

Edited by

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About FES Youth Studies

What are young people afraid of or hopeful about? In a rapidly changing world that is challenged by the climate crisis and inequalities, and in many parts aging societies and democratic decline, **FES Youth Studies** investigate how young generations perceive the development of their societies and their personal future. Our aim is to foster informed debate about young people's views on politics and democracy against the background of their life circumstances and values. This includes key issues such as education, employment and mobility, family and friends, and their overall attitudes and perceptions. We focus on young people aged 14 to 29 to understand their perspectives on these critical topics.

FES has conducted numerous youth studies around the world since 2009. In 2024, young people in Greece were surveyed along with youth in other Southeastern Europe and Central Eastern Europe countries.

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Executive Summary

The large-scale FES Youth Study Greece 2024 research project was conducted during winter and spring 2024 simultaneously in 12 countries of Southeast Europe, with the support of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Our aim was to explore the values, opinions and preferences of young people in the 14–29 age group, using the same methodology and questions in all countries surveyed.

Young Greeks are moderately satisfied with their lives and fairly optimistic about their personal future but rather pessimistic concerning the future of the country. Most of them live with their parents and siblings, and relations between them and their parents are fairly positive. Although they appreciate the warmth of the nuclear family, they desire their independence. But living on their own is not possible because of the difficulties of becoming financially independent.

Qualifications and connections with powerful or influential people are highlighted as the most effective factors in finding a job. Young Greeks are not willing to leave the country, but opportunities to improve their standards of living, as well as better education might persuade them to emigrate. Nevertheless, the majority have taken no action to leave Greece.

Young people in Greece exhibit fairly low levels of interest in politics. They feel that they know something or even rather a lot about politics, but do not see themselves as being represented in national politics. Being able to vote at the age of 17 is regarded primarily as motivated by political parties' desire to manipulate young people, but at the same time they feel that they should have more opportunities to have a voice in politics. Young Greeks support democracy no matter what, but a tangible minority are no strangers to antidemocratic attitudes.

Young Greeks gravitate towards the political centre and identify as progressive. They tend to be liberal, preferring values that are closer to freedom than to equality.

Young Greeks have anti-immigration views and believe that those living in Greece should adopt its customs and values, of which they are particularly proud. They want to remain in the EU, but identify much more as Greek. They identify also as Greek Orthodox but do not practice their religion.

Young women are more supportive of social equality than men. Men, on the other hand, emphasise ethnocentrism and protection of their social superiority. Young women demand their rights more than men and consider themselves to be more vulnerable to multiple forms of personal violence. All in all, overt sexism is probably a thing of the past for most young Greeks, but a modern form of sexism that neglects women's demands and denies that women are still discriminated against is still present in some young Greeks, especially young men.

Key Facts

Most of the young people interviewed have not left Greece for more than six months.

They are generally unwilling to emigrate to another country. They would consider moving for practical reasons, however, such as better living conditions and higher wages.

Young Greeks tend to be centrist and identify as progressive.

They are fairly liberal, favouring values that emphasise freedom over equality. They support income equality but are sceptical about an increased role for the state. They take action through demonstrations and volunteering, but do not align themselves with political parties.

57%

of young Greeks express a desire to have at least one child in the future, especially in their 30s. This interest in parenthood tends to increase as young people mature and report greater satisfaction with their current lives.

The majority of young people live in households with parents and siblings.

Nevertheless, independence appears to be widespread, particularly among those reaching adulthood. Financial stability is also a key factor in determining whether people live with their parents or seek to live on their own.



Many young people spend more than 30 minutes a day on social media. Young women spend a lot more time on social media than young men. Also, online platforms are becoming the main source for consuming news, as well as for education and training.

Young people in Greece, especially young women, show low levels of political interest.

Although they claim to be aware of political issues, they do not feel represented. Many believe that political parties try to manipulate them. There is a general mistrust of political institutions, but they also feel that there should be more opportunities for them to express their political opinions.

Most young Greeks are generally satisfied with their lives and optimistic about their personal future.

However, they are pessimistic about the future of the country. In fact, 52% believe that the country is heading in the wrong direction and they point to shortcomings in the country's welfare. The most common concerns about the future include the health care system, unemployment and the (in) adequacy of pensions.



For young people, qualifications or expertise and connections with powerful or influential people are the most efficacious factors in finding a job in Greece.

Most young people are proud of their Greek identity and identify primarily as Greeks, but also value their EU citizenship.

1 ■ Introduction

Investigating a specific age cohort, such as the youth population, can bring to light implicit interpretations characterised by hope or pessimism. The social environment shapes people's identities. This may be revealed by comparing aspects and behaviours of contemporary young people with those of the preceding generation or by anticipating changes they might bring. This report, which aims to provide a concise overview of young Greeks' primary perceptions, sets aside comparative or prospective evaluations to focus on present-day social reality.

The research was carried out simultaneously in 12 Southeastern European countries – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Greece and Turkey – under the auspices of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Representative samples of young people aged 14–29 years of age provided insights into their identity and their perspectives on social reality. They all share experiences that are common internationally, such as prolonged economic austerity, the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change and the growth of the digital economy and society, to name but a few. Local social realities, however, are likely pervasively to form national subordinate identities and, in consequence, affect the superordinate European identity. It is therefore valuable to study young people at the national level before attempting international comparative research.

In Greece, in 2023, young people aged 15–29 represented 15.2 % of the general population (10,482,487 people). Participants in this research project were born between 1995 and 2010. They were thus born at a time of social, economic and political change. They have grown up in modern families, which have transmitted contemporary values, and their independence is somewhat delayed. They are well-educated and skilled, but employment is not taken for granted in a period of digital transformation and automation. They live self-consciously in parallel social and digital environments. They are underrepresented in traditional political institutions as their political activities and behaviour differ somewhat from what went before.

We expect this report to give voice to young people in Greece to state who they are and what they believe. We also anticipate that some people will have their interest aroused sufficiently to want to delve deeper into the data and findings and to investigate new research questions at the national and comparative levels.

2. Methodology

This research is aimed at understanding the views, perceptions and beliefs of Greek young people. It focuses on various aspects of their social and personal lives that are important for getting to grips with their perspectives. Specifically, young respondents in Greece shared their opinions on topics such as education, employment and mobility, family and future plans, social perceptions and values, political attitudes and participation.

The target population is young people living in Greece, aged from 14 to 29. Interviews were conducted using computer-assisted online interviews (CAWI) via the Ipsos Online Access Panel. Quota selection was applied according to age, gender and region, with an additional soft quota on education. The youngest respondents were recruited exclusively via their parents, who first provided information about their children and gave their consent.

The fieldwork for the online interviews took place between 9 February 2024 and 25 March 2024. The final sample size was 1,000 persons. The results presented in this report are based on weighted data, applying 'rim weight'. The previously set quotas – namely gender, age and region – were used as weighting targets.



3 Basic demographic characteristics and trends

Some 510 women and 488 men participated in the research (one person stated 'another gender', and one more preferred not to answer the relevant question). Of these, 320 persons are 14–18 years of age, 370 are 19–24 years of age, and 310 are 25–29 years of age. Participants represent all areas of Greece. Specifically, 35.9 % live in Attika, 6.6 % in Western Greece, 6.4 % in Thessaly, 6.4 % in Crete, 5.7 % in East Macedonia and Thrace, 4.6 % in Peloponnese, 4.4 % in Central Greece, 3.2 % in South Aegean, 2.9 % in Epirus, 2.3 % in South Macedonia, 1.9 % in North Aegean, and 1.7 % in the Ionian Islands.

33 % of young people in Greece describe their parents as well-educated

Most of the young people who participated in the research are from urban areas (69.2 %), far fewer from non-urban areas (28.3 %). More specifically, 56.4 % reside in cities, 12.8 % in areas more urban than rural areas, 13.8 % in areas somewhere in-between, 4.5 % in more rural than urban areas, and 9.9 % in villages. All ages and genders are represented in all regions.¹



Education

As expected, the educational level of the people participating in the research depends on their age. Among the youngest (14–18 years of age), most (28.5 %) state that they have graduated from secondary education. Among 19–24 year olds, the majority (38.2 %) graduated from secondary education, while 12.5 % hold a higher education degree. Older participants (25–29 year-olds) confirm the higher educational level. Among them, 20.5 % have graduated from secondary education and 18.9 % from university.

Most young people describe their parents as well-educated. In this category, both parents obtained a higher education degree, with 35.2 % of mothers and 32.7 % of fathers being described as highly educated. Parents with vocational or technical secondary education come next, followed by those with a secondary school diploma. Fewer parents only completed primary education.


It's worth noting that parents with higher levels of education are more likely to live in urban than rural areas. Specifically, 36.1 % of fathers who live in cities have a higher education degree, compared with 26.1 % of fathers who live in non-urban areas. The difference is even more pronounced for mothers: 40.9 % of mothers living in cities are highly educated, while only 23.8 % of mothers living in non-urban areas have higher education diplomas.

Families' financial backgrounds

To assess the respondents' personal perceptions of their family's social situation, they were asked to choose a description that adequately describes their household's financial situation. The responses range from experiencing severe financial constraints to being in a situation of wealth.

Fig. 1 Financial situation in the households of youth in Greece (in %)

Which of the following descriptions most adequately describes the financial situation in your household?



The largest group of young people comprises those who say they live in a restrictive economic situation, providing only basic necessities without the possibility of comfort (30.7 %) (Fig. 1). A proportion of 27.3 % experience a slightly better economic situation, as their family 'can afford to buy some more expensive things but not as expensive as a car or a flat'. Next come those who admit to more serious financial constraints, as their families have 'enough money for basic bills but not for clothing and shoes' (20 %). Some 8.6 % of respondents declared that they are living in poverty. Finally, only 7.8 % state that they live in wealth.

Semantic distinctions are determined based on the level of urbanisation.² In non-urban areas, young people are more likely to experience poverty, with 11.3 % admitting to it compared with 7.8 % in urban areas. Moreover, those who face severe financial restrictions, such as those who have 'enough money for basic bills and food but not for clothes and shoes', are more commonly found in rural areas (24 %) rather than urban areas (18.8 %).

By contrast, families with a relatively comfortable economic situation ('we can afford to buy some more expensive things but not as expensive as a car or a flat') are more likely to live in cities (29.3 %) than in villages (24 %). Also, more wealthy families ('we can afford to buy whatever we need for a good living standard') are more commonly situated in cities (9.4 %) than in villages (4.6 %).

