

By Kidist Mulugeta

The Role of Regional and International Organizations in Resolving the Somali Conflict: The Case of IGAD

Submitted to Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, Addis Ababa
December, 2009

Table of Content

List of Abbreviations	5
List of Tables	6
List of Figures	6
List of Appendices.....	6
Executive Summary	7
Introduction	8
CHAPTER ONE: THE SOMALI CONFLICT	9
1.1 The Causes of the Somali Conflict	9
1.1.1. Root Causes	9
1.1.2. Aggravating Factors	10
1.2. The Implications of the Somali Conflict	11
1.2.1. Local Implications	11
1.2.2. Implications for the Regional States and the International Community	15
1.3. Attempted Conflict Resolution Efforts	16
1.3.1. International Intervention	16
1.3.2. Peace Talks	17
1.4. Current Development	17
1.4.1. Political Development in Somalia	18
1.4.2. The Issue of Security	19
1.4.3. The Government Institutions	20
CHAPTER TWO: IGAD’S ROLE IN SOMALIA	22
2.1. Background to IGAD	22
2.1.1. The Origin of IGAD	22
2.1.2. Vision, Mission, Principles, and Major Activities of IGAD.....	23
2.1.3. Organs of IGAD	23
2.1.4. Draft Peace and Security Strategy of IGAD	24
2.1.5. Ongoing Revitalization	25
2.2. IGAD’s Role in Somalia	25
2.2.1. IGAD Member States and the Somali Conflict	26
2.2.2. IGAD’s Involvement from 1991 to 2002	26
2.2.3. The Role of IGAD in the Establishment of the TFG of Somalia: The Eldoret Peace Process	28
2.2.4. The Establishment of the TFG II and IGAD	34
2.3. IGAD’s Achievements in its Effort to Resolve the Somali Conflict	35
2.3.1. The Continuous Engagement of IGAD	35
2.3.2. The Commitment of the Member States of IGAD	35
2.3.3. The Efforts of the IGAD Secretariat	36
2.3.4. IGAD as a Forum for Member States	37
2.4. The Challenges of IGAD in Somali Peace Making and Lessons to be Learned	37
2.4.1. The Complexity of the Somali Conflict	37
2.4.2. Regional Factors	38

- 2.4.3. Different Approaches in Addressing the Somali Conflict40
- 2.4.4. The Limited Capacity of the Secretariat of IGAD41
- 2.4.5. The Neutrality and Enforcement Capacity of IGAD43
- 2.4.6. Lack of Regional Policy on Peace and Security.....44
- 2.4.7. Lack of Sufficient and Appropriate International Commitment44
- 2.5. IGAD, the AU and the UN.....45

- CHAPTER THREE: The Role of the African Union and the United Nations46**
- 3.1. The Role of the AU46
 - 3.1.1. Background to AMISO46
 - 3.1.2. AMISOM in Somalia46
- 3.2. The Role of the UN in Somalia47
 - 3.2.1. The United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS)48
 - 3.2.2. The UN Support to the TFG II48
 - 3.2.3. The UN Support to AMISOM49

- Conclusion50
- Recommendations51
- Bibliography54
- Appendix60

List of Abbreviations

AAU	Addis Ababa University	SCIC	Supreme Council of Islamic Courts of Somalia
AU	African Union	SCSC	Supreme Council of Sharia Courts
AFP	Agence France-Presse	SDM	Somali Democratic Movement
AMISOM	African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia	SNM	Somali National Movement
ARS	Alliance for the Re-liberation for Somalia	SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
ARS-A	Alliance for the Re-liberation for Somalia-Asmara	SNRP	Somali National Reconciliation Process
ARS-D	Alliance for the Re-liberation for Somalia-Djibouti	SRRC	Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahelo-Saharan States	SRSO	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning Network	SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations	TFG	Transitional Federal Government
DDR	Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration	TFG II	Transitional Federal Government II
DPA	Department of Political Affairs	TNG	Transitional National Government
EAC	East African Community	UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	UN	United Nations
EU	European Union	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
HLC	High Level Committee	UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
ICCJ	International Criminal Court of Justice	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
ICG	International Crisis Group	UNISOM	United Nations Mission in Somalia
ICJ	International Court of Justice	UNSOA	UN Support Office for AMISOM
ICPAT	IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism	UNITAF	Unified Task Force
IDPs	Internally Displaced Peoples	UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority for Development	UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
IGADD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification	UNSC	United Nations Security Council
IGASOM	IGAD Peace Keeping Mission to Somalia	US	United States
IPF	IGAD Partners Forum	USC	United Somali Congress
JSC	Joint Security Committee		
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs		
OAU	Organization of African Union		
PSC	Peace and Security Council		
REC's	Regional Economic Communities		
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community		
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons		

Lists

List of Tables

Table 1: Area, Population, Religious Composition, Military Budget and Personnel Strength of IGAD Member States

Table 2: Selected Inter-State Conflicts among IGAD Member states

Table 3: Selected Intra-State Conflicts in the IGAD Member States

Table 4: Total Accumulated Unpaid Contributions of the IGAD member states from 2000-2006

List of Figures

Figure 1: IGAD Organizational Structure

Figure 2: IGAD Office for Somalia

List of Appendices

Appendix 1: List of Interviewed Personalities

Appendix 2: Clan Groups in Somalia

Appendix 3: Political Map of Somalia

Appendix 4: Interview Questions

Executive Summary

Somalia is the only country in the world without a functioning government controlling the entirety of its territory for nearly two decades. Since 1991, while Somaliland and Puntland have enjoyed relative stability, the southern part has been raked by violence as various clans, warlords and Islamist groups have repeatedly competed for power and resources. Somalia's ongoing conflict in one of the most unstable regions of Africa has been a source of concern for regional States as well as regional and international Organisations.

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as a regional organization, has been consistently engaged in trying to resolve the prolonged conflict of Somalia. IGAD member states have committed their resources, time and energy in dealing with this conflict, essentially neglected by the international community. The major obstacles to various peace initiatives, however, are within Somalia. The conflict has complicated the issue of power sharing, resource allocation, land and properties. It has also deepened the existing clan division which was always manipulated by political elites in order to achieve their narrow interests at the expense of the national agenda. The mushrooming of political elites or/and other stakeholders benefiting from the ongoing chaos has further contributed to the failure of various initiatives.

The role of external actors is either negligible or is fueling the conflict in Somalia. Both state and non-state actors have been providing at different times weapons and finance to different warring groups. Neighboring states, Arab states and Western states have been drawn into Somalia's conflict for various reasons including terrorist and security concerns. At the regional level, the conflicting interests of IGAD member states in Somalia made it very difficult for the adoption of a common position. IGAD member states are weakened by inter-state and intra-state conflicts, poverty and humanitarian crises which is draining the capacity and focus of IGAD itself.

Indeed, IGAD as an institution faces many challenges. The organisation lacks autonomy and capacity to successfully handle a very complex conflict like Somalia. It also lacks the financial capacity to push successfully and forcefully its peace initiatives forward. Yet, despite these challenges, IGAD has been instrumental in bringing the Somali crisis to the attention of the international community.

As a regional organisation, the role of the African Union (AU) in Somalia has been marginal. The AU has deployed peacekeeping troops, though they are struggling to strengthen their presence in Somalia. The Mission has itself become embroiled in the conflict between the government troops and insurgent groups. Its presence in Somalia, however, has effectively ensured the continuity of the weak Transitional Federal Government.

In general, regional and international organizations have provided a vital forum for various actors to address the conflict in Somalia. Mobilisation of funds and support for various initiatives in Somalia has so far been shouldered by these organizations. It has to be noted that IGAD in particular has made a significant contribution in terms of trying to resolve the Somali conflict. If these organisations effectively coordinate their actions and that of their member states, a stable Somalia which is not a safe haven for terrorists and pirates as well as a source of refugees, internally displaced persons and light weapons may be possibly restored.

Introduction

Somalia is engulfed in a Hobbesian world, virtually “a war of all against all.” A confluence of factors including colonial legacy, external intervention, clannism, Siad Barre’s dictatorship, and the intensification of armed opposition contributed to the disintegration of Somalia in 1991. Somalia has been struggling, since then, with the complete absence of a functioning central government and consequently of law and order.

The Somali people have gone through all kinds of misery in the past two decades. The anarchy, violence, and poverty forced many Somalis to be displaced, become refugees, and thousands lost their lives. The effects of the general anarchy in Somalia have not only affected the population of Somalia, they have also had a spillover effect to the Horn of Africa region and the international community. The problem of refugees, the smuggling of small arms and light weapons, the spreading of terrorism, and radicalization are all threats emerging from Somalia, mainly affecting the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states. IGAD has, therefore, been engaged with the Somali conflict for almost two decades.

Established in 1986 with the objective of addressing the environmental degradation of the Horn of Africa, IGAD was revitalized in 1996 with a broader mandate of resolving the conflicts in the region, including the Somali conflict. IGAD has been active on the issue of Somalia since 1991. A series of peace initiatives were organized by IGAD member states under the mandate of IGAD. Though weak, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was created by the peace process organized under the auspicious of IGAD in 2004, has international backing and is still serving as a stepping stone for further reconciliation. IGAD’s conflict resolution effort in Somalia has been, however, challenged by a number of internal and external factors. IGAD has been principally characterized by a lack of political will and grave constraints of resources—human, financial, and logistic—which have impeded it from living up to its expectations. IGAD is also weak due to the widespread inter- and intrastate conflicts and poverty that make the region extremely volatile. Neither is the role of external actors in undermining IGAD’s peace initiatives in Somalia negligible.

In broader terms, this study is designed to examine IGAD’s institutional, political, and financial capacity for dealing with the prolonged Somali conflict. Efforts by

the African Union (AU), particularly African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and the United Nations (UN) are also briefly analyzed. This study contributes to the ongoing discussion on conflict and conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa by analyzing the peace initiatives taken by IGAD in the past two decades. It will also serve as a source of information and catalyst for further studies.

The major issue that the study examines is the role of IGAD in resolving the Somali conflict. It also examines the conflict resolution mechanisms of IGAD as a regional organization. In doing so, the study focuses on the following research questions. What are the factors that led to IGAD’s engagement with the Somali conflict? Who are the main actors behind IGAD’s involvement? What are the interests of member states? Does IGAD have the institutional capacity and the political will to deal with the complex and prolonged conflict in Somalia?

Methodology

Approach

The fact that the study seeks to explain the complex causes of the Somali conflict and how it affected the regional and international security means that the approach has to be analytical. On the other hand, there has been a necessity to consider the numerous peace efforts made by IGAD, the AU, and the UN to resolve the conflict. In this case, negotiations, conferences, and actions of IGAD, the AU, and the UN are briefly studied. Such an approach is basically descriptive. The study therefore uses both analytical and descriptive approaches.

Data collection

The principal sources of data are documents and academic literature. These include books, articles, media publications, and different reports. In order to strengthen aspects of the data provided by these writings, the researcher interviewed thirty-five individuals including: experts on Somalia, academicians from research centers and universities, and middle-level officials from international and regional organizations. The researcher actually conducted two field trips to Kenya and Djibouti for these interviews.

Organization of the Study

The research is organized as follows. The first chapter introduces the causes and implications of the Somali conflict. The second chapter assesses the peace processes led by IGAD and the successes and challenges of IGAD in dealing with Somalia. The third and final chapter briefly examines the role of the AU and the UN in dealing with the Somali conflict.

Chapter One: The Somali Conflict

1.1. The Causes of the Somali Conflict

Three basic reasons are mentioned by most scholars as the root causes for the Somali conflict and the subsequent disintegration of the state. These are colonial legacy, clan system, and economic factors.

1.1.1. Root Causes

Colonial Legacy

Most conflicts in Africa could be traced back to European colonialism. In this regard, Somalia, as one of the colonies of the European states, is not an exception. The colonial powers (Britain, Italy, and France) partitioned Somalia into five parts. Britain took two parts (British Somaliland and the northern territory of Kenya), Italy one part known as Italian Somaliland, France the northern coast, and the rest was occupied by Ethiopia (the Ogaden). The subsequent attempt to reintegrate these different Somali-inhabited parts led the state, which emerged in 1960, to enter into conflicts with neighboring states and eventually to disintegration. Colonialism also posed a serious challenge to national integration in the post-independence period because of the distinct colonial experiences of the British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland which formed the independent Republic of Somalia (Petrides 1980; Mesfin 1964).

Clan System

Colonialism being the external factor in the Somali crisis, there is a more important and fundamental factor in the Somali life clan system. Somalis speak the same language, adhere to the same religion, and are from the same ethnic group, which is rare in the case of Africa. Although such homogeneity should have been an asset to build a nation state, clannism has long hindered internal cohesion in Somalia. There are five major clans in Somalia: Darood, Hawiye, Rahanwyeen, Isaaq, and Dir, and each clan has its sub-clans. Clans and sub-clans play a very

important role in defining the political, economic and social landscape of Somalia.

Clannism is partly related to the Somali pastoralist culture. Over 80 percent of the Somali people are pastoralists, lacking the culture of a centralized administrative system and promoting loyalty to their kin and clans. The division between clans has also widened over the years due to competition over resources, elite manipulation, and political patronage. For instance, during twenty years in power (1969–1991), Siad Barre introduced a clan-based divide and rule policy. Barre developed his own mechanism of appointing loyal political agents from his own clan to guide and control civil and military institutions. Besides the political favoritism, his clansmen—the Marehan clan of Darod—also benefited from the economic system. Barre’s policy instigated suspicion and hatred among the clans and finally led the country into deep statelessness. Moreover, the struggle for scarce resources between different clans and sub-clans left Somalia divided (Latin and Samatar 1987, 29; Zartman 1995, 4; Prunier 1988, 24).

Economic Factors

Competition for economic resources is also a major cause for the Somali conflict. Clashes over resources such as water, livestock, and grazing have always been a source of contention in Somalia, both before and after independence. In the post-independence period, competition over state power involved securing the major economic resources. This coupled with economic mismanagement, corruption, and failure to meet the people’s expectations and provide them basic services by successive regimes led to increasing poverty and further discontent.

1.1.2. Aggravating Factors

Barre’s Dictatorship

General Siad Barre came to power through a bloodless military coup, overthrowing the civilian government in 1969. He initially gained the support of the people by establishing self-help community projects and building health and education services. Nonetheless, he eventually became a tyrant, unmindful of the human cost in prolonging his grip on power. Under Barre, Somalia had

the worst human rights record and his administration was also known for corruption, political patronage, personalized leadership, and absence of any room for accommodation. African Watch estimated that during his time in power, Barre killed up to 60,000 civilians (Africa Watch Report 1990, 28; also see Adam 1995, and Woodward 1995).

Ogaden War

The 1977–1978 Ogaden war was initiated by Somalia to fulfill its long-awaited dream of creating a *Greater Somalia* by reintegrating the Ogaden into the Somali republic. The integration of the Ogaden into the larger Somali Republic was meant to boost Somali nationalism and thereby unite the country into one nation-state. Nonetheless, the war turned unpleasant for Somalia in early 1978, when it was defeated by Ethiopia, with the support of the Soviet Union and Cuba. Somalia’s defeat weakened Barre politically and intensified internal opposition (Mulugeta 2008). After the defeat, a group of disgruntled army officers attempted a coup d’état in 1978 and rebel movements were established and launched attacks against Barre with the support of Ethiopia, which further exacerbated the conflict (Brons 2001, 184; see also Ayoob 1980, 147–148 and Negussay 1984, 54).

Cold War Legacy

Somalia’s strategic position on the Red Sea and Indian Ocean had attracted the attention of both superpowers, the US and USSR, especially during the Cold War to gain and maintain access to Middle Eastern oil. In the 1960s and early 1970s, Somalia was strongly supported by the Soviet Union in terms of military and financial aid. When the Soviet Union shifted its support to Ethiopia in 1977, Barre, in turn, sought the support of the West—particularly the US. The successive support from the two superpowers sustained Barre’s dictatorship, which led to growing internal opposition and the subsequent disintegration of the state (Zartman 1995, 28; Kinfe 2002, 28).

Intensification of the Armed Struggle against Barre's Rule

A number of clan-based rebel movements emerged in Somalia during the late 1970s and the 1980s, largely in response to Barre's brutality and his divide and rule policy. The Darood-dominated Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the Isaaq-dominated Somali National Movement (SNM), and the Hawiye-dominated United Somali Congress (USC) were the major rebel movements that launched military attacks and toppled Barre out of power. The subsequent failure of the various rebel movements to agree on terms for the establishment of a viable post-Barre government led to the total breakdown of law and order (Sorenson 1995, 28; Zartman 1995, 75).

1.2. The Implications of the Somali Conflict

1.2.1. Local Implications

For the last two decades, Somalia has been suffering from lawlessness due to non-existent state institutions, highly factionalized political groups, and repeated external intervention. The protracted conflict in Somalia has had an overall impact that is manifested in the economic, social, and political arena.

Economic and Social Implications

The conflict in Somalia affected its formal economic system. The flourishing of the black economy (unregulated market including chat, banana, charcoal) after 1991 only made a few groups or individuals inside and outside Somalia beneficiaries. These, in turn, became backers of the numerous rebel movements and warlords. Moreover, in the absence of a central government the rate of unemployed increased at an alarming rate over the years, "47 percent of economically active population is unemployed in Somalia" (Maimbo 2006; Interview with Somali Analyst One). A large majority of the people, up to 40 percent of the urban households are dependent on remittances. Some argue that even the remittances have shown substantial reduction due the current financial and economic crisis (Interview with Somali Analyst One;

Brons 2001). The health services and school enrollment is also the lowest in the world.

Humanitarian Implications

Somalia has seen the world's most dreadful humanitarian crisis since the state collapsed in 1991. Recently, out of the total estimated nine million people:

- over 3.2 million are in dire need of humanitarian assistance;
- over 1.2 million have been displaced;
- hundreds of thousands have lost their lives as a result of the civil war;
- up to 300,000 children are acutely malnourished annually, which is the highest in the world (UNHCR 2008; also see Keck 2009).

The humanitarian situation is aggravated by a confluence of factors including violence, drought, increasing food prices, piracy, increasing inflation rate, and targeted killings of humanitarian workers.

The delivery of aid has shown a substantial reduction since Al-Shabaab controlled larger territories in the south and central parts of Somalia. This is mainly due to the threat from some of the Al-Shabaab units, like the case in Bidoa and Jowhar. According to the UNICEF informant, forty-two aid workers have been killed and abducted since January 2008. Some of UNICEF's humanitarian supplies—amounting up to US\$3 million—were also looted and destroyed by the Al-Shabaab in Jowhar on May 17, 2009 (Interview with UNICEF official).

To make matters worse, the UN and the US suspended aid shipment to southern Somalia. The former in fear of threats from the Al-Shabaab, while the latter claimed that aid could feed the war and might end up in the hands of terrorists (ICG 2008; and see IRIN 2009). According to WFP, the Al-Shabaab also issued unacceptable demands including "the removal of women from all jobs and the payment of US\$ 20,000 for protection every six months from each of the regional offices" (Daniel 2010); it was ordered to leave when it refused to accept the demands (Daniel). Some argue that donors have genuine cause, while others suspect that they are using aid as a weapon to make people fight the Al-Shabaab, which is blamed for the substantial reduction (Interview with Oxfam informant).

Some observers argue that Somalia does not need aid at all, claiming that people are not starved in Somalia.

According to Ali Wahad Abdullahi, a Mogadishu resident, there is enough food in Somalia and people live through remittance and support each other. He added that aid agencies exaggerate humanitarian conditions in Somalia to serve their interest. Some argue that the agencies themselves have become warlords, who want to see the perpetuation of the conflict as their carriers are dependent on it. Moreover, a huge amount of money is said to be spent on covering the operational costs of the agencies. And, since most aid agencies are based in Nairobi, they have a very weak monitoring mechanism. As a result, the local partners are said to be enriching themselves (Interview with Ali Wahad Abdullahi).

It is true that the agencies spend money to cover high operational costs like renting chartered airplanes and ships to deliver aid. This should not, however, lead to the conclusion that aid should be stopped. People are suffering from the ongoing conflict. The Dadaab camp in Kenya, alone receives approximately 5,000 refugees a month and hosts an excess of 200,000 refugees (Interview with UNHCR official). The moment international agencies pulled out, the local agencies are also targeted by the Al-Shabaab. As a result, most agencies are keeping a low profile, and others have left Somalia. Those still engaged are overstretched, complicating aid delivery (Interview with Oxfam official). The Somalis are, therefore, suffering from humanitarian crisis.

Political Implications

The Somali conflict has had different political implications for different parts of Somalia. The British Somaliland proclaimed its independence in 1991, although it has not yet been recognized by the international community. This was followed by the subsequent emergence of the clan-based regional administration of Puntland in the northeast by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf in 1998. The establishment of this type of administration helped to restore a relative peace in the northern part of Somalia. Nonetheless, the situation in the southern and central parts of Somalia has remained precarious as the fierce clan rivalry to capture state power, cities, ports, and other economic resources resulted in many killings, anarchy, and eventually the flourishing of Islamist movements: Al-Itihad, the Union of Islamic Courts, and finally the Al-Shabaab (De Waal 1996; also see: Marchal 2004, 114–115; Lewis 2002, 263–295).

Al-Itihad

Al-Itihad is the foremost Somali Islamist movement, and has its origins in the 1950s. However, it started to function officially after the removal of Barre in 1991, since Barre declared “scientific socialism” outlawing political Islam during his administration. Most of the leaders of Al-Itihad have received religious education in religious institutions of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Al-Itihad’s objective was to establish an Islamic state constituting all Somali inhabited territories in the Horn of Africa.

The group had been using mosques, schools, and refugee camps to disseminate its ideology and recruit supporters. It has also been providing social services to the society in southern Somalia, which made it popular among the Somalis. Arab states have been the greatest supporters of Al-Itihad in terms of finance, ideology, military training, and equipment. The group used to receive aid and relief assistance from Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt. The Somali Diaspora in the West were also important financial backers. Islamic charities also supported Al-Itihad in terms of finance, food, and medicine (ICG 2007, 5; also see: Medhane 2002, 7–10; Adar 2002, 7–10).

Al-Itihad also maintained close trade ties with Arab states by establishing profitable businesses such as banks, import-export trading, and small industries in Somalia. The black economy that flourished after 1991 created a favorable environment for Al-Itihad to transact goods freely.

Clan politics and the strength of faction leaders and warlords constituted an obstacle to Al-Itihad’s internal success. Al-Itihad launched a series of terrorist attacks in Ethiopia in 1996, which led the group to its final days as Ethiopia successfully attacked and dislodged it from its bases in Luuq and Buulo Hawwa in late 1996 and in 1999 (Medhane 2002, 61–64; Brons 2001; Pirio 2007, 85; Vinci 2009, 80–84).

