



ALBANIANS AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL

Towards a redefinition of the social contract

Sashenka Lleshaj
Alba Cela



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Authors: Sashenka Lleshaj
Alba Cela

Data processing: Güven Güneren

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The present study- Part of a set of studies about the actors in the Albanian democracy

At the beginning of the year 2014 the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung brought into life, together with leading experts of six distinguished organizations and Think Tanks, a long term project. The aim of this project is to create and stimulate a political and social discussion in Albania about the EU Integration.

A long-term Project in several stages

The starting point of the contemplation was the perspective that Albania desires to be soon a full EU member, with an economic and social developed society. More than 80% of the population aims at this goal. To reach it Albania must fulfil, *inter alia*, the minimum social standards of the EU — the so called European Social Model (ESM). **These standards can only be reached if all involved parties of the society along with politics and administration act jointly, namely that they foster a trusting and cooperating relationship between each other.** In order to become an EU member the requirements are high and can just be reached through the cooperation of all participating actors.

On this regard, the long-term project was planned in several stages. They should overlap in time to interweave results from the discussions of the actors with the project work. From this point of view the project stays dynamic and is co-designed by those who are participating in the discussions. Starting point — the first stage — was the assumption that a democratic, social and economic successful society can only develop if all actors act on the foundation of trust, democratically orientated and with the willingness to develop an active cooperation. If the cooperation occurs, the EU membership will be achieved easily. This is why all actors respectively were interviewed about their stands, engagement

and commitment the above mentioned principles and the other involved groups. In this manner three different studies were created.

The first stage: Studies about the main actors

The first study is based on a representative survey in the **population**, a fundamental actor for building up democratic relations. The second study is based on a survey with employees of the public administration in all levels of employment and in all regions - with the self-concept of the **administration** as a service provider for citizens and state. The third study enters uncharted territory. With the background knowledge that **political parties** are the backbone of democracy, members of all three main political parties represented in the parliament were interviewed regarding the present situation and about discussions within their parties. In spite of the fact that this survey cannot - because of self-evident reasons – base on representative data, nevertheless allows a clear view on the leading political protagonists.

The second stage: Potential for similarities and oppositions

The results of these studies are supposed to be seen in correlation with each other to shed light on potentials and shortcomings for a future interaction of these three main groups within democracy. In this discussion should be included the findings of the public debate during the first stage. To a certain extent a “**Manual for Public Debate on Democracy in Albania**” is supposed to be delivered. This working title hints that the working book delivers less answers and recommendations but rather poses questions and stimulates suggestions because the process between the actors is not limited by time. The process is a constantly dynamic one, where always new aspects come into play.

The third stage: The public - lectures, debates and discussions

Public debates and information events - based on the first findings - complete the project work. These events take also place to continuously include new stimulations and findings in the project work. Altogether there will be debates in schools and universities as well as in the public media with representatives of all groups. Policy papers will equally contribute to the important political as well as social debate.

This project path is already part of its objective: **active involvement of all actors in one common discourse**. It is not about finding quick solutions or just an exchange of statements, it rather aims at developing and building up reciprocal trust. Otherwise stated: this endeavour tries, with this genre of public debates, to **ameliorate the rapport of actors - Politics, administration and citizens - and to be conducive for a more efficient cooperation in the organization of a social and democratic society**.

The third stage is certainly organized in an open manner, time and content wise. The project is mainly activated by how far the named actors in this society are ready to get involved in the public with their claims and wishes, their visions and fears.

From this point of view, the project will accompany the Albanian politics for a little while on their way to the EU and will support them. An inevitable component of a democratic debate is that this does not always work smoothly. But one thing always got confirmed: the best friend of a positive development is a critical and constructive dialogue between the actors who have mutual respect for each other.

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1. Introduction

The post-communist market economy euphoria marginalized the social dimension of the state despite the fact that citizens continued to see the state as a main provider of social services. The legacy of the paternalist relationship with the state and the feeling of entitlement towards free services such as education, health care, child care, etc., were especially present in post-communist Albania throughout the transition period. While liberal democracy and market economy were seen as the main pillars of the organization of the state after communism, citizens' mindset towards the state, public institutions, and social services did not change as rapidly as the economic system did through the application of the shock therapy at the beginning of the 90s.

Nevertheless, new research has shown that despite the fact that the communist legacy is important to citizens' attitudes towards democracy, market economy and institutions in the transition period, the post-communist experience with institutions and their performance during this period has affected citizens' attitudes as much as the communist legacy. Thus some would argue that citizens' experience with the post-communist period has been as important in defining their political attitudes as the communist period, and institutions' economic performance and success during transition has a positive correlation with citizens' trust towards them.¹ In the same variation spirit other scholars

1. See William Mishler and Richard Rose. "Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies". *The Journal of Politics*, 59: 2, (May 1997): 418-51. Also see: Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua A. Tucker. Communist Socialization and Post-Communist Economic and Political Attitudes. (Paper prepared for presentation at the *Center for the Study of Democratic Politics, Princeton University*, May 9, 2012). Available at: <http://www>.

would argue that the post-communist countries have not moved within the same tracks during transition given their different post-communist experiences. For example, Central and Eastern Europe countries — which were involved in the EU accession process in their early transition period — better accommodated citizens' needs and requirements into a well-constructed welfare system compared to other countries in the region.

This two dimensional variation of the pre and post-communist period on the one side (temporal variation) and the cross-country variation during the post-communist period on the other side (spatial variation), makes generalizations very difficult while posing the necessity of a country-specific in-depth research. At the same time, the approaches presented above invite researchers to conduct more work into the post-communist period and the specific institutional designs that were present during the transition period which are accountable to a great extend for citizens' attitudes.²

1.1. The importance of this survey

Given the above picture, with studies mainly conducted in Central and Eastern Europe and the post-soviet countries, this survey tries to map the *general attitudes of Albanian citizens* towards the state, its institutions, public services, the public versus private provision of services, as well as outlines citizens' main attitudes towards the welfare state, social solidarity, the extent of the universal provision of services, etc. This survey is important for several reasons:

princeton.edu/csdp/events/Pop-Eleches05102012/Pop-Eleches05102012.pdf.

2. See Linda J. Cook. *Postcommunist Welfare States: Reform politics in Russia and Eastern Europe*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).

First, this survey adds to a very limited number of social surveys conducted in Albania. While a wide range of surveys have been conducted in the country, social surveys are less common. To be mentioned are *Albanian Youth 2011: In between trust for the future and distrust for the present!*, *The state of Albanian democracy at the eve of 2013 general elections*, as well as *The European Social Survey (ESS)2013* conducted by OSF Albania. This survey will add to these existing ones as well as use them as a comparative asset when appropriate.

Second, this survey goes beyond the existing efforts in comprehensively trying to adopt the main pillars of the *European Social Model* to a survey for the Albanian context. The European Social Model is defined in the European Commission's *White Paper on European Social Policy - A Way Forward for the Union* of 1994, where the main pillars are defined as "democracy and individual rights, free collective bargaining, the market economy, equal opportunities for all, and social protection and solidarity."³ The European Social Model is a unique combination meant "to give to the people of Europe the unique blend of economic well-being, social cohesiveness and high overall quality of life."⁴ Thus, the European Social Model serves as the skeleton of this survey as it defines its main sections:

1. Democracy and market economy;
2. Trust;
3. Collective bargaining and social dialogue;
4. Public services and state size;

3. Eurofund. *European Social Model*. (last updated: May 5, 2011). Available at: <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/europeansocialmodel.htm>

4. European Commission. *White Paper on European Social Policy - A Way Forward for the Union (COM (94) 333*, Brussels, July 27, 1994),p. 1. Available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/1118/1/social_policy_white_paper_COM_94_333_A.pdf.

5. Equal opportunities and social protection;
6. Risk assessment.

Third, policymakers can find this survey helpful in the future when in need of social consensus over major social reforms or over the design of new social schemes. We already find social issues and especially discussions on the social welfare very relevant for Albania today in the light of the current economic hardship and of approaching new social problems like aging of the population. Especially with the start of negotiation for membership in the European Union in the near future, national consensus on reforms is going to be crucial. Some successful cases from Central and Eastern Europe show that incorporation of citizens' needs, opinions and viewpoints when taking major steps forward with reforms is vital to successful reforms and the EU accession timing.

2. Executive Summary

How does the current institutional design affect citizens' stands over issues of democracy, market economy, equal opportunities, social protection and solidarity? What are citizens' views on the welfare state? What general principles are at the centre of citizens' answers throughout the survey and how can they be generalized on a societal level? These are some general issues this executive summary will try to touch upon through reporting the main findings before moving on with methodology and detailed findings and analysis. Each of the sections of this survey has some key findings that are important to be mentioned and discussed more in detail. Moreover, there are some cross-sectional findings which are especially important to be underlined and discussed here.

'It is a partial democracy we live in'

The majority of the Albanians citizens we interviewed (72 percent) believe that they live in a *partial democracy*, or what scholars have defined as a hybrid regime. Whether the answer is "Albania is more democratic than non democratic" or "Albania is more non democratic than democratic", citizens perceive the level of democracy in the country as being somewhere in between democracy and non democracy. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that a bigger share of respondents (43 percent) believed that "Albania is more non democratic than democratic".

While in the 2013 survey⁵, a considerable share of answers fell on

5. Alba Çela and Joana Kosho. *The state of Albanian democracy at the eve of 2013 general elections*. Albanian Institute for International Studies (Tirana, 2013). Also see Chart 7 in the "Findings and Analysis" below where the 2013 answers have been reported for comparison reasons.

the two extremes of “Albania is a totally democratic country” or “Albania is a totally non democratic country” — with 34 percent of answers — this year, only 20 percent of answers fell on the two extremes while respondents tended to go more towards the centre where a not fully democratic country was indicated. This *centripetal move* is significant as citizens’ views shifted from the extreme edges of the ‘totally democratic’ versus ‘totally non democratic’ dichotomy to the more moderated ‘more democratic’ versus ‘more non democratic’ dichotomy.