Main Takeaways

- 1. Parents are considered well-educated, as most have completed secondary education or possess a higher education degree.**
- 2. Most young people describe their family as living at a low financial level, stating that incomes cover only basic living requirements.**
- 3. Those reporting that their families face economic constraints tend to reside in rural areas.**

4. Young people and education

In the Greek education system, there are eleven years of compulsory education,³ from the ages of 4 to 15, and education is under the supervision of the Ministry of Education, Religious Affairs and Sports.⁴ The education system is divided into three levels: primary, secondary and tertiary, with an additional post-secondary level providing vocational training.

27 % of young Greeks are NEETs – not in any kind of education or training

When asked about their current education status, almost half (44.1 %) of Greek young people in our sample are enrolled in some kind of education or training. Broken down, they are divided into undergraduate students (29.9 %), students in master's or doctoral programmes (8.4 %) and those enrolled in some other form of education or training (9.8 %). One in five are still at school, high school or in vocational training (24.3 %), while 26.9 % of the Greek young people (aged 14–29) sampled, are not in any kind of education or training.⁵



Quality of education and satisfaction

The importance of education in Greek society, both as a mechanism for upward social mobility and as a public good, has long been discussed and documented, both in landmark studies (Tsoukalas 1977; Lambiri-Dimaki 1983) and more recent accounts (Maloutas et al. 2019). However, recent studies point to the fact that, despite the strong demand for higher education, satisfaction is quite low, especially with the school environment (Iliou, Kakepaki and Klironomos 2023). The system's emphasis on national admissions examinations (Panelladikes exetaseis), whose outcome gives access to higher education, makes the final school years even more oriented towards the final exams. This, in combination with the centralised and highly academic nature of the Greek education system (Koulaidis et al. 2006) has been related to overall low satisfaction with the quality of education.

The Greek young people sampled remain rather unsatisfied with the quality of education in Greece. When asked 'how satisfied are you generally with the quality of education in Greece' **47.6 % of respondents are not satisfied at all or mostly dissatisfied**. Younger people of school age (14–18 years of age) are even more dissatisfied, with more than half (53.9 %) stating their dissatisfaction with the quality of education. The fact that they are still at school might be an indicator of their disappointment in secondary education, as already mentioned.

Levels of satisfaction vary even more when we compare the social level of the respondents. Young people coming from deprived backgrounds (those responding that they 'live in households with not enough money for basic bills (electricity, heating...) and food') are even less satisfied with the quality of their education – one in five (25.6 %) are not satisfied at all – than young people living in households in which 'they can afford to buy whatever they want for a good living standard', among whom total dissatisfaction is only 11.5 %.

Fig. 2 **Hours spent on different activities among youth in Greece (in %)**

Approximately how much time do you spend on the following online activities on an average working day?

	Schooling/ education	Work (paid activities)	Internet newspapers, informative portals	Social networks
No time at all	21.9	34.2	28.6	5.5
Up to 15 minutes	12.5	14.2	29.7	11.6
15–30 minutes	17.1	13.6	19.3	14.7
30 minutes to 1 hour	14.3	13.5	11.1	18.2
1–2 hours	12.7	8.2	6.3	18.4
2–3 hours	9.9	4.4	2.7	15.9
3–5 hours	7.0	4.2	0.9	8.8
More than 5 hours	4.5	7.7	1.3	6.8

At the other end of the spectrum, only 9.3% of deprived young people are very or mostly satisfied with their education, compared with 23.1% of those at the other end of the social ladder. In other words, **social deprivation appears to be a sound predictor regarding (low) satisfaction with education.**

Corruption in Education

Perhaps not surprisingly, given the overall low satisfaction with the quality of education, Greek young people overwhelmingly agree that there

This perception of corruption is even more widespread among young Greeks with a higher education and those aged 24–29, an indication that the actual experience of the higher education system rather reinforces people's belief that there is corruption in education.

Social media are in, traditional news outlets are out

Greek young people were asked to estimate the amount of time they spend each day online, engaged in any of the following four options (Fig. 2):

47.6% of young Greeks are not satisfied at all or mostly dissatisfied with the quality of their education

is corruption in education. When asked whether they agree that 'there are cases where grades and exams are 'bought' in institutes/universities in Greece', more than half (52.9%) agree, either mostly or completely. At the same time, only 3.6% of Greek young people completely disagree with the idea that grades can be bought.

- I do things related to my schooling/ education
- I do things related to my work (paid activities)
- I read internet newspapers, informative portals
- I spend time on social networks like Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, etc.

Respondents were given a choice between various time spans ranging from 15 minutes to more than five hours every day (with the option of 'no time at all' also available). **Time spent on social networks, such as Facebook, Instagram and TikTok, is the most popular online activity of the four.** More than 80 % of the young people asked stated that they spend more than half an hour every day on these networks, while 31.5 % of them can be described as 'heavy users', spending more than two hours every day. It is interesting to note that the older sub-groups of our sample (aged 19 and over) spend more time on social media than the 14–18 years old, possibly because they have more free time and a less structured daily programme than younger people of school age. 'Heavy users' account for only 23.7 % of young people between 14 and 18 years of age, but 36.1 % of those aged 19–24 and 34 % of those aged 25–29.⁶ The gender difference is even more important: the young women surveyed spend significantly more time than young men on social media, with heavy users among women reaching 36.8 % compared with 26.5 % for men.⁷ The fact that social media engagement may be linked to lower self-esteem or other mental health issues (Twenge and Martin 2020), body image problems (Saiphoo and Vahedi 2019) or various forms of cyber stalking (Harewell, Pina and Story 2022) alerts us to the fact **that young women's heavier engagement makes them more vulnerable.**

Online news consumption presents a different pattern: 29.7 % of young people spend less than 15 minutes every day reading internet newspapers or informative portals, and 28.6 % spend no time at all on such activities. At the other end, heavy news consumers (those spending more than two hours online) account for only 4.9 % of Greek youth. This pattern is an indication that news consumption takes place largely through social media and the more traditional information channels are becoming less relevant for young people. This finding is related to very low levels of trust in traditional Greek media (Kalogeropoulos, Rori and Dimitrakopoulou 2021), regardless of format (TV, digital or print), which makes Greece an outlier regarding patterns of news consumption.

Online activities related to schooling and/or education are less relevant now, in contrast to the pandemic period when all such activities moved online. About one in five (21.9 %) do not spend any time online studying. However, as expected, online use is related to the age of the respondent. **Among school-aged young people** (aged 14–18) **only one in ten** (10.8 %) **do not spend any time at all in such activities, in contrast to almost four out of ten** (37.2 %) **young adults aged 25–29** (with those aged 19–24 being somewhere in between).⁸ We can therefore assume that for almost all school-aged Greek young people, some kind of online schooling/education has become the norm and is a daily habit, while 43 % spend at least one hour online every day for schooling and education.

The situation is rather the contrary with regard to age and work-related online activities. As expected, the majority of school aged young Greeks do not spend any time online in paid activities related to work. Half of them (50.6 %) do not spend any time at all in such activities, and another 34.1 % spend an hour or less daily. Among the oldest age group sampled (25–29) 11.9 % spend more than five hours every day using the internet for work-related activities, 4.8 % spend 3–5 hours daily and 15.3 % spend 1–3 hours daily online for work-related activities. That said, 23.1 % of them do not use the internet for work at all.

Main Takeaways

- 1. Greek young people present low levels of satisfaction with education.**
- 2. Their perception is that corruption is widespread in education.**
- 3. Young women in Greece are heavier users of social networks than young men.**
- 4. Traditional media outlets are becoming less and less relevant for young people with regard to news consumption.**
- 5. Online tools for education and training are part of the everyday lives of young Greeks, especially those of school age.**

5. Employment and mobility

Young people constitute a vulnerable population in terms of employment. In Greece, general employment rates and youth employment rates declined significantly from 2010 onwards, reflecting the impact of the European financial and economic crisis. In 2013, youth unemployment in Greece peaked at 62.3%. More than a decade later, despite economic growth, it seems that more than one in five young people are still struggling to enter the labour market. According to the latest data, the overall employment rate in Greece was 11.5 % for 2023 and is 10.8 % for 2024.⁹

49 %

of young people are actively employed. Older people have better employment prospects in their field of expertise

The unemployment rate among young people (15–24 year-olds) has consistently been about twice as high as the rate for the general population over time. The latest data shows that 22.6 % of 15–24 year-olds are unemployed, while 10.1 % of 25–74 year-olds do not have jobs. In addition, the youth unemployment rate in Greece (22.6 %) is substantially higher than the EU27 average (14.4 %).¹⁰

The present research analyses participants' employment status, area of work and qualifications. Personal perceptions of crucial job factors are also documented.

During the 2009 financial and economic crisis, Greece experienced outmigration because a considerable number of highly skilled young Greeks emigrated for 'better career prospects, better chance of finding a job related to their specialisation, a satisfactory income and increased opportunities for further training' (Pratsinakis 2022: 30). Greece has suffered a so-called 'brain drain' since 2010 as more than 200,000 professionals have left the country (Labrianidis and Pratsinakis 2016: 11).

Results from the present research will shed light on issues such as Greek young people traveling abroad for training or education, long stays abroad, desire to emigrate, reasons for possible emigration, and actions taken to move abroad.


Young participants who have some sort of occupational status (49.2 %) outnumber those with no job (41 %). However, the most common answers of respondents are 'I have no job, but I am actively looking for a job' (20.6 %) and 'I have no job, and I am currently not looking for a job' (20.4 %).

Current employment status can be determined by analysing the variations among different age groups (applying chi-square tests).¹¹ **As expected, among pre-adults (14–18 years of age), most respondents stated that they 'have no job and they are not looking for a job' (38.6 %). Among those who have just entered adulthood (19–24 year-olds), the majority 'have no job but are actively looking for one' (25 %), followed by those who 'have no job, and are not looking' for one (17.7 %). The 25–29 year-old age group is the most active in terms of their careers: 27.8 % of them reported having 'a permanent contract for a full-time job', while 21.7 % stated that they are currently unemployed but 'actively looking for a job'.**



Fig. 3 Views on important factors for finding a job among youth in Greece (in %)

In your opinion, how important are the following factors when it comes to finding a job for a young person in your country? 'Mostly important'- and 'very important'-answers combined



Age is also significantly associated with employees' area of work. More older respondents state that they work in their area of professional specialisation.¹² Characteristically, among 25–29 year-old employees, the majority (45.1%) 'work in their profession'. By contrast, most pre-adults 14–18 years of age (45.5%) work in fields in which they have no specialisation.

As far as young 14–24 year-olds are concerned, most do not work in their profession or area of specialisation (32.5%). However, 27.6% of them state that they do.

No differences between age sub-groups are verified for the estimation of qualifications for respondents' current work (applying chi-square tests). In addition, no gender differences are verified for any of the previous research questions drawing employment profiles of young people in Greece.

