socialization of young males with their peers often involves taking part in peer conflicts. With regard to most forms of violence, males lead, however, there is no difference between male and female participation in violent behaviour in university/school toward peers and individuals with different political views. It is more likely for young people from the countryside to be involved in some kind of violent behaviour at least once, than for young people in cities<sup>248</sup>. Violent behaviour significantly declines with age. It is most present among the youngest group, those aged 15-19 (26.3%), and the least present among those between 25-29 years old (8.6%)<sup>249</sup>. It is interesting that the level of financial income among young people correlates with violent behaviour, so that the growth of available income also leads to a higher willingness to engage in violent behaviour<sup>250</sup>. The highest level of

<sup>247</sup>  $\chi^2=48.26$ ,  $p<.001$ . Phi=-.202.

<sup>248</sup>  $\chi^2=3.79$ ,  $p<.05$ . Phi=-.059.

<sup>249</sup>  $\chi^2=45.18$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.195.

<sup>250</sup>  $\chi^2=15.39$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.127.


violent behaviour is seen in children whose parents have a secondary school education, and the least in those whose parents have a primary school education<sup>251</sup>. Young people who belong to the right of the political spectrum are twice as involved in violent behaviour than young people with different political beliefs<sup>252</sup>. Another piece of evidence shows that risky behaviour is always accompanied by other types of risky behaviour, and young people who have at least once entered a physical confrontation in the past year also smoke<sup>253</sup> and consume alcohol<sup>254</sup> and marijuana<sup>255</sup> more often.

## Sexual relations

The sexual decomposition of marriage is a part of the modernization process, which can be said to have occurred in Serbia during the era of socialism. Although the value of marital life is still at a high level (Milić, 2010; Tomanović, 2012), sexual relations are most often practised before marriage. Among the young people in Serbia 20.4% have not had sexual relations yet, 28.4% have only had sexual relations with one partner, while over half (51.2%) have had more than one partner. Sexual experience is most closely linked to the age of young people<sup>256</sup>, so among young people who are between 15-19 years old almost half (47.1%) still have not had sexual relations, as opposed to those aged 20-24 (10.9%), and those between 25-29 (5.5%). Young males testify to having sexual relations more often than young females<sup>257</sup>, and young people within the Belgrade region are the youngest to enter into sexual relations, followed by Vojvodina, and somewhat later Central Serbia<sup>258</sup>. The high the level of education among parents, the high degree of sexual freedom among young people is, since their experiences are to a lesser extent related to only one partner<sup>259</sup>.

Sexual relations among young people often involve a risk of unintended pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases, considering that one-third of young people who have sexual relations never use contraceptives, and an additional third only occasionally uses contraceptives. Bearing in mind that sexual education is not a part of the educational curriculum, it isn't surprising to learn that almost one in every ten young people older than fifteen does not know what contraception is (in the age group 15-19, 15.9% of young people do not know what contraception is).

**Figure 5.19: The use of contraception among young people who have had sexual relations (in %)**



Contraceptive methods are used more often by young females than young males<sup>260</sup>. Certain connections appear between the cultural capital of young people and their parents and the knowledge and advantages of contraception. In fact, young people who have a higher level of education<sup>261</sup> and young people whose mother has a higher level of education<sup>262</sup> are more likely to use contraceptive methods.

<sup>251</sup>  $\chi^2=6.01$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.072$ .

<sup>252</sup>  $\chi^2=18.68$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.128$ .

<sup>253</sup>  $\chi^2=15.34$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.115$ .

<sup>254</sup>  $\chi^2=50.71$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.209$ .

<sup>255</sup>  $\chi^2=13.10$ ,  $p<.001$ . Phi=.109.

<sup>256</sup>  $\chi^2=287.45$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.353$ .

<sup>257</sup>  $\chi^2=65.05$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.238$ .

<sup>258</sup>  $\chi^2=54.85$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.154$ .

<sup>259</sup>  $\chi^2=16.38$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.085$ .

<sup>260</sup>  $\chi^2=12.95$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.119$ .

<sup>261</sup>  $\chi^2=22.12$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.148$ .

<sup>262</sup>  $\chi^2=12.90$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.085$ .

## Discussion

The most dominant form of entertainment for young people during their leisure time is listening to music, which is usually not an activity separately practiced since music is an integral part of everyday life, and is listened to during leisure time as well as at work (studying, breaks, on the way to work/school). Young people in Serbia have a similar order of priorities regarding their leisure time as young people in the region. Namely, the order of priorities starts from listening to music, to socializing, watching movies, engaging in sports activities, to the least practised, reading. Analyses indicate that stratification differences are significant with some activities. Young people whose parents have a higher level of education are more likely to read and socialize. Socializing is linked to the available income of the household, which suggests that social capital is partly influenced by economic capital. With adulthood and entry into the role of employer, spouse/partner, and parent, the patterns of the use of leisure time change, and less time is dedicated to most activities. Socializing declines in particular, as well as those activities which are structured, while those that are centred around the home and that do not require a high level of commitment, such as relaxing in front of the television, become more dominant.

Although we are definitely talking about a population that was born into the world of the Internet, and although the majority of young people use the Internet actively, television has still not lost its significance, because young people often combine these two media channels to follow a variety of content. The things young people follow online and on television are an expression of their various tastes, and represent an important source of information, satisfaction, and are a symbolic resource for expressing their identity. With regard to this, several significant differences among young people can be seen. With parents who have a higher cultural capital, a decline can be noticed in the number of young people who listen to folk and pop music, as well as the number who watch reality shows. With a higher personal cultural capital, more young people are interested in political debates while less watch reality shows, however, with the growth of financial status, more are interested in the news. Young people in cities watch documentaries and scientific programmes more often, while young people in the countryside watch Serbian movies, reality shows, sports programmes, and listen to folk music more often. With age, young people slowly shift from watching entertainment programmes to watching more informative and political programmes.

Access to the Internet indicates that the digital gap among young people has most probably been overcome. Differences are displayed in the way the Internet is used. With the growth of personal and cultural capital and cultural capital within the family, as well as the financial status of the household a young person lives in, more diverse use of the Internet is evident. This diversity is displayed in the use of the Internet for business purposes, information, communication, and the use of online financial services. In this manner, young people differ according to the degree to which they are able to take advantage of the opportunities the Internet can offer.

Based on what they view as modern and what they view as *passé*, young people can be separated into four groups: those who are *traditional* and aspire toward family life and stability, those who are *hedonistic* and want to live free from the *chains* of social norms and look good, those *focused on their careers* and wish to gain financial independence through education and employment, and *activists*. The pattern of *independence* becomes more prevalent with the growth of cultural capital (personal and in the family) of the young person. Activism is somewhat more frequently a strategy employed by young people who come from families with a lower financial standard.

The data suggests that, according to the level of risky behaviour, young people in Serbia do not differ greatly from young people in the region. The use of cigarettes and marijuana is higher among young people who live in households with a lower financial standard, but also among young people who have more money available for their own personal needs. On the other hand, the acceptance of alcohol grows with the cultural capital of young people and their parents. Violent behaviour is largely an issue among young males, and is less often expressed by young people whose parents are either on the lowest or highest levels of education. Analyses confirm a significant connection between all forms of violent behaviour, which indicates the risk of young people entering into a vicious circle which is difficult to escape, and therefore failing to fulfil their potential.



# TRUST, ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS



## Introduction

For stable social integration it is necessary that universal values that transcend individuals and narrow groups be accepted, as well as mutual trust and action, which are not only in the best interest of the individual, but in the interest of the wider community. With the degree of integration of a society in mind, Robert Putnam defines social capital as "a feature of social life-expressed through networks, norms, and trust-that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives" (Putnam 1995: 664–665). He identifies three significant elements of social capital: 1) networks, i.e. social relationships which people enter into and which can be temporary or permanent, 2) norms, i.e. rules which define social relationships and which can be generally accepted, or can lead to disagreement and conflict, and 3) trust, which involves the expectation that all participants will act in a certain manner. According to him, social capital is not just (or is not primarily) an individual matter, but an element of society at large. Societies can have more or less social capital, and therefore possess a higher or lower level of solidarity. In societies in which wide networks of solidarity exist (mainly via (in)formal associations), and in which the norms containing universalistic values are respected, there is also a high degree of general trust in people and a specific trust in institutions. In these kinds of societies the level of predictability of social life is high. On the other hand, in societies in which the actions of institutions are unpredictable, solidarity is based primarily on family and social connection, which leads to the strengthening of particular interests and a weaker establishment of universalistic norms, as well as less trust in people and institutions.

Where there is a lower degree of confidence that institutions act for the common good, it is less likely that citizens will rely on these same institutions. Research on a national sample shows a lower level of trust in institutions and organizations in comparison to countries of the European Union (Stanojević, Stokanić, 2014). The same analyses show that the relationship between trust in the government and civic norms often have a negative correlation. With a higher level of trust in the government, parliament, the judiciary, and political parties, there is a lower degree of acceptance of universalistic civic norms, implying that trust in the government is based on individual interests and to the detriment of the common interest. (*Ibid*: 196). The same research shows that participation in the actions of civic societies does not lead to a higher acceptance of universalistic norms. The degree of acceptance of universalistic norms in Serbia is among the lowest in Europe. This means that young people who are socially active, do not develop through their activities a higher degree of responsibility towards the common good. As Putnam foresaw, post-socialist societies will, due to changes in the legitimacy and logic of social integration, go through a period of low trust, with individual interests and norms gaining importance, and with a relatively low degree of participation in activities which are for the common good (Putnam, 1993).

## Analysis


### Participation

For the first element in social capital, we will check the degree and reasons for participation in various organisations and activities which are for the common good, and which are on a voluntary basis (voluntary work). Two out of five young people (39.4%) were involved in some kind of voluntary work in the past twelve months.<sup>263</sup>

Viewed according to the type of activity and the type of organisation young people were involved in during the past twelve months, we see that one in five young people in Serbia displayed solidarity with the population which suffered the consequences of the floods. These activities involved directly eliminating the threat of further flooding (by building embankments), dealing with the consequences of the floods (clearing flooded areas), as well as collecting and distributing humanitarian support to the affected population.

<sup>263</sup> It should be noted that participation in voluntary work was at a somewhat higher level than usual, since mass flooding occurred during the research period, and a large part of the population (young people) were helping prevent the further flooding of rivers and rectify the consequences. The participation of young people in some form of voluntary work excluding help in the flooded areas is 28.8%.


**Figure 6.1: The level of activity of young people in various organizations and informal situations (in %)**



Young people are equally involved in the organization of sports events and helping people with special needs / the elderly. The level of participation of young people in some form of civic society is fairly low (including religious activities), which implies that the NGO sector is still underdeveloped and inclusive.

When it comes to the relationship between the socio-demographic traits of young people and the types of activities, we noticed the following: work in local communities is more often carried out by young people in the countryside than young people in cities<sup>264</sup> and more often by young males than young females<sup>265</sup>. Young males also take the lead in the organization of sports events<sup>266</sup> and this type of activity decreases with age<sup>267</sup>. Young people whose parents have a higher educational level<sup>268</sup> and where the household has a higher financial status, the level of participation of young people increases in these kinds of activities<sup>269</sup>. In relation to the region they come from, young people from Central Serbia participate in these activities most often, followed by young people from Vojvodina, and the least level of participation is seen in young people from the Belgrade region.

**Figure 6.2: The level of activity according to place of residence (in %)**



The organization of cultural events occurs more often in the cities than in the countryside, so young people from urban areas are more active in these kinds of activities<sup>270</sup>. In relation to the level of education, young people who are still gaining their education are the most active, followed by those with university degrees, while the least number of volunteers is among those with lower levels of education<sup>271</sup>. The level of education of parents shows a similar link to the organization of cultural events – young people whose parents have a university degree are more willing to engage in this kind of activity<sup>272</sup>.

<sup>264</sup>  $\chi^2=5.01$ ,  $p<.05$ ,  $\Phi=-.065$ .

<sup>269</sup>  $\chi^2=6.34$ ,  $p<.05$ , Cramer's  $V=.074$ .

<sup>265</sup>  $\chi^2=11.12$ ,  $p<.05$ ,  $\Phi=-.097$ .

<sup>270</sup>  $\chi^2=7.58$ ,  $p<.05$ ,  $\Phi=.080$ .

<sup>266</sup>  $\chi^2=11.27$ ,  $p<.05$ ,  $\Phi=-.097$ .


<sup>271</sup>  $\chi^2=17.30$ ,  $p<.05$ , Cramer's  $V=.122$ .

<sup>267</sup>  $\chi^2=16.67$ ,  $p<.001$ , Cramer's  $V=.119$ .

<sup>272</sup>  $\chi^2=16.67$ ,  $p<.001$ , Cramer's  $V=.119$ .


<sup>268</sup>  $\chi^2=8.92$ ,  $p<.05$ , Cramer's  $V=.088$ .

**Figure 6.3: The level of activity according to gender (in %)**



Young females are significantly more willing to help peers with studying than young males<sup>273</sup>. Young people whose parents have a higher level of education are more willing to help peers with studying<sup>274</sup>, as are those young people who live in households with a higher financial standard<sup>275</sup>. Bearing in mind that the cultural capital of the family is largely passed on from generation to generation, children whose parents have a higher level of education often have more knowledge which they can share with their peers. The traits of young people are connected to activities within NGOs in a similar manner. Young females are often more active in NGOs<sup>276</sup>, and the higher the level of the parents' education, the higher the level of activism<sup>277</sup>. Additionally, young people in the countryside are significantly less involved in the activities of NGOs<sup>278</sup> than their peers in the cities.

**Figure 6.4: The level of activities according to the educational level of parents (the domination principle, in %)**



Regarding the solidarity young people showed during the floods, analyses reveal that the level of involvement in activities increased with the level of education of parents<sup>279</sup> and with the level of education of the young people themselves<sup>280</sup>. Young people still in the educational system (university students 25.5%, secondary school students 19.4%) were the most active, those with university degrees (17.3%) and those who had finished secondary school (16.4%) were somewhat less active, and those with finished primary school (9.7%) were the least active. Care should be taken when interpreting this data, since in certain situations the motivation to be socially involved was not lacking, but what was lacking were the basic assumptions of social participation. Resources (time, infrastructure, money, organisation) are unequally distributed within society and young people who belong to separate segments of the population do not have equal access to these resources. Therefore, young people who live in better financial conditions, whose parents have a higher level of education, who live in urban areas, have a higher chance of engaging in various activities, be of use, as well as expanding their own social network.

It is interesting to note that the ideological position of young people affects their level of solidarity. During the aforementioned natural disaster that affected Serbia in 2014, young people who see themselves on the left of the political spectrum (31.7% of them) were significantly more<sup>281</sup> engaged in providing help, while those in the political centre (21.1%) were somewhat less engaged and the least engaged were those on the right of the political spectrum (13.6%) and those ideologically undecided (13.5%). This data suggests two things. Firstly, that ideology is a significant factor of social action, and secondly that solidarity is present more on the left of the political spectrum than on the right, where solidarity is largely a part of an imaginary identification with the collective – the nation.

<sup>273</sup>  $\chi^2=9.16$ . p<.05. Phi=.088.

<sup>278</sup>  $\chi^2=11.12$ . p<.001. Phi=.097.

<sup>274</sup>  $\chi^2=7.61$ . p<.05. Phi=.081.

<sup>279</sup>  $\chi^2=21.20$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.135.

<sup>275</sup>  $\chi^2=7.37$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.080.

<sup>280</sup>  $\chi^2=8.13$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.084.

<sup>276</sup>  $\chi^2=3.81$ . p<.05. Phi=.057.


<sup>281</sup>  $\chi^2=23.07$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.143.

<sup>277</sup>  $\chi^2=8.35$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.085.

Values influence the level of activism in another significant way. Young people who identify as non-religious are more often involved in the work of NGOs (11.1% as opposed to 2.2% of those who are religious<sup>282</sup>). Young non-religious people were significantly more involved in helping during the floods (30.6% as opposed to 18.4% of religious young people<sup>283</sup>). There is no single activity in which religious young people take the lead.

Young people usually stated three motives that led them to engage in volunteer work. The first two express their direct relationship to the community (desire to help and to participate), and the third is also of the instrumental kind (although not necessarily egotistical) towards solving a concrete problem. The number of those who engage in volunteer work in order to meet a future employer or gain friends is fairly low. This kind of motivation refers to the non-instrumental value of these activities led by the desire to be of help to other people and socially useful.

**Figure 6.5: The reasons young people engaged in volunteering activities (in %)**



In a situation in which young people are largely socially atomized and directed towards their informal connections and the people closest to them, it can be said that there is a desire to expand these networks and to step outside of known boundaries in order to achieve cohesion and solidarity on a higher social level.

## Trust

Among young people in Serbia, the findings show that with the gap in social distance, there is a lower degree of trust between people. Young people trust their immediate family members the most. It is interesting that they have the most trust in the second category, which is their friends, followed by their relatives. This finding confirms the conclusions of other researchers that modernization processes have led young people to place their network of friends on a much higher and more significant level than their wider network of relatives (Milić, 2004; Tomanović, 2008a). The least trust is given to people with different political beliefs. At the same time, this is the only result that is below the level of distrust (a score of 5 indicates the centre). It is interesting that there is a relatively low level of trust in church leaders. If we examine the data in more detail, the standard deviation regarding this question is 3.01, indicating that young people are divided into those who have a high level of trust and those who have a low level of trust in church leaders.

<sup>282</sup>  $\chi^2=19.99$ . p<.001. Phi=-.131.

<sup>283</sup>  $\chi^2=6.48$ . p<.05. Phi=-.075.

Figure 6.6: The level of trust in various people (average score)



The following socio-demographic characteristics of young people are related to trust. Trust in colleagues from work or school is significantly more pronounced<sup>284</sup> in young people who have a university degree, as opposed to those with a primary or secondary school education<sup>285</sup>. A longer education expands the social circle of a young person and strengthens the *bridging* and *linking* of social capital, so friends at work, and acquaintances gained during the educational process become more significant and are given a higher level of trust. When talking about the level of trust in friends, significant differences occur in relation to where young people live, their employment status, and their level of education (those who are not still in the process of education). Young people who live in towns have a higher level of trust in their friends than those who live in the countryside<sup>286</sup>, bearing in mind that social networks in towns are based on friendship to higher extent than on kinship and neighbourly relations. Those who are unemployed have a lower level of trust in their friends than those who are employed or inactive (gaining their education).<sup>287</sup> This finding raises the question of the possible different expectations (loans, help with employment) from friends, which leads to a lower level of trust in those young people who are in a difficult position regarding employment, as opposed to those who are employed or gaining their education, so the pressure on the networks of friends is lower and the relationship somewhat different. The comparison of young people who have finished primary or secondary school in relation to those who have university degrees indicates a higher level of trust in friends among those with a higher level of education<sup>288</sup>, which is consistent with the finding that a longer educational process leads to a larger circle of friends and closer relationships among them.

The level of trust in relatives and neighbours varies in relation to the educational level of the young person's parents. Those young people whose parents have finished primary or secondary school have a higher level of trust in neighbours and relatives than those whose parents have university degrees.<sup>289</sup>

Regarding differences in the level of trust in people who belong to different religions or have different political beliefs, it can be seen that young females are less distrustful than young males<sup>290</sup>. Surprisingly, young people who are in the lower third on the scale of material status have a higher level of trust in people of different religious beliefs than those at the top of this scale.<sup>291</sup>

<sup>284</sup> Results of the t-test show that young people who hold university degrees ( $M=6.81$ ,  $SD=2.12$ ) are significantly different ( $t=-3.29$ ,  $df=561$ ,  $p<.001$ ) to those who only have a primary or secondary school education ( $M=6.81$ ,  $SD=2.12$ ).

<sup>285</sup> Here we have joined the categories of young people with an (in)complete primary and secondary school education due to the low level of those belonging to the first category.

<sup>286</sup> Results of the t-test indicate that young people from the cities ( $M=8.75$ ,  $SD=1.58$ ) are significantly different ( $t=-3.37$ ,  $df=779.45$ ,  $p<.05$ ) to those from the countryside ( $M=8.39$ ,  $SD=1.87$ ).

<sup>287</sup> One-way analysis of variance shows that there are significant statistical differences between groups of young people according to their employment status. Bearing in mind that comparing groups displayed an inhomogeneity of variants (Leven's statistics  $<.05$ ), the alternative Brown-Forsythe measure was used and displayed a statistical significance of the model (4.56,  $p<.001$ ). With a post hoc Tamhane test, the existence of significant differences between those unemployed ( $M=8.17$ ,  $SD=2.18$ ), those employed ( $M=8.67$ ,  $SD=1.65$ ), and those inactive ( $M=8.74$ ,  $SD=1.58$ ) was discovered.

<sup>288</sup> Results of the t-test show that young people with a university degree ( $M=8.82$ ,  $SD=1.30$ ) are significantly different ( $t=-3.29$ ,  $df=561$ ,  $p<.001$ ) to young people who have only finished primary or secondary school ( $M=8.39$ ,  $SD=1.93$ ).

<sup>289</sup> Measured with a t-test, the results show that young people whose parents have a lower educational level ( $M=7.81$ ,  $SD=2.02$ ) are significantly different ( $t=-3.10$ ,  $df=505.34$ ,  $p<.05$ ) to those whose parents have university degrees ( $M=7.52$ ,  $SD=2.27$ ) in regards to their trust of relatives. A similar result is obtained when viewing the level of trust towards neighbors, where young people whose parents have a lower educational level ( $M=6.22$ ,  $SD=2.57$ ) are significantly different ( $t=3.23$ ,  $df=1144$ ,  $p<.05$ ) to those whose parents have university degrees ( $M=5.7$ ,  $SD=2.58$ ).

<sup>290</sup> Measured with a t-test, the results show that young males ( $M=4.78$ ,  $SD=2.41$ ) are significantly different ( $t=-2.04$ ,  $df=1068$ ,  $p<.05$ ) to young females ( $M=5.08$ ,  $SD=2.36$ ) regarding the level of trust they have toward people of different political beliefs. A similar result is obtained when viewing the level of trust in people of different religious beliefs, where the results show that young males ( $M=5.63$ ,  $SD=2.37$ ) are again significantly different ( $t=-3.23$ ,  $df=1093$ ,  $p<.05$ ) to young females ( $M=6.08$ ,  $SD=2.37$ ).