The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)

There is much controversy and confusion on the emergence of the Islamic courts that are the basis of the UIC in Somalia. Some associate its emergence with clans, taking it as a form of local response to the existing lawlessness and that they are based on a particular clan. Others relate the UIC establishment with the business

community, which needed to enhance security and improve commercial transactions. The emergence of the UIC is also linked to Al-Itihad. After its defeat by Ethiopian forces and its failure to control political power in Somalia, Al-Itihad changed its strategy from “direct politico-military confrontation to expanding its influence as a grass root movement for order, stability, and moral rectitude” by establishing the Islamic courts (Kinfe 2006; and see ICG 2006).

The UIC’s accession to political power began with the establishment of an umbrella structure named the Supreme Council of Sharia Courts (SCSC) in 2004, organizing the leadership of different Islamic courts. The initial objective of the UIC was to fill the legal vacuum left in the wake of state collapse and to provide some order through a Sharia law system. The political objective of the UIC was weak until they were infiltrated by Al-Itihad. Since then, they have shared Al-Itihad’s objectives of establishing an Islamic state, islamizing the Horn of Africa, and pursuing the Greater Somalia ideology (Kidist 2008).

The Islamic courts had their own militias. The UIC were financially assisted by the business community through private contributions in exchange for the protection they provided. In addition, the UIC became more broadly acceptable and popular than previous forms of administration—especially among the Hawiye clan—and the people agreed to pay taxes. Out of the eleven Islamic courts in Mogadishu, ten were from the Hawiye clan (Kidist).

Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, considered to be a moderate leader, was elected as the chairman of the UIC even though Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, former Al-Itihad leader, retained considerable influence as a vice chairman. By June 2006, the UIC were strong enough to drive out the warlords who controlled Mogadishu for the past sixteen years. Between July and August 2006, the UIC succeeded in controlling cities and ports in the southern and central parts of Somalia; these included Jowhar, Bay, Bakool, Baldawayne, Hobyo port, and they opened the Mogadishu port as well. The UIC was, however, dismantled by Ethiopia’s intervention in 2006 (ICG 2007; Moller 2007, 27–29; Grono 2007, 5; also see Pirio 2007).

The Al-Shabaab

The Al-Shabaab is a radical Islamist group that dominates the current political arena in Somalia. It served as a military

wing of the UIC. During Ethiopia’s intervention, when UIC’s political leaders left Somalia, the Al-Shabaab decided to stay and wage a guerilla war against Ethiopia, the TFG, and AMISOM troops. Accordingly, the Al-Shabaab garnered sufficient popular support in 2008 by projecting itself as a nationalist group (ICG 2008).

The Al-Shabaab has no specifically written or declared program, its principal objective is to “establish a strictly Wahhabi doctrine in Somalia and later expand it to the Horn and the rest of Africa through military intervention” (Ali 2008). Thus, it partially shares the objective of its predecessor, Al-Itihad.

The leadership of the Al-Shabaab is decentralized. The group is at least composed of three autonomous units functioning in (1) Mogadishu and central Somalia, (2) Jubba valley, Bay, and Bakool, and (3) Shabeelle regions. Al-Shabaab controls larger territories in the central and southern parts of Somalia including the key towns of Bidoa, Merka, Jowhar, and most profitably the port of Kismayou (Interviews with ICG informant and Somali analyst one).

Originally, the Al-Shabaab was multiclan; but it quickly adjusted to clan dynamics because the units largely operate in the areas dominated by their own clans. The Al-Shabaab’s unit in Bay and Bokol for instance, is led by Muktar Robow from Rahanwye clan, which is dominant in the area. In addition to clan division, there is a difference in the interpretation of Islam among the units. Some of the units cooperate with aid agencies, while others threaten them, claiming that it is un-Islamic to work with infidels (Interviews with ICG informant and IGAD official three; McGregor 2009; Ali 2008, 5).

The Al-Shabaab receives financial support both from local and foreign sources. Locally, mosques, religious leaders, and local community networks provide long-term financial support for the Al-Shabaab’s logistical and operational needs. Al-Shabaab is also said to have businesses in the areas it controls. The group is further said to receive US\$2 million net profit every month from the Kismayou port (Interviews with Somali analyst three and Ali Wahad Abdullahi). The Somali Diaspora and foreign Islamist donors—primarily from the Arab states—are also said to be active financiers of the radicals. Thus, they have plenty of cash to buy arms and recruit troops (Hansen 2008, 5; and see Garowe 2009 and ICG 2008).

Currently, the Al-Shabaab is said to have approximately 3,000 troops, but some put the number closer to 10,000. The Al-Shabaab established successful local and interna-

tional recruiting mechanisms. Internally, they are able to attract thousands of uneducated and unemployed youngsters by providing them money, training, ideology, and arms. The amount of money paid for the troops is highly controversial. It ranges from US\$20 to US\$600 every month. ICG puts the rate at US\$70 every month, which is still quite high by Somali standards. The Al-Shabaab further uses the Internet, local radio stations, and newspapers to disseminate its propaganda and recruit troops internally and externally (Kidist 2009).

The Al-Shabaab is supported by foreign jihadists who are training them in tactics, explosives, and propaganda. Foreign fighters from Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, Nigeria, and Pakistan have joined them. However, their number is controversial, ranging from 20 to 600 (Security and Development Policy Group 2008, 53; and see ICG 2008 and Shinn 2009). The foreigners joining the Al-Shabaab are ideologically manipulated. Some believe that it is a real Jihad. Eritrea has been repeatedly accused of arming, training, and supporting the radicals (Interviews with AFP correspondent, Somali analyst one, and Ali Abdullahi; Africa Research Bulletin 2007; Swain and Gillard 2009; The Sunday Times 2009; Hansen 2008; ICG 2008).

The Al-Shababab is listed as a terrorist group by the US, which claims that it has links with the Al-Qaeda. There is no hard evidence, however, to support this allegation (Interview with Somali analyst one). Nevertheless, there is an ideological similarity between the two organizations, and some of the Al-Shabaab leaders—including Aden Hash Ayro (killed in April 2008 by a US air strike), Ahmed Abdi Godane, Ibrahim Haji Jama, and Mukhtar Robow—were trained in Afghanistan. The Al-Shabaab also exaggerates its alleged link with Al-Qaeda by claiming that it receives direct orders from Osama Bin Laden, which is apparently done to garner support from foreign Islamist donors (ICG 2008).

With regard to the popular support for the Al-Shabaab, opinions are highly divided. Some observers claim that the group is popular in Somalia and it is highly supported by the Hawiye clan members. According to Ali Wahad Abdullahi, the Hawiye clans benefited most from the state collapse; they took the belongings of the dwellers who lived in Mogadishu. So, they are against any state formation in fear of losing control over businesses and becoming the targets of revenge by other clans (Interview with Ali Wahad Abdullahi).

According to the proponents of the above argument, the Hawiye clan elders in Mogadishu are well respected and they have power to stop Al-Shabaab if they want to. The elders support the Al-Shabaab, since it provides security by establishing small Sharia courts. Murursade and Duduble in the central parts of Somalia are said to be the Al-Shabaab strongholds (Interview with AFP correspondent).

There are, however, observers arguing that the Al-Shabaab is not popular in Somalia, especially among the elders. The group's strict imposition of Islamic laws including amputation, beheadings, cutting of hands, and stoning to death are said to be condemned by most Somalis that adhere to traditional Islamic practices. The Al-Shabaab is also said to lack legitimacy in the south due to the clan factor, since some of the leading figures are drawn from the Isaaq clan of Northern Somaliland (Security and Development Policy Group 2008; Menkhaus 2008, 5–7; Menkhaus 2009; interview with Somali analysts one and three).

Even though it is hard to verify the two arguments, the Al-Shabaab enjoys popular support in some parts of Somalia for providing much needed security. However, the Al-Shabaab's strict interpretation of Islamic laws remains a source of popular dissatisfaction, despite the popular need to institute Sharia as a governing law in Somalia. As a result, the Al-Shabaab is facing opposition from groups like Al-Sunna Wal-Jama, which is fighting to maintain traditional Islamic practices. The Al-Shabaab is further challenged by clan competition for resources and control over towns and ports, which makes it difficult for the group to provide effective administration. But, the Al-Shabaab remains a relatively strong fighting force in Somalia and people are fearful of the group (Kidist 2009).

Hizbul Islam

Hizbul Islam is a combination of four groups: the Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia- Asmara, the Somali Islamic Front (JABISO), Raskanboni, and Anole. It has been led by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys since his return from exile in 2009. The group's objective is toppling the internationally-backed government and expelling foreign troops from Somalia. Hizbul Islam is allied with the Al-Shabaab on the common agenda of fighting Sharif's government (Interviews with AFP correspondent and TFG II official).

The alliance, however, did not last long as the two Islamic groups started to fight over territories, key towns, port Kismayou, and the main port in the south. The Al-Shabaab dismantled the group from some of its strongholds, but Hizbul Islam still controls pockets of land in Somalia (VOA News 2009; Said 2009; Interview with AU informant).

1.2.2. Implications for the Regional States and the International Community

The general anarchy in Somalia not only affected the population of Somalia, it also had a spillover effect on neighboring states and the international community at large. The issues of terrorism, refugees, piracy, arms smuggling, and human trafficking have been the concern of the international community over the past two decades.

Refugees

According to the UNHCR 2008 report, Somalia is the third largest origin of refugees in the world next to Afghanistan and Iraq (UNHCR 2008, 2009). The Somali refugees are scattered all over the world. The front-line states, especially Kenya, hosts the largest number of Somali refugees. According to the UNHCR report, there are over 320,000 refugees in Kenya (UNHCR 2009, 2008). In 2008 alone, 60,000 new Somalis sought refuge in Kenya (Human Rights Watch 2009). Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Yemen are also large recipients of Somali refugees (United Nations News Service 2009; American Chronicle 2009).

Hosting refugees has security, political, and economic implications. Refugees could pose a security threat to the host country. For example, mingling with Somali refugees who flocked in thousands into Ethiopia, Al-Itihad undertook a series of terrorist attacks in Ethiopia in the mid-1990s: bombing of Ras Hotel in Dire Dawa (February 2, 1996); of Ghion Hotel (January 18, 1996); and Wabi Shebelle Hotel in Addis Ababa (August 5, 1996).

Currently, the Al-Shabaab is said to be recruiting troops from refugee camps in Kenya and there is a growing fear in Nairobi that it could launch terrorist attacks. The threat is also eminent in other states, since Al-Shabaab established networks within the Somali Diaspora. Twenty Ame-

ricans of Somali origin from Minneapolis who went to fight in Somalia, the terrorist plot in Australia that involved Somali sympathizers of Al-Shabaab, and the rapid radicalization of the Somali community living in the United Kingdom are sufficient indicators of its networks outside Somalia (Interviews with ICG informant and AFP correspondent).

The presence of Somali refugees in the front-line states—Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti—is said to have increased tensions and created ethnic militants in the Somali inhabited areas of these states. The economic impact of hosting refugees is also high for these states (Interview with IGAD official one).

Terrorism

The vacuum created in the post-1991 period gave rise to the flourishing of international criminal and terrorist operations within Somalia, which became a concern for the international community. There is a strong belief that anarchic Somalia was used as a transit and a safe haven for Al-Qaeda agents, who organized a series of bombings in Eastern Africa. The radical Islamist groups in Somalia are said to be the principal interlocutors for Al-Qaeda's cell in East Africa. Accordingly, the West—especially the US—has been monitoring Somalia closely with the narrow interest of hunting a handful of Al-Qaeda suspects and preventing the emergence of a Taliban-like government. Furthermore, the US supported and gave protection to any group or regional state that supported its effort (ICG 2008).

Piracy

The international community is also concerned by the incidents of piracy off the coast of Somalia. In 2009, 217 ships were attacked by Somali pirates of which forty-seven were hijacked and 867 crew members were held hostage. This is a dramatic increase as compared with 2008, when over 134 incidences had been recorded. Somalia stands first in the 2009 piracy world records, accounting for more than half of the 406 incidents recorded in 2009 (IMB 2010).

The marked increase in the number of reported attacks along the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden has caused considerable damage to international trade

(Middleton 2008). The economic implication of piracy on shipping companies, insurance companies, and states is excessively high. All major shipping companies insure their ships and cargos. Nonetheless, when passing through the Gulf of Aden, which is considered a high risk zone by the insurance companies, the premium increases. A recent study estimates an increase in insurance and transport costs from US\$500 to US\$20,000 for a voyage through the Gulf of Aden (FOI 2008; and see Kidist 2009).

Though the actual use of force by the Somali pirates is modest, the human cost of piracy incidents is still a concern for the international community. For example, out of the 889 crew members taken hostage in 2008, 815 were taken in Somalia. Four people lost their lives, fourteen are still missing, and two crews were injured as a result of Somali pirate attacks. Piracy incidents could also increase the possibility of environmental degradation. Pirates have been indiscriminately firing Rocket Propelled Grenades in order to capture potential targets. Such violent acts against chemical and oil tankers could result in a major oil spillover and cause environmental damage in the Horn of Africa (Cargo Security International 2008).

The international community responded to the growing threat by deploying naval forces along the lengthy coast of Somalia, which is very costly. The EU alone spends over EUR 80 million annually for operation Altanta, a naval force deployed along the coast of Somalia (Interview with EU official). The presence of naval forces temporarily subdued piracy activities. Nonetheless, effective maritime security has become difficult to achieve due to continued instability in Somalia (Kidist and Mesfin 2009).

Armed Smuggling and the Proliferation of Small Arms

Somalia is said to have thousands of small arms and light weapons. Large numbers of weapons were amassed during the Cold War era (Interview with Somali analyst one). The post-1991 anarchy further created an opportunity for the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). There is an uncontrolled flow of arms from both state and non-state actors in anarchic Somalia. Accordingly, Somalia is one of the major sources of SALW in the Horn of Africa.

The anarchy in Somalia, the porous boundary, and the presence of Somali refugees and nomadic groups in neighboring states made it easier to smuggle weapons

from Somalia (ICG 2005). Al-Itihad, a radical Islamist group in Somalia, was involved in arms trade in the Horn of Africa. The proliferation of SALW is one of the major sources of insecurity in the region. It fueled and sustained conflicts, and contributed to increasing criminal activities. According to one ICG report, the terrorist attacks in Kenya in 1998 and the failed 2002 attempt on an Israeli charter aircraft were carried out with weapons smuggled from Somalia (Farah, Aisha, and Daud 2006; Eaves 2002).

In general, the influx of refugees and the proliferation of arms, piracy, and terrorism are all problems emerging from Somalia and posing a threat to the region and international community.

1.3. Attempted Conflict Resolution Efforts

1.3.1. International Intervention

The combination of civil war and humanitarian crises after the state collapsed in 1991, led to the first UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). It was authorized by Security Council Resolution 751 of April 24, 1992 (Dagne 2009). The Mandate originally granted to UNOSOM I was to oversee the ceasefire in Mogadishu, provide security for UN Personnel, and deliver humanitarian assistance. Nonetheless, UNOSOM I could not provide the desired security due to the failed ceasefire and continued looting. As a result, the UN Security Council authorized a US-led unified Task Force (UNITAF). The idea was to provide security along the lines of the UNOSOM I. Eventually, UNITAF's mandate was expanded under UNOSOM II in May 1993 to include "establish[ing] transitional government institutions and consensus on basic principles and steps leading to the establishment of representative democratic institutions," according to Security Council Resolution 814.

In May 1993, UNISOM II forces were attacked, which led to a battle in which eighteen American soldiers were killed. After this incident, US troops pulled out of Somalia—followed by the UN troops in March 1995—without having accomplished their mission.

1.3.2. Peace Talks

Since the Somali state collapsed, there have been around fifteen conflict resolution efforts organized by different states, as well as regional and international organizations. Some of the major conferences supported by the regional states and the international community include: the Djibouti Conference in 1991; the Addis Ababa Conference in 1993; the Cairo Conference in 1997; the Arta Conference in 2000; the Eldorate Process in 2002, which gave birth to the first Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004; and the recently held Djibouti Peace Process in 2008, which led to the establishment of the second Transitional Federal Government (TFG II) by combining the TFG I with ARS-D (Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia-Djibouti) (ICG 2004; and see Dagne 2009, 19).

The last fourteen resolution efforts failed to establish a functioning government in Somalia and the results of the most recent one remain to be seen. A confluence of factors contributed to unsuccessful peace talks. A deep-rooted sense of loyalty to clans, which has worsened over the years by the protracted conflict in Somalia, and the presence of groups that have benefited from the protracted conflict undermined the success of peace processes (IGAD 2003, 11). The proliferation of small arms and light weapons also exacerbated the conflict. According to Eavis “almost one out of every four Somali males was armed with a weapon” (2002). External intervention in terms of sponsoring competing or parallel peace conferences, and providing military and financial support to various warring groups aggravated hostilities (ICJ 2004). The international community’s indifference to the Somali crisis, due to the disastrous intervention in the 1990s, further undermined peace initiatives.

1.4. Current Development

In 2006, there were two major actors in Somalia: the TFG backed by the international community and the UIC. The UIC was able to control larger territories in the south and central parts of Somalia—including Mogadishu—and established a semblance of peace in the areas of their control, while the TFG was limited to Baidoa. On December 24, 2006, Ethiopian and TFG forces launched a successful military attack against the UIC. In less than a week, the Ethiopian troops captured Mogadishu and the

UIC dissolved and surrendered political leadership to clan leaders (ICJ 2007).

The Al-Shabaab, the military wing of the UIC, started launching attacks against the TFG and Ethiopian forces and also the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which was deployed in March 2007. After two years of fighting, the Al-Shabaab controlled much of the south and central territories of Somalia, including parts of Mogadishu.

With the intensification of the insurgency and the ineffectiveness of the TFG—due to an internal power struggle, lack of legitimacy, and broader representation—President Abdullahi Yusuf was forced to resign in December 2008 (ICG 2007).

It was in this difficult situation that the Djibouti peace process was initiated by the UN. Its major objective is to stabilize the country by forging a political alliance between the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) and the TFG. The ARS, however, became divided into two: ARS-Asmara and ARS-Djibouti. ARS-Asmara rejected any peace agreement with the TFG and vowed to fight until all foreign troops leave Somalia. Its leader, Sheik Dahir Aweys, went back to Somalia and joined Hizbul Islam to achieve this objective in April 2009, only a few months after the TFG II took over (Interview with TFG II official one).

In October 2008, the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-liberation for Somalia-Djibouti (ARS-D) signed the Djibouti Agreement and created a new Somali TFG II. In January, the new government expanded its parliament to include some 200 ARS members and seventy-five civil society and opposition representatives. Sheikh Sharif from the Hawiye/Abgal clan was elected as the new president by the expanded parliament and Ali Sharmark, from the Darood clan, was selected as a prime minister, which was followed by the formation of thirty-six cabinet members (Interview with TFG II official two).

One of the points of agreement between the TFG and the ARS-D was the full withdrawal of the Ethiopian military forces from Somalia. The Ethiopian withdrawal was eventually effected in January 2009 but left the weight of protecting the GNU to the under-strength AMISOM (Heinlein 2009; Dagne 2009; Menkhaus 2009).

Currently, there are two major actors in southern Somalia: the TFG II and the Al-Shabaab. There are also other groups such as Hizbul Islam and Al-Sunna Wal-Jama that control pockets of land in the south and central parts of the Somalia. The establishment of the TFG II

has generated some hope among different observers. Upon its establishment, it was expected to broaden its base through reconciliation, establish a semblance of peace and strengthen the Transitional Federal Institutions (Interview with EU informant).

1.4.1. Political Development in Somalia

Unlike its predecessor, the leadership of the TFG II showed its willingness to broaden its base. President Sheikh Sharif has demonstrated his readiness for negotiation and reconciliation. On March 15 2010, the TFG II reached a power-sharing agreement with Al-Sunna Wal-Jama, which controls pockets of land in the central part of Somalia mainly in the Galgudud region. TFG II agreed to give five ministerial positions and Al-Sunna Wal-Jama troops will be integrated into government's security structures (VOA News 2010).

President Sharif also tried to reach out secretly to some of the radicals like Sheikh Dahir Aweys and other Hizbul Islam coalitions. According to TFG official II, the TFG II is expected to reach an agreement with the group in the coming few months. Sharif also pushed for the adoption of Sharia law in Somalia, in an effort to bring the radical groups to the negotiating table (Interview).

The TFG II had a further discussion with Hawiye clan elders in Mogadishu. President Sheikh Sharif represents Hawiye/Abgal, a sub-clan that was highly disappointed during the first TFG administration as it felt marginalized and even encouraged attacks against it. Therefore, the fact that he hails from the Hawiye clan diffuses opposition even though Sharif's administration does not enjoy as much popular support as expected (McGregor 2009).

The survival of the TFG II, however, depends on its ability to bring the Al-Shabaab to the governing coalition, which has not yet been achieved. The group has actively rejected the Djibouti peace process and controls larger territories in the south and central parts of Somalia, including some of the key towns Jowhar, Merka, Bidoa, and the port of Kismayou (Menkhaus 2009; Olad 2008; Security and Development Policy Group 2008; Hull and Svensson 2008, 31; interview with Somali analyst one).

The reluctance of the Al-Shabaab leaders is presented as a major obstacle by some observers. Accordingly, the top Al-Shabaab leaders adhere to radical Islamic ideology and view the GNU as a stooge of the West and are

against the presence of foreign troops in Somalia. The individual ambition, ideologies and policies of hard-liners, therefore, made it difficult for negotiation. The Al-Shabaab is also in control of the larger territories in south and central Somalia. It possesses a relatively organized force and has plenty of cash, which contributes to their arrogance with regard to negotiation (Interviews with IGAD informant three and GNU official one).

There are however, observers who blame the TFG II for not making concerted effort to reach the elements of the Al-Shabaab, claiming that there is still arrogance within the TFG II. Even groups other than the Al-Shabaab are not well represented in the expanded parliament. Sharif is said to have appointed his own partisans when he was given a chance to appoint 50 percent of the parliament during the Djibouti Peace Process. According to the proponents of this argument, Sharif's willingness to negotiate is regarded as an effort to simply gain the support of the people (Interviews with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs informant and Somali analyst one).

Some other observers argue that, though Sharif wants to negotiate, he does not have the experience to manipulate opposition groups and bring them to the negotiating table. The Arab states are said to have offered Sharif US\$3 million dollars every month and urged him to establish a joint committee to reconcile with the opposing groups. Sharif allegedly accepted the money but rejected any negotiations with the so called terrorist groups. By doing so, he wanted to buy the support of the West, but failed to solicit the support of Arab countries. The way he has approached the Arab World is said to be very poor and seen as a lost opportunity (Interview with AFP correspondent).