Albanian citizens’ perception of the regime/level of democracy looks consistent with the wide literature on hybrid regimes, which considerably relates the transition period with this form of regime.⁶ Nevertheless, the wider share of such a view in 2014 compared to 2013 brings some other questions into discussion, mainly related to whether Albania is moving out of the transitional period, or whether the transition period is over, but these developments need more time to be reflected in citizens’ perceptions. If the second conclusion would be true, then the reported centralization of views is a positive development. Certainly, there is space for further research on these points.

‘We want a market economy but not an economy led by the market’

Some very interesting views — sometimes contradictory too — are expressed in relation to the market economy and the way the Albanian economy should be designed and how it should function. From respondents’ answers to some questions on the market economy, the state intervention in economy, the states’ regulatory role in economy and the states’ minimal role in

6. For some views on Central and Eastern Europe see: Elisabeth Bakke and Ingo Peters (eds.). *20 Years since the Fall of the Berlin Wall: Transitions, State Break-Up and Democratic Politics in Central Europe and Germany*. (Berlin: BWV Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2012).

economy, it is appropriate to say that citizens' views are mostly trying to describe a *mixed economy* as the right economic system for Albania, at least in principle. Thus, Albanians seem supportive of an economy where the state is present to a considerable extent.

Accordingly, when citizens' were asked whether or not the *market economy* was the right economic system for Albania, the majority of respondents (65 percent) answered that it was. On the following question, when answering whether or not the state in Albania should intervene in economy in defining prices, protecting certain strategic businesses, etc, more than 2/3rd of the sample (71 percent) answered that the state should intervene. Furthermore, 84 percent of respondents answered that they agreed with the statement "the state in Albania should regulate economic relations, general rules on competition and trade, etc". In order to confirm the general conclusion that Albanians would prefer in principle a mixed economy, the answer to the last question on the topic is also significant. Thus, a wide majority of respondents (77 percent) did not agree with the statement "the state in Albania should intervene and be present as little as possible in economy as the market regulates itself".

'These institutions are not worth our trust'

What is immediately noticeable in Albanians' institutional trust level is their *high distrust*. While distrust in public institutions has been a widespread symptom of post-communist transition, institutional distrust is still a very persistent phenomenon in the Albanian society. The less distrusted institutions (the more trusted as a result) in the country — which scored low levels of distrust with fewer "none" and "a little" answers and high levels of trust with higher percentages of "some" and "a lot" answers — are public education institutions, private hospitals, police and the media. On the other extreme, the Central Election Commission,

the opposition and courts scored a very high level of distrust, while political parties are distrust outliers with 45 percent of respondents indicating that they have no trust in them. Public hospitals also scored very low in the trust level with 59 percent of respondents indicating “none” or “little” trust as an answer.

When asked specifically on courts and their current status of justice delivery, citizens showed a low level of trust towards the judicial system in Albania. This was visible if looking at the fact that more than 60 percent of respondents agreed with the following statements: “citizens should have political connections in order to get a fair judgment”, “citizens should have personal connections in order to get a fair judgment”, and “citizens should pay bribes/corrupt judges/prosecutors in order to get a fair judgment”. At the same time, 76 percent of respondents did not agree with the statement “the judicial system in Albania gives fair decisions”.

‘We want a wide-sized state, despite our satisfaction with public services’ provision’

A consistent trend throughout the survey is respondents’ tendency to choose the state, public institutions and public funding as the preferred and the most desirable way to provide public services, despite the fact that apart from electricity, for all of the other services provided by the state and which were listed in our survey more than 50 percent of citizens indicated that they are “not satisfied” or “not very satisfied” with (see chart 25). When asked about who should be the *main provider of some core public services*, respondents were relatively consistent in their opinion that the state had to be the main provider.

Thus, the state was the preferred provider starting from jobs with the lowest 66 percent of respondents’ answers indicating the state as the main provider, and then going to public safety with

91 percent of respondents' answers indicating the state. For other services like justice, education, social protection, health care, infrastructure, electricity, water supply, post offices and housing the state was indicated as the main provider in between 66 and 91 percent of respondents' answers (chart 21). Furthermore (chart 31), 70 percent to 90 percent of respondents answered that the state should ensure child care services, unemployment assistance, paid maternity leave, adequate health care and 91 percent answered that the state should ensure disability assistance.

When specifically asked about education, health care and retirement fund (pensions) provision, the majority of respondents answered that education and health care in Albania should be “public and funded by general taxation”, while pensions should be “publicly managed and funded by social contributions, but allowing those who choose to do so to devote part of the contributions to a private fund”.

Furthermore, public institutions are also indicated *as better* public services' providers (Chart 26), with the exception of health care and employment promotion where the private sector is indicated as a better provider.

Finally, while most of respondents (66 percent) indicate that privatization makes state enterprises more effective in providing services, even more respondents (72 percent) think that not all state enterprises in Albania should be privatized. It looks like the preferred solution for citizens — with 70 percent of answers — would be the application of a model where the state continues to be the owner of important enterprises while private companies are contracted only for the management part.

‘Services should be public⁷ although we are not sure if we are ready to pay more taxes’

Usually, from some of the western welfare models (Nordic model), it is the case that a higher quantity and quality of public services provisions by the state is coupled with a higher level of general taxation, especially income taxes. Although, as noticed above, Albanians are asking for an omnipresent state in relation to public services, they are undecided in relation to paying more in order to get better/wider services. Thus, 49 percent of respondents agreed that “the level of taxation should increase if this would bring to better services” against 51 percent that disagreed with the statement.

Despite the fact that respondents are undecided if they would pay more for better services, the majority (70 percent) agreed that “who earns more should pay more” and 62 percent disagreed that “income taxes should have a fixed rate despite the level of incomes”. From respondents’ answers it could be concluded that citizens would prefer a progressive taxation in relation to the flat one and that the social gap is meant to be reduced by the higher payment/contribution of those who earn more.

“The multi-actor decision-making on public services is desirable but not applied into practice”

7. “Public” in this context refers to the universal access to services offered by the state. The difference “public” versus “private” in this study is done according to the general understanding in Albania – the provision of services by the state which are accessible by everyone versus the provision of services by a private entity which are accessible through a certain payment fee. This difference “public” versus “private” would not have any meaning in an Anglo-Saxon context where for example universities, hospitals, or kindergartens are considered public, despite the fact that access to these services is offered through a fee. Due to the limited space, this is certainly a very simplified explanation of a complex phenomenon and understanding of these terms in different societies.

How should decisions on public services be taken and by whom? In relation to decision-making actors, citizens see the state as an important decision-maker but not the only one. They see the community and trade unions as similarly important and legitimate actors in discussing important issues on public services as well as on taking decisions over them. In few words, citizens see a *collaborativemulti-actor decision-making* on public services as the optimal model.

Asked on whose responsibility should decision-making on public services management and priorities be, more than half of respondents (58 percent) answered that such decisions should be taken by “both experts/policymakers and the general public or community groups which benefit and contribute to these services”. From the rest of respondents, 1/4th answered that the “community and the general public should be much more involved in shaping these services while indicating priorities to policymakers”.

Furthermore, when people were asked on who should be responsible for taking important decisions on wages, working hours and workers’ rights in Albania, a wide majority of respondents (61 percent) answered that the “government and policymakers in collaboration with the trade unions” should be responsible for this. Furthermore, 1/5th of respondents answered that these decisions should be “mainly discussed and decided by trade unions while the government and policymakers are the endpoint of the process or the receiving end”. Only 12 percent answered that these decisions should be “exclusively discussed and decided by public institutions, the government and policymakers”.

Despite these views on the optimal process, the majority of citizens feel like having little or no influence in decision-making

on a national and/or local level. Thus, 80 percent of respondents answered that they have “little” or “no influence” over the local level decision-making process and 89 percent answered in the same way over the national level decision-making process. In the same way, trade unions’ activity in Albania is generally unknown by citizens — a detail that tells a lot about their low public engagement. Thus, 86 percent of respondents were not able to agree or disagree with the statement that trade unions today are “active and effective in supporting workers’ rights”.

“We want a fairer and more solidar society”

Judging from this survey, it looks like the majority of Albanian citizens wants to live in a society that provides considerable social protection and that is lead by solidarity. This was first visible when respondents were asked to *define a fair society* and they were mainly divided between two statements: that in a fair society “who pays more gets more, but certain disadvantaged segments of society should be assisted by the state” and “no one is left without basic public services despite their ability to contribute” — with both of the statements being indicated by 36 percent of respondents each.

Furthermore, when asked specifically on the *unemployment assistance* in Albania, a large majority of respondents (83 percent) answered that the current allocated sum per household was too small. The other two options — where the unemployment assistance is stated as high or as about right — got some insignificant indication percentages compared to the above option.

We previously underlined the fact that Albanian citizens are very keen on having an active and wide-sized state that takes care of many aspects of citizens’ lives. Continuing on the same major theme, the majority of respondents (from 72 percent to 91 percent) also want the state to be active in providing services

to disabled and disadvantaged people, working parents, poor families, retired people, etc. Moreover, 43 percent of respondents think that the Albanian state should “have an active redistribution role in lowering the rich-poor gap” and 35 percent think that it should “moderately engage in redistribution policies”. Only 12 percent of respondents think that “the rich poor gap is not a matter the state should be dealing with”.

‘We all have similar problems’

Another present theme in the survey — especially visible from the last survey section on risk assessment — is the fact that respondents perceive their current major problems to be similar to the problems that they think other fellow Albanian citizens have. Accordingly, when indicating what respondents considered to be a problem for Albanian citizens today, the most indicated values were unemployment, poverty and poor standards of justice. Similarly, when asked about what their most concerning personal issue was, the majority of answers indicated low economic income, unemployment and poverty. Judging from the symmetry of these answers, we could probably conclude that there is a certain social cohesion in terms of what citizens see as commonly problematic or as unifying element in their everyday life.