When young people are asked to indicate important factors in finding a job, 'expertise' (60.7%) and 'connections with people who are in power' (52.9%) are the most prevalent. 'Experience abroad' appears less important (36%). Although political parties in Greece have traditionally performed such a role, they are no longer considered the primary actors. Characteristically, membership of a political party is assessed as the least important factor for achieving occupational inclusion (25.8%) (Fig. 3).

61%

of young people in Greece think expertise is the most important factor for finding a job, followed by connections with people who are in power (53%)

Participants are also required to indicate how their current field of work aligns with their level of education. **Among employees, over half (54.7%) claim that their current field of work 'is in line with their achieved level of formal education'. A smaller percentage (28.7%) assess that they are overqualified for their job and only 12.7% estimate that they are underqualified for their current employment.**

More grown-ups (25–29 year-olds) appear to prioritise 'expertise' and 'experience from abroad' to a lesser extent. In contrast, the younger group (14–18 year-olds) include among useful factors in finding a job 'membership of a political party', 'experience abroad' and connections with powerful people.

It seems that people aged 25–29 prioritise ‘expertise’ and ‘experience abroad’ to a lesser extent when looking for a job. In contrast, 14–18 year-olds more often consider ‘membership of a political party’, ‘experience abroad’ and connections with powerful people as effective factors in finding a job.

83 % of young Greeks have not been away from Greece for more than six months

In the following section of the survey, participants are asked about mobility experience and/or plans outside the country. **It appears that most young people (39.7 %) have never ‘stayed abroad for learning or training purposes’.** However, nearly three out of 10 (27.6 %) have stayed in another country for educational reasons. Some 28.8 % answered ‘don’t know’.

As expected, answers differ between age sub-groups. The 24–29 year-olds are more likely (50 %) than the 19–24 year-olds (38.1 %), and especially the 14–18 year-olds (11.9 %) to have ‘been abroad as part of higher education’.¹³

Those most likely to have been abroad ‘as part of secondary school education’ are the 19–24 year-olds (51.4 %), followed by the 14–18 year-olds (26.2 %).¹⁴ Concerning those who state that they do not intend to go abroad for educational purposes, most are pre-adults (41.6 %), followed by the 19–24-year-olds (35.5 %), and the 25–29 year-olds (22.9 %).

Fig. 4 **Reasons for moving to another country and desire to emigrate among youth in Greece (in %)**

*How strong is your desire to move to another country for more than six months?
What is the main reason for why you would move to another country?*

	Total	Do not intend/Weak desire to emigrate	Moderate desire to emigrate	Strong/Very strong desire to emigrate
Higher cultural diversity	0.6	16.7	66.7	16.7
Being close to people I care for	1.0	20.0	70.0	10.0
Social and political stability in the host country	2.5	12.0	52.0	36.0
Escape from unfavorable situation	2.8	19.2	46.2	34.6
Because of corruption and clientelism in my home country	3.1	19.4	41.9	38.9
Better opportunities for starting my own business	3.7	7.9	50.0	42.1
Experiencing a different culture	3.7	8.1	45.9	45.9
Other/DK	4.3	55.2	13.8	31.0
Better education	5.8	22.4	31.0	46.6
Better employment possibilities	8.5	25.0	38.1	36.9
Improvement of the standard of living	15.1	12.6	39.1	48.3
Higher salaries	25.3	21.7	43.9	34.4

More than eight out of 10 say that they have not been away from Greece for over six months (83%). When participants are asked about their willingness to emigrate to another country for more than six months, young people initially express a lack of desire (35.4 % state they 'do not intend to emigrate' or have a 'weak' desire), followed by a moderate desire (31.4 %). A proportion of 29.3 % declare a 'strong' or 'very strong' desire to emigrate to another country. No differences between genders have been ascertained. However, in terms of age, young adults (19–24 year-olds) at the onset of independence are those who most frequently express a strong desire to live abroad.¹⁵

Despite young people's general reluctance to leave their country, it is worth investigating the possible reasons for taking such action. **Economic issues are the most prominent reasons for a young person to emigrate to another country. Respondents prioritise 'higher salaries' (25.3 %) as the major motive for leaving the country, followed by 'improvement of the standard of living' (15.1 %) and 'better employment possibilities' (8.5 %).**

We are trying to better understand what motives for moving to another country drive young people to take such action. It seems that the majority of those who express a strong desire to emigrate do so for reasons such as 'improving their standard of living' (48.3 %) and 'getting a better education' (46.6 %).

Most of the respondents expressed reluctance to move abroad within the next few years. A small percentage of young people (21 %) consider the possibility of emigrating 'within the next five years'. This is followed by those who envision the possibility 'within the next two years' (13.8 %) and 'within the next ten years' (12.8 %).

As far as the time they might wish to stay away from the country is concerned, the majority state up to five years. In more detail, 18.3 % mentioned they could stay abroad from one to five years, while 10 % mentioned 'less than a year'.

Very few young people have taken any action in order to leave the country. However, **among those who have taken action, it appears that they rely on personal relations.** Some 14.2 % of respondents 'have contacted friends/relatives to help them move abroad'; 9.7 % 'have contacted potential universities/schools', and 9.5 % 'have contacted potential employers'. But **43.8 % of the young Greeks who participated in the survey have taken no action to migrate.**

Main Takeaways

- 1.** Pre-adults often work in jobs for which they have no professional specialty, whereas older individuals tend to work in their chosen field.
- 2.** Qualifications or expertise and connections with powerful or influential people are highlighted as the most efficient factors in finding a job.
- 3.** Most young people have never participated in education or training programmes in another country, but the likelihood of moving abroad is higher for 25–29 year-olds.
- 4.** Young people are not willing to leave their country.
- 5.** Opportunities to improve their standards of living, as well as better education might persuade them to emigrate.

6

Family and plans for the future

Research on the youth population in Greece in recent years underlines two interrelated factors that the young themselves highlight as essential for managing and planning their lives: employment and independence. Characteristically, when they are asked, 'What are the main problems that young people face in Greece today?' they prioritise vocational factors (such as unemployment, low salaries, lack of opportunities, uncertain professional future), followed by autonomy (including inability to achieve independence or to start a family) (Koliastasis 2022: 10). This is particularly marked for people 17–39 years of age and especially among 25–29 year-olds.

14 % of young Greeks live on their own, the vast majority lives with their parents and siblings

Such economic hindrances – which apparently became established from the outset of the European financial crisis in 2009 – impede young adults in their efforts to live independent lives. Perhaps inevitably, they opt to stay at home with their parents longer than they would wish (Christopoulou and Pantalidou 2022). The latest research on housing highlights that Greece has the second-highest percentage of young people 25–34 years of age still living at home in Europe (60 %) (Manalis et al. 2022).¹⁶

These restrictions for young people are attributed to unemployment, low-paid and precarious jobs, and low household income. Furthermore, in Greece housing costs are too high and have been rising steadily in recent years (Alexandri 2022; Kafetzis 2022).

The present research captures key features of the families of Greek young people, such as personal coexistence in the household, desired present and/or future living situation, relationships with parents, current relationship status, and desire for their own family with children in the future.

Cherishing family warmth and yearning for independence

Respondents nestle in the intimacy of the family because only 14.2 % appear to live on their own. The majority coexist in households, with parents and siblings. As expected, among those who live in single households, barely any are non-adults (4.9 % are 14–18 years old) (Fig. 5).¹⁷ The majority of those living alone (54.2 %) are 19–20 years old and 25–29 years old (40.8 %). The former are persons living at home in order to study and/or enter the labour market, while the latter includes those who have completed their studies and/or vocational training.¹⁸

Notwithstanding the finding that the majority of young people in Greece appear to live in multi-member households, including the parental and/or their own family, the idea of independence seems widespread, notably among those reaching adulthood. Besides age, financial capacity is also a determining factor in living with parents and/or hoping to live alone.

Receiving parental care is 'the simplest and most comfortable solution' for non-adults (63.6 % are 14–18-year-olds) (Fig. 5). The comfort that young people experience tends to decrease as they get older (23.4 % for 19–24 year-olds, 13 % for 25–29 year-olds). Pre-adults desire independent living despite the disagreement of parents (66.7 %).





Fig. 5 Household formation and living situation by age among youth in Greece (in %)

*Which of the following persons live with you in the same household?
Which of the following statements best describes your situation?*



Additionally, 29.6 % of 19–24 year-olds report feeling pressured by their parents to remain in the family household instead of pursuing independence. This inhibitory effect of parents diminishes after the age of 25 (3.7 % for 25–29 year-olds).


Although respondents indicate parents as a dominant factor in their living situation – either as care providers or as persons who disagree with their independent living – they also attribute staying at home with their families to financial restrictions. As far as those who have just entered adulthood are concerned (19–24 year-olds), it is noteworthy that nearly half (47.7 %) stress that they ‘would like to live alone if financial circumstances allowed it’ (Fig. 5). The pervasiveness of financial restrictions concerns not only those entering the age of independence but also older young adults (25–29 year-olds) (26.6 %), and even pre-adults (14–18 year-olds) (25.7 %).

Living in harmony with parents is easier while young people are still growing

Attempting to look closely at family relationships, more than nine in ten respondents confirmed **harmonious interactions with their parents**. Some 44.2 % state that ‘they get along very well’ with their parents, while 48.8 % confirm that ‘they get along, although sometimes they have differences of opinion’. Conflictual relationships are admitted by only a small minority because only 5.3 % confess that ‘in general they do not get along and often argue’, while barely 0.8 % refer to a ‘very conflictual relationship’ with their parents.

Fig. 6 Plan to have children by age and life satisfaction among youth in Greece (in %)

How many children do you plan or imagine to have in your life altogether?



Crosstabulation analysis¹⁹ does not confirm a significant relation between the age of respondents and their relationship with their parents. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that among respondents who admit that they often argue with their parents, the majority (45.3 %) are 19–24 year-olds.²⁰ In addition, 19–24 year-olds describe their relationship with their parents mainly as conflictual (62.5 %).²¹ It appears that when young Greeks reach the age of independence, tensions with their parents tend to increase. Nonetheless, conflictual relationships faded out after the age of 25.

57 % of young Greeks want to have at least one child in the future

Furthermore, gender differences turn out to be significant as far as relationships with parents are concerned.²² In more detail, almost twice as many women (66 %) than men (34 %) state that they 'do not get along, and often argue' with their parents. By contrast, men (52.7 %) more often than women (47.3 %) 'get along very well' with their parents.