Above all, the TFG II has nothing to offer—neither territory nor cash. The TFG II further lost popularity and credibility because of its failure to provide security and service. Hence, there is no incentive for opposition groups to join the TFG II. Individuals and groups that have been benefiting from the ongoing chaos also manipulate ongoing negotiation efforts (Interview with ICG informant).

The international community is also to be blamed for the lack of progress in reconciliation. After the Djibouti process, the international community—especially the West—literally stopped pushing for reconciliation because of of Al-Shabaab's designation as a terrorist group, and has since followed with a one-sided militaristic

approach in dealing with the radicals (Interviews with German Institute for International and Security Affairs informant, OXFAM informant, and EU official). The fact remains that the TFG II is unable to show a tangible change in the sphere of reconciliation and the broadening of its representation, and still has a long way to go (Menkhaus 2009; Olad 2008; Security and Development Policy Group 2008; Hull and Svensson 2008).

1.4.2. The Issue of Security

With regard to the issue of security, the TFG II is making an effort to establish a National Security Force, drawn up from the TFG and ARS forces. The TFG II aims to train a 10,000-strong police force by 2010. Currently, the TFG II has approximately 3,700 soldiers, 5,007 police officers, and 150 guards trained by different actors—including AMISOM, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Djibouti (Interview with UNPOS official one). AMISOM is planning to train 6,000 troops by the end of 2010. The US, France, Sudan, and Egypt are also said to be involved in training TFG II's security forces. The UNDP is also actively engaged in training the police force. The TFG II also has a plan to establish an air force and naval force (Interview with UNPOS official one; Amnesty International 2010).

The international community has committed resources to support and strengthen the TFG II's security apparatus. The ongoing training and the salaries of the security forces are financed by donors. Out of the US\$200 million pledged in the Brussels conference in April 2009, about 80 percent goes to the security sector with AMISOM taking the lion share (Refugees International 2009, 6–10; Hull and Svensson 2008; interview with ICG informant; also see Amnesty International 2008; and Ryu 2009).

In September 2009, the US government announced that it would send forty tons of weapons and ammunition worth US\$10 million to the TFG II with the objective of beefing up its security apparatus and halting the advance of the radicals. The US action was, however, criticized by many observers fearing that the weapons might have ended up in the hands of radical groups. The US also launched a number of air strikes, killing alleged terrorists including the prominent Al-Shabaab leaders Adan Hashi Ayro in May 2008, and Saleh Ali Nabhan in September 2009. The action is again criticized for being counterproductive, since some of the strikes caused civilian deaths and casualties. Moreover, the killing of a

handful of the Al-Shabaab leaders did not weaken the organization (Kidist 2009).

The unity government has also been successful in forging alliances with some of the clan militias to contain the Al-Shabaab's advance. The withdrawal of Ethiopia made it a bit easier for the TFG II to forge tactical alliances since the Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam lost their main rallying point (Moller 2009, 18; Shinn 2009, P 4; interviews with UNPOS informant and GNU official two; and see Hansen 2008). Moreover, the TFG II allied with Al-Sunna Wal-Jama, which is fighting against the Al-Shabaab's radical imposition of the Sharia law with its brutal versions such as public beheadings, sentencing robbers without due process, cutting off hands and stoning of a 13 year old, rape victim, which does not appeal to most Somalis who practice moderate Islam. (Moller; Shinn; Hansen 2009; interview with EU official).

Despite the TFG II's efforts and the international community's support, the issue of security still remains precarious in Somalia. The Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam have been launching a series of attacks on the TFG II and AMISOM forces, confining them to the limited area of Villa Somalia (the presidential palace), some ministries and police stations, the airport, and the seaport. Some claim that the TFG II only controls few districts in Mogadishu, and its control in south and central Somalia is insignificant (Interview with Ali Wahad Abdullahi).

The Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam continue targeted killings of government officials and security personnel—including the Mogadishu Police Chief, the National Security Minister, and recently three ministers—with the clear objective of undermining the military and intelligence power of the TFG II (Kidist 2009). According to Ali Wahad Abdullahi, a Mogadishu resident, the Al-Shabaab kills anyone who works or collaborates with the government and AMISOM. So, those who work for the government are forced to live in the few districts controlled by the TFG II and need AMISOM's protection (Interview).

The Al-Shabaab is also said to have infiltrated the TFG II's security forces. Some of the MPs and ministers are alleged to have links with the Al-Shabaab. The bombings of the highly secured AMISOM base in Mogadishu on September 17, 2009, killing twenty-one people including seventeen AMISOM officials, made many observers suspect the linkage. Accordingly, the President moves from one place to the other using AMISOM's armored vehicles, even within the palace. Such developments have had an

impact on the provision of coordinated security (Interview with AMISOM official two).

To make matters worse, the TFG II military forces are said to suffer from low morale and poor salaries, unlike the Al-Shabaab forces. According to an AFP correspondent they are not even treated well when they are injured; they are sent to their families for treatment (Interview). As a result, many deserted shortly after completing their training, taking with them the weapons they had just received. Moreover, the troops of the TFG II operate without basic command and the troops' loyalty is divided; they associate themselves with one or the other minister, clan, or warlord (Interview). Despite progress in the training of the police force, "the GNU have only few police stations in the neighborhood" (Interview with Somali analyst one). In a nutshell, the TFG II forces are too weak, ill-equipped, poorly paid, and divided in order to defeat the insurgent groups (Refugees International 2009; McGregor 2009; and see Menkhaus 2008).

The TFG II is further unable to sustain the alliance that it forged with various clan militias and groups, due to cash constraints (Interview with UNPOS official two). Some observers also argue that President Sharif does not have a loyal base and troops to fight for him. Nor does he have the "personality and charisma" to inspire people to fight for the TFG II (Interview with Somali analyst one). AMISOM neither seems to do much in boosting security and territorial control of the TFG II. AMISOM is understaffed, suffers from financial constraints, and has come under numerous deadly attacks (Refugees International 2009, 6–10; Hull and Svensson 2008; also see Amnesty International 2008; and Ryu 2009).

On the contrary, the Al-Shabaab fighters are said to be disciplined, well paid, loyal, and relatively organized. Accordingly, they are said to have the guts, ability, and power to intimidate people. As yet, the group is not troubled by internal divisions; none of its leaders officially has given contradictory statements nor undermined statements made in the name of the organization, which is impressive in Somali politics (Interview with AFP correspondent).

The Al-Shabaab has enough resources to buy arms and recruit troops and it is supported by foreign jihadists who are providing training in tactics, explosives, and propaganda. The Al-Shabaab forces are relatively loyal. The TFG II's weakness further allowed the group to expand its territorial control and appear strong (Hansen 2008; Ali 2008, 3–5; and see: Garowe Online 2009; Security and

Development Policy Group 2008, 53; ICG 2008; Shinn 2009). The West also promoted the Al-Shababab, by giving it wide media coverage (Interview with German Institute for International and Security Affairs informant).

As compared with the TFG II, the Al-Shabaab has attained more popular support for the provision of security in its area of control. They have established a reputation for providing justice; they travel with mobile Sharia courts so that criminals can be given quick trials. They have also established small Sharia courts in the neighborhood, which continue to be the source of legitimacy for the radicals (Interview with Ali Wahad Abdullahi; Security and Development Policy Group 2008).

The Al-Shabaab, however, provides security through violence and intimidation, which is unacceptable for most Somalis. In an effort to impose its brand of strict Sharia law, the Al-Shabaab stones alleged criminals to death without due process of the law and executes alleged spies and Christians. Moreover, it is engaged in a battle with various groups including its former allies Hizbul Islam, Al-Sunna Wal-Jama, and other clan militias thus worsening security in Somalia (Interviews with AFP correspondent, ICG informant, and Somali analyst two).

1.4.3. The Government Institutions

According to the Djibouti agreement, the TFG II has a mandate of two years starting from January 2009. Within this tight timeframe, it is expected to set up functioning institutions. So far, what exists includes the Executive (the President, the Prime Minister, and Cabinet), the Parliament, and the weak security apparatus. Some improvements have been witnessed, such as establishing relatively transparent customs and tax collection systems at the port of Mogadishu. The TFG II is also said to have started to pay some of the security forces from collected taxes (Keck 2009).

The overall progress achieved regarding government institutions is however, very limited. The ministries do not have a functioning bureaucratic system and the government is not providing services. The TFG II lacks financial capacity and human capital to establish functioning institutions. The TFG II source of revenue is limited to tax collected from its international borders including Mogadishu port and airport. It has not developed sufficient capacity to handle limited donor's financial support, which is managed by an international auditing firm

(Interviews with ICG informant, AFP correspondent, and Somali analyst one).

Despite the involvement of UNDP, UNPOS, AMISOM, and the EU in capacity-building programs, the international community showed little commitment to provide financial support to strengthen the capacity of government institutions. Out of the US\$200 million pledged in Brussels, around US\$15 million was allotted to the TFG II to buy furniture and pay salaries of its officials and the rest went to strengthen its security apparatus. Out of the US\$15 million they have only received US\$ 3 million as of December, 2009 (Interview with IGAD official three).

Donors place all kinds of conditionalities not to wire money to the TFG II. The issue of accountability is widely recognized as a reason not to finance the government directly. Although this is a valid concern, since there is corruption within the TFG II, it is also unrealistic to require the GNU to establish institutions—like a Central Bank, treasury, and audit offices—in order to be held accountable, without providing sufficient financing to do so. It is, therefore, a vicious circle (ICG 2009; Interview with AU official two).

Some of the TFG II officials are blamed for the lack of progress. Instead of sitting and finding solutions in Mogadishu, the ministers and the parliamentarians are said to be touring around the world in the name of searching for funds (AFP 2009; and see Menkhaus 2008).

In general, the confluence of factors, the limited territory controlled by the TFG II, the prevailing insecurity, and the lack of commitment from the international community make it very difficult to build effective institutions. And, a government without functioning institutions can do very little to change the rather bleak realities in Somalia.

In short, the current situation in Somalia can be described as a violent stalemate. Despite its large territorial control and relative strength, Al-Shabaab is unable to dislodge the internationally backed TFG II from power. Neither is the TFG II able to dislodge the radicals, because it is weak and dysfunctional. Moreover, its territorial control is quite limited, which hampers it from providing much needed security and services to the people.

Despite the challenges, the TFG II has shown its resilience and has remained in Mogadishu for one year, which is commendable. But the TFG II will continue to be challenged by the Al-Shabaab and other insurgents. Establishing credible institutions, improving security, service delivery, and accountability are also future assignments for the TFG II. The coming months and years will, there-

fore, be decisive in determining Somalia's future. And, the role of regional and international actors will determine the shaping of politics inside Somalia (Kidist 2009).

Chapter Two: IGAD's Role in Somalia

2.1. Background to IGAD

2.1.1. The Origin of IGAD

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) was established in 1986, with the objective of addressing environmental crises that led to food insecurity and famine in the Horn of Africa. Because of the prevailing inter- and intrastate conflicts, the impetus for the establishment of IGADD came from UN agencies, which saw the urgent need for a regional coordination agency to address problems of famine and

drought. The founding members were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, and Uganda. In 1993, Eritrea joined the Organization after its independence. The headquarters is located in Djibouti. It is one of the African Union's (AU) recognized Regional Economic Communities (RECs), with over 200 million people and an area of 5,222,520 square kilometers.

Despite the organization's narrow initial scope, IGADD summits provided a venue for meetings between member states to solve other issues of mutual concern including peace and security. IGADD facilitated peace between Ethiopia and Somalia. By 1994, the members of IGADD had come to realize that the developmental problems of the region extended beyond the impact of environmental degradation. Accordingly, on March 21,

	Area (square km)	Population Estimates in 2009 (in millions)	Population Estimates in 2000 (in millions)	Christians Estimate in 2000 (in Millions)	Muslims Estimate in 2000 (in Millions)
Djibouti	23,200	0.8	0.6	0.04	0.56
Eritrea	117,600	5	3.8	1.9	1.9
Ethiopia	1,104,300	82	60	30.8	22
Kenya	592,909	39	28.3	22.1	2.8
Somalia	637,660	9	7	-	7
Sudan	2,505,813	41	29.3	2.4	21.9
Uganda	241,038	32	24	20	2.8
Total	5,222,520	208.8	153	77.24	58.96

	Other Estimate in 2000 (in Millions)	GDP- Per Capita Estimate in 2009 (in US \$)	Military Budget Estimate in 2007 (in US \$)	Military Personnel strength (Ground Force)
Djibouti	-	2,800	26,000,000	8,000
Eritrea	-	700	65,000,000	200,000
Ethiopia	7.2	900	345,000,000	150,000
Kenya	3.4	1,600	445,000,000	20,000
Somalia	-	600	-	-
Sudan	5	2,300	335,000,000	100,000
Uganda	0.2	1,300	187,000,000	45,000
Total	15.8	-	-	-

Table 1: Selected Inter-State and Intra-State Conflicts

Source: IISS Military Balance 2007, African Statistics (Year Book 2010, UNIECA)

1996, IGADD member states decided to transform the organization into the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The new IGAD was launched in Djibouti November 25–26, 1996 (IGAD 2001).

With the inauguration of IGAD, great emphasis was given to the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts as a means for achieving sustainable development. IGAD member states agreed: a) to take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional cooperation, peace, and stability; b) to establish effective mechanisms of consultation and cooperation for the peaceful settlement of differences and disputes; and c) to agree to deal with disputes between member states within this subregional mechanism before they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996). With this aim, three priority areas were identified: conflict prevention, management and humanitarian affairs; infrastructure development and food security; and the environment.

The need for engaging IGAD in the Somali and Sudanese peace processes was one of the major reasons that brought about the transformation of IGAD. Great emphasis was also given to regional economic integration.

The revitalization of IGAD was conceived due to the existing good relations between member states. The end of the Cold War led to the end of dictatorial regimes in Ethiopia and Somalia and “the ideological differences and military confrontations associated with it” (Kinfe 2006) The newly “emerging leaders” promoted policies of peaceful relations and a new era of cooperation and co-existence. Hence there was political will and new energy to address the security issues in the region through revitalized regional organization (Interview with IGAD official one).

2.1.2. Vision, Mission, Principles, and Major Activities of IGAD

IGAD has the vision of “becoming the premier regional organization for achieving peace, prosperity, and regional integration in the Horn of Africa.” The mission of IGAD is to assist and complement the efforts of the member states to achieve, through increased cooperation:

- food security and environmental protection
- promotion and maintenance of peace and security
- economic cooperation and integration (IGAD 2001).

The principles and values of IGAD include:

- promotion of good governance and protection of human rights through institutionalization of democracy and transparency
- promotion of a sense of community that aspires to maintaining peace in the region and the peaceful resolution of disputes between and within member states (IGAD 2003).

The core activities of IGAD, according to the IGAD Strategy include:

- promoting compatible policies in the IGAD priority areas
- developing strategies and concepts of regional relevance
- capacity building

IGAD’s approach is to be proactive towards the relevant emerging issues both regional and international in nature.

2.1.3. Organs of IGAD

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government is the supreme policy-making organ of the Authority. It determines the objectives, guidelines, and programs of IGAD and meets once a year. A Chairman is elected from the member states in rotation (IGAD 2001).

The other important organ of IGAD is the Council of Ministers. It is composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and one other Focal Minister designated by each member state. The Council formulates policy and approves the work program and annual budget of the Secretariat during its biannual sessions. The Council of Ministers meets twice in a year (IGAD 2001).

The Committee of Ambassadors is comprised of IGAD member states’ Ambassadors or Plenipotentiaries accredited to the IGAD headquarters in Djibouti. It convenes as often as the need arises to advise and guide the Executive Secretary.

The Secretariat, the executive organ of IGAD, is headed by an Executive Secretary appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government for a term of four years and renewable once. The Secretariat assists member states in formulating regional projects in the priority areas, facilitates the coordination and harmonization of development policies, mobilizes resources to implement regional projects and programs approved by the Council,




Figure 1: IGAD Organizational Structure
 Source: IGAD, 2001

and reinforces national infrastructure necessary for implementing regional projects and policies (IGAD 2001).

The Executive Secretary is assisted by four directors heading four divisions: 1) Economic Cooperation and Social Development; 2) Agriculture and Environment; 3) Peace and Security; and 4) Administration and Finance. The number of employees at the IGAD Secretariat was thirty professionals, as of December 2008 (IGAD 2008).

The Conflict Early Warning Network (CEWARN) is the unit of IGAD that was established with the objective of preventing conflicts, mainly in pastoral areas, in the region by facilitating the exchange of pertinent information among the member states. ICPAT is IGAD’s security sector program striving to build member states’ national capacity against terrorism, and promote regional security cooperation by tightening border control and enhancing judicial measures against terrorism.

IGAD also has liaison offices located in member states. The office in Kenya is responsible for environmental issues and the office in Uganda coordinates on HIV/AIDS. The liaison office in Mogadishu is responsible for updating IGAD on day-to-day developments in Somalia. IGAD has set up a Facilitation Office for Somalia in Ethiopia to be able to follow the development in Somalia. It has also a liaison office accredited to the African Union (Interview with IGAD official two).

2.1.4. Draft Peace and Security Strategy of IGAD

The importance of regional peace and security strategy is indisputable to contain and manage conflicts in the region and harmonize and coordinate peace making and building activities. IGAD endorsed its first peace and security strategy during the 2003 summit.

Elements of IGAD peace and security architecture are already in place, starting with the obligations of all member states imposed by the UN Charter and the Constitutive Act of the AU to participate in advancing the international collective security. There are also IGAD-specific agreements and mechanisms that indicate the collective aspirations of member states for mutual security including the Agreement Establishing IGAD (1996), Program on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, the Protocol on the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN, 2002), IGAD Capacity Building Against Terrorism (ICPAT), and the policy framework for the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG, 2005).

The Strategy owned by the IGAD Secretariat was prepared by consultants over the last four years. It is based on the above mentioned elements and covers 2010–2014. The peace and security strategy accords the primary responsibility to governments to ensure peace and security to their citizens. The strategic objectives include

strengthening conflict prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts; consolidating preventive diplomacy; promoting cooperation to address common peace and security threats; and enhancing cooperation in other areas accidental to peace and security such as environment and transboundary resources. Respect for principles of international law, mutual respect, and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, rejection of use of force, respect for territorial integrity and equitable utilization of transboundary resources, and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty are the chief principles of the strategy (IGAD 2001). The aim of the strategy is “to enable IGAD member states and the IGAD Secretariat and citizens of the region to actively contribute to developing and maintaining peace and security” (IGAD 2005). The strategy is still under discussion (Interview with Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official two).

2.1.5. Ongoing Revitalization

For a long time IGAD’s Secretariat and its member states focused on the more pressing issues of peace and security. It did little towards economic integration and cooperation (MOFA 2008). Therefore, the member states decided to revitalize IGAD for the second time during the twelfth ordinary summit in June 2008.

The current revitalization is mainly aimed at promoting regional integration to address common challenges such as infrastructure, food security, trade barriers, and conflict. Accordingly, IGAD in collaboration with the ECA prepared a Minimum Regional Integration Plan (MIP) in 2008. The MIP summarizes strategies and approaches adopted by IGAD since its inception and its achievements so far in the integration agenda. It also justifies the need for regional integration, given the current global economic challenges and regional challenges and opportunities. It also outlines an integration plan encompassing peace and security, infrastructure, trade, environment, agriculture, and natural resources—a regional integration. The Draft MIP was, however, highly criticized for its incompleteness by IGAD member states. As a result, the revitalization is still in progress (IGAD 2008).

2.2. IGAD’s Role in Somalia

2.2.1. IGAD Member States and the Somali Conflict

IGAD was established in one of the most volatile regions in Africa. The region is characterized by wars both inter- and intrastate, economic problems, drought and famine, and social strife. The Horn region is also interconnected by history, geography, and the same ethnic groups sharing limited resources and living in different states that are the result of European colonialism. This creates a problem of easily affecting another either directly or indirectly. Therefore, the Somali crisis is a predicament that has a regional dimension with a spillover effect in almost all the member states of IGAD.

Ethiopia shares around 1,600 kilometers of undemarcated border with Somalia. There are ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Ethiopia and Somalia went to war in 1963 and 1978 over the Ogaden. Beside the ethnic and territorial issues, Ethiopia is vulnerable to Islamist extremism and terrorist attacks from radical Islamic groups based in the stateless Somalia. The porous border serves as an easy passage for smuggling of arms and goods that threaten the security of Ethiopia. The refugee problem exerts pressure on all the neighboring countries including Ethiopia. In addition, Ethiopian rebel groups—mainly the OLF and the ONLF—that fight the government for the secession of their respective ethnic groups recruit, train, operate, and launch attacks from Somalia. Subsequently, Ethiopia regards the Somali as one of its national security issue and it is one of the active players in Somali affairs (Interview with Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official one).

Kenya, which shares a border with Somalia, is threatened by the crisis in Somalia as the northeastern part of the country is inhabited by ethnic Somalis. Like Ethiopia, Kenya is exposed to terrorist attacks from groups that operate from Somalia. The flow of Somali refugees is another source of concern for the government as most of the Somali refugees are in Kenya.

Djibouti is also threatened by the crisis in Somalia as it shares a border with Somalia, which serves as an easy passage for illegal arms and refugees. Half of the popu-

lation of Djibouti is also composed of ethnic Somalis in Djibouti (Interview with IGAD official one).

Eritrea has been actively involved in Somalia after its border war with Ethiopia from 1998–2000. It supports various groups to counterbalance the involvement of Ethiopia in Somalia. It can be said that Eritrea is in Somalia primarily to weaken the role of its arch enemy, giving the Somali problem a regional dimension.

Uganda and Sudan is concerned about the possible occurrence of terrorist attacks from Somalia, although it does not share a border with Somalia. Furthermore, it is the main troop contributing country to AMISOM. Sudan neither shares a border with Somalia, nor is actively involved in Somali affairs. This could be because of its own internal problems. Nonetheless, Sudan has a religious connection with Somalis which creates some sense of obligation to be concerned about the Somalis' fate (Interview with IGAD official two).

2.2.2. IGAD's Involvement from 1991 to 2002

Since the transformation of IGADD to IGAD, one of the priority areas of IGAD has been addressing the long standing inter- and intraconflicts of the Eastern Africa region. In this regard, IGAD has been engaged in various activities to address the Somali crisis. From 1991 to 2002, IGAD gave a mandate to member states to deal with the issue of Somalia. The issue of Somalia was mainly handled by Djibouti and Ethiopia (Interview with Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official one). This shows that, at the outset, the members of IGAD were relatively on common terms to reach a consensus on the Somalia peace initiative taken by one of them.

