WULF D. HUND

Historizing Race or Racializing History?

Notes on a Problematic Tendency in the Analysis of Racism, Being Simultaneously a Review of a Six-Volume ›Cultural History of Race‹[1]

In May 1943, Aimé Césaire joined other intellectuals in writing a sarcastic letter to a representative of the Vichy regime. In rejecting the latter's accusation of racial prejudice, they characterized their own position as »›Racists‹, yes. Racism like that of Toussaint-Louverture, Claude McKay, and Langston Hughes – against the racism like that of Drumont and Hitler«.[2] A year later, C. L. Robert James argued that »the Negro is ›nationalist‹ to the heart and is perfectly right to be. His racism, his nationalism are necessary means of giving him strength, self-respect, and organization to fight for integration into American society. It is a perfect example of dialectical contradiction.«[3]

This use of the term ›racism‹ by race-critical thinkers was indeed contradictory. The longer, the more the word was used in the contemporary discourse to criticize and discredit the use German Nazis made of the race concept (though it always had other connotations). And the concept of ›race‹, in turn, was defended (by Ruth Benedict and others) against its abuse by Fascists, but it was also rejected as a scientific error and ideological myth (e. g. by Ashley Montagu), and, moreover, used as a black counter-concept against the white supremacist pretension to divide humankind into hierarchically ordered races.[4] In this sense, W. E. Burghardt Du Bois wrote in 1940 that he had been made »a ›race‹ man« by historic circumstances and had had to make »an attempt to rationalize the racial concept« to cope with social and ideological discrimination.[5]

1 *Marius Turda* (general ed.), A Cultural History of Race, 6 vols. [1: A Cultural History of Race in Antiquity, ed. by *Denise Eileen McCoskey*, 227 pp. — 2: A Cultural History of Race in the Middle Ages, ed. by *Thomas Hahn*, 239 pp. — 3: A Cultural History of Race in the Renaissance and Early Modern Age, ed. by *Kimberly Anne Coles/Dorothy Kim*, 230 pp. — 4: A Cultural History of Race in the Reformation and Enlightenment, ed. by *Nicholas Hudson*, 223 pp. — 5: A Cultural History of Race in the Age of Empire and the Nation State, ed. by *Marina B. Mogilner*, 218 pp. — 6: A Cultural History of Race in the Modern and Genomic Age, ed. by *Tanya Maria Golash-Boza*, 216 pp.]; all volumes Bloomsbury Academic, London/New York etc. 2021, hardcover, 440 £. In the following, references to these volumes are put in brackets directly in the text by citing the number of the volume and the respective page numbers. As to quotations: emphases in the originals are not included, all italics are mine. Many thanks to Bärbel Kirchhoff-Hund, Stefanie Affeldt and Joe Paul Kroll for their critical reading of the text.

2 *Aimé Césaire/Suzanne Césaire/Georges Gratiant* et al., Response from Tropiques (May 12, 1943), translation published in: *T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting*, Negritude Women, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis/London 2002, pp. 128–129, here: p. 128.

3 *C. L. Robert James*, [Letter to Constance Webb, 1944], quoted from: *C. L. Robert James*, On the Negro Question, ed. by *Scott McLemee*, University Press of Missouri, Jackson 1996, p. xxvi.

4 Cf. the chapter »›Racism‹. The Birth of a Concept« in *Wulf D. Hund*, Marx and Haiti. Towards a Historical Materialist Theory of Racism, Lit, Berlin/Münster 2022, pp. 61–86.

5 *W. E. Burghardt Du Bois*, Dusk of Dawn. An Essay toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept [first published in 1940], with an introduction by K. Anthony Appiah, ed. by *Henry Louis Gates, Jr.*, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York etc. 2007, p. 67.

During the last three quarters of the century, this complex situation underwent several changes. ›Racism‹ was more or less linked to ›race‹ and ›race‹ was redefined as a social category without removing its naturalistic foundations. On top of that, ›race‹ was detached from its conceptual history, and the boundaries of its categorical scope were dissolved. The six volumes on the ›Cultural History of Race‹ from antiquity to modernity are a monument of sorts to this tendency. In addressing the social drama of race over the course of more than two millennia, they even go beyond the dramatic form, which, following the ancient precepts of Aristotle and Horace, consists of five acts.

As the six volumes exceed common standards anyway, I venture a brief ›Vorspiel auf dem Theater‹, which in Germany, where I am writing this essay, is an idea made famous by Goethe's ›Faust‹. In this ›prelude on stage‹, the director of the theatre demands action to please the audience: »They come to look, and then they want to stare.« In this instance case, the director is a publisher, and they did not do as good a job as they might have done. Yes, there is much to look at – the books are illustrated. But the figures are sometimes mere illustrations[6], often oversized[7], several times

6 An example for both is figure 5.3 in 1:88. In a full-page illustration, it shows Jacobus Elisa Johannes Capitein (reproduced from Wikimedia Commons, by the way). He lived from 1717–1747 and had nothing to do with ›Antiquity‹, the topic of this volume (except that he quoted Aristotle; but, in writing a doctoral thesis, he also mentioned Ammonius, Athenaeus, Euripides, Cicero, Horace, Ovid, Seneca, Terence, and other classical authors). However, his dissertation is neither discussed in this volume (which is understandable), nor does his name appear in the volume discussing the time of his activities. Moreover, neither the translated edition of his work (see The Agony of Asar. A Thesis on Slavery by the Former Slave, *Jacobus Elisa Johannes Capitein*, 1717–1747, translated with commentary by Grant Parker, Markus Wiener, Princeton 2001) nor any of the studies dealing with him (see, with further bibliographical references, *Hendrik L. Bosman*, Jacobus Capitein. Champion for Slavery and Resisting Mimic?, in: Old Testament Essays 34, 2021, no. 2, pp. 628–645) are mentioned.

7 That is not only a method of pretending volume at little cost for the publisher, letting the readers pay dearly for oversized portraits of David Gyasi (1:138) and Brad Pitt (1:155) (in the volume on Antiquity because they played Achilles), Ernest Renan (5:63), Jamal al-Afghani (5:65), Juri Zaydan (5:70), James Prichard (5:79), Franz Pruner (5:82), or for full-page portraits of Franz Boas (6:110), Robert Park (6:111), and Max Weber (6:120) – all of them images without any analytical importance. Beyond that, such a strategy of illustrating has also problematic substantial dimensions, if malicious representations of others, not least in a sexualized context, are displayed in large format like Sarah Baartman in 4:149 or 5:7, a procedure Renée Green has once deconstructed with her installation ›Sa main charmante‹ as part of a pornotropic peep-show (cf. *Sabine Ritter*, Facetten der Sarah Baartman. Repräsentationen und Rekonstruktionen der ›Hottentottenvenus‹, Lit, Berlin/Münster 2010, pp. 125 ff.). The misuse of both images as mere illustrations is highlighted by the fact that the captions only mention the holders of the copyrights but neither the perpetrators (i. e. the artists) nor the propagators of the drawings and that the authors do not apply themselves to an analysis of the pictures. This practice of illustration comes with further surprises. An almost full-page portrait of Frantz Fanon in the volume on Antiquity, for instance, bears the caption »Frantz Omar Fanon« (1:168), with no explanation for the name being given in that form. The associated text refers throughout to »Frantz Fanon« (1:167 ff.). Born as Frantz Marguerite Victor Fanon on 20 July 1925 in Fort-de-France, Martinique, he died, at least according to his passport, as Omar Ibrahim Fanon on 6 December 1961 in Bethesda, Maryland. He used ›Ibrahim‹ when he wrote his address on the last letter to his brother. Of ›Omar‹, he had made use several times as delegate and speaker to international conferences. Both first names were part of his cover name, when, in 1958, as a member of the

used repeatedly in different volumes or even in the same volume[8], and occasionally so blurred that the relevant parts are not identifiable.[9]

A minor complaint applies to the book's shoddy layout (when thumbed like a flipbook, the bottom margins of the text move like a swell). However, the editing of the footnotes is a symbol of indifference towards the readers combined with profit maximization for the publisher. The footnotes are placed at the end of each volume, and to grasp what is happening there, you have to go back to the table of contents each time to make sure which chapter you are in – because the titles of the chapters are shown in the page headers without their numbers, whereas the footnotes are arranged according to the numbers of the chapters without their titles and without using the possibility to present the corresponding pages of the text in the page header, which instead simply reads ›notes‹. This is almost a deliberate obstruction.

Algerian ›Front de Libération Nationale‹, he obtained a new false but legal passport from the United Kingdom of Libya, made out to Omar Ibrahim Fanon, born in Tunis. They obviously were *noms de guerre*, for he never changed his *nom de plume*. His major work, ›Les damnés de la terre‹, was published just a few days before his death under the name Frantz Fanon (cf. *Roberto Beneduce*, La potenza del falso. Mimesi e alienatione in Frantz Fanon, in: aut aut, 2012, no. 354, pp. 5–45, p. 5 [birth/death]; *David Macey*, Frantz Fanon. A Biography, 2nd ed., Verso, London/New York 2012, e-book version, chapter 9; *Leo Zeilig*, Frantz Fanon. A Political Biography, 2nd ed., I. B. Tauris, London 2021, e-book version, chapter 4 [›speaker‹]). From time to time, even critical studies like *Lewis R. Gordon*, What Fanon Said. A Philosophical Introduction to his Life and Thought, Fordham University Press, New York 2015, p. 9, contract these names and declare that he was born as »Frantz Omar Fanon« in Martinique (though Gordon quotes his address from Fanon's last letter to his brother: »Dr. Ibrahim Fanon | 13 East-Room 217 | National Institute of Health | Bethesda, Maryland«, ibid., pp. 142 and 176).

8 As the figure of the ›monstrous races‹ on the ›Psalter Map‹ in volume three – first as a mere illustration (occupying nearly the entire page) (3:40); then, exactly the same image is reproduced in another essay (3:172), again at large scale, this time as part of a series showing the same subject, the entire map (with the ›races‹) (3:171), an enlargement of the ›races‹ (3:172), two more enlargements (3:174, 3:177), and the inscriptions (3:173), taking up, together with the already mentioned doublet, some five pages. In addition to these figures, there is another depicting the ›races‹ (from Mandeville) (3:175), though this image is reproduced only some pages earlier in exactly the same version (3:160) as well as early on in the same volume (3:34), and though the same figure is also printed in a full-page version in volume two (2:157). What looks like a melange of sloppiness, waste of space, and making money hand over fist, is, in any case, neglectful on part of the editors and, above all, seems intentional on the part of the publisher. By the way: I learned a new English word in this context, when I enquired whether there was a literal equivalent for the German ›Beutelschneider‹. – I will, however, not use the word ›cutpurse‹, because it is anachronistic, given that we are not in John Gay's ›Lincoln's Inn Fields‹, »the happy hunting ground of the pickpocket, the cut-purse and the foot-pad« (*Charles E. Pearce*, ›Polly Peachum‹. Being the Story of Lavinia Fenton [Duchess of Bolton] and ›The Beggar's Opera‹, Stanley Paul, London 1913, p. 73), but in the blessed fields of scientific publishing.