Nearly half of the respondents (51.4 %) are single. Next come those who are in a relationship but do not live together (17.7 %), those living with a partner but not married (15.1 %), those who are married (14 %), and finally those who are divorced (1 %). As expected, relationship status significantly covariates with age.²³ Most singles are 14–18 years of age (41.7 %), and the proportion decreases as people grow older (34.9 % for 19–24 year-olds, 23.4 % for 25–29 year-olds). This pattern is reversed among those who have a partner or spouse.²⁴

If current life is satisfiable, parenting is desirable for young people between 25 and 35 years of age. In order to identify respondents' intention to have a family in the future, they are asked: (a) how many children (if any) do they plan or imagine having in the future, and (b) at what age do they plan to have their first child?

More than half of them (56.5 %) state a positive intention to have at least one child in the future, while the remainder would prefer not to have children (21.6 %) or are still undecided (21.9 %) (Fig. 6). Among those who desire a family of their own in the future, the majority wish to have their first child around the age of 30.²⁵ Characteristically, the dominant answer is 30 years old (22.2 %), followed by 28 years old (11.2 %).

In any case, respondents stated that they wish to have a child not earlier than the age of 15, as well as no later than the age of 53. **In sum, the most desirable decade for parenting appears to be the one from 25 to 35 years of age.** Percentages tend to diminish after 36 years of age, indicating an important milestone for future family plans.

The general optimistic intention of Greek young people to have a family in the future is further tested in comparison with some other variables. First, we attempt to test possible covariance between desire for future children and social profile variables such as (i) age and (ii) gender.²⁶ There is no difference between men and women as far as desire for a future family is concerned. However, in the case of age sub-groups, pre-adults (14–18 year-olds) more often tend to state that they have not yet made plans for their future family (36.4 %) (Fig. 6). While people aged 19–29 years of age are more likely to declare that they do not plan to have a child in the future than younger people.

Two further variables related to respondents' current and future livelihood are tested in covariance with the desire to have children. On one hand, the majority of those who state that they are not satisfied with their current lives declare that they do not plan to have children in the future (29.2 %) (Fig. 6). Also, **among those who are satisfied with their current lives, 51 % plan to have at least two children in the future, whereas 42.7 % of people who are not satisfied with their lives dream of a large family.** On the other hand, provisions for one's personal future in ten years do not appear to relate to planning for childbearing.²⁷

We applied correlation analysis between the number of desired children and respondents' ideological orientation, namely self-positioning on three scales: (i) Left vs Right-wing, (ii) Conservative vs Progressive, and (iii) Radical vs Moderate.²⁸ Findings indicate that respondents' individual ideological positions do not correlate with their future family plans.

Finally, participants were asked to indicate what was important to them when choosing a partner. Most respondents consider 'education level' (42.8 % find it 'Important/Very important') as the primary criterion for choosing a partner. 'Economic standing' (31.7 %) and 'religious beliefs' (31.45 %) follow. To a lesser extent, they report 'national origin' (28.8 %), 'family approval' (21.1 %), and 'virginity' (12.6 %).

Main Takeaways

- 1. Most pre-adults (14–18 year-olds) live at home with the parental family because it is the most practical solution, and due to parental restrictions.**
- 2. Financial restrictions hinder most adults (19–28 year-olds) who would prefer to live on their own.**
- 3. Conflicts with parents emerge after adulthood is reached, but tensions fade as young people grow older.**
- 4. More than one in two young Greeks desire to be parents in the future, mainly around their 30s.**
- 5. Desire to become a parent increases as young respondents grow up, as well as the more they declare they are satisfied with their current lives.**

7 General values, attitudes and perceptions

Recent research on Greek young people indicates that this generation is currently faring well in their personal lives, depending on themselves and their families for the present and their individual futures. However, they seem quite pessimistic about the future of their country and are critical of the state's effectiveness.

52 % of young Greeks believe that the country 'is moving in the wrong direction'

The research findings indicate that most young people are rather satisfied with their lives (Iliou et al. 2023: 53; Nikos Poulantzas Institute 2023: 10). However, a significant number of young people report dissatisfaction, highlighting the need for improvements in their living conditions. Young respondents appear cautiously optimistic and are evenly split between being 'a little confident' and 'quite confident' about their personal future (Nikos Poulantzas Institute 2023: 11).

Prominent among their concerns about the future is the country's economic situation (Koliastasis 2022: 9). Specifically, most express that their primary concern is 'low salaries and working conditions' (Nikos Poulantzas Institute 2023: 13).

Additionally, the majority, 52%, believe that the country 'is moving in the wrong direction' (Nikos Poulantzas Institute 2023: 69). In line with the above, most believe that the main problems young people are facing in Greece are uncertain professional and social security future, unemployment, lack of opportunities and low wages (Koliastasis 2022: 10). Our research illuminates participants' personal and social perceptions, including their core values, life satisfaction, outlook on personal and national futures, worries, societal views, minority impressions, discrimination, and religion.

Prominent among young Greek respondents' values are those indicative of independence and strength. They are followed by values defining personal life, such as well-being, academic education, family, and so on. Collective values, such as political and civic activation, are moderately adopted, while 'wearing branded clothes' is the only rejected value (Mean=2.39).²⁹

In more detail, respondents focus on personal control (such as 'being independent' and 'taking responsibility') and progress ('having a successful career'), which draws a rather individualistic profile (Fig. 7). Collective values, such as 'political activation' and 'participation in civic action', are adopted much less frequently. Having a successful career and achieving an academic degree, as well as having children still seem to be priorities for young Greeks, while marriage is comparatively less desired.


To test possible gender differences with regard to the endorsement of specific values, we applied independent sample T-tests. Intra-gender differences are verified only with regard to having children.³⁰ **Young men (Mean=3.72) more often than women (Mean=3.52) declare a wish for a future family.** This might indicate that young women prioritise self-enhancement values and tend to avoid fulfilling the dominant social stereotype of women as mothers.

In addition, testing differences in value adaptation between age groups, it appears that younger people tend more often than older ones to adopt self-centred values that rely on wealth and personal appearance.



Fig. 7 Personal values among youth in Greece (in %)

How much are the following items important to you?



One-way analysis of variances (ANOVAs) indicates that pre-adults (14–19 year-olds) more often than adults (19–29 year-olds) state that it is important for them to 'get/be rich', to 'look good' and to 'wear branded clothes'.

Three key questions were asked to capture the perceptions of Greek young people regarding their current life and their projection of personal and collective life at the national level.

Participants were asked to assess the degree of satisfaction with their life on a scale from 1 (Dissatisfied) to 10 (Satisfied). **Generally, a mean of 6.29 indicates a moderate but rather positive satisfaction with their lives.**³¹


Looking more deeply, we see a rather optimistic view of the lives of Greek youth. The majority (51.1%) declare that they are satisfied with their lives (7–10 on the scale) (Fig. 7); 29.6% indicate a neutral position (5–6 on the scale), and 18.5% indicate dissatisfaction (1–4 on the scale).

To what extent are you satisfied with your life in general? – How do you see your personal future in 10 years? – How do you see the future of Greek society in general?

There are no gender-specific differences concerning personal perceptions of satisfaction with current life (applying independent samples T-test).³² Nonetheless, self-estimation of life satisfaction appears to vary by age sub-group.

Fig. 8 Life satisfaction, personal future, and future of the country (in %)

To what extent are you satisfied with your life in general? How do you see your personal future in 10 years? How do you see the future of Greek society in general?



One-way analysis of variances (ANOVAs)³³ indicates that **pre-adults (14–18 year-olds) tend to assess their lives more positively (Mean=6.70) than the 19–24 year-olds (Mean=5.98) and/or the 25–29 year-olds (Mean=6.23)**. It is also remarkable that those entering adulthood (19–24 year-olds) appear more sceptical than others. This might reflect the concerns of young people who are reaching the threshold of adulthood and are at the beginning of independent adult life, with all that this implies in terms of life changes and responsibilities.

Regarding future projections, the majority are optimistic about their personal future but pessimistic about the future of Greek society in general. In particular, more than half (57.4 %) declare that their 'personal future will be better than now' (Fig. 8). By contrast, almost half of young participants (49.2 %) think that the collective future will be worse than at present in Greece.

There are no differences between genders as far as perceptions of personal future are concerned (applying chi-square tests). Nevertheless, men express greater optimism for the national future than women. The majority of those who hope that the future of Greece 'will be better than now' are men (60 %).

In the case of age differences, it appears that those reaching adulthood (19–24 year-olds) are more optimistic for their personal future (applying chi-square tests).³⁴ Among those who state that their future in ten years will be 'better than now', the majority are 19–24 year-olds (42.4 %), followed by 25–29 year-olds (30.1 %) and 14–18 year-olds (27.5 %). Estimations for the national future are similar between age sub-groups.³⁵

Participants are asked to rate various concerns according to their personal perceptions. **Greek youth highlight a 'bad health-care system' as their greatest worry (64.5 %)** (Fig. 9). The experience of the recent global pandemic might be behind this. Nonetheless, a 'global pandemic' (35.1 %) is among the three least mentioned worries, and respondents emphasise a national welfare deficit in Greece. **The second fear young people mention is unemployment (60.7 %)**, a realistic worry for young people in Greece. According to the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT), in 2023, youth unemployment (15–29 year-olds) in Greece was 21.8 %, ³⁶ one of the highest in the European Union.

More than half of young people in Greece also worry about 'not having a decent pension', underlining one more national welfare problem. Two international issues are also considered worrying by nearly half of respondents, namely 'pollution and climate change' (50.1 %) and 'war' (48.8 %).

Fig. 9 Fears and concerns among youth in Greece (in %)

To what extent are you frightened or concerned in relation to the following things?

Share of 'a lot'-responses

	Male	Female	Total
Being a victim of domestic violence	17.8	33.3	25.5
Negative effects of artificial intelligence	30.1	34.1	32.1
Global pandemic	31.6	38.8	35.1
Terrorist attack	31.5	40.5	36.0
Being a victim of sexual violence (including rape)	23.3	53.7	38.5
Being a victim of physical violence	30.7	51.5	41.1
Too many immigrants and refugees	43.6	44.1	43.9
Getting robbed by someone	39.2	48.5	43.9
Housing problems	42.2	47.8	44.9
Getting seriously ill	36.6	54.3	45.3
War	44.5	53.2	48.8
Pollution and climate change	42.9	57.4	50.1
Not having a decent pension	48.5	60.3	54.3
Having no job	56.8	64.3	60.7
Bad healthcare system	58.7	70.6	64.5

Fears of becoming a victim not as high. This also applies to global issues, such as 'terrorism' (36 %) and 'pandemic' (35.1 %). Lastly, young people do not have digital worries about artificial intelligence (32.1 %).

Notably, there appear to be significant differences between genders on 12 out of 14 questions presented to the respondents (applying chi-square tests).³⁷ **Women, in general, tend to express worries more often than men (Fig. 9). Nonetheless, it is remarkable that women, much more often than men, tend to confess fears of victimisation.** Therefore, women perceive themselves as vulnerable to 'sexual violence'³⁸ (53.7 %), 'domestic violence'³⁹ (33.3 %), and 'physical violence' (51.5 %).⁴⁰

In order to get a picture of young people's main social perceptions, they were asked to answer questions targeting social values, social groups, and experiences of discrimination.