There is no clear left-right ideological division in Albania

While people in Albania would identify themselves as belonging to the left wing or the right wing in relation to the party they are affiliated with, in terms of ideology it looks like there is no clear division or belonging in Albania. From the cross-tabulations presented in Chapter 4 one can notice that in relation to classical ideologically sensitive questions on the state, the economy or the welfare system, answers do not meet expectations in relation to the ideological profile. While the left wing group respondents and

the central and central right group respondents tend to be more consistent with their ideological profiles' traditional stands, those that identify as the right wing group are the most inconsistent in their answers with the expectations one would have judging from their identification as belonging to a right wing ideology.

The income level is important in defining part of citizens' stances

Throughout the survey we noticed that the income level was usually more important than the ideological profile in defining respondents' answers. Thus, when people were asked in relation to state intervention in economy, models of decision-making, public versus private management of education, health, retirement income, taxation and privatization, income looked as an important variable that affected respondents' answers. Although we cannot claim any causation at this point — as it will be visible for the cross-tabulations present throughout Chapter 4 — there is a certain level of correlation between incomes and respondents' answers in relation to certain questions.

3. Methodology and respondents' profile

3.1. Methodology and sampling

This survey had a sample of 1200 respondents and aimed at having a large variety of respondents' profiles in terms of gender, age, education level, employment status as well as incomes and ideological profiles; although some of these characteristics could not be pre-determined since the selection of respondents was random with prior quota sampling according to the population size of the 12 administrative regions of Albania. The survey was conducted with structured interviews during May-June 2014 in the biggest urban areas of the 12 administrative regions of Albania.⁸

This specific crosscut of the population is helpful in exploring some main patterns of peoples' perceptions and expectations in relation to democracy, the market economy, public and private institutions and the social welfare in Albania. Accordingly, with such a wide range of data on an extended vertical and horizontal sample of the population, the analysis will be able to explore the possible variations of citizens' stances in relation to specific variables, such as income level and ideological profile.

As mentioned in the introduction part, the conceptualization of the survey sections has been done in accordance with the main pillars of the European Social Model. The last chapter on risk assessment has been left intentionally as a concluding section in order for policymakers and future surveys to follow up from there as a starting point to conduct further research or design policies.

In terms of the specific questions asked, the survey has borrowed

8. See Appendix 1 for the survey template.

the conceptual framework of the questions from well-known social surveys with the necessary adaptations to meet the Albanian context. An important source was the European Social Survey,⁹ the Spanish Center for Sociological Research (CIS),¹⁰ 2020 Public Services Trust,¹¹ as well as question asked in previous surveys, especially those on trust and risk assessment.

With such a representative sample, although throughout the findings and analysis the report refers to the sample and to the respondents, we are statistically able to generalize for a wider population and refer to Albanian citizens.

3.2. Profile of respondents

As showed in the figures below (chart 1 and 2), the sample of this survey is composed of 52 percent female respondents against 48 percent male.¹² The *age sampling* varies from 18-29 years of age to over 70 years of age. The colorful composition of the age pie chart shows that the age groups were also balanced in the sample with two major groups being the 18-29 years of age (38 percent) and 30-39 years of age (24 percent). It is visible that the sample

9. European Social Survey. *Data and Documentation*. (2014). See: <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/>. A survey example available here: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round6/fieldwork/source/ESS6_source_main_questionnaire.pdf.

10. See Inés Calzada and Eloísa del Pino. Perceived efficacy and citizens' attitudes toward welfare state reform. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. Volume 74:4. (2008).

11. 2020 Public Services Trust at RSA. *What do people want, need and expect from public services?* (2010). Available at: http://www.ipsos-mori.com/DownloadPublication/1345_sri_what_do_people_want_need_and_expect_from_public_services_110310.pdf.

12. Note on percentage values: Throughout the survey values have been rounded up, thus no digit was left after the decimal point.

age was relatively young with almost 80 percent of the sample being below 50 years of age.




Chart 1




Chart 2

While gender and age are important variables in getting a general picture of the respondents' profile, the *education level* and *employment status* are some further variables that better help us in detailing people's stances in a social survey. These are variables that could potentially determine people's choices in the survey questions, given the fact that both the education level and the employment status — separately or combined — affect or determine people's values and their view on social, economic and political issues.

In terms of education the sample has a relatively wide group of university educated respondents which comprise 40 percent of the sample. This is followed by 35 percent of high school educated people and 13 percent of master or doctoral level educated people.




Chart 3

In terms of employment status, more than half of the sample is composed of employed respondents, while 19 percent are students, 16 percent are unemployed and 9 percent are retired/pensioners.




Chart 4

As the literature on social welfare in general and on social welfare in post-communist countries in particular shows,¹³ the *level of incomes* is a major variable in defining people's perceptions, expectations and stands in relation to public institutions, the

13. See Richard Rose and Toni Makkai. "Consensus or dissensus about welfare in post-communist societies?", *European Journal of Political Research*, Volume 28: 2, (September 1995): 203–224.

role of the state in economy, the profile of a fair society, etc. Thus, this variable, along with the ideological profile, becomes very important in analyzing respondents' answers throughout the survey.

The *ideological profile* is assumed to be compatible with the economic and social status, a status which in our survey could be partially coupled or represented by the level of incomes. The wide literature on post-communist political attitudes and social cleavages generally underlined the fact that left-right spectrum citizens' self-placement in these countries was not defined in accordance to their level of incomes as it is assumed from a Western society tradition.¹⁴ Despite these views, according to Pop-Eleches and Tucker,¹⁵ people in post-communist societies in these last years, tend to define themselves increasingly in the left-right spectrum (the so called left-right self-placement) in accordance to their economic profiles, thus incomes.

In relation to the household level of incomes,¹⁶ it is visible that more than half of respondents (60 percent) claimed that their aggregated household level of incomes per month was below or equal to 60 thousand Lekë. Furthermore, 34 percent claimed a household level of income in between 60 thousand Lekë and 160 thousand Lekë, while only 4 percent claimed to have a household

14. Hulda Thorisdottir, John T. Jost, IdoLiviatan and PatrickeShrout. "Psychological Needs and Values Underlying Left-Right Political Orientation: Cross-National Evidence from Western and Eastern Europe." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 71:2 (2007): 175-203.

15. Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua A. Tucker. Communist Socialization and Post-Communist Economic and Political Attitudes.(Paper prepared for presentation at the *Center for the Study of Democratic Politics, Princeton University*, May 9, 2012). Available at: <http://www.princeton.edu/csdp/events/Pop-Eleches05102012/Pop-Eleches05102012.pdf>.

16. We take into consideration the fact that in similar surveys respondents are not always declaring their exact income level.

level of incomes that exceeded 160 thousand Lekë.




Chart 5¹⁷

When it comes to the left-right self-placement, a considerable amount of respondents (26 percent) did not define themselves in ideological terms, stating that they belonged to none of the categories of the ideological spectrum. Furthermore, 9 percent of respondents choose not to give an answer to this specific question. If these two categories are combined, then there is no left-right placement info about more than 1/3rd of the sample (35 percent). This aside, respondents were spread throughout the spectrum in a considerable way. Accordingly, the main categories were the left with 23 percent and the right with 15 percent. If the respective centres are taken into consideration then the left comprises of 1/3rd of the sample (33 percent) and the right comprises of almost 1/4th of the sample (23 percent).

17. Note on incomes: Why were people asked about their household incomes and not their personal incomes? The household level of income is perceived to be as important as the personal income in the post-communist countries literature and especially more conservative societies as the family is very supportive of its members. This brings about the other problem of number of family members, but we believe from previous surveys that the size of the nucleus family in Albania, especially in urban zones, does not vary considerably.




Chart 6

3.3. Cross-tabulations and variation

Throughout the analysis of the findings in the next chapter we have conducted cross-tabulations of variables in order to see how the profile of respondents' affected their answers and stands on important issues. During the analysis we were especially interested in looking at the variation of answers in relation to respondents' incomes and their ideological profiles. As it was previously mentioned, when looking at the literature, these two variables tend to affect respondents' views on the role of the state in economy, redistribution policies, the welfare state and its' characteristics, etc. In the next chapter, these results will be reported after those questions where important variation in terms of income and ideological profile is present.

4. Findings and analysis

This chapter is organized in six subchapters that represent the six main sections of the survey questionnaire, respectively: (1) Democracy and market economy; (2) Trust; (3) Collective bargaining and social dialogue; (4) Public services and state size; (5) Equal opportunities and social protection; and (6) Risk assessment. The questions that fall into these general categories aim at presenting a relatively detailed picture of the state of the welfare system in Albania, public services and state size, as well as citizens' expectations and stands in relation to them.

At the same time, throughout the subchapters, the variation of answers in relation to income and ideological profile will be reported and analyzed. Cross-tabulation of variables will be showed and discussed in relation to those questions where a significant variation in terms of income and/or ideological profile has been noticed.

Throughout the analysis, in some cases there will be a comparison with two previous surveys: *Albanian Youth 2011: In between trust and distrust for the future* and *The state of Albanian democracy at the eve of 2013 general elections*; where few of this survey questions or similar ones were asked, although none of these previous surveys was similar in profile and aims to this one.

Section I: DEMOCRACY AND MARKET ECONOMY

This section serves to outline citizens' major stances and principles on the current state of democracy and the market economy as well as rule of law and citizens' perception of their influence in decision-making in Albania. While democracy as such is not questioned in detail, except for the first question, general principles on market economy serve as important introduction questions of the survey in order to define respondents' general views, beliefs and political principles in relation to the state and its role in economy. Nevertheless, citizens' answers about the decision-making responsibility over public services' distribution and management and about the level of influence they have over decision-making on a national and local lever is a good indicator to measure in general terms the degree of perceived participatory democracy among respondents.