9 An example is figure 6.3 in 1:110, which shows two rows of throne bearers of different ethnic background on a relief on the tomb of Darius I – or, in fact, it does not show them: the figures are barely identifiable. And yet there exist excellent photographs of this subject, some of them even accompanied by drawings showing hairstyle, clothing, arms, and even physiognomy of the figures. Both are accessible on Wikipedia, URLs: <https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/62/Tomb_of_Darius_I_Soldiers_of_the_Empire_with_labels.jpg> and <https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2e/Top_side_darius_I_tomb.jpg> – as well as in tandem <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tomb_of_Darius_the_Great#/media/File:Armies_of_Darius_I.jpg> [5.5.2023]. Not only in this case is the necessary accuracy for picture selection and image editing lacking.

Fortunately, two other actors in Goethe's ›prelude‹ are the author and the comedian. In this case, they are represented by an impressive troupe of well-known specialists in the analysis of race and racism. For this reason alone, the collection presents a bunch of interesting papers – in keeping with Goethe's motto: »Who brings a lot, brings something that will pass.« But there is also a focus that holds together the numerous essays. They are arranged in a manner obviously set down in advance by the general editor. Each volume is divided into the sections *1. Definitions and Representations of Race*, *2. Race, Environment, Culture, 3. Race and Religion*, *4. Race and Science*, *5. Race and Politics*, *6. Race and Ethnicity*, *7. Race and Gender*, *8. Race and Sexuality* and *9. Anti-Race*.

The last section best illustrates the central thrust of the ›Cultural History of Race‹. As Asa Simon Mittman explains in his version of ›Anti-Race‹ (3:165–187), »[a]nti-race sounds so much like anti-racist – the two concepts are separated by only a few letters! – but is, in fact, its opposite, indeed, its active opponent« (3:183). He equates »›anti-race‹ ideology« with »the ableist term ›colour-blindness‹« (3:165), declares that »we can trace racial (and therefore racist) thinking back at least as far as the Middle Ages« (3:169) and approvingly quotes Ibrahim X. Kendi: »if we stop using racial categories, then we will not be able to identify racial inequity. If we cannot identify racial inequity, then we will not be able to identify racist policies« (3:185).[10]

There is an essential but tacit assumption in these deliberations: that racism is consistently tied to race and that anti-racist critique must therefore highlight race. Since contradiction is a condition of insight, I will counterargue that racism is much older than the discourse of race, instead dating back to ancient times (and not only in Europe). Hence, I disagree with the thesis of these collected essays that ›race‹ has a long tradition going back to antiquity – without, however, negating the existence of racism before modernity. This means that I make the case for a decoupling of race and racism and for an analysis of racism that is aware of the different socio-historical forms of its subject: there was racism in ancient and medieval times, but it was not racially based; and hence: there were no races before modernity.[11]

Given the enormous range of the papers at hand, my review will not proceed step by step and not provide summaries of the different volumes (much less of their many chapters). Instead, I focus on chapters that are particularly relevant to the general tendency of the ›Cultural History of Race‹, namely those that illustrate how the concept of race has been expanded and traced back to ancient times on the one hand, and how racism is exclusively tied to such a generalized concept of race on the other. Of course, there are contributions that argue more cautiously and hint at the complexity of the reference points of racism. For example, in his chapter ›Race and Politics‹ (4:87–109) Matthew Bennett explains that »to mark the Other in the sixteenth century, colonists deployed a congeries of difference based on pre-contact European categories, such as barbarian, wild man, Jew, Moor, animal and monster« (4:87). En passant, I refer to similar arguments. However, these do not determine the tone of the collected essays, as they do not critically engage with their compre-

10 The quote is from *Ibram X. Kendi*, How to Be an Antiracist, One World, New York 2019, p. 54.

11 Cf. *Wulf D. Hund,* Dehumanization and Social Death as Fundamentals of Racism, in: *Maria Kronfeldner* (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Dehumanization, Routledge, London/New York 2021, pp. 231–244.

hensive historical scope or their narrow focus on race-bound racisms. Additionally, I will note that a chapter on ›Race and Class‹ is missing.

For the first chapter – *Racecraft or Conceptual Histories of Race and Racism* – I borrow an expression that is cited several times in the collection at hand (1:142 ff., 151 ff., and more frequently; 2:32 ff., and more often). The term was coined by Karen Fields at the beginning of this century and became widespread after she used ›racecraft‹ as the title of a book written together with her sister Barbara Fields.[12] Attentive readers have noticed how potentially explosive the category is.[13] In that respect, the book itself is quite outspoken. Karen and Barbara Fields highlight the paradoxical opinion of Kwame Anthony Appiah that »the great antiracist W. E. B. Du Bois was both a lifelong opponent of racism and a lifelong racist« because he did not sufficiently transcend the race concept.[14] For them, ›race‹ is »the doctrine that nature produced humankind in distinct groups«, and »racecraft« deliberately invokes »witchcraft«, which not only rationalizes race but also obscures that »[r]acism and class inequality« are »part of the same phenomenon«. Unfortunately, the use of ›racecraft‹ in the ›Cultural History of race‹ is utterly different, as it does not critically reject but rather perpetuate the concept of race (even with occasional hocus-pocus).

The second chapter – *A Storm is Blowing Towards Paradise* – addresses the omissions, manipulations, and subterfuges that some essays in this collection use to install ›race‹ as an epoch-spanning concept. The title of this chapter alludes to a famous sentence of Walter Benjamin. But while his storm blows from paradise (propelling the angel of history away into the future)[15], the angel of the ›Cultural History of Race‹ has unleashed a storm that blows towards paradise, driving a modern category towards ancient history and attempting to equate the history of racism with that of race. As a result, the differences between racisms are obscured and the complexity of modern racism does not come into view. But what is worse, some analyses even forego accurate reasoning in favour of simplified assertions and ideological misrepresentations.

En passant, Benjamin's metaphor brings to mind a famous photograph of Frederick Douglass (see Figure 1). It depicts him as an ›angel of history‹ whose gaze is directed towards a catastrophic past – one which, however, was also characterized by resistance and the struggle for change. This is represented by the images hanging on the wall in front of him. His own portrait symbolizes the fight against slavery

12 Cf. *Karen E. Fields/Barbara J. Fields*, Racecraft. The Soul of Inequality in American Life, Verso, London/New York 2012.

13 Cf., e. g., *Gargi Bhattacharyya*, Rethinking Racial Capitalism. Questions of Reproduction and Survival, Rowman & Littlefield, London/Lanham etc. 2018, p. 108, who questions her central concept in the light of the argument of the Fieldses: »The very term, ›racial capitalism‹, falls dangerously close to a mode of racecraft.« Nevertheless, she holds on to her catchword and does not take the step to ›racist capitalism‹.

14 *Fields/Fields*, Racecraft, p. 196; for the following quotes see pp. 16 (›nature‹), 19 (›witchcraft‹), 266 (›class inequality‹).

15 Cf. *Walter Benjamin*, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in: *id.*, Illuminations, ed. by *Hannah Arendt*, Schocken, New York 1969, pp. 253–264, here: pp. 257 f.

and against the racism that persisted after abolition.[16] Other images also conveyed this message. They changed over time and included portraits of Toussaint Louverture or Joseph Cinque. In the present context, the photograph also serves as a reminder that Douglass was one of the most photographed individuals of the 19th century and that he engaged with the significance of photography on multiple occasions. In one of his writings, he refers to humans as »picture-making animal[s]«, interprets photography as the democratization of representation, and connects it to the struggle against slavery. And with his »awareness of the possibilities of imagery to shape public opinion«, he fought, as Zoe Trodd has clarified, »one of the first great visual battles in US history; between racist stereotypes and dignified self-possession«.[17] However, in the ›Cultural History of Race‹, none of this seems to have been enough

16 It should be noted in passing that the portrait also illustrates the social position of Douglass, who was not only able to have himself photographed but also possessed an artistic portrait of himself – a charcoal drawing by Eva Webster based on a photograph by Lydia Cadwell. I would like to thank John Stauffer for this information; Webster's drawing is available online, URL: <https://www.nps.gov/museum/exhibits/douglass/exb/visionary/FRDO5219_FRDOportrait.html> [5.5.2023].

17 *Zoe Trodd*, The After-Image. Frederick Douglass in Visual Culture, in: *Celeste-Marie Bernier/Hannah Durkin* (eds.), Visualising Slavery. Art Across the African Diaspora, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool 2016, pp. 129–152, here: p. 130. For Douglass's handling of photography see *John Stauffer/Zoe Trodd/Celeste-Marie Bernier*, Picturing Frederick Douglass. An Illustrated Biography of the Nineteenth Century's Most Photographed American, Liveright, New York 2015 – the image referred to here can be found in: ibid., pp. 60 and 185, and on URL: <https://www.flickr.com/photos/washington_area_spark/46958069551> [5.5.2023] (public domain); the quote is from *Frederick Douglass*, Lecture on Pictures, in: ibid., pp. 126–141, here: p. 131. In addition, cf. *Sarah Blackwood*, Fugitive Obscura. Runaway Slave Portraiture and Early Photographic Technology, in: American Literature 81, 2009, issue 1, pp. 93–125, and *Laura Wexler*, ›A More Perfect Likeness‹. Frederick Douglass and the Image of the Nation, in: *Maurice O. Wallace/Shawn Michelle Smith* (eds.), Pictures and Progress. Early Photography and the Making of African American Identity, Duke University Press, Durham 2012, pp. 18–40. Douglass is only mentioned once in the ›Cultural History of Race‹ (5:167). Surprisingly, this contribution by Lynn M. Hudson on ›Anti-Race‹ (5:165–180) is also the only one to contain the word ›cinema‹ (5:175). Celluloid racisms are not a systematic topic in these volumes. However, from the beginning, the moving images of the cinematograph served as mass media vehicles for the racist stereotypes of modernity. Relevant roles were played not only in ›blackface‹ (cf. *Brian D. Behnken/Gregory D. Smithers*, Racism in American Popular Media. From Aunt Jemima to the Frito Bandito, Praeger, Santa Barbara 2015, pp. 48–54) but also in ›redface‹ (cf. *Jacquelyn Kilpatrick*, Celluloid Indians. Native Americans and Film, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln 1999), ›yellowface‹ (cf. *Harry M. Benshoff/Sean Griffin*, America on Film. Representing Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality at the Movies, 2nd ed., Blackwell, Malden 2009 [first published 2003], pp. 123–142), and not least in ›jewface‹ (cf. *Esther Romeyn*, Street Scenes. Staging the Self in Immigrant New York, 1880–1927, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 2008, pp. 187–211). Furthermore, Douglass's gaze at history was obviously mediated by his library. Among other books, he had Martin Delany's ›Principles of Ethnology‹ on his shelf. Delany provided a simple answer to the question of the origins of different skin colours and subsequent races, mixing creationist and environmental elements. The colours were attributed to the various ›complexions‹ of Noah's sons and their descendants and were perceived as ordinary »mark[s] of distinction [...] at that early period, when races were unknown«. Migration to different parts of the world then contributed to the further development of such differences due to varying environmental conditions. These conditions also influenced the development of civilization. Egyptians and Ethiopians, who »occupied the most favourable position in point of geographical location«, advanced »the most rapidly in the progress of civilization« – *Martin R. Delany*, Principia of Ethnology.

to warrant the inclusion of any images of Douglass or even references to them – another proof of the superficial handling of illustrations in the present volumes.