First, participants were asked to indicate whether some behaviours can be justified in their opinion. **Young people are open to behaviours that involve self-determination, namely 'abortion' (Mean=6.16) and 'homosexuality' (Mean=6.12). They also tend to justify the use of social contacts for reasons of efficiency⁴¹ (Mean=5.61). By contrast, behaviours reflecting civic disengagement and/or lack of reliability are rather rejected. 'Cheating on taxes if you have the chance' (Mean=4.72), as well as 'accepting/giving a bribe', do not appear to be considered justified by most young people.**

It is worth noting that women are more supportive of self-determination-related behaviours than men with regard to 'abortion'⁴² and 'homosexuality'⁴³ (applying independent samples T-test), while men tend to reject 'cheating on taxes' less often.⁴⁴

Fig. 10 Societal views among youth in Greece (in %)

How strongly do you agree with the following statements?

Share of 'agree'-responses

	Male	Female	Total
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women	9.9	4.8	7.4
There is a natural hierarchy between black and white peoples	11.0	10.6	10.8
On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do	16.7	7.4	12.1
Immigrants enrich our culture	17.0	18.9	17.9
Jews have too much influence in our country	22.0	19.5	20.8
Same-sex couples are as good parents as other couples	19.8	39.2	29.5
We must protect our own culture from the influence of other cultures	40.0	31.7	35.9
Same-sex couples should have the right to marry	32.1	52.5	42.2

In addition, comparisons between age sub-groups (applying one-way ANOVAs)⁴⁵ indicate that younger people (14–18 year-olds) (Mean=5.54) justify 'homosexuality' to a lesser extent than 19–24 year-olds (Mean=6.55) and 25–29 year-olds (Mean=6.30).

Looking at multiple societal views of young Greek respondents, the three most supported concern acceptance of same-sex families and ethnocentrism. Nearly four in ten agree that 'same-sex couples should have the right to marry' (42.2 %) (Fi. 10). To a lesser extent, they also support the view that 'same-sex couples are as good parents as other couples' (29.5 %). More than one in four (35.9 %) support the claim that 'we must protect our culture from the influence of other cultures'. Views reflecting distinctions between social groups, such as the dominance of men in political representation (12.1 %), the superiority of whites over black people (10.8 %), and the distribution of occupational resources in favour of men over women (7.4 %), are much less supported.

As far as gender differences are concerned, women tend to be more supportive than men of same-sex families with regard to parenting⁴⁶ and marriage⁴⁷ (applying chi-square tests). By contrast, men more than women tend to support views that empower their social position, for example, that they are 'better political leaders than women' and that they 'should have more right to a job than women' in case of lack of jobs.⁴⁸


Also, men are more prone to ethnocentric views, such as that there is a need to 'protect their own culture from the influence of other cultures'⁴⁹ and to antisemitism (for example, 'Jews have too much influence in the country').⁵⁰

We focus on young people's perceptions of different minority groups and their experiences of discrimination. First, participants were asked to express 'how they would feel if one of the following families or persons moved into their neighbourhood'. According to their answers, **young people in Greece declare a social affinity with Christians** (69.3 % 'Good/Very good') (Fig. 11). To a lesser extent, they state they would feel 'good/very good' about the following as neighbours: Jewish people (45.2 %), LGBTQIA+ people (39.8 %), and Muslim people (36.9 %). Social distance is stated rather for Roma people (14.5 %) and drug addicts (8.8 %). As far as LGBTQIA+ people are concerned, women are more often among those who declare relevant social affinity than men.⁵¹

Participants were also asked to assess the rights of different minority groups in Greece. Answers reveal that **'women' and 'young people' are perceived as advantaged, while 'members of the LGBTQIA+ community' and 'ethnic minorities' are moderately valued. 'Poor people' are considered the most disadvantaged social group.**⁵²

Fig. 11 Opinions on neighbours among youth in Greece (in %)

How would you feel if one of the following families or persons moved into your neighbourhood?



Men, in general, attribute more rights to all the aforementioned minority groups,⁵³ except for 'poor people', where there is no difference between genders with regard to perceptions. Especially as far as the rights of women⁵⁴ are concerned, twice as many men as women declare that they have too many rights. Stereotypical divisions between genders are therefore highlighted when it comes to perceptions of social power. Women say that they need to improve their social power, while men state that women have already reached that goal.

Discrimination

Discrimination is not common among young people in Greece. More than half of all respondents declared that they have never been discriminated against for any reason. In addition, among those who have experienced discrimination at least once, the reasons, in order of frequency, are as follows: 'Political convictions' (44.5 %), 'Economic background' (37.5 %), 'Ethnic origin' (36.5 %), 'Gender' (32.2 %), 'Religious beliefs' (25.3 %), 'Sexual orientation' (24.6 %), 'Spoken language' (21.3 %).

As expected, **more than seven in ten (76.9 %) declared themselves to be Greek orthodox as far as religious identity is concerned. But almost 16 % declared that they 'do not belong to any religious community'.**

No differences between genders were found. However, pre-adults (14–18 year-olds) less often define themselves as non-religious (21.9 %) compared with 19–24 year-olds (46.5 %) and 25–29 year-olds (31.6 %).⁵⁵ Attending religious services or going to church does not seem to be a common cultural practice for young people. Most of them go to church 'only on special holy days' (30.7 %).

Main Takeaways

- 1.** The most widely accepted personal values emphasise self-reliance and strength, while collective values are given lower priority.
- 2.** Most Greek young people assess their current lives as satisfactory in general.
- 3.** More than one in two hope that their personal future will be better than it is at present, but nearly half of them tend to be pessimistic about the future of their country.
- 4.** Young people often express worries about the welfare of Greece. The health-care system, unemployment and decent pensions are mentioned most often.
- 5.** Fear of becoming the victim of multiple forms of personal violence is stated much more often by women than by men.

8 Political attitudes and participation

Perhaps no other issue has been more contested or talked about in recent years than the changing nature of the relationship between young people and politics. A burgeoning literature on the topic highlights aspects related to, among other things, youth political participation (Weiss 2020) and the fact that young people are likely to conceptualise differently what is (and is not) political participation (Pickard and Bessant 2018); the relationship between digital media and youth political engagement (Boulianne and Theocharis 2020); the individual forms of doing politics (or do-it-yourself politics) and the rise in issues related to the environment (Pickard 2019); the impact of precarious employment and unemployment in their levels of engagement and participation or in voting for far right parties (Monticelli and Bassoli 2018; Zagórski, Rama and Cordero 2021); and the fact that formal political actors seem to depoliticise young people (Giugni and Grasso 2020), which may result in their disengagement from politics. These, to name but a few, are some of the recurring themes in the political science literature on young people and politics. On the broader framework of democracy, trust and representation, concerns are raised regarding young people's underrepresentation⁵⁶ in representative institutions, such as national and European Parliaments, and the relationship between (declining) political trust and negative assessments of the quality of democracy.

In Greece, interest in the relationship between young people and politics is ever expanding, with numerous publications, research programmes and surveys emerging in the past ten years.⁵⁷ These studies, although sometimes inconclusive, point to the importance of political socialisation factors in shaping political attitudes and participation and to the financial crisis as a critical juncture for 'doing politics' in Greece (for an overview see Kousis and Kalogeraki 2022: 217–235).

Greek young people know about politics, but don't see themselves as represented

Political interest is an indicator that captures the degree of one's psychological involvement in politics and serves as a key factor that explains numerous other political orientations. So-called 'subjective' interest in politics has been used as a way of operationalising this concept for nearly eight decades (van Deth 1990: 281). In this survey, we have used subjective self-reporting by asking young people in Greece: 'How much are you personally interested in politics?' Respondents were able to choose between 'Not interested at all', 'Mostly not interested', 'In between', 'Mostly interested' or 'Very interested'.

Overall, **young people in Greece exhibit rather low levels of political interest**, with 16.1 % claiming to be very interested in politics, 19.6 % mostly interested, 37.6 % standing in between, 14.9 % mostly not interested, and finally 11.9 % claiming to be very interested in politics (Fig. 12). **Men profess higher levels of political interest than women, with 39.6 % of men claiming to be mostly and very interested, compared with 31.4 % of women. Age is also a predictor of political interest, with older age groups professing the highest levels of interest.** To that end, 31.7 % of 14–18-year-olds are very and mostly interested in politics, a figure that rises to 36 % for 19–24 year-olds and to 39.1 % for 24–29 year-olds.⁵⁸ Although it is difficult to tell whether those differences point to a life-cycle effect or to micro generational differences, they are nevertheless indicative of the fact that youth, as a social category, may contain many internal divisions.





Fig. 12 Interest in politics among youth in Greece (in %)



So-called 'internal political efficacy' (Cambell et al. 1960) is an indicator of a person's ability to understand and participate in politics and is key to political trust and participation. In the present study, young Greeks were asked to assess their knowledge of politics on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates that 'I know nothing at all' and 5 indicates that 'I know a lot'. Their answers indicate that **young Greeks feel that they know 'somewhat' to 'rather a lot' about politics, with a mean value of 3.17**. In similar fashion to the previous question, we detect some gender and age differences, **with young men professing to know more about politics than young women**, with a mean value of 3.29 for men and 3.04 for women, and older sub-groups of 25–29 year-olds also claiming to be more knowledgeable, with a mean score of 3.27, compared with 3.18 for the 19–24 age group and 3.04 for 14–18 year olds.

Interestingly, the one indicator on which there are no gender or age differences is the question on the representation of young people's interests in politics. When respondents were asked 'how well do you think young people's interests are represented in national politics?', they overwhelmingly gave negative answers, **with almost six out of ten young Greeks believing that their interests are either poorly (40.4 %) or not at all (18 %) represented in national politics**.

Young Greeks may vote, but still dislike parties

Low turnout in elections has become a recurring issue in all parliamentary democracies. Declining voting trends⁵⁹ in recent decades have raised concerns about the quality of democracy. In Greece, voting is compulsory, but enforcement of sanctions was abandoned in the year 2000. Turnout has been declining in the past 15 years, with turnout in the June 2023 national elections (53.7 %) and the June 2024 European Parliament elections (41.4 %) being the lowest since the restoration of democracy in Greece in 1974.⁶⁰ Young people and voting has become another hot topic, with evidence pointing to their propensity to abstain from electoral politics (Deželan 2023: 14). Although conventional wisdom has it that young people tend to participate less in elections, it is unclear whether this trend is reversing or not. In Greece, the data seem inconclusive, although past accounts pointed in the direction of lower turnout for younger age groups (Vassilopoulos and Vernardakis 2015), a trend that was verified in the last national elections, in which it is estimated that their turnout decreased further (Koustenis 2024: 43).