On an important question, but also a worm-up question to this survey, on the *level of democracy in the country*, respondents were divided mainly in between the opinions that “Albania is more non democratic than democratic”, with 43 percent, and “Albania is more democratic than non democratic”, with 29 percent. As it can be seen from the chart 7 below, the 2014 values from this survey are comparable with the 2013 values from *The state of Albanian democracy at the eve of 2013 general elections*.¹⁸

What is important to be noted in this case is that while the share of those indicating that “Albania is a totally non democratic country” fell by 10 percent from 2013 to 2014, the share of those indicating that “Albania is more non democratic than democratic” rose by 7 percent. In the same way, while the share

18. Alba Çela and Joana Kosho, 2013: 33.

of those indicating that “Albania is a totally democratic country” fell by 4 percent, the share of those indicating that “Albania is more democratic than non democratic” rose by 8 percent. Thus, in 2014 there is a clear shift towards the middle moderated values of ‘*partial democracy*’ with 72 percent of the answers falling into this category, against 57 percent of the previous year. Thus, a centripetal move is present in citizens views which tend to move from the extreme edges of radical views towards a more moderated and complex view of the political system in Albania.




Chart 7

When people were asked whether or not the *market economy* was the right economic system for Albania, the majority of respondents, 65 percent, answered that it was. Nevertheless, around 1/5th of the sample (21 percent) thought the opposite was the case. While as a general principle for a post-communist country this looks like a common answer pie, the two following questions — which can also serve as testing questions for this

one — show a more complicated picture of citizens’ stands and perceptions in Albania.




Chart 8

Variation in terms of income and ideological profile

While the above chart gives the general picture of citizens’ answers, chart 8.1 helps to better understand the variation of respondents’ answers in relation to their household incomes. The chart shows that respondents with higher incomes tend to agree more that the market economy is the right economic system for Albania, although no clear correlation can be noticed here. Thus, when moving from the ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ income range to ‘100.000-160.000 Lekë’ respondents tend to increasingly agree with the statement that the market economy is the right economic system for Albania (the percentage changes gradually from 53 to 82 percent). Until here the correlation is strong. The pattern is not complete as the ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ income range respondents do not follow the previous trend.

ALBANIANS AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL




Chart 8.1

If we look at respondents' ideological profile and their answers to the same question, there is no ideological clear division in relation to this question. From the chart below, 'central right' respondents seem like representing the far right, while 'centre' and 'central left' respondents support market economy more than those respondents that identify themselves as 'right' (74 percent and 75 percent against 67 percent).




Chart 8.2

State intervention in economy — although this can be done on different degrees and by following different models of state intervention — is generally considered a very different economic principle compared to the market economy. In answering whether or not the state in Albania should intervene in economy in defining prices, protecting certain strategic businesses, etc, more

than 2/3rd of the sample answered that the state should intervene and only 29 percent answered that it should not. If compared with the previous question in relation to the market economy, the answer would not be very consistent. Nevertheless, the way the statement has been formulated: “the state in Albania should intervene in economy in defining prices, protecting certain strategic businesses, etc”, can still sound as moderated capitalism to a post-communist society. This would be the case if taking into consideration the fact that the opposite of market economy in Albania would be a system that resembles a totally state-owned and state-controlled economy similar to the communist period in the country. Accordingly, state intervention in economy, with some specifications on the specific field, is probably *perceived as a mixed economy* by the majority of citizens. Thus, this is seen as a desirable option.




Chart 9

Variation in terms of income and ideological profile

In answering whether the state in Albania should intervene in economy in defining prices, protecting certain strategic businesses, etc, respondents' answers didn't significantly vary in relation to

income or ideological profile, differently from what one could expect in this specific case. This is visible from chart 9.1 and 9.2.




Chart 9.1




Chart 9.2

The statement “the state in Albania should regulate economic relations, general rules on competition and trade, etc” was meant to define a *regulatory role of the state in economy*, thus a mixed economy. While we believe that the previous question was also probably perceived within the same framework of mixed economy, this statement looks like the most popular among the survey respondents. Accordingly, 84 percent of respondents answered that they agreed with the statement and only 16 percent believed the opposite was the case.




Chart 10

Variation in terms of income and ideological profile

In answering whether or not “the state in Albania should regulate economic relations, general rules on competition and trade, etc” a certain variation in terms of income was noticed. Thus, while 87 percent of those indicating ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ as their income agreed with the statement, this percentage gradually diminished with the rise of the level of household incomes until reaching 76 percent in the case of those indicating ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ as their income level. Nevertheless, this is not a significant variation as respondents of all income levels generally agreed with the statement.




Chart 10.1

When it comes to the ideological profile, the same pattern is noticed as in previous question: while the variation relatively meets expectations when moving from the ‘left’ wing group to the ‘central right’ group, the pattern is “broken” when reaching the ‘right’ wing group with 81 percent of them agreeing with the statement that “the state in Albania should regulate economic relations, general rules on competition and trade, etc”.




Chart 10.2

The final statement on the economy within the same category of questions, asked if whether “the state in Albania should not take part in economy as the market regulates itself”. A wide majority of respondents (77 percent) did not agree with the statement while only 23 percent thought this should be the case. The answer to this question is consistent with respondents’ stances on the previous two questions on the degree of state intervention in economy.




Chart 11

Variation in terms of income and ideological profile

As there was no significant variation in terms of income in relation to respondents' answers to whether or not "the state in Albania should not take part in economy as the market regulates itself", a more important pattern is noticed in relation to the ideological profile. In the same continues pattern as in previous questions, it is visible from chart 11.1 that there is a variation in terms of ideological profile when moving from the left wing group to the central right group of the political spectrum, but the pattern is "broken" again when it comes to the unexpected stances of the majority of the right wing group with 76 percent of them disagreeing with the statement. The central right wing group is again more rightist than the right wing group when it comes to stance on the market economy and the role of the state in economy.




Chart 11.1

If looking at the overall picture of answers to the above four statements, it is visible that the majority of respondents tend to be supportive of a mixed economy of some kind where the state does play a role, despite the different opinions on the extent of this role. Furthermore, throughout the above questions there is no variation in terms of the level of income and a weak variation in terms of ideological profile with especially not ideologically compatible answer from those that are self-placed in the right wing group.

Another question on this section was related to the *decision-making on public services* management and priority setting. Asked on whose responsibility should decision-making on public services management and priorities be, more than half of respondents (58 percent) answered that such decisions should be taken by “both experts/policymakers and the general public or community groups which benefit and contribute to these services”. From the rest of respondents, 1/4th answered that the “community and the general public should be much more involved in shaping these services while indicating priorities to policymakers” and the remaining 18 percent believed that these decisions were to be trusted to experts as they were more knowledgeable about these issues.




Chart 12

Variation in terms of income and ideological profile

It is interesting to see that there is considerable variation in terms of respondents' income level when it comes to indicating the responsible actors that should make decisions on public services. Thus, it looks like the higher the incomes the more people tend to indicate that decisions on public services should

be responsibility of “both experts/policymakers and the general public or community groups which benefit and contribute to these services”. Thus, as it can be seen from chart 12.1, 51 percent of people that belong to ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ category indicated this option against 80 percent of those that belong to the ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ income category. Obviously, the opposite pattern is true for the other two options of exclusivity for community groups or experts in taking decisions on public services — as with the increase of incomes, people tend to choose these two options less.




Chart 12.1

After answering a question on the share of responsibility among public official and the community in relation to decision-making on public services, people were asked about their personal engagement and *degree of influence over decision-making on the national and the local level*. While to the previous question more than half of respondents answered that decisions on public services should be the responsibility of “both experts/policymakers and the general public or community groups which benefit and contribute for these services”, to the current question a similar amount of respondents answered that they have no influence over decision-making at the local or national level.

Thus, 47 percent of respondents answered that they have no influence over shaping decisions about public services on a local level and 64 percent answered that they have no influence over shaping decisions on public services on the national level. If the answer 'no influence' is combined with the answer 'little influence', then 80 percent of respondents answered that they have little or no influence over the local level decision-making process and 89 percent answered that they have little or no influence over the national level decision-making process. When comparing respondents' answers in relation to the local and the national level, it is understandable why on the local level citizens' believe they influence decision-making slightly more (11 percent more citizens indicated they have 'some' or 'a lot' of influence at the local level decision-making compared to the national level).




Chart 13

Variation in terms of income and ideological profile

From chart 13.1 it is visible that with the increase of incomes respondents tend to believe that they have more influence in decision-making at the local level. Thus when moving from ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ to ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ income range, the percentage of those that indicate they have ‘a lot’ of influence increases from 2 percent to 10 percent. Similarly, the percentage of those that indicate ‘some’ influence varies from 13 percent to 22 percent. Nevertheless, we cannot see a clear correlation between income and the perceived influence over decision-making at the local level, given the fact that ‘little’ and ‘none’ alternatives are also affected by income level until a certain point (moving from 55 percent to 37 percent for ‘none’ for example), but the pattern is not complete when the ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ income level is reached.




Chart 13.1

When it comes to respondents ideological profile and their answers to the same question, it is visible from chart 13.2 that no significant variation is noticed, although those that define themselves as ‘central’ in the political spectrum tend to generally indicate higher levels of influence compared to those that define themselves as belonging to ‘left’ or ‘right’.