<sup>291</sup> One-way factor analysis of variance shows that there are significant statistical differences between groups ( $F=6.11$ ,  $p<.05$ ). With a post hoc Scheffe test, the existence of statistically significant differences between those who are in the lower third on the scale of financial well-being ( $M=6.43$ ,  $SD=2.39$ ), those in the middle of the scale ( $M=5.10$ ,  $SD=2.24$ ) and those at the top ( $M=4.68$ ,  $SD=2.41$ ) was discovered.

In their narratives, all young people emphasize the importance of their family members, who they can rely on at all times. The first choice for young people is either their whole family as a group, or parents and brothers and sisters. The reasons trust is gained and kept within the family are on the one hand the honesty and openness which exist in families, and on the other the inability to create a similar relationship with other people. The expectations of others often lead to disappointment and withdrawal, which explains the high level of distrust in people in general (Stanojević, Stokanić, 2014).

Well, I can tell my mum anything, and my dad. I really have an open relationship with them and I know they won't say anything, they won't start yelling or something like that, they'll sit down with me and have a normal conversation. We really have an open and honest relationship, since they're young parents. It really is an open relationship. And they understand everything

(Female, secondary school, 17, a suburb of Belgrade)

Honestly, I have a certain circle of people whom I trust, and I don't trust the others. Basically, there are a lot more people whom I don't trust.

(Male, 24, intern in a law firm, small town)

Only relationships within the family are viewed as relationships where personal interest does not come into play, while even relationships with friends, neighbours, and relatives can be based on personal interest, which can, at a certain point, jeopardize their trust.

**Can you tell me who you trust the most?**

I: My mother and father ... I can tell them anything.

K: **And who do you trust the least?**

I: My neighbour. I'm just kidding. I don't know... These days even your closest friend can deceive you, and there's a large chance that someone who you barely know will help you out when you're in need.

(Unemployed, 21, secondary school, small town).

The least trust is given to people with whom the relationship is based on formal connections: colleagues and business associates. These formal relationships often lead to informal ones, occasionally creating conflict between formal obligations at work or school and personal loyalty. Bearing in mind that people in these kinds of relationships are in a certain kind of competition (for marks, work promotions), the clash between these two spheres usually leads to a loss of trust in the private aspects of the relationships.

**Who do you trust the most?**

My mother and sister. They are the most honest, and always give me their honest opinion, because real friendships definitely don't exist these days. I'm more and more convinced in that each day... Here, I have a lot of colleagues from university who are all there when they need something, and then when I need something from them no one is there to help. Maybe you can find an honest person somewhere, a real friend, but I don't have anything like that. I have been disappointed by my friends a lot of times, so maybe that's why I have such an opinion.

(Female student, 22, middle-sized town)

N: My family.

I: **And who do you trust the least?**

N: Probably colleagues from work ... You have to keep quiet about personal matters and work and that's that. I probably only distrust them. And maybe, my relatives.

I: **What about your relatives?**

N: Well, the standard procedure! Whenever something happens problems come to light.

I: **You said that you don't have close relationships with your colleagues?**


N: No I don't, no, no. Nothing too exaggerated, but there are always conflicts with colleagues from work. Setting each other up and things like that... Someone will tell the employer this, someone else will tell him that, and then it's better to stay quiet. You do your job, mind your own business and that's that.

(Female, 27, college, employed on contract, a middle-sized town)

## Distrust – social distance

Another aspect of social cohesion is the level of distance members of society have towards different categories of people. If the distance is large, there is a lesser possibility of cohesion, mutual cooperation, and mutual life, and vice versa, if the distance is smaller there is a better possibility of cooperation and mutual trust. To check the degree of distance, we asked respondents how they would feel if different categories of people moved into their neighbourhood.

**Figure 6.7: The level of distance felt toward various groups of people (in %)**  
How would you feel if the following groups or individuals moved into your neighbourhood?



The results show that the least distance is felt toward students. Bearing in mind that a significant number of respondents are still in the education system, this kind of change in their neighbourhood could mean the opportunity to meet new people and socialize with them. The level of distance felt towards Russians is somewhat less, as only 5% of young people stated that they would not be happy if people from Russia were to become their neighbours, and the situation is similar with retired people (pensioners) and internally displaced people from Kosovo and Metohija. Every sixth young person would not be happy if a family from the USA or China moved into their neighbourhood, and every fifth would not feel happy if a Roma family or a family from Croatia moved into their neighbourhood. A significant distance towards asylum seekers exists, where every fourth young person feels a certain opposition, while the highest degree of opposition recorded was towards homosexuals. Two out of five young people would not be happy if a homosexual couple moved into their neighbourhood.

The attitude towards homosexuals is significantly connected to the socio-demographic traits of the respondents, such as gender, the type of place they live in, the level of education of their parents and their own level of education. Young females display a lower degree of distance towards homosexuals than young males.<sup>292</sup> In rural areas, where people are more traditional, there is also less understanding towards people of different sexual orientation, which is confirmed by the finding that young people in cities are more willing to accept homosexuals into their neighbourhoods.<sup>293</sup> A significantly smaller distance felt towards homosexuals is evident with the higher the level of the education of parents<sup>294</sup>, as well as the higher the level of the young person's education<sup>295</sup>.

Regarding the social distance felt towards asylum seekers, people from Croatia, and Romas, the analyses show that young females are significantly more tolerant towards all of these groups than young males.<sup>296</sup> The level of education of parents does not have an impact on the level of distance felt, but the level of education of young people and where

<sup>292</sup> Measured with a t test, results show that young males ( $M=3.67$ ,  $SD=1.09$ ) are significantly different ( $t=8.62$ ,  $df=1123.68$ ,  $p<.05$ ) from young females ( $M=3.13$ ,  $SD=1.01$ ).

<sup>293</sup> Results of the t test indicate that there are significant statistical differences  $6.56$ ,  $df=1133.68$ ,  $p<.001$ ) between young people from the countryside ( $M=3.68$ ,  $SD=1.06$ ) and those from the cities ( $M=3.25$ ,  $SD=1.07$ ).

<sup>294</sup> Results of the t test with which the difference between young people whose parents have a lower level of education than university ( $M=3.47$ ,  $SD=1.01$ ) and those with a university degree was measured ( $M=3.24$ ,  $SD=1.03$ ) show significant differences ( $t=3.50$ ,  $df=776.62$ ,  $p<.001$ ).

<sup>295</sup> Results of the t test with which the differences between young people who have a lower level of education than university ( $M=3.58$ ,  $SD=1.15$ ) and those who have a university degree was measured ( $M=3.11$ ,  $SD=0.98$ ) show significant differences ( $t=5.05$ ,  $df=408.35$ ,  $p<.001$ ). Inactive young people (those who are currently in the educational system) were not included in the analysis.

<sup>296</sup> In order to check whether there is a significant difference in the level of distance we conducted t tests which showed that there are significant differences ( $t=4.66$ ,  $df=1110.95$ ,  $p<.001$ ) between young males ( $M=3.20$ ,  $SD=1.01$ ) and young females ( $M=2.94$ ,  $SD=0.88$ ) regarding the distance felt towards asylum seekers, but also that the differences between young males ( $M=3.08$ ,  $SD=1.08$ ) and young females ( $M=2.78$ ,  $SD=0.86$ ) are significant ( $t=5.04$ ,  $df=1073.61$ ,  $p<.001$ ) in regards to people from Croatia.

they live are linked to the level of tolerance towards asylum seekers and people from Croatia. People who only have a primary or secondary school education show a higher level of distance towards these two categories of people than young people who have a university degree.<sup>297</sup> Also, young people from urban areas show a lower level of distance than those from rural areas.<sup>298</sup> The distance towards Romas does not vary in relation to the socio-demographic traits of young people, indicating a deep-seated prejudice against this population.

To check the total degree of social distance, we formed a composite index in which we added up the results of the given answers (on a scale from one to five, with the answer "I don't know" excluded). In the total sum, 14.4% of young people show no distance toward the mentioned categories of people, 59.8% are mostly uninterested, 24.9% show a certain form of distance, while only 0.8% are radically exclusive.

Several distinct scenarios can be seen in the narratives of young people. The first one reveals that they would be very happy if people who have a different cultural background or who are themselves different moved into their neighbourhood. They justify their reasons for accepting these people with broadening their own cultural horizons on the one hand, and on the other with the political stance that an attitude towards different people is based on tolerance.

I: I don't have a problem with that, because that kind of outlook we generally lack in our country, and it is necessary to see all cultures and accept that all people are simply different...

K: And what would the advantages of living in a neighbourhood next to someone like that be?

I: Getting to know other cultures, their behaviour, just accepting people as they are

(Male, student of economics, private university, 24, Belgrade)

The second scenario involves a reserved attitude towards certain groups of people. It implies that different people have a right to their own lives, have a right to live and express their differences, but only in the privacy of their own homes and adhering to the general social norms.

K: And would you mind gay people, the LGBT population?

I: I think I wouldn't, because...well this is Serbia... I mean, there would always be problems with them, they would always have some people coming over, there would always be problems, it would be chaotic. At least I think so. This environment would simply never accept them. I honestly don't mind, they can do what they want in the privacy of their own home. But I think they wouldn't be accepted in this area and that it would be a serious problem. People would mistreat them. And yet here we all are in the same neighbourhood.

(Female, secondary school student, 17, suburb of Belgrade)

The third scenario involves an open distance toward people who are somehow different. In this case it is the LGBT population that is seen as radically different and with no possibility of fitting into the local environment, which would consequentially cause trouble.

K: What do you think of homosexual couples? Would it bother you?

I: I had a gay at school. I support them in a way, I don't support seeing it happening in front of me.

K: Do you generally have a problem with them, do you have something against them?

I: Look, I like men. If a girl were to approach me and ask me about some nonsense I would exit through the first door and never speak to her again, because I can't stand that type of thing.

(Female, 20, Belgrade, secondary school, sales assistant in a Chinese store)

The most common distance in the narratives was towards homosexuals and members of the LGBT population. Young people would either like, or were indifferent towards all other groups of people moving into their neighbourhood.

<sup>297</sup> The t test indicates that young people who have a lower level of education than university ( $M=3.19$ ,  $SD=1.05$ ) are significantly different ( $t=2.94$ ,  $df=406.51$ ,  $p<.05$ ) from those with a university degree ( $M=2.93$ ,  $SD=0.89$ ) regarding the distance felt toward asylum seekers, as well as the distance felt toward people from Croatia (those with a lower level of education than university  $M=3.03$ ,  $SD=1.08$ , and those with a university degree  $M=2.71$ ,  $SD=0.83$ ;  $t=3.54$ ,  $df=556$ ,  $p<.001$ ).


<sup>298</sup> Results of the t test show that there are significant statistical differences ( $t=3.16$ ,  $df=850.36$ ,  $p<.05$ ) between young people from the countryside ( $M=3.19$ ,  $SD=0.95$ ) and those from the cities ( $M=3.00$ ,  $SD=0.96$ ) regarding the distance felt toward asylum seekers. The differences are also statistically significant ( $t=4.48$ ,  $df=1133$ ,  $p<.05$ ) between young people from the countryside ( $M=3.10$ ,  $SD=1.04$ ) and those from the cities ( $M=2.83$ ,  $SD=0.94$ ) regarding the distance felt toward people from Croatia.

## The values of young people

Bearing in mind these last statements, the results that follow explain more closely the existing traditional values of young people. We evaluated the values of young people in two ways in this study. The first way includes values relating to desired personality traits, and the second includes the right to do whatever they want with their body and different ways of expressing their identity.


In the first case we set eight values in front of the respondents, where they had to choose the first, second, and third (ranking them). The values of personal dignity, material wealth, and doing what's right mainly indicate traditional and materialistic values, which emphasize material safety and stability of status and personality, while the values of innovation, tolerance, altruism, and ambition/combativeness lean toward the (post)modern values of universality and the importance of individuality. Observing the way they chose valuable traits, young people mainly emphasize personal dignity, doing the right thing, and tolerance, and put least emphasis on material wealth and innovation. The values they chose represent a mixture of traditional and postmodern values.

Figure 6.8: Desired personal traits (in %)



The value of personal dignity was chosen more often by young people whose parents have a primary school education (82.6%), as opposed to those whose parents have a secondary school education (63.4%), or university degree (63.8%)<sup>299</sup>. The second trait connected to personal dignity is the material status of the household, and those with more material wealth mostly value personal dignity more<sup>300</sup>. Reputation as a value is more important to young males than young females<sup>301</sup> and to younger groups – with age its significance declines<sup>302</sup>. As the analyses of trust and social distance showed, young females are less exclusive, and so young females (44.6%) more often chose tolerance than young males (29.8%) as a desired value<sup>303</sup>. On the other hand, young males (35.4%) significantly more often emphasize the importance of combativeness – a fighting spirit to achieve a goal – than young females (27.4%)<sup>304</sup>. The importance of the stated values, increase with the material status of the respondents<sup>305</sup>. Doing the right thing/acting in a correct manner are values that are somewhat more significant to those young people whose parents have a primary school education<sup>306</sup>. The last desired value – innovativeness, is connected to the place of residence<sup>307</sup>, the level of education of parents<sup>308</sup> and the level of education of the young person<sup>309</sup>, and is valued more among young people in urban areas, and increases with the growth of cultural capital of young people and their families.

Figure 6.9: The desirability of innovativeness as a personal trait (in %)



<sup>299</sup>  $\chi^2=10,32$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.094$ .

<sup>305</sup>  $\chi^2=16.90$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.121$ .

<sup>300</sup>  $\chi^2=10,74$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.96$ .

<sup>306</sup>  $\chi^2=13.77$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.109$ .

<sup>301</sup>  $\chi^2=8.19$ ,  $p<.05$ . Phi $=-.083$ .

<sup>307</sup>  $\chi^2=8.60$ ,  $p<.05$ . Phi $=.085$ .

<sup>302</sup>  $\chi^2=8.56$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.085$ .

<sup>308</sup>  $\chi^2=8.02$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.083$ .

<sup>303</sup>  $\chi^2=27.72$ ,  $p<.001$ . Phi $=.153$ .

<sup>309</sup>  $\chi^2=6.49$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.105$ .


<sup>304</sup>  $\chi^2=8.79$ ,  $p<.05$ . Phi $=-.086$ .

The values of altruism and material wealth are not systematically connected with any of the examined socio-demographic traits of young people.

The second way of testing the values of young people involved attitudes towards sex and sexuality. We attempted to establish to what degree young people are open about sexuality, represent women's rights (including the right to do with their body as they wish), and whether they consider tolerance towards others and the freedom to express ones personality (through sexuality as well) virtues of today's modern times and where there is no alternative. This was done by asking them about their attitudes to: 1) sexual abstinence, 2) abortion, and 3) homosexuality.

Regarding the first question: what they thought about abstinence among young people today, a third of consider it to be a certain kind of virtue for females and members of either sex. A fifth do not consider it to be a virtue, and even feel certain pressure from their environment, while almost half of the young people consider that abstinence is outdated and does not belong in the modern world.

**Figure 6.10: Attitudes toward sexual abstinence among young people (in %)**



In relation to the socio-demographic traits of young people<sup>310</sup>, the place they live in is one of the contexts where a difference can be seen in relation to this question. The least number of those who consider it to be a virtue are in Belgrade (19.1%), followed by Central Serbia (24.5%), and with the highest number in Vojvodina (27.8%), and the differences are statistically significant<sup>311</sup>. Differences do not appear in relation to the gender of the young person, but, as is expected, with age less and less young people consider sexual abstinence to be a virtue<sup>312</sup>. This attitude is not connected to any other socio-demographic characteristic of young people, but shows certain connections to personal values. Young people who consider abstinence a virtue, most often chose dignity<sup>313</sup> and doing the right thing as values<sup>314</sup>.

**Figure 6.11: Attitudes towards abortion (in %)**



The second attitude refers to the how much abortion is considered to be justified. A quarter of young people do not have a formed opinion regarding this subject, a quarter are explicitly against abortion, while almost half consider that abortion should be banned or possibly defined in which cases it would be justified to intervene. Young people from the countryside are somewhat more conservative regarding this issue than young people from the towns<sup>315</sup>, but the amount of young people still without a formed opinion is also higher in the countryside. The most liberal regarding abortion are those who live near the capitol city, followed by young people from Vojvodina, and finally Central Serbia<sup>316</sup>. While the younger groups, either still do not have a formed opinion, or think that abortion should be sanctioned, but as they grow up they have a clearer attitude toward this subject. At the same time, support for the view that abortion

<sup>310</sup> In order to more clearly recognize the differences related to this question, we created a new variable which only included two categories: 1. which shows virtue, and 2. express some kind of deviation from this kind of practice (the category, other, was excluded from the analysis).

<sup>311</sup>  $\chi^2=6.26$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.080$ ,

<sup>312</sup>  $\chi^2=11.28$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.108$ .

<sup>313</sup>  $\chi^2=4.97$ ,  $p<.05$ . Phi $=-.071$ .


<sup>314</sup>  $\chi^2=6.30$ ,  $p<.05$ . Phi $=-.081$ .

<sup>315</sup>  $\chi^2=23.31$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.142$ .

<sup>316</sup>  $\chi^2=44.04$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.138$ .

should be banned is declining<sup>317</sup>. It is interesting that in relation to the material status of the household, the highest amount of support for the right to have an abortion comes from young people who live in households from the middle echelon, while the highest number of advocates against abortion, live in wealthier households<sup>318</sup>. As expected, support for the ban of abortion declines with inherited cultural capital, so young people whose parents have a university degree twice as often support the right to abortion than young people whose parents only finished primary school<sup>319</sup>. The biggest differences occur in relation to the religious beliefs of young people. Young people who consider themselves religious are nearly three times as often against abortion and do not accept the opinion that abortion should remain legal in comparison to young people who do not consider themselves religious<sup>320</sup>.

Figure 6.12: Attitudes toward abortion according to the socio-demographic traits of young people (in %)



<sup>317</sup>  $\chi^2=17.23$ , p<.05. Cramer's V=.086.


<sup>318</sup>  $\chi^2=10.62$ , p<.05. Cramer's V=.068.

<sup>319</sup>  $\chi^2=42.15$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.136.

<sup>320</sup>  $\chi^2=63.92$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.238.

The third attitude, which on the one hand represents the approximation of the post-materialistic values of self-expression (Inglehart, Baker, 2000), and on the other the value of tolerance (Pavlović, 2009), indicates pronounced values that are not post-materialistic and/or tolerant of the young people in Serbia. Only a quarter of young people consider that people of a different sexual orientation (homosexuals, lesbians) are acceptable to some degree. A fifth have a neutral attitude, while 54% of young people have a negative attitude towards homosexuals and lesbians. The values of authoritarianism, patriarchy, and nationalism have significant support among the general population and are changing relatively slowly (Pešić, 2006). These results are consistent with the results of research regarding the significant presence of homophobia and conformism among secondary school students (Radoman, 2011).


**Figure 6.13: The attitude towards homosexuals and lesbians (in %)**



The attitude towards homosexuals significantly varies among young people. The opinion that homosexuals are acceptable is only dominant among those young people who do not consider themselves religious. In all other categories of young people the attitude that homosexuals are not acceptable prevails, but this difference is larger or smaller. Thus, urban areas prove somewhat less homophobic than rural areas. Females are more tolerant than males. It is interesting that with age the level of intolerance and homophobia decreases. In the absence of comparable studies from the past these results are open to two interpretations. The first involves the cohort effect, and the second, the characteristic changes to the life cycle of young people. The first case would imply significant social changes that retraditionalize young people, so that ideas of tolerance lose significance in the context of prolonged social transformation, and young people increasingly turn to authoritative and intolerant values. The second case is connected to changes that a young person goes through in their psychosocial development, in which the need for conformity and the development of identity in relation to distancing oneself from others would be more pronounced in younger people than older cohorts, who, passing through these phases enter new situations and roles (employee, parent) which require a more flexible relationship with others and consequently lead to a higher level of tolerance. The proximity to Belgrade indicates the significance of the capital city to the boundaries of tolerance, since the least amount of homophobia is present in the Belgrade region, and the highest in Central Serbia. Cultural capital of both parents and young people is also significantly connected to the level of homophobia. With a higher level of education the degree of non-acceptance declines and the degree of acceptance of sexual differences as a normal way of expressing ones personality increases. Young people differ from each other the most according to the level of education of their parents, indicating the importance of socialization within the family and the transgenerational inheritance of values. Education not only entails the virtue of tolerance, but also the expansion of personal social networks and getting to know different people. They both represent experiences that have the capacity to transform a young person. A trait that is also systematically connected to attitudes towards homosexuals is the ideological outlook of young people. Those on the left are the most tolerant, those in the centre somewhat less, and those who view themselves within the boundaries of nationalistic ideology are the least tolerant. Bearing in mind that the modern left largely rests on defending the rights of minorities (ethnical, national, sexual), this result implies a significant homology between ideas and values. This consistency is present to a higher degree on the right than on the left, which is still divided on the issue.

Certain personal values are connected to the level of tolerance towards sexual minorities. The values of tolerance and innovation, as well as highly individualized values, are connected to a lesser degree of homophobia, while the personal qualities of reputation and combativeness - the first referring to conformism, and the second to ambition (in which homosexuality can be perceived as a weakness) - are connected to a higher degree of homophobia.

Figure 6.14: The attitude towards homosexuals and lesbians according to the socio-demographic traits of young people (in %)



## Young people and religion


Serbia is one of the post-socialist countries which, on the global map of values (traditional vs. rational/secular), belongs to the group of countries with pronounced secular-rational values (Welzel, Inglehart, 2009). Research also shows that Serbia, in comparison to the other countries of former Yugoslavia, such as Slovenia, belongs to the group of countries, along with Macedonia and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which traditional values are somewhat more pronounced, indicating the importance of religion, family, and informal relationships (Kuhar, 2009). Bearing in mind that in the period of socialism a significant decline in the importance of religiosity occurred in a relatively short time span, since one ideology of collectivism of which religiosity was an essential component of national identity was replaced by another, after the fall of socialism religiosity became important again, however, not as a mechanism for finding answers to life's problems, but as a *differentia specifica* in relation to other ethnic groups (Vukomanović, 2008). As we will see in the continuation of this text, it is relatively easy to recognize the difference between religious identification and religiosity. While the former involves identification with a specific religious community as a member of a (ethnical, cultural) group, the latter involves beliefs and the practice of religious rituals, with primary focus on their theological importance.

The results of the research show that most young people in Serbia identify with religious terminology: among them 84.8% are Orthodox Christian, 4.7% Catholic, 2.2% Muslim, 1.2% Protestant, while 5% of young people declare themselves atheist and 1.1 agnostic.

