DEMOCRATIC CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN THE ARMED FORCES

POLICY BRIEF

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In its fullest sense, it means that all decisions regarding the defence of the country - the organization, deployment, and use of armed forces; the setting of military priorities and requirements; and the allocation of the necessary resources - are made by democratic leadership and scrutinized by the legislative body in order to ensure popular support and legitimacy.

Simon Lunn

Abstract

At present, the Albanian Armed Forces enjoy insufficient management authority over human resources, budgets and assets. These powers, which traditionally belong to the armed forces in Western countries, have been gradually removed starting in the 1990s; since 2008, they have been exercised almost entirely by the Ministry of Defence. The unfavourable situation created, especially after 2008, has resulted in the poor state of the Armed Forces in terms of their capabilities, resources and force development, leading to teething troubles and difficulties in carrying out their constitutional mission. From the analysis here, the problem in question has come as a result of the problematic implementation of democratic control over the Armed Forces, removing from them the necessary authority to carry out their mission. Using analytical and comparative methods help us understand what is wrong and the causes and consequences, as well as allowing us to draw conclusions and make recommendations. What started as democratic control over the Armed Forces after the change of the political system in Albania currently results in civilian micromanaging.
I. Introduction

The “Albanian Security Barometer, National Survey – 2020” and “Albanian Security Barometer, National Survey – 2022”, conducted by the Center for the Study of Democracy and Governance, show that the public's perception of security and defence is at a historical low point, as the majority of the respondents think that the Armed Forces are not able to protect the country and they do not believe that the government will fix this problem in the security sector. Similarly, the credibility of institutions that exercise democratic control over security institutions is low. These findings, which will be elaborated on in more detail in this paper, also led to the initiation of this research and policy brief. This paper will focus entirely on the role that institutions play in the democratic control of the Armed Forces and the consequences that arise from imbalances of authority.

II. Reforms, control and management of the Armed Forces

1. Reform and democratic control

After the 1990s, the Albanian Armed Forces underwent several reforms, which in most cases consisted of only reducing of their size\(^1\) without a real study of how they would be developed in the post-communist era and become part of NATO\(^2\).

At this time, there was also much talk of democratic and civilian control of the Armed Forces. This control, necessary for a democratic country, was often perceived as civilian control over the Armed Forces and it was not absent even before the 1990. There is a difference between “civilian control” and “democratic control”, since civilians, although they may be politicians, are not necessarily democratic in the sense of applying democratic norms. The point is that civilian leadership is not necessarily democratic. Democracy is much more than civilian politicians working in

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\(^1\) Government Decision: VKM No.138, date 14.03.2007 “Për procedurën e trajtimit të armëve, teknikës e pajisjeve të FA të hequra nga armatimi e përdorimi”; Prime Minister’s Order: Urdhri i Kryeministrit No.5, date 17.01.2008 “Për heqjen nga armatimi e përdorimi i Forcave të Armatosura të 89 raketave tokë-ajër SAM-2”; Defense Minister’s Order: Urdhri 1281, date 03.09.2008 i Ministrit të Mbrojtjes “Për asgjësimin e raketave tokë-ajër SAM-2”; Defense Minister’s Regulation: Udhëzim i Ministrit të Mbrojtjes No.8, date 31.05.2006 “Për afatet e përdorimit, kriteret, procedurat dhe kompetencat për nxjerrjen jashtë përdorimi të pajisjeve e vlerave materiale në FA dhe regullat për trajtimin e tyre pas heqjes nga armatimi e përdorimi”.