Djibouti's Initiative in 1991

Immediately after the demise of the Barre regime in June 1991 the President of Djibouti, Hassan Guoled Aptidon, offered his good offices for mediation among the warring parties of Somalia. Djibouti's effort was supported by IGADD and its member states. The meeting was attended by the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), United Somali

Congress (USC), Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), and IGADD. The participants agreed to hold a national reconciliation conference. Accordingly, the government of Djibouti convened the second conference in July, 1991. At the end of the meeting, the Somali participants agreed to a cease-fire and to establish a provisional government. However, the agreement did not hold. One of the powerful faction leaders, General Aideded rejected the new government, which resulted in widespread violence. The SNM, which declared the independence of Somaliland, also boycotted the meeting.

Ethiopia's Efforts

In 1993, the UN-sponsored peace conference was convened in Addis Ababa. Fifteen faction leaders attended the meeting. It was also agreed to establish a two-year transitional Council. The Addis Ababa peace process strengthened the role and legitimacy of the faction leaders which denied room for new Somali leaders. This process also failed because of the fierce competition among factions that were unable to see beyond their short-term benefits (Kinfe 2002, 65–76).

In the mid-1990s, IGAD mandated Ethiopia to coordinate the peace dialogue and mediation process. Ethiopia hosted the Sodere peace process in 1996. It was given recognition by the IGAD heads of states and governments. Many political actors—including twenty-seven faction leaders—participated, although a few boycotted the peace talks. The participants of the peace process established a National Salvation Council “as part of a preparatory course of action leading to the establishment of a Provisional Central Government of Somalia” (UNSC 1997). Before the Sodere agreement could be implemented, however, the Egyptian government convened another meeting of the same Somali faction leaders and those who boycotted the peace process. The Cairo process (1997) also collapsed when several Somali allies of Ethiopia withdrew and convened another peace process in Bossaso, Somalia in 1998 (Dagne 2009).

In response to the Egypt's action, IGAD members expressed their serious concern on the proliferation of initiatives with regard to Somalia, during the 6th IGAD Summit and Ministerial Session that took place in Djibouti from March 14–16, 1998. In the same meeting, all concerned partners were requested to channel all assistance to Somalia through the IGAD machinery.

The IGAD members further expressed their support for Ethiopia during the 1998 summit, by unanimously endorsing Ethiopia's new proposal which underscored the need to strengthen the bottom-up approach of the peace process in Somalia. The new approach was based on autonomous regional administration as building blocks for reconciliation. According to a source from the MOFA, Ethiopia changed the approach it followed during the 1996 Sodere process, because faction leaders lacked a national agenda and were rightly regarded as highly opportunistic. Following the endorsement of the approach, IGAD prepared a strategic paper namely "New Approaches to the Somalia Reconciliation Process" (Interview with Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official).

The IGAD paper led Ethiopia and IGAD to convene a number of meetings including the First and the Second International Consultative Meetings on Somalia in late 1998. At these Meetings most of the Somali faction leaders and representatives of the international community were able to attend. As a result of the meetings, IGAD was able to establish a Somalia Standing Committee and a Fact Finding Mission, which was able to visit Somalia (Kinfe 2006, 360–361). When Ethiopia was caught in a fierce border conflict with Eritrea between 1998 and 2000, Djibouti again took over the lead in 2000.

Djibouti's Arta Conference of 2000

In 2000, Djibouti proposed a new initiative, taking Civil Society Organizations as a base. The leaders of IGAD expressed their full support for the initiative, claiming that it was in line with the bottom-up approach endorsed by IGAD in 1998 (IGAD 1999). Accordingly, IGAD declared that "there is no alternative for peace in Somalia to pushing forward with the building block and the bottom up approach in which the role of warlords is contained and that of civil society is enhanced" (IGAD 1999).

This decision of IGAD led to the convening of the Somali Reconciliation Conference in Arta, Djibouti in, May 2000, where about 400 delegates took part in several months of deliberation. It was attended by CSO representatives and some Somali clan leaders. However, the Arta process was boycotted by several powerful faction leaders as well as by Somaliland and Puntland, who labeled it unrepresentative and externally imposed. In August 2000, the conference gave rise to the establish-

ment of a Transitional National Government (TNG) headed by Dr. Abdiqasim Salad Hassan.

Even though all member states of IGAD formally supported the process, their level of commitment to the process and its outcome was dissimilar. Djibouti and Eritrea were close allies of the TNG. Though the logistics of the Arta conference was all covered by Ethiopia, it became hostile towards it, alarmed by TNG's alleged links with Islamist and terrorist groups (Interview with IGAD official one). Hence, Ethiopia started to back a rival coalition of factions, the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) (ICG 2007, 2–3). Kenya and Uganda were also anxious about the risk of Somalia being used as a launching ground for hostile operations under the TNG. The TNG, therefore, lacked the necessary political support from most of the members of IGAD. Instead "regional powers lined up behind their respective proxies, funneling arms and ammunition into the country," ICG noted (ICG 2007).

The TNG also did not get sufficient support internally. It lacked legitimacy from the main clans. It was regarded as representative of the Hawiyee/Habar Gidir/Ayr sub clans, which led to fierce clan rivalry especially with the Darood clan, represented by SRRC and backed by Ethiopia (ICG 2002, 2). Subsequently, the TNG failed to establish its authority beyond the capital, Mogadishu and its three-year life span terminated without operating as a national government (Kinfe 2006, 215). The Arta peace process was not, therefore, successful in stemming the continued fighting. Violent clan wars continued to plague Somalia (IGAD 2002, 59).

In general, IGAD was involved in restoring peace and stability in Somalia between 1991 and 2002 by endorsing the initiatives taken by member states or by mandating member states to lead initiatives on Somalia. Although IGAD gave its backing to the Sodere and Arta peace conferences, the hosting and mediation was provided by the Ethiopian and Djibouti Governments, respectively (IGAD 2003, 24). Consequently, it is safe to say that the role of IGAD Secretariat in these peace processes was limited to endorsing the initiatives of its members. The institutional involvement of IGAD was minimal. As Sally Healy correctly noted, "until 2002 IGAD played no institutional role in Somali reconciliation beyond endorsing Ethiopian and Djiboutian initiatives" (2009, 10).

IGAD members showed their support for all the initiatives taken by Djibouti and Ethiopia before the Arta conference. According to an academician from the AAU, this is

because IGAD member states enjoyed relatively good relationship (Interview with AAU academician three). The internal division among IGAD member states started to be more conspicuous during the Arta conference. Ethiopia sponsored the establishment of the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) as a counter balance for the TNG. This move disappointed the government of Djibouti, which wanted to see the strengthening of its brain child, the TNG. Eritrea, which was in a fierce war (1998–2000) with Ethiopia, supported the TNG as the Ethiopian rejection of the TNG became well known. However, IGAD continued to serve as a forum to facilitate dialogue among antagonistic neighbors on regional issues (Interview with IGAD official one).

2.2.3. The Role of IGAD in the Establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia: The Eldoret Peace Process

The TNG continued to be a government only in name. The members of IGAD remained divided and the international community became more indifferent to the prospect and legitimacy of the Somali government. Despite the continued anarchy, the war on terror—which focused on Afghanistan—was the main focus of attention for the international community. By mid-2002, Somalia had returned to the periphery of the international agenda. The UN was reluctant to take up the leadership role in Somalia, after its infamous failure to restore stability in the early 1990s (Interview with IGAD official three).

It was during this time that members of IGAD made “a strategic break-through” in 2002 with the convening of another peace conference (IGAD 2003). Nonetheless, the regional rivalry—particularly between Djibouti and Ethiopia over the TNG—became palpable. Moreover, the unresolved border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia made it difficult for member states to take initiatives individually and get acceptance. Consequently, they were forced to use IGAD as a forum (Interview with AAU academician four). As a result, IGAD, changed its approach of endorsing the initiative of one of its members, and showed a relatively visible effort during the Eldoret peace process (Interview with IGAD official three).

The Eldoret Peace Process

The IGAD Summit held in Khartoum in January 2002 agreed to convene a new peace process under the auspices of IGAD. The IGAD leaders assigned the responsibility of undertaking the peace process to what they called the IGAD Technical Committee, which was composed of the front-line states, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya.

Due to the intensified rivalry between Ethiopia and Djibouti over the TNG, Kenya was considered neutral and was designated as a chairman of the IGAD Technical Committee. The assumption was, that “Ethiopia and Djibouti’s partisanship would cancel one another out, leaving Kenya to provide unbiased leadership” ICG noted (ICG 2002). Kenya’s endeavor was supported by ambassadors of IGAD member states seated at Nairobi. The conference was held in the Kenyan town of Eldoret (Interview with IGAD official three).

The Three Phases of the Eldoret

The Eldoret peace conference consisted of three phases. In the first phase, it was envisaged that 300 Somali political, military, traditional, and civil society leaders would agree upon the desired results of the conference. This preliminary preparation aimed to create a sense of ownership among the Somali actors.

The second phase would tackle substantive issues of the peace process. This stage consisted of six reconciliation committees working on the federal charter/constitution, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, land and property, local conflicts, economic recovery, and regional and international issues. Roughly seventy-five delegates, selected by the plenary, would constitute the reconciliation committees. After dealing with specific issues, they were expected to present their report to the plenary.

In the third phase, the report of the committees would be discussed and approved by the plenary. After that, this phase would deal with the contentious issue of power sharing with the objective of forming a broad-based and functioning central government. The Eldoret peace framework was promising. It tried to take lessons from the previous failed initiatives. As ICG noted, it gave priority to substantive issues over the issue of power-sharing and the issue of representation was taken seriously (2002, 3).

The Eldoret Declaration

The Eldoret conference, the most inclusive Somali forum—though Somaliland remained aloof—was convened on October 15, 2002. The Eldoret Declaration signed on October 27, 2002 provided for a Cessation of Hostilities and for the Specification of Structure and Principles of the Somali National Reconciliation Process. The Declaration committed the signatories, *inter alia*, to cease hostilities, to agree on a new federal charter, commit to the principle of decentralization and federalism, to abide by the conclusions of the process, and to support establishment of enforcement mechanisms.

The second phase of the Eldoret peace process got into serious trouble as the question of representation on the Reconciliation Committees became a highly complicated and difficult issue. The Somali political leaders arrived with a higher number of delegates, which did not correspond with the records of the secretariat. Independent Somalis complained about marginalization and demanded seats. Consequently, instead of the 300 delegates envisioned by the organizers, over 1000 Somalis were present at Eldoret. This confusion is clearly “the failure of the Technical Committee to establish clear criteria for delegates and to abide by to them” (ICG 2002, 4). Moreover, the two members of the Technical Committee, Djibouti and Ethiopia, fought over seat allocations for their respective Somali clients (ICG 2002, 4).

The stalemate over participation was resolved when the Technical Committee proposed a formula for clan representation known as the 4.5 formula. The formula envisioned 400 seats divided equally between the four major clan groups, and minority groups collectively receiving half as many seats as a major clan—i.e., eighty-four seats for each major clan, forty-two seats for minorities, and twenty-two additional seats to be allocated at the discretion of the Technical Committee (ICG 2002, 5). Here, the intention was to show that all clans are equal and the power of decision making is fairly distributed.

In the second phase, no committee was able to sustain a quorum. The drafts failed to represent consensus (ICG 2003, 5). As a result, the reconciliation process remained in stalemate from September to December 2003. The TNG and its allied factions withdrew from the Eldoret peace process. The Technical Committee undertook several consultations to end the deadlock. The 10th IGAD Summit, which took place from October 24–25, 2003 tried to address the causes of the stalemate.

During the summit, the Somali leaders raised their concerns regarding the ownership and management of the conference. Most Somali leaders had complained that it was the Technical Committee, and not themselves, who were dictating the terms and pace of the peace process. They also complained that there were conflicting interests and approaches among the three front line states namely Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya, which constituted the Technical Committee, thereby creating confusion among the Somali delegates (Peace and Security Council of AU 2004, 2).

Given the concerns raised by the Somalis, the Summit decided “to expand the Technical Committee, now renamed as the Facilitation Committee on the Somali Peace Process led by Kenya, to include Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Sudan” (IGAD communiqué 2003). The Summit also ordered the newly formed Facilitation Committee to take immediate steps towards the convening of a Leaders’ Retreat, with the objective of resolving all the outstanding issues relating to the peace process.

The Facilitation Committee was able to return the Somali leaders who had withdrawn from the peace process. The sense of failure of yet another Somali peace process was heightened by the failure of the new IGAD Facilitation Committee to convene the Leaders’ Retreat in December 2003. The reasons for the delay of the retreat included a disagreement over Somali participants and a split between Kenya and Uganda over the issue of leadership and venue (ICG 2004, 10).

The Leaders’ Retreat and the Establishment of the TFG

The Leaders’ Retreat began on January 9, 2004 at the Nairobi Safari Park Hotel, and lasted until January 29, 2004. After nearly three weeks of strenuous bargaining, the Declaration on the Harmonization of Various Issues—proposed by the Somali delegates at the Somali consultative meetings at State House, the Kenyan presidential residence—was signed on January 29, 2004. The Somali leaders agreed on the name of the government and charter, the size of the parliament, and the duration of the transitional period (Peace and Security Council of the AU 2004, 3–4).

The signing of this Declaration was supposed to be the entry point into the third and the last phase of the conference. However, confusion over the January 29 Declara-

tion emerged virtually before the ink could dry. Fresh misunderstandings surfaced as a result of attempts by some Somali leaders to restructure certain sections in the Draft Charter (Peace and Security Council of the AU, 4). The dissatisfied Somali leaders went back to Somalia with the intention of forming a new alliance.

The IGAD Ministers “expressed concern at the unacceptable absence of certain Somali leaders from the third and final phase of the conference” and warned the leaders to come to the peace talks without any conditionality. The Facilitation Committee warned the Somali leaders by stating: “Spoilers and those who obstruct the process from within and outside SNRP will be named publicly and subjected to targeted international sanctions” (IGAD communiqué 2004). As a way forward, the Ministers “reinforced further the robust mandate given to the IGAD Facilitation Committee to remove all bottlenecks in the distribution of seats among sub-clans and in the subsequent selection of members of parliament and use its discretion to channel the peace process to its conclusion” (IGAD communiqué 2004).

At the third and final stage, the source of the division was how to select the 275-member Transitional Parliament. The IGAD Facilitation Committee proposed and appealed to most Somali leaders to agree on the “4.5 formula,” in which each of the four major clans would have sixty-one delegates and minority groups collectively thirty-one. Though divergent interpretations of the formula led to bitter division between the TNG and SRRC, the Transitional Parliament was established based on the so-called 4.5 Formula, as it was intended by the Facilitation Committee.

The new TFG parliament ratified the Charter. The Charter, which created institutions assigned responsibilities, roles and obligations. Major political agreements reached by the different factions for political dispensation in the Charter included:

- election of the president by parliament,
- traditional leaders to elect parliamentarians in consultation with the political leaders
- parliament to be composed of states and regional administrations and
- the interim period to be five years

In a major power-sharing structure, Somalia would have a president, a prime minister, and three deputy prime ministers (IGAD Secretariat 2003, 10). On October 10, 2004, the newly established Transitional Federal Parlia-

ment elected Abdullahi Yusuf, the former President of Puntland, as President of the TFG.

The Eldoret/Mbaghati peace took over two years under the auspices of IGAD, more than the time initially planned, which was six to nine months. As noted earlier, the process was hampered by lack of genuine commitment from the Somali leaders, division within the IGAD members, and mismanagement of the conference both logistically and financially. However, the IGAD Facilitation Committee showed maximum patience in concluding the process with the formation of a new government. The Facilitation Committee met eleven times in one year to address the more complicated issues in the process (IGAD Secretariat 2003, 25).

It is worth noting that the peace process was taken under the auspices of IGAD. Despite their differences, the members were committed to restoring peace and stability in Somalia. It was particularly the member states that played crucial roles. They were also able to bring most of the Somali actors into the peace talks. In spite of the lengthiness of the peace conference, the IGAD members managed to complete the process with the establishment of a new government, which offered a new opportunity to try to achieve stability in stateless Somalia (IGAD Secretariat 2004, 25). IGAD achieved what other organizations had failed to take action on (Interview with Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official).

In addition, IGAD’s ownership of the peace processes helped to secure the exclusion of secondary actors from outside the region: principally Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. Moreover, IGAD’s peace-making activities helped to secure legitimacy for the organization and build wider international acceptance as the only appropriate forum for tackling conflicts in the Horn (Healy 2009, 11).

The role of IGAD secretariat, however, remained marginal although the Eldorate peace process was convened in its name. The leadership and mediation role was carried out mainly by the front-line states.

The Role of IGAD in Sustaining the TFG

The TFG, formed in October 2004, could not move into Somalia because of volatile security and the emergence of the UIC as a major political player in the same year. The UIC was popular among the Hawiye, which is a dominant clan in Mogadishu. This became a major obstacle for the newly established TFG to get legitimacy and ins-

tall itself in the capital city. Neither did the newly established TFG have a strong security force to move to Mogadishu and consolidate power.

The Unrealized IGAD Peacekeeping Mission

In view of the deteriorating security situation, the heads of states and governments of IGAD issued a communiqué at the January 31, 2005 meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, on their plan to deploy a Peace Support Mission to Somalia. According to the communiqué, the Mission would “provide security support to the TFG and guarantee the sustenance of the IGAD peace process and assist with the reestablishment of peace and security including training of the police and the army” (IGAD communiqué). The decision of IGAD summit was endorsed by the Fourth Ordinary Session of the African Union and authorized by the 24th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU held on February 7, 2005 (Interview with Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official).

With the view of implementing the decisions, the AU/IGAD sent a Fact-Finding and Reconnaissance Mission on February 14, 2005 to determine the mandate, force, size, structure, and tasks of the peace support mission. The proposed IGAD Forces for Somalia (IGASOM) deployment plan was presented by the Military Experts to the IGAD Member states, refined by the chiefs of defense, and finally approved by the Ministers of Defense at the March 14, 2005 meeting in Entebbe, Uganda. It was intended to deploy up to 10,000 peacekeepers throughout Somalia—with the exception of Somaliland—starting from April 2005. The expected cost of IGASOM was estimated to be US\$413 million per annum (Mays 2005; and see News from Africa 2005).

The IGASOM deployment plan was adopted at the 24th IGAD Council of Ministers on March 18, 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya. In this ministerial meeting it was decided that Sudan and Uganda would make the initial deployment of troops. The remaining IGAD members would assist the training of the Somali army and in the provision of logistics and later in troop contributions. The Council also decided to amend the constitution of IGAD to allow the deployment of IGASOM (IGAD Council of Ministers communiqué 2005). On March 20, 2006, the 11th IGAD summit held in Nairobi reiterated its decision to deploy IGASOM. The UNSC had shown its support by authorizing the deployment of 8,000 IGASOM force for six

months, excluding the front-line states from contributing troops to the mission. Moreover, the UNSC decided not to apply the arms embargo on Somalia for IGASOM, under resolution 1725 (2006).

Nevertheless, the IGASOM was not deployed. It is pertinent to state that IGASOM was a controversial issue among the IGAD member states. While Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda supported the mission, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Sudan showed strong reservations. Moreover, its deployment was opposed by some factions and the UIC in Somalia. Most importantly, the proposal lost financial support from the major powers including the US (Bryden 2006). The US was said to be reluctant to see the involvement of front line states and was at that time providing assistance to some warlords to hunt a handful of alleged terrorists. Thus, IGASOM lacked financial and logistical support (Bryden). Some, however, argue that the deployment of IGASOM might have enhanced the role and credibility of IGAD and assisted TFG’s installment since the UIC was not as strong at that time; hence this is widely considered a lost opportunity.

When the decision to deploy IGASOM was delayed, Ethiopian troops helped with the installation of the TFG in Jowhar and then in Baidoa in 2005. As a sign of solidarity and support to the new government of Somalia, the IGAD ministers convened their 26th meeting in Jowhar on November 29, 2005 (IGAD Council of Ministers 2005). The Ministers encouraged the TFG to engage in dialogue. But, IGAD warned those who deliberately continued to obstruct the peace process that they risked decisive measures being taken against them, including being referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC). It also called for financial assistance to the TFIs.

Despite the diplomatic and military support from IGAD member states, the TFG was still unable to install itself in the capital. The UIC, on the contrary, controlled Mogadishu and increased its area of influence in central and southern parts of Somalia in mid-2006 (IGAD Secretariat 2006, 47). The war between the US-backed warlords and the UIC further intensified insecurity in Somalia, making it difficult for the weak TFG to consolidate power.

Attempts to Negotiate the TFG and UIC

The UIC continued to reject the Transitional Federal Charter. Similarly, TFG considered the UIC a terrorist organization. In spite of having their differences, both

parties, the TFG and the UIC, participated in a dialogue. However, two rounds of peace talks that took place in Khartoum, Sudan, under the auspices of the Arab League did not bring any accord (Interview with IGAD official one 2009). Both parties accused each other of violating the terms of the agreement. TFG accused the UIC of expanding its territorial control while the UIC pointed out that the TFG invited Ethiopian troops into Somalia. The third round failed to take place when the UIC insisted on the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces as condition for taking part in the dialogue.

As an attempt to prevent the escalation of war in Somalia, the Extra-ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers' Meeting held in Nairobi, Kenya on June 13, 2006 encouraged and supported the TFG to pursue constructive dialogue with all of those who recognized the Transitional Federal Institutions and its Charter. IGAD expressed its readiness to support constructive dialogue in Somalia. The Ministers also threatened to catalogue all those involved in the illegal use of arms to terrorize and harm innocent civilians. In this regard, it recommended that those involved in these activities should be subjected to the legal international process for prosecution for crimes against humanity.

They also agreed to give amnesty to those who may have been involved in these illegal activities in the past, but who now agreed to surrender and follow the path of dialogue with the internationally recognized TFG, which was the legitimate authority for Somalia. The IGAD member states agreed to apply the same sanctions against all warlords and to grant free passage to be extended to those warlords who surrendered and subjected themselves to dialogue with the TFG.

This "carrot and stick" approach of IGAD could not bring any change to the realities on the ground. The leaders of the UIC continued to announce that they aimed to establish an Islamic state that included all Somalis in the Horn of Africa, including the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. The UIC declared jihad on Ethiopia claiming that it had its forces in Somalia supporting the TFG. Thus, the main ally of the TFG, Ethiopia wanted to crush the UIC by declaring them as "clear and present threat for national security" (Interview with Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official).

In the meantime, the UN Security Council Resolution 1725—adopted on December 6, 2006—partially lifted the arms embargo and authorized the AU and IGAD member states to establish a training and protection mis-

sion in Somalia. However, the AU and IGAD could not deploy any force as the TFG forces supported by Ethiopian troops launched a massive offensive against the UIC on December 25, 2006.