Figure 1: An angel of history – Frederick Douglass in his study

The third chapter – *The Missing Link: Race and Class* – draws attention to the astonishing fact that ›class‹ as a central reference point, already present in early sociological approaches to the analysis of racism, is absent from the contents and represents a gap in the deliberations of numerous contributions to the ›Cultural History of Race‹. Yet ›class‹ is often cited as one of the ›Big Three‹ of social discrimination[18] and is a central component of intersectional approaches. Without being suspected of economic reductionism, Margaret Andersen and Patricia Hill Collins state that »[r]ace, class, and gender matter because they remain the foundations for systems of power and inequality«, that they »operate together« as »intersecting categories« and »si-

The Origin of Races and Color, with an Archæological Compendium of Ethiopian and Egyptian Civilization [etc.], 2nd rev. ed., Harper and Brother, Philadelphia 1880, pp. 21 (›complexion‹), 46 (›progress‹).

18 *Jan Nederveen Pieterse*, Other, in: *Ellis Cashmore* (ed.), Encyclopedia of Race and Ethnic Studies, Routledge, London/New York 2004, pp. 306–307, here: p. 307.

multaneously structure […] experiences«, and that they »are linked experiences, no one of which is more important than the others«.[19]

I. Racecraft or Conceptual Histories of Race and Racism

The general editor has contributed a preface (redundantly reproduced in all six volumes), in which he claims that the »General History of Race documents the long history of the concept of race from antiquity to the present day« (1:ix) and that »various national traditions are examined from a global perspective« (1:ix), thereby »provid[ing] not only academic guidance but […] a nuanced and innovative critique of race and racism as well« (1:x). Since he has not himself contributed a paper to this collection, one must draw on one of his other works, such as ›Historizing Race‹.[20]

Here, he makes a direct connection between ›race‹ and ›racism‹, defining the latter as »the ordering and understanding of the world with reference to race«. To wit, »the modern idea of race« is said to have been developed in Europe; but at the same time, it is understood that »there is an established racial tradition in countries which are neither white nor European such as Japan and China« and that »various ideas of race circulated in the Muslim-ruled Middle East and Africa before the Europeans established their presence in those parts of the world«. Concerning the category's conceptual frame, Turda formulates a demand »to disengage from the outdated strategy that sees race either as biologically defined or as exclusively constructed as a result of social imagining«. In this vein, he writes that »race's primary purpose is to signify and explain differences between human beings and this impulse to divide people into quite distinct groups, though historically contingent, seems ›essential‹ to human society and social organization« because race »contains elements of both nature and culture«.

While this is a rather vague conceptual framework, it merges social and biological elements, transcends the scope of race to times before the beginning of modern colonialism and to parts of the world beyond Europe, and inextricably links racism to race. The first notion is an unavoidable anathema to the use of ›race‹. The second view expresses the increasing disposition of racism analysis to include non-European racisms. And the third attitude is due to the fact that this disposition, though it considers instances that are both regionally and temporally distant, nevertheless employs a category of modern European origin and thus seeks race-like phenomena globally in ancient histories.

Compared to such a wide-ranging perspective, the contributions to the ›Cultural History of Race‹ may seem more modest, but they do not consider their focus on European history a limitation. On the contrary, this point of view results in the mes-

19 *Margaret L. Andersen/Patricia Hill Collins*, Why Race, Class, and Gender Still Matter, in: *id.* (eds.), Race, Class, and Gender. An Anthology, 9th ed., Cengage, Boston etc. 2015 (first published 1992), pp. 1–14, pp. 2 (›power‹), 4 (›together‹, ›intersecting‹, ›structure‹), 11 (›linked‹).

20 *Marius Turda/Maria Sophia Quine*, Historicizing Race, Bloomsbury, London/Oxford etc. 2018; for the following quotes see pp. 5 (›reference‹), 6 (›idea of race‹ – ›Africa‹), 9 (›disengage‹), 15 (›primary purpose‹), 14 (›nature and culture‹).

sage that racism was, at least until the expansion of colonialism and the propagation of race thinking, an entirely European phenomenon. Even with regard to the present situation, there is a lack of detailed analytical reflections on racisms in China, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mauritania, Myanmar, Rwanda, Yemen, and other countries.

And yet, some authors anticipate that their approach might be seen as limited and that their use of the category of ›race‹ considered anachronistic. Regarding their strategy's self-imposed constraints, they concede (from the first paper in volume 1 to the last text in volume 6) that »we should not expect ancient and modern views of race, separated by thousands of years, to coincide seamlessly« – for »they do not« (1:4). They also acknowledge that »there are many forms of oppression that can take in the form of racism« and which »exist and have existed historically among and across so-called non-White populations and subjectivities as well« (6:160). However, they seem to have no idea of how racism can be analyzed without any reference to race. As a result, they blur the boundaries between different forms of racism and allow the expansion of the concept of race to times when ›race‹ did not exist as a category.

A careful reading of the sources could have pointed in a more complex direction. In her introduction to volume 6, Tanya Maria Golash-Boza writes:

> »The modern idea of race is a product of colonization. As European colonizers and settlers arrived in the Americas, they grappled with the differences between themselves, the Indigenous occupants of the land and the people brought in bondage from Africa. European colonization of the Americas was brutal and violent. Europeans developed ideas about enslaved Africans and the Indigenous peoples of the Americas to justify enslavement and genocide. These ideas evolved into the modern view of race […].
> In 1735, the Swedish botanist Carolus Linnaeus […] proposed that all human beings could be divided into four groups. Linnaeus described these four groups, which correspond to four of the continents, in Systemae Naturae in 1758:
> Americanus: reddish, choleric, […] obstinate, […] regulated by customs.
> Asiaticus: sallow, melancholy, […] ruled by opinions.
> Africanus: black, phlegmatic, […] indolent, […] governed by caprice.
> Europaenus: white, sanguine, […] inventive; governed by laws« (6:1).

This is a telling passage in several aspects. It unquestioningly mingles realist and constructivist elements of an understanding of race. Similarly, it tacitly intertwines structural and ideological elements of racism. It addresses the development of modern race thinking in an undifferentiated and summary fashion. And, at the same time, it misses the opportunity to address the nexus of different (both older and newer) fundamentals of racism.

When European colonizers arrived in America, all the passengers on board, including Africans, believed they had reached India (otherwise they would not have set sail in the first place). Contacts with African and Asian people and cultures were not actually new at this time. And the contacts with the indigenous population in the newly discovered continent in the first fifty years were distinctly multifarious, ranging from paradisiacal to imperial dimensions.

Moreover, the use of African slaves by the Iberians began much earlier than their transport to the Americas and increased significantly after the Ottomans closed the Dardanelles and stopped the trade in light-skinned slaves from the Crimea in the mid-15th century.[21] Slavery had been endemic in Europe since antiquity – corresponding legitimisations included. Regarding the enslavement of Africans (which by then already had a long autochthonous history)[22], these legitimisations were initially upheld and, in addition, augmented by new prejudices. In particular, the Portuguese African slave trade substantially contributed to the development of anti-black images, especially those legitimating the enslavement of Africans.[23] These were among the points at which the development of race thinking connected with the expansion of the transatlantic slave trade.

While the institution of slavery was not unknown to the indigenous population of the Americas[24], their enslavement by the Europeans created a different situation. Rather than limited raids for slaves, it was a systematic enslavement of whole populations, coupled with the devastating effects of diseases that led to a genocidal situation. As a consequence, the ›Leyes Nuevas‹ (›New Laws of the Indies for the Good Treatment and Preservation of the Indians‹) were enacted in 1542, prohibiting the enslavement of the indigenous population. Although these laws were circumvented by all available means[25], their codification had at least ideological consequences.

At this point in time, various forms and traditions of *slavery* intersected. Their respective *legitimizations* could not have been upheld without racism. Furthermore, while *race* as a category was already in use, the concept of race had not yet been developed. And when it eventually took shape (in the thought of, among others, *Linné*), it became intertwined with earlier elements of racist discrimination that were not related to race.

In regard to *slavery*, the ›Cultural History of Race‹ ranges from antiquity to modernity but is restricted to slavery in or originating from Europe. It does not address the history of slavery in other parts of the globe. As a result, the question of early non-European legitimizations of slavery remains unanswered. And yet, it would be odd if slavery in Africa, the Americas, and Asia[26] – which undoubtedly existed in very different varieties, but at their core as forms of dehumanization –

21 Cf. *Hannah Barker*, That Most Precious Merchandise. The Mediterranean Trade in Black Sea Slaves, 1260–1500, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2019.

22 Cf. *Sean Stilwell*, Slavery and Slaving in African History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York etc. 2014.

23 Cf. *Debra Bumenthal*, Slavery in Medieval Iberia, in: *Craig Perry/David Eltis/Stanley L. Engerman* et al. (eds.), The Cambridge World History of Slavery, vol. 2: AD 500–AD 1420, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York etc. 2021, pp. 508–530, here: p. 528.

24 Cf. *Fernando Santos-Granero*, Vital Enemies. Slavery, Predation, and the Amerindian Political Economy of Life, University of Texas Press, Austin 2009; *Camilla Townsend*, Slavery in Precontact America, in: *Perry/Eltis/Engerman* et al., The Cambridge World History of Slavery, vol. 2, pp. 553–570.

25 Cf. *Andrés Reséndez*, The Other Slavery. The Uncovered Story of Indian Enslavement in America, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Boston 2016.

26 See e. g. *Sean Stilwell*, Slavery and Slaving in African History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York etc. 2014; *Perry/Eltis/Engerman* et al., The Cambridge World History of Slavery, vol. 2, with the contributions *Don J. Wyatt*, Slavery in Medieval China, pp. 271–294, *Seung B. Kye*, Slavery in Medieval Korea, pp. 295–312, *Leslie C. Orr*, Slavery and Dependency in Medie-

should have existed without racism. However, even a comparative view is no guarantee against the unhistorical distension of the race concept. The late Ian Law, editor of another ample book series addressing race and racism, had no problem affirming the »durability and pervasive nature of elements of race-thinking over millennia« and asserting that »[t]he symbolic, cosmological universes developed before European contact in many societies – for example among Amerindians and in China – contain key discursive elements of racial differentiation«.[27]

With regard to the *legitimization* of slavery, the ›Cultural History of Race‹ refers to the stereotype of the ›barbarian‹, only to suggest that it was ›racialized‹ by the ancient Greeks. This is accompanied by skewed rhetoric. »[T]he ancient Greeks and Romans did not recognize anything like contemporary racial categories«, concedes David Kaufman in his paper on ›Race and Science‹ in antiquity (1:67–82). But then he continues: »Nevertheless, even if the ancient Greeks and Romans would not have recognized our racial distinctions, that does not mean that they did not draw racial distinctions of their own« (1:67). However, the contributors do not culturally unfold the stereotype of the barbarian. Here, too, a comparative approach might have been helpful. ›Barbarians‹ were also known in ancient China and their construction shows similarities as well as differences. Frank Dikötter argues that »[t]he dichotomy between culture and race […] should be abandoned« in this instance, because »[p]hysical composition and cultural disposition were confused in Chinese antiquity«.[28] Yang Huang assumes that the Chinese concept of the Barbarian was more flexible than the Greek and therefore more ›cultural‹, insofar as it covered the idea of the conversion of barbarians to civilisation.[29]

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val South India, pp. 313–333, *Matthew S. Gordon*, Slavery in the Islamic Middle East (c. 600–1000 CE), pp. 337–361, *Paul J. Lane*, Slavery in Africa c. 500–1500 CE, pp. 531–552, *Townsend*, Slavery in Precontact America, pp. 553–570; *Santos-Granero*, Vital Enemies.