\(^2\) “… the reform process should be guided by basic principles. Any reform must be accompanied by strong political support and should be carefully planned and adaptable during the course of implementation. Defense reform requires a clear understanding of the security environment, the capability to anticipate and translate threats and challenges into adequate force plans as a part of an overall strategic assessment, and the ability to secure governmental and parliamentary support for sufficient resources. Given the importance of a coordinated interagency approach, the reform process should also be designed as a national project.” Tobias Pietz, Marc Remillard, Defense Reform and Transformation in Albania, Macedonia and Croatia, Bonn International Center for Conversion, brief 34, Bonn 2006, pg. 9.
security institutions. "Democratic control of the Armed Forces continues to be a concept not easily understood by civil and military officials and has not yet been integrated into the policy-making process in the field of defence. Both civilian and military leadership find it difficult to distinguish democratic control from civilian subjugation of the Armed Forces."³ In an interview with “Sot” newspaper on August 9, 2013, Piro Lutaj, at the time Chairman of the Parliamentary Security Committee, expressed his concern about the situation at the Ministry of Defence. He noted that civilian employees were acting as if they were high-ranking military officials, while generals were being promoted based on their political and personal connections to the Minister of Defence, causing them to behave like low-ranking soldiers.⁴ In a confidential cable sent to the US State Department in August 2009, the Chargé d’Affaires at the American Embassy in Tirana, Deborah Jones, described the non-transparent manner in which some generals were being appointed or dismissed at that time, without even the knowledge of the Chief of General Staff (Chief of Defence). She concluded her cable with the following remark: “...it is still common practice throughout the Albanian Government for appointment decisions at every level to be made unilaterally from the top without consultation, a practice which inhibits the development of a professional cadre of civil servants and military officers.”⁵ Although time has passed since these observations were made, the state of affairs in the Armed Forces remains unchanged and has even worsened.

Civilian control over the armed forces exists in non-democratic countries as well as in democratic countries. However, distortions may occur in the use of armed forces or even in the use of its assets and the defence budget if there is only civilian control without democratic control, as it is understood in the West. As an example, during the events of 1997, the Albanian Armed Forces were disbanded⁶ in an attempt to use them for internal political purposes: “The civilian leadership’s lack of experience in defence policies and a military subservient to civilian leadership would create a hybrid form of civilian control that was neither democratic nor totalitarian. [...] The development of this system of civil-military relations would lead to the dissolution of the army in 1997.”⁷

One of the main institutions that exercise democratic control over the armed forces in Western countries is parliament through defence committees. The designation and powers of said committee vary from country to country (see Appendices 1-4), but in

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³ Alban Dafa, “Kontrolli (jo) demokratik i Forcave të Armatosura të Shqipërisë, Qendërism i politikës së mbrojtjes dhe mbikëqyrje e paefektshme”, Instituti per Demokraci dhe Ndermjetesim, pg. 9, Tirane, 2021.
⁴ “Eshtrë alarmante situata në Ministrinë e Mbrojtjes, teksa shikon nëpër korridorë punonjës civilë që silen si gjenerale, dhe gjenerale të graduar vetëm për shkak të besnikërive politike e personale ndaj Ministrit dhe Shefit të SHP, të silen si ushtarë.” Piro Lutaj, Interviste, Gazeta “Sot”, datë 09.08.2013.
⁶ Tobias Pietz, Marc Remillard, Defense Reform and Transformation in Albania, Macedonia and Croatia, Bonn International Center for Conversion, brief 34, Bonn 2006, pg.10.
⁷ Alban Dafa, “Kontrolli (jo) demokratik i Forcave të Armatosura të Shqipërisë Qendërism i politikës së mbrojtjes dhe mbikëqyrje e paefektshme”, Instituti per Demokraci dhe Ndermjetesim, pg. 19, Tirane, 2021.
general, parliament stands at the top of the pyramid of democratic control over the armed forces.

While it is true that the military should be under democratic control regarding security policy, security requirements, and the decision to use force, politicians should not micromanage. Micromanaging is not a task for politicians. However, military leadership must be held accountable for its actions and must operate within legal frameworks and according to priorities established by the political leadership. A successful defence policy relies on a climate of mutual respect, recognition of professional competence and transparent decision-making procedures that reflect military and political input.

Ultimately, politics will prevail, but the armed forces should be allowed to exercise their powers, according to the standards of Western democracies. The line between the delegation of authority on the one hand and accountability on the other is a crucial issue for modern democracies.