In the present study, the **evidence shows that young people did indeed vote in the last national elections (June 2023)**; 73.2 % of 19–24 year-olds and 80 % of 25–29 year-olds claimed to have voted.⁶¹ Even if self-reporting is usually higher than the official results, due to social desirability (McAllister and Quinlan 2021), these figures do not point to an apathetic and alienated youth.

What is probably more interesting is the follow-up question on those reporting that they didn't vote in the previous election. Respondents were given the following list of reasons for not voting and were asked to choose one:

- Was prevented from voting e.g. due to illness or holiday
- It would have not changed anything if I had voted
- This election was not a really important decision
- As a matter of principle, I do not vote
- There was no party I wanted to vote for
- I am not interested in politics at all.
- I did not feel informed enough to decide about voting
- Other

The main reason chosen by 36 % of those who abstained was that they were 'prevented from voting, for example, due to illness or holiday', with 17.1 % claiming that 'there was no party I wanted to vote for'. Other reasons chosen included 'it would not have changed anything if I had voted' (13.4 %). We could argue therefore that abstention, even when it takes place, is caused primarily by practical reasons that prevent young voters from getting to the polling station and less a symptom of political disengagement. Interestingly, **young people may vote but tend to dislike the major parties contesting the elections. When asked to say how they feel about the major parties in Greece, on a scale from zero to ten, where zero means that they strongly dislike and ten means that they strongly like, all parties attracted negative assessments.**

New Democracy (ND), the conservative ruling party, is the least disliked with a mean value of 3.45; SYRIZA, the opposition party, has a mean value of 3.10; PASOK gets 3.21, KKE 2.71 and the Spartans 2.48. Apart from the latter, a far-right party founded in 2017 with strong connections to the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn, which was later banned from running in the 2024 European elections,⁶² all the other parties listed are part of the traditional party system in Greece. **It is therefore safe to say that traditional parties do not appeal to young voters.**


Young Greeks gravitate towards the centre and identify as progressive

Concerning their political beliefs, young Greeks were asked to place themselves on a left–right axis, with one indicating that the far left and ten the far right. The majority place themselves in the centre, with a mean of 5.88. Young women tend to be more left leaning (mean = 5.49) than young men (mean = 5.84), a finding that is consistent with gender differences in electoral behaviour in Greece (Koustenis 2024).

At the same time, respondents were asked to place themselves on a scale of one to ten, where one means 'conservative' and ten means 'progressive'. **Most young Greeks place themselves closer to the progressive pole of the axis (mean = 6.56), with young women once again identifying as somewhat more progressive (mean = 7) than young men (mean = 6.15).** Finally, when asked where they place themselves on a ten-point axis, with one meaning 'radical' and ten meaning 'moderate', most respondents placed themselves somewhere in between (mean = 5.62).⁶³

Fig. 13 Views on voting at 17 among youth in Greece (in %)

Young people can vote from the age of 17. Which of the following do you think will happen in the long run? Figures do not add to 100 because respondents could choose up to two options



Young people believe that political parties try to manipulate them

An electoral reform in 2016 expanded voting rights to 17 year-olds. When young respondents were asked to assess this change, they were offered a list of options to choose from in an effort to elicit what they believe will happen in the long run (Fig. 13). **More than half (50.7 %) answered that 'political parties will attempt to manipulate young people', with 34.1 % believing that this reform will boost participation, because 'more young people will take part in the elections'.** Fewer than two out of ten (19.6 %) believe that by the act of voting 'more young people will be interested in the political life of the country'.

In favour of income equality but sceptical of an increased role of the state

Young Greeks were asked about their political views on a series of issues with regard to the role of government and the call for more income equality.

First, they were asked whether they agree or not with the statement 'Incomes of the poor and the rich should be made more equal'. More than six out of ten (61.4 %) strongly and mostly agree with this statement. When asked about their level of agreement on whether 'Government ownership of business and industry should be increased', their opinions showed that they are less keen on such state intervention, given that 34.4 % strongly and mostly agree with the statement. However, young Greeks overwhelmingly agree (78 % strongly and mostly agrees) that 'Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for'.


Therefore, **young Greeks are strongly in favour of redistribution for the less fortunate, and believe that this should be the government's responsibility. However, they tend to be much more sceptical when it comes to an increased role for the state in economy through the ownership of business and industry.** Therefore, they see the state as having rather a regulatory role.

The concept of political trust is key to the functioning of democracies; over recent decades the overall decline in trust in new and established democracies has prompted concerns and has fuelled discussions on the future of representative democracy (Dalton 2004; Norris 2011).

Fig. 14 Trust in political institutions among youth in Greece (in %)

On the whole, how far do you trust the entities listed below?

Combined 'quite a lot' - and 'completely' - answers



Empirical research has demonstrated that people tend to trust those institutions more that are not politicised and divisive and tend to represent the community as a whole (the army, the judiciary or the church) and less those institutions that are perceived as more divisive (governments, parliaments, parties and so on) (Newton, Stolle and Zmerli 2018). Recent research has found that this applies to Greece as well (EnTrust 2024), where social and political trust was already generally low before the Great Recession resulted in another sharp decline.

Greek youth were presented with a list of 13 political institutions and were asked: 'On the whole, how far do you trust the entities listed below?', having to choose between 'Fully', 'Quite a lot', 'Somewhat', 'A little' and 'Not at all' (Fig. 14).

The army is the institution with the highest levels of trust, given that 43.5 % of Greek young people trust it quite a lot or fully. As discussed in the previous section, non-divisive institutions, such as the army, the police, religious institutions or the judiciary, tend to have higher levels of trust, while more politicised institutions have less. **However, the very low proportion of Greek young people who trust quite a lot/fully institutions such as political parties (8.1%), the media (10.3%), trade unions (12.3%), the national parliament (15.3%) or the national government (17.2%) is indicative of trends pointing rather to 'numbing cynicism' rather than 'vigilant scepticism'** (van der Meer 2017).

Trust in most institutions is related to the material situation of the respondents. With the exception of the army, the police and religious institutions, in all other cases young people from deprived backgrounds (those responding that they 'live in households with not enough money for basic bills (electricity, heating...) and food') are even less trusting of all the other Institutions.

44 % of young Greeks trust the army quite a lot or fully, making it the institution with the highest levels of trust

If young Greeks do not trust most Institutions, however, does that have an effect on democracy? When asked about their opinions on democracy, young Greeks were offered a number of statements to express their level of agreement or disagreement (Fig. 15). **The statement with which young people agree more is that 'Young people should have more possibilities to speak out in politics', with 67.7 % agreeing mostly and completely. At the same time, the majority of young Greeks support democracy no matter what**, because six out of ten (62.3 %) agree that 'democracy is a good form of government in general' and nearly as many (59.9 %) agree that 'democracy is always and under all circumstances preferable to any other kind of government'. On the other hand, nearly half of the respondents (45 %) agree that 'democracy is the best possible system only when it can deliver economic security for people'. **Although support for democracy is still dominant, we should be aware of the fact that antidemocratic attitudes are not unknown among young Greeks.** For example, three out of ten agree that 'we should have a strong leader who does not have to bother with Parliament or elections' and more than one in ten (14.4 %) blatantly agrees that 'under certain circumstances dictatorship is a better form of government than democracy'.


Young people demonstrate and volunteer, but turn their back on parties

Young people tend to engage in more informal and non-traditional political activities; recent data for Greece confirm these findings (Kakepaki 2023: 184). Greek young people were given a list of different ways to show political engagement and were asked whether 'they have done' or 'would do' any of them (Fig. 16). More than three out of ten young people in Greece (34.5 %) have participated in a demonstration. **Age is a robust predictor of this kind of political engagement; for example, only 25.7 % of 14–18 year-olds has participated in a demonstration, compared with 35.9 % for those aged 19–24 and 42.8 % for those aged 25–29.**⁶⁴ Similarly, 27.5 % have volunteered or participated in civil society activities, rising to 32.8 % for 25–29 year-olds.⁶⁵ Signing a set of political demands or supporting an online petition is something that 23.8 % of young Greeks have done, with the percentage for those aged 25–29 once again being higher (31.3 %).

Political consumerism, as it is sometimes called, is another initiative taken up by young people in Greece: 23.4 % have stopped buying things for political or environmental reasons, and yet again, older cohorts (25–29 year-olds) engage more (30.3 %) in such activities.⁶⁶ **Interestingly, the only initiatives not related to the age of the respondent are those that are closer to traditional party politics:** work for a political party or political group and participation in political activities online or in social networks are preferred by small segments of the youth population (5.4 and 16.7 %, respectively), without any indication that once younger cohorts move to the next age group they will get involved in such initiatives.

We may therefore assume that young people in Greece get involved in political initiatives and are even more willing to do so in the future, as long as these initiatives are non-partisan. Another important observation is related to gender and political participation.

Fig. 15 Opinions on democracy among youth in Greece (in %)

*How much do you agree/disagree with the following statements?**'Mostly agree' - and 'completely agree'-responses combined*

Although, as discussed in previous sections, young men tend to profess the highest levels of political interest and knowledge, when it comes to actual behaviour there is no statistical difference in the ways young women and young men engage in politics. The only exception is participation in political activities online or in social networks, where men are engaged more than women (19.2% of men, 14.5% of women). Whether this is an indication of how online communities are constructed, and the way political masculinities are built online is open to discussion and further investigation.

Young people fear for their jobs in the future


Much of the political rhetoric of all political actors is centred around the biggest issues that all countries will face in the future. The EU is set to adopt its strategic agenda for the next five years,⁶⁷ and the UN Sustainable Development Goals for 2030⁶⁸ are high on that agenda. It is therefore imperative to discuss with young people what they perceive to be critical for the future.

Young Greeks were given a list of twelve issues and were asked to say for each one whether they consider it to be one of the biggest issues that Greece will face in the next decade (Fig. 17). **More than six out of ten young Greeks (66.4%) consider unemployment to be the biggest issue facing Greece.** Next comes the 'quality of public services (health, education)', with 51.3% of young Greeks believing this to be one of the biggest challenges for the country in the near future. 'Corruption', 'immigration' and 'climate change' follow with half of young people identifying them as future problems for the country. **It thus seems that the most pressing issue for young Greeks is related to their material well-being (unemployment).**

This finding is consistent with previous surveys (Koliastasis 2022: 10), in which unemployment was regarded as one of the major problems for young people (although the question was worded differently).

Fig. 16 **Forms of political engagement among youth in Greece (in %)**

There are different forms of political engagement. Have you done or would you do any of the following?