27 Cf. *Ian Law*, Racism and Ethnicity. Global Debates, Dilemmas, Directions, Longman, Harlow 2010, p. 3 (›millennia‹); *Shirley Anne Tate/Ian Law*, Caribbean Racisms. Connections and Complexities in the Racialization of the Caribbean Region, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2015, p. 4 (›universes‹); see also my review essay *Wulf D. Hund*, Rassismusanalyse in der Rassenfalle. Zwischen »raison nègre« und »racialization«, in: AfS 56, 2016, pp. 511–548, here: pp. 511 f.

28 *Frank Dikötter*, The Discourse of Race in Modern China, Hurst, London 1992, p. 3; this view is still expressed in the second ›fully revised‹ edition (Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York etc. 2015, p. 3).

29 *Yang Huang*, Perceptions of the Barbarian in Early Greece and China, in: CHS Research Bulletin 2, 2013, no. 1, § 15, URL: <https://research-bulletin.chs.harvard.edu/2014/03/14/perceptions-of-the-barbarian-in-early-greece-and-china/> [5.5.2023]. Similar narratives also existed elsewhere. When, at the beginning of the 17th century, El Inca Garcilaso de la Vega drafted his ›Comentarios reales‹, he certainly made use of explanatory models learned in Iberia. But he also referred to information gained by his own experience and from indigenous contact persons. According to these, humans lived »como bestias« before the arriving of the Incas: »las gentes en aquellos tiempos vivían como fieras y animales brutos, sin religión ni policía, sin pueblo ni casa, sin cultivar ni sembrar la tierra«. Only the rule of the Incas made possible that they lived »como hombres racionales y no como bestias« in houses and villages, cultivated the soil and grew plants – *Garcilaso de la Vega, el Inca*, Comentarios reales de los Incas, ed. by *Ángel Rosenblat*, 2 vols., Emecé Editores, Buenos Aires 1943, vol. 1, pp. 40 and 41; cf. *Anna Becker*, ›La traduzion del Indio‹. Die Comentarios reales des Inka Garcilaso de la Vega zwischen europäischer Wissenstradition und peruanischer Selbstbehauptung, in: *Susan Richter/Michael Roth/Sebastian*

The clarification of *race* and the differentiation between race as a category and a concept, in particular, are both lacuna in the ›Cultural History of Race‹ overall. Of course, there are references to the early meaning of race as well as to the emergence of race as a concept. Right in the middle of this collection of texts, Nicholas Hudson in his ›Introduction‹ (4:1–17) clarifies that the »era between the Reformation and the Enlightenment […] developed a concept with far-reaching and damaging consequences […], the idea of ›race‹« (4:1). Yet just a few pages later – in the chapter ›Definition and Representation of Race‹ (4:19–31) – Denis Austin Britton claims: »Early usages show that the word ›race‹ did in fact racialize people« (4:21). This is illustrated by, for instance, a collection of quotes related to religion. One is from Jean de l'Espine and mentions Christians as »the race and lineage of God«. The trouble (not only) with this quote is that it is not about ›racialization‹ but uses ›race‹ in the sense of the French discourse related to class.[30]

Finally, the example of *Linné* – who devised an early classification of humankind according to external appearance (skin colour) and internal qualities (temperament) – might have been a perfect test setup for an examination of the transition from older forms of racism to the new race paradigm and the associated intermingling of earlier racist ascriptions with modern ones. The ›Cultural History of Race‹ misses this opportunity. Linné plays only a small role in the last volume of the collection, and not even a speaking (or writing) one. Yet his performance is no less instructive for it.

In the first edition of his ›Systema Naturæ‹ (1735), the genus »Homo« is divided into »Europæus albesc.«, »Americanus rubesc.«, »Asiaticus fuscus«, and »Africanus nigr.« In the second edition (1740), the Homo Americanus remained »rubescens« and the »Homo Asiaticus« remained »fuscus«, but the »Homo Europæus« was now »albus« and the »Homo Africanus« was »niger«. Therefore, Europeans had transi-

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Meurer (eds.), Konstruktionen Europas in der Frühen Neuzeit. Geographische und historische Imaginationen, Heidelberg University Publishing, Heidelberg 2017, pp. 253–265.

30 Cf. *Jean de l'Espine*, A Very Excellent and Learned Discourse, Touching the Tranquilitie and Contentation of the Mind, John Legate, Cambridge 1592, p. 9 (recto): »If a King, a Prince, or mean gentleman would in these dayes use the trade of marchandise, and negotiate in matters of small importance, he should be accounted a man of a base minde. So should every man, that not considering he is created after the image of God, and that the better and more excellent part whereof he is made, hath his beginning from heaven, doeth so abase and obscure him selfe. We are of the race and lineage of God, (as S. Paul saith) and therefore it is a great shame for us & a dishonour to God that we live so miserably, and that we have always our heartes in our bagges, or counting houses, or else in some golden mine.« The translation corresponds with the original (I have consulted the edition Excellens Discours, Hierosme Haultain, La Rochelle 1584, pp. 50 f.). In this paragraph, Delespine does not racialize faith or religion but treats the spiritual nature of humans as creatures of God in the contemporary discourse of race in France, which was about class. At the same time, *François de Belle-Forest*, Les grandes Annales, et Histoire générale de France [etc.], vol. 2, Gabriel Bion, Paris 1579, p. 1620 (recto), explained that a marriage across class borders would be a »crime de sang« leading to a »meslange des races« and *François de l'Alouette*, Traité des Nobles et des Vertus dont ils sont formés [etc.], Guillaume de la Nouë, Paris 1577, p. 31 (verso), demanded the preservation of »le lustre d'une race & Noblesse« by prohibiting marriages between aristocrats and commoners (see *Wulf D. Hund*, Stichwort: Rasse. Anmerkungen zur Begriffsgeschichte, in: *Karl Porges* [ed.], Den Begriff »Rasse« überwinden. Die »Jenaer Erklärung« in der [Hoch-]Schulbildung, Klinkhardt, Bad Heilbrunn 2023, pp. 33–99, esp. pp. 43–52).

tioned from ›becoming white‹ to ›white‹ and Africans from ›becoming black‹ to ›black‹, but Americans were still on their way to being a ›red‹ race, and Asians were not ›yellow‹ at all, but ›dark‹ and ›brownish‹. Mankind persisted in this state until the ninth edition (1756). But between this and the tenth edition (1758) – that quoted by Golash-Boza – something crucial must have happened.[31]

Now, the genus was divided into two subdivisions, »H. diurnus« and »H. nocturnus«. The latter was tagged with an asterisk, and the corresponding footnote clarified that Linné was addressing the discussion about the supposed transition zone between the great apes from Africa and Asia and humans. One of the examples was »Homo sylvestris Orang Outang« with the reference »Bont. Jav.«, that means Jacob de Bondt (Bontius), who, while working in Batavia for the Dutch East India Company as a physician, had remarked on a hairy being from Java, fancifully illustrated in the posthumous publication.[32] This not only indicated scientific tentativeness about the place of apes and humans in nature and the questions regarding the boundaries between them. It also was a manoeuvring space for old and new racisms because »when the human/animal divide narrowed, the divide between ›savage‹ and ›civilized‹ peoples crystallized, becoming wider than in any previous pe riod.«[33]

Beyond that, the rest of the genus multiplied and ›homo diurnus‹ was divided into six groups: »Ferus«, »Americanus«, »Europæus«, »Asiaticus« »Afer«, and »Monstrosus«. The first group listed some of the so-called wild children, while the last group was a reaction to reports of the ›anomalous‹ bodies of ›Patagonian Giants‹ or ›monorchid Hottentots‹. Additionally, each of the four continental groups was eventually assigned a distinct ›racial‹ colour: Homo Americanus was now »rufus« (red), Europæus was still »albus«, Asiaticus was »luridus« (pale yellow), and Africanus was »niger«, as before. Furthermore, all of them had acquired psychological attributes. Americans were choleric and ruled by custom, Europeans were sanguine and ruled by virtue, Asians were melancholic and ruled by opinion, Africans were phlegmatic and ruled by arbitrariness.

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31 See *Carolus Linnæus*, Systema Naturæ, 1st ed., de Groot, Lugdunum Batavorum 1735, n. p.; 2nd ed., Kiesewetter, Stockholm 1740, p. 34; 9th ed., Haak, Lugdunum Batavorum 1756, p. 3. The following quotes are from the 10th ed., Salvius, Holmium 1758, pp. 20 (diurnus), 24 (nocturnus; Orang, Bont. jav.; Troglodytes), 20–22 (ferus etc.).

32 Cf. The chapter ›Ourang Outung sive Homo silvestris‹ in *Jacob Bontius*, Historiæ Naturalis & Medicæ Indiæ Orientalis Libri Six, pp. 84 f., contained in *Willem Piso*, Gulielmi Pisonis De Indiæ Utrisque Re Naturali et Medica. Elzevirios, Amsterdam 1658. The corresponding illustration is available online, URL: <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Engraving_of_a_orangutan_Wellcome_L0032838.jpg> [5.5.2023]; for de Bondt see *Donald F. Lach/Edwin J. van Kley*, Asia in the Making of Europe, vol. 3: A Century of Advance, University of Chicago Press, Chicago/London 1993, pp. 457 f.

33 *Silvia Sebastiani*, A ›Monster with Human Visage‹. The Orangutan, Savagery, and the Borders of Humanity in the Global Enlightenment, in: History of the Human Sciences 32, 2019, issue 4, pp. 80–99, here: p. 80; see also *id.*, Challenging Boundaries. Apes and Savages in Enlightenment, in: *Wulf D. Hund/Charles W. Mills/id.* (eds.), Simianization. Apes, Gender, Class, and Race, Lit, Wien/Zürich 2015, pp. 105–137. For the gendered dimension of this discussion see the chapter ›The Gendered Ape‹ in *Londa Schiebinger*, Nature's Body. Gender in the Making of the Modern Science, with a New Preface, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick 2004, pp. 75–114 (with two figures of de Bondt's female orangutan on pp. 102 f.).

Hence, the stage was set for the development of race sciences with their bio-cultural amalgamation of physical and mental characteristics – not least by rewriting the appearance of the Asians from a ›brownish‹ to a ›pale yellow‹ skin colour. At the same time, the script integrated older narratives of ›wild men‹ (from the Middle Ages) and legendary ›monsters‹ (from Antiquity) who survived in the nomenclature of ›Homo Ferus‹ and ›Homo Monstrosus‹. The background of this development remains untold in the collection under consideration and, due to this, its central eponymous category remains vague.