Ethiopian Intervention

The Ethiopian government declared war on UIC in late 2006 by categorizing it as a terrorist organization. The Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia was motivated by the UIC's alleged link to terrorists, irredentist rhetoric, support to Ethiopian rebel groups (OLF and ONLF), and dependence on Eritrea. Surprisingly, the UIC forces were quickly defeated and left most of their controlled areas, which enabled the TFG to move to Mogadishu (Kidist 2008).

The intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia was supported by all IGAD members except Eritrea. All the meetings of IGAD appreciated the sacrifice Ethiopia was making for the peace and stability of Somalia and the region as a whole. Session 26 of IGAD Council of Ministers— held on April 13, 2007 in Nairobi, Kenya—stated the following to demonstrate its unequivocal support to the Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia (Interview with Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official):

The Council of Ministers expresses its appreciation to the Ethiopian Government for all the sacrifices it has made to promote the common position of IGAD Member States, which is fully consistent with the commitment of the organization for the success of the TFG and for the interest of the people of the IGAD region to achieve peace and stability and to protect the region from terrorists and extremists (IGAD Council of Ministers, 2007).

This position has been reiterated at almost all levels of the IGAD meetings. Ethiopia withdrew its forces in January 2009, after the signing of the Djibouti peace process.

The Intensification of the Insurgency

After the quick defeat of the UIC, the Al-Shabaab continued to wage guerrilla warfare against the Ethiopian and TFG forces, inflicting a series of attacks including suicide bombings for the first time in Somalia's history. The intensification of the fight led to one of the worst huma-

nitarian crises in the world. The insurgents applied a military tactic of hit and run. After two years of fighting, it controlled much of the south and central territories of Somalia including parts of Mogadishu (Kidist 2009).

IGAD's Response

With the intensification of the insurgency, IGAD showed its support for the TFG as a legitimate government in Somalia that needed to be assisted by the international community. Thus, it pushed for the deployment of the African Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia, which was deployed in March 2007.

IGAD also warned of imposing sanctions against the insurgents (Interview with IGAD official three).

Moreover, during the 33rd Extraordinary Meeting in May 2009, the IGAD Council of Ministers called on the UNSC to impose a no-fly zone on a number of specific airports including: Kismayo, Baidoa, KM 50, Balidoogle, Waajid, Hudur, all airports in Gedo Region, Isaley, and Johwar. This was to prevent arms and supplies reaching the Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. The Council also asked the Security Council to impose a blockade on sea ports, particularly Kismayo and Merka, to prevent any further influx. The IGAD Ministers noted that there were international naval forces present in the region that could enforce such a blockade (IGAD 2009). However, this IGAD proposal was not implemented. Some argue that IGAD made the decision without consulting those who were supposed to implement the plan, which is the West, since a blockade of the sea is extremely costly. IGAD came to a conclusion too soon, and as a result its proposal lost credibility (Interview with European Union official).

With the objective of addressing the growing attack against the Ethiopian and AMISOM forces, IGAD also called on the African Union-Peace and Security Council and the UNSC to review the rules of engagement of AMISOM to enable it to engage in active defense operations. Given the rapidly changing situation in Somalia, the Council of Ministers further called on the UNSC to review its previous resolutions to allow front line states to deploy their troops in Somalia, if necessary.

In an unusual but strong move, the leaders of IGAD also condemned Eritrea as an aggressor and called upon the UNSC to impose sanctions on the Government of Eritrea, which is accused of arming, training, and supporting alleged terrorists in Somalia (IGAD 2009). Moreover,

Eritrea's presence is seen to be a threat since it opposes every initiative taken by IGAD due to its conflict with Ethiopia (Interview with AAU academician two). For the first time in African history, IGAD's decision was supported by the Assembly of Heads of States and Government of the African Union (Interview with Somali analyst one).

The UNSC approved sanctions against Eritrea on December 23, 2009 (Interview with Ethiopian Foreign Ministry official one). The decision was opposed by Libya, which was then chair of the AU, and China, which abstained from voting. Resolution 1907 of the UNSC imposed an arms embargo on Eritrea. The UNSC also voted to ban travel and freeze the assets of Eritreans designated by a committee of the fifteen-nation panel. The resolution demands that Eritrea "cease arming, training, and equipping armed groups and their members including the Al-Shabaab, which aims to destabilize the region" (UNSC 2009).

According to some observers, the sanctions against Eritrea will partially halt the flow of weapons and money reaching the radicals. It is also aimed to give a political signal to the Al-Shabaab and its sympathizers (Interview with IPF informant). Others argue that they will not change the politics on the ground, as long as the radicals have grass-root support and other channels for weapons and financial assistance. The implication of the sanctions on both Eritrea and the radicals remains to be seen subsequent to their implementation (Interview with AAU academician one).

Weaknesses of the TFG

At the beginning, the TFG and TFIs made progress in setting up political institutions such as a Supreme Court, regional and district councils and convening a National Reconciliation Congress. However, further progress was hampered by lack of institutional capacity and inadequate resources and external assistance to the TFIs. This situation affected the formation of a national security force. The TFG was also not capable of reaching out to and establishing its control over all areas of Somalia. Therefore, a security system, which is mainly based on clan and warlords, continued in Mogadishu and other territories.

Abdullahi Yusuf, who comes from the Darod clan, was not welcomed by the Hawiye clan, given the historical competition between the two clans. His call for the deployment of 20,000 international troops further under-

mined his legitimacy. The appointment of Ahmed Ghedi, a veterinary professor from Hawiye clan, did not appease the opposition as he was not well accepted by the clan. Soon, the TFG was engulfed in an intense power struggle between President Abdullahi Yusuf and Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Ghedi over issues of transparency and accountability, as well as diverging interpretations of the Charter regarding the term of office of the Prime Minister and its implications. The Prime Minister lacked the experience and the political skill to bridge the widening gap between the Hawiye and the Darod clans. It was clear that President Abdullahi and Prime Minister Ghedi completely failed to run the TFG as a united government. The tension within the TFG was eventually resolved with the resignation of Mr. Ghedi (Interviews with Somali analyst three and Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official).

After Mr. Ghedi resigned, the new Prime Minister Ahmed Nur was highly opposed by President Abdullahi due to his keen interest in reaching out to the insurgents and for his participation in the UN-sponsored Djibouti peace process. The internal power struggles within the TFG continued to weaken the governing capacity of the TFIs.

The IGAD expressed its total disappointment at the TFG leadership's lack of political will to implement the decisions that could bring peace and stability to Somalia. The Somali leadership was also blamed for the failure to establish institutions of governance and broaden its governing coalition. The absence of harmony within the leadership was stated as one major reason. Accordingly, IGAD made it clear that its patience with the TFG's leadership, particularly the President, was running out. Subsequently, the Council of Ministers of IGAD threatened to take the necessary action to impose targeted sanctions including travel bans and freezing of assets, among others, against all those in- and outside Somalia who have become obstacles to peace there. It called upon the AU and the UNSC to do the same (IGAD Council of Ministers communiqué 2008; and see IGAD 2008).

Despite the warnings, the TFG leaders continued to compete for political power. Hence, IGAD fully supported the Djibouti peace process as another attempt to bring peace and stability in Somalia and with the aim of broadening the base of the TFG (IGAD 2008). The IGAD decision was a fatal political blow to President Yusuf who opposed the Djibouti peace talks. Lacking all the legitimacy he enjoyed with the IGAD leaders, he was left with no option but to resign.

2.2.4. The Establishment of the TFG II and IGAD

The glaring flaws of the TFG, the escalation of the attacks, and the tragic humanitarian disaster led the international community to consider new peace talks. The aim was to reach out to the moderate elements of the ARS, broaden the base of the TFG, and marginalize the radicals. With these objectives, the Djibouti peace process was started in Djibouti on May 9, 2008. However, the peace process divided the ARS between ARS-Djibouti, which was willing for negotiation, and ARS-Asmara, which was opposed to any dialogue with the TFG before the withdrawal of all foreign troops (Interview with UNPOS official two).

The ARS-Djibouti and the TFG agreed to form a new unity government by expanding the number of Somali parliamentarians to 550 and elected the former leader of the UIC, Sheikh Sheriff and Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as the new President and Prime Minister of the TFG, respectively. The two sides also agreed to establish a Joint Security Force. Ethiopian forces fully withdrew as agreed by the Djibouti peace process. Despite the establishment of the new government, the security situation remains precarious.

The Djibouti peace process took place under the auspices of the UN. However, IGAD, cognizant of the serious problems of the TFG fully supported the peace process, which aimed to broaden the base of the Somali government by reaching out to the moderate elements of the ARS. It also sent a clear and strong political message to the former TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf, who opposed the process. This contributed to the resignation of President Abdullahi Yusuf, which facilitated agreement between the TFG and the ARS-D. IGAD also established a Facilitators Office for Somalia Peace and Reconciliation to keep a close eye on the developments of the peace process in Somalia (Interviews with IGAD officials three, six, and two).

IGAD Facilitators Office for Somalia Peace and Reconciliation

IGAD established a Somalia Facilitator Liaison Office in Addis Ababa in October, 2008. The Facilitator's Office is mandated to: facilitate reconciliation; assist institutional and capacity building efforts; assist the mobilization of

financial and technical resources for the TFG II; assist the TFG II to fulfill its mandate as per the TFC and the Djibouti agreement. The Facilitator's office also coordinates activities of IGAD with the African Union and the United Nations (Interview with IGAD official four).

In order to achieve its mandates and address the problems in Somalia, the Facilitator's Office has produced a strategic plan named "Reestablishing Effective Institutions in Somalia." The two-year strategy (2009–2011) is designed to reestablish institutions that can create a system of basic administration and provide security (Interview with IGAD official four). The strategy is expected to be endorsed by IGAD members. IGAD also established a liaison office in Mogadishu to update and provide information on a daily basis for the Facilitators Office. The Facilitators Office has been supported financially by IPF, especially Denmark and Finland. Currently, IGAD is handling the issue of Somalia through the Facilitators Office (Interview with IGAD official two).

The Facilitator's Office has been gathering information and updating member states on developments in Somalia. Its activities have also been coordinated with the UN and AU. The three offices have monthly coordination meetings to avoid duplication of activities and design future strategies. The achievements of the Facilitators office so far have, however, been limited (Interview with IGAD official four).

The IGAD member states continue to play different but important roles in strengthening the TFG II. Djibouti played an active role in hosting the conference (Interview with IGAD official four). Ethiopia and Kenya, though they seem to follow a wait and see approach, did not stop from providing training to the TFG II security forces. Uganda is playing its part by contributing troops to the AMISOM.

2.3. IGAD's Achievements in its Effort to Resolve the Somali Conflict

2.3.1. The Continuous Engagement of IGAD

Since the collapse of the Somali central government in 1991, IGAD and its predecessor IGADD have shown continuous engagement in addressing the conflict in Somalia. From 1991 to 2002, IGAD was involved in endorsing the initiatives of its individual member states. When the

international community lacked the political and economic will to permanently engage in Somalia, the members of IGAD were steadfast in seeking solutions to the crisis in Somalia under various initiatives (Interviews with IGAD officials three and six).

In 2002, IGAD embarked upon a new process under its own auspices which lasted for two years. After the formation of the TFG and the GNU, IGAD has continued to support the fragile governments. IGAD was the primary instrument in soliciting financial and diplomatic support for the TFG (Interviews with IGAD officials three and six). Currently, IGAD has decided to establish a facilitator's office for Somalia to assist the TFG II (Interview with Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official one). This could be seen as a sign of its commitment to the cause of peace and stability in Somalia. Some argue that if it were not for IGAD, the Somali conflict would have been forgotten by the international community (Interview with IGAD official one).

2.3.2. The Commitment of the Member States of IGAD

The IGAD member states—in particular Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya—have exerted considerable effort in dealing with the prolonged conflict in Somalia. Ethiopia and Djibouti have initiated and organized a series of peace processes despite the frustrating situation in Somalia.

The Assembly and the Council of Ministers of IGAD have met repeatedly to exclusively discuss Somalia. In




Figure 2: IGAD Offices for Somalia
Source: Compiled by the author

2008 alone, IGAD held two extraordinary summits and five extraordinary Council of Ministers meetings and Somalia was one of the major agendas (IGAD Secretariat 2008, 50). In 2009, the Council of Ministers met four times to exclusively discuss the Somali issue. The frequency with which the organs of IGAD have been meeting was testimony to the members' commitment to the Somalia issue (Interview with Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official one).

Member States' commitment to the peace of Somalia was mainly witnessed during the Eldoret peace process. Despite the internal divisions and frustrating rivalry between the Somali actors, they remained fully engaged in the process for almost two years (Kinfe 2006, 142). When the Eldoret process was suffering from huge financial deficit, Kenya, the Chair of the Technical/Facilitation Committee, carried the burden of the costs of the conference. Hence, member states of IGAD showed their commitment and invested their scarce resources on the Somalia peace processes (Interview with Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official one).

The member states also showed their commitment when they agreed to deploy a peacekeeping mission in Somalia in 2005. The member states were ready to amend the mandate of IGAD, which does not permit sending troops to member states. An agreement by IGAD member states, which are very sensitive about the issues of sovereignty and internal affairs, to send the IGASOM could be taken as an indicator of firm commitment to address the conflict in Somalia (Interview with IGAD official three). Moreover, when proposing IGASOM, IGAD asked member states to fund their own deployment. Though the deployment of IGASOM could not be realized due to various reasons; IGAD members continue to be committed to establishing a functioning central government in Somalia.

Currently, IGAD member states are making substantial effort in sustaining the fragile government in Somalia. Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, and Kenya are providing training for more than 3,000 TFG II's military and police forces (Amnesty International 2010). Uganda sent troops to Somalia under AMISOM (Interview with IGAD official four). In addition, Djibouti has agreed to send one battalion to Somalia to join AMISOM (Interview with UNPOS official).

In a nutshell, it is frustrating for any actor or actors to deal with the complex and dynamic Somali conflict. The

IGAD member states, however, consistently engaged their energy, time, and resources to solve the prolonged conflict, which is commendable.

2.3.3. The Efforts of the IGAD Secretariat

Somalia is one of the priority agendas of IGAD. It is one of major reasons for the revitalization of IGAD. The IGAD Secretariat has been engaged in various efforts that have contributed to the peaceful resolution of the Somali conflict. It produces situation reports for regular meetings of the organs of IGAD. The Secretariat has regular meetings once or twice in a year. It also collects information and updates and advises the Council of Ministers to make decisions.

IGAD Secretariat prepares concept notes for the regular meetings of the Council of Ministers. IGAD organizes several workshops and expert meetings to produce concept notes. With the aim of supporting the peace endeavors in the region, IGAD carries out studies by its own experts or by hiring consultants. For extraordinary meetings, the Secretariat provides logistical services and produces documents (Interview with IGAD official two). IGAD has also established a full-time office for Somalia to support the TFG II with the view to strengthening its capacity.

2.3.4. IGAD as a Forum for Member States

IGAD provides an important forum for the member states to discuss the Somali issue. It has enabled them to reach important decisions and common positions that would have been very difficult without the presence of IGAD, as most of the member states find it difficult to maintain strong bilateral relations. The Eldoret peace process was conducted because IGAD was used as a framework for dialogue. Despite the regional rivalry, the members have continued to use IGAD as a platform to promote regional issues. As an IGAD official has correctly noted, IGAD members were forced to use IGAD as a forum because of the straining of relations starting from 1995 (Interview with IGAD official one). In addition, the IGAD Secretariat plays an important role in representing the region in various regional and international meetings

and in communicating the common position of IGAD on Somalia (Interview with IGAD official one).

2.4. The Challenges of IGAD in Somali Peace Making and Lessons to be Learned

Somalia has been without a functioning central government for almost two decades. Efforts to restore peace and stability are yet to bear fruit. The following factors could be mentioned as to why the peace initiatives—particularly those spearheaded by IGAD—were not successful in Somalia.

2.4.1. The Complexity of the Somali Conflict

Somalia, as the only case of state failure in modern times, has gone from crisis to crisis making peace very difficult to achieve. The total disintegration of the state made the issue of representation, power, and resource sharing and reconciliation a difficult task in Somalia. Moreover, sustainable peace primarily requires committed internal actors. In this regard, IGAD lacks genuine partners of peace from within. Clan loyalty has been a major obstacle for all the peace processes launched after 1991. Zero-sum clan contest coupled with protracted conflict deepened divisions make reconciliation and power-sharing a difficult task in Somalia. The peace efforts were also interrupted by opportunist warlords and other groups and individuals who benefited from the chaos. These groups lack national interest and they breach and disown several agreements they have even signed (ICG 2003, 3; IGAD 2003, 11; and see Coyne 2006, 15).

Somalis have known Islam since centuries when the religion was introduced in the eastern coasts of Africa. They have practiced the tolerant version of Islam and Somalis are known to reject the harsh interpretation of the religion. However, this religious culture is under pressure from the tiny but highly violent Islamist extremists who aim to establish a Taliban-like regime in the Horn of Africa by uniting all Somalis living in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. These Islamists who proclaim allegiance to the global jihad movement are becoming clear obstacles to peace in Somalia, further complicating the Somali conflict. Their presence and political intentions

have created grave anxiety for their neighbors and the international community, thus giving the Somali crisis regional and international dimensions (Interviews with Somali analyst one, AU official two, and AAU academician one).

The collapse of a central state with one of the biggest armies in Africa left Somalia flooded with arms and ammunition. The combination of civil war, poverty, and lawlessness has aggravated the peril of militarization of the society. Due to the prevailing sense of insecurity, most Somalis are unwilling to disarm. Thus, all of the weak Somali governments have found it very difficult to disarm the society and monopolize the use of physical force. In most cases, attempts at disarmament led to further bloodshed. At Eldoret, the Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) Committee proposed the integration of the militia forces into the national army. However, given the serious nature of the problem, the Committee itself believed that effective disarmament and demobilization requires the deployment of international forces (Interviews with Somali analyst one, AU official two, and AAU academician one).

The issue of land is one of the most complicated matters in the Somali crisis. The colonial administration, clan disputes, fluidity of ownership, and changing settlement patterns have further aggravated the complexity of the land and property disputes. Any attempt to implement a fair system to remedy this problem requires wide consensus and a strong and functioning government.

Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world. The Somali population is dependent on international humanitarian assistance. The greater part of the internal revenue, which is very insignificant in addressing the long accumulated social and economic problems, ends up in the pockets of the warlords. Hence, it has been difficult for governments established after 1991—the TNG, the TFG and the TFG II—to generate revenues internally. In Eldoret, for instance, the Committee on Economic Recovery proposed a budget of over US\$1 billion for the first two years, exclusively from foreign aid. The current government of Somalia has also presented a budget of US\$108 million for 2010 expecting donors to fill 80 percent its treasury (ICG 2010, 12).

Year	Type of Inter-State Conflict	States Involved	Major Contentious Issue or Area
1964	Brief armed conflict	Ethiopia-Somalia	Control of Ethiopia's Somali-inhabited territory
1960s	Tensions	Kenya-Somalia	Control of Kenya's Northern Frontier District
1977-1978	Full-scale war	Ethiopia-Somalia	Control of Ethiopia's Somali-inhabited territory
1994-1998	Tensions	Sudan-Eritrea	Islamist threat
1995-1998	Tensions	Sudan-Ethiopia	Sudanese link to the Mubarak assassination attempt
1998-2000	Full-scale war	Eritrea-Ethiopia	Territorial dispute
2006-2008	Intervention	Ethiopia-Somalia	Ethiopia intervened militarily
2008-2009	Brief armed confrontation	Eritrea-Djibouti	Territorial dispute
2009	Tensions	Kenya-Uganda	Territorial dispute over the Migingo islands

Table 2: Selected Inter-State Conflicts among IGAD Member States
Source: Berouk, 2010

2.4.2. Regional Factors

Rivalry among Member States

The strength of any organization depends on the relationship between its member states (Interview with AAU academician three). However, the history of IGAD member states has always been full of rivalry. Politically, almost all of them have issues of dispute between themselves.

The historical rivalry among IGAD member states show that the region is in serious crisis (Interview with AAU academician two). The organization is thus a reflection of this reality.

The rivalry among member states has led to endless competition in framing and initiating peace processes in Somalia. It has also become difficult to have a common position on Somalia. Ethiopia and Eritrea have taken their proxy war to Somalia by supporting and arming various Somali factions further aggravating the conflict since 1998. The formation of the TNG was not welcomed by Ethiopia, while Eritrea supported it. Ethiopia and Djibouti also demonstrated contradictory views on the Somali peace processes. The internal dynamics, therefore, made it very difficult for IGAD to function properly and deal

with regional security issues (Interview with ICG informant). This has led many close observers to conclude that IGAD is in a coma (IGAD Secretariat 2004). While this is the dominant opinion, there is also a view that the effect of the regional division is exaggerated. No matter what their differences, the member states work for their common interest. For instance, more than 70 percent of IGAD's Council of Ministers meetings revolved around Somalia, showing that when it comes to their interest, they are ready to engage in dialogue (Interview with IGAD official one).

Regional Instability

The IGAD is immersed in dealing with a number of regional issues. Somalia is not the only conflict in the region. Member states of IGAD are ravaged by intra- and inter-state conflicts. Sudan is in a crisis; Ethiopia was engaged in a civil war for a long time and still is confronted by small-scale armed resistance; Kenya is a very fragile state; neither Eritrea nor Uganda are doing well. The nature of the state in the region is at the root of all of the troubling news that come out of the IGAD member states (Medhane 2003). The state is oppressive and at least in fragile

democratic transition. The regimes are characterized by bad governance, poor human rights records, and weak democratic institutions and culture.

The regional states have a long history of engaging in each other's internal affairs by supporting rebel groups. As a result, it is hardly possible to think of a common security policy and structure, since an air of mistrust and non-cooperation rather than of peaceful coexistence predominates. IGAD is therefore, unable to develop a common position to effectively deal with Somalia.

Intra- and interstate conflicts have also made it very difficult for IGAD to focus on addressing the anarchic situation in Somalia (Interview with ICG informant). For instance, IGAD exerted considerable energy, time, and money to deal with the crisis in Sudan from 1994 to 2005. IGAD is

also expected to deal with other ongoing intra- and interstate conflicts, such as the Ethio-Eritrean and Eritrea-Djibouti boarder stalemate.

To make matters worse, IGAD member states are constantly challenged by drought, desertification, and poverty. Accordingly, IGAD's focus, energy, and capacity have been divided to deal with various and equally important regional issues.