ALBANIANS AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL




Chart 13.2

In relation to citizens' perceived influence in decision-making at the national level, from the chart below (chart 13.3), it is visible that there is some interesting variation in terms of the level of incomes. Thus when moving from '0-30.000 Lekë' to 'over 160.000 Lekë' income range, the percentage of those that indicate they have 'some' influence gradually increases from 4 percent to 14 percent. Furthermore, the percentage of those that indicate 'none' as an answer gradually decreases from 75 percent of those with a '0-30.000 Lekë' income level to 55 percent of those that indicated 'over 160.000 Lekë' as their income level. Judging from these responses we could say that the higher the level of incomes, the more people tend to feel they have a higher influence over decision-making at the national level.




Chart 13.3

When it comes to the ideological profile, from the chart it looks like there is no significant variation. Again, the 'none' influence

answer looks less popular among the central political spectrum respondents compared to the extremes of left and right (with 59 percent, 57 percent and 62 percent, against 68 percent and 64 percent).




Chart 13.4

Before jumping to the section on trust, people were asked to answer a combined general question on the *state capacity, its respect of human rights, ability to function properly and ability to provide services in Albania*. From the chart below it is visible that respondents were almost equally divided in their level of agreement with the statements. It is important to the general aim of this survey to notice that a higher disagreement was expressed towards the statement “the Albanian state is providing basic public goods to its citizens”, with 57 percent of respondents answering that they ‘agree a little’ or ‘not at all’ with the statement. On the other hand, respondents agreed the most with the statement that “the Albanian state is present in all the Albanian territory”, where 53 percent of respondents answered that they ‘fully’ or ‘partially’ agree with such a statement.




Chart 14

Section II: TRUST

Before going much deeper into issues of state size, collective bargaining, public services and social protection, this subchapter tries to generally map Albanians' trust in some important institutions. Despite the fact that usually these questions aim at measuring trust, as noted in the chart, institutions have been lined up while taking into consideration *the level of distrust* as a primary ordering value (notice the blue leading area in chart 15), because of the interesting comparative values the level of distrust represents while being very significant. Although the trust values are also noted, they have not served as ordering values in the chart, but will be equally important during the analysis.

By looking exclusively at the distrust level in chart 15 — those that exclusively indicated 'none' for the specific institution — the institutions that score best (low) in the distrust scale are public education institutions — with only 10 percent of respondents indicating 'none' as an answer — followed by private hospitals with 12 percent and police, the media and the government, with 13 percent each. On the other extreme, the Central Election Commission (CEC), the opposition and courts scored a very high level of distrust (respectively 30 percent, 34 percent and 35 percent) while political parties are distrust outliers with 45 percent of respondents indicating that they have no trust in them.

If the 'none' answer is coupled with the 'a little' answer and considered as a low trust indication all together, then to the less trusted institutions above, which had a high distrust level, another one is added: public hospitals. Thus in the 'none-a little' joined distrust scale, political parties are still the outliers with 80 percent of respondents indicating no trust or a little trust and courts, opposition, CEC and public hospitals scoring from 69 percent to 59 percent distrust.

If we now turn at the trust level and see the percentage of trust here defined by the answer ‘a lot’, private hospitals are trust outliers with 23 percent of respondents indicating that they have ‘a lot’ of trust in these institutions. In terms of trust, private hospitals are followed by the Prime Minister with 20 percent of respondents answering a lot, the media with 16 percent and the army with 15 percent. If we combine the answers ‘a lot’ and ‘some’ the most trusted institutions are the private hospitals with 65 percent and the public education institutions with 63 percent of respondents indicating either ‘some’ or ‘a lot’ of trust in them.




Chart 15

If the current (dis)trust situation is compared with the previous year in the same period, it looks like people expressed a lot of frustration and distrust towards public institutions in the pre-

election time (see chart 16). It should be noted that last year’s survey had another focus, thus the question addressed fewer institutions, while the 2014 question aimed at expanding the focus by adding some service providers which will be important in the following questions. In 2013, courts and the Prime Minister scored very low in trust — and consequently high in distrust — with 45 percent of respondents indicating ‘not at all’ as an answer, while the media was indicated as the most trusted institution with 17 percent of respondents trusting it ‘very’ much. It looks like the media constantly emerges as the most trusted institution in surveys. In a 2011¹⁹ survey on youth in Albania, the top trusted institution among them was the media.




Chart 16²⁰

19. ArbjanMaznikuand Geron Kamberi, The living style: democracy and governance, in *Albanian Youth 2011: In between trust and distrust for the future*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. (Tirana, 2001).p. 199.

20. Answers from the 2013 survey *The state of Albanian democracy at the eve of 2013 general election*.

As it is visible from both 2013 and the current 2014 survey, courts are some of the most distrusted institutions in the county. In order to get a more detailed picture about the citizens' perceptions on the *functioning of the judicial system* in Albania, this last question of the section asked people to indicate whether they agreed or not with some statements on the judicial system. It is very clear from chart 17 that the vast majority of respondents – more than 60 percent in every statement – showed a very low level of trust towards the judicial system in Albania.

More specifically, 76 percent of respondents did not agree with the statement “the judicial system in Albania gives fair decisions”. Moreover more than 60 percent of respondents agreed with the following statements: “citizens should have political connections in order to get a fair judgment”, “citizens should have personal connections in order to get a fair judgment”, and “citizens should pay bribes/corrupt judges/prosecutors in order to get a fair judgment”. Accordingly, a vast majority of respondents believes that the justice system does not give fair decisions and that in order to get a fair judgment one should have political or/and personal connections or/and use a form of corruption towards key decision-making actors.




Chart 17

Below are the answers to the same question from the 2013 survey which look almost identical to the current picture. It looks like the current level of trust results slightly higher by 3-6 percent compared to 2013, especially in relation to the last statement on bribes where in 2013 75 percent of respondents answered that “in order to have justice, citizens must pay bribes”, while in 2014, 68 percent agreed with this statement.




Chart 18²¹

21. Answers from the 2013 survey *The state of Albanian democracy at the eve of 2013 general elections*.

Section III: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND SOCIAL DIALOGUE

With the end of communism in Albania — as in the other post-communist countries, except for some of them where trade unions were really active like in Slovenia — there was no such thing as the community of workers in collective terms and the trade unions became practically only formal organizations with no real legitimacy among workers or power to influence decision making by representing workers' rights. Consequently, *collective bargaining* as a concept and phenomenon is not a very common practice in Albania.

Nevertheless, when people were asked on who should be responsible for taking important decisions on wages, working hours and workers' rights in Albania, a wide majority of the respondents (61 percent) answered that the government and the policymakers in collaboration with the trade unions should be responsible for this. Furthermore, 1/5th of respondents answered that these decisions should be mainly discussed and decided by trade unions while the government and policymakers are the endpoint of the process or the receiving end. Only 12 percent answered that these decisions should be exclusively discussed and decided by public institutions, the government and policymakers. Accordingly, from these answers, it is visible that the




Chart 19

majority of people believe that trade unions should have a very active role in deciding about issues related to workers.

Variation in terms of income and ideological profile

From chart 19.1 it is visible that there is a certain variation in terms of incomes in relation to the responsible actors that should take important decisions on wages, working hours and workers' rights in Albania. Thus, when moving from '0-30.000 Lekë' to 'over 160.000 Lekë', respondents tend to be more favorable of a collaborative decision-making model (with 69 percent compared to 55 percent) where both the government and trade unions are taking part, while the exclusivity of one or the other is less desirable. This pattern was also previously noticed from the question on decision-making over public services' management, where the higher the income the more respondents tended to support a collaborative model of decision-making.




Chart 19.1

From chart 19.2 it is clear that no variation is noticed in terms of ideological profile, although those identifying as belonging to the centre tend to be more supportive of a collaborative model of decision-making compared to the rest of the political spectrum.




Chart 19.2

While to the previous question, the majority of respondents (61 percent) answered that decisions in relation to workers' issues were to be taken by policymakers' in collaboration with trade unions, the first important clue from this questions' chart is that respondents' felt like not having enough information in relation to the *current situation of trade unions* in Albania. Thus, to two important statements on trade unions' activity — trade unions are “existent but ineffective in supporting workers' rights” and they are “not independent from political parties or other fractions” — almost half or respondents were not able to give an answer on agreement or disagreement. Moreover, 86 percent of respondents were not able to agree or disagree with the statement that trade unions today are “active and effective in supporting workers' rights”.

Besides the lack of information on specific issues related to the trade unions' current activity, for those that expressed agreement or disagreement with the statements, more than half indicated that trade unions are “existent but ineffective in supporting workers' rights” and 33 percent agreed that these unions are “not independent from political parties or other fractions”. It is

interesting to see that more than half of respondents (56 percent) answered did not agree with the statement that trade unions were “nonexistent after the end of communism” while only 31 percent agreed.



Chart 20

When looking at the overall picture presented by respondents’ answers to the above mentioned statements, it seems like most of people are aware of trade unions’ existence but have no information on their current activity in Albania.

Section IV: PUBLIC SERVICES AND STATE SIZE

This subchapter on public services and state size represents one of the main sections of the survey where some crucial questions have been asked. This set of questions aimed at getting respondents' opinions on main issues that would answer some 'who' and 'how' questions. These inquiry into actors, roles and modalities is fundamental in understanding citizens' stances on the welfare, the role of the state and its' size and especially the values that stand at the basis of the social tissue in Albania. Whether it is a need for efficiency, a demand for major social solidarity, a request for more space for personal initiative or the legacy of the past that stands behind respondents' opinions and answers, this is something that needs further research to be defined. Nevertheless, this section's questions give some important insights into the current stands of Albanian citizens in relation to the state and society as well as in relation to the state-society relationship.

Apart from the general need to map Albanian citizens' values, opinions and stances in relation to these important issues, this chapter has a very contemporary profile in measuring citizens' stances on a main theme of the Albanian public debate during these years: *the public versus the private provision of public services*. Consequently, this section provides an outline of Albanian citizens' attitudes over the above theme in relation to some core public services provision by the state or by private entities.