Analysis of the correlation of the socio-demographic characteristics of young people and religious identification shows that among those who have a university degree (8.8%) or are still attending university (10.4%) there is a significantly larger number of nonreligious<sup>321</sup> young people than among those who have a secondary school education (3.9%) or those still attending secondary school (4.2%), and among those who have a primary school education there are no nonreligious people. The same connection exists in relation to the educational level of parents<sup>322</sup>, where there can be seen a decline in the number of young people who identify with one of the religions among those whose parents have a higher level of education. All young people whose parents only have a primary school education identify themselves as members of one of the religions. There are no significant differences in relation to gender and age, but a somewhat higher number of young people from towns (7.9%) do not identify as members of one of the religions<sup>323</sup>, as opposed to those from the countryside (3.3%).

During the research, respondents were offered statements that represent the basis of the teachings of all Judeo-Christian traditions: that God exists, that Heaven and Hell exist, that God created the world, and that the source of moral rules and obligations lies in God. Respondents could choose to believe, doubt, or not believe in each statement, or even to have no opinion about them. The largest number of young people believe that God exists, while the least number believe that God is the source of moral rules and obligations.

Figure 6.15: Beliefs in religious truths (in %)



It is interesting that among the young people who identified as members of certain religions, there is a significant number of those who doubt (15.5%), or do not believe at all (7.5%) that God exists. Also, among those who consider themselves atheists, every fourth is not completely sure (25.4% of them doubt), that God (does not) exists. The difference is even larger with regard to the belief in the existence of Heaven and Hell - 31.9% of religious people doubt that they exist, while 14% explicitly do not believe that they exist. The situation is similar regarding the theological belief of Creation – 26.3% of those who identify themselves as members of a certain religion doubt the truthfulness of the Book of Genesis, while an additional 13.9% do not believe in it. The situation is almost identical regarding the last statement, that God is the source of moral principles – only 49.2% of young people strictly believe in its authenticity. Another interesting difference appears among young people in relation to their self-positioning within the sphere of political ideology. There is a larger number of young people who consider themselves atheists and agnostics among those on the left of the political spectre, compared to those on the right.

<sup>321</sup>  $\chi^2=17.21$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.122.


<sup>322</sup>  $\chi^2=39.42$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.186.

<sup>323</sup>  $\chi^2=10.0$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.093.

Out of the social-demographic characteristics that are connected to religious belief, gender stands out most consistently, and so a significant number of young females more often believe that God exists<sup>324</sup> as well as that Heaven and Hell exist<sup>325</sup>, compared to young males. Another important feature that affects the degree of religious belief is the educational level of parents, which is significantly connected to the belief that God created the world<sup>326</sup>, and that God is the source of moral rules and obligations<sup>327</sup>, and therefore the higher the level of the parents' education, belief in the above statements declines.

When it comes to religious practices, the celebration of religious holidays is the most common practice among young people, while pilgrimage is the least widespread. Less than 5% of young people attend church regularly, while a quarter of them never do. A somewhat more widespread religious practice is praying, which is regularly or often practiced by a third of respondents, while confession is relatively rare. Bearing in mind the social significance of the celebration of religious holidays, it is not surprising that this is the most common religious practice among young people. With regard to the personal networks of acquaintances and family relationships, the celebration of the family patron saint is a very widespread and significant form of religious practice, while the celebration of Christmas, Easter, and other religious holidays (which are in some cases public holidays) is very significant on a national level and on a local community level.

**Figure 6.16: The religious practices of young people (in %)**



As with beliefs, there are also discrepancies here between how young people perceive themselves and what they do. Among young people who identify with one of the religions, 22% never attend church services, 23.1% never practice prayer, while 5% never celebrate religious holidays. The fact that 62.5% of nonreligious young people celebrate religious holidays is surprising at first glance. Bearing in mind their primary social and/or identificational character, these practices leave enough space for young people to participate in them and retain their alternative identity.

Young people from the countryside attend church services more often than young people from the towns<sup>328</sup>, while the higher the educational level of parents<sup>329</sup>, the frequency of this practice declines. The educational level of young people is not significantly connected to this practice, so the inherited cultural pattern stands out as a factor which could explain the level of religiosity. If we consider the pronounced social aspect of religiosity – the celebration of holidays, the only difference that appears among young people is whether they live in the countryside or in towns, so in rural areas this practise is significantly more present than in urban areas<sup>330</sup>.

In the narratives about religiosity, we have discovered three scenarios: 1) normative and practical religiosity, 2) the social aspect of religiosity, and 3) the belief in a higher power, but are disconnected from religious rituals.

The first scenario implies the belief in holy truths as they are revealed in scripture, as well as a regular practice of religious rituals.

I: I believe in God and I attend services. We have icons in our house. I respect the cult of icons. I find that normal. Other people from my environment do the same. It wouldn't be normal for me to stand out. And I was taught to believe in that, so it's normal to me.

(Female, secondary school student, 17, suburbs of Belgrade)

I: I love our faith. I go to church, at least once a week. I believe in God.

K: And what do you think, what connects you to that religion?

I: I was born into the religion. How can I explain it to you? It's a habit to love our faith, and it's innate, rooted in me. Maybe if I was born into another faith, maybe I would love that faith, but... I respect other faiths, but ours...

(Female, hairdresser and beautician, 22, unemployed, from a large town)

<sup>324</sup>  $\chi^2=10,58$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.095.

<sup>328</sup>  $\chi^2=17,38$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.122.

<sup>325</sup>  $\chi^2=13,19$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.106.

<sup>329</sup>  $\chi^2=35,19$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.123.

<sup>326</sup>  $\chi^2=23,38$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.101.

<sup>330</sup>  $\chi^2=25,24$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.147.

<sup>327</sup>  $\chi^2=18,96$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.091

It is interesting that in the stated narratives in which young people discussed regular religious activities, the use of possessive pronouns is pronounced. Religion in both scenarios appear as part of belonging to a social and religious group, and explicitly or implicitly implies conformism.

The third scenario shows that young people have some idea of religion, but have not completely accepted the views of the church, or have certain reservations towards its interpretation of the world and/or the way one should act.

**I: Would you describe yourself as a religious person?**

N: Well, I am. I mean, nothing too excessive.

**I: Why?**

I don't know. I can't say I don't believe in God. But then, I'm not the kind to visit churches and monasteries all the time. I'm somewhere in the middle.

(Female, 27, college, employed on contract, middle-sized town)

I: Well, I believe in God. I can't say I go to church every day and that nonsense, no one does that. There is some higher power. I'm not competent to talk about it.

(Male, 24, secondary school, unemployed, from a large town)

## Discussion

Although the participation of young people in volunteering activities is on a rather low level compared to western European countries, this kind of engagement is among the highest within the region (Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015: 25). The results of research position young people from Serbia at the same level as young people from Slovenia. We should bear in mind here that a year before the research was conducted Serbia was hit by a natural disaster which moved a high number of citizens to engage in rescue and protection activities. If their participation in this sudden and unexpected event is excluded, young people from Serbia are still relatively very active in comparison to their peers from the region. One of the reasons for this result could be a certain institutional support of youth organizations<sup>331</sup>. This unfortunate event has brought to light another important aspect. There is significant potential and the desire among young people to be socially useful and display solidarity. In this sense, the creation and strengthening of infrastructure, as well as more pronounced support for the initiatives young people propose, could create a space for better communication, cohesion, and trust. Young people from the countryside are an especially vulnerable category, given that in rural areas the least amount of infrastructural capacities for organizing social activities exists.

The trust of young people is very personalized, and significantly declines in relation to unfamiliar people. Family relationships are the only certain social relationships. Almost all young people have undivided confidence in their family members. It is interesting that young people have more trust in their friends than their relatives, indicating a continued weakening of wider kinship networks and kinship solidarity. As is the case in all other countries in the region, the least amount of trust is given to people with different political beliefs, different religious beliefs, as well as to religious leaders. Bearing in mind that generalised trust is relatively undeveloped and that young people are largely locked into their primary social networks, the question arises as to on what basis it is possible to develop the cohesiveness of young people, and whether there are significant divisions and caution in relationships.

The same conclusion can be made when attempting to recognize to whom young people express (the largest) social distance. Young people in Serbia do not significantly differ from their peers in the region. The least distance is expressed towards university students and pensioners, but the distance increases towards people of different nationalities, and culminates towards homosexuals. The distance is more prevalent toward Croats, Romas and asylum seekers from the Middle East. Besides ethnical distance, the level of distance is most prevalent towards people of different sexual orientations.

Young people in Serbia, like most young people in the region (except from Slovenia), identify themselves through their affiliation to a certain religion. In Serbia most are Orthodox Christian, while only every ninetieth person described themselves as atheist. Even though most young people see themselves as members of a certain religion, this does not necessarily mean that religious beliefs or practices are generally adopted. Most young people actually use religion as one of the symbols of identificational differences and the basis of affiliation to an (ethnical) social group.

<sup>331</sup> The ministry of youth and sport allocates certain resources each year for youth projects.

# SUBJECTIVE REALITY - PERCEPTION OF RISK, SATISFACTION AND ASPIRATIONS



## Introduction

The moment modern society was confronted with disasters caused by human actions, such as the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster in 1986, brought into question not only the concept of development but also its purpose by the fact that the survival of humanity was endangered, and it has become usual to describe the new age with the syntagm "risk society". Global risks – ecological, security, economical, and others gain specific meaning and weight in local social contexts. Like a source of anxiety, they can influence the perception of reality and the actions of people. In studies on young people, risk is most often viewed from the perspective of risk-taking behaviour, which was discussed in the chapter on lifestyles. The topic of this chapter is the structural risks which constitute the context of uncertainty that a young person has to face every day, whereby their perceptions in relation to their observations form their aspirations and action. It is our goal to analyse how young people in Serbia observe certain global social risks which also occur in their environment, as well as certain personal risks experienced through discrimination. We would then like to analyse how much young people are satisfied with different aspects of their lives and which factors influence their level of satisfaction, as well as the feeling of control over their own lives. We will then examine whether young people have aspirations towards migration, especially towards emigration, what their motives are, and how much an incentive risk factors are to taking this kind of action.

The increasingly frequent international comparative research of subjective well-being (SWB), as well as individual evaluations of the quality of life, which are based on the self-evaluation of satisfaction, happiness, and physical and mental health, that are considered to be its constituent elements (Pichler, 2006). As opposed to the more emotional or affective concept of happiness, it is considered that life satisfaction envelops more cognitive evaluations of the life of an individual, which "lead to general satisfaction or frustration with ones place in society" (World Happiness Report, 2012: 7). European Quality of Life Surveys (EQS) show that life satisfaction is higher among younger people than older people, which is especially pronounced among those younger than 25 who still live with their parents and whose situation regarding satisfaction has not significantly changed since 2007 (Eurofound, 2014b: 10). Some authors therefore conclude that young people have in a way become "resistant" to deteriorating economic and living conditions and that they have adapted to uncertainty (Pichler, 2006: 441). Recent studies, however, indicate that material and employment status, as well as activities, are connected to the well-being of young people (Eurofound, 2014b). Researchers in Slovenia have had the same results and found a strong correlation between the subjective well-being of a young person and the material well-being of their family (CEPYUS-FES, 2013: 189). Similarly, employment as a determinant of life satisfaction is controversial, since on the one hand it is claimed that the lack of employment is compensated for with other elements, such as personal and family life (Pichler, 2006), or is mediated by "sense of control over one's life" (Khattab, Fenton, 2009), while on the other hand findings show that unemployed and inactive young people, in comparison to others, give low estimates of their subjective well-being (Eurofound 2014b: 5). The estimates also differ as to whether young females are more or less, or for various reasons (Khattab, Fenton, 2009), satisfied with their lives than males. It has been undoubtedly determined that the quality of personal relationships and the intensity of social contacts contribute to the feeling of life satisfaction (Haller, Hadler, 2006). In the research conducted in Serbia in 2011, three aspects of life satisfaction were examined and it was determined that young people express the highest level of satisfaction with family life, followed by personal/intimate relationships, and the least with their occupations (Tomanović et al. 2012). These results are consistent with European results and are not surprising when the high level of unemployment and risky employment among young people in Serbia is taken into consideration. Research has shown that young females are on average more satisfied in all three aspects than young males (*Ibid*).


Like other forms of social mobility, migration represents a significant indicator of the openness of society, and, whether they are temporary or permanent, or migration to smaller or larger places – it depends on certain social assumptions which enable or prevent spatial mobility (Stanojević, 2012a). Research on the internal mobility of young people has shown that migration to larger cities is characteristic of those with a higher level of education and who come from better-off families, while migration to smaller places is characteristic of those with a lower level of education and a somewhat worse material position (Stanojević, 2012a: 73). Regarding international migration, relocating outside of Serbia, research from 2003 and 2011 has shown that there are discrepancies between the aspirations towards relocation, which are significant and increasing (Gredelj, 2004; Jarić, Živadinović, 2012), and taking concrete action to achieve those aspirations. The reasons for potential emigration are no longer dominantly political, like during the nineties, but are primarily economic and the consequence of a low life standard, high unemployment rates and the feeling of a lack of perspectives. The strongest predictors of the aspiration to emigrate are previous migrational experiences, unemployment, family status (if they are not married and parents), and for agency towards emigration, it is a higher level of education. (Mojić, Petrović, 2013).

# Analysis

## The perception of risk in society

The perception of young people in Serbia regarding which social problems are worrying (alarming) is primarily a reflection of the specific socio-economic state of society and the public discourse within it, as well as a reflection of the public discourse regarding global issues. Therefore, young people in Serbia, like their peers in Croatia (Ilišin *et al.* 2013: 119) and Bulgaria (Mitev, Kovacheva, 2014: 182), single out unemployment, increasing poverty, and job insecurity as the three most serious problems in society (Figure 7.1). These issues also directly affect the daily existence of most young people within their respective societies.

Figure 7.1: The perception of the significance of problems (risks) in Serbian society (the option extremely alarming in %)



However, what is surprising is that these problems are more often singled out as extremely alarming by those young people who according to their socio-economic status - material status of the household, inherited and gained cultural capital (their own education and the education of their parents) - shouldn't be affected by these issues more than those young people whose social status is lower<sup>332</sup>. Similar results have been found by researchers in Croatia (Ilišin *et al.* 2013: 122). This fact, accompanied by the fact that problems concerning the dysfunctionality of the social system, such as an inefficient struggle against corruption and failure to implement (or the incorrect and inconsistent application of) laws<sup>333</sup> and certain global problems, such as environmental pollution and the increase in chronic diseases<sup>334</sup> are more often singled out by young people with a higher economic and educational status, indicates that an explanation may be sought in their greater sensibility to general social issues.

## The experience of discrimination


Different forms and causes of discrimination which (young) people encounter to a greater or lesser extent in their everyday lives can be interpreted as personal risks which can lead to social exclusion. In order to detect these risks we asked young people through a survey whether and how much they have felt discriminated against due to some characteristic, such as: gender, material status, religion, ethnicity, educational level, belonging to a political party, place of origin or country of origin. Most – between two-thirds and four-fifths – young people stated that they have never experienced discrimination (Figure 7.2).

<sup>332</sup> For example, the fear of poverty is more often singled out by young people with a higher educational status ( $\chi^2=25.16$ ,  $p<.05$ , Cramer's  $V=.085$ ) and a higher material status ( $\chi^2=17.66$ ,  $p<.05$ , Cramer's  $V=.087$ ).

<sup>333</sup> Young people with a higher educational status ( $\chi^2=21.81$ ,  $p<.05$ , Cramer's  $V=.079$ ) and a higher material status ( $\chi^2=16.45$ ,  $p<.05$ , Cramer's  $V=.084$ ) are more often worried about the inconsistent application of the law.

<sup>334</sup> Young people with a higher level of education ( $\chi^2=24.40$ ,  $p<.05$ , Cramer's  $V=.084$ ) are more worried about climate change, and young people with a higher material status ( $\chi^2=16.56$ ,  $p<.05$ , Cramer's  $V=.085$ ) are more worried about the increase in chronic diseases.

Figure 7.2: Experiences of discrimination: Have you ever felt discriminated against due to one of the following? How often? (in %)



Our participants have to a certain extent felt discriminated against, most often due to their material status and gender, followed by their place of origin and other characteristics of social status and identity. Economic (social class) and gender discrimination also occur as the most commonly observed in other studies in the region (Ilišin *et al.* 2013: 97; CEPYUS-FES, 2014: 182; Mitev, Kovacheva, 2014: 66).

When we compare the mean values of the rate of discrimination (from 5 for very often to 1 for never), analysis of the characteristics of young people who have felt discriminated against to some degree shows significant and interesting results. The most often cited form of discrimination – based on material status – differentiates the level of exposure of young people to all other forms of discrimination (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1: The connection of material status with forms of discrimination

Discrimination based on	Material Status	M	SD	F
gender	lower	1.8199	1.07173	24.638**
	middle	1.4127	.78235	
	higher	1.3101	.70247	
material status	lower	1.9313	1.05283	42.718**
	middle	1.5058	.80698	
	higher	1.2815	.61947	
religion	lower	1.5280	.90872	17.517**
	middle	1.2327	.66692	
	higher	1.1768	.53396	
ethnicity	lower	1.5280	.82962	19.484**
	middle	1.2207	.60386	
	higher	1.1811	.55959	
educational level	lower	1.6770	1.05832	28.931**
	middle	1.2596	.66273	
	higher	1.2004	.57789	
belonging to a political party	lower	1.4600	.94571	7.672**
	middle	1.2545	.74737	
	higher	1.1886	.63899	
place of origin	lower	1.5776	.97237	10.895**
	middle	1.3148	.71303	
	higher	1.2685	.66208	
country of origin	lower	1.6625	1.08092	17.971**
	middle	1.3059	.74156	
	higher	1.2495	.65510	

Results of the one-way factor analysis of variance (Table 7.1) indicate that there are significant differences in the level of discrimination based on the material status of a young person according to all the researched characteristics. Post hoc Tahmane tests indicate that young people from households with the lowest material standards are significantly different from those in the middle and in the highest positions in that they feel a higher level of discrimination. This difference is precisely the greatest when it comes to discrimination based on material status, followed by the level of education and gender, then ethnicity, religion, country and place of origin, and the least when it comes to discrimination based on belonging to a political party.

Regarding gender discrimination, besides the above-mentioned connection to material status there are also connections to two more traits: gender and place of residence. Young females notice being discriminated against based on their gender<sup>335</sup> more often ( $M=1.54$ ,  $SD=0.88$ ) than young males ( $M=1.31$ ,  $SD=0.72$ ). This implies that gender discrimination is more often discrimination towards females who are to a smaller or greater extent more sensitized to perceiving discrimination. Young people from towns ( $M=1.49$ ,  $SD=0.86$ ) differ significantly from young people from the countryside ( $M=1.32$ ,  $SD=0.71$ ) with regard to the degree of gender discrimination that they have suffered<sup>336</sup>, which may indicate a greater perception of sensibility in young people from urban areas.

Discrimination based on the educational level of a young person is, besides material status, connected to gender: young males are more often ( $M=1.36$ ,  $SD=0.79$ ) vulnerable to this form of discrimination than young females ( $M=1.23$ ,  $SD=0.62$ )<sup>337</sup>, as well as to the educational level of parents: young people whose parents have finished primary or secondary school ( $M=1.34$ ,  $SD=0.76$ ) are perceived to be discriminated against more than those whose parents have finished university ( $M=1.21$ ,  $SD=0.61$ )<sup>338</sup>.

Discrimination based on religious beliefs is, besides material status, connected to gender: young males are more often vulnerable ( $M=1.30$ ,  $SD=0.74$ ) than young females ( $M=1.20$ ,  $SD=0.57$ )<sup>339</sup>, to place of residence: young people from towns are more vulnerable ( $M=1.29$ ,  $SD=0.72$ ) than young people from the countryside ( $M=1.19$ ,  $SD=0.54$ )<sup>340</sup>, as well as to the educational level of parents: young people whose parents have finished primary or secondary school ( $M=1.29$ ,  $SD=0.72$ ) are more vulnerable than those whose parents have finished university ( $M=1.16$ ,  $SD=0.59$ )<sup>341</sup>.

Ethnicity as a source of discrimination is connected to ethnical belonging: it is perceived more often by young people who are not Serbian<sup>342</sup>. This form of discrimination is connected to the educational level of parents: young people whose parents have finished primary or secondary school ( $M=1.29$ ,  $SD=0.68$ ) are more vulnerable to it than those whose parents have finished university ( $M=1.17$ ,  $SD=0.51$ )<sup>343</sup>.

It is interesting that the level of education of parents is statistically significantly connected to the level of perceived discrimination among young people because of membership of a political party: it is again more pronounced among those young people whose parents have finished primary or secondary school ( $M=1.30$ ,  $SD=0.82$ ) than those whose parents have finished university ( $M=1.15$ ,  $SD=0.52$ )<sup>344</sup>. This form of discrimination is more often perceived among young males ( $M=1.31$ ,  $SD=0.81$ ) than young females ( $M=1.19$ ,  $SD=0.64$ )<sup>345</sup>. It is interesting that discrimination is more often perceived by young males who declare themselves as members of the political right, followed by the left, and the least by those who declare themselves as members of the political centre<sup>346</sup>. A similar weak, but significant connection between belonging to the political right and perceiving discrimination due to political views was found by researchers in Slovenia (CEPYUS-FES, 2014: 183).

Like material status, the region a respondent lives in is statistically significantly connected to all forms of discrimination, except discrimination based on political beliefs (Table 7.2).

<sup>335</sup> Measured with a t test there is a significant difference ( $t=-4.76$ ,  $df=1132.22$ ,  $p<.001$ ).

<sup>336</sup> Measured with a t test there is a significant difference ( $t=-3.71$ ,  $df=1028.39$ ,  $p<.05$ ).

<sup>337</sup> Measured with a t test there is a significant difference ( $t=-3.13$ ,  $df=1104.22$ ,  $p<.05$ ).

<sup>338</sup> Measured with a t test there is a significant difference ( $t=3.09$ ,  $df=924.58$ ,  $p<.05$ ).

<sup>339</sup> Measured with a t test there is a significant difference ( $t=-2.51$ ,  $df=1098.17$ ,  $p<.001$ ).

<sup>340</sup> Measured with a t test there is a significant difference ( $t=-2.66$ ,  $df=1091.36$ ,  $p<.05$ ).