Quality of public services, immigration, corruption, climate change and inequalities are considered almost equally important. Issues such as what has been termed as the brain drain ('skilled workforce leaving the country') or the demographic decline, which are high on the political agenda, do not reach the same level of concern among young Greeks. It is also worth noting that 'robotisation and transformation of employment' is considered the least pressing issue; it might be that unemployment, which many mentioned, encompasses such concerns.

When we look more closely at the gender differences in young people's concerns, a few things stand out. For example, although unemployment is the majority choice of both young men and women, for women 'climate change' is the second most important issue (57 % of women compared with 43.3 % of men find it to be one of the biggest issues of the next decade).⁶⁹

This finding is consistent with previous research that finds young women to be more worried than young men about climate change (Iliou, Kakepaki and Klironomos 2022: 80).

Young women are also more worried than men about corruption and inequalities. It appears therefore that gender is a factor that shapes the way young people view (and fear for) their future.


Human rights, individual freedom and security matter most to young people

Young Greeks were presented with a list of nine values and were asked to rank the three that are more important to them:

- Human rights
- Individual freedom
- Security
- Democracy
- Economic welfare of citizens
- The rule of law
- Social equality
- Gender equality
- Employment

Fig. 17 Issues for the next decade for youth in Greece (in %)

Which of the following do you think will be the biggest issues facing your country in the next decade?



The three values that were ranked first were 'human rights' (24.9 %), 'individual freedom' (15.4 %) and 'security' (12.4 %), with 'democracy' coming a close fourth (12.3 %). **The picture overall seems to indicate that young Greeks are fairly liberal, favouring values that are closer to freedom than to equality** (social and gender equality were ranked first by 5.9 % and 5.8 %, respectively).


When young Greeks were asked to rate the status of these values, both in Greece and in the EU, respondents rated the domestic situation as visibly worse than the situation in the EU overall (Fig.18). For 'human rights', the value ranked by most as more important to them, the difference is 20.6 %. The EU was ranked best in comparison with Greece with regard to 'employment' (33.7 %) and 'economic welfare of citizens' (30.6 %). Overall, young Greeks perceive the EU as faring much better in relation to values; indeed, Greece was ranked below it on every single item.

Proud to be Greek and against immigration

Nativist and anti-immigrant sentiments have become widespread all over Europe. Far-right xenophobic parties are an alarming phenomenon and seem to be creeping into mainstream politics (Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn 2016), even among young people.⁷⁰ In Greece, feelings of national pride among young Greeks have been documented in past surveys, and the propensity of young men to vote for far-right parties has been also confirmed in the most recent national elections in Greece (Koustenis 2024: 42).

Fig. 18 Perceived state of the following values among youth in Greece (in %)

How good or bad, in your view, is the status of the following values in your country and in the EU?
 'Very good'- and 'good'-responses combined




Young Greeks were presented with a series of statements measuring nationalistic attitudes (Fig. 19). Their rejection of immigration is evident. Most young Greeks (56.8 %) disagree and mostly disagree that 'Greece should accept/receive more immigrants', and at the same time express their pride in 'being a citizen of Greece' (55.8 % agree and mostly agree). Young Greeks rather reject *jus sanguinis* (right of descent); 46.7 % disagree and mostly disagree with the notion that a 'real Greek is only a person with real Greek blood' and the statement that 'it would be the best if Greece was inhabited by real Greeks', but approximately one in four agree with both propositions. Similarly, one in three Greeks (33.1 %) agrees and mostly agrees that 'non-Greeks living in Greece should adopt Greek customs and values'.

All in all, young Greeks believe that the country in general shouldn't receive more immigrants, and that immigrants living in Greece should adopt the customs and values of the country, which young people are particularly proud of.

Another pattern that emerges from the answers of young Greeks is that the younger cohort of respondents (14–18 year-olds) are more prone to adopt nationalist and anti-immigrant attitudes. They are prouder than the older sub-cohorts,⁷¹ reject immigration more,⁷² believe more that it would be best if Greece was inhabited by 'real Greeks'⁷³ and agree more that non-Greeks should adopt Greek costumes and values.⁷⁴ Although it is inconclusive whether these attitudes will change as they grow older, they nevertheless give cause for concern about the potential of a younger generation of Greeks who might adopt even more xenophobic and racist attitudes in the future. These might be reflected in their electoral behaviour once they have the right to vote.

Fig. 19 Nationalistic Attitudes among youth in Greece (in %)

To what degree do you agree with the following statements?



Young greeks want to stay in the EU but see themselves primarily as Greek

Greece has long been one of the most pro-European countries in the EU. Even the significant Eurosceptic shift during the financial crisis was fairly 'soft', rejecting EU policies but still supporting Greek membership of the European Union (Katsanidou and Lefkofridi 2020; Clemens, Nanou and Verney 2016).

When young Greeks were asked their opinion on whether Greece should remain in or leave the European Union, more than six out of ten (63.8 %) did not want Greece to leave. Only two out of ten (20.7 %) were in favour, and 15.5 % replied 'don't know'. Although there is a clear consensus regarding EU membership, a small minority voices its concerns in a more staunchly anti-European manner.

When asked whether they see themselves as Greek or as European, however, young Greeks identify much more as Greek than as European. Almost eight out of ten young Greeks (78.1 %) see themselves as very much and completely Greek.

Half as many (37.4 %) young Greeks see themselves as European. Younger cohorts (14–18 year-olds) are even more attached to their national identity: 85.1 % of them see themselves very much and completely Greek, compared with 73.6 % of 19–24 year-olds and 76.3 % of 25–29 year-olds.

'We believe in gender equality, but ...'


Anti-feminist attitudes and new forms of sexism have emerged as issues of grave concern in European societies, with discussions of possible threats due to the rise of far-right parties (Verloo and Paternotte 2018) and sexist attitudes among young men (Off, Charron and Alexander 2022).

Greece has one of the lowest scores in EIGE's Gender Equality Index.⁷⁵ According to data from the World Values Survey, segments of the population still hold quite stereotypical attitudes regarding gender roles (Kakepaki 2022). In recent years, the #MeToo movement and elevated media visibility regarding certain gender-based violence cases have sparked even more debates on these topics.

Fig. 20 Views on gender equality among youth in Greece (in %)

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Combined responses 'strongly agree' and 'agree'



When young Greeks were asked a set of questions designed to measure traditional and modern sexist attitudes, the results were mixed (Fig. 20). **Most Greeks, both men and women, have fully accepted the role of women in the workforce and approximately seven out of ten would be equally comfortable having a woman or a man as a boss. Conversely, only a small minority (14.6%) adhere to a traditional division of gender roles** and 'agree' and 'agree strongly' that 'when both parents are employed and their child gets sick at school, the school should call the mother rather than the father'. Although still small, the share of young men agreeing (17.2 per cent) is higher than that of young women (11.9%).⁷⁶

Most young Greeks still feel that there is room for improvement: 37.2% agree and strongly agree that 'society has reached the point where men and women have equal opportunities for achievement', although while nearly half of young men agree with this statement (47.4%) only around one in four women do so (26.8%).⁷⁷

To that end, young men more than women tend to express views that indicate they believe there has been an 'overreaction' from women: 34.1% of young men agree and strongly agree that 'over the past few years, the government and news media have been showing more concern over women than is warranted by women's experiences', as opposed to 21.9% of young women.⁷⁸ Finally, a significantly lower percentage of young men agree and strongly agree that they 'can understand the anger of women movements in Greece' (32.2%), whereas young women fully support this statement (58.7% agree and strongly agree).⁷⁹ **We can assume therefore that although overt sexism is probably a thing of the past for most young Greeks, 'modern sexism' (Swim et al. 1995), which dismisses women's demands and denies that women are still discriminated against, is present among some young Greeks, especially young men.**

Main takeaways

1. Young people in Greece exhibit rather low levels of political interest. Men profess higher levels of political interest than women. Age is also a predictor of political interest, with older age groups professing highest levels of interest.

2. Young Greeks believe that their interests are poorly represented in national politics, but still vote in national elections. Abstention, when it takes place, is caused primarily by practical reasons that prevent young voters from attending the polling station. On the other hand, while young people vote they may dislike the major parties contesting the election.

3. Young people feel that they should have more possibilities to speak out in politics. At the same time, the majority of young Greeks support democracy no matter what. Although support for democracy is still dominant, we should be aware that antidemocratic attitudes are not absent among young Greeks.

4. Demonstrations are the most frequent political initiative taken by young Greeks. Age is also a sound predictor of this kind of engagement. Young people in Greece take political initiatives and are even more willing to take them in the future, as long as these initiatives are non-partisan. Although young men claim the highest levels of political interest and knowledge, when it comes to actual behaviour there is no statistical difference in the ways young women and young men engage in politics, the only exception being participation in political activities online/social networks, where men are more engaged than women.

5. Young Greeks gravitate towards the centre and identify as progressive; they are rather liberal, preferring values that are closer to freedom than to equality; when asked to rate the status of these values, both in Greece and the EU, in all cases respondents rated the domestic situation as visibly worse than the situation in the EU as a whole.

Conclusions

In the preceding chapters we have illustrated our basic findings on the core values, attitudes and orientations of young Greeks today. If we had to summarise them in a few sentences, we would describe Greek young people as (i) individualistic but family oriented, (ii) negative towards the political system but eager to see themselves represented, and (iii) skilled but worried about their material well-being in the future.

(i) Young Greeks anticipate having essential assets in their future lives that are key pillars of well-being in adulthood, namely a family of their own and a well-paid job. They rely on themselves and their close relatives for their first steps rather than government support, as they are supported by their families. Consequently, they are optimistic about their personal future but pessimistic about the future of the country. Although various youth employment schemes can assist their economic independence, affordable housing for young people is an essential step for independence, and one that political actors should prioritise.

(ii) Young Greeks do not see themselves as represented in national politics and feel that parties will try to manipulate them. They have strong antiparty sentiments but at the same time want their voice to be heard. Therefore, there is a demand for political actors to better represent young people's needs. In some countries the issue of age quotas has come up as a possible solution. We suggest that political actors must find more meaningful ways to engage young people. The recent electoral reform that enables postal voting⁸⁰ may in the long run enable citizen participation, especially among young people, who are more receptive to such initiatives. Also, in symbolic terms, the age at which people are eligible to stand for the national parliament (presently 25 years of age, one of the highest in the EU) could be lowered.

(iii) Young Greeks are moderately satisfied with their current lives and somewhat unwilling to leave their country. Nonetheless, their material well-being is of vital importance. Unemployment is the one issue that keeps coming up as critical. This is the first generation of young Greeks destined to have a lower standard of living than their parents and this is reflected in their outlook. Interestingly, and probably contrary to what was happening during the decade of the economic crisis, most young people do not favour emigration.