In the field of security and defence, parliamentary practices differ compared to other areas of government activity. All Western parliaments have standing committees on defence and the armed forces. Germany has perhaps the strictest parliamentary control over the defence budget\(^8\). France has a rapporteur whose findings are subject to general debate in Parliament\(^9\). The Netherlands practices several rounds of written comments and questions from all parties, to which the government responds before the debate takes place\(^10\).

The challenge is to design a methodology for the constitutional role of parliament so that its control is professional and purposeful. If such a rigorous method is not formalized, then there is a risk that parliamentary control will turn into political rhetoric.

Since democratic control is a broad topic, this paper will focus on analysing micromanagement in the Albanian Armed Forces, particularly with regard to human resources, assets, and the defence budget.

### 2. Powers regarding the defence budget

The authority on drafting, approval, execution and control of the implementation of expenditures in the defence budget in Albania is left undefined according to Law 64/2014 (amended by Law 98/2015).\(^{11}\) Thus, one of the main pillars of democratic control over the Armed Forces remains evasive. How does it work in practice? The

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\(^{8}\) Deutscher Bundestag: [https://www.bundestag.de/ausschuesse/a12_verteidigung/arbeit-und-aufgaben-des-verteidigungsausschusses-englisch](https://www.bundestag.de/ausschuesse/a12_verteidigung/arbeit-und-aufgaben-des-verteidigungsausschusses-englisch).


\(^{10}\) Tweede Kamer: [https://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/members_of_parliament/committees/def](https://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/members_of_parliament/committees/def).

\(^{11}\) Parliament Decision: Ligji 64/2014 (ndryshuar me ligjin 98/2015) “Për pushtetet dhe autoritetet e drejtimit e të komandimit të Forcave të Armatosura të Republikës së Shqipërisë”.
military leadership has the right to propose a draft defence budget for the following fiscal year, based on priorities and force development programs. In practice, it often happens that the budget requested by the General Staff for mission fulfilment and modernization programs is approved with significant cuts by the Ministry of Defence, especially in force development and modernization programs. Despite this, even after approval, part of the budget for the force development and modernization programs is not allocated but is kept in the Ministry of Defence for execution. Force Commands only manage the budget for salaries and operational expenses, while the General Staff has no role at all in the execution of the defence budget. It is redundant to talk about a democratic control mechanism here since the Ministry of Defence itself approves and executes the budget for the main defence programs. The role of the Ministry should be in approving and controlling the implementation of the budget in all defence programs. It should be noted that the role of the Defence Committee and Parliament in the defence budget is not clearly defined either, since the law referred to above does not mention any authority. Even on Parliament’s official website, we did not find any data in this regard. Non-Albanian experts have pointed out the issue in early studies and have spoken with reservations about the role of Parliament.

In the 2000 law “On the Powers and Authorities of the Control and Command of the Armed Forces”, Parliament had the right to separately approve the defence budget. This was later removed in the new law, adopted in 2014.

In the “Albanian Security Barometer, National Survey - 2020”, on the question of whether parliament’s control over security institutions should be strengthened, citizens are resolute that the current situation should change. Some 71.4% of respondents say that there is a great need for this change to happen (see Figure 1 and 2 in the Appendices). Consecutively, this requires the presence of professional staff in Parliament to keep members fully informed on key issues of defence, the Armed Forces and related data.

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12 Ibid.
14 “According to its Constitution, Albania is a parliamentary republic, whereby the Parliamentary Assembly is supposed to be the supreme state institution. The parliament must approve all strategic documents on national security and defense policy and exerts control over the armed forces. However, according to many local and external experts, the Assembly is only pretending to exercise oversight over the security sector and performs its functions very poorly. Especially with regard to national security and defense policy, the parliament has been playing a rather marginal role. For example, the parliamentarians have to rely on information released by the government and the military, which are the very institutions that they are expected to oversee. A lack of proper debate is also evident even when defense-related documents are approved. This is mainly attributed to the limited expertise of many parliamentarians on the issue of defense, as well as to a lack of interest. Budget control is also supposed to be at the heart of parliamentary control, though this is an area where there is a gap between constitutional provisions and parliamentary practice.” Tobias Pietz, Marc Remillard, Defense Reform and Transformation in Albania, Macedonia and Croatia, Bonn International Center for Conversion, brief 34, Bonn 2006, pg. 13.
2.1 The experience of the Western countries

Most parliamentary democracies have permanent defence committees, which have powers enshrined in law or regulations regarding the defence budget\(^\text{16}\).