<sup>341</sup> Measured with a t test there is a significant difference ( $t=3.36$ ,  $df=995.1$ ,  $p<.05$ ).

<sup>342</sup>  $\chi^2=37.59$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.179.

<sup>343</sup> Measured with a t test there is a significant difference ( $t=3.45$ ,  $df=971.42$ ,  $p<.05$ ).

<sup>344</sup> Measured with a t test there is a significant difference ( $t=3.77$ ,  $df=1030.8$ ,  $p<.05$ ).

<sup>345</sup> Measured with a t test there is a significant difference ( $t=-2.73$ ,  $df=1072.19$ ,  $p<.05$ ).

<sup>346</sup>  $\chi^2=60.04$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.133.

**Table 7.2: Connection between region and the form of discrimination**

Discrimination based on	Region	M	SD	F
Gender	Belgrade region	1.4040	.76620	11.422**
	Vojvodina	1.6159	.90209	
	Central Serbia	1.3371	.77296	
Material status	Belgrade region	1.5212	.82931	5.866*
	Vojvodina	1.5690	.90581	
	Central Serbia	1.3861	.71356	
Religion	Belgrade region	1.1648	.54024	10.712**
	Vojvodina	1.3979	.81060	
	Central Serbia	1.2233	.63488	
Ethnicity	Belgrade region	1.1676	.49818	7.147*
	Vojvodina	1.3552	.71663	
	Central Serbia	1.2397	.65306	
Educational level	Belgrade region	1.2131	.54699	7.474*
	Vojvodina	1.4256	.88320	
	Central Serbia	1.2726	.70173	
Place of origin	Belgrade region	1.2131	.53114	10.261**
	Vojvodina	1.4759	.86918	
	Central Serbia	1.3277	.76354	
Country of origin	Belgrade region	1.2528	.65914	4.041*
	Vojvodina	1.4261	.80764	
	Central Serbia	1.3258	.81569	

Results of a one-way factor analysis of variance (Table 7.2) indicate that there are significant differences in the level of discrimination in three regions in Serbia according to all researched characteristics, except membership of a political party. Post hoc Tahmane tests indicate that the Vojvodina region stands out as the region with the highest level of perceived discrimination. We can assume that Vojvodina stands out due to two reasons: it is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious community – a region in which, besides real inequalities in social status, young people are more sensitive to differences and recognizing inequality and discrimination.

**Table 7.3: The correlation coefficients of different forms of discrimination**


Discrimination based on	Material status	Religious beliefs	Ethnicity	Level of education	Belonging to a political party	Place of origin	Country of origin
Gender	.521**	.434**	.421**	.410**	.324**	.398**	.437**
Material status	1	.477**	.398**	.475**	.345**	.411**	.385**
Religious beliefs		1	.610**	.451**	.501**	.516**	.506**
Ethnicity			1	.517**	.521**	.561**	.565**
Level of education				1	.550**	.499**	.450**
Belonging to a political party					1	.528**	.464**
Place of origin						1	.659**
Country of origin							1

Correlations (Table 7.3) show that all forms of discrimination are connected to a lower or greater degree, which indicates that social characteristics based on what young people are discriminated against (gender, class, religion, education, place, etc.) often go together. Combined with the previous findings that low material status (and the determinants connected to it – lower cultural capital within the family) is significantly connected with a higher degree of discrimination in all its forms, provides strong evidence regarding an unfavourable social status as the grounds for discrimination and the potential risk of marginalization and social exclusion. Previous research of young people in Serbia in 2011 showed a category of young people who are under great risk of social exclusion: these are people with no qualifications and secure employment, whose parents have a low level of education, who are financially dependent on parents and who still live with their parents, are concentrated in rural areas, are employed as physical labourers or have agricultural jobs, and have a low level of political and civic participation (Tomanović, Stanojević, 2012: 282, 283).

## Satisfaction with life

It was established in the aforementioned study that young people who are socially marginalized are much less satisfied with their personal, family, and professional life than others (*Ibid.* 283). In this study, we were interested in the extent to which young people are satisfied with their personal relationships, family life, and profession (what they do for a living). On a four-level scale ranging from "I am not satisfied at all" to "I am completely satisfied", young people expressed different levels of satisfaction in the previously mentioned domains of their lives (Figure 7.3).

**Figure 7.3: The level of satisfaction with personal relationships, family life, and profession (in %)**



The level of satisfaction young people expressed is somewhat higher than in the aforementioned study (Stanojević, Tomanović, Ljubičić, 2015), probably due to the younger age of the tested population. However, it was again highest in the domain of family relationships ( $M=3.36$ ,  $SD=.76$ ), followed by the domain of personal relationships ( $M=3.17$ ,  $SD=.81$ ), and the lowest in the professional domain (what the young person does for a living) ( $M=3.01$ ,  $SD=.90$ ).

**Table 7.4: The correlation coefficients of satisfaction**

Satisfaction:	Family life	Occupation
Personal/intimate relationships	.561**	.368**
Family life		.384**

Connections exist between satisfaction in all three domains, with the strongest being between satisfaction with personal relationships and satisfaction with family life, as was also the case in previous research (Stanojević, Tomanović, Ljubičić, 2015).

**K: To what degree are you satisfied with your life so far?**

I: Well, I'm satisfied, because everyone I care about is, thank God, alive and well. And as long as that remains the case I won't be able to say that I am not satisfied and happy. As long as that's the case I can't moan about life, far be it.

**K: And on a personal level, are you satisfied?**

I: Well, I am. I'm twenty years old, I'm trying to get through the best I can, and we'll see what happens.

(Female, unemployed, secondary school, 22, large town)

Young females are more satisfied than young males in the domain of personal relationships<sup>347</sup> and family life<sup>348</sup>, while there are no significant gender differences in the domain of professional life. The connection between certain domains, and especially between satisfaction with personal relationships and satisfaction with family life, is however more strongly felt among young males than young females (Table 7.5). This may indicate a certain separation of spheres in the lives of young females and a potential conflict of roles, while the everyday life domains are in harmony for young males (*Ibid.*).

**Table 7.5: The correlation coefficients of satisfaction according to gender**

Gender		Family life	Occupation
Male	Personal/intimate relationships	.619**	.456**
	Family life		.427**
Female	Personal/intimate relationships	.482**	.280**
	Family life		.342**

<sup>347</sup>  $\chi^2=9.41$ .  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.090$ ,

<sup>348</sup>  $\chi^2=18.93$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.125$ .

Satisfaction with personal relationships is, besides gender, also partially connected to social contacts: as expected, young people with a circle of friends<sup>349</sup>, are somewhat more satisfied. However, surprisingly no correlation was found with their satisfaction regarding their friends. This aspect of satisfaction with life is also connected to the education of the young person: those still gaining their education and those who have finished university are more satisfied with personal relationships than those who have lower educational levels, and especially those who have only finished primary school<sup>350</sup>. In addition, lower material status is connected to a lower level of satisfaction with personal relationships<sup>351</sup>. Similarly, young people with a primary school education<sup>352</sup> and those with a lower material status<sup>353</sup> stand out regarding their level of satisfaction with family life. A lower level of satisfaction with their occupation (what they do for a living) is expressed by older respondents<sup>354</sup>, who have a lower educational level<sup>355</sup> whose parents have a lower educational level<sup>356</sup> and who live in households with a lower material status<sup>357</sup>.

The connection of the most commonly observed form of discrimination – due to material status – is significantly connected with satisfaction in all three studied domains (Table 7.6).

**Table 7.6: The correlation coefficient of satisfaction with a feeling of discrimination due to material status**

Satisfaction:	Personal/intimate relationships	Family life	Occupation
Discrimination due to material status	-.190**	-.219**	-.172**

With the increase of discrimination due to material status comes a drop in the level of satisfaction a young person feels with their occupation, personal relationships, and family life.

## A sense of control over one's life

Following the idea that the sense of control over one's life is an important component that affects the level of satisfaction with life (Khattab, Fenton, 2009), time perspective and planning (Brannen, Nilsen 2002, 2007; Anderson *et al.* 2005), and indirectly the orientation towards agency, we have classified it as a separate dimension in our research through two indicators. We asked young people how often they achieve what they wanted and how often they feel they have control over their lives.

**Figure 7.4: The frequency of feeling control over one's life and achieving intentions (in %): How often do you feel:**



The frequencies with which young people feel they have control over their lives and that they can achieve what they want are significantly connected (the correlation coefficient is .510). Results (Figure 7.4) show a relatively high degree of control over life and achievement of wishes according to the statements of young people.

### A: Do you feel that you do have control over your life?

I: I have control. To a great extent, yes. I think that regarding everything I have done so far, I haven't had a single regret, but I think that I have done everything with a cool head and have thought about everything.

### A: And you have managed to carry out all of your plans?

I: Umm, with rational thinking, yes. Of course, those plans were realistic, we can't daydream about things, I mean, it's important that our wishes are in accord with our capabilities, I think we can achieve any goal. If it's carried out well.

(Male, student of economy, private university, 24, Belgrade)

<sup>349</sup>  $\chi^2=11.71$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.100,

<sup>354</sup>  $\chi^2=33.35$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.120,

<sup>350</sup>  $\chi^2=17.02$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.070,

<sup>355</sup>  $\chi^2=64.61$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.137.

<sup>351</sup>  $\chi^2=34.49$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.122.

<sup>356</sup>  $\chi^2=23.27$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.101.

<sup>352</sup>  $\chi^2=11.71$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.100,

<sup>357</sup>  $\chi^2=39.63$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.132.

<sup>353</sup>  $\chi^2=75.52$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.181.

The feeling a young person has that they can achieve what they desire is connected to their level of education – highly educated young people have that feeling more often than those with a primary school education<sup>358</sup>. Similarly, it's also connected with the level of education of their parents<sup>359</sup>. Young people with stable employment have the feeling that they can achieve what they want significantly more often than those who are unemployed<sup>360</sup>. The situation is similar with those who have more money at their disposal<sup>361</sup>. On the other hand, young people who live in households with a lower material status more often answered that they can never (3.8%), and rarely (23.1%) achieve what they desire<sup>362</sup>. The feeling of control over their own lives is also significantly connected to the educational level of a young person<sup>363</sup> and their parents<sup>364</sup>, their employment status<sup>365</sup> and the amount of money they have at their disposal<sup>366</sup>. We can conclude that the set of indicators of low and potentially risky social status lowers the level of feeling of agency – the level of control and success of the actions of those young people, which limits the potential for action and thus making their position even more vulnerable.

We were also interested in whether the feelings of success and control were connected to the aspects of life satisfaction. Analysis shows that relatively strong positive correlations exist between the feeling of achieving intentions and the feeling of control over life and satisfaction in all three domains (Table 7.7).

**Table 7.7: The correlation coefficient of satisfaction with the feeling of achievement and control**

Satisfaction:	Personal/intimate relationships	Family life	Occupation
Achieving intentions	.230**	.147**	.271**
Control over life	.255**	.185**	.196**

In the narrative form, the complicated relationship between different levels of satisfaction and the feeling of control can be seen in the following statement made by a young female:

I: With my family yes, I'm satisfied, but regarding work I'm not that satisfied. I would like to change something about work and something about my partner and our relationship. So, something about our life together.

**A: Do you feel you have control over your life?**

I: Sometimes I don't have control. Sometimes regarding work, sometimes regarding my boyfriend, and then I occasionally feel that I am losing myself at the time.

**A: Do you manage to achieve what you plan?**


I: Well, to an extent. I don't know. Again, I have a job, I have a boyfriend beside me. That's something, it's a kind of achievement. But on the other hand, I don't have a house, I don't have my own living space.

(Employed, college, 27, middle-sized town)

## Imagining the future and aspirations to migrate

Within the context of perceiving social and personal risks, life satisfaction, and the potential to take action, it is essential to examine how young people evaluate the future – of the society they live in, as well as their own surroundings. The first question was related to evaluating changes in the material status of people in Serbia in the next ten years. (Figure 7.5).

**Figure 7.5: The evaluation of changes in the material status of inhabitants of Serbia in the next 10 years (in %)**



<sup>358</sup>  $\chi^2=50.24$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.121.

<sup>359</sup>  $\chi^2=23.65$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.101.

<sup>360</sup>  $\chi^2=18.45$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.126.

<sup>361</sup>  $\chi^2=46.51$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.128.

<sup>362</sup>  $\chi^2=28.52$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.094.

<sup>363</sup>  $\chi^2=31.66$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.096.

<sup>364</sup>  $\chi^2=19.21$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.091.

<sup>365</sup>  $\chi^2=21.66$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.137.

<sup>366</sup>  $\chi^2=47.85$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.130,

Young people in Serbia balance between moderate optimism and sceptical realism, because almost half consider that the situation will become better, and a third that there will not be any changes. In this regard, they are grouped together with countries in the region such as Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Bulgaria, while young people in Romania are more sceptical, in Slovenia more pessimistic, and in Albania and Kosova extremely optimistic (Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015: 134). The conclusion of this comparative study is that the most optimistic young people who are most hopeful about the future come from the least developed region of southeastern Europe, while those who enjoy a relatively higher degree of material wealth are anxious that they could lose it (*Ibid.* 134). On a micro level the same conclusion cannot be drawn, because young people who live in households with a higher material standard express more optimism regarding the economic future of Serbia than those who live in situations of material deprivation<sup>367</sup>.


A similar situation is revealed in the estimation of their own future, where the difference in optimism/pessimism between materially affluent and deprived young people is even more pronounced (Figure 7.6).

**Figure 7.6: The estimation of their personal future according to the material status of the household (in %)**



A comparison shows large discrepancies in the estimations of a social and personal future (figure 7.7), which according to some authors is a result of the well-known fact that personal optimism is superior to social optimism (Ilišin *et al.* 2013: 123).

**Figure 7.7: The comparison of projections of personal and social future**



Spatial mobility, and especially inner spatial mobility, is not a significant characteristic of the Serbian population. Young people move from small towns to larger ones for education and they sometimes stay in them because there is a strong possibility of gaining employment and reaching a certain standard of life, while the opposite, migration to smaller towns is extremely rare. Somewhat more than a third (37.6%) of young people who expressed the desire to move to another place in Serbia state economic reasons as their main reason: the improvement of life standard (42.6%) and easier employment (25.7%), and much less are cultural reasons – better education (9.3%), and greater cultural diversity (7.4%).


The emigration of young people is a frequent topic of public discourse in Serbia, and is surrounded by a lot of mystification. A relatively large number of young people express a desire to move, but it doesn't result in action. And so, in the 2003 survey, 45.8% expressed a desire to emigrate, but only about 6% actually took concrete steps towards this goal, while 46.6% explicitly stated that they do not want to leave the country (Jarić, Živadinović, 2012).

<sup>367</sup>  $\chi^2=42.41$ .  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.136$ .

In this study from 2015, 30.8% of young people stated that they do not want to move abroad, a fifth (20.8%) that their desire to move is very strong, a fourth that their desire to move is of medium strength (23.9%), and a fourth that their desire to move is weak (23.8%). From a comparative perspective, the motivation of young people from Serbia to leave is significantly weaker than the motivation of young people from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Kosovo, somewhat weaker than young people from Macedonia, somewhat stronger than young people from Romania, and significantly stronger than young people from Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Croatia (Hurrelmann, Weichert, 2015 : 118).


A comparative analysis of surveys from 2011 and 2015<sup>368</sup> show that the number of young people who do not want to leave the country has increased slightly.

**Figure 7.8: The desire of young people to leave the country – compared with studies from 2015 and 2011 (in %)**



Of the total number of young people in the survey of 2015, only around a fifth took concrete action towards potential emigration, which is again somewhat less than in 2011 (Figure 7.9).

**Figure 7.9: Young people who took steps towards moving out of the country – compared studies from 2011 and 2015 (in %). I contacted:**



Similar as in previous studies, the motivation of young people for eventual emigration is almost completely economic (81.9%): the improvement of life standard (65.2%), easier employment (16.6%), better conditions for starting their own business (4.1%), and to a much lesser degree better education (4.3%), and greater cultural diversity (3.7%). The most desirable destinations for emigration are EU countries (22.8%), especially Germany (20.6%), Austria (8.7%), and Italy (6.9%). Regarding countries that are not in the EU, the most desirable are the USA (16%), Australia (6.6%), and Canada (5.4%).

The desire to leave is connected to the feeling of life satisfaction: it is stronger if satisfaction in any of the three domains is weaker (Table 7.8)

**Table 7.8: The correlation coefficient of satisfaction with the desire to leave the country**

Satisfaction:	Personal/intimate relationships	Family life	Occupation
The desire to leave the country	-.105**	-.069*	-.063*

Thus, a half of young people who are not satisfied with personal relationships, and over a third who are not satisfied with family life (38%) or their occupation (35%) – have a strong desire to leave, as opposed to a fifth of those who are completely satisfied in these respects.. There is also a weak, but statistically significant connection between the level of discrimination felt due to material status and the desire to emigrate ( $R = -.063$   $p < 0.05$ ).

<sup>368</sup> Given the different samples of the population included in the survey: in 2011, 18-35 years old, and in 2015, 15-29 years old, in the analysis samples were made uniform so as to relate to young people between 18 and 29 years old.

Although interpretations of motivation and actions related to emigration require further research and analysis, we could assume, on the basis of following longitudinal results of studies, that young people in Serbia, as time passes and despite prolonged economic and political crises as well as the lack of a clear perspective for the future, are becoming more and more realistic regarding their assessment that in order to move to another country they need to have certain resources besides a simple desire. This assumption is backed by results of the study from 2011 (Mojić, Petrović, 2013), as well as this study. Analysis of the characteristics of those young people who have taken some steps to prepare for potential emigration show differences in relation to those young people who have only expressed a desire to leave: they are predominantly from towns and mostly from the Belgrade region, more of them are between 20 and 24 years old, are not married or in cohabitation, come from families in which parents have a higher education, and they themselves have high personal income. We can conclude that young people who take action have more capital than those for whom emigration is only an aspiration.

Qualitative analysis also shows that the attitude towards moving and leaving the country is by no means straightforward and cannot be interpreted in a uniform manner. Unemployment is not enough of a motive to leave if the young person is satisfied with their personal and family relationships and the environment they live in.

**K: You never thought about leaving Nis?**

I: No, all my loved ones are here.

(Female, unemployed, secondary school, 22, large town)

Because life in an unfamiliar environment involves taking new risks:

**A: Have you thought about moving somewhere?**

I: Let's say Belgrade. Because of money maybe, and employment. Maybe it's a little easier than here. But I'm afraid of how I'll manage in Belgrade. Whether I'll have enough money, whether I'll be able to find my way around there.

(Female, employed, college, 27, middle-sized town)

Some young people possess the motivation, but are also aware of their lack of qualifications:

**K: And you asked around regarding a job abroad?**

I: I did, there are jobs, but they all require secondary school education.

(Male, unemployed, elementary school, 21, small town)

The motivation to move is higher if a young person has personal experience of living abroad:

I: I was in Germany last year for a month and I really saw that those people have great lives.

**K: What is the strongest impression?**

I: Their way of life. It's not like here, let's see, I'll come over for coffee, let's go over here, let's go over there, large celebrations, large crowds of people. People simply work for a certain amount of time, everyone is focused on their own life. ... They know how long they work, then they go home, sleep, rest, focus on their family, it's great, and then tomorrow they do it all again. Their families don't lack anything. I mean, most families. You can make a good living there, you can live well. And they really do their best. Children have a great education there. It's simply better.

(Female, secondary school student, 17, suburb of Belgrade)

Most of the interviewed young people do not consider permanent emigration, but temporary, which would provide them with new perspectives – something that is more possible now than a decade or two ago:

I: I thought about moving, but not permanently, maybe spending a part of my life in some Scandinavian country or maybe even America. For two reasons: the first is the language, the second is the scope of seeing something new, and the third is that I'm really interested in seeing how real capitalism works. I want to know the system, how it really works. I mean, we're a long way from all of that. ... Well, we now have those opportunities while we're studying and the "Work and travel program" and so on, but simply through, maybe through some acquaintances abroad to get some contacts and then go over...

(Male, student of economy, private university, 24, Belgrade)

A young male who has a temporary job abroad, plays football in Austria, also sees it as a temporary solution to ensure a certain level of standard at home:

I: I was planning on opening my own business at home, buying an apartment, getting married, two sons, one daughter. Since I play football in Austria I think that might all come true. In Serbia it isn't realistic at all with this kind of pay.

(Male, unemployed, secondary school, 24, large town)

Only one unemployed young male from a middle-sized town explicitly stated that he does not see a future in Serbia and that he is taking steps – through intensive contact with friends and family from Scandinavia and learning the language – to turn his desires into plans and achieve them.

On the other hand, a young male who worked as an intern in a family law office expressed satisfaction with the local environment in which he knows everybody, as well as with his life and the accomplishment of his plans:

**K: How satisfied are you with your life so far?**

I: Of course, I can't say I'm one-hundred percent satisfied, but I am fairly satisfied. I'm slowly achieving the goals I have set for myself and I think that I did fairly well regarding school. As a person I think I'm fairly average and normal, so, honestly, I'm satisfied.

With regard to moving abroad – I have never even thought about it, and would never go, but that's to do with the fact that I knew I had a good job secured here, so I don't judge people who leave the country, but I really never thought about it.

(Male, intern in law firm, 24, small town)

## Discussion

The complex combination of perceptions, hopes, and plans which we have sketched out here under the name of subjective reality, is of all the topics the one that resists rigorous scientific analysis and, fragmented as it is, deeper interpretation. It still provides a good portrayal of all the ambivalent positions of young people in Serbia – between conditions, opportunities, aspirations, plans and agency. On the one hand, it is influenced by strong structural constraints regarding planning and agency, inequality and perceived injustice (discrimination), dissatisfaction and fear of the unknown. On the other hand, there is the strong influence of fitting into the local community and identity, a feeling of belonging and the importance of close relationships – with the family, partner, friends, imagining and inventing the future, optimism, desires and plans.

The observed discrimination among young people in Serbia is not distinct, which proves that young people are less sensitized to observing it as it has been noted in other studies (Pichler, 2006; CEPYUS-FES, 2013). There was, however, a concentrated risk of discrimination among the materially underprivileged, which is a certain kind of indicator of their social exclusion. We have determined a high level of personal optimism, a characteristic of young people which has also been noted in other studies (Ilišin *et al.* 2013), but here also significant stratification differences are shown. Similarly, there is a relatively high level of potential to act – an impression of the achievement of desires and control over one's life, but again it is lower among young people with lower levels of capital.