The role of Arab states is also not negligible in undermining the role of IGAD (Interview with ICG informant). The Al-Shabaab is said to receive financial support and weapons from supporters in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Egypt and Libya also face similar accusations. Egypt has been repeatedly accused of spoiling the peace initiatives taken or endorsed by IGAD. These states are known for

Year	State	Type of Intra-State Conflict	Major Contentious Issue or Area	Involved IGAD Member States
Since the 1990s	Djibouti	Ethnic tension between Afar and Issa	Control of state power	Somalia and Eritrea
1991 to present	Eritrea	Religious and ethnic tension	Control of state power	Ethiopia and Sudan
1960's-1991	Ethiopia	Civil war	Control of state power and secession	Sudan and Somalia
1991 to present		Small scale armed resistance by OLF and ONLF	Control of state power and secession	Eritrea and Somalia
Since 1960s	Kenya	Ethnic tension preceding and following elections	Control of state power	-
Since 1991	Somalia	Civil war among clans, factions, militia groups	Control of state power, key towns, ports	Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya
1983-2005	Sudan	Civil war between SPLA and the government	Secession	Ethiopia and Uganda
Since 2003		Darfur crisis	Autonomy and resource distribution	Eritrea
Early 1990s -2006	Uganda	Civil War	Autonomy	Sudan

Table 3: Selected Intra-State Conflicts in the IGAD Member States

Source: Compiled by the author from various Sources

providing financial support to radical groups in the name of charity.

Lack of a Regional Power

In addition to the prevailing regional instability and conflict, the IGAD region lacks a regional power. Nigeria and South Africa are taking the lead with regard to ECOWAS and SADC, respectively. But, no one state takes such responsibility from IGAD member states; none of them has the capacity to assume an unchallenged regional leadership (Interviews with ICG official and IGAD official two). Though Ethiopia has the military might and large number of people, it lacks the economic muscle to exercise regional leadership. Kenya does not have the military supremacy to set the tone of regional agendas. And, Sudan despite its oil wealth and territorial supremacy is weakened by internal conflicts (Moller 2009).

2.4.3. Different Approaches in Addressing the Somali Conflict

Structure of the State

The member states of IGAD differ in their approach to addressing the Somali conflict. There is a fundamental difference, particularly on the use of either federal or a unitary system. Djibouti, Eritrea, and Kenya promote a unitary structure arguing that it advocates and maintains the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia. They see federalism as a way of “balkanizing” the country. In fact, these countries have taken this position given the possible implication of federalism for their own internal political systems.

According to Ethiopia and its allies in Somalia, federalism promotes a more useful political settlement with regards to existing regional entities such as Puntland and Somaliland. As Ethiopia itself is a federal state, it may have a political interest to see another federal state as a neighbor (Interview with IGAD official three). This difference was reflected in the Somali peace conferences. In Arta, under the influence of the government of Djibouti, a unitary form of government was adopted. However, in Eldoret, because of Ethiopian pressure, the conference endorsed a federal system of governance for Somalia. Although the Eldoret Declaration called for a federal sys-

tem, several faction leaders claimed that they signed under pressure from the Technical Committee, mainly Ethiopia. This proves that there is no consensus on federalism both in IGAD and among other delegates who have signed the Eldoret Declaration (Interview with AAU academician four).

Representation

The other source of difference in the Somalia peacemaking approach was the selection of local actors as a foundation for establishing a viable state. The peace initiatives endorsed by IGAD selected different actors at different peace conferences. At Sodere, the main actors were the Somali warlords. After that, in 1998, IGAD followed an approach called building blocks, by taking the existing autonomous regions such as Puntland and Somaliland as bases to install a working federal government in Somalia. In Arta, the main emphasis shifted to Somalia civil society and clan leaders by excluding the warlords. In Eldoret the warlords and clans were at the center of the peace process. During the Djibouti peace process, moderate Islamic groups were given special emphasis (Interview with IGAD official one).

As a result of selecting different actors at different peace conferences, IGAD has suffered from inclusivity problems. In theory, IGAD says that its processes are inclusive, but in reality they are not (Interview with AAU academician two). The talks could not involve all Somali actors—warlords, clan leaders, members of civil society, business community, and Islamist groups—by recognizing their role for peacemaking in Somalia. For instance, though various Islamist groups have been active in Somalia since the collapse of the Barre regime, they were not well recognized as important actors in the peace processes until 2008.

There were a number of Islamist movements during the Eldoret peace conference that were actively involved in the provision of social services. However, the Eldoret peace process denied them any place and role. This is due to the lack of comfort from the members of IGAD, particularly Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda. The so-called moderate Islamist groups were recognized and represented for the first time during the Djibouti peace process, organized under the auspicious of the UN. The process is not inclusive, however, since president Sharif was given a

power to select half of the parliamentarians, causing dissatisfaction among the clan leaders and business community (ICG 2003).

The business community, which is powerful in Mogadishu and southern Somalia, was not invited to many of the peace processes, including the Eldoret and Djibouti conferences. Business people command resources and have private security forces. These businesses never paid taxes and if governments were established, they would have to start paying, which was obviously against their wishes. As a result, they were against many peace initiatives (Interview with Somali analyst three).

The other criticism related to the lack of inclusivity of the peace conferences deals with absence of a mechanism to actively engage the Somali population. As the peace processes were held outside Somalia, IGAD should have developed a mechanism of reaching out to the Somali population. There was no organized and effective effort to make the larger population the owner of the peace processes. This has exposed the people to be victims of the discontented groups (Interview with Somali analyst three).

Although IGAD peace processes tried to bring groups together like elders and religious leaders, the mandate of such groups was not clear. At Eldoret the leaders raised a lot of questions related to representations. Even if they were involved, they were usually bribed by the powerful actors in Somalia, which erodes their credibility as reliable forces of peace (Interview with AAU academician two). The issue of inclusivity, therefore, remains a challenge in Somalia. The presence of various equally competent and antagonistic stakeholders in Somalia made it difficult for IGAD to launch an all inclusive peace initiative. Moreover, the member states' urge to deal with selected groups or individuals who could promote their interest further complicated the issue of representation.

2.4.4. The Limited Capacity of the Secretariat of IGAD

Despite its broad mandate, the revitalized IGAD was not provided with sufficient capacity, resources, and political commitment (Healy 2009). The IGAD Secretariat is weak with only few professional and administrative staff (Interview with AAU academician one).

Lack of Sufficient Political Will

In terms of peace and security, the role of the IGAD Secretariat is marginalized. The Secretariat does not influence decisions. It just implements decisions taken by the Council of Ministers and the Assembly. There were even times when the Secretariat did not attend the meetings of the Council of Ministers (Interview with Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official). In the whole Somali peace process—both before and during Eldoret—one barely saw the role of the Secretariat and the Executive Secretary of IGAD. The front line states were in charge of the management of the peace processes.

Some observers argue that member states do not want to see IGAD as a strong regional organization. They all want to use the organization as a forefront to promote their agenda. According to Sally Healy,

The IGAD peace initiatives ... were political initiatives conceived and largely executed by one or more member states. The mediation was not entrusted to the IGAD Secretariat, which had neither the capacity nor the authority to lead and manage the peace processes that were carried out in its name (2009, 11).

There are, however, observers who argue that IGAD does not need an elaborate structure. Rather, what it needs is a lean structure. According to these observers, IGAD should only implement the decisions undertaken by member states. Its institutional capacity is, therefore, seen as adequate to fulfill its mandate (Interview with AAU academician four). This shows that there are divergent opinions as regards the role the organization should play.

Year	Amount (US\$)
2000	3,895,629
2001	3,999,408
2002	4,934,519
2003	6,107,245
2004	5,674,129
2005	7,165,158
2006	7,430,921

Table 4: Total accumulated unpaid Contributions of the IGAD member states from 2000-2006

Source: This table is computed based on the annual financial report of the IGAD Secretariat

IGAD also suffers from the dual membership of most of its member states, which at the same time belong to other regional organizations. This divides their focus and reduces their commitment to IGAD. Uganda and Kenya are members of the East African Community (EAC) and all IGAD members except Somalia are members of COMESA. Moreover, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Sudan are members of the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) (IGAD 2008).

Financial Constraints

IGAD lacks the necessary institutional capacity to play a significant role in Somalia's peace processes. IGAD has been dependent on donors, mainly the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), comprising donor states and organizations, to execute its projects. The operational cost of IGAD, however, has been covered by member states' contribution. Except for Ethiopia the other IGAD member states do not pay a substantial amount of their contributions. As a result, IGAD faces serious financial constraints.

The above table indicates that, except for 2004, the total accumulated unpaid contributions of the IGAD member states has been increasing since 2000, creating a financial burden both for the Secretariat and the member states and affecting the operational capacity of IGAD. There is a general perception that the current staff is insufficient to effectively manage the magnitude of IGAD's vision and mission. The IGAD Facilitator's Office for Somalia Peace and Reconciliation has only four professional staff and the total IGAD staff members are not more than thirty (Interview with IGAD official three). One of the biggest challenges in IGAD is that the recruitment process takes a very long time (Interview with IPF official; IGAD 2001, 30).

The prevalence of poverty, ongoing conflicts within and between member states and lack of political commitment are often mentioned as reasons for the accumulation of the financial arrears. Moreover, member states themselves are dependent on external assistance to carry out their own development programs.

IPF's Contribution

Established in 1997, the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) works closely with the Secretariat through financing some

projects and peace processes. However, the IPF is not providing sufficient financial support and when it does, the financial resources do not come in time as every country has its own conditionalities and requirements. This limits IGAD's independence and ownership of initiatives (Interview with AAU academician two). Some observers argue that the IPF tacitly influences decisions as they always have their agenda (Interview with AAU academician three). IGAD initiatives get acceptance and financial support if they are in line with the donors' interests. In most cases, IGAD's programs are planned with the hope that donors would provide financial support. However, another IGAD source claims that the IPF is neutral (Interview with IGAD official three).

According to IPF, the reluctance to fund some projects is due to issues such as conflicts among member states, huge unpaid membership arrears, lack of a clear strategy, and a small secretariat that does not have the capacity to monitor the implementation of huge projects (IGAD 2001, 27). According to a source from IPF, most IPF members are also skeptical about IGAD's role as a whole. "The organization is perceived to be dominated by Ethiopia to promote its interests in the region. The objective of Uganda and Kenya is neither clear as they are more loyal to the East African Community" (Interview with IPF official).

Nor does IGAD's location in Djibouti give the IGAD secretariat the image and profile required for a regional organization. Most donors are based in Addis Ababa. Meetings are always held outside of Djibouti (IGAD 2001, 31). This led to the shelving of important projects, programs, and peace initiatives. It can be said that IGAD is an institution that suffers due to aid dependency. In a nutshell, the member states do not commit or are unable to commit national financial resources. Subsequently, IGAD is unable to operate with its full capacity, which contributes to its weakness as an organization.

Weaknesses of IGAD Secretariat

Apart from the issues of capacity, resources, and political will, the IGAD Secretariat itself shows significant weaknesses. The peace process on Somalia is said to be inadequately documented and managed. The secretariat failed to provide appropriate conference services, especially during the Eldoret peace process. This, according to the ICG, posed the greatest threat to the success of the

process (ICG 2002, 6). Furthermore, the IGAD staff was perceived to have been more loyal to their national government than to IGAD, thus affecting the organizational activities (IGAD 2001, 30).

The Executive Secretary has also been unable to emerge as a strong and unbiased peace negotiator in Somalia in the past two decades, partly because it lacks authority and the inherent weakness of the institution (Interview with AAU academician three). The name of the Executive Secretary is rarely mentioned during peace processes. Instead the names of countries are always heard, illustrating the less important role of the Executive Secretary (Interview with AAU academician two).

There is another view that justifies the existing role of the Executive Secretary. According to this observation, the Executive Secretary gets instructions from the Council of Ministers. When instructions are given, the Executive Secretary can maneuver within bounds. However, the secretariat can only work within the mandate given by its member states. Hence, the front line states definitely have taken most of the initiatives and are more involved (Interview with AAU academician four). However, it seems clear that whatever the role given to the Executive Secretary, he should be an energetic and influential actor in the regional peace making processes. In general, the absence of a strong, efficient, and impartial organization made the Somali peace process a source of political strife among the IGAD member states.

2.4.5. The Neutrality and Enforcement Capacity of IGAD

IGAD's Enforcement Capacity

IGAD has not been able to successfully implement its decisions. IGAD usually issues communiqués. Nonetheless, it is not often taken seriously even by the members themselves (Interview with AAU academician three). And even when they do, they have financial and other constraints. There is a tendency of enforcement on issues that are less sensitive and political, such as environment and health issues (Interview with AAU academician one). And, most of the decisions of IGAD are accepted by non-members, if they are in line with their own interests (Interview with AAU academician four).

IGAD itself is highly divided internally and members give priority to their own narrow national interests. During the previous peace processes on Somalia, Somali politicians, academicians, and their diaspora did not often endorse IGAD's decisions further undermining its role (Interview with AAU academician two).

The Issue of neutrality

Many observers argue that IGAD is not neutral because of the divergent and conflicting interests the member states have in Somalia. Since all the members reflect different interests and hence support different groups, it has seriously compromised the neutrality of IGAD. Members, for example, were informally screening the participants who would take part in the Somali peace processes to make sure that their interests were represented (Interview with AAU academician three).

The results of the Somali peace processes are often viewed as the outcomes of the front-line states, not IGAD. During the Arta peace conference, the President of Djibouti had handpicked the members of the Somali Parliament; thus, TNG was largely seen as a creation of Djibouti.

There is also a perceived dominance of Ethiopia in relation to the IGAD's peace processes in Somalia. It sponsored the Sodere peace conference in 1996 and international consultative meetings on Somalia in the late 1990s. In these conferences Ethiopia played an important role and is also said to have worked hard to see the emergence of a friendly government from the Eldoret process. This later created a widespread sense that the government of Abdulahi Yusuf is too close to Ethiopia (Interview with AAU academician two; and see ICG 2003, 13).

Ethiopia also managed to successfully galvanize the endorsement of all IGAD members—except Eritrea—for its intervention in Somalia (Interview with Ethiopian Foreign Ministry official). IGAD's support to the Ethiopian intervention had faced strong opposition from Eritrea, which claimed that IGAD is partial to Ethiopia and the US. Eritrea suspended its IGAD membership in 2007.

According to some observers, Ethiopia was instrumental in IGAD condemning Eritrea as an aggressor of Somalia. Some observers are of the opinion that IGAD should not have rushed to call for sanctions on Eritrea, arguing that should be inclusive and that it is a mistake to isolate Eritrea (Interview with German Institute for International and

Security Affairs informant). Others argue that IGAD has been trying to bring Eritrea on board but so far it has been in vain, because of the reluctance of President Issayas Afewerki.

All these observers note that Ethiopia influences the decisions of IGAD on Somalia. Some could justify this as Somalia's stateless situation threatens the security of Ethiopia (Interview with AFP correspondent). Others see it as undermining the role and credibility of IGAD. Therefore, they argue that Ethiopia's role in IGAD has to change (Interview with German Institute for International and Security Affairs informant). In short, the perceived lack of neutrality exacerbates the disunity among member states of IGAD and makes the Somali crisis more complex to address (MOFA 2009).

2.4.6. Lack of Regional Policy on Peace and Security

The Somali peace processes exposed IGAD's lack of a comprehensive regional peace and security policy to address the fundamental causes of regional crises. IGAD does not yet have a common policy and objective on regional security issues, although a draft strategy has been debated for some time now (Interview with IGAD official two). The attempts within IGAD to forge a common approach to conflict resolution have focused more on revitalization of the organization than on common security policy and strategy. Priority is given to short-term political gains.

The absence of political values such as democracy, respect for human rights, tolerance for diversity as well as weak economic bondage are the factors that hamper the development of common policy (Medhane 2003, 101–102). In addition, most states in the region have not completed their state formation. Therefore, territorial problems proliferate, causing inter- and intrastate conflicts that impact the entire region. Furthermore, there is no hegemonic power. This obstructs the establishment of a comprehensive peace and security structure (Interview with AAU academician two).

Some observers argue that the members are not ready and willing to have a common peace and security policy. This view is vindicated when the IGAD Council of Ministers rejected the comprehensive peace and security strategy, which was prepared over a period of more than three years (Interview with AAU academician one).

2.4.7. Lack of Sufficient and Appropriate International Commitment

The international community shows a lack of interest in the Somali crisis. This is particularly true after the Black Hawk Down incident, in which eighteen US marines were killed. Somalia has been "forgotten" by the International Community (Bush 1997).

Somalia attracts the attention of international actors not for its state failure per se, but when it becomes the source of global insecurity. The US government was highly involved in Somalia because of its fear that Somalia would be a safe haven for international terrorists. The involvement of the Bush administration under its war on terror banner went to the extent of financing and arming the warlords in 2006 who were defeated by the UIC.

The piracy problem along the coast of Somalia also attracted the attention of the big powers, thus putting the issue of Somalia piracy on the global agenda. When it comes to an issue that poses a direct threat to their interests, the global powers have acted quickly and collectively by deploying their naval forces along the coast of Somalia. As mentioned earlier, the European Union alone spends US\$80 million annually for the operation Atalanta, mandated to deter, prevent, and repress acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia. The international community's net direct financial support to the TFG II in 2009 is, however, only US\$3 million (Interview with German Institute for International and Security Affairs informant).

The international community demonstrated less interest in the IGAD-led peace process on Somalia. The TNG, which was the result of the Arta peace process, was not recognized by the US and the EU. In Eldoret, the EU and the US—despite their modest financial contributions—remained largely less engaged diplomatically. And, the UN, represented by a Special Representative of the Secretary General, kept a low profile. This coupled with lack of interest from the Security Council, made the role of the UN only symbolic and limited to keeping track of the process. The huge financial debt of the Eldoret conference is a clear instance of the lack of international support to the IGAD-led peace process.

IGAD also failed to deploy IGASOM, partly due to absence of political and financial support from the international community. The Bush administration did not support the proposal and lifting of the arms embargo,

although the United Nations provided the necessary exemption in December 2006 (Dagne 2009). Hence it took the TFG two years to come to Mogadishu (Interview with IGAD official one).

This lack of international support for the responses to the Somali crisis is strikingly evident when one looks at the kind of political and financial backing the international community provided to the Southern Sudan peace process, which became successful under the auspices of IGAD. “Unlike IGAD’s Sudan peace process, which was going on in parallel, neither the US nor other Western powers were actively involved in the mediation process at Eldoret” (Healy 2009, 10).

Since the establishment of the TFG II, the international community has been greatly interested in providing support mainly for the security sector (Interview with German Institute for International and Security Affairs informant). According to Somali Analyst one, Somalis do not need weapons and arms, they already have enough. He added that the TFG II could have “bought” legitimacy if they were well financed by the international community (Interview with Somali analyst one). Nonetheless, direct financial assistance remains insignificant.

The international community places accountability as a precondition to providing the required assistance. The donors always make excuses not to give money, says an AFP correspondent (Interview with IGAD official four). He added that the TFG II was forced to engage with PricewaterhouseCoopers accounting firm to install a mechanism of financial accountability and transparency. But later, the donors rejected the proposal on the basis that the firm is not a Somali-based organization. Without providing sufficient support, the international community expects the TFG II to expand its territories, build its capacity, and engage with the radicals (Interview with EU official). According to some observers, the international community lacks patience to make long-term commitment in Somalia.

2.5. IGAD, the AU, and the UN

IGAD has established a liaison office to the AU, mainly to work together with the departments of peace and security, political affairs, and economic affairs. IGAD, through its liaison office in Addis Ababa attends the meetings of the AU Peace and Security Council. In the meetings, the office gives information about the common positions of

IGAD. Subsequently the Liaison Office facilitates interaction between the two organizations. On several occasions the resolutions of IGAD have been adopted by the AU, promoting policy harmonization (Interview with IGAD official six).

To institutionalize its relations, IGAD has signed a memorandum of understanding with the AU and other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to coordinate peace and security activities in 2008. IGAD and the AU had shown a considerable level of coordination when the AMISOM was deployed (Interview with AAU academician three).

IGAD, through its Facilitator’s Office holds monthly coordination meetings in Nairobi with the AU and the UN. They share information and agree on next steps or strategies. They also assign activities to avoid duplication of work (Interview with IGAD official three). During the meetings member states are represented by their resident ambassadors. IGAD decisions regarding Somalia are becoming more and more relevant and accepted by the UN.

Chapter Three: The Role of the African Union and the United Nations

3.1. The Role of the AU

The AU as well as its predecessor the OAU hardly played a significant role in addressing the state collapse in Somalia. There have been fifteen peace initiatives with the view of forming a functioning central government. None of them, however, was sponsored by the OAU/AU. Subsequently, it is safe to conclude that the OAU/AU was not a leading actor in Somalia affairs until recently. It is pertinent to say that it has been limited in endorsing the decisions of the regional organization, IGAD, other initiatives taken by the UN and member states. As IGAD is taken as one of the five building blocks of the AU, it could be argued that the AU endorses the decisions of IGAD that promote policy coordination and harmonization.

3.1.1. Background to AMISOM

Nonetheless, the AU has been actively involved in Somalia since 2007 by sending peacekeeping troops. The Ethiopian government strongly pushed for the deployment of the AU peacekeeping force in order to be able to withdraw its own troops from Somalia. The US also lobbied and gave incentives to the African countries to contribute to AMISOM (ICG 2008).

Mandate of AMISOM

The African Union Peace and Security Council, in its 69th meeting of January 19, 2007, mandated the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to:

- support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stake holders,
- provide, as appropriate, protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and their key infrastructure, to enable them carry out their functions,
- provide, within capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts,
- monitor, in areas of deployment of its forces, the security situation,

- assist in the implementation of the national security and stabilization plan of Somalia, particularly the effective reestablishment and training of all inclusive Somali security forces,
- facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation of refugees and the resettlement of IDPs, and
- protect its personnel, installations and equipment, including the right to self defense (AU Communiqué 2007).

The mandate did not include the protection of civilians. The intensification of the attacks caused the flight of one third of Mogadishu's population within four months. The mission does not provide strong humanitarian support to the people; they only give medicines and first aid to some people including wounded government forces.

3.1.2. AMISOM in Somalia

AMISOM has been struggling in Somalia since its deployment. It has been constantly attacked by the insurgents. AMISOM's "identification with the TFG and by extension the Ethiopians had made it constant target of attacks" (ICG 2008, 12). The most deadly of all was the suicide attack on its base in September 2009, which claimed the lives of twenty-one AMISOM troops, including the deputy chief of the command (AU Representative for Somalia 2009). The AU special envoy Nicholas Bwakira stated on November 25, 2009 that AMISOM lost eighty of its troops since its deployment (Peace Operations Working Group 2009). Some say if Al-Shabaab had anti-tank weapons, the casualties would have been worse and AMISOM would not have survived for even a day.