Based on the standard practices of the Western countries that we studied, parliaments assess if the funds available for the defence budget are sufficient for the proposed projects and if the priorities for the development of the armed forces have been properly considered. In some countries, parliaments or their defence committees oversee defence procurement and may request detailed information from the ministry of defence about purchases exceeding a certain monetary value\(^\text{17}\). Among the countries we studied for this paper, such rules exist in Germany, Norway, the Netherlands and Poland. This ensures not only the efficient allocation of defence funds and the prevention of corruption but also promotes transparency in the use of the budget. This, in turn, helps to build public support for the armed forces by demonstrating that taxpayer money is being spent appropriately and in the interest of national security. In this respect, democratic control of the defence sector contributes to raising awareness in society about the basic right of citizens to know how the government is planning and implementing policies for their security.

What is worth noting here is that at the end of the defence budget approval procedures, it is allocated to the armed forces for implementation, while the Ministry of Defence has the right to control how the budget is executed.

2.2 The consequences of the applied model

The model applied in Albania has resulted in the inefficient use of the defence budget, which is also reflected in the public’s perception. According to the “Albanian Security Barometer - 2022”\(^\text{18}\), when respondents were asked whether Albania should strengthen the Armed Forces, the police, the intelligence services, and the diplomatic service, 97.5% of respondents answered that the Armed Forces should be strengthened. Furthermore, about 88.5% of respondents think that Albania cannot protect its sovereignty by itself.

The public’s perception of the strength and ability of the Armed Forces to defend the country is perhaps at historic lows. This perception was influenced by the drastic reduction of existing military capabilities in 2007, with the scrapping of Albania’s entire arsenal of tanks, armoured personnel carriers, missiles, aviation, artillery and naval fleet\(^\text{19}\). According to authorities, the rationale behind this action was that “they

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\(^{16}\) Appendix 3, Powers of defence budget control.

\(^{17}\) Appendix 4, Powers concerning defence procurement.


\(^{19}\) Government Decision: Vendimi i Këshillit të Ministrave no. 662, date 4.10.2006 “Për heqjen nga armatimi e përdorimi i një pjese të mjeteve luftarake të aviacionit të forcave të armatosura, si dhe për asgjësinin ose çmontimin e shitjen e tyre”.
were Eastern weapons" and that "they would be replaced by Western weapons", even though among the armoured personnel carriers sent for scrap were also 120 M-113s, produced in the US and donated by Italy for the Albanian Army. On the other hand, the total removal and destruction of combat capabilities were not accompanied by amendment of the Constitution, where the Armed Forces continued to be responsible for preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Albania. They no longer had the necessary armaments and equipment to do so, which proves that the decision was political and not professionally supported.

In the “Albanian Security Barometer, National Survey - 2020”, there are interesting findings regarding the public's perception of the government's credibility and institutions for improving the security and defence sector\textsuperscript{20}. So for example, when respondents were asked, "how much do you trust the government in improving security?", 54.5\% answered that they have trust, while 44.5\% answered that they have little or no trust\textsuperscript{21}. Almost the same public perception is also found for the Ministry of Defence. Only 57.7\% of the respondents answered that they have trust or some trust in the Ministry of Defence, while 41.3\% say that they have little or no trust\textsuperscript{22}. Despite this, public trust in the Armed Forces is significantly greater, with only 10\% of respondents having no trust\textsuperscript{23}.