Migration among young people occurs more often on the level of aspirations, creating a sense of freedom to act rather than being an actual part of their plans. Agency related to leaving is based on the realistic estimation of available resources – economic, cultural, and social capital, as well as the possibility to capitalize on them in the country of destination through social contacts and networks.



# YOUNG PEOPLE AND THE POLITICAL SPHERE

## Introduction

Political activism is viewed in at least two ways in social studies: 1) in a narrow sense which implies involvement in conventionally conceived politics through the activities of political parties, trade unions, voting in elections, etc., and 2) in a broader sense, which refers to different initiatives which may be formalized in the form of civic associations, for example, civil rights protection, environmental protection, improvement of the local community, culture, entertainment, etc., or informal activities ranging from signing petitions to various forms of protest to blocking and occupying public spaces. Research has identified that in the West there is a weakening trend in the traditional forms of involvement (Norris, 2003) usually expressed in the reduced participation of voters at elections and in the reduced membership of political parties, and at the same time there is a gradual strengthening of new forms of articulation of interests and values within the wider concept of the political field, whose carriers are younger, urban and educated people. These trends are still not prominent in post-socialist countries, but young people are gradually becoming more interested in new forms of politics (Vukelić, Stanojević, 2012).

If we were to try to provide an outline of young people within these two types of political involvement in Serbia, it would look like this. The involvement of young people in political parties, as with the general population, is specific. In comparison with other European countries, young people in Serbia are at the top regarding membership in a political party (about 12%). Another important feature is that the ratio of active and inactive members is again among the highest in Europe, which implies the desire to own a membership card, but to be inactive (Vukelić, Stanojević, 2012). The general perception of the role of political parties in society reveals one of the most important motivations for entering into political life. The research on young people aged 19 to 35 in 2011 showed that they consider that in order to advance in society it is much more important to have political connections and informal support networks rather than institutional channels. About two-thirds of the young people said that it was necessary to know the right people in order to advance, while about half emphasized political suitability (Mojić, 2012b). Bearing in mind that the unemployment rate of young people aged 15 to 29 is 37.6% (ARS, 2015) and that the state is a very significant employer, politics largely serves to redistribute public goods through party channels.

Another form of involvement is emerging, yet has not been developed enough. The same study shows that more than two-thirds of young people are not members of any organization. Very few young people participate in work in the civil sector (Jarić, Živadinović, 2012a). Young people mostly support those with initiatives that advocate solving problems that affect all, regardless of social status - ecological. Research reveals that to a large extent, young people do not represent or support far-right or left-wing ideologies. Bearing in mind that most of young people make very small use of politics, even though this part of the public sphere opens up possibilities for more flexible forms of articulating their interests, it can be concluded that they are largely excluded from this field.


The consequence of this is that the majority of young people use individualized and atomized strategies of "coping", relying on their own strengths and informal channels of support, which further leads to the strengthening of particular interest groups and cliques and the weakening of social solidarity and cohesion.

## Analysis

### Interest in politics

As the first data shows, young people in Serbia are not interested much in politics, national, regional, or global. There is a little more interest in domestic politics, and while 27.6% are interested to a certain extent, a third of them are completely uninterested in the political developments in the country. There is a lower level of interest in political developments outside of the country.

Figure 8.1: The level of interest in political life (in %)



The data also indicate that there is a very strong correlation in the level of (lack of) interest in politics at the aforementioned four levels, which implies that those who are interested, are interested in political life in general, while those who are uninterested, are not interested on any level. Bearing in mind that about half of the young people are a little interested or not interested at all, these findings raise the question of the possibilities of articulating young people's interests.

Table 8.1: The level of correlation of interest in politics at different levels

How interested are you:	in politics in the Balkans	for politics in Serbia	for EU politics
For world politics	.933**	.929**	.912**
For politics in the Balkans		.912**	.892**
For politics in Serbia			.977**

The factors that influence the degree of interest in domestic politics are the cultural capital of the family of origin (the parents' education), the level of education of the young person and gender.<sup>369</sup> With each subsequent level of the parents' education and the young person's education, the level of interest in politics in the country increases. To a somewhat greater extent, young males are more interested in the sphere of politics than females. Neither age nor where the person is from are significant determinants. The data suggests that those who have already finished university and students are mostly interested in politics. Twice as few secondary school students are interested in politics than students, indicating that the place where political views are largely formed is at university. This situation on the one hand, is problematic because the voice and interests of those who remain with a secondary school education and those who complete their education and have technical and blue-collar occupations, are rarely heard and their interests rarely articulated.

The reasons why young people are (un)interested in politics is expressed in the narratives which specify this field as immoral and insincere, and politicians as people who primarily work to line their own pockets.

Well, because it upsets me the way people are here and what they say. And then I just laugh at their stupidity. It's really like that. It's sad that we've come to this situation, but ...

(Male, student of economy, private university, 24, Belgrade)

Who does what and whether somebody needs to kill somebody doesn't interest me. Politics were once upon a time normal and now they're not.

(Female, 20, Belgrade, secondary school, working as a sales assistant in a Chinese store)

K: Why do people join a party in Serbia?

I: Well, only to line their own pockets.

K: Do you think that any ideologies exist that they agree about?

I: No, no, they don't care about Serbia and whether it progresses.

(Male, 24, secondary school, unemployed, large town)

Young people perceive politics as a field where it is possible to achieve instrumental objectives, and so they are sometimes a part of it. For example, one respondent pointed out that politics do not interest her at all, but that she became a member of a party because it was essential for her friend who works in the party to attract new members.

<sup>369</sup> Interest in domestic politics indicates statistical significance with respect to gender ( $\chi^2=23.99$ ,  $p<.001$ , Cramer's  $V=.144$ ), the education of respondents and the status of education ( $\chi^2=37.4$ ,  $p<.05$ , Cramer's  $V=.09$ ), the parents' education is expressed using the domination principle ( $\chi^2=20.7$ ,  $p<.05$ , Cramer's  $V=.095$ ).

I'm not interested in the party at all. I did her a favour. Because it meant something to somebody and it's OK.

**I: Did you try to make any contacts through the party?**


N: No, no. No, because I think they all make empty promises. Lots of people I know are in that same party. They all expected something and they all waited for a job, but nothing ever happened. Lots of people who worked and campaigned for them got nothing. Especially during the last election. They just make empty promises. I didn't want to get involved in all that.

(Female, employed, college, 27, middle-sized town)

## Is politics in?

In the study, the question was also asked as to what extent they considered it popular, meaning *in*, to be active in politics in the narrow (conventional) and broad sense (in civil initiatives). And while the period of the nineties was marked by student and civil protests in which young people played a significant role, the period after the democratic changes seems to be going in the direction where politics is decreasing in importance in the lives of young people. Only a quarter of young people considered it to be *in* to be included directly in conventional political life, and about a third thought it was good to be part of civil initiatives.


**Figure 8.2: The popularity of political and civil action, or whether it is in or out (in %)**



On average, there does not exist opposition to these two modes of political action among young people, since there is a correlation between the perceptions of their (un) popularity<sup>370</sup>. It is interesting that in their perception of political life as being popular, there are no sociological characteristics of young people which differentiate them. On the other hand, the two appear to be important in explaining the small differences in the popularity of civic initiatives: gender<sup>371</sup> and age<sup>372</sup>, and so young females and those who are younger more often favour this form of involvement.

Although young people often declare that they are not interested in politics, when asked about the sources they use to be informed about current political events, only 1.6% state that they do not follow politics. Therefore, the previous indicators can be interpreted to a greater extent as being their way of expressing distance in relation to the political sphere rather than a true lack of information and lack of interest. The most common source of information is the Internet, followed by television, daily newspapers, discussions and the least common, the radio. The fact that almost half of the young people use the Internet as the main medium through which they are informed about political events, indicates that there has been a generational change, which in itself means that traditional information channels have become secondary. New media brings with it new forms of political and civil participation, which takes place in a virtual sphere.

**Figure 8.3: The use of different media as sources of information on political developments (in %)**



<sup>370</sup> rho=.282. n=1174. p<.001.


<sup>371</sup> rho=-.067. n=1171. p<.05.

<sup>372</sup> rho=-.06. n=1171. p<.05.

## Political action – elections

A certain amount of resistance to the political sphere is seen in practice, and not just in attitudes to politics. In the survey, we asked young people which political party they would vote for if elections were held tomorrow. The answers included the options *I do not want to vote*, *I do not know yet* and *I do not want to answer*. Almost half of the young people who are eligible to vote resolutely refuse to participate even minimally - by voting in the elections - in political life. Every sixth young person is undecided, apropos at the moment cannot identify which political party best expresses their interests, and an interesting fact is that there is a relatively high number of young people who refuse to give an answer to this question.

Figure 8.4: If elections were held soon, do you know who you would vote for? (in %)



Two factors affect their attitude to elections. Firstly, to a greater extent than others, young people whose parents have a higher education refuse to vote (52.4% compared with those whose parents have a secondary 43.3% and primary school education, 37.3%<sup>373</sup>). Secondly, when considering young people who are not in the process of education, a significant number of those with a secondary education refuse to vote in elections (47.4% compared with those who finished university 35.9% and primary school 37.5%<sup>374</sup>). Young females are twice as undecided than young males with regard to who to vote for, but they are equal with regard to their decision not to vote in the next election.

When we asked young people<sup>375</sup> whether they have to date voted in an election, and how frequently, we get a different picture. About a third (31.1%) regularly voted in all elections, 18.9% at most, 26.8 several times, while 17.4% never, and an additional 6% who cannot remember whether they voted or not. The discrepancy in the responses to the previous two questions suggests two possible explanations. The first is that their attitude to the elections indicates an attitude towards the wider political and social situation that is perceived as problematic, and therefore their refusal to participate in the elections is a form of protest against politics. The actual practice can go the other way, so that when the time comes for elections, young people, who otherwise would have stated that they did not want to vote, vote for those who least deviate from what they see as a desirable social and political agenda. Research (CESID, 2012) indicates that the number of young people who abstain from voting in political elections does not differ greatly from the number of older citizens. The second is that the gradual routinization of political life, which is embodied at the very least in the minimum functioning of institutions, i.e. fair elections and the possibility of a change of government without major upheavals and protests, leads to a gradual loss of interest in politics for young people.

In interviews young people express different attitudes towards participation in elections and voting. Answers range from going to the polls regularly with clear reasons to not knowing why they should even go to the polls. However, young people often have reasons for (not) going to the polls and their choices often include judgement of the candidates' personality rather than the political programme they represent.

Yes, always, I believe that it is a citizen's obligation.

(Male, student of economy at a private university, 24, Belgrade)

I follow what they do and how they carry out their duties when they are in power and then I decide. I see whether they fulfil their promises.

(Male, unemployed, Elementary school, 21, small town)

K: Did you vote?

I: Yes, once, and I just circled something, I don't know what, I didn't even look... I did it so that those in my building would see me, I don't know, to see that I was alive.

(Male, unemployed, 21, secondary school, small town)

The candidate for whom I voted came to our village and did everything he said he would.

(Female, employed, 20, a village near Belgrade)

<sup>373</sup>  $\chi^2=13.9$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.085$ .


<sup>374</sup>  $\chi^2=12.6$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.05$ .

<sup>375</sup> In this analysis we singled out young people who had the right to vote in the previous parliamentary elections (2014), i.e. those who were older than 19 when we were carrying out the research.

Probably the best framework for explaining why young people have little interest in politics is, on the one hand, that they believe that they do not have a significant impact on what is happening within the political field, while on the other hand, that their interests are not adequately represented.

Young people feel that their vote does not have a big impact on politics in their environment, both on a national and local level. Only every fifth young person feels that their vote influences local politics and only one in every six national politics. The majority believe that their vote does not affect political life at all or significantly.

**Figure 8.5: How much of an impact do you think your vote has on how institutions function? (in %)**



Examining the factors that differentiate young people in their perception of the importance of their vote, the analysis shows that those who have completed university and those who are presently studying, and especially those who are doing their postgraduate studies, often believe that their vote has an impact on national and local politics. The analysis further indicates that the oldest cohort of young people (25-29 years old) think that their vote has more influence on politics in comparison with the younger cohorts. On the one hand, these findings may be indicators of the difference in the development of awareness of the importance of participating in elections, and on the other hand, the difference in the real influence that individuals have on political life.


In accordance with the above mentioned prevailing resistance to the sphere of politics, the following findings relate to young people's level of interest in politics. In this case, the majority of young people (44.6%), believe that their interests are represented very little or not at all. Only 3.3% of young people feel that their interests are represented in politics, while 23.2% to a certain extent. Nearly one in every ten (8.9%) have no opinion on this issue. It is interesting that young people, among themselves, do not differ on any one topic, so that no group of young people (according to education, gender, age, where they are from) feels that their interests are more or less articulated. This finding tells us that although some state measures target certain categories of young people (sometimes middle class and sometimes lower class), young people do not recognize (or do not feel the effects) that some of the measures are specific to the group to which they belong.

Although young people feel that their interests are not represented adequately and that their vote does not make a significant difference, it is interesting to note that the majority are still to some extent satisfied with the state of democracy in Serbia. Only 1% of young people are fully satisfied, an additional 46.1% are (moderately) satisfied, while 33.3% are dissatisfied and 13.2% very dissatisfied (an additional 6.4% have no opinion on the subject). The only factor that separates young people concerning their level of satisfaction with the state of democracy in the country is their educational status. Secondary school students and those who have only completed primary school show a somewhat higher level of satisfaction compared to those who have completed their education and students<sup>376</sup>.

## The ideological positioning of young people

To study the political ideology of young people we used the classic scale of one to ten where the respondents were asked to position themselves from the extreme left to the extreme right (across the political centre). The respondents were informed beforehand that the right means that they are closer to the ideology of nationalism, while the left that they are sympathetic to socialism, communism, and so on. Even when the question is asked in this way, almost a third of young people are not able to clearly distinguish their positions (Figure 8.6).

**Figure 8.6: The ideological position of young people on the scale of right-left (in %)**



<sup>376</sup>  $\chi^2=33.21$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.084.

Almost half of the young people elected positions around the centre (the sum of the options 4,5,6,7 is 49.3%), while the left (the sum of the options 1, 2, 3 is 10.8%) and right (the sum of the options 8,9, 10 is 9.7%) wing of the political spectrum are almost equal. These findings represent another in a series (Vukelić, Stanojević, 2012) which indicates that young people in Serbia are not extremely nationalistic, i.e. that extreme ideologies are not present to a high degree, and so among younger generations there is a revival/preservation of the idea of social and material equality.


The analysis shows that differences in the spectrum of political ideologies occur between young people in relation to their parents' education, so that young people whose parents have a university education are a little closer to the left spectrum<sup>377</sup>. Furthermore, young people who live in the city are closer to the left compared to those from the countryside<sup>378</sup>, while young females, on average, are less inclined to the right than their male peers<sup>379</sup>. One difference that occurs with young people in terms of their ideological position is their attitude to going to the polls. Young people who belong to the right in almost half of the cases (48.6%) know who they would vote for in the elections as opposed to 31.7% of young people who belong to the left and 20% who are in the centre of the political spectrum of ideologies. This also suggests the potential lack of political parties that would bring the ideas of the left and of civil society closer together, and promote them among younger voters. Bearing in mind the political changes in southern Europe after the start of the economic crisis, dissatisfaction with the austerity measures, new labour legislation and social policies has generated a significant potential towards the left.

## Generational (dis)continuity

The generational approach in domestic sociology, under the influence of critical approach, is to a large extent used as a framework for the explanation of political change (Kuljić, 2009; Tomanović *et al*, 2012). In the analysis of the political revolt in the nineties, the changes brought about by new generations, with their demands for the organisation of social relations, were recognised as one of the causes of the revolt against the authoritarian system (Milić, Čičkarić, 1998). However, besides the political generations at a social level, at a family level the genealogical generational relationships between parents and children also operates, where cultural, ideological and political views and interests may be the same or different. The level of agreement of the political opinions of young people with their parents was examined by the question to *what extent their political views and beliefs agree with that of their parents*. We also asked them the question *how often they discuss politics with their parents*, to verify the degree of exchange of views on political issues between generations.

Young people in most cases do not discuss political topics with their parents or do so very rarely. Only one in ten regularly talks about politics with their parents. When it comes to comparing the characteristics of young people and the exchange of views on political themes with parents, the analysis indicates that young people talk about politics more frequently<sup>380</sup> as they grow older. In relation to their level of education<sup>381</sup>, those who have finished primary school talk the least with their parents (59.3%), followed by those who are still attending secondary school (55.3%), those who have completed their education and have finished secondary school (50.8), and significantly fewer students (38.7%) and those with a university education (32.6%). Parents' education and how frequent politics are discussed are linked in the same way, the higher the education of parents, the more they discuss the political situation<sup>382</sup> in the home.

**Figure 8.7: How frequent young people discuss politics with their parents (in %)**



<sup>377</sup> Compared with young people whose parents have primary and secondary school education, grouped together, given the fairly small number of cases where parents have only a primary school education and who have positioned themselves on the ideological scale. Measured by t test there is a significant difference between young people according to their parents' education:  $t=2.77$ ,  $df=782$ ,  $p<.05$ .

<sup>378</sup> Measured by t test there is a significant difference between young people according to where they live:  $t=3.06$ ,  $df=496$ ,  $p<.05$ .

<sup>379</sup> Measured by t test there is a significant difference between young people according to gender:  $t=2.33$ ,  $df=785$ ,  $p<.05$ .


<sup>380</sup>  $\chi^2=60.8$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.113.

<sup>381</sup>  $\chi^2=13.9$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.085.

<sup>382</sup>  $\chi^2=26.6$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's V=.105.

Due to the fact that there is little discussion about politics, more than a quarter of young people do not know the political views of their parents. Only every tenth person has the same political view as their parents, in addition, about a third share similar beliefs, while 30% have very little nothing in common with their parents.

**Figure 8.8: To what extent do young people agree with the political views and beliefs of their parents? (in %)**



It is interesting that there are no significant differences in the degree of agreement of young people with their parents' political attitudes and ideological orientations (on the scale left-centre-right). This means that parents are equally (un)successful in transferring their political ideas to their children, regardless of the ideology and political beliefs that they themselves have. The educational status of young people is an important differentiating factor, given that the greatest degree of agreement between the generations can be seen with young people who have finished university and the lowest among those with a primary school education<sup>383</sup>. The same applies when we look at the education of parents. With the increase of the educational level of parents, the higher the rate of political agreement between generations<sup>384</sup>.

It is significant that the political socialization of children within the family influences their behaviour in the political field. With frequent conversations with parents about politics, their level of interest increases at all levels (national<sup>385</sup>, Balkan<sup>386</sup>, European<sup>387</sup> and world<sup>388</sup>). Also, those who frequently have conversations about politics with their parents often know who to vote for in the next election<sup>389</sup> and are more likely to have voted in the elections to date<sup>390</sup>. There is an identical situation with the degree of agreement in the attitudes between parents and children and the behaviour of young people in the political field. With increasing levels of agreement about political beliefs, the degree of interest in politics on all levels increases as well as the level of voter turnout, and there is a clearer commitment regarding who to vote for in the elections.<sup>391</sup> From the above it is possible to draw two conclusions. Non-inclusion in or the withdrawal of young people from the sphere of politics may be due to the attitude towards political issues within the family home. If parents do not talk about politics with their children, it is more likely that the children will not be very interested in these topics. On the other hand, if there is a chasm in political attitudes between children and parents, one of the strategies of the children may be to withdraw, abandoning this field and their own expression of views.

<sup>383</sup>  $\chi^2=20.8$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.078$ .

<sup>384</sup>  $\chi^2=24.6$ ,  $p<.05$ . Cramer's  $V=.102$ .

<sup>385</sup>  $\chi^2=642.46$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.374$

<sup>386</sup>  $\chi^2=576.07$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.354$

<sup>387</sup>  $\chi^2=533.88$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.341$

<sup>388</sup>  $\chi^2=559.34$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.346$

<sup>389</sup>  $\chi^2=95.284$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.166$ .


<sup>390</sup>  $\chi^2=111.17$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's  $V=.155$ .

<sup>391</sup> The differences were statistically significant at the level of interest for national ( $\chi^2=304.78$ ,  $p<.001$ , Cramer's  $V=.259$ ), Balkan ( $\chi^2=253.06$ ,  $p<.001$ , Cramer's  $V=.236$ ), European ( $\chi^2=243.51$ ,  $p<.001$ , Cramer's  $V=.232$ ) and world ( $\chi^2=228.45$ ,  $p<.001$ , Cramer's  $V=.224$ ) politics, as well as the attitude to voting ( $\chi^2=64.62$ ,  $p<.001$ , Cramer's  $V=.138$ ) and participation in voting to date ( $\chi^2=91.5$ ,  $p<.001$ , Cramer's  $V=.142$ ).

## Trust and politics

Trust in social institutions is the basis for how a political system functions. Trust, moreover, is one of the most important aspects regarding how recent modern societies function, where many stable norms have lost legitimacy and where the balance of how any (sub)system functions depends on mutual trust and confidence in the collective bodies (groups and institutions).

Figure 8.9: Level of trust in various institutions (a lot to some extent, in %)



Regarding the trust that is given to individual players, we recognize that young people trust most the institution of force and religious organizations, and the least, the institutions and organizations that are directly involved in the execution of power - parliament, government and political parties (Figure 8.9). It is interesting that young people show a higher degree of confidence in independent institutions (such as the protection of rights of citizens - ombudsman) and non-governmental organizations than in those who hold political power. Trust in a political party increases when switching from the left to the right ideological spectrum<sup>392</sup>, which implies that the offer on the political market is better for young people who are nationally oriented, and to a somewhat greater extent suit their needs. Trust in parties is connected with the voting behaviour of young people. Young people who believe more or less in parties more often go to the polls<sup>393</sup>. On the other hand, trust in the church decreases with the increase of the educational status of young people<sup>394</sup> and the education of their parents<sup>395</sup>. As expected, as one goes from the left to the right of the political spectrum, there is an increase in trust in the church as an institution, both in majority and minority ethnic groups, which symbolises the preservation of cultural heritage and national remembrance.

The low level of trust in institutions is based on a number of insights obtained from in-depth interviews. Firstly, young people recognize that the institutions do not work in favour of the common good and that public resources are often used to provide benefits for themselves and their family/friends.