The bitter truth is that most authors of the ›Cultural History of Race‹ do not consider it worthwhile to ponder the question of how the category of race emerged, spread across European languages, and eventually evolved into a concept to put the global population in a differencing, valuing, ranking, and discriminatory order by combining observable or supposed physical, mental, and cultural characteristics. Instead, the vast majority of the contributions use ›race‹ in a fluid and vague sense rather than as a modern concept shaped in the 18th century by using a category which, since the 15th century, had been charged with descent and genealogy in conjunction with class, culture, and ethnicity.

This is emphasized by the multiple references to Geraldine Heng and her definition of race. Apart from the fact that she is the only author to be represented with two papers (2:97–112, 3:19–32), her understanding of ›race‹ is a reference point for several other contributors (1:53, 2:12, 2:28, 2:50, 2:97, 2:138, 2:178, 3:16, 3:55, 3:94, 3:166). In her own papers, Heng provides an expanded definition:

> »Race is one of the primary names we have – a name we retain for the epistemological, ethical, and political commitments it recognizes – for a repeating tendency, of the gravest import, to demarcate human beings through differences among humans that are relatively essentialized as absolute and fundamental, so as to distribute positions and powers differentially to human groups.[34] […] The differences selected for essentialism will vary in the longue durée of human history from the pre-modern eras well into the twenty-first century – perhaps fastening on bodies, physiognomy and somatic differences in one instance; perhaps on social practices, religion or culture in another; and perhaps a multiplicity of interlocking discourses elsewhere« (2:97).

This ›interlocking‹ is illustrated by the example of »medieval Jews« who »can be racialized for their putative somatic differences as well as their religio-cultural differences«. Regarding »bodies«, Heng lists »a special stench«, »the foetor Judaicus«, a »peculiar facial physiognomy«, »the facis Judaica«, and »even […] horns and a tail«. Concerning religion, she notes instances such as deicide, host desecration, or conspiracy with »Satan and the Antichrist«. Taken together, this is supposed to demonstrate »how racial formation functioned« by »biologizing, essentializing and defining an entire community as fundamentally and absolutely different« (2:98).

But mere mention of the »badge« reveals that the ›interlocking‹ is a muddle that blurs the several forms of racism. The ›biology‹ at work here does not even have the

34 This part of the definition originates from *Geraldine Heng*, The Invention of Race in the European Middle Ages, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York etc. 2018, p. 27, and is repeated by the author in her second paper in this collection (3:23).

status of the various manifestations of the Evil One when visiting a witch. Jews had to be stigmatized because their ›racialization‹ was unsuccessful (in fact repeatedly, until the ›Judenstern‹ in Nazi Germany). Nonetheless, Heng resolutely disregards the difference between clothing and skin, asserting that »[t]he tagging of Jewish people with a badge« is »the way state racism signs itself materially on the bodies« (2:100).

This phraseology is as ambiguous as the linguistic racialization of religion by translation. After briefly addressing the issue of ›crusades‹, Heng concludes »that the heterogeneous Christian militia reached across boundaries of country, region, ethnicity, tribe and class to constitute themselves as a people defined by their religion alone: gens Christiana, a Christian race. The racing of the internal alien – Jews – and the external alien – Muslims – thus conduced to a racial self-consciousness and collective self-naming, for the Latin Christians of the West, of their own religio-racial identity in an ethnopolitics of race« (2:105). This is not the end of this line of argument. The naturalizing implications of the category of race also come to light in its critical use, in this case as »Christian-coloured« (3:19) politics.

While this is a sort of inverse vocabulary thimblerig, played not with three shells and a pea but with three peas (religions) and one shell (race), Heng has to resort to imprecise reading and symbolic speculations when it comes to black members of the ›Christian race‹, such as Feirefiz, Saint Maurice of Magdeburg, and Moriaen (2:109–111). With regard to the Middle Dutch Arthurian romance ›Moriaen‹, Heng is so fixated on »epidermal race« (2:111) that she loses sight of the text. In the story, Moriaen is described as black and tall, »sward ende groet« (2415). However, the common people did not fear him because he was African. For them, »moriaen was in scine | Als hi vter hellen ware comen | Si waenden den duuel hebben vernomen« (2418–2420) – the black knight looked as if he had come from hell, like the devil. They were even certain that he was the devil, and no one else – »di duuel ende niemen el« (2428).[35]

Concerning Wolfram von Eschenbach's ›Parzival‹, she even goes one step further and ignores one of the pivotal messages of this popular verse narrative. It is in the first passage of the novel – and after telling it, Wolfram ironically adds that »diz vliegende bîspel | ist tumben liuten gar ze snel«, meaning that his »flying example« might be too fast for ›unwise‹ readers (a word meaning ›inexperienced‹, in German as in English later overlaid by the one-dimensional ›dumm‹/›dumb‹). The preliminary verses read: »Ist zwîvel herzen nâchgebûr, | daz muoz der sêle werden sûr. | gesmæhet unde gezieret | ist, swâ sich parrieret | unverzaget mannes muot, | als agelstern varwe tuot« – the debut of the magpie (agelstern) at the very beginning points to black and white not as skin colours but as a human spiritual condition where doubt (zwîvel) is the neighbour of the heart and troubles the mind's peace. But there is hope, because humans share in hell and heaven, »der mac dennoch wesen geil: | wand an im sint beidiu teil, | des himels und der helle«. This is expressed via a spiritual colour code that can easily be deciphered. Black connotes the realm of darkness (swarz/vinster), whereas a steadfast mindset (stæte gedanken) is combi-

35 *[Anonymous]*, Moriaen, with the lines of verses in brackets quoted from URL: <https://www.dbnl.org/tekst/_mor001mori01_01/_mor001mori01_01_0008.php> [5.5.2023].

ned with brightness and purity (blank): »der unstæte geselle | hât die swarzen varwe gar, | und wirt och nâch der vinster var: | sô habet sich an die blanken | der mit stæten gedanken«.[36]

There is no ›race‹ far and wide in this parable, and its following detailed account is not about race but about virtue, chivalry, and chastity. And lo and behold: Feirefiz, the magpie-like son of an African queen and a European knight, helps his half-brother Parzival, who was too ›tumb‹ to find the Holy Grail on his own – a heathen supports a Christian on the way to salvation. This mission accomplished, Feirefiz converts to Christianity and marries a Christian with whom he migrates to »Indyâ«, where his wife gives birth to »ein sun, der hiez Jôhan«, later known as Prester John. And here it is: religious racism in the epochal fight between good and evil. Wolfram leaves no doubt about this: Christianity is the only saving religion, but it is also multi-coloured. His racism is religious, but not racial.

This leads us to Saint Maurice. For Heng, his »racialization […] indicates how Africa can be made useful« to an »Emperor« or an »Archbishop« (2:110). This superficial functionalist explanation bypasses the core of the problem. Thereby it evades discussing the religious racist front line at the border between Christianity and paganism. Instead, Heng settles for the speculation that »[e]pidermal blackness, laid on a holy figure such as a saint, has prophylactic properties« because it shows that even an »African, whose colour personifies sin itself, can be forgiven« (2:111).

In fact, it shows something else. Firstly, the ›Emperor‹ in question, Frederick II, was born in Sicily and brought up in a multicultural atmosphere shaped by Europeans and Africans, Normans and Arabs, Christians, Muslims and Jews. Nevertheless, he considered himself a Christian emperor and (after a bloodless crusade) crowned himself King of Jerusalem. Since he took slavery for granted, he also acquired black slaves.[37] However, even a former slave like Johannes Morus was able to make a career at Frederick's court, where he was appointed treasurer and made a baron.[38] Perhaps he was even in the entourage when the emperor visited Magdeburg in 1231, accompanied by »many Saracens and dark Ethiopians«.[39] On the one hand, this expressed the multi-ethnic shape of Frederick's dominion – as shown some years later on a fresco in Verona depicting »emperador Federico II, que recibe el homenaje de los pueblos de la tierra«, among whom the black delegation was the

36 *Wolfram von Eschenbach*, Parzival (Studienausgabe), ed. by *Karl Lachmann*, De Gruyter, Berlin 1965, p. 1. Given the English and American handling of the category race, it is not surprising – but wrong – that different translations (*Jessie L. Weston* [1912], *Helen M. Mustard/Charles E. Passage* [1961], *Arthur T. Hatto* [1980], *Cyril Edwards* [2004], *Anthony S. Kline* [2020]) should transfer the Middle High German ›blank‹ into ›white‹ and, in this way, racialize Wolfram's parable. To be sure, Wolfram has »wîz und swarzer varwe«, the colours white and black, in his vocabulary. However, in this metaphysical context, he does not use ›wîz‹ but ›blank‹; the following quote (›Jôhan‹) is from p. 374.

37 Cf. *David Abulafia*, Frederick II. A Medieval Emperor, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York etc. 1988, p. 337.

38 Cf. *Anne Kuhlmann-Smirnov*, Schwarze Europäer im Alten Reich. Handel, Migration, Hof, V&R unipress, Göttingen 2013, p. 118.

39 A temporary chronicler as quoted by *Peter Martin*, Schwarze Teufel, edle Mohren. Afrikaner in Bewußtsein und Geschichte der Deutschen, Junius, Hamburg 1993, p. 18.

most numerous group (see Figure 2).[40] On the other hand, it was also an imperial strategy. Its background was revealed in a hymnal eulogy by Nicholas of Bari who referenced Psalm 72 (in the Septuagint version) when declaring about Frederick: »Coram illo procident Ethiopes, id est pagani« – before him, Ethiopians and heathens will bow their knees.[41]

Figure 2: King of Jerusalem – Cultural pluralism and Christian hegemony

40 *Libero Cecchini*, Recomposición de un espacio arquitectónico para la recuperación de un gran fresco medieval. La abadía de San Zeno en Verona, in: Loggia 10, 2000, pp. 26–37, here: p. 32; for interpretations see *Victor H. Elbern*, Das Fresko Kaiser Friedrich II. an der Torre di S. Zeno zu Verona, in: Archiv für Diplomatik, Schriftgeschichte, Siegel- und Wappenkunde 41, 1995, pp. 1–20, and *Gian Paolo Marchi*, Interpretazioni dell'affresco della torre abbaziale di San Zeno a Verona, in: Medioevi. Rivista di letteratura e cultura medievali 2, 2016, pp. 19–30. The fresco is also included in the introduction by *Paul H. D. Kaplan* to the new edition of *David Bindman/Hanry Louis Gates, Jr.* (eds.), The Image of the Black in Western Art, vol. 2/1: From the Early Christian Era to the »Age of Discovery«. From the Demonic Threat to the Incarnation of Saint-hood, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge etc. 2010, pp. 1–30, here: p. 6; for images of Saint Maurice in Magdeburg and in many other places and versions see, in the same volume, *Jean Devisse*, A Sanctified Black: Maurice, in: ibid., pp. 139–194; an image section of the fresco in Verona is online, URL: <https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/98/Affreschi_torre_San_Zeno_Verona.jpg> [5.5.2023].