“A fundamental failure of the defence reforms undertaken over the past 30 years has been a profound misunderstanding of the concept of ‘democratic control of the armed forces.’ This principle continues to be equated simply with civilian control, but limited to the government executive bodies and is not further expanded to include the role of the Parliament and independent oversight institutions and civil society.”\textsuperscript{24}

More specifically, the applied model has resulted in 1) an incorrect perception and implementation of democratic control over the Armed Forces, leading to inefficient use of the defence budget\textsuperscript{25}; 2) mismanagement of assets and properties of the Armed Forces; 3) ineffective handling of human resources has led to the loss of a considerable number of officers and to challenges in attracting new candidates; 4)

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid. pg. 65.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. pg. 66.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid. pg. 61.
\textsuperscript{24} Alban Dafa, “Kontrolli (jo) demokratik i Forcave të Armatosura të Shqipërisë Qendërsim i politikës së mbrojtjes dhe mbikëqyrjes e paefektshme”, Instituti per Demokraci dhe Ndernjëtesim, pg. 43, Tirane 2021.
\textsuperscript{25} “…The Minister of Defense then proposes these plans for adoption by the Parliament. However, the implementation of these programs and plans is problematic and resembles the movement of traffic on the streets of Tirana, where most of the drivers do not follow the rules. More specifically, if the ‘drivers’ of institutions do not feel that they will be caught for breaking the rules, they are less likely to have any respect for the law”.
experimentation with the military education system by changing the education model every 2-3 years, with long-term negative consequences.

III. Personnel management

The military leadership currently has no appointment authority over officers of any rank, which rests with the Ministry of Defence. This unpleasant situation is also reflected in the perception of the public, where 54.4% of respondents think that the army is little or not at all free from political interference. It is true that the management of human resources in the defence sector has not always been like this, and it is important to acknowledge this fact. Until 1990, although there was strict political and civilian control over every unit of the Army, the military leadership had some powers in the management of personnel, according to the level of the unit represented. So for example, a brigade commander, which was at the tactical level, had the right to appoint staff officers at the battalion level, company commanders and platoon leaders, and staff officers in the brigade headquarters. The division commander, at the operational level, had the right to appoint battalion commanders and chiefs of the staffs of subordinate brigades. Such powers continued to be in force until 2007 when the Force Commander had the right to appoint and promote officers up to the rank of captain, while the Chief of the General Staff (Chief of Defence) had the power to appoint officers up to the rank of lieutenant colonel.

Although limited, military leadership had some powers in personnel management. After 2008, an administrative order of the Minister of Defence removed all these powers. According to paragraph 3 of Article 18 of Law 64/2014 (as amended by Law 98/2015), the Minister of Defence has the possibility to delegate certain powers in this area, although this has not yet happened in practice.

It is worth mentioning that the General Directorate of the State Police manages all personnel under its authority and budget as well.

3.1 How do Western countries engage with this issue?

In all Western countries studied, military leadership manages personnel up to the rank of colonel. The minister’s role is limited to policies and not involved in military personnel management except for the highest military position.

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28 Ibid. pg. 5, 6.
3.2 The consequences

- Appointments and promotions have not been based on merit or professionalism\(^{29}\), leading to the demotivation of military officers and their regular resignations from active duty. Resignations have been more obvious from the year 2000 through the present\(^{30}\), mostly from young officers and those who have been educated or trained in allied and partner countries.

- The Ministry of Defence has taken control of personnel management authority, which has led to the politicization of the management of professional military personnel in the armed forces. This has resulted in politically motivated dismissals and removals. “...one of the first consequences of AAF restructuring following the change of government (in Albania) was the discharge of 1,500 officers of different ranks from the AAF, the military academies, the General Staff, and the Ministry of Defence. The reason for their discharge was that these officers were appointees of the Democratic Party and were thus replaced by officers “loyal” to the ruling Socialist Party.”\(^{31}\) Since there was no officially published data available, it is challenging to illustrate these discharges with figures. Therefore, we used publications made by non-governmental institutions in our study.