A person becomes disappointed with time when they see what is happening in all spheres of society. There is not a lot of trust in any one institution, on the other hand, there is not one that I could say that I would have nothing to do with... I'm not disappointed with any institution in particular, but I am with the people in the institutions, but then again I shouldn't generalise because of one individual.

K: What happened?

I: Well, that's another thing. You hear about who did what and who accepted what... except for corruption it's about family and friend connections. You scratch my back, I'll scratch yours. And it's in all spheres of social life and institutions.

(Male, intern in a law firm, 24, small town)

<sup>392</sup>  $\chi^2=70.98$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.145.

<sup>393</sup>  $\chi^2=93.42$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.165.

<sup>394</sup>  $\chi^2=23.02$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.081.

<sup>395</sup>  $\chi^2=32.95$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.119.

I: The least in the parliament.

K: Why?

I: They work more for themselves and less for the people...They all work firstly for themselves and then for others.

(Female student, 22, middle-sized town)


I trust the police, I think that the system is good, but all the others, I don't know if they are good. I think that the judicial system is bad. I think that it's been badly done, but there are many problems everywhere, I think that in essence salaries are low, and they live on the edge, and they often accept money, for example a bribe and that's nothing, it's just the way it is when you go to the doctor's and in the judicial system and so on. The state is guilty. But do they do their job, I think they do as much as they are paid for, I think they do that much...I think that they are badly paid and that is the main problem. There is no motive.

(Male, a student of economy, private university, 24, Belgrade)

## Key Problems

In order to identify which problems are seen to be the most acute and those which the government of Serbia should resolve with all its strength, the respondents were asked to assess (on a scale of 1 - not important to 4 – very important) 16 problems facing the country. Figure 8.10 presents the most frequent response of the option *very important*.

Figure 8.10: On what the government should focus (very important, in %)?



The biggest problem to be addressed first is the problem of youth unemployment, followed by the economic underdevelopment of the country. Very high on this scale is the fight against crime and corruption, which young people perceive as the cause of economic underdevelopment, but they can be an indicator of life in a society that is interspersed with informal and clientelistic relationships and is far from meritocratic principles and the predictability of action.

It is interesting that young people put relatively low value on the support of Serbs in neighbouring countries, as well as improving relations with its neighbours, which indicates that young people focus primarily on their own unfavourable situation and feel that it has priority. Another very important finding is that respondents do not identify the country's preparation for EU membership as one of the priorities that the government should focus on. And while, after the changes in 2000, economic growth and stability were associated with the process of European integration, it seems that after the start of the economic crisis, which resulted in the introduction of austerity measures in many countries of southern Europe, confidence that getting closer to the EU would simultaneously solve economic problems was undermined.

The findings suggest an association between the socio-demographic characteristics of young people and the priorities that the government should focus on. When it comes to reducing unemployment, with age, the importance of this objective for young people<sup>396</sup> increases, given that slowly they are emerging from the educational process and are facing a very difficult situation in the labour market. It is surprising that with the increasing levels of education, there is a growing acceptance of the view that unemployment should be very significantly reduced<sup>397</sup>. As expected, more women<sup>398</sup>, in the older cohorts<sup>399</sup> believe that the government should focus on improving the problems of women in society, and acceptance of this goal increases with the level of education of young people<sup>400</sup>.

When it comes to the spiritual rebirth of people, this goal is somewhat more prevalent among young people whose parents have completed primary school<sup>401</sup> and as it is clearly connected with the political orientations of young people, so it is more common among those who are on the right on the ideological political spectrum<sup>402</sup>.

Young people in their narratives explain what they see as problems in the community in which they live and why they should be pursued. They all identify the biggest problem to be the underdevelopment of the labour market and the very small number of jobs available. In their interpretation they explain why there are no jobs. The explanations range from failed and suspicious privatization to the lack of transparency in politics, which is the main channel of social promotion and employment.

Unemployment and misery, poverty, that's it. Such a system was made that the inflow of foreign capital came too quickly, we let go some companies that were worth money for very little, steel plants, breweries, cement plants, companies that we could have kept were sold for very small sums of money

(Male, a student of economy, private university, 24, Belgrade)

I: Unemployment.

K: Why?

I: They promise jobs, employ a hundred or so and the rest are literally on the streets or work off the books.  
(Female, employed, secondary school, 20, Belgrade)

The first and foremost problem is our mentality. And all that corruption and stuff is normal here and everyone talks about how it has to be eradicated, but it's so widespread, and the problem is that people are convinced that it's normal and that's the way it should be. I strongly believe that our mentality is the main problem.

(Female student, 22, middle-sized town)

I: Ok, how do people that you know get jobs? What do you hear?

N: Mainly through connections...family or whatever... acquaintances, friends, family, aunt, uncle. They work in state-owned companies and they'll get me in and so...it's more or less political. And probably money.

I: What's the first thing that needs to be tackled in this country?

N: First of all the political side, then finance. There is no work, nothing...probably change some things or put some other people in some of those positions.

(Female, employed, college, 27, middle-sized town)

It is interesting that the young people recognize another significant problem in social and political life in Serbia – the lack of solidarity. In the next narrative, great social differences, lack of solidarity and compassion are recognized as the biggest social problems, but this kind of perspective has its discursive foundation in the only collectivistic discourse that is present – nationalism.

That we can't get along as humans. That a brother strikes against his brother. That there is many unemployed, so many hungry people, abandoned about whom no one takes care, that there are many rich and many poor and no middle ... Maybe we could accomplish something if we could unite. I know from my experience – when I can't manage something, I call my friend for help. So, I believe that if we would unite as people, maybe we could do something. ... Because, when there were the hardest times, when there were floods, we all got united.

(Female, unemployed, secondary school, big town)

<sup>396</sup>  $\chi^2=28.23$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.110.

<sup>397</sup>  $\chi^2=22.76$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.081.

<sup>398</sup>  $\chi^2=44.71$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.195.

<sup>399</sup>  $\chi^2=29.29$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.112.

<sup>400</sup>  $\chi^2=31.68$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.096.

<sup>401</sup>  $\chi^2=16.25$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.084.

<sup>402</sup>  $\chi^2=66.72$ ,  $p<.001$ . Cramer's V=.143.

## Young people and European integration

Serbia's path towards the EU began with the democratic changes in 2000. The most important events towards European integration were the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2008, its ratification in the EU Parliament in 2011, and the opening of negotiations for the accession of Serbia to the EU in 2014. For the majority of citizens, European integration represented a synonym for the introduction of democratic and stable institutions as well as the economic recovery of the country after the war and its isolation. Therefore, the introduction of new standards in political and social life meant reducing nepotism and corruption, a predictability of social life, improving material standards through the introduction of clear rules and fair competition on the market. A positive view of the EU is seen in survey research where a predominantly positive mood towards Serbia joining the European Union was detected. In the same survey there is a gradual declining trend in support for EU integration as the path becomes more certain but also more demanding, but it is also due to the austerity measures which EU officials insist on, and which have led to a significant decline in standards in the countries in southern Europe (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy) (CESID, 2012). Despite some economic recovery of the country after 2000 and the establishment of certain standards regarding how institutions<sup>403</sup> function, the analysis indicates that the citizens expected more fundamental and rapid changes. After the initial enthusiasm, this situation led to disappointment not only in politics, but also in the EU, as the requirements on the path for integration were perceived as blackmail.

In this part of the study, we describe the attitude of young people in terms of EU integration. We will try to offer answers to the question of what young people see as the benefits of accession, and what some of the disadvantages or dangers to their lives they see in this supranational political and economic community.

Figure 8.11: The rate of which young people aged 15-29 agree with the entry of Serbia into the EU (in %)



Research confirms the trend of weakening support for European integration. Only a third of young people are of the opinion that Serbia has a place within the EU, while three out of ten people believe that it has. This attitude is related to the gender of the respondents<sup>404</sup>, as females more frequently support Serbia's entry into the EU, as well as the education of the respondents<sup>405</sup>, where with the rise in level of education there is a rise in the level of support for EU integration. Analysis indicates that there is a somewhat higher level of support for this process by young people who are on the ideological spectrum in the centre, next are those to the left and the least, the right-winged young males and females<sup>406</sup>.

Figure 8.12: How much trust do you have in the EU? (in %)



There is a similar distribution of responses to the question regarding the issue of trust in EU institutions. The attitude of young people to European Union institutions was marked by scepticism. Two out of five young people have neither a positive nor a negative attitude towards it, a third have an attitude of distrust, while only every fifth young person has confidence in how European institutions function.


<sup>403</sup> One should bear in mind that the first fair parliamentary elections and non-violent change of government took place after the democratic changes.

<sup>404</sup>  $\chi^2=17.00$ , p<.05. Cramer's V=.120,

<sup>405</sup>  $\chi^2=41.88$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.095.

<sup>406</sup>  $\chi^2=91.36$ , p<.001. Cramer's V=.164.

Figure 8.13: Why and to what extent is entry into the EU welcomed? (in %)



The reasons why it is good that Serbia becomes part of the EU indicate that young people have fewer dilemmas when it comes to travelling, socializing and getting to know other people, as benefits of EU membership. After these key reasons as to why it would be good to continue with EU integration, they those associated with transition to the labour market. Better education and employment opportunities, whether at home or abroad, which consequently lead to higher living standards. Almost a third of young people expressed doubt that EU accession will lead to the democratization of society and two fifths believe that there will be a higher level of security in the country. It is interesting that young people do not differ greatly from each other when it comes to the benefits of joining the EU. The only socio-demographic characteristic that shows a clear connection with the acceptance of the benefits of EU integration is gender. Young females are somewhat less sceptical than young males. Another feature that shows a correlation with the level of scepticism is the ideological position of the young person. Young people who have positioned themselves in the centre of the political ideological spectrum mainly recognize the benefits of joining the EU, followed by young people on the left and then those on the right.

These results are supported by the narratives of our respondents. The three most common scenarios regarding the advantages of joining the EU are: 1) stability and the opportunity to stabilise institutions; 2) travel opportunities; and 3) the opportunity to work abroad.

It's not perfect, but the main advantage is that we'll feel more stable, we'll have more of a leg to stand on economically, we won't have that problem. We'll be full-fledged members, we'll have the support of the international institutions, the judicial system will finally be sorted out, all state systems will function like real systems as they should. We simply don't have stability and security, luckily we are geographically in Europe. We are a country that has elements of Columbia, Bolivia and ... I think it will bring us into line.

(Male, student of economy, private university, 24, Belgrade)

**K: What do you think are the advantages of the EU?**  
I: Well, a better life, for sure. We wouldn't need passports; it would be easier to travel.


(Male, unemployed, 21, elementary school, small town).

It would be great if the borders were open so that we could go and work abroad and not need visas and such like.

(Male, unemployed, secondary school, 20, small town)

The reasons why young people are often critical about joining the EU can be found in the dangers that they perceived as real if Serbia becomes part of this international community which involves uniform criteria for functioning, free markets of goods, capital and workforce. The greatest risks for joining are seen in the economic dependence of a small and underdeveloped country, which by joining a community like this would further lose the means to carry out independent economic policies, and therefore the standards of developed countries would additionally reduce its performance of competitiveness.

Figure 8.14: The dangers facing Serbia if it becomes a part of the EU (in %)



Even though less young people believe that this process will threaten the national identity and sovereignty of the country, almost half of them consider the above mentioned to be of serious threat. Acceptance of the view that the process of joining threatens national identity declines with their level of education<sup>407</sup>, the education level of their parents<sup>408</sup> and it is less present among young females than young males<sup>409</sup>. Those young people who position themselves to the right on the political ideological spectrum, more often agree with this attitude than the others<sup>410</sup>.

Young people in the narratives reveal what they consider the shortcomings of the EU to be. Respondents believe that the EU presents a specific barrier whereby the situation cannot be worse than it is now, but through the experiences seen in the neighbouring countries, they do not expect too much progress in Serbia. Also, a big problem is the standards which are universal for all EU countries, and while on the one hand, Serbia does not live up to these standards economically, on the other, they do not correspond to its cultural heritage. Young people believe that EU membership should be based on the possibility of bilateral agreements and compromises.

The shortcomings are that in principle nothing would change. A concrete example is Croatia which joined the EU two, three years ago and nothing is better, maybe it's even worse, and so I'm not a great fan of the European Union. I know that it wouldn't be better, but if we don't go in that direction, it will be much worse.

(Male, intern in a law firm, 24, small town)

Ok, the European Union give us certain standards, but then again they ask for things that we aren't ready to do, for example, they raise prices in Serbia...Then they impose their own standards that we have to accept, for instance, gay marriage and that's meant to be normal for us. But you can't because people aren't used to that, we need a lot more time for people to accept it. There needs to be more people who will talk to us about the European Union and tell us that what they offer is good, and to listen to the things that aren't so good, to find some kind of compromise with the European Union. But, you can't. It doesn't function like that. It's too quick, they do things too quickly, too quickly they impose some standards that we can't fulfil.

(Female, secondary school student, 17, a suburb of Belgrade)

The disadvantage of the European Union is that it's very easy for a few big countries to eat up countries in transition, including us, but then again, it's our problem that this transition is not being implemented the way it should be. The problem is that the European Union, with an influx of capital would eat up the small and medium enterprises that are not competitive enough to fight on the market and the problem is that they would exploit a large amount of our natural and human resources.

(Male, student of economics, private university, 24, Belgrade)


<sup>407</sup>  $\chi^2=25.59$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.086.

<sup>408</sup>  $\chi^2=17.43$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.087.

<sup>409</sup>  $\chi^2=17.99$ . p<.05. Cramer's V=.124.

<sup>410</sup>  $\chi^2=106.82$ . p<.001. Cramer's V=.178.

**Figure 8.15: To what extent the following circumstances make Serbia's entry into the EU more difficult? (in %)**



The respondents were offered eight factors which might affect the speed of Serbia's entry into the EU (Chart 8.15). More than half of the young people agree that each of them is a significant factor that slows the process. They believe that the most significant is the insufficient economic development of the country, the criteria that the country must meet is too strict and a lack of democracy.

## Discussion

The data indicates a significant degree of disinterest of young people in political affairs, or perhaps to be more precise, resistance towards this sphere. Resistance occurs mainly due to the perception of a lack of clear rules of the game, a lack of respect for the law in this field, a lack of predictability of the political system, as well as a sense that ordinary people cannot sufficiently influence political decisions and processes. The political field is largely seen as a place where personal interests are realized and less a place of debate of public interest. There is a dominating feeling that things are done without their knowledge and approval and this leads to (self)exclusion. That is why politics is to a very small extent popular among young people. However, this does not mean that young people are not at some level informed about events around them and key political processes.

Interest and involvement in politics is more common among young males and those who are more educated. The form of political socialization within the family is another important factor which determines to what extent a young person is involved in political events. In those families where there are discussions between parents and children about politics, young people's level of interest in political issues is higher. Another important factor is agreement of political attitudes between generations: where parents and children have the same view regarding matters and processes - there is a higher degree of interest of the children to be involved in the political field.

This research confirms that the majority of young people belong to the centre or they cannot position themselves at all on the political ideological scale. One in ten young people belong to the left or to the right. In the present political space, young people on the left and in the centre have, according to their own testimony, fewer options for whom to vote than those who belong to the right. Those on the left side of the political spectrum and those in the centre, to a greater extent, support the idea of EU integration than those on the right.

Trust in institutions and organisations is relatively low. The majority of young people put their trust in only two institutions - the police and the church, while there is a higher degree of distrust than trust in all the others. The lowest level of confidence is in the political parties because, as the narratives reveal, they are more for personal promotion and personal gain rather than for defending public interest.

For the country to be somewhat better, the Government of the Republic of Serbia should primarily focus on solving economic problems, economic growth and reducing unemployment, and in order to make that happen it is necessary to consistently eradicate crime and corruption at all levels of society, because they hinder the ability to progress. Young people to a lesser extent consider that EU integration is the primary objective of the government, expressing the opinion that perhaps the problems within society must be addressed independently of EU requirements, and that some EU demands can wait until the key problems in society are solved.

In accordance with the latter, there are specific reservations of young people to join the EU. Although the majority believe that Serbia's entry into the EU will most likely bring economic progress, more employment and travel opportunities, the majority also agree that there is the potential risk of further weakening the already underdeveloped economy and an even greater economic and political dependence. The experience of neighbouring countries that have become part of the EU during the last decade, shatter any illusions about the EU as a project in which all economic and social problems are solved. However, most young people believe that there is no alternative to the EU.

# CONCLUSIONS

In the first part of the concluding remarks we will put forward the main conclusions according to the thematic areas of research, which will serve as a basis for their synthesis and problematization in the second part.

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## **The socio-economic status and material conditions of young people's lives**

The socio-economic position of young people is significantly conditioned by the resources of the family of origin. The economic, social and cultural capital of the parents determines the possibilities for acquiring an education and thus determines the educational status of the young person, and indirectly their position in the labour market, or in other words, their working and professional status. It is connected with where they live: young people from urban areas have a better socio-economic status, as do young people from the Belgrade region due to greater opportunities on the labour market.

Young people in Serbia are generally characterized by their high financial dependence and resource dependency on their family, which gives rise to significant differences in their financial position. In this regard, it is important to point out and warn that there is a part of young people who are exposed to extreme material deprivation, who do not have the means to feed themselves properly. The housing dependence of young people with regard to the resources of the family of origin is also great, whether they, by pragmatic choice, live in the family household, or with the help of family resources have their own living space.

All of these findings point to a homology of socio-economic status and its transgenerational reproduction, with a consequential reduction of the possibilities for social mobility and the closure of the social structure in Serbia.

## **Education**

Young people expressed good motivation for education, but also worded their dissatisfaction critically with regard to the quality of education in Serbia.

The study results point to the persistence of a high level of reproduction of educational inequality, which was evident from analyses through the indicators, such as the educational chances odds, inequality in the accumulation of cultural capital, inequality in access to government support measures and education assistance, and inequality in educational aspirations and plans. Connected with this is the finding regarding the social stratification of accessibility to higher education, which is the channel to social promotion, but also guarantees easier and better employability. The latter is not even secured with the vocational education system, which this research has shown to be inadequate in terms of ensuring professional qualifications and practical skills, that are in accord with the needs of the labour market. The education system in Serbia is inflexible in that it does not allow the possibility of combining education with work, parenting, etc., which hinders the individualisation of the life trajectories of young people and makes them largely financially dependent on their parents.

## **Work and employment**

The results indicate that due to high unemployment and temporary (often illegal) employment, the working status of young people in Serbia is very risky. The flexibilisation expressed through the number of working hours per week, which is great, indicates a high level of exploitation of labour. Another form of the flexibility of work, working outside of your qualifications, is also highly present among young people in Serbia, and in our opinion is also risky because it is most often associated with deprofessionalisation, working under ones education qualifications and knowledge.

Analysis of the results indicate a high level of irregularities in the labour market and corruption of the system, whether through the perceived (political) clientelism or the practise of nepotism, and the activation of social contacts as channels of employment.

## **Young people and their family**

The results of our analysis indicate a low level of patriarchy and authoritarianism in intergenerational relationships in the families of young people in Serbia, which are also indicators of the process of their detraditionalization and individualisation. The family remains a sphere of great importance for the young person, especially as a source of emotional - psychological support.

On the other hand, there remains a high level of traditionalism in the understanding and practice of family life: the meaning and importance of marriage and children and a low acceptance of alternative forms of family life other than marriage with children. The gender differences that have emerged in the results of the analysis do not express more or less detraditionalization among young females and males, but on the contrary, they express their acceptance of the different content of certain traditional gender family roles and identities. In understanding and practice, traditional forms of family life are less pronounced among young people with high cultural capital, which makes them heralds of the process of detraditionalization in this domain.

Deferred transition to parenthood takes place in an unfavourable structured environment, with informal networks as the primary source of support and help.

### **Leisure time and lifestyles**

The leisure activities of young people in Serbia are similar to those of their peers in the region: the most common is listening to music, followed by socialising, watching movies, sports activities, while reading is not widespread and is the least common. The analysis indicates that stratification differences are significant regarding some leisure activities: young people whose parents have a higher education frequently read and socialise, and socializing is associated with disposable income and the financial situation of the household, which suggests that social capital partly is mediated by economic capital. The survey also showed that with adulthood and new work and family roles, leisure time becomes private and passive.

Young people usually combine the Internet and television as mediums for following various content, but they differ by stratification and age. Analysis shows that there is no digital divide among the population of young people in Serbia, but there are stratification differences in its use, so the possible uses of the Internet become a source of their differentiation.

Based on what they see as modern and as outdated, young people can be divided into four groups: those who are traditional and aspire to family life and stability, the hedonist group who want to live free of the "shackles" of social norms and want to look good, the group of young people who are career-minded and want to achieve financial independence through education and employment and the activists. These patterns are also linked to personal and family cultural capital, and the most systematic pattern is the distinct wish of the young person to achieve independence through education, which becomes more prevalent as the level of education of the parents and the young person increases.

Data indicates that the frequency of young people in Serbia practicing risky behaviour does not differ significantly from young people in the region. However, the analysis confirms a significant connection between all forms of risky behaviour, which leads to the danger of young people entering a vicious circle from which it is difficult to get out and to realize their potential.

### **Trust, attitudes and beliefs**

The analysis shows that with young people in Serbia there is the potential for solidarity and civic engagement, which was expressed in practice during the threat of flooding last year. On the other hand, given that confidence is personalized and that there is a high degree of mistrust of political figures and institutions, the role of young people as participants in strengthening social cohesion is also limited. That the potential for initiating cohesiveness is low is indicated by a social distance towards ethnic groups and there is also a specific marked distance towards homosexuals (homophobia). The need to connect with the local and familiar is also expressed in strong religious identification associated with ethnic identity, which, however, is not accompanied by the adoption of religious dogmas and practices.

### **Subjective reality - perception of risk, satisfaction and aspirations**

The perception of discrimination among young people in Serbia is not too high, but it is concentrated among those in a low material position, who are therefore at risk of social exclusion. Young people express a high level of personal optimism and a relatively high level of satisfaction, as well as having a sense of control over their lives. And these aspects are mediated by the level of capital that a young person has or does not have, which indicates the stratification diversification of the subjective reality of young people similar to their objective reality.

The decision to emigrate is more at the level of aspiration and more pronounced among young people who are objectively in a riskier position. Agency to emigrate is, on the other hand, linked to the possession of economic, cultural and social capital, which provides a realistic basis for life abroad.