41 *Rudolf M. Kloos*, Nikolaus von Bari, eine neue Quelle zur Entwicklung des Kaiseridee unter Friedrich II., in: Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters 11, 1954/55, no. 1, pp. 166–190, here: p. 173.

Furthermore, the ›archbishop‹ stood in the tradition of expansionist politics directed against the Slavic people. When a newly founded monastery in Magdeburg was devoted to Saint Maurice in the second half of the 10th century, it was intended as a base for missionizing the Slavs.[42] Hence, Maurice as a knight and a martyr seemed to be no bad choice. In 1108, the then archbishop was one of the signatories of the ›Epistola pro auxilio adversus paganos (Slavos)‹ which called for a crusade.[43] When the Wendish Crusade against the Polabian Slavs east of the river Elbe finally took place in 1147, the archbishop of Magdeburg was one of the participants.

When Magdeburg Cathedral burned to the ground, the statue of Saint Maurice was destroyed with it. We do not know exactly what motivated the archbishop to replace it with a new statue representing Maurice as a black saint. But instead of postmodern speculations, history suggests a possible explanation. Maurice became ›black‹ in a political and ideological milieu in which African exponents of Christianity were sought as allies against the Muslim empires around the Mediterranean in an atmosphere characterized by crusades, Islamic conquests (in the East), and Christian reconquista (in the West). Wolfram's African knight who eventually fathered Prester John or the Biblical magus or ›wise man‹ commonly depicted as black and worshipped since the 12th century were prominent precedents for another black saint, Saint Maurice. The Africans who accompanied Frederick II to Magdeburg were a symbol of a multi-ethnic vision of a global Christian empire. Undeniably, this was a racist perspective. But its essence was religious and not racial.[44]

II. A Storm is Blowing towards Paradise

In ›Temptation‹, one of Langston Hughes's stories of Simple, the protagonist is convinced that Adam and Eve were white: »Ever since I been seeing a Sunday school card, they was white. That is why I want to know where was us Negroes when the Lord said, ›Let there be light‹«? The author answers: »Oh, man, you have a color complex so bad you want to trace it back to the Bible.«[45]

Be that as it may, the skin colour of the first couple has long been discussed. After all, Adam was made of dust taken from the earth (ʾădāmâ). As a result, he was red – at least according to Flavius Josephus: »This man was called Adam, which in Hebrew tongue signifies one that is Red, because he was formed out of red earth.«[46] This was still the colour of Gabriel de Foigny's paradisiacal but utopian inhabitants

42 Cf. *Anton Landersdorfer*, Die Gründung des Erzbistums Magdeburg durch Kaiser Otto den Großen, in: Münchener theologische Zeitschrift 46, 1995, no. 1, pp. 3–19, here: p. 5.

43 Cf. document 91 in Urkundenbuch des Hochstifts Merseburg. Erster Theil, ed. by the Historische Commission der Provinz Sachsen, Otto Hendel, Halle 1899, pp. 75–77.

44 See the chapter ›Black Knights and Black Saints‹ in *Wulf D. Hund*, Wie die Deutschen weiß wurden. Kleine (Heimat)Geschichte des Rassismus, Metzler, Stuttgart 2017, pp. 45–59.

45 *Langston Hughes*, The Best of Simple, Hill and Wang, New York 1961, p. 26.

46 *Flavius Josephus*, The Complete Works, transl. by William Whiston, Scranton, Hartford 1905, p. 40 (Book 1.1).

of a widely ›undiscovered‹ Terra Australis: »their Flesh is more | upon the Red than Vermilian«.[47]

On the ›Psalter Map‹ (designed at the beginning of the 13th century), the situation is even more confusing. It shows a famous gathering of representatives of the »so-called ›monstrous‹ peoples« or »›monstrous races‹« (3:170). Asa Simon Mittman is sure that these are »images of Africans«, because »that is exactly what these inhuman cannibals and animalistic hybrids and headless horrors – naked and therefore apparently cultureless […] – are intended to present« (3:170). However, it is obvious that »all of them are white« (3:171), and, therefore, the author resorts to a highly specious line of argument. He notes that »blackness« is »present in the image«, »used for the anthropomorphic winds that surround the world« (3:172).[48] From this, he concludes that this is a »dislocation« of »blue-black Muslim figures to the map's periphery« (as winds) and that »even supposedly racial difference is constructed in terms of whiteness«. This is taken as evidence that the monsters (because of their whiteness) are framed as »more human […] than the North African and Middle Eastern groups«. This is considered as an »aggressive absence of indicators of any Islamic presence anywhere on the surface of the earth« (3:176). Unfortunately for this breezy reasoning, at that time the monsters did not only roam the south of the globe but also the north. As Adam of Bremen reported, »[i]bi sunt Amazones, ibi Cynocephali, ibi Ciclopes, qui unum in fronte habent oculum; ibi sunt hii, quos Solinus dicit Ymantopodes, uno pede salientes, et illi, qui humanis carnibus delectantur pro cibo«[49] – alongside with Amazons, there are Dogheads, Cyclopes with one eye in the middle of their forehead, Ymantopodes who hop on one foot, and even cannibals who delight in human flesh as food.

After all, in a little town in the south of Germany, ›race‹ reached back to paradise. In Calw, in 1770, a black Eve and a white Adam were painted on a panel in the old pharmacy (see Figure 3).[50] The members of the owner's dynasty were affiliated to European colonialism by their profession. In the apothecary garden grew medicinal plants »aus denen weit entlegenen Gärten Ost≠ und West≠Indiens«, from India and the Caribbean. One of the family members was a professor of botany in St. Petersburg before returning to his hometown to devote himself to his botanical studies. But when he heard about the outcome of Josef Banks voyage with James Cook, he

47 *Gabriel de Foigny*, A New Discovery of Terra Incognita Australis [etc.], John Dunton, London 1693, p. 63.

48 For an image of the map see URL: <https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/psalter-world-map> [5.5.2023].

49 *[Adam von Bremen]*, Magistri Adam Bremensis Gesta Hammaburgensis Ecclesiae Pontificum, ed. by *Bernhard Schmeidler*, 3rd ed., Hahnsche Buchhandlung, Hannover etc. 1917, p. 257; for the background see *Anja Ulrike Augustin*, »Norden, Suden, Osten, Wester«. Länder und Bewohner der Heidenwelt in deutschen Romanen und Epen des 12. bis 14. Jahrhunderts, 2 vols., PhD Thesis, Würzburg 2014, and *Grzegorz Bartusik/Radosław Biskup/Jakub Morawiec* (eds.), Adam of Bremen's Gesta Hammaburgensis Ecclesiae Pontificum. Origins, Reception and Significance, Routledge, Abingdon/New York 2022.

50 Cf. *Werner Sollors*, Neither Black nor White Yet Both. Thematic Explorations of Interracial Literature, Harvard University Press, Cambridge/London 1997, pp. 32 f. I want to thank Helga Satzinger for an interesting discussion of the painting and Ute Lilly Mohnberg from the municipal administration of Calw for letting me use a file of the painting.

immediately hurried to London. And he received plants not only as gifts from Banks but also from other naturalists – including specimens from the Pacific Islands, India, Japan, and South Africa.[51]



Figure 3: Diversity in Paradise – Racial community or hybrid ambiguity

The scientific interest of the pharmacists was not limited to plants alone. As the painting of Adam and Eve shows, it also included the discussion of human classification. At the time it was painted, the tenth edition of Carolus Linnaeus's ›Systema Naturæ‹, which classified homo sapiens into four coloured groups, had already been published. Did the painter seek to express an objection to its hierarchical arrangement?[52] But what, then, does the doubling of the Edenic couples signify? The painter of the multiracial paradise established a certain distance between the hu-

51 *Peter Hartwig Graepel*, Carl Friedrich von Gärtner (1772–1850). Familie, Leben, Werk, PhD Thesis, Marburg 1978, pp. 14 (quote on officinal plants), 49 (Banks etc.).

52 *Curt Stern/Gertrud Belar*, Race Crossing in Paradise?, in: Journal of Heredity 44, 1953, no. 4, pp. 154–155, here: p. 154, consider the painting a sign of »tolerance«; *Helga Satzinger*, White Adam and Black Eve. A 1770 Painting at the Old Pharmacy, Calw [etc.], in: politika (online) 2019, URL: <https://www.politika.io/en/notice/white-adam-and-black-eve> [5.5.2023], emphasizes that it represents »a debate, in which black and white people were not yet perceived as belonging to different races but as varieties of humanity with a common origin«; there also the following quote on ›bastardisation‹.

man couple on the right and the pongid couple on the left. However, the pharmacists for whom he pictured the racialized biblical scenery were heavily engaged in hybridizing plants in their herb garden. One of the scientists involved was even »fascinated by the possibility to create new varieties or even new species by artificial fertilisation« and he »compared bastardisation with the efforts of the alchemists to transform lead into gold or gold into lead«.

Hence, the posture of the first couple might not have been innocent. After all, Linné listed the ›Homo sylvestris Orang Outang‹ as part of the genus – and no less a philosopher than Jean-Jacques Rousseau pondered how he could prove the affinity between humans and great apes. Giving a report of rumours about »Monstres« like the »Pongos« in the »Congo«, he also mentions a »Bête« which looks so much humanoid »qu'elle pouvoit être sortie d'une femme et d'un singe«. The truth of such narratives, he concluded, could only be proved by an experiment that could not be conducted »innocemment«.[53]

In fact, the semantic gale of ›race‹ unleashed by these Aeolisses and Aeolusses of the ›Cultural History of Race‹ is not sufficient to blow their key category back into paradise.[54] Had they examined the evidence in the context of its time, they would have found that the discussion is not about paradisiacal races but about retrojecti-

53 *Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes, in: *id*., Œuvres complètes, vol. 3, ed. by *Bernard Gagnebin/Marcel Raymond*, Gallimard, Paris 1964, pp. 109–236, pp. 209 (›monstres‹ etc.), 211 (›innocemment‹).