Lack of political progress is also another cause of concern for AMISOM. Some argue that the deployment of any peacekeeping force should be preceded by an inclusive peace agreement and consensus among major parties to the conflict, which unfortunately is not the case for AMISOM. The Djibouti peace agreement was rejected by the major opposition groups, hence by implication they are against the deployment of foreign troops in Somalia. The political situation neither showed progress since the establishment of the GNU.

The mission also suffers from lack of sufficient staff and resources. At the African Union Summit in late January 2007, several African countries including Ghana, Nigeria, Burundi, Uganda, and Malawi pledged to contribute

troops for a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Out of the 8,000 troops authorized by the Peace and Security Council, to date only 5,217 troops from Burundi and Uganda have been deployed. The remaining states pledging troops have yet to convert their words into action (Amnesty International 2010).

The security situation in Somalia caused reluctance among states contributing troops—particularly Nigeria and Ghana (Hull and Svensson 2008, 28). In addition, they have delayed their contribution for reasons related to financial and logistical difficulties. Some also don't have interest in what is going on in a country that is very far away from their own (Interview with AU official three). Other countries had already committed peacekeeping troops elsewhere in Africa, such as Darfur and Congo. AMISOM is, therefore, understaffed.

According to some observers, those states that contributed troops also lack full commitment to the Somali peace process. Uganda is said to be sending troops with the aim of raising its status in the region, gaining financial and logistic support, and creating business connections in Somalia. Burundi considers the peacekeeping mission as part of its demilitarization and demobilization program (Interview with Oxfam official). The Ugandan and Burundi peoples are against the mission and it is very difficult for the governments to sustain the deployment (Interview with German Institute for International and Security Affairs informant). This evidently affects the effectiveness of the mission.

In addition to being understaffed, the mission also continues to face financial and logistical constraints (Hull and Svensson 2008, 31). The annual budget of AMISOM is estimated to be US\$622 million. As of January 2008, AMISOM has received only US\$32 million (Peace and Security Council of the AU 2008). Its troops have not been regularly paid. The Ugandan troops, for instance, were not paid for six months in 2009 (Peace Operations Working Group 2009). However, new pledges have been made by EU and the Arab League for EUR60 million and US\$18 million respectively, to support AMISOM.

AMISOM also lacks strong popular support. AMISOM is the lifeline of the TFG II, so it is not regarded as neutral (Hull and Svensson 2008, 21). Some observers argue that, at the beginning, AMISOM was considered neutral, but after it engaged in a series of combat operations with insurgents, it has been accused of indiscriminate attacks and shelling, resulting in its credibility being eroded (Interview with AFP correspondent).

AMISOM structures of command and control are not yet clear and the command has been without cohesion as “the AU only issues guidelines to national contingents serving the mission” (Hull and Svensson 2008, 21). This obviously hampers the effectiveness of the mission and its capacity to successfully discharge its mandate.

As a result of its limited staff and resources, AMISOM only provides VIP escort, within its immediate area of operation to ensure the protection of the airport, seaport, Kilometer 4, and villa Somalia, which hosts the President. Furthermore, it provides limited humanitarian support to the local population—medical support and water—as well as on-demand escort for humanitarian organizations.

In general, the underfinanced and understaffed AMISOM is not playing the role expected to play. Although the resolution authorizing AMISOM formulated an expectation that the UN would take over the responsibility for the mission within six months, the UN has been unwilling to do so without a comprehensive peace plan. The UNSC has, therefore, extended the mandate of AMISOM several times. On February 4, 2010, the UNSC extended AMISOM's mandate to January 31, 2011 (Interviews with Ali Wahad Abdullahi and AFP correspondent).

Despite the criticism leveled against AMISOM and its drawbacks, the AMISOM troops have taken the risk where others—especially the West—avoided for a long time, which should be recognized. The peacekeeping forces are paying blood in Somalia. Some argue that if it was not for their support, the TFG II itself would not have survived a single day in Mogadishu. AMISOM is also providing training to the TFG II armed forces. It is planning to train 6,000 troops by the end of 2006. If accomplished it is said to boost security in the areas controlled by the government. Moreover, the mission provides limited humanitarian support to the people; it provides medicines and first aid to some people including wounded government forces (Interviews with Ali Wahad Abdullahi and AFP correspondent).

3.2. The Role of the UN in Somalia

The history of the UN's involvement in Somalia is extremely complex and has left a legacy of mistrust between Somalis and international partners. The overall perception of the UN in Somalia is negative (UN 2009, 3). Soon after the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, the UN sent two peacekeeping forces, UNSOM I and UNSOM II.

After eighteen US marines were killed, the UN peace keepers left Somalia without restoring peace and stability. This failure has had a huge impact on the role of the UN in Somalia. The decision not to deploy a peace-keeping force is still greatly and negatively influenced by the failure of the Blue Helmets in the early 1990s.

The UN also tried to sponsor a peace conference in the early 1990s, which failed without any tangible result. After this, the UN remained more or less passive in Somali affairs except in engaging in humanitarian activities.

3.2.1. The United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS)

Following the failure of the UN peacekeepers to bring stability to Somalia, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) was established on April 15, 1995 to promote the cause of peace and reconciliation through contacts in Somalia, including Somali leaders, civic organizations, the neighboring states, and other concerned organizations.

UNPOS is a political mission, supported and overseen by the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA). The Head of the office is the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Somalia, who closely monitors the situation in and relating to Somalia and assists the Secretary-General in providing periodic briefings and written reports to the Security Council every four months. UNPOS also provides political guidance to the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator of the UN agencies (UNPOS).

UNPOS has supported initiatives by states in the region to promote peace and national reconciliation in Somalia. In this regard, it has supported the Arta and the Eldoret peace conferences. Recently, it has organized the Djibouti peace process, which led to the formation of the current government in Somalia (UNSC 2009).

Since August 2007, Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah has been the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Somalia. The Office is working in Nairobi due to the difficult security situation in Mogadishu. However, the head of the UNPOS has promised to open an office in Mogadishu as soon as possible (MOFA 2009).

The Current Strategy of the UN in Somalia

The objectives of the United Nations in Somalia are based on three tracks. The political track aims to assist the TFG II in building support for the peace process in Somalia and broadening the base of the unity government through dialogue and reconciliation. Under this track, the UN also intends to build the capacity of the local administrations, to support the drafting of a constitution and to integrate human rights issues into all aspects of the peace process.

On the security track, the UN assists the TFG II in creating security conditions. Here, the priority is to build local security forces with the view of raising the legitimacy and credibility of the TFG II forces. Finally, the UN continues to provide humanitarian services including health, education, and water under its recovery track (UN 2009).

3.2.2. The UN Support to the TFG II

The Djibouti Peace Process under the UN

The Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General for Somalia, Ahmediou Ould Abdallah, negotiated a peace accord between the TFG and the ARS-D in Djibouti from of August 14–19, 2008. The agreement provides, among others for:

- the cessation of armed confrontation for an initial period of ninety days renewable,
- the submission of a request to the United Nations for it to authorize and deploy, within 120 days, an international stabilization force from countries that are friends of Somalia, excluding neighboring states,
- the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops from Somalia after the deployment of a sufficient number of United Nations forces,
- the commitment of both parties to undertake all necessary measures to ensure unhindered access and assistance to affected population and,
- the establishment of a Joint Security Committee (JSC) and a High Level Committee (HLC) to follow up on the implementation of security arrangements and issues relating to political cooperation between the parties, justice and reconciliation (Peace and Security Council of the AU 2008, 1).

UNPOS is helping the TFG II establish an effective mechanism to get financial support from the international com-

munity and use the finance appropriately. The international community is demanding that the TFG II establish a financial system for accountability purposes. UNPOS is helping the government establish such mechanisms (Interview with UNPOS official one). As has been discussed in the previous sections, the international community's direct financial support to the TFG II is, however, insignificant.

UNPOS also works closely with the Joint Security Committee in coordinating and facilitating training and logistics provided by various actors for the TFG II's security forces. The JSC, however, provides limited coordination (Interview with UNPOS official two). In addition, the joint security meeting has only been held once, in October 2008, since the establishment of the TFG II. According to some observers, the meeting was done simply to convince the donor community (Interview with AFP correspondent).

The UNPOS also encourages the TFG II to engage in further dialogue with various groups like Al-Sunna Wal-Jama (Interview with UNPOS official two). So far, there have not been any negotiation between the TFG II and Al-Shabaab. According to some observers, UNPOS has no interest in pushing the TFG II to negotiate with the so-called terrorists (Interview with Somali Analyst one). Moreover, the entire Djibouti process, which gave birth to the TFG II, was not representative since President Sharif was given a chance to select 50 percent of the Parliament (Interview with AFP correspondent). Some argue that the SRSG, Ahmedou OuldAbdallah wanted a "quick fix" and wanted to maintain his credibility (Interview with Ethiopian Foreign Ministry official). He neglected the clan elders and the clan leadership council and other important stakeholders in Somalia.

The Possible Deployment of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Somalia

After the Ethiopian intervention, the US has been determined to see the deployment of the UN peacekeepers in Somalia. Nonetheless, the UN Secretariat, after an assessment of the security and political development in Somalia, recommended the following:

The deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation directly, at this stage, would be a high-risk option. In the prevailing security circumstances, deployment will

require a substantial, robust military component that has full capacity to protect itself and to preserve a secure environment. Given the divergent view among the main Somali political players, as well as the attitude of groups that remain outside the Djibouti process, such an operation could trigger opposition from substantial elements of the Somali society opposed to international military intervention (UN 2009, 15).

The report of the UN Secretary General also argues that the Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam would find a new foreign enemy to intensify the insurgency. This could result in attacks against the blue helmets drawing them into the civil war. In addition, the deployment of the UN peacekeepers would undermine the GNU by associating it with external intervention (UN 2009, 15). The ICG also agrees with the assessment of the Secretariat. It is of the strong opinion that the UN peacekeepers should be deployed in support of a comprehensive and working peace accord not in advance of it (ICG 2008, 20).

The previous US administration wanted to see the deployment of the UN troops in Somalia. The other members of the Security Council have followed the recommendation of the Secretary-General and preferred not to authorize the deployment of the UN peacekeeping forces in Somalia, at least, given the current situation (ICG 2008, 20).

3.2.3. The UN Support to AMISOM

As the deployment of UN forces became controversial, the UN chose to follow the option of strengthening AMISOM while building Somalia's security institution. According to the Report of the Secretary General,

The United Nations would continue its support to AMISOM, helping AMISOM to build its troops strength to the authorized level of 8,000 and strengthening the capacity of AMISOM to continue to secure strategic installations and provide a security backbone in the capital until the national security force is able to assume full responsibility for security in Mogadishu (UN 2009, 15).

Subsequently, the UN provides financial, logistical, and technical assistance to the AMISOM. The UN dispatched ten military, police, and civilian experts to the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa to assist the AMISOM in plan-

ning and management (UN 2009, 15). The UN also provides logistical support to the mission through The UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA).

The UN convened a donors' conference on the of April 23, 2008 in Brussels to solicit contributions both for AMISOM and the Somali transitional security institutions. The donors have pledged US\$200 million (Interview with IGAD official four). The AU and the UN have also signed a Memorandum of Understanding to establish the necessary institutional framework. This MOU provides the necessary oversight and accountability mechanism between the two organizations.

The United Nations Trust Fund for AMISOM channels financial assistance from donors to the African Union and AMISOM troop contributing countries, for troop reimbursement and procuring contingent equipments. The United Nations Trust Fund for the Somali Security Forces channels financial assistance to the Somali authorities in support of the strengthening of the Somali national forces.

Conclusion

Somalia has been in constant turmoil since 1991. The complexity of the problem, led to at least fifteen failed peace processes. The region and the international communities that have been affected by the prolonged crisis have tried various and sometimes contradictory solutions to resolve it.

IGAD has been constantly engaged with the Somali problem since the 1990s. Throughout the 1990s, it mandated its member states especially Ethiopia and Djibouti, to deal with the issue. IGAD has also taken common positions by endorsing initiatives taken by member states during this period. IGAD played a relatively visible role during the Eldorat peace process, which gave birth to the TFG in 2004. IGAD member states have exerted considerable energy, time, and resources to deal with the conflict in Somalia.

Despite the series of efforts that IGAD member states have made to solve the conflict in Somalia, they often became part of the problem. The rivalry and conflict between member states extended into Somalia and aggravated the situation. Member states' contradictory approaches to dealing with the Somali issue also hampered IGAD from taking a common position. The issue of neutrality often caused antagonism among the members, affecting IGAD's capacity to deal with the Somalia issue.

Actually, IGAD played a limited role in resolving the Somalia conflict because it neither has an institutional capacity nor the authority to deal effectively with the problem. IGAD's institutional capacity is affected by unpaid financial arrears. Most of the IGAD member states did not pay their contributions in time. Its dependence on foreign donors prevents it from having enough funds and maintaining its independence. The organization has also been suffering from the lack of a regional power asserting its role in the region.

IGAD is a reflection of its member states, which are engulfed in inter- and intrastate conflicts. They have had a history of intervening in the internal affairs of one another, supporting rebel groups, and spoiling their relations. These conflicts have simply paralyzed IGAD from playing a meaningful role in Somalia. Moreover, poverty, environmental degradation, proliferation of small arms, terrorism, refugees, and pandemics are the features of the IGAD member states. These factors have further affected IGAD's capacity to focus on Somali conflict.

The African Union has also been actively engaged with the Somali conflict since it deployed peacekeeping troops in 2007. Despite deadly attacks from the insurgents, AMISOM has been protecting the TFG II and providing limited humanitarian support. The mission, however, has been challenged by the lack of sufficient staff as well as financial and logistics support. Neither is the international community fully committed to deliver the pledged support. In spite of these problems, AMISOM has continued to operate in Somalia.

The UN, which withdrew from Somalia since its failed military intervention, has shown some renewed interest by sponsoring the Djibouti peace process and granting limited assistance to the TFG II to ensure that it remains in power. Currently, its support has been limited to the political and security arena, leaving the issue of peacekeeping to AMISOM.

Despite various efforts made by regional and international organizations, the situation in Somalia remains precarious. Somalia still lacks a well functioning government with the sufficient capacity to provide security and basic services to the people. The TFG II remains weak and it is limited to some parts of Mogadishu. The radical Islamic groups—Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam—continue to threaten the very existence of an internationally backed government by waging a series of attacks and controlling most of the central and southern territories of Somalia. The situation in Somalia, therefore, has reached a critical stage, requiring coordinated and long-term engagement and commitment of regional and international organizations.

Recommendations

- IGAD is weak—politically, financially, and institutionally. Though its member states have shown commitment in dealing with the issue of Somalia, IGAD had limited authority to actively and effectively deal with the Somali conflict. The chances for it to be strong in the near future are limited, given the prevalent intra- and interstate conflicts among its member states. The member states should be willing to resolve their differences according to international law and practices. In this regard, the IGAD Secretariat, especially the Executive Secretary, should strive to resolve the rivalry by creating a forum for discussion and convincing regional and international actors to help reduce regional tensions. Relations characterized by mutual respect, trust, and peaceful coexistence will be a great boost in enabling IGAD to effectively address regional challenges including the Somali conflict.
- IGAD's activities and peace initiatives on Somalia have been affected by financial constraints. The Horn of Africa region is plagued by poverty and conflicts. This, however, should not be taken as an excuse. IGAD member states should be committed to see their organization earn the respect and support it deserves from the international community, by setting an example. There is no other way but to strengthen the capacity of IGAD by providing unreserved political and financial support to enable it to play its expected role.
- The IGAD Secretariat does not have sufficient staff members and lacks the necessary institutional capacity to deal with regional problems such as the Somali conflict. The Facilitator's Office has only few professionals at its service. IGAD should, therefore, strengthen links with various academic and research institutions to fill the gap and make its decisions, recommendations and initiatives more viable and credible.
- The Somali conflict is very complex and difficult to deal with, since there are various stakeholders and actors engaged in it. Neither do the prospects seem promising as various groups—including radical Islamists, clan militias and warlords, supported by external actors—continue to jostle for power and control key towns, ports, and airports. The issues of land, justice, and clan remain a bottleneck for peace initiatives. The conflict is, therefore, beyond the current capacity of IGAD. It thus requires more efficient institutional strength as well as a multilateral and long-term engagement by all

concerned actors. IGAD should take note of this fact and devise a strategy in consultation with the AU and the UN to work for a viable solution, create a sense of ownership, and avoid suspicion. By doing so, it could also easily solicit financial support for its initiatives.

- If IGAD were non-existent, we would have talked about the need to set up a regional organization to address the regional problems in a concerted manner. The international community should not only focus on the negative sides of IGAD. Its consistent efforts, with limited capacity, should be acknowledged. Future initiatives should be encouraged and built upon as the Somali crisis continues to pose a threat to international security.
- The international community should also come to the understanding that complex regional problems can only be addressed through a strong and reliable organization. In this respect, strengthening IGAD is the best available option to facilitate regional peace and development. With this objective the donors have to render their financial support without any further delay or condition. Piracy should also be taken as an opportunity to push the support of the international community for Somalia.
- AMISOM is too understaffed and underresourced to fully discharge its mandate. The possibility of having additional troops remains low due to the volatile security in Somalia, and the lack of financial and political commitment. AMISOM is struggling to keep its personnel and government officials safe. The risk of getting attacked by the radicals is high as there are allegations that the TFG II is infiltrated.
- Despite all the challenges, AMISOM will continue its mission in Somalia. As long as there is a perceived threat from the radical Islamic groups, the international community is supportive of the TFG II; the dominant belief given the current situation is that there is no better alternative other than the current government. Therefore, providing financial and logistical support to reach AMISOM's mandated size, and fully discharge its responsibilities is urgently needed from the international community. AMISOM's mandate should not, however, be expanded to include the rules of engagement. AMISOM should avoid civilian casualties as much as possible. Lack of progress on the ground might frustrate AMISOM, hence the TFG II security forces should be strengthened.
- The UN is taking a lead in the Somali peace process, which is commendable after a long period of disengagement. It should however, be more committed to ensure its sustenance. It should look for long-term engagements and commit sufficient resources. The possibility of deploying UN blue helmets remains very low, but the UN should continue to strengthen AMISOM in terms of planning, logistics, and finance and simultaneously should try to bring various groups to the governing coalition to make the TFG II, its brain child, more representative and credible. Deploying UN peacekeeping forces is also not advisable, given the current insecurity, considering the history of UN missions in Somalia, and the difficulty of managing multinational forces. Finally, any peacekeeping mission has to go hand in hand with a viable and all-encompassing peace process.

Selected Recommendations

- The TFG II is not shining anymore. Its institutions are dysfunctional and some of its leaders are said to be opportunists. But, it should be noted that it has only been one year since its establishment. It has survived in Mogadishu, despite deadly attacks from Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. In the short term, the TFG II's security apparatus and institutions should be strengthened. IGAD member states should continue their support in terms of training, finance, and logistics. But, it has to be done with precaution and full coordination. The recruitment of TFG II forces to be trained, for instance, should be carefully selected to avoid desertion and infiltration by the Al-Shabaab. IGAD member states and the TFG II should also strengthen their intelligence to identify and apprehend hard core elements of the Al-Shabaab.
- Following a one-sided militaristic approach alone, however, could exacerbate the situation. The TFG should seriously engage with various actors and expand its governing coalition. It should strengthen its ties and negotiate power-sharing with various clans and groups as it did with Al-Sunna Wal-Jama. More effort should also be exerted in bringing all actors including those who allied with Al-Shabaab for tactical reasons and are willing to negotiate. The existing clan division among the radicals should be manipulated. Co-opting and buying some of the members of

Al-Shabaab should also be considered. The West is currently making an attempt at negotiation and buying the moderate elements of Taliban in Afghanistan, and the same strategy should be employed in Somalia. The hardcore elements of the Al-Shabaab should be, however, dealt militarily.

- The TFG II should deal with its internal weaknesses, divisions and rivalries since it has a very short mandate that ends in 2011. IGAD, the AU, and the UN should encourage such efforts and develop the TFG II's capacity to be accountable.
- Sanctioning Eritrea could temporarily reduce arms and financial support reaching the radical groups in Somalia. Peaceful mechanisms should, however, be explored by IGAD to bring Eritrea on board and deal with Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam for sustainable peace in Somalia and the region at large.
- Most of the local administrations are not viable in the southern and central parts of Somalia. And, from now onwards, a local initiative could take a long time to emerge because there are forces against it that are ideologically equipped, coupled with armed religious forces and external interventions. But, those areas that have established peace in Somalia— like Puntland and Somaliland—should be consolidated and developed.
- The long-awaited IGAD peace and security strategy failed to be adopted by IGAD member states. Advancing common peace and security agenda enhances mutual benefits for all the members. Therefore, the member states should reconsider having a common policy to enable IGAD to effectively address conflicts in the region.
- Economic integration will also connect the destiny of the peoples in the region making the means of violence and sabotage self-destructive.

Bibliography

- Adam, Hussien.** 1995. "Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?" In *Collapsed States: the Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, edited by William Zartman,. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Adar, Adan.** 2002. "The Scope Strength of Islamic Fundamentalism in Somalia."
- Africa Research Bulletin.** 2007. "Eritrea-Somalia: Arms for Shabaab," *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series*, 44(7).
- African Union.** 2004. Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia.
- African Union.** 2007. Communiqué of the AU, PSC 69th Meeting, January 19, 2007.
- African Union.** 2008. "Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Status and Prospects of the Peace and Reconciliation Process." Paper presented at 139th meeting of Peace and Security Council, Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt.
- African Union Representative for Somalia.** 2009. Statement by the AU Special Representative for Somalia, September 18, 2009
- Africa Watch Report.** 1990. *Somalia: Government at War with its Own People*. New York: Africa Watch Committee.
- Ali, Abdisaid.** 2008. "The Al-Shabaab Al-Majaidinna—A Profile of the First Somali Terrorist Organization" paper presented on the joint Kenya-Uganda Border Security and Management Meeting held April 28–29, Uganda, organized by ICPAT.
- American Chronicle.** 2009. "The Plight of Somali Refugees," July 8, 2009.
- Amnesty International.** 2008. *Routinely Targeted Attacks on Civilians in Somalia*.
- Amnesty International.** 2010. *Somalia: International Military and policing Assistance should be Reviewed*. London: Amnesty International publications.
- Ayoob, Mohammed.** 1980. "The Horn of Africa." In *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World*, edited by Mohammed Ayoob.
- Besteman, Catherine.** 1996. "Violent Politics and the Politics of Violence: The Dissolution of the Somali Nation-State," *American Ethnologist*, 23(3).
- Brauer, Jurgen.** 2009. "*The Terrorist Firm: Innovation, Substitution, and Productivity*." Paper presented at the NATO Defense College, Rome, Italy, October 14, 2004.
- Brons, H. Maria.** 2001. *Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State: Somalia from Statelessness to Statelessness?* Utrecht: Drukkerij Haasbeek.
- Bryden, Matt.** 2007. *Situation Assessment and Prospects for Stabilization in Somali*. Nairobi: Development Alternative Inc.
- Bush, Kenneth D.** 1997. "When Two Anarchies Meet: International Intervention in Somalia." *Journal of Conflict Studies*, XVII (1).
- Cargo Security International.** 2008. Global: IMB Latest Piracy Report Highlights Unprecedented Increase in Somali Pirate Activity. Statement issued by the IMB on 23 October.
- Charny, Joel et al.** 2009. *Somalia: Political Progress, Humanitarian Stalemate*.
- Clarke, Richard and Rob Knake.** 2008. "Counter-Terrorism Issues for the Next President," *Counter Terrorism Center at West Point*, 1(3).
- Cooke, Jennifer.** 2006. *Fading Hopes for Somalia Crisis*. Washington D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies:
- Cooke, Jennifer and David.** 2007. "Somalia's Future: Option for Diplomacy, Assistance and Peace Operations." Reports of a January 17, 2007 conference co-sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, US Institute of Peace and Woodrow Wilson International Center.