When answering about who should be the *main provider of some core public services*, respondents were relatively consistent in their opinion that the state had to be the main provider. Yet, within this major trend there are some variations to be taken

into consideration. On the one extreme of the chart there is public safety and justice which were indicated as exclusive state provision domains with 91 percent of respondents indicating the state as the main provider in each case. On the other extreme of the chart there are situated post offices, housing and jobs where the state is still seen as the main provider, but to a lower percentage — 66-69 percent — compared to the other services. It is significant to notice that housing in terms of provision is seen by 8 percent of respondents as the domain of the family and other similar entities, although this is a very low percentage compared to those indicating the state as the major responsible actor that should take care of housing provisions.




Chart 21

As some services are very significant and important in order to understand citizens’ opinions and viewpoints on provision matters, the following three questions specifically focus on education, health care and pensions (retirement fund). Questions are intentionally formulated in a ‘*should be*’ fashion in order to

make respondents indicate their preferred configuration of the service despite the current status of such a service in terms of provision and management. Furthermore, in terms of values, such a formulation invites respondents to consider the normative dimension of the issue.

Regarding *education*, the majority of respondents (44 percent) answered that education in Albania should be “public and funded by general taxation”. A similar share of answers (40 percent) indicated that education in Albania should be “public and funded partly by taxes and partly by users’ fees”. These two options — where a predominantly public profile of education in Albania is stated — represent the major indicated ones, while the other two options — that education should be “publicly funded but managed by private organizations” and “private and paid for directly by citizens when using it” — were indicated only by 8 percent and 3 percent of respondents respectively.




Chart 22

Variation in terms of income and ideological profile

When it comes to financial matters in relation to education in Albania, there is a clear variation in terms of income (Chart 22.1). Thus, the higher the incomes the more respondents tend to support that education in Albania should be “public and funded partly by taxes and partly by users’ fees” (with a variation from 39 percent to 47 percent with the increase of incomes), while with the increase of incomes the less respondents tend to support the option that education in Albania should be “public and funded by general taxation” (with a variation from 50 percent to 29 percent with the increase of incomes). Furthermore, with the increase of incomes respondents are more supportive of the statement that education in Albania should be “publicly funded but managed by private organizations”, although this answer was not the most popular ones in general terms.




Chart 22.1

From chart 22.2 it is visible that there is no variation in terms of ideological profile in relation to the funding and management of education in Albania. Thus, the left, central left and central right wing respondents mainly prefer an education that is “public and funded by general taxation” (48 percent, 48 percent and

47 percent of them respectively), while centre and right wing respondents prefer an education that is “public and funded partly by taxes and partly by users’ fees” (48 percent and 47 percent respectively).




Chart 22.2

When the same question is asked about the *health care* in Albania, respondents’ preferences are almost identical to the previous question. Accordingly, half of respondents answered that health care should be “public and funded by general taxation” and 32 percent answered that it should be “public and funded partly by taxes and partly by users fees”. Thus, more than 80 percent of respondents chose the same two options for both education and health care. Only 11 percent of respondents answered that health care should be “publicly funded but managed by private organizations”.




Chart 23

Variation in terms of income and ideological profile

When it comes to the funding and management of the health care system in Albania, there is a limited variation in terms of incomes. Thus, when moving from ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ to ‘100.000-160.000 Lekë’ support for a health care that is “public and funded by general taxation” decreases (from 55 percent to 43 percent), only to get higher again (57 percent) for those respondents that indicated ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ as their income level. The opposite trend happens with the statement that health care in Albania should be “public and funded partly by taxes and partly by users’ fees”.




Chart 23.1

From chart 23.2 we see a previously noted trend in relation to the ideological profile: the extreme left and right have similar views while differing from the central part of the political spectrum. Thus, in relation to health care, while left wing and right wing respondents and right mainly support a health care that is “public and funded by general taxation” — with 57 percent and 51 percent respectively — central left, centre and central right tend to be more balanced in between a health care that is “public and funded by general taxation” and “public and funded partly by taxes and partly by users’ fees”.




Chart 23.2

In relation to *pensions*, only 1/3rd of respondents believed that the current status quo — where pensions are publicly managed and funded by social contributions — was the way pensions in Albania should be. Instead, almost half of respondents (49 percent) indicated that pensions should be “publicly managed and funded by social contributions, but allowing those who choose to do so to devote part of the contributions to a private fund”. It is interesting to see that 9 percent of respondents choose an option not very popular in Albania yet, the private schemes of pensions.




Chart 24

Variation in terms of income and ideological profile

From chart 24.1 it is visible that there is a considerable variation in terms of income when it comes to how pensions in Albania should be funded and managed. Thus, with the increase of incomes, respondents tend to increasingly support the statement that pensions in Albania should be “publicly managed and funded by social contributions, but allowing those who choose




Chart 24.1

to do so to devote part of their contributions to a private fund” and decreasingly support the statement that pensions should be “publicly managed and funded by social contributions as they currently are”. In the same way, with the increase of incomes respondents also tend to choose the statement that pensions in Albania should be “fully working on private schemes and private contributions”.

From chart 24.2 we can see that there is no meaningful variation in terms of ideological profile. Nevertheless, it could be noticed that while all the political spectrum respondents tend to be more supportive of a mixed scheme where the right to choose is also present, the left wing respondents are more ideological in their answer with 39 percent of them supporting pension schemes that are “publicly managed and funded by social contributions as they currently are”.




Chart 24.2

When it comes to the level of *citizens' satisfaction with the standards of those public services that are provided by the state in Albania*, there is a consistent trend with previous questions. In the same fashion as in the questions about the level of trust, in Chart 25, public services have been listed in relation to citizens' reported level of dissatisfaction rather than satisfaction. From

chart 25 it is visible that the better scoring services are electricity, education and water supply with the smallest percentage of people indicating “not satisfied” as an answer (respectively 13 percent, 14 percent and 18 percent). On the other side, respondents were satisfied the less with waste management, employment promotion and consumer’s protection with 56 percent, 52 percent and 44 percent respectively choosing “not satisfied” as an answer.

If the dissatisfaction options “not satisfied” and “not very satisfied” are combined, then the worst rated public services in terms of citizens’ satisfaction are health care with 87 percent, justice and/or justice related issues with 85 percent and employment promotion with 85 percent. It is important to notice that apart from electricity, for all of the other services more than 50 percent of citizens indicated that they are ‘not satisfied’ or ‘not very satisfied’.




Chart 25

In order to get some further insights into citizens' opinions about some important public services, they were asked about *the quality of the services provided by public and private institutions* in Albania. Respondents' answers to this question were consistent with the previous ones. Thus, when asked who provides a better quality of services, public safety and education were the top ones where public institutions are seen as the better providers, with 65 percent and 63 percent of answers respectively indicating public institutions. On the other side, health care and employment promotion are seen as better provided by the private sector, with 69 percent and 52 percent respectively indicating the private sector. These answers are consistent especially with the previous question on trust where private hospitals and public education institutions were among the most trusted institutions.




Chart 26

A consistent trend throughout the survey — and especially along this section— is respondents' tendency to choose the state, public institutions and public funding as the preferred and the most desirable way to provide public services (with very few exceptions regarding health care and sometimes housing,

employment promotion, etc). As state provided public services are closely related to the level of taxes and citizens' contributions, the next question asked whether people agreed or disagreed with some statement related to taxation.

Respondents' agreed the most — 70 percent in both cases — with the statements that “I would be willing to contribute with non financial means (volunteering, community services, etc)” and “who earns more should pay more”. Respondents were almost equally divided in answering in relation to the statement “the level of taxes should increase if this would bring to better services”, with 51 percent disagreeing and 49 percent agreeing. Respondents disagreed the most with the statements “the level of taxes should decrease as I am willing to privately provide services for myself and family” and “income taxes should have a fixed rate despite the level of incomes”, with 60 percent disagreeing with the first statement and 62 percent disagreeing with the second.

From these answers it is visible that while respondents are undecided if they would pay more for better services, they are more decided about how they think public services should be paid for. The two statements “who earns more should pay more” and “income taxes should have a fixed rate despite the level of incomes” were meant to portray the progressive and the flat tax in simple words.²² Accordingly, in terms of taxation, it looks like respondents support progressive taxation compared to flat taxation. From respondents' answers it is visible that people would prefer the social gap to be reduced by those who earn more to pay more.

22. The flat tax also means that who earns more should pay more, even when the taxation rate is fixed, but in our case putting this statement with the other that specifically mentioned the fixed rate serves to distinguish the two statements as different.





Chart 27

Variation in terms of income and ideological profile

The cross-tabulations reported below in relation to chart 27 have been selected in accordance to their significant variations in relation to incomes and/or ideological profile while those statements where there was no variation, or where variation was insignificant, were left out.


In relation to the statement, “who earns more should pay more”, from chart 27.1 it can be noticed that there is variation in relation to the level of incomes. Thus, with the increase of incomes there is a decrease in respondents’ agreement with the statement. While 71 percent of ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ income range respondents agree that “who earns more should pay more”, 58 percent of ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ income range respondents agreed with the statement. The rest of income ranges’ level of agreement varied in between these two percentage values. This reported variation fulfils expectations as the more people earn, the less they are willing to support a progressive taxation, although 58 percent of

support from the ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ income range respondents is still a high value of support for progressive taxation.



Grafiku 27.1

An important variation is present even in relation to respondents’ ideological profile. Thus, from chart 27.2 it is clear that when going from the left side of the political spectrum to the right side, respondents’ agreement with the statement “who earns more should pay more” decreases. Thus, as 82 percent of left wing respondents agreed with the statement, 57 percent of right wing respondents agreed, while the other central positions of the political spectrum falling somewhere in between these values. This reported variation fits the general expectations in relation to the ideological profile as the righter one goes in the political spectrum the less people support a progressive taxation. Nevertheless, 57 percent of support from the right wing respondents for the statement is still very high for a right wing ideology.