Two final remarks:

Young Greeks today have lived their entire lives as European citizens, and therefore cannot easily see themselves separately from the European Union. Although critical of EU institutions at the same time they believe that some core values are better protected there.

Young Greeks prioritise self-centred values, such as independence, responsibility and a successful career, and stand for equality and social rights for all. Nevertheless, gender differences are evident in many of the social orientations of young Greeks and may provide favourable ground for the spillover of certain ideas about masculinity to anti-democratic attitudes.

In conclusion, young Greeks who participated in this survey appear to be self-centred and **individualistic**. This is to be expected for people their age, focused on the first steps towards independence. They declare themselves to be **unsatisfied** by welfare, the education provided them and politics, and are worried about their future employment opportunities. However, their concerns do not seem to hinder them, as they declare that they **want their voices to be heard** and their perspectives represented in politics. Reading between the lines of the present report may help stakeholders to formulate priorities for youth policies. Giving the young themselves the opportunity to express their point of view is undoubtedly a valid way of identifying policy priorities and implementing policies.

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Endnotes

- 1 Applying chi-square tests, there are no differences between age sub-groups ($\chi^2 = 16.424$, $df = 10$, $p = 0.088$, $N = 999$), or between genders ($\chi^2 = 4.781$, $df = 5$, $p = 0.443$, $N = 999$).
- 2 $\chi^2 = 198.895$, $df = 10$, $p = 0.000$, $N = 1,000$
- 3 → eurydice.eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-education-systems/greece/organisation-education-system-and-its-structure
- 4 → minedu.gov.gr
- 5 According to Eurostat data from 2023, NEETS (those not in education, employment or training) in Greece accounted for 16 % of the age group between 15–29 years of age. Thus NEETS are somewhat overrepresented in our sample (→ ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/product/page/EDAT_LFSE_21).
- 6 $\chi^2 = 33.753$, $df = 14$, $p = 0.002$, $N = 976$
- 7 $\chi^2 = 27.471$, $df = 7$, $p = 0.000$, $N = 973$
- 8 $\chi^2 = 74.046$, $df = 14$, $p = 0.000$, $N = 968$
- 9 Hellenic Statistical Authority (April 2024): Labour research.
- 10 Unemployment by sex and age, monthly data, Eurostat.
- 11 $\chi^2 = 220.793$, $df = 20$, $p = 0.000$, $N = 1,000$
- 12 $\chi^2 = 24.742$, $df = 8$, $p = 0.002$, $N = 468$
- 13 $\chi^2 = 22.281$, $df = 2$, $p = 0.000$, $N = 1,000$
- 14 $\chi^2 = 10.829$, $df = 2$, $p = 0.004$, $N = 1,000$
- 15 $\chi^2 = 20.570$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.000$, $N = 962$
- 16 As illustrated in the relevant figure the percentage of young people still living at home with their parents in Greece started to rise after 2010. Greece has one of the highest percentages of young people in this position and much higher than the European average.
- 17 Chi-Square Tests confirm significant relation between age subgroups and (6 out of 8 items) of Household formation with the exception of 'Live with my grandparent(s)' and 'Live with my friends/other relatives'.
- 18 Descriptive bivariate analysis confirms that among those who live alone the majority are undergraduate students (43.7 %). The remaining in descending order are: 'Not in any kind of education or training' (18.3 %), 'Enrolled in some other form of education or training' (14.8 %), 'School/high school /vocational training' (4.2 %).
- 19 $\chi^2 = 14.67$, $df = 8$, $p = 0.06$, $N = 1,000$
- 20 The remaining percentages are 26.4 % for 14–18 year-olds and 28.3 % for 25–29 year-olds.
- 21 The remaining percentages are 37.5 % for 14–18 year-olds and 0.00 % for 25–29 year-olds.
- 22 $\chi^2 = 15.81$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.03$, $N = 998$
- 23 $\chi^2 = 139.310$, $df = 10$, $p = 0.00$, $N = 999$
- 24 Distribution within 'married' people: 33.6 % for 14–18 year-olds, 14.3 % for 19–24 year-olds, and 52.1 % for 25–29 year-olds. Distribution within 'living with partner, not married': 7.3 % for 14–18 year-olds, 45.7 % for 19–24 year-olds, 47 % for 25–29 year-olds. Distribution within 'in relationship, but do not live together': 20.9 % for 14–18 year-olds, 54.2 % for 19–24 year-olds, 24.9 % for 25–29 year-olds.
- 25 Central tendency indicators are as follows: Mode: 30, Mean: 28.45, Median: 28.92, Std. Deviation: 4.664, Range: 38, Minimum: 15, Maximum: 53, $N = 514$.
- 26 $\chi^2 = 44.39$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.355$, $N = 997$
- 27 $\chi^2 = 13.67$, $df = 8$, $p = 0.091$, $N = 879$
- 28 $r^2 = -0.029$, $p = 0.420$, $N = 781$

- 29 Means of values in descending order are as follows (1= Not at all important, 5= Very important): 'Being independent' (4.45), 'Taking responsibility' (4.32), 'Having a successful career' (4.12), 'Healthy eating' (3.88), 'Graduating from university' (3.75), 'Having children' (3.63), 'Doing sports' (3.61), 'Getting/Being rich' (3.56), 'Looking good' (3.38), 'Getting/Being married' (3.21), 'Being active in politics' (3.07), 'Participating in civic actions/initiatives' (3.01), 'Wearing branded clothes' (2.39).
- 30 $t(950) = 2.42$, $p = 0.000$
- 31 Central tendency indicators are as follows: Mode: 7, Mean: 6.29, Median: 7, Std. Deviation: 1.987, Range: 9, Minimum: 1, Maximum: 10, N = 992
- 32 $t(989) = -0.15$, $p = 0.881$. Men (Mean = 6.28), Women (Mean = 6.30)
- 33 $F(2,989) = 11.589$, $p = 0.000$
- 34 $\chi^2 = 24.259$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.000$, $N = 880$
- 35 $\chi^2 = 0.530$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.971$, $N = 920$
- 36 See The Greek Economy (May 2024). Hellenic Statistical Authority, p. 35 → statistics.gr/documents/20181/18272859/greek+economy_31-05-2024.pdf/55aace02-e077-7366-e392-436e0d02a43a
- 37 There is no difference between genders in relation to such items as 'Too many immigrants and refugees' and 'Negative effects of artificial intelligence'.
- 38 $\chi^2 = 153.864$, $df = 2$, $p = 0.000$, $N = 941$
- 39 $\chi^2 = 39.057$, $df = 2$, $p = 0.000$, $N = 949$
- 40 $\chi^2 = 53.592$, $df = 2$, $p = 0.000$, $N = 947$
- 41 'Using connections to "get things done"' (for example, in hospital, at different offices, etc.).
- 42 $t(879) = -4.817$, $p = 0.000$. Men (Mean = 5.74), Women (Mean = 6.57)
- 43 $t(921) = -5.318$, $p = 0.000$. Men (Mean = 5.65), Women (Mean = 6.59)
- 44 $t(905) = -1.977$, $p = 0.048$. Men (Mean = 4.87), Women (Mean = 4.56)
- 45 $F(2,786) = 9.979$, $p = 0.000$
- 46 $\chi^2 = 44.436$, $df = 3$, $p = 0.000$, $N = 895$
- 47 $\chi^2 = 40.52$, $df = 3$, $p = 0.000$, $N = 927$
- 48 $\chi^2 = 54.269$, $df = 3$, $p = 0.000$, $N = 937$
- 49 $\chi^2 = 11.35$, $df = 3$, $p = 0.010$, $N = 934$
- 50 $\chi^2 = 10.456$, $df = 3$, $p = 0.015$, $N = 821$
- 51 $\chi^2 = 39.493$, $df = 3$, $p = 0.000$, $N = 998$
- 52 Proportions of answers concerning 'Enough rights/ Too many rights' are as follows: 'Women' (66.8 %), 'Young people' (57.8 %), 'Members of the LGBTQIA+ community' (50.2 %), 'Ethnic minorities' (50.1 %), 'Poor people' (25.9 %).
- 53 Applying chi-square tests.
- 54 $\chi^2 = 65.407$, $df = 2$, $p = 0.000$, $N = 949$
- 55 $\chi^2 = 34.032$, $df = 14$, $p = 0.002$, $N = 1,000$
- 56 → data.ipu.org/age-brackets
- 57 Although the list of publications and research is ever expanding, some of the most robust comparative work that includes Greece can be found at the MYPLACE (→ myplaceresearch.wordpress.com) and EURYKA (→ unige.ch/sciences-societe/euryka/home) projects.
- 58 Pearson chi-Square = 25.319, $df = 8$, $p = 0.001$, $N = 996$
- 59 → idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout-database
- 60 → ekloges.yypes.gr/current/e/home/index.html

- 61 We exclude 14–18 year-olds from the discussion because the majority of them were not entitled to vote.
- 62 → ekathimerini.com/news/1237263/greek-top-court-bars-far-right-spartiates-party-from-eu-election-race
- 63 We should note here that almost one in five of those surveyed (19.6 %) answered that they ‘don’t know’ and therefore did not place themselves on the radical/moderate axis.
- 64 $\chi^2 = 22.076$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.000$, $N = 993$
- 65 $\chi^2 = 13.189$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.010$, $N = 993$
- 66 Pearson chi-Square = 15.039, $df = 4$, $p = 0.005$, $N = 992$
- 67 → consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/strategic-agenda-2024-2029
- 68 <https://sdgs.un.org>
- 69 $\chi^2 = 18.154$, $df = 1$, $p = 0.000$, $N = 998$
- 70 → politico.eu/article/far-right-europe-young-voters-election-2024-foreigners-out-generation-france-germany
- 71 $\chi^2 = 30.167$, $df = 8$, $p = 0.000$, $N = 974$
- 72 $\chi^2 = 20.375$, $df = 8$, $p = 0.009$, $N = 966$
- 73 $\chi^2 = 21.170$, $df = 8$, $p = 0.007$, $N = 966$
- 74 $\chi^2 = 25.560$, $df = 8$, $p = 0.001$, $N = 959$
- 75 → eige.europa.eu/gender-equality-index/2023/EL
- 76 $\chi^2 = 20.890$, $df = 6$, $p = 0.002$, $N = 999$
- 77 $\chi^2 = 65.749$, $df = 6$, $p = 0.000$, $N = 999$
- 78 $\chi^2 = 23.367$, $df = 6$, $p = 0.001$, $N = 999$
- 79 $\chi^2 = 86.442$, $df = 6$, $p = 0.000$, $N = 999$
- 80 → ypes.gr/en/elections/eu-elections/general-information-about-postal-voting

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