- Coyne, Christopher J.** 2006 *Reconstructing Weak and Failed States: Foreign Intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy in Foreign Policy Analysis*.
- Dagne, Ted.** 2009. *Somalia Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace*. Congressional Research Service.
- Daniel, Wallis.** 2010. "WFP suspends operations in much of southern Somalia," *Reuters*, January 5, 2010.
- David.** 2009. *Somali's New Government and the Challenges of Al-Shabaab*.
- De Waal, Alex.** 2007. "Class and Power in a Stateless Somalia." A Discussion Paper Prepared for Inter Africa Group.
- Eavis, Paul.** 2002. "SALW in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region: Challenges and Ways Forward." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume IX, Issue 1*.
- El-Affend, Abdewahab.** 2005. "Facing IGAD's Triple challenge: New Prospects for regional cooperation in the Horn of Africa." Paper presented at the Conference to launch an IGAD Strategy for Peace and Security in the sub-Region. Khartoum, Sudan, October 1–3, 2005.
- Farah, Ibrahim, Aisha Ahmad, and Daud Omar.** 2006. "Small Arms and Border Controls in the Horn of Africa: The Case of Malkasufta, Ethiopia; Mandera, Kenya; and Bula Hawa, Somalia." In *Africa Peace Forum, Controlling Small Arms in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region: Supporting Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration*. Waterloo, Ontario: Africa Peace Forum and Project Ploughshares.
- FOI.** 2008. *State Failure on the High Seas—Reviewing the Somali Piracy*. FOI Somalia Papers, Report.
- Garowe Online.** 2009. "Sheikh Sharif Accuses Eritrea of Aiding Somalia Insurgents." *Garowe Online*, June 28, 2009.
- Grono, Nick.** 2007. "Somalia: Nation on the Cusp of Chaos or Resurrection." *the Australian*, January 8, 2007.
- Halden, Peter.** 2008. *Somalia: Failed State or Nascent State System?* FOI Somalia Papers: Report 1. Stockholm: FOI.
- Hansen, Stig.** 2008. *Misspent Youth: Somalia's Shabaab Insurgents*.
- Hassan, Abdulahi.** 2009. "Inside Look at the Fighting Between Al-Shabaab and Ahlu-Sunna wal-Jama." *CTC Sentinel*, 2(3).
- Healy, Sally.** 2007. "Conflict in the Ogaden and its Regional Dimension." *Horn of Africa Seminar Report by Chatham House*.
- Healy, Sally.** 2009. Peacemaking in the Midst of War: An Assessment of IGAD's contribution to Regional Security. Crisis State Paper No 2.
- Heinlein, Peter.** 2009. "Somalia Leaders Race to Form Government, as Islamists Advance." *VOA News*, January 5, 2009.
- Human Right Watch.** 2009. "Kenya: End Abuses and Neglect of Somali Refugees." Commentary, HRW commentary available at www.hrw.org.
- Hull, Cecilia and Svensson Emma.** 2008. *African Union Mission in Somalia-Exemplifying African Union Peace Keeping Challenges*. Stockholm: FOI.
- IMB.** 2010. 2009 World Piracy Figure Surpass 400.
- International Crisis Group.** 2002. *Salvaging Somalia's Chance for Peace*. Africa Briefing No. 11.
- International Crisis Group.** 2003. *Negotiating a Blueprint for Peace in Somalia*. Africa Report No 59.
- International Crisis Group.** 2004. *Biting the Somali Bullet*. Africa Report No 79.
- International Crisis Group.** 2005. *Somalia's Islamists*. Africa Report No 100.
- International Crisis Group.** 2006. *Can the Somali Crisis be Contained?* Africa Report No 116.
- International Crisis Group.** 2007a. *Somalia: The Tough Part is Ahead*. ICG Policy Briefing, No 45. Brussels: ICG.

- International Crisis Group.** 2007b. Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State. Africa Report No.147.
- International Crisis Group.** 2008. Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State. Africa Report No147. Brussels: ICG.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 1987. IGAD Secretariat Annual Report, 1987.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 1994. IGAD Secretariat Annual Report, 1994.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 1996. Agreement Establishing the IGAD.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2001. IGAD Institutional Assessment, 2001:41
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2003a. Strengthening the Role of IGAD in Regional Peace Initiatives and Post Conflict Reconstruction.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2003b. Communiqué by the 10th Ordinary IGAD Summit, Uganda, Kampala, October 24–25, 2003.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2003c. IGAD Strategy, 2003.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2004. IGAD Secretariat Annual Report 2004.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2005a. IGAD Communiqué on January 31, 2005 Summit in Abuja, Nigeria.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2005b. Communiqué of the 24th Ordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers on Somalia on March 18, 2005, Nairobi, Kenya.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2005c. Consensus Document and Way Ahead. Khartoum, October 1-3, 2005.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2006a. IGAD Secretariat Annual Report 2006.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2006b. Nairobi Declaration of 11th Summit of Heads of State and Government of IGAD, March 20, 2006.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2006c. Institutional Assessment of Inter-Governmental Authority. Delegation of European Commission to Ethiopia.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2007a. Declaration of the 26th Session of IGAD Council of Ministers, April 13, 2007, Nairobi, Kenya.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2007b. IGAD Secretariat Annual Report, 2007.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2008a. IGAD Secretariat Annual Report 2008.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2008b. Declaration of the Summit 2008.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2008c. IGAD Minimum Integration Plan (MIP).
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2008d. Communiqué of the IGAD Council of Ministers, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia *"IGAD frankly criticizes the TFG"* 2008.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2009a. Project Proposal on Re-establishing Effective Government Institutions in Somalia. Office of Facilitators for Somalia Peace and Reconciliation.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2009b. Strategic Plan of the Office of the IGAD Facilitator on Re-establishing effective Government Institutions in Somalia 2009–2011.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2009c. IGAD Communiqué of the 33rd Extra Ordinary Session (Extra-Ord. No.1) of the IGAD Council of Ministers on the Security and Political Situation in Somalia, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 20th May, 2009.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).** 2010. IGAD Final Draft Peace and Security Strategy 2010–2014.

- International Maritime Bureau.** 2009. "Piracy Figure for 2009 Surpasses those for the Previous Year."
- IRIN.** 2009. "Somalia: Donor Caution Alarms Aid Workers." November 6, 2009 (IRIN).
- Institute for Security Studies.** 2009. Profile: Inter-Governmental Authority for Development.
- Keck, Trevor.** 2009. "Somalia: Any Chance for Peace?" Policy Brief for Friends Committee on National Legislation, Washington DC.
- Kidist Mulugeta.** 2008. *The Causes of Ethiopia-Somali War of 2006*. Thesis for a Master of Arts in International Relations, Addis Ababa University.
- Kidist Mulugeta.** 2009. "Probable Scenarios for Somalia." Paper presented at the 5th Cairo Expert Group Meeting, organized by FES from November 4–5, 2009.
- Kidist Mulugeta and Berouk Mesfin.** 2009. "Piracy off the Coast of Somalia." Inter Africa Group Brief No.12.
- Kinfe, Abreha.** 2002. *Somalia Calling: the Crisis of Statehood and the Quest for Peace*, EIIPD.
- Kinfe, Abreha.** 2006a. "Somali which Way? The New Conflict between the TFG and UIC and its Challenges to Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa." *EIIPD Occasional paper* No 24.
- Kinfe, Abreha.** 2006b. "The Bin Laden Connection: Terror in Africa."
- Latin, David and Said Samatar.** 1987. *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State*. Colorado: Westview Press.
- Lewis, I. M.** 2004. *A Modern History of the Somali: Revised, Updated and Expanded*. London: Woolnough.
- Maclean, William.** 2009. *Scenarios: What would Al-Shabaab Win Mean for Somalia*.
- Maimbo, M. Samuel.** 2006. "Remittances and Economic Development in Somalia." Social Development Papers, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Paper No 38/ Nov 2006.
- Makinda, Samuel.** 1987. *Superpower Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa*. London: Croom Helm.
- Marchal, Roland.** 2004. "Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War: Before and after September 11." In *Islamism and its enemies in the Horn of Africa*, edited by Alex de Waal. London: Hurst.
- Marchal, Roland.** 2007. Somalia: A New Front against Terrorism. Available at <http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/marchal/>
- Mays, Terry M.** 2005. "The AMISOM: Why did it successfully deploy following the failure of IGASOM?" Presented in partial completion of the requirement of the Certificate of training in United Nations Peace Support Operation.
- McGregor, Andrew.** 2009. *Who is Who in the Somali Insurgency*. Washington DC: The Jamestown Foundation.
- Medhane, Tadesse.** 2002. *Al-Itihad: Political Islam and Black Economy in Somalia*. Addis Ababa: Mega Printing Enterprise.
- Medhane, Tadesse.** 2003. *Turning Conflicts to Cooperation: Towards an Energy-led Integration in the Horn of Africa*.
- Menkhaus, Ken.** 2008. "Somalia: A Country in Peril, a Policy Nightmare." ENOUGH Strategy Paper.
- Medhane, Tadesse.** 2009. "Somalia after the Ethiopian Occupation: First Steps to End the Conflict and Combat Extremism." Interview by ENOUGH.
- Menkhaus, Ken.** 2009. "Somalia after the Ethiopian Occupation: First Steps to End the Conflict and Combat Extremism," Interview by Enough.
- Mesfin, Wolde Mariam.** 1964. *The Background of the Ethio-Somalia Boundary Dispute*.
- Middleton, Roger.** 2008. "Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars." Chatham House Briefing paper.

- MOFA.** 2009. "IGAD calls for Sanctions against Eritrea; it underlies its political and Economic Role in Somalia Peace Process." *Week in the Horn*.
- Moller, Bjorn.** 2007. "Africa and the US War on Terror with a Special Focus on Somalia." Paper Presented at the SIRC Conference on Post-Conflict Peace Building in the Horn of Africa.
- Moller, Bjorn.** 2009a. "The Somalia Conflict: The Role of External Actors."
- Moller, Bjorn.** 2009b. "Africa's Sub-Regional Organizations: Seamless Web or Patchwork?" Danish Institute of International Studies, Working Paper No 56.
- Myers, S. Andre.** 2009. "Somalia: The Center Cannot Hold." *World Politics Review*. Available at <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=4192>.
- Negussay, Ayele.** 1984. "Somalia's Relations with her Neighbors: From Greater Somalia to Western Somalia to Somali Refugees." In *Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*, edited by Sven Rubenson. Addis Ababa: Institute of Ethiopian Studies.
- News from Africa.** "IGAD to Deploy Peace Keepers Despite Opposition by Faction Leaders," March 16, 2005.
- Olad, Mohamed.** 2008. "Mogadishu Police Chief among 17 Killed in Fighting in Somalia," *The Associated Press*.
- Petrides, Saint Pierre.** 1980. *The Boundary Question between Ethiopia and Somalia*. New Delhi: People's Publishing House.
- Peace and Security Council of AU.** 2004. Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia.
- Peace and Security Council of AU.** 2008. Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia. 105th Meeting, January 18, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- Pirio, A. Gregory.** 2007. *African Jihad: Bin Laden's Quest for the Horn of Africa*. New York: Red Sea Press.
- Prunier, Gerard.** 2006. "CIA Coup in Somalia," *Reuters*.
- Prunier, Gerard.** 1988. "Somalia Clan Organization and the Problem of State Power: The Case of Ogaden." In *Proceedings of 9th International Congress of Ethiopian Studies*.
- Prunier, Gerard.** 2009. "Somalia: Beyond the Quagmire," *Democracy News Analysis*.
- Refugees International.** 2009. "Somalia: Political Progress, Humanitarian Stalemate." *Field Report*.
- Ryu, Alisha.** 2009. *Somalia Insurgents Reject AU Peacekeeping Proposals*. Global Security.org.
- Said, Ahmed.** 2009. "Somalia: Hizbul Islam Eclipsed By Al-Shabaab." *American Chronicle*, November 10.
- Security Council Report (2010).** January 2010 Somalia. Available at <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org>.
- Security and Development Policy Group.** 2008. *Chronic Failures in the War on Terror from Afghanistan to Somalia*. The International Council on Security and Development Report.
- Shinn, H. David.** 2006. "Somalia, the United States and the Horn of Africa." *Remarks* before the Somali Institute for Peace and Justice. Minneapolis, Minnesota November 11, 2006.
- Shinn, H. David.** 2009. "Somalia's New Government and the Challenge of Al-Shabaab." *CTC Sentinel*, 2(3).
- Somali Cause (2010).** Somalia. A Comprehensive Review on the Transitional Federal Government (TFG): Analysis and Recommendation. Washington DC: Somali Cause.
- Sorenson, John.** 1995. *Disaster and Development in the Horn of Africa*.
- Swain and Gillard.** 2009. "Is Somalia a New Afghanistan? The War-torn Nation is Acting as a Dangerous new Magnet for Terror." *The Sunday Times*, August 9.
- The Associated Press.** 2009. "Somali Security Minister Killed in Explosion." *The Associated Press*.

- The Peace Operations Working Group.** 2009. "Somalia." *Peace Operations News Letter*, No. 30, December 2009.
- The Peace Operations Working Group.** 2009). "Somalia" *Peace Operations News Letter*, No.30, December, 2009.
- United Nations.** 2009. Report of the Secretary General on Somalia pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1863 (2009), April 16, 2009.
- United Nations Security Council.** 1997. "Security Council Calls for Halt of Hostilities in Somalia, Cooperation with Regional Peace Initiatives." Press Release, February 27, 1997.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.** 2008. "Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced, and Stateless Persons."
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.** 2009. "Iraqis, Afghans, and Somalis top list of Asylum Seekers in Industrialized World." Press Release.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.** 2009b. "Humanitarian Appeal, 2009." Kenya Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan 2009
- United Nations News Service.** 2009. "UN Rushing Relief Supplies for Somali Refugees in Ethiopia, February 6. Available at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49aff7b41e.html> (Accessed on December 18, 2009).
- United Nations News Service.** 2009. Resolution 1907, December 23, 2009.
- United Nations News Service.** 2009. UN Security Council Resolution 1863.
- UN.** 2009. Report of the Secretarial General on Somalia pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1863 (2009), April 16, 2009.
- Vinci, Anthony.** 2009. *Armed Groups and the Balance of Power: the International Relations of Terrorists, Warlords, and Insurgents*
- VOA News.** 2009. "Al-Qaeda-Linked Militants Capture Key Somali Town." VOA News November 28, 2009.
- VOA News.** 2010. "Somali Government, Moderate Islamists Sign Power-Sharing Deal." <http://www1.voanews.com/english/new>.
- <http://www.aethiopien-botschaft.de>
- Woodward, Peter.** 1995. *The Horn of Africa: State, Politics and International Relations*. London: Tourism Academic Studies.
- Zartman, I.** 1995. *Collapsed State: the Disintegration and Restoration of a Legitimate Authority*. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publisher.


Appendix

Appendix 1: List of Interviewees

List of Informants	Time and Date of the Interview
AAU Academician one	October 12, 2009. 3:30 pm–11:00 pm, Addis Ababa
AAU academician two	October 12, 2009. 11 :00am–1:00 pm, Addis Ababa
AAU Academician three	October 20, 2009. 10 :00 am–11:15 am
AAU Academician four	October 24, 2009. 4:00 pm- 6:00 pm, Addis Ababa
AFP correspondent	October 15, 2009. 3:30 pm–6:00 pm, Nairobi
Ali Wahad Abdullahi, Mogadishu Resident	October 15, 2009. 11:45am–2:00 pm, Nairobi
AMISOM informant one	October 12, 2009. 10:30 am–11 :30 am, Nairobi
AMISOM informant two	October 12, 2009. 11 :45 am–1 :15 pm, Nairobi
AU informant one	November 6, 2009. 4 :00 pm–5:15 pm, Addis Ababa
AU informant two	November 11, 2009. 4:30 pm–11:25 pm, Addis Ababa
AU informant three	November 11, 2009. 5:30 pm–6:30 pm, Addis Ababa
Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official one	October 31, 2009. 6:00 pm–8:00 pm, Addis Ababa
Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official two	February 15, 2010. 11:00 am–12:00 pm.
EU informant	November 10, 2009. 9:00 am–10:30 am, Addis Ababa
German Institute for International and Security Affairs informant	November 5, 2009. 10:30 am–11:15 am, Cairo.
ICG informant	October 13, 2009. 4 pm–5: 50pm, Nairobi
IGAD Official one	October 28, 2009
IGAD Official two	November 10, 2009 11:00 am–12:30 pm, Addis Ababa
IGAD Official three	November 17, 2009. 3:00 pm–4:30 pm, Addis Ababa
IGAD Official four	November 22, 2009. 3:00pm–4:00 pm, Djibouti
IGAD informant five	November 23, 2009. 10:00 am–11:00 am, Djibouti

List of Informants	Time and Date of the Interview
IGAD informant six	December 1, 2009. 7:15 pm–8:15 pm, Addis Ababa.
IPF informant	December 9, 2009. 11:15 am–6:00am, Addis Ababa
ISS informant	November 5, 2009. 1:30 pm–2:45 pm, Addis Ababa
OXFAM source	October 13, 2009 10:35 am–12:15 am, Nairobi
Somali Analyst one	October 11, 2009. 6:00 pm–3:30 pm Nairobi
Somali Analyst two	October 12, 2009. 2:00 pm–5:10 pm, Nairobi
Somali Analyst three	November 12, 2009. 12 pm–1:30 pm
TFG II Official	October 14, 2009. 10:30 am–12:00 pm, Nairobi
TFG II Official	November 4 2009. 10:30 am–11:00 am, Cairo.
UNHCR Official	3:15 pm–10:00 pm, Nairobi Airport
UNPOS Official one	October 16, 2009. 11:00 am–12:00 pm Nairobi
UNPOS Official two	October 16, 2009. 11:00 am–12:00 pm Nairobi
UNICEF source	October 15, 2009. 7:00 pm–9:00 pm

Appendix 2: Clan Groups in Somalia



Appendix 3: Political Map of Somalia



Appendix 4: Interview Questions

1. Does IGAD have the institutional, financial, and political capacity to address the Somali conflict?
2. How far does IGAD utilize existing local traditional conflict resolution mechanism?
3. How do you assess the role of the Executive Secretary in terms of taking the lead in resolving the Somali conflict?
4. Does IGAD include all actors in its conflict resolution endeavors in Somalia? (How much does IGAD follow and implement the principle of inclusivity?)
5. How do you assess the reputation of IGAD as a neutral facilitator? And which actors take the leading initiatives in IGAD's decisions regarding Somalia?
6. Does IGAD have a comprehensive regional peace and security framework that addresses the fundamental roots of the regional conflicts? (issue of Ethio-Eritrea war)
7. How do you assess the lack of durable security architecture at regional level?
8. How far has the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) been supportive in alleviating resource constraints? And to what extent do they influence IGAD's decisions?
9. How far does IGAD coordinate activities within its system? (the relationship between the executive council, the secretariat, and the assembly)
10. How does IGAD coordinate its activities with other actors such as the AU and UN?
11. How do you assess the decision enforcement capacity of IGAD? The commitment of IGAD members to its decisions? And are its decisions taken seriously by other states, regional, and international organizations?
12. How far does IGAD implement preventive diplomacy?
13. What should be done to strengthen the Peace and Security structure of IGAD? (expanding CEWARN and ICPAT)
14. What are the successes and challenges of IGAD in resolving the Somali conflict? And what are the lessons learned from the involvement of IGAD in the Somalia peace process?
15. What should be done to actively involve IGAD in post-conflict reconstruction activities?
16. What measures should be taken to enable IGAD to play an important role in Somalia conflict resolution in the future? (in terms of policy reform, institutional capacity building, policy harmonization and coordination)
17. What lesson can be taken from other African regional organizations?
18. What were the efforts made by the AU to resolve the Somali conflict?
19. What is the reputation of AMISOM as neutral peacekeeping force?
20. What are the challenges and success of AMISOM?
21. What are the possible reasons for member states not to commit enough troops to AMISOM?
22. Is there possibility to expand the mandate of AMISOM?
23. How far does foreign resource dependence affect the deployment of AMISOM?
24. Which actors influenced AU's decisions to deploy peacekeeping forces?
25. How far does the AU lead the Somali peace initiatives?
26. What are the efforts exerted by the UN in bringing durable peace to Somalia?
27. How much are the UN and other actors influenced by the Black Hawk accident?
28. Can we see UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia?

Short Biography

Mrs. Kidist Mulugeta is currently serving as a research consultant at the Governance Section of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. She has produced papers on security issues of the Horn of Africa including piracy, the Ethiopia-Eritrea war and the Somali conflict.

Imprint

Published by:
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Addis Ababa Office,
P.O. Box 8786, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Tel +251 (0) 11 123 3245/46
Fax +251 (0) 11 123 3855

FES-Ethiopia@ethionet.et
www.ethiopia.fes-international.de

Coordinator:

Arne Schildberg

First impression in October 2010

Layout by Uta Herrmann Grafikdesign, Germany
Coverpicture: © picture-alliance/dpa/epa Ahmed

Printed in Addis Ababa

© Copyright with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Die in dieser Publikation zum Ausdruck gebrachten Ansichten sind nicht notwendigerweise die der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Diese Publikation wird auf Papier aus nachhaltiger Forstwirtschaft gedruckt.

ISBN 978-99944-997-4-8