## Young people and the political field

The stated disinterest of young people in Serbia in political affairs can be interpreted as a form of resistance due to the perceived corruption of the system. Young people do not have a sense of their own impact on political issues nor on solving problems related to their own existence, but they tend to be informed through the media and through discussions within their own social circles. The level of interest in the sphere of political and civic participation is part of political socialization, and our research has shown its connection with the political culture within families in Serbia. Young people expressed very low trust in institutions, particularly in political parties, and hence their withdrawal from and even resistance to the field of politics. In relation to the ongoing process of the integration of Serbia into the EU, young people expressed reservations as well as a pragmatic understanding of the necessity to join.



If we synthesize the previous findings into three levels of results related to the three levels of reality: objective - structural; normative and subjective - relational - behavioural, we may problematise the question: how much of a discrepancy is there in the lives of young people, and how much harmony?

Analysis shows that the objective position is associated with various structural features that are for the majority of young people more restrictive than enabling. The research findings have documented several such indicators, among which are: a lack of good education, unemployment, risky employment, financial dependence, housing dependence, exclusion from decision-making and alienation from the political sphere. Based on the above, the objective situation of young people in Serbia can be characterized as structurally risky.

There are a number of examples where there is agreement between the objective reality and its subjective perception, as can be seen, for example, in the significant dissatisfaction with the quality of education, the perception of corruption within the system and the channels of social promotion, the distrust in social and especially state institutions. In general, however, the characteristics of subjective reality: the perception of a future, satisfaction with life, a sense of control and achievement – among the majority of young people do not correspond to the characteristics of objective reality, that is to say that they are much more positive than the reflection of the objective reality would be. The findings regarding good intergenerational and primary social relations and practices (parents and independent decision-making; friends and socializing), and their importance for young people in Serbia (e.g. personalized trust), leads us to assume that they represent a bridging mechanism between the structural risk of objective reality and its subjective experience, where one level of reality compensates the other (Pichler, 2006). Because of such a compensatory mechanism, the subjective reality of young people in Serbia is apparently not burdened with frustration. We say apparently, because the dark side of this concretization of the importance of the domain of personal and private primary social capital is the development of a local identity (našijenstvo; Spasić, 2013), based on ethnic identity, which is reflected particularly through the high importance of religious affiliation, as well as a fear of what is different, foreign and unknown – members of other ethnic groups or those who have different sexual orientation and their rejection. It can also be assumed that from this concretization of the importance of the family stems the traditionalism of young people regarding their understanding of family life.

Up to now, the conclusions have related to the majority of young respondents and they have been treated as a homogeneous social group. Our analysis, however, shows that the social category of young people in Serbia is diversified on the basis of more socio-demographic characteristics. In the following table we show the influence of the stratification characteristics, such as the education of young people and their parents, the material status of the household head, the type of area and gender, in different dimensions of the three considered levels of reality.

Structural level	Education	Material Position	Employment	Financial autonomy	Housing situation
Education of young people		✓	✓	✓	
Education of parents	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Material position	✓		✓	✓	✓
Village/town	✓	✓			✓
Area		✓	✓		
Gender				✓	✓

Subjective level	Perception of future	Perception of discrimination	Satisfaction	Achievements/control over their live	Leisure time
Education of young people		✓	✓	✓	✓
Education of parents		✓	✓	✓	✓
Material position	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Village/town		✓			✓
Area		✓			
Gender		✓	✓		✓

Normative level	Trust	Social distance	Confessional identity	Ideology	Values
Education of young people	✓	✓	✓		✓
Education of parents	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Material position					✓
Village/town	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Area					✓
Gender		✓		✓	✓

This summary shows that obviously there are many differences between young people in Serbia according to the stratification characteristics, especially social ones: cultural capital – their education and their parents' education, and economic capital – the material position of the household. It has been shown in the analysis that a lack of or a low level of these types of capital, primarily within the family, in a familistic institutional environment generates unequal opportunities for access to key resources: education and employment. In this way, the differences turn into social inequalities that are reproduced from generation to generation.

# ANNEX

## YOUNG PEOPLE IN SERBIA 2015

Hello, my name is ..... I'm the interviewer researching the everyday life and attitudes of young people in Serbia and it is being conducted by SeConS from Belgrade with the support of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

You were selected randomly and for us it is very important that you answer our questions openly and honestly. The survey is voluntary and anonymous - your answers will be treated as confidential, which means that no one will know your name, or have access to your responses, which will be subsequently analysed statistically. Your data (name, phone number) will only be used by interviewers to control the interview.

Do you have any questions? Can we start? Thank you.

Region	%
Belgrade Region	30.0
Vojvodina	24.9
Central Serbia	45.1

Type of settlement	%
Village	36.7
City	63.3

### A1. How often do you do the following activities?

		Often (1)	Sometimes (2)	Never (3)	(Don't know) (88)
A1.1	Listen to music	86.2	13.3	0.5	0.0
A1.2	Go out with friends	67.7	31	1	0.3
A1.3	Read books / newspapers	32.9	52.5	14.3	0.2
A1.4	Do sports activities	39.4	45.6	14.6	0.3
A1.5	Watch TV	46.4	44.1	9.6	0.0
A1.6	Watch movies	47.4	48.9	3.6	0.2
A1.7	Write, paint, play an instrument	11.6	26.2	61.5	0.8
A2.8	Playing video games	15.9	36.5	47.3	0.3

### A3. How often do you watch the following programs (on TV, computer, smart phone, tablet, etc.)?

		Weekly					
		1	2	3	4	5	88
A3.1.	Serbian folk music shows	15	14.1	17.7	21.7	31	0.5
A3.2.	Serbian pop music shows	13.4	19.7	23.8	23	19.7	0.4
A3.3.	Foreign music shows	20.1	18.6	21.4	21.2	18.4	0.3
A3.4.	Serbian films	8.8	17.1	25.3	37.5	10.7	0.7
A3.5.	Foreign films with social topics	8.4	20.8	31.9	29	9.2	0.8
A3.6.	Foreign action films	8.1	20.7	30.1	29.2	11.2	0.7
A3.7.	Foreign thrillers	8.6	22.4	29.1	27	12.2	0.7
A3.8.	History/scientific documentaries	5.7	14.5	22.1	30.8	26.2	0.7
A3.9.	TV series	24.9	21.4	17.7	17.4	18.1	0.4
A3.10.	News	25.6	21.6	16.3	17.2	18.7	0.6
A3.11.	Political debates	4.4	6.1	13	21	54.7	0.9
A3.12.	Sports / sports talk shows	23	19.8	16.1	18.6	22	0.6
A3.13	Religious programmes	2.1	3.2	7.9	17.4	68.5	0.8
A3.14.	Reality shows	8.3	11.5	10.6	16	53.3	0.4
A3.15.	Game shows and quizzes	21	24.9	19.8	17	16.8	0.4

A4. Do you have access to the Internet (any through WiFi, smart phone, ADSL, cable, dialup, on a public PC)?

Yes	99.3
No	0.7

A5. How many hours on average you spend daily on the Internet? M = 3.62, SD = 2.67 88. (Do not know) 2.8%

A6. What do you usually use the Internet for? (INTERVIEWER: Several answers are possible, record all those listed by the respondent)

		Yes	No
1.	For work	35.1	64.9
2.	For information/reading news online	56.7	43.3
3.	To search for information (about school, work, travel, entertainment, etc.).	56.7	43.3
4.	To communicate with relatives and friends using chat sites and Skype	57.6	42.4
5.	For E-mail	44.5	55.5
6.	To view video clips / to listen to music	63.7	36.3
7.	For downloading movies / books	33.7	66.3
8.	To play video games	23.5	76.5
9.	To play virtual games	2.8	97.2
10.	To purchase online / bill payment / reservations	18.3	81.7
11.	To access social networks like Facebook / Myspace / Hi5 / G+	82.2	17.8
12.	For online-banking	4.9	95.1
13.	For something else. What?	0.5	99.5
88.	(Don't know)	0.0	100.0

A7. How much money on average did you spend on your personal needs last month?

Not counting living expenses such as accommodation, food, bills, etc.?

Up to 25 EUR	20.8
26-50 EUR	22.1
51-100 EUR	21.1
101 + EUR	18.2
77. (Refused to answer)	4.4
88. (Don't know)	13.3
Total	100.0

A8. In your opinion, which of the following is modern ('in') or outdated ("out")?

[INTERVIEWER: At no time read the option "Do not know"]

		'In' 1	In between 2	'Out' 3	(Don't know) 88
A8.1.	To be faithful (to a partner, friends, employer)	70.6	20.8	8.4	0.2
A8.2.	To take responsibility	74.7	18.5	6.4	0.3
A8.3.	To be independent	78.9	17	3.7	0.3
A8.4.	To graduate from university	73.5	20	6.2	0.3
A8.5.	To have a career	83.7	13.7	2.6	0.1
A8.6.	To be active in politics	25.3	32.3	42.2	0.3
A8.7.	To participate in civil actions / initiatives	31.1	44.7	23.7	0.6
A8.8.	To get married	52.2	34.2	13.3	0.3
A8.9.	To look good	82.6	16	1.3	0.1
A8.10.	To wear branded clothes	42.7	38.5	18.6	0.3
A8.11.	To eat healthily	66.6	28	5.3	0
A8.12.	To use marijuana	13.4	22.8	63.2	0.6
A8.13.	To play sports	76.7	20.6	2.6	0.1

B1. Please imagine a scale with the values of 1 to 10, where 1 represents the people in which you have the least trust, and 10 the people in which you have the most trust. Where on the scale would you put the following people?  
 [INTERVIEWER: At no time read the option "Do not know"]

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	(Don't know)
B1.1.	Your colleagues from work, school, university	3.2	3.1	6.4	6.4	17	11	15.6	15.8	9.9	9.8	1.8
B1.2.	Church leaders	17.6	8.7	8.1	6.6	14.3	7.6	8.5	9.3	6.3	10.2	2.8
B1.3.	Your friends	0.9	0.5	0.8	0.9	3	3.6	7.7	16.7	28.5	37.1	0.2
B1.4.	People with different political preferences	11.6	5.7	8.2	7.1	24.9	9.6	9.3	8	4.7	2	9
B1.5.	Your cousins	1.4	1.4	2.2	2.8	8.6	7.4	12.2	19.9	22	21.7	0.4
B1.6.	Your neighbours	6	6.1	7.2	7.5	13	10.6	15.4	14.3	10.1	8.5	1.3
B1.7.	People of different religions	5.5	3.4	5.4	6.6	22.7	13.2	12.1	10.6	8.1	5.5	6.8
B1.8.	The members of your family	0.8	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.6	0.3	1	3.5	11.5	81.1	0.3

B2. How would you feel if any of the following people or families moved into your neighbourhood?

		Very good	Good	Uninterested	Bad	Very bad	(Don't know)
		1	2	3	4	5	88
B2.1.	A Roma Family	6.2	24.8	48.3	14.7	4.1	1.9
B2.2.	A homosexual couple	3.8	13.4	41.4	18.2	21.7	1.5
B2.3.	A group of students	22.8	43	29.4	3.1	1	0.8
B2.4.	A couple of pensioners	10	33.6	48.8	4.8	1.9	0.8
B2.5.	A family from Kosovo (IDPs)	9.5	33	48.5	5.1	2.4	1.5
B2.6.	A Chinese Family	6.7	26.2	52.8	8.4	4.1	1.9
B2.7.	A Russian family	12.7	31.9	48.5	4	1.2	1.7
B2.8.	The family of asylum seekers	4.8	17.8	50.6	15	9.7	2
B2.9.	A family of USA citizens	10.2	27.5	46.5	8.6	5.4	1.8
B2.10.	A Croatian family	5.9	23.8	49.5	9.3	9.7	1.8

B3. Have you ever felt discriminated against because of some of the following things? How often?

		Quite often	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	(Don't know)
		1	2	3	4	5	88
B3.1.	Your gender (male / female)	0.70	2.10	10.20	13.00	73.60	0.50
B3.2.	Your material situation (poor / rich)	0.50	2.10	10.30	18.10	68.70	0.30
B3.3.	Your religion (Orthodox, Catholic, Islamic, etc.).	0.60	1.70	3.90	9.50	84.00	0.30
B3.4.	Your ethnic origins	0.30	1.60	4.20	10.30	83.30	0.30
B3.5.	Your level of education	0.80	1.50	5.40	10.30	81.60	0.30
B3.6.	Your membership to a political party	1.00	2.00	4.50	4.70	82.70	5.10
B3.7.	Your place of origin, the place where you come from	0.30	2.50	6.60	10.90	79.40	0.30
B3.8.	Your country of origin	0.80	2.40	6.40	9.30	80.60	0.40

B4. Which from the list do you appreciate the most?

[INTERVIEWER: show card no. 1 - Select the most important (1), the second most important (2) and third (3)]

		Rank I	Rank II	Rank III
1.	Personal dignity	53.5	15.5	8.6
2.	A social reputation - status	6.6	11.1	6.7
3.	Altruism (helping others)	6.1	12.8	11.3
4.	Material wealth	3.7	6.2	8.2
5.	Tolerance (acceptance and respect of differences)	7.5	21.3	15.9
6.	A fighting spirit (to achieve goals)	8.2	13.9	15.5
7.	Accuracy (correctness)	11.8	14.6	23.8
8.	Innovation, spiritual creativity (creation and the acceptance of new ideas)	2.6	4.5	9.7
88.	(Don't know)	0.1	0.1	0.1

B5. Have you participated in voluntary work during the last 12 months, performed unpaid volunteer work?

1.	Yes	39.1
2.	No (INT. question B8)	60.5
	(Don't know)	0.4

B6. In which of the following activities did you voluntarily do during the last 12 months?

(INT: more than one answer is possible)

		YES	NO
1.	Work in the local community	5.8	94.2
2.	Helping people with special needs/the elderly	8.3	91.7
3.	Organising sporting events	8.3	91.7
4.	Organising cultural events (festivals, concerts, etc.).	7.3	92.7
5.	Helping peers to learn	7.9	92.1
6.	Religious Activities	1.5	98.5
7.	Work in the business sector (of a company)	2.3	97.7
8.	Activities in NGOs	2.8	97.2
9.	Helping in flooded areas	19.1	80.9
10.	Other _____	2.4	97.6
88.	(Don't know)	0.9	99.1

B7. What is your most important reason for volunteering?

1.	The desire for activity / social engagement	21.0
2.	The desire to solve a specific problem	19.2
3.	A commitment to help others	49.4
4.	Family tradition	1.0
5.	Religious beliefs	0.4
6.	The desire to gain new friends	2.3
7.	The desire to apply expertise into practice	3.3
8.	The desire to meet potential future employers	0.4
9.	For social and political beliefs	0.2
10.	Other	1.7
88.	(Don't know)	1.0

B8. What is your religion, denomination?

1.	Orthodox	84.9
2.	Catholic	4.7
3.	Islam	2.2
4.	I am an atheist	5.0
5.	Other. What? (INT: write down the answer) _____	1.2
6.	I am an agnostic	1.1
88.	(Don't know)	0.9

B9. Do you believe, doubt or not believe in following?

		I believe	I doubt	I don't believe	(Don't know)
		1	2	3	88
1.	That God exists	69.6	16.7	11.3	2.5
2.	Both heaven and hell exist	46.8	30.9	18.5	3.7
3.	That God created the world	52.3	25.7	18.5	3.4
4.	That God is the source of moral prescriptions and duties.	43.1	29	22.8	5.1

B10. How often do you:

		Regularly	Often	Sometimes	Never	(Don't know)
		1	2	3	4	88
1.	Attend service (liturgy)	4.4	13.2	55.4	26.8	0.1
2.	Pray	12	21.2	38.8	27.8	0.3
3.	Go to confession	1.1	3.7	17.8	77	0.3
4.	Celebrate religious holidays	68.2	15.1	9.6	7	0.1
5.	Go on a pilgrimage	1.1	2.4	13.8	81.5	1.1

**C1. Who do you live with?**

1.	Alone	5.7
2.	With both parents	59.9
3.	With your mother	
4.	With your father	3.0
5.	With a partner or spouse	11.6
6.	With friends/cousins	4.0
7.	With somebody else	4.4
88.	(Don't know)	0.1

**C2. (If the respondent lives with their parents)**

Which of the following statements best describes your situation?

1.	I live with my parents because it's the simplest way for our family	58.5
2.	I'd live alone if I had the money	34.4
3.	I would like to live alone, but my parents do not agree	2.6
4.	Other. What? _____	3.5
88.	(Don't know)	1.0

**C3. Which of the following statements best describe your relationship with your parents?**

1.	We get on very well	42.5
2.	We get on well, although we sometimes have very different opinions	50.2
3.	Generally we do not get on well, we have arguments quite often	5.4
4.	We have a very conflicting relationship	0.8
5.	My parents are not alive	0.9
88.	(Don't know)	0.3

**C5. Which member of your family has the biggest impact on your important decisions?**

1.	Father	30.3
2.	Mother	42.8
3.	Brother	3.3
4.	Sister	4.9
5.	Grandfather	1.7
6.	Grandmother	1.1
7.	Somebody else	8.5
8.	Father and mother	2.0
9.	Nobody	1.2
88.	(Don't know)	4.2

**C6. How do you make important decisions?**

1.	My parents decide about everything	1.6
2.	My parents and I make decisions together	48.0
3.	I make decisions independently	50.1
	(Don't know)	0.3

**C7. Where do you see yourself in the future?**

1.	With a family, married	83.4
2.	With a partner- out of wedlock	10.5
3.	Alone- without partner and children	3.7
88.	(Don't know)	2.4

**C6.1. How often do you experience the following?**

		Never	Rarely	Often	Always	(Don't know)
		1	2	3	4	88
C6.1.1.	To get what you are looking for	1.2	15.4	66.1	17.3	0.1
C6.2.2.	To feel that you have control over your life	1.6	15.1	58.1	24.7	0.5

**C8. In your opinion, what is the main advantage of marriage in relation to a common-law partnership? A common-law partnership is cohabitation of unmarried partners.**

1.	Marriage provides greater responsibility among partners	28.0
2.	Marriage provides greater responsibility toward children	24.7
3.	Financial security is greater in marriage	7.3
4.	In Serbia, marriage is respected more than a common law partnership	9.7
5.	Other	4.5
6.	There are no benefits, no difference	22.2
88.	(Don't know)	3.5

**C9. In your opinion, what is the main advantage of a common-law partnership in relation to marriage?**

1.	Greater independence of partners	14.6
2.	It leaves more space for partners to devote to their careers	10.1
3.	There is less possibility of conflict between partners	8.6
4.	It is easier for partners to resolve disagreements	7.1
5.	It is easier for partners to end the relationship	17.3
6.	Other	5.8
7.	There are no benefits, no difference	29.8
88.	(Don't know)	6.8

C10. In your opinion, what is the best age for females to get married? M=26.5, SD=2.77

C11. In your opinion, what is the best age for males to get married? M=28.9, SD=3.2

C12. How many children would you like to have? M=2.44, SD=.94

C13. In your opinion, for a choice of a future partner / spouse, how important- essential are the following factors?

		Very important	Important	Neither	Unimportant	Completely unimportant	(Don't know)
		1	2	3	4	5	88
C13.1.	Religious affiliation	14.7	24.1	23.7	20.1	16.9	0.4
C13.2.	Financial status / position	5.5	25.1	34.7	22.3	12.2	0.2
C13.3.	Approval by family	10.7	35.5	26	16.6	11	0.2
C13.4.	Virginity	4.7	9	15.5	32	38.5	0.3
C13.5.	Personality	54.6	35.7	4.4	3.8	1.5	0.1
C13.6.	Appearance	21.2	47.9	22.2	6.6	2.1	0.1
C13.7.	Level of education	20.9	42.8	26	7.5	2.7	0.1
C13.8.	Common interests	41.8	43.4	10.8	2.7	1.2	0.1
C13.9.	Place of origin	4	14	26.3	30.8	24.7	0.2
C13.10.	Nationality	10.4	21.4	22.6	24.9	20.5	0.3

C14. Let's move on to another topic. Do you have a circle of friends / acquaintances with whom you often go out?

1.	Yes	96.3
2.	No	3.6
88.	(Don't know)	0.1

C15. In general, how satisfied are you with your friends?

Very Satisfied	Satisfied	Neither	Unsatisfied	Very Unsatisfied	(Don't know)
1	2	3	4	5	88
42.1	50.6	5.0	0.9	1.3	0.1

D1. Would you like to move to some other place in Serbia?

1.	Yes	96.3
2.	No	3.6
88.	(Don't know)	0.1

D2. What is the MAIN REASON for which you would move/relocate?

1.	To improve living standards	42.6
2.	Greater cultural diversity	7.4
3.	A better education	9.3
4.	Easier to find employment	25.7
5.	Better conditions for starting my own business	3.0
6.	To be closer to the people who are important to me	4.4
7.	To run away from conflicts where I live	1.6
8.	8. Other. What? _____	2.5
88.	(Don't know)	3.5

D3. How strong is your desire to move out of the country?

1.	Very strong	20.8
2.	Up to a certain level	23.9
3.	Not that strong	23.8
4.	Don't want to move	30.8
88.	(Don't know)	0.7

**D4. Where would you prefer to move to?**  
(one answer)

1.	Australia	6.6
2.	Italy	6.9
3.	Germany	20.6
4.	Austria	8.7
5.	Other EU countries	22.8
6.	USA	16.0
7.	Canada	5.4
8.	Other _____	10.5
88.	(Don't know)	2.5

**D5. What is the MAIN REASON for which you would move out of Serbia?**

1.	To improve living standards	65.2
2.	Greater cultural diversity	3.7
3.	A better education	4.3
4.	Easier employment	16.6
5.	Better conditions for starting my own business	4.1
6.	To be closer to the people who are important to me	1.8
7.	To run away from conflicts in Serbia	1.0
8.	Other. What? _____	2.3
88.	(Don't know)	1.0

**D5.A. What do you do in order to leave the country? (INT: Multiple responses possible)**

		YES	NO
1.	I contacted the embassy	1.2	98.8
2.	I contacted potential employers	3.4	96.6
3.	I contacted relevant universities	1.9	98.1
4.	I contacted friends / relatives to help me to move	13.8	86.2
5.	Nothing	70.1	29.9
6.	Something else. What? _____	2.1	97.9
88.	(Don't know)	1.5	98.5

**D6. How do you see your situation in 10 years' time?**

1.	Better than now	80.5
2.	The same as now	13.7
3.	Worse than now	3.7
88.	(Don't know)	2.1

**E1. At what stage of education are you at the moment?**

1.	At secondary school	27.0
2.	At university	27.0
3.	Post-graduate studies (master, doctorate)	5.8
4.	Not in the process of education (INT. go to question E9)	40.1
88.	(Don't know)	0.1

**E2. Would you say that you go to school (university):**

1.	Very gladly	18.0
2.	Gladly	28.4
3.	Sometimes gladly, Sometimes not	43.4
4.	Reluctantly	7.9
5.	Very reluctantly	1.8
88.	(Don't know)	0.4

**E3. In your opinion, what is everyday life at school / university like?**

1.	Very difficult and stressful	5.3
2.	Difficult and stressful	13.7
3.	Difficult and stressful up to a certain level	49.5
4.	Easy and not particularly stressful	26.9
5.	Very easy and free of stress	4.0
88.	(Don't know)	0.7

**E5. Do you think that the marks/exams can be "purchased" in your school / at your university?  
To pay for a higher grade / to pass an exam?**

1.	Yes, often	17.1
2.	Yes, sometimes	25.2
3.	Yes, but very rarely	26.8
4.	No, never	25.0
88.	(Don't know)	5.8

E6. How many hours a day on average do you learn? M=2.64, SD=1.79

E9. Which of the following statements in relation to the choice of school / university best describe your situation?