Grafiku 27.2

When it comes to the level of taxation, again there is variation in relation to the level of incomes. From chart 27.3 it is visible that with the increase of incomes, the level of support for the statement that “the level of taxes should increase if this would bring to better services” increases. Thus, while support for the statement is 40 percent for the ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ income range respondents, this support gradually amounts with the rise of incomes until reaching 55 percent for the ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ income category.




Chart 27.3

In relation to the same question and respondents’ ideological profile, from chart 27.4 it looks like there is some variation in relation to the ideological profile — except for the left wing respondents where the pattern is not continues. Thus, when moving from the central left to the right wing, the percentage of those supporting the statement gradually decreases from 57 percent to 44 percent.




Chart 27.4

When it comes to fix taxation, there were no important income variations in relation to respondents' stances, while all of the income ranges mainly disagreed with a flat taxation.




Chart 27.5

When it comes to the ideological profile of respondents in relation to the same question there is some important variation. Thus, when we move from the left wing to the right wing in the political spectrum, the level of support for the flat taxation gradually increases, while the entire political spectrum is mostly against the fact that taxation should have a fixed rate. Thus, while 30 percent of left wing respondents support flat taxation, 47 percent of right wing respondents support it. Although this variation and the support trend was expected, still the right wing general level of support for the flat taxation (47 percent) is lower than expected.




Chart 27.6

Last but not least, a question that would give some further insides on Albanian citizens' preferred size of the state was the one related to *privatization and state enterprises*. From

the chart below it is visible that citizens agreed the most with two statements “the Albanian state should contract managing private companies without giving up state ownership over state enterprises” and that “privatization makes state enterprises more effective in providing services”, with respectively 70 percent and 66 percent. On the other hand, respondents disagreed to a similar degree — respectively 72 percent and 65 percent — with the statements “all state enterprises in Albania should be privatized” and “no privatization process of any kind should be applied for any state enterprise ownership or service management”.

While most of respondents indicate that privatization makes state enterprises more effective in providing services, even more respondents think that not all state enterprises in Albania should be privatized. It looks like the golden mean for them is the application of a model where the state continues to be the owner of important enterprises while private companies are contracted only for the management part.




Chart 28

Variation in terms of income and ideological profile

While we are not reporting the income chart here as there was no variation in terms of income in relation to whether or not the Albanian state should contract managing private companies without giving up ownership over state enterprises, a different picture is present when it comes to respondents' ideological profile. Although the pattern is no complete when it comes to the right wing respondents' attitudes, still there is some variation when moving from the left wing to central right. Thus, while 72 percent of left wing respondents agree with the fact that the state in Albania should contract managing companies without giving up state ownership over state enterprises, this percentage decreases to 55 percent of the central right respondents.




Chart 28.1

In relation to the statement that “privatization makes state enterprises more effective in providing services”, there was no significant variation in terms of income but some important variation in terms of ideological profile. Although, the right wing respondents are still outliers from the pattern, there is a gradual increase in agreement with the statement when moving from the left side of the spectrum to central right (from 59 percent to 85 percent).




Chart 28.2

In relation to the statement that “no privatization process of any kind should be applied for any state enterprise ownership or service management” there was no significant variation in terms of ideological profile but there is some variation in terms of income. Thus, with the increase of incomes, respondents tend to disagree with the statement more.




Chart 28.3

When it comes to the statement that “all state enterprises in Albania should be privatized” there is a significant variation in terms of ideological profile. Thus, when moving from the left side of the spectrum to the right side, respondents’ agreement with the statement tend to rise. This trend is generally compatible with expectations.

Towards a redefinition of the social contract




Chart 28.4

Section V: EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES AND SOCIAL PROTECTION

After inviting respondents to think about public services and the private versus public provisions, this section focuses on societal issues by measuring citizens' opinions on social protection and equal opportunities. This section is especially related to issues of social solidarity which lie at the foundation of welfare states and for some European philosophical schools it represents one of the main social cohesion elements for modern societies. Consequently, the section deals with issues such as: fair society, the social assistance, the rich-poor gap, job security, redistribution policies, etc. Compared to previous sections, this one is specifically digging into the *values and principles* that lie beneath or at the centre of citizens' opinions and viewpoints.

Starting from a question that defines the foundation of the chapter, we asked how citizens perceived *a fair society*. Respondents were mainly divided between two statements: that in a fair society "who pays more gets more, but certain disadvantaged segments of society should be assisted by the state" and "no one is left without basic public services despite their ability to contribute", which were indicated by 36 percent of respondents each. Another 1/5th of respondents answered that in a fair society "everyone is rewarded in wealth in accordance to talent and contribution". In either a moderate or in a kind of radical way, the majority of respondents (72 percent) believed that in a fair society there should be a certain degree of solidarity for the disadvantaged segments of society.




Chart 29

Continuing with a specific question on the *unemployment assistance* in Albania, a large majority of respondents (83 percent) answered that the current allocated sum per household was too small. The other two options — where the unemployment assistance is stated as high or as about right — got some insignificant indication percentage compared to the above option. While it is almost impossible for 83 percent of our sample to have personally been assisted through this assistance scheme, it is clear that citizens’ perceive this assistance as insufficient despite their personal experience.




Chart 30

The chart below visualizes respondents’ answers about a list of statements in relation to what the Albania state should provide to different categories of people in Albania. In all of the statements, the vast majority of respondents fully agree with the statements which are mainly indicating a proactive role of the state in securing assistance and social protection to different social categories.

However, while the percentages of disagreement with the statements are insignificant, the level of full agreement and partial agreement is more interesting to be discussed. The statements that reported a higher degree of ‘partial agreement’ – although still low compared to the full agreement – were that the state should “ensure sufficient child care services for working parents” and that the state should “ensure a job for everyone who wants one”, where 26 percent and 22 percent of respondents respectively indicated that they partially agree with the statement. On the other hand, the statements that were largely agreed with




Chart 31

by around 90 percent of respondents were that the state should “ensure adequate health care for the sick” and that the state should provide “financial assistance to people with disability”. 89 percent and 91 percent of citizens respectively fully agreed with these statements. It looks like citizens are more sensitive when it comes to those social categories that are perceived as more at risk and less able to provide services for themselves.

When specifically asked about the degree of *engagement of the state in redistribution policies*, the majority of respondents (43 percent) answered that the Albanian state should “have an active redistribution role in lowering the rich-poor gap”. Another 35 percent answered that the state should “moderately engage in redistribution policies”; while 12 percent answered that “the rich-poor gap is not a matter the state should be dealing with”. Accordingly, although to different degrees, most of respondents expect the state to have an active redistribution role.




Chart 32

Variation in terms of income and ideological profile

When it comes to the state role in redistribution policies, from chart 32.1, it can be noticed that there is considerable variation in

terms of income. Thus, with the increase of incomes respondents tend to agree *less* that the Albanian state should “have an active redistribution role in lowering the rich-poor gap” (51 percent of respondents in the ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ income range agree against 29 percent of respondents in the ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ range). On the other hand, with the increase of incomes respondents tend to agree *more* that the Albanian state should “moderately engage in redistribution policies” and that “the rich-poor gap is not a matter the state should be dealing with”. This was expected to be a sensitive question in relation to the level of income.




Chart 32.1

When it comes to the ideological profile, there is some variation worth noticing. Thus, when moving from the left side of the political spectrum to the right side, respondents tend to agree less that the Albanian state should “have an active redistribution role in lowering the rich-poor gap”, but the trend is reversed when it comes to the statement that “the rich-poor gap is not a matter the state should be dealing with”, where central right and right wing respondents tend to support this last statement more than the rest of the spectrum, although this is still their least preferred option in terms of percentage compared to the other two.

Towards a redefinition of the social contract




Chart 32

Section VI: RISK ASSESSMENT

This concluding section evaluates *citizens' perceived major problems* for Albanians today and for themselves. Apart from the horizontal comparison within the chapter in between what citizens perceive as other fellow Albanians' main problems and their own problems, the chapter also serves as a good basis to compare vertically with other chapters in order to evaluate citizens' major discontents and their approach towards institutions, trust, social services provision, the role of the state, etc.

Citizens were first asked about what they considered to be *a problem for Albanian citizens* currently. It is important to notice that in this question, citizens could choose more than one option. A vast majority of respondents (87 percent) indicated unemployment as a problem for Albanians today, followed by




Chart 33

poverty with 75 percent. Around half of respondents indicated the poor standards of justice (53 percent), the poor standards of health care (48 percent) and crime, violence and/or trafficking (45 percent) as the problems of Albanians today. The low level of education, gambling games/casinos, lack of public order/safety and violation of human rights were indicated as problems by around 1/3 of respondents each. Around 20-25 percent of respondents saw poor infrastructure, poor business opportunities, lack of social solidarity and ineffective police as a problem. Moreover, 12 percent of respondents indicated lack of freedom as a problem.

When it comes to indicating *the most concerning personal issue*, there is a certain consistency of what are perceived as general problems of Albanian citizens with what citizens think as their own major problem. Thus, the three major indicated problems — low economic income with 29 percent, unemployment with 22 percent and poverty with 12 percent — are very similar to what they see as other fellow Albanians problems. Moreover, other




Chart 34

indicated problems that mostly concerned respondents with 5-7 percent of indications were work safety, high rates of crime and/or lack of security, poor standards of health care and property issues.

If the above results from this years' survey are compared with the 2013 survey we see an almost identical picture of respondents' major perceived problem. Thus, low income, with 28 percent; unemployment, with 25 percent; and poverty, with 13 percent are the main indicated problems, followed by crime rate and job security.