- High military leadership positions are often left vacant for long periods, up to two or three years, leaving deputy commanders in charge. This has happened over long periods for positions such as the Logistic Support Command, Training and Doctrine Command, Air Force Command, Armed Forces Academy (now Security and Defence College) and even the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (Chief of Defence). Based on this, there has been speculation about the professional and ethical integrity of decisions taken by such officials, who are lured by the possibility of promotion.

- The appointments of officers from the Land Forces to the high post of the Commander of the Naval Forces have been the most obvious cases. These officers come from a completely different profession than the naval forces.\(^{32} \)\(^{33}\) “These


\(^{30}\)“...Only 930 officers and NCO actually left the AAF during 2003 – 2004”. Tobias Pietz, Marc Remillard, Defense Reform and Transformation in Albania, Macedonia and Croatia, Bonn International Center for Conversion, brief 34, Bonn 2006, pg.15.

\(^{31}\)Ibid., pg. 14.


appointments call into question the judgment of Albanian elected officials and give the impression that defence policies are not considered complex or important enough to require professional expertise.\(^{34}\)

- Officers have been discharged from duty without legal or administrative procedures. Many officers discharged in this way have won trials against the Ministry of Defence and gained the right to return to active duty. Despite these decisions, the Ministry of Defence has chosen to pay them for staying home instead of offering them positions to serve in the Armed Forces. This has hurt both the defence budget and troop morale. There are no published figures on how much this negative impact on defence budget is, but it is a fact that dozens of officers have been paid for years to stay at home.\(^{35}\)

- Since the military leadership only has the right to propose some candidates for different positions in the Armed Forces in personnel management, it has often led to controversial appointments from a professional point of view. The military leadership hides behind not having authority. If the appointment authority were left to the military leadership, then the Ministry of Defence would play the role of policy-maker and controller, even in the absence of a military ombudsman or commissioner for the armed forces.

IV. Conclusions

- Since the 1990s, the defence of the country and the modernization of the Armed Forces have not been a priority of numerous governments. Politicians viewed the Armed Forces only as a means to join NATO.

- Defence reforms did not serve the purpose of national security. As such, they have only resulted in cuts in its resources and capabilities.

- Democratic control over the Armed Forces has been improperly implemented, taking away their traditional and necessary powers for successful operation. This has caused them to shrink excessively in terms of military capabilities and not be able to fulfil their constitutional mission in the present security environment.

- Security and defence institutions have insufficient oversight by Parliament.

- Security policies and strategies have been ambiguous and irrelevant during this period.

\(^{34}\) Alban Dafa, “Kontrolli (jo) demokratik i Forcave të Armatosura të Shqipërisë Qendërësim i politikës së mbrojtjes dhe mbikëqyrje e paefektshme”, Instituti per Demokraci dhe Ndermjetesim, pg. 10, Tirane, 202.

• Promotion of politically motivated military leadership has occurred at all levels. Demotivation of military personnel results in regular resignation, mainly among young officers, and difficulties in recruiting new candidates.

• The military education system has been negatively impacted, with long-term consequences.

V. Recommendations

1 Budget management

• While the defence budget should be planned and controlled at a central level, its execution should take place in a decentralized manner. The Armed Forces should be the planner and executor of the approved defence budget while the Ministry of Defence and Parliament should be the approver and controller of its implementation.

• The Parliamentary Security and Defence Committee should take a greater role in approving the defence budget and controlling its implementation based on best practices from Western countries.

2 The management of human resources

• The military personnel management authority must be delegated from the Ministry of Defence to the General Staff and Force Commands. This authority must also be included in Law 64/2014 (amended by Law 98/2015) “On the powers and authorities of direction and command of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania”.

• Reviewing the policy followed until now and taking into consideration the best experiences and practices from the West regarding the implementation of democratic control over the Armed Forces will give them the necessary authority and freedoms to be developed and modernized by national priorities as well as towards the collective defence of NATO.
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About the author

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Appendices

Figure 1. Perception of the effectiveness of Parliament's oversight of security institutions.