54 That is surprising insofar as Adam and Eve invented not only sin but also gendered complexions. In the middle of the first millennium, that flashed up in a miniature of the ›Vienna Genesis‹ which showed »a tawny Adam and pale, white Eve« – *Ori Z. Soltes*, Visual Arts (part of the lemma ›Eden, Garden of‹, in: Encyclopedia of the Bible and Its Reception, vol. 7, De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston 2013, col. 362–391), col. 382–386, here col. 382; cf. *Karl Clausberg*, Die Wiener Genesis. Eine kunstwissenschaftliche Bilderbuchgeschichte, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1984, and, for a visual representation, the website of the Austrian National Library, URL: <https://onb.digital/result/BAG_11470100> [5.5.2023]. This image went on to permeate the visual arts not only of Christianity. The famous miniature of the ›Fall‹ from the ›Book of Divination‹, written at the beginning of the 17th century for the Ottoman Sultan Ahmed I, shows Adam and Eve, naked (except for the leaves covering their genitals) and light-skinned. But Adam is tanned, given the abundant sunbathing during his time in paradise, whereas Eve, though no less scantily clad, is represented with a pure white skin, like an angel also present on the scene (cf. *Begüm Özden Firat*, Encounters with the Ottoman Miniature. Contemporary Readings of an Imperial Art, I. B. Tauris, London 2015, p. 42; a reproduction of the miniature can be found online, URL: <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Adam_and_Hawa.png> [5.5.2023]). As the authors of the ›Cultural History of Race‹ are only interested in racial or racialized colourations, they forego the chance to analytically distinguish classist and sexist colour schemes from racist ones in a precise manner – even in the chapters on ›Race and Gender‹ and ›Race and Sexuality‹. When *Sarah Salih* mentions the »trope of the ›Saracen Bride‹« with a »skin whiter than daisies« (2:144), she only argues that her »destiny was always to become a Christian« and therefore »carries that teleology in her body« (2:144). She reckons at least without *William Austin*, Hæc Homo wherein the Excellency of the Creation of Woman is described, by Way of an Essay, Fussell, London 1639, who argued that Eve was »brought forth the last creature in time, as an epitome, conclusion, period, and full perfection both of Heaven and Earth« (p. 13); and that, while Adam was made of »red earth«, she was made of »bone« with some flesh (pp. 29 f.); and that his complexion had a »rude shape« and was »overgrown and rough (like the rude and hairy beasts of the field)« (p. 104), while she was white like »Lillies«, of »pure snowie colour«, »a piece of polisht Ivory« (pp. 102 f.).

ons from a different historical situation into an imagined topography. Exactly the same can happen with regard to real history and its ages. Nonetheless, the authors do their utmost to convince their readers of the existence of racial ideas even in antiquity.

Concerning the beginning of racism, there are, of course, fundamental epistemological and methodological questions to consider. Vanita Seth has highlighted some of these in the context of the expanding use of the category of race with regard to epochs where it was at best »an idea without a name«. However, as ›race‹ was developed as a body-related concept in modernity, its retrospective application to earlier times runs the risk of »projecting contemporary racial associations […] onto a distant past« and of misunderstanding »associations with black and white«.[55]

Such an endeavour is precarious for several reasons. It imposes a modern category (›race‹) onto ancient mentalities and replaces a variety of culturally shaped ancient phrasings with a modern English idiom (›race‹). It also attributes a metaphysical omnipotence to this category, allowing it to absorb other attributes (through ›racialization‹). Moreover, it assumes a one-dimensional and continuous understanding of the attributes in question (›colours‹).

Several authors of the ›Cultural History of Race‹ acknowledge such objections, with one even recognizing that they are negotiating a »terminological minefield« (Grant Parker, 1:85). Furthermore, there are a number of contributions to the collection that do not participate in the racialization of the past without hesitation. In her chapter on ›Race and Science. Black Skin in Medieval Medicine and Natural Philosophy‹ (2:81–96), for example, Maaike van der Lugt meticulously explores the situation, appealing to scholars to »avoid all anachronism«, to keep in sight »that skin colour did not loom as a major concern for medieval thinkers«, to consider that black skin »did not inevitably possess the same connotation or valence as in later times«, to bear in mind that the scholars of the time »concentrate[d] on individual colour and not on colour as a marker of ethnicity«, and to »address the issue of terminology, a matter that reveals the ambiguities inherent in medieval classifications of skin colour« (2:82 f.).

In the same volume, William Chester Jordan and Helmut Reimitz discuss »Anti-Race? The Danger of Binaries« (2:171–179). They demand »methodological discipline to avoid ›foisting the present onto the past unjustly‹« and point to the »deliberate anachronism« used by »[l]iterary scholars« in their examination of »the multiple historical layers of race-thinking and action«, an »approach« which »is problematic for historians«. Hence, »relatively wide definitions of race«, such as that of Geraldine Heng, are »raising the question whether such an inclusive definition of race does not rather obscure the historical peculiarities and specific trajectories of race thinking« (2:177 f.).

By and large, however, the authors of the ›Cultural History of Race‹ do not heed reminders like these, instead following the perspective indicated by the collection's title. What they call a »fluid approach to race in Greco-Roman antiquity« (Sarah Derbew, 1:25) enables them to diffuse the category of race. The associated hints that

55 Cf. *Vanita Seth*, The Origins of Racism. A Critique of the History of Ideas, in: History and Theory 59, 2020, issue 3, pp. 343–368, here: pp. 349 (›idea‹), 353 (›distant past‹ etc.).

»the ancient Greeks and Romans did not recognize anything like contemporary racial categories« do not amount to a problematization but instead are stepping stones to the assertion that the ancient Greeks and Romans had »racial distinctions of their own« (David Kaufman, 1:67) or that they »have their own constructions of race and racism« (Jackie Murray, 1:138).

And soon enough we find Herodotus speaking about »the Aithiopians' race« (1:27) or Titus Livius writing about »the race of Numidians« (1:132).[56] By »taking a broad view of race« (Shalley P. Halley, 1:121), »racialized gender« becomes ubiquitous in antiquity – »[t]he Odyssey offers up […] representations of the intersection of race and gender«; »racialized gender is at the centre of the construction of identity for Hellenic peoples«; »[f]or Sparta, racialized gender comes into stark relief because of the apartheid system which existed there«; »[r]acialized gender was central to the founding of Rome«; etc. (1:122 ff.).

In addition, the authors use an alleged »slippage and overlap between race and religion« (Denise Kimber Buell, 1:53) to expand the meaning of ›race‹ by asserting that »ancient conceptualizations of religion were relevant for claims about collective belonging in ways that resemble or anticipate modern race« (1:60). Inconsistent facts do not lead to a discussion of diverse racisms (determined by different reference points such as ›barbarian‹, ›infidel‹, ›impure‹, or, much later, ›coloured‹ others). Instead, various forms of racism are lumped together and subordinated to the category of race. Where contradictions loom, ›abnormity‹ is invoked, ›intersections‹ are deployed or, in extreme cases, miracles are conjured.

Since skin colour is the most popular marker of modern race thinking, it cannot be silenced – even if it appears in an inverted sense. The »Gauls« were racialized »like the monstrous giants or the barbaric Amazons« but also characterized by »ra-

56 In fact, Titus Livius wrote about the »genus Numidarum« – in German simply »die Numider« or »der Numidier«, the Numidian(s), even in translations from the 19th century, when German writers were part of a scientific community that racialized whatever was at hand (*Titus Livius*, Römische Geschichte [30.12.18], ed. by *Konrad Heusinger*, vol. 3, Vieweg, Braunschweig 1821, p. 598; *id*., Römische Geschichte, ed. by *C. F. Klaiber*, vol. 13, Metzler, Stuttgart 1829, p. 1926). In her introduction to volume 1 (pp. 1–20), *Denise Eileen McCoskey* starts with a short discussion of Aubrey Diller to illustrate that »just as race became a major preoccupation in the emerging fields of natural science, it became central to historiography, and early classical scholars« (1:2). An example from Diller's work may illustrate what this implicated. Discussing the opinion of Greek philosophers that the »mingling of people« of different origin is a threat for the polis, Diller quotes from Aristotle (Politics 1303a 25): »Another cause of revolution is difference of races« (*Aubrey Diller*, Race Mixture among the Greeksbefore Alexander, University of Illinois, Urbana 1937, p. 19). In a newer translation, the same sentence reads: »Ethnic difference also causes faction« (*Aristotle*, Politics, ed. by *C. D. C. Reeve*, Hackett, Indianapolis etc. 1998, p. 140), whereas recent German translations use the word ›Stamm‹, ›tribe‹ (*Aristoteles*, Politik. Teil III, in: *id.*, Werke, ed. by *Hellmut Flashar*, Akademie, Berlin 1996, p. 55, or *Aristoteles*, Politik, ed. by *Wolfgang Kullmann*, Rowohlt, Reinbek 1994, p. 226). To illustrate his statement, Aristotle's first example reads: »The Achaeans co-settled Sybaris with the Troezenians, but later, when Achaeans became more numerous, they expelled the Troezenians« (*Aristotle*, Politics, p. 140). Sybaris was founded as a colony in Calabria by people from Helike and Troezen, two city-states in the Peloponnese. The conflict in question was between these settler groups, not even between the settlers and the colonized. Hence, to use ›race‹ in this context, a word of modern origin with a meaning that has historically evolved from cultural and classist differences to race theories, is a daring anachronism to say the least.

cial elements« like skin colour. However, while the source describes their skin as white »like snowflakes« or »milky-white«, it is interpreted as »unnaturally pale« (Naoíse Mac Sweeney, 1:114 f.) in defiance of the naturalness of snow and milk. In ›A briefe of the Bible drawne first into English poësy‹ by Henoch Clapham, »the dagters of Men (viz. of Kains lawles race)« are described as »snowt-faire«, and the interpretation reassures that »we might expect the holy and unholy to be marked in terms of white and black«. We are only a few steps from paradise, and Eve's female descendants are tagged by the original sin and the mark of Cain. Their whiteness is just a gendered surface: »The unholy may have white skin, but the unlawful nature of the racial mixing is evidenced in the progeny of ›Gyants and strong Miscreants‹« (Dennis Austin Britton, 4:26). In Thomas of Kent's ›Roman de toute chevalerie‹, a »bele e blanche« African queen commands a whole army of knights who »sunt plus blanc qe neif«, whiter than snow. However, as »[w]hite Ethiopians […] are not just an anomaly but a paradox«, they must be »a wondrous exception« (Suzanne Conklin Akbari, 2:57 f.). Nor does the »diffuse space of ›race-thinking‹ or ›race-making‹« at the time come as any wonder, because »the system – or, in Foucauldian terms, the discourse – is not yet fully operational« (2:61). Accompanied by wondrous phenomena, the telos of ›race‹ already determines the intellectual world of antiquity and the Middle Ages. It is not surprising, therefore, that we find not only »a Christian race« in the ›Cultural History of Race‹ but also a »Christian-coloured« one.

When the facts do not fit the predefined strategy, some authors bluntly advocate for retrospective racialization. To elucidate what is actually happening here, I reproduce the opening passage of the chapter ›Definitions and Representations of Race‹ (2:27–46) by Christine Chism in the volume concerning the Middle Ages:

> »At the gates of fourteenth-century Constantinople, a Muslim traveller found himself detained by the Eastern Christian inhabitants of the city. Even though he was protected by a royal entourage and was visiting a city whose emperor had married his daughter to a Muslim Khan to cement border amicability, Ibn Battuta found the chaos at the gates so terrifying he went and hid among the baggage. Several decades after the event he related the story to Muslim readers back in his Maghribi homeland:
> ›We found there about a hundred men, with an officer on a platform, and I heard them saying *Sarākinū*, *Sarākinū*, which means ›Muslims‹. They would not let us enter, and when those who were with the khātūn said that we belonged to their party, they answered, ›They cannot enter except by permission‹, so we stayed at the gate‹.[57]
> How do we describe this moment? We have an epithet, *Sarakinu*, a Greek word that originally identified a particular Arabian tribe, which had been generalized over centuries of transregional war and commerce to designate (and render fearful) any Muslim. We have a recognition and marking of otherness: Ibn Battuta *looks* like a Muslim to the citizens of

57 Just as a matter of form: I use the same edition as Chism and have corrected her quotation, which omits the diacritics on ›khātūn‹ (i.e. wife of the Khan) as well as on ›Sarākinū‹, which, in the original, has the footnote: »The Arabic transcription correctly renders the Greek sarakenoi, ›Saracens‹« – *Ibn Battuta*, The Travels of Ibn Battuta, A.D. 1325–1354, vol. 2, ed. by *Hamilton A. R. Gibb*, Ashgate, Farnham 2010 (digitalized version of the ed. Cambridge University Press, London/New York 1962), p. 504 (for the following quotes from this edition see the page references with ›IB‹ in the running text). Moreover, the inverted commas around ›Muslims‹ are missing and the last sentence begins after a period instead of a comma in Chism's version.