Chart 35²³

23. Answers from the 2013 survey *The state of Albanian democracy at the eve of 2013 general elections*.

Appendix1: Questionnaire

| |
|--------------------|
| I. GENERAL PROFILE |
|--------------------|

1. Gender

1 Male 2 Female

2. What is your age?

- a. 18- 29
- b. 30 -39
- c. 40-49
- d. 50-69
- e. Over 70

3. What is your level of education?

- a. No education
- b. Elementary School
- c. High School
- d. University education
- e. Master
- f. PhD

4. What is your household level of income:

- a. 0- 30.000 ALL
- b. 30.001- 60.000 ALL
- c. 60.001- 100.000 ALL
- d. 100.001- 160.000 ALL
- e. Above 160.000 ALL

5. What is your employment status:

- a. Employed
- b. Self employed
- c. Unemployed
- d. Student
- e. Pensioner
- f. No answer

6. How would you define your ideological profile:

| | |
|----|----------------------|
| 1 | <i>Left</i> |
| 2 | <i>Central left</i> |
| 3 | <i>Centre</i> |
| 4 | <i>Central right</i> |
| 5 | <i>Right</i> |
| 6 | None |
| 99 | No answer |

II. DEMOCRACY AND MARKET ECONOMY**7. How would you assess the level of democracy in Albania today? (Check only one alternative)**

| | |
|-----------|---|
| 1 | Albania is a fully non-democratic country |
| 2 | Albania is more non-democratic than democratic |
| 3 | Albania is more democratic than non-democratic |
| 4 | Albania is a fully democratic country |
| 99 | Don't know / No answer |

12. Do you agree with the following statements?

| | 1. Yes | 0. No | 99. Don't know |
|--|--------|-------|----------------|
| The judicial system in Albania gives fair decisions | | | |
| Citizens should have personal connections in order to get a fair judgment | | | |
| Citizens should have political connections in order to get a fair judgment | | | |
| Citizens should pay bribes /corrupt judges/ prosecutors in order to get a fair judgment | | | |

13. To what extent do you agree with the following statements (check only one alternative per statement):

| | 4. Fully agree | 3. Somehow | 2. Little | 1. Not at all | 99. Don't know/no answer |
|--|----------------|------------|-----------|---------------|--------------------------|
| The Albanian state is functioning properly nowadays | | | | | |
| The Albanian state is present in all the Albanian territory | | | | | |
| Law enforcement is present in all Albanian territory | | | | | |
| The Albanian state respects human rights | | | | | |
| The Albanian state is providing basic public goods to its citizens | | | | | |

III. TRUST

14. Below is a list of institutions in Albania. How much trust do you have in each of them? (check only one alternative per institution):

| | 1. A lot | 2. Some-how | 3. Little | 4. None | 99. Don't know/no answer |
|-----------------------------------|----------|-------------|-----------|---------|--------------------------|
| 1. President | | | | | |
| 2. Government | | | | | |
| 3. Prime Minister | | | | | |
| 4. Opposition | | | | | |
| 5. General attorney | | | | | |
| 6. Police | | | | | |
| 7. Political parties | | | | | |
| 8. Courts | | | | | |
| 9. Private education institutions | | | | | |
| 10. Public education institutions | | | | | |
| 11. Private hospitals | | | | | |
| 12. Public hospitals | | | | | |
| 13. Central Election Commission | | | | | |
| 14. Civil Society | | | | | |
| 15. Media | | | | | |
| 16. Religious institutions | | | | | |
| 17. Army | | | | | |
| 18. Intelligence services | | | | | |

IV. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND SOCIAL DIALOGUE

15. Important decisions on wages, working hours and workers rights in Albania (Check only one alternative):

| | |
|-----------|---|
| 1 | Should be exclusively discussed and decided only by public institutions and government/policymakers |
| 2 | Should be discussed and decided by the government/policymakers in collaboration with the trade unions |
| 3 | Should be mainly discussed and decided by trade unions while the government/policymakers are the endpoint |
| 99 | Don't know |

16. Trade unions in Albania nowadays are:

| | 1. Yes | 0. No | 99. Don't know |
|---|--------|-------|----------------|
| 1. Nonexistent | | | |
| 2. Existent but ineffective in supporting workers rights | | | |
| 3. Active and effective in supporting workers rights | | | |
| 4. Not independent from political parties or other fractions | | | |

V. PUBLIC SERVICES AND STATE SIZE

17. In your opinion who should be the main provider of these services:

| | 1 State | 2 Private entities | 3 Others (family, community, NGOs) |
|----------------------------|---------|--------------------|------------------------------------|
| Jobs | | | |
| Education | | | |
| Health Care | | | |
| Social protection/services | | | |

| | | | |
|----------------------------|--|--|--|
| Justice | | | |
| Public safety | | | |
| Infrastructure | | | |
| Housing | | | |
| Water supply | | | |
| Electricity | | | |
| Communication/ Post office | | | |
| Equal opportunity | | | |
| Other (specify) | | | |

18. In your opinion education in Albania should be (Check only one alternative):

1. Public and funded by general taxation
2. Public and funded partly by taxes and partly by users fees
3. Publicly funded but managed by private organizations
4. Privatized and paid for directly by citizens when using it
99. Don't know

19. In your opinion health care in Albania should be (Check only one alternative):

1. Public and funded by general taxation
2. Public and funded partly by taxes and partly by users fees
3. Publicly funded but managed by private organizations
4. Privatized and paid for directly by citizens when using it
99. Don't know

20. In your opinion pensions in Albania should be (Check only one alternative):

1. Publicly managed and funded by social contributions as they currently are
 2. Publicly managed and funded by social contributions, but allowing those who choose to do so to devote part of the contributions to a private fund
 3. They should be fully working on private schemes and contributions
99. Don't know

21. Are you satisfied with the standards of the following public services provided by the state in Albania (Check only one alternative per service):

| | 4. Very satisfied | 3. Satisfied | 2. Not very satisfied | 1. No satisfied | 99. Don't know/no answer |
|----------------|-------------------|--------------|-----------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| Education | | | | | |
| Health Care | | | | | |
| Justice | | | | | |
| Security | | | | | |
| Infrastructure | | | | | |
| Water supply | | | | | |
| Electricity | | | | | |
| Pensions | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Employment promotion | | | | | |
| Business affairs (registration, taxation authorities, competitiveness) | | | | | |
| Consumer protection | | | | | |
| Human rights protection (protection of vulnerable groups/ minorities/ from discrimination) | | | | | |
| Waste management | | | | | |

22. Who provides a better quality of the following services?

| | <i>1 Public institutions</i> | <i>2 Private sector</i> | <i>99 Don't know</i> |
|----------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|
| Education | | | |
| Health Care | | | |
| Justice | | | |
| Security | | | |
| Employment promotion | | | |
| Pensions | | | |

23. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

| | YES | NO |
|--|-----|----|
| All state enterprises in Albania should be privatized | | |
| Privatization makes state enterprises more effective in providing services | | |
| The Albanian state should contract managing private companies without giving up state ownership over state enterprises | | |
| No privatization process of any kind should be applied for any state enterprise ownership or service management | | |

24. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

| | YES | NO |
|---|-----|----|
| 1. The level of taxes should increase if this would bring to better services | | |
| 2. The level of taxes should decrease as I am willing to privately provide services for myself and family | | |
| 3. I would be willing to contribute with non financial means (volunteering, community services, etc) | | |
| 4. Who earns more should pay more | | |
| 5. Income taxes should have a fixed rate despite the level of incomes | | |

VI. EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES AND SOCIAL PROTECTION

25. In a fair society (Check only one alternative):

1. Everyone is rewarded in wealth in accordance to talent and contribution
2. Who pays more gets more, but certain disadvantaged segments of society should be assisted by the state

3. No one is left without basic public services despite their ability to contribute

99. Don't know/ No answer

26. How do you evaluate unemployment benefits currently in Albania? (Check only one alternative):

1. The allocated sum per household is too low

2. The allocated sum per household is too high

3. The allocated sum per household is just about right

99. Don't know/ No answer

27. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

| <i>The Albanian state should provide:</i> | Fully agree | Partially agree | Not at all |
|--|--------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| 1 An adequate retirement income in old age | | | |
| 2 Financial assistance during periods of unemployment | | | |
| 3 Financial assistance to poor families | | | |
| 4 Financial assistance to people with disability | | | |
| 5 Ensure a job for everyone who wants one | | | |
| 6 Ensure adequate health care for the sick | | | |
| 7 Ensure sufficient child care services for working parents | | | |
| 8 Provide paid maternity leave | | | |
| 9 Provide specific quotas and opportunities for disadvantaged groups in society (roma, women, ect) | | | |

28. The Albanian state (Check only one alternative):

1. Should have an active redistribution role in lowering the rich-poor gap
2. Should moderately engage in redistribution policies
3. The rich-poor gap is not a matter the state should be dealing with
99. Don't know

| |
|-----------------------------|
| VII. RICK ASSESSMENT |
|-----------------------------|

29. Which of the following do you consider to be a problem for Albanian citizens today? (Check all that apply):

1. Unemployment
2. Poverty
3. Lack of public order/security
4. Ineffective police
5. Low level of education
6. Poor standards of Justice
7. Violation of human rights
8. Poor standards on health care
9. Crime/violence/trafficking
10. No Freedom
11. Environmental degradation
12. Illegal Business/Poor business opportunity
13. Gambling
14. Poor standards of roads
15. Lack of social solidarity

- 16. Other (specify)
- 17. There are no problems for citizens
- 99. Don't know/ No answer

30. What is your most concerning personal issue? (Check only one alternative)

- 1. Low economic income
- 2. Poverty
- 3. Unemployment
- 4. Job insecurity
- 5. Poor standards of education
- 6. Poor standards of health care
- 7. Lack of social services
- 8. High rate of crime/security
- 9. Environmental damage/ Pollution
- 10. Housing
- 11. Property issue
- 12. No problem at all
- 99. Don't know/ No answer

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