Figure 2. Perception of whether Parliament’s oversight of justice institutions needs to be strengthened.
Appendix 1: Defence committee structure and organization

<table>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Parliamentary Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Standing Committee on Defence</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Const, Parliamentary Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>National Defence Committee</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Const, Law, Parliamentary Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Committee on National Defence</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Parliamentary Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Defence Committee</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Const, Parliamentary Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Defence Committee</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Parliamentary Regulation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36 Constitution
## Appendix 2: Powers of the defence committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Powers</th>
<th>BEL</th>
<th>CAN</th>
<th>CZE</th>
<th>DEN</th>
<th>FRA</th>
<th>GER</th>
<th>GRE</th>
<th>HUN</th>
<th>ITA</th>
<th>LUX</th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>NOR</th>
<th>POL</th>
<th>POR</th>
<th>SPA</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The authority to supervise (oversight of military, executive, budget, ensures).</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The committee is responsible for enacting laws.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To propose new laws related to defense matters.</td>
<td>Par 37</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Par 39</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Par</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To modify or redraft suggested defense laws.</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To question the Minister of Defence</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Com m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To call upon the Defense Minister to attend Committee or Plenary sessions and provide testimony.</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>No 39</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To call military personnel and other government</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37 Parliament
38 Defence Committee
39 Neither a power of the Committee nor of the Plenary Session.
employees to committee sessions for providing testimony.

To invite specialists from the community (NGOs, universities, think tanks) to committee sessions for providing testimony.

To acquire documents from the defense ministry and the military.

To conduct investigations (parliamentary inquiries) on matters related to defense.

To hold hearings on matters related to defense.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Parliamentary Plenary</th>
<th>Committee on Defence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is it common for the Parliament’s Plenary to alter draft laws proposed by the Parliamentary Committee on Defence?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40 Not applicable
## Appendix 3: Powers of defence budget control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Powers</th>
<th>BEL</th>
<th>CAN</th>
<th>CZE</th>
<th>DEN</th>
<th>FRA</th>
<th>GER</th>
<th>HUN</th>
<th>ITA</th>
<th>LUX</th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>NOR</th>
<th>POL</th>
<th>POR</th>
<th>SPA</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has the ability to view all documents related to the defense budget.</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>Comm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is authorized to modify and allocate funds for the defense budget.</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Plen</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>Plen</td>
<td>Plen</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Plen</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control the defence budget by programmes</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Plen</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control the defence budget by projects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Plen</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Plen</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has the authority to accept or reject any additional defense budget proposals.</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>Plen</td>
<td>Plen</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Plen</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Plen</td>
<td>Plen</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Plen</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Plen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

41 Parliament.
42 Defence Committee.
43 Neither a power of the Defence Committee nor of the Plenary Session.
44 Plenary Session.
45 Not applicable
### Appendix 4: Powers concerning defence procurement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Powers</th>
<th>BEL</th>
<th>CAN</th>
<th>CZE</th>
<th>DEN</th>
<th>FRA</th>
<th>GER</th>
<th>GRE</th>
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<th>NL</th>
<th>NOR</th>
<th>POL</th>
<th>POR</th>
<th>SPA</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Defense Minister is required to furnish the Committee/Parliament with comprehensive details on procurement decisions that exceed a certain amount (above ...EUR).</td>
<td>No⁴⁶</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>50,00</td>
<td>Com m; 800,00</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Com m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All contracts exceeding a certain amount (.... EUR) are determined by the Committee/Parliament.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Com m; 25 million</td>
<td>N/A⁴⁷</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>50,00</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>28 million</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Committee/Parliament plays a role in determining the need for new equipment.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par⁴⁸</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Committee/Parliament participates in the process of evaluating and choosing a manufacturer and product.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Par</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>Com m</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁴⁶ Neither a power of the Defence Committee nor of the Parliament.
⁴⁷ Not applicable
⁴⁸ Parliament.
⁴⁹ Defence Committee.
The Committee/Parliament takes part in evaluating proposals for compensation and offset.