1.	I'm going (went) to a school that I wanted to enrol in; I'm studying (studied) what I wanted to	73.0
2.	I chose a school / university that will provide me with a job, even though it was not a school / university that I wanted to enrol in	15.8
3.	I chose the school/university that I believed I had a realistic chances to enrol in, although I did not want to go there	9.1
88.	(Don't know)	2.1

E10. In general, how satisfied are you with the quality of education in Serbia?

Very satisfied	Satisfied	Partly satisfied	Unsatisfied	Very unsatisfied	(Don't know)
1	2	3	4	5	88
3.0	24.7	45.6	18.9	6.7	1.1

E11. If you could choose, where would you like to be educated?

1.	In a state educational institution in Serbia	49.2
2.	In a private educational institution in Serbia	7.9
3.	In a state educational institution abroad	24.6
4.	In a private educational institution abroad	13.6
88.	(Don't know)	4.6

E13. Have you ever done professional training, internship, additional training?

1.	Yes	42.2
2.	No	57.1
88.	(Don't know)	0.7

E14. (INT: For University students of all levels)

Do you believe that you will be able to find a job soon after graduation/completion of studies?

1.	Yes, I believe I will be able to find a job soon after graduation	26.6
2.	Yes, I believe I will be able to find a job after some time	30.9
3.	No, I do not think I'll be able to find a job soon after graduation	31.3
4.	I don't know / I hope I will	11.2

E15. Are you currently employed (permanent, temporary or part-time)?

1.	Yes	37.7
2.	No (INT. Go to a question E18)	62.3
88.	(Don't know)	

E16. How many hours, on average, do you work per week? M = 40.65, SD = 15.87

E17. Are you working in your profession, i.e. a job for which you are trained (educated)?

1.	I have no qualifications	2.2
2.	Yes, I am working in my profession, i.e. a job I was trained (educated) for	34.5
3.	Yes, in some way	13.6
4.	No, I do not work in my profession, i.e. a job I was trained (educated) for	48.4
5.	Don't know	1.2

E18. In which of the following sectors would you like to work in?

1.	Public sector	62.1
2.	Private sector	26.2
3.	NGO sector	1.4
4.	International organizations (UNDP, OSCE, etc.).	6.7
5.	Other _____	1.5
88.	(Don't know)	2.2

E19. I will show you a list of five factors that people in Serbia consider to be essential for finding a job.  
(INT: show card number 2). Please rank them in order of importance: 1 - that you believe is most important, and 2 the second most important and so on..

	Factor	Rank I	Rank II	Rank III	Rank IV	Rank V
E19A	Acquaintances / friends	26	26.7	18.1	17.1	11.2
E19B	Expertise	17.8	20.7	23.1	26.1	12.2
E19C	Level of education	17.5	23.5	15.4	24	20.2
E19D	Political connections	30.4	16.6	15.9	17.1	20.1
E19E	Luck	8	12.5	27.3	15.6	36.3
E19F	Other. What? _____	0.3	0	0.2	0.1	0

E20. Now I'll show you the 4 factors that people consider important when deciding to accept a job.  
(INT: show card 3). As with the previous question, please rate them by the order of importance for you personally:  
1 - the most important, 2 - the second most important and so on..

	Factor	Rank I	Rank II	Rank III	Rank IV
E20A	Income / salary	56.4	27.4	10.9	4.7
E20B	Job security	22.7	40.3	25.7	11.5
E20C	Work with people that I like	3.6	10.2	24.4	61.8
E20D	Job satisfaction	17.1	22	39	21.8
E20E	Other. What? _____	0.2	0	0	0.2

E21. Did you do any of the following activities, which you paid for, during the last year in your leisure time?

		YES	NO
E21.1	A foreign language course	16.0	84.0
E21.2	Regular sport activities, recreation	35.8	64.2
E22.3	Professional training	12.9	87.1
E21.4	Art classes	5.4	94.6

F1. How often do you discuss politics with your parents?

1. Very Often	2. Often	3. Sometimes	4. Rarely	5. Never	88. (Don't know)
2.7	7.1	18.1	25.3	46.2	0.5

F2. How much are you personally interested in politics:

		Very interested	Interested	Neither	Not interested	Not interested at all	(Don't know)
F2.1.	World politics	3	12	22.9	20.6	39.7	1.9
F2.2.	Balkan politics	3.6	12.9	23.9	20.5	37.2	2
F2.3.	Serbian politics	7.3	20.3	23.7	14.9	31.8	2
F2.4.	EU politics	2.6	12.9	25.4	19.5	37.6	2

**F3. To what extent do your political views and beliefs agree with your parents' views?**

1. Very much	2. To some extent	3. A little	4. Not at all	88. (Don't know)
10.4	32.8	16.7	13	27.1

**F4. If parliamentary elections took place for the Republic of Serbia, which political party would you vote for? (INT: enter the name of the party)**

1.	I know who I would vote for	20.6
2.	I don't want to vote	46.1
77.	(Refuse to answer)	17.8
88.	(Don't know)	15.5

**F5. As far as you can remember, how many times did you vote since you are eligible to vote?**

1.	At all elections since obtaining my voting rights	23.7
2.	At most elections	13.9
3.	At several elections	20.0
4.	Never	36.5
88.	(Don't know)	6.0

**F6. In your opinion, how much does your vote have an influence on how institutions function?**

		A lot	To some extent	Little	Not at all	(Don't know)
		1	2	3	4	88
F6.1	At a national level (parliament and government)	2.4	12.1	29.1	51.2	5.2
F6.2	At a local level (town, municipality, local assembly)	4.9	15.8	28.9	45.3	5.1

**F7. What is your main source of information about current political events?**

1.	The Internet	45.9
2.	TV	36.2
3.	Daily newspapers	5.6
4.	The radio	0.9
5.	Discussions with family	2.4
6.	Discussions with friends and acquaintances	3.3
7.	Other _____	0.9
88.	(Don't know)	4.8

**F8. Your general political beliefs**

When people talk about their political beliefs, they usually speak about left and right beliefs and in accordance with their beliefs they typically support political left-wing or right-wing parties. In relation to the "left" and "right", where on a scale would you put yourself?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88. (Don't know)	
2.8	2.2	5.8	5.9	32.2	5.4	5.8	4.1	1.9	3.7	30.1	
Extremely left						Extremely right					

**F9. To what extent, in your opinion, are the interests of young people represented in Serbian politics today?**

1. Very much	2. To some extent	3. Little	4. Not at all	88. (Don't know)
3.3	23.2	44.3	20.3	8.9

		A lot	To some extent	Little	Not at all	(Don't know)
		1	2	3	4	88
F10.1.	Political parties	0.9	10.8	28.1	57.5	2.7
F10.2.	The Parliament of the Republic of Serbia	1.5	15	34.5	45.8	3.2
F10.3.	The Government of the Republic of Serbia	3.2	16.7	32.3	44.7	3.1
F10.4.	Local government, authorities	3.2	19	31.3	43.9	2.6
F10.5.	The army	18.4	35.8	26	16.6	3.2
F10.6.	The judiciary	9.2	28.9	31.3	28	2.6
F10.7.	The police	11.8	33.3	29	23.4	2.6
F10.8.	The Ombudsman	9	29.8	30.3	24.6	6.2
F10.9.	The Church	22.1	29.5	22	23.3	3.2
F10.10.	The media	2	18.9	32	43.9	3.2
F10.11.	The unions	1.7	15.5	33.8	42.6	6.4
F10.12.	NGOs	2.3	18.8	33.5	36.6	8.8

F11. In general, are you satisfied with the state of democracy in Serbia?

1. Very satisfied	2. Satisfied	3. Moderately satisfied	4. Unsatisfied	5. Very unsatisfied	88. (Don't know)
1	7.6	38.5	33.3	13.2	6.4

F12. To what extent should the Serbian government focus on achieving the following objectives?  
(INT: show card number 4).

		A lot	To some extent	Little	Not at all	(Don't know)
		1	2	3	4	88
F12.1	The fight against crime and corruption	76.5	15.4	4.3	2	1.8
F12.2	Spiritual renewal	34.3	35.1	18.4	8.4	3.7
F12.3	Economic growth and development	82.2	12.1	3.4	0.6	1.7
F12.4	Strengthening the armed forces and security	49.4	30	14	3.4	3.2
F12.5	Preserving the environment	61.7	27.5	7.1	1.5	2.3
F12.6	Ensuring human rights and freedom	64.5	25.6	6.2	1.4	2.3
F12.7	Social justice and security for all	66.7	23.4	6.6	1.3	2
F12.8	Improving the status of women	52.4	31.6	10.3	3.3	2.4
F12.9	Improving the position of young people	69.4	21.8	4.4	2.4	2
F12.10	Encouraging the growth of population, births	60	25.8	8.9	3.2	2
F12.11	The development of private entrepreneurship	46.5	32.9	15.1	3.4	2
F12.12	Preparation for the accession of Serbia to the EU	26.1	31.1	20.9	17.5	4.4
F12.13	The reduction of unemployment	84.9	7.4	3.4	2.3	1.9
F12.14	Support for Serbs in neighbouring countries	35.2	36.4	16.7	7.3	4.4
F12.15	The improvement of relations with neighbouring countries	36.3	37.2	17.3	5.3	3.9

**G1. In your opinion, to what extent are the following problems disturbing (alarming) for Serbian society?**

		Very alarming	Moderately alarming	Somewhat alarming	Not alarming at all	(Don't know)
		1	2	3	4	88
G1.1	The increase in poverty	81.7	13.5	2.8	1.2	0.8
G1.2	Unemployment	87.1	9.9	1.7	0.5	0.9
G1.3	Environmental pollution	45.9	37.3	13.1	2.4	1.3
G1.4	Terrorist threats	20.0	22.6	27.6	26.0	3.8
G1.5	The threat of AIDS / HIV	22.2	26.1	30.1	17.4	4.2
G1.6	The prevalence of diseases (cancer, heart disease, etc.).	63.7	22.5	9.9	1.8	2.1
G1.7	Failure to implement the law or improper and inconsistent application of the law	47.9	36.8	10.6	2.4	2.3
G1.8	Job insecurity	67.6	24.8	5.5	0.8	1.3
G1.9	Safety in the workplace (dangerous and unsafe workplaces)	38.0	40.7	15.9	3.3	2.0
G1.10	The risk of living abroad permanently (emigration) for Serbian citizens working abroad	37.1	32.8	17.1	9.7	3.3
G1.11	Street crime	52.2	32.5	11.5	2.6	1.1
G1.12	Various criminal activities and smuggling	51.9	32.6	11.7	2.4	1.4
G1.13	Climate change	28.8	37.2	23.0	9.2	1.8
G1.14	The inefficient fight against corruption	57.2	28.2	10.2	2.8	1.6

**G2. In your opinion, what will happen with the financial situation of people in Serbia over the next 10 years?**

1.	It will improve significantly	6.2
2.	It will improve to some extent	37.7
3.	It won't change	29.1
4.	It will worsen to some extent	14.2
5.	It will worsen significantly	6.6
88.	(Don't know)	6.3

**H1. Do you agree Serbia's entry into the EU?**

1. Strongly agree	2. Tend to agree	3. Neither	4. Tend to disagree	5. Strongly disagree	88. (Don't know)
8.1	25.5	29.9	9.6	19.9	7.1

**H2. Please evaluate why and to what extent Serbia's entry into the EU is desirable**

		Strongly agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Strongly disagree	(Don't know)
		1	2	3	4	88
H2.1	Better and faster economic growth	22.6	38.7	15.6	14	9.2
H2.2	A faster democratization of society	16.4	39.8	17.9	14.8	11.1
H2.3	A higher standard of living	24.4	37.2	16.1	13.4	8.9
H2.4	Better protection of human and minority rights	20.7	40	15.7	13.4	10.2
H2.5	New insights into the culture and religion of other nations	17.3	36	20.3	15.9	10.4
H2.6	Better employment opportunities	29.3	34.5	14.3	12.5	9.4
H2.7	Better education	27	34.1	16.3	13.3	9.2
H2.8	Better military security of Serbia	16.3	32.1	21.5	18.8	11.3
H2.9	Better opportunities to travel and new friendships	34.7	33	10.5	11.8	10.1

**H3. Please evaluate why and to what extent Serbia's entry into EU is not desirable**

		Strongly agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Strongly disagree	(Don't know)
		1	2	3	4	88
H3.1	Threatens the national identity of Serbs	20.8	24.7	28	15.2	11.3
H3.2	Threatens the sovereignty of Serbia	19.1	25.1	29.6	13.4	12.7
H3.3	Increases the possibility of economic exploitation of Serbia	21.3	32.1	24.3	9.7	12.5
H3.4	Makes Serbia dependent on the developed European countries (culturally, politically, economically, etc.).	25.7	33.1	19.4	10.4	11.3
H3.5	Constrains economic growth in Serbia through economic standards and measures	20.6	30	23.8	12.7	12.9

**H4. Please evaluate to what extent the following factors make Serbia's entry into the EU difficult**

		Very much	Mostly	Mostly not	Not at all	(Don't know)
		1	2	3	4	88
H4.1	The insufficient economic development of Serbia	30	42.6	11.5	4.6	11.3
H4.2	The lack of democratization of the political system	20.3	45.1	15	5.2	14.5
H4.3	Too strict EU criteria for future members states	27.3	37.8	17.6	4.5	12.8
H4.4	Unfairly imposed conditions for Serbia's entry into the EU	29.5	33.9	17.4	5.8	13.4
H4.5	Insufficient respect for human and minority rights in Serbia	18.2	33.2	26.3	8.3	14
H4.6	The interests of some groups in power in Serbia to prevent its entry into the EU	18.1	34.2	24.9	8.1	14.7
H4.7	The incompetence of the government to comply with EU requirements and standards	22.2	33.4	22.8	6.8	14.8
H4.8	Dissatisfaction of the EU with Serbia's cooperation with the Hague Tribunal	17.8	34	23.5	9.6	15.1

**H5. How much trust do you have in EU institutions?**

1. A lot	2. Mostly	3. Neither	4. Mostly don't have	5. None at all	88. (Don't know)
2.4	18.2	40.2	13.4	19.1	6.6

**LS. To what extent are you satisfied with your life so far - regarding:**

		Not at all	To some extent	Pretty, Quite	Completely	(Don't know)
		1	2	3	4	88
LS1	Personal / intimate relationships	2.9	17.2	40.2	39.6	0.2
LS2	Family life	1.8	12.2	33.8	52.1	0.2
LS3	What you do (your occupation)	6.7	20	37.6	34.5	1.2

**iDIPLOM. What is your highest level of education school? Your mother and your father?**

	Did not complete or completed elementary school	A three-year secondary school	Four-year secondary school	University / Vocational college	Master or PhD degree
Interviewee	26.2	10.8	44.2	15.1	3.7
Mother	10.1	13.9	52.9	20.6	2.5
Father	8.1	16.2	50.2	21.7	3.8

HNo. How many people, including yourself, live in your household? M=3.75 SD=1.5

FAM1. What is your marital status?

1.	Not married	87.0
2.	Married	8.7
3.	We live together but we are not married	3.3
4.	Divorced	0.7
5.	Widowed	0.3

FAM2. How many children do you have?

None	91.0
1	6.1
2	2.5
3+	0.4

FAM3. When do you plan to have your first child?

1.	I have a child	8.9
2.	I am not planning on having the children	17.2
3.	I plan them when I'm..... years old	73.9

M1. How many desktop computers do you have in your home?

1.	None	17.5
2.	1	66.2
3.	2 or more	16.3

M2. How many laptop computers do you have in your home?

1.	None	32.4
2.	1	52.6
3.	2 or more	15.0

M3. How many cars do you have in your home?

1.	None	23.8
2.	1	60.2
3.	2 or more	16.0

M4. How many rooms are there in your house?

1.	1	3.9
2.	2	19.7
3.	3	27.4
4.	4	24.6
5.	5 or more	24.4

M5. How many books do you have in your home?

1.	0	2.0
2.	up to 10	10.2
3.	10-20	10.8
4.	21-30	12.1
5.	31-50	19.2
6.	51-100	17.0
7.	Over 100	21.9
88.	(Don't know)	6.8

M4.1. Where do you live?

1.	In my parents' home	66.9
2.	In an apartment / house that I inherited	8.4
3.	In an apartment / house that my parents bought for me	7.1
4.	With relatives or friends	1.6
5.	In an apartment / house that I bought alone or with a partner	3.4
6.	In a flat / house where I pay rent	5.8
7.	In flat/house where somebody else pays the rent	5.0
8.	In a student dormitory	0.3
9.	Other. What? _____	0.3
10.	With a partner (in his / her home)	1.0

M8. Do you have your own room?

1.	No	17.1
2.	Yes	82.9

M9. Which of the following descriptions best fits the financial situation of your household?

1.	We do not have enough money for food	1.4
2.	We have enough money for food, but not enough to buy clothes and shoes	12.5
3.	We have enough for food, clothes and shoes, and we can save a little, but not enough to buy expensive things (refrigerator, TV, etc.).	45.1
4.	We can afford to buy some more expensive things, but nothing so expensive as e.g. a car	36.1
5.	We can buy whatever we want	5.0

**ETHN. What is your nationality, ethnicity?**

1.	Serbian	90.4
2.	Hungarian	3.7
3.	Albanian	0.0
4.	Bosniac	2.2
5.	Roma	0.9
6.	Croatian	0.3
7.	Other? _____	1.5
8.	Yugoslav	0.3
77.	(Refuse to answer)	0.7

**OCUP1. At a moment you are:**

1.	Permanently employed	16.1
2.	In temporary/part-time employment	14.7
3.	Self-employed / freelance	1.8
4.	Unemployed	17.0
5.	A pupil	25.6
6.	A student	23.8
7.	A farmer	0.3
8.	A tradesman / craftsman	0.1
9.	Other	0.5

**INC. What are your sources of income? (INT: multiple answers possible, record everything relating to the respondent)**

1.	My parents support me	59.8
2.	My partner supports me (boyfriend / girlfriend, spouse)	4.6
3.	I get financial assistance from my parents / relatives	5.4
4.	Family pension	2.4
5.	Social welfare	0.8
6.	Student scholarship, loan	4.1
7.	I have personal income (salary, honorarium, etc.).	36.8
8.	I have income from renting	0.9
9.	Other (specify what) _____	1.2
88.	(Don't know)	0.3

## QUESTIONNAIRE

Please read the questions, and answer each by circling the number in front of the answer that applies to you / with which you agree.

**A9. Do you smoke?**

1.	Yes, regularly (every day)	28.9
2.	Sometimes	15.3
3.	No (I am a non-smoker)	55.8

**A10.1. Do you use / smoke marijuana?**

1.	Yes, regularly (every day)	1.4
2.	Yes, a few times a week	1.1
3.	Weekends only	2.1
4.	Rarely	10.3
5.	No, never	85.1

**A12. To what extent are you satisfied with your appearance?**

1.	Very satisfied	20.8
2.	Satisfied	54.4
3.	Satisfied up to some extent	21.2
4.	Unsatisfied	2.2
5.	Very unsatisfied	1.3

**A10. Do you drink alcohol?**

1.	Yes, regularly (every day)	2.8
2.	Yes, a few times a week	11.9
3.	Weekends only	30.5
4.	Rarely	38.1
5.	No, almost never	16.7

**A11. According to you, alcohol is:**

1.	Acceptable	68.0
2.	Necessary in order to be accepted by others (in society)	9.1
3.	Unacceptable	22.9

**A13. Which of the following best describes best your sexual experiences?**

1.	I still haven't had sexual relations	20.4
2.	I have had sexual relations with one partner	28.4
3.	I have had sexual relations with more partners	51.2

**A14. Do you use contraception?**

1.	Yes, always	26.2
2.	Yes, sometimes	27.9
3.	No, never	37.3
4.	I'm not familiar with methods of birth control. I don't know what contraception is.	8.5

**A15. What do you think about sexual abstinence (refrain from sexual relations) for young people today?**

1.	It is a merit / virtue both for young boys / men and young girls / women	20.3
2.	It is a merit / virtue for young girls / women	11.1
3.	It is a psychological burden / a weight	21.0
4.	It's an outdated notion	44.2
	Other. What? _____	3.4

**A16. In your opinion, to what extent are gays and lesbians (gay men and women) acceptable?**

1.	Fully acceptable	10.4
2.	Mainly acceptable	14.6
3.	Neither	20.9
4.	Mostly unacceptable	19.1
5.	Totally unacceptable	34.9

**A17. What is your opinion regarding abortion?**

1.	Abortion should be outlawed in all cases	15.1
2.	Abortion should be forbidden by law, except in cases where it is medically justified	32.8
3.	Abortion should be legal	26.5
4.	I don't know, I don't have an opinion about it.	25.6

**C16. Have you participated in any of the below stated conflicts involving violence, in the last 12 months?**

		YES	NO
C16.1.	With young people from your neighbourhood	6.1	93.9
C16.2.	With other young people in a club or cafe	11.2	88.8
C16.3.	In a sports hall, stadium, etc.	4.5	95.5
C16.4.	At school / university	5.4	94.6
C16.5.	With young people of different political beliefs	1.5	98.5
C16.6.	With the police (e.g. during a demonstration)	2.4	97.6

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