> Constantinople, whatever that means. Most of all, we have a gate, at which he is caught because he wears whatever threat that Sarakinu entrains in his body, dress and face: the gates slam shut for him while admitting others in the party. We could call this a moment of routine civil surveillance, a clash of ethnocentricities or an encounter of Christian-Muslim interconfessional enmity; and it is all these things. What is added when we recognize racialization at this moment? Are we being inadmissibly presentist if we see a form of racial profiling here? Does Ibn Battuta, by translating *Sarakinu* as ›Muslims‹, propose a racial dimension to religious practice? How can defining pre-modern race help parse this encounter?
>
> For instance: Can present-day associations with racial violence bring this moment to life for modern readers? Can racing this encounter help us attend more to Ibn Battuta's subjective experience of fear, isolation and reduction to a vulnerable body? […] This chapter argues for the tactical utility of seeing medieval race in scenes like this […]. It argues that race is an action whose definition is always in contest. For Ibn Battuta, racing emerges in the translation from *Sarakinu* to *Muslim*. What *Sarakinu* means to the Byzantines is quite different from what *Muslim* or *muslimīn* mean to Ibn Battuta and his audience, and the gap between the dehumanizing epithet and its translation is why definitions of race slip at the moment of racing« (2:27 f., italics in the original).

Unfortunately, this passage is not a solitary slip in the reasoning of this volume. It draws on an arbitrary reading of the sources – and, in this particular case, even manipulates them. And it takes for granted what should have been problematized: the existence of ›race‹ prior to its categorization and even before the development of the modern concept of race.

What does Ibn Battuta report? As a companion of Bayalun, daughter of Byzantine emperor Andronikos III and wife of Uzbek Khan of the Golden Horde, he travelled from the latter's residence of Mukhsha to Constantinople. As for the attitude of the husband, Ibn Battuta does not mention ›amicability‹ but records: »This sultan is mighty in sovereignty, exceedingly powerful, great in dignity, lofty in station, victor over the enemies of God, the people of Constantinople the Great, and diligent in the jihād against them« (IB 482). Regarding the arrival in Constantinople, he describes a reception in five steps. First, the travelling party was met at the border by a Greek official »with a great body of troops and a large hospitality gift« (of which Ibn Battuta got his share) (IB 501). Near Constantinople, one of Bayalun's brothers »arrived with five thousand horsemen« (IB 502). The next day, another brother, »the heir to the throne, arrived in magnificent style with a vast army« (IB 503). After that, the party set up a camp a few miles from Constantinople and was welcomed by the citizens. Even »the sultan and his wife […] came out with the officers of state and the courtiers« (IB 504). This mighty concourse of people caused pushing and shoving, and that was the situation in which Ibn Battuta was frightened by the crush of people.

Later, the travellers entered the city. When they »reached the first of the gates of the king's palace«, they were stopped and had to wait for permission because Ibn Battuta was identified as ›Saracin‹ (IB 504). As a response, the emperor »gave order that we should not be molested wheresoever we might go in the city, and this order was proclaimed in the bazaars« (IB 504). Some days later, Ibn Battuta »had audience of the sultan« (IB 504). He had to pass »through four gateways«, where he was

searched each time and informed that »every person who enters the king's presence, be he noble or commoner, foreigner or native, must be searched« (on which he remarked: »The same practice is observed in the land of India«) (IB 505). During the audience, he received a robe of honour and a horse as a gift as well as being assigned a guide to show him the city: »It is one of the customs among them that anyone who wears the king's robe of honour and rides on his horse is paraded through the city bazaars with trumpets, fifes and drums, so that the people may see him. This is most frequently done with the Turks who come from the territories of the sultan Ūzbak, so that they may not be molested; so they paraded me through the bazaars« (IB 506).

During his exploration of Constantinople, Ibn Battuta met the former king Jirjis who had become a monk. The elderly man asked about him and instructed his escort and interpreter (a Greek »who knew the Arabic tongue«):[58] »Say to this Saracen (meaning Muslim) ›I clasp the hand that has entered Jerusalem and the foot that has walked within the Dome of the Rock and the great Church called Qumama, and Bethlehem‹ and [so saying] he put his hand upon my feet and passed it over his face. I was amazed at their belief in the merits of one who, though not of their religion, had entered these places« (IB 512 f.).

So much for the S-word. Instead of tagging it (like Chism) as a »dehumanizing epithet«, Ibn Battuta mentioned it twice in a descriptive sense as the term used by Christians to name Muslims, while neither addressing nor discussing its supposed disparaging dimensions.[59] In this situation, the term was not used as a »marking of otherness« but rather to describe a well-known difference. Hence, he did not make the »subjective experience of fear, isolation and reduction to a vulnerable body«, but of being politely welcomed and opulently endowed with gifts and even accepted as a devout pilgrim who had visited the holy sites of Christendom (although as holy sites of Islam). There was no »racing« in his story – until it was abridged and distorted in the modern re-narration of a critical race scholar.

58 By the way: when Ibn Battuta met Bayalun, she was surrounded by »about a hundred slave-girls, Greek, Turkish and Nubian« (IB 488). He himself got slaves as presents and he bought some by himself. His first two slaves were a man and a girl of Greek origin (cf. *Ross E. Dunn*, The Adventures of Ibn Battuta. A Muslim Traveler of the 14th Century, Croom Helm, London etc. 1986, p. 154).

59 For a short categorization see *Daniel G. König*, Isidore of Seville on the Origins of the Term ›Saracens‹, in: *id./Theresa Jäckh/Eric Böhme* (eds.), Transmediterranean History. Commented Anthology of Primary Sources, URL: <https://wiki.uni-konstanz.de/transmed-en/index.php/621:-_Isidore_of_Seville_on_the_Origins_of_the_Term_"Saracens"> [5.5.2023], who concludes: »it is possible to conceive geographic, ethnic, and linguistic explanations. The geographical explanations attribute the Greek variant of the term ›Saracens‹ to toponyms that are located on the Sinai or in the northern periphery of the Arabian Peninsula and have already been recorded in parts by ancient authors such as the geographer Ptolemy. The ethnic explanations assume that an Arab tribe carrying the ethnonym ›Saracens‹ existed, and claim that the latter was then increasingly applied to other Arab groups during the repeated emergence and collapse of pre-Islamic tribal confederations. Linguistic explanations link the term ›Saracens‹ with Arabic and Aramaic terms. In this vein, Σαρακηνοί/*Saraceni* is either derived from *sāriq/sāriqīn* (Arabic: ›stealing‹/›thieves‹), from *šarqī/šarqīyyūn* (Arabic: ›Eastern‹/›Orientals‹), from *s^{e}rāq* (Aramaic: ›emptiness‹/›wasteland‹), and finally from *šarika(t)* (Arabic: ›association‹, here in the sense of ›confederation‹).«

On top of this, Chism completely abdicates the commitment to discuss thoroughly the conceptual history of disputable categories (above all in a chapter on ›definition and representations‹). Yet ›Saracen‹ would have been a perfect example for such a debate (as well as ›race‹, of course). While there are several chapters in this volume addressing the topic ›Saracens‹, unfortunately (again), that dealing with the history of the category is another bitter pill (at least for my expectations). In her paper ›Race and Politics‹ (2:97–112), Geraldine Heng makes short work of ›Saracens‹: the word, »that, in the late antiquity, referred to pre-Islamic Arabs« became the label »for the international enemy that Latin Christendom fought in its holy wars« by making Islam »into an instrument of essentialism«, that »raced all Muslim believers into a singular, homogenous whole« and »embedded a lie at the heart of the raced identity« with the propagation of a »fake etymology« by insinuating that Arabs (and, later, Muslims) used this name to pretend that they were legitimate descendants of Abraham and his wife Sarah despite being Ishmaelites, descendants of Ishmael, the son of Sarah's slave Hagar, and therefore should be called Hagarenes (2:101 f.).

This truncated derivation ignores essential developments and differences and, to top it all, passes off the associated ideology as an »ingenious lie« (2:102). Such criticism of ideology implicitly imagines powerful control centres for the phrasing of thoughts and beliefs, staffed by devious liars who propagate untruths to denigrate potential or real enemies in the interest of ruling classes – instead of monitoring the history of the category and asking who contributed to the changes of its meaning, when and why, and with what consequences.

As shown in a meticulous study by Jan Retsö, in actual fact the ›Geography‹ of Ptolemy, written in the 2nd century CE, seems to be »the earliest text where we find the Saracens mentioned as a group of people« and during the next centuries »Saracens and Arabs are mentioned side by side by the authors«, that is, as different people. At the beginning of the 4th century, Eusebius of Caesarea wrote in his ›Chronicon‹: »Abraham from the maid Agar gave birth to Ismahel from whom the lineage (genus) of the Ismaelites [came] who later were called Agareni and lately Saraceni«. In the course of that century, »›Saracens‹ becomes the regular term for the desert-dwellers in the Middle-East«[60] and the Saracens became allies of the Roman Empire, even contributing to the defence of Constantinople against the Goths in 378.[61]

But neither the Saracenization of Arabs nor (after the rise of Islam) the Muslimization of the Saracens was the last word in this context. The Saracens were also paganized (so much that the name Saracen could even refer to pagans of antiquity or contemporary pagans like the Irish and Scots in the 13th century or the Lithunians in the 14th century).[62] Moreover, the »homogeneous whole« of Saracens was subject to a range of modifications, including the praise of Islamic knighthood. In England,

60 *Jan Retsö*, The Arabs in Antiquity. Their History from the Assyrians to the Umayyads, RoutledgeCurzon, London/New York 2003, pp. 505 f. (›side by side‹), 507 (quote from Eusebius), 514 (›desert-dwellers‹).

61 Cf. *David Woods*, The Saracen Defenders of Constantinople in 378, in: Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 37, 1997, no. 3, pp. 359–379.

62 Cf. Matthieu Boyd, Celts Seen as Muslims and Muslims Seen by Celts in Medieval Literature, in: *Jerold C. Frakes* (ed.), Contextualizing the Muslim Other in Medieval Christian Discourse, Pal-

an analysis of the various tales of the Auchinleck manuscript, produced around the time Ibn Battuta entered Constantinople, has revealed a »similarity between noble Saracen warriors and their Christian counterparts«. Both are characterized by »knightliness« and, as a consequence, it seems that »class identity […] transcends cultural or religious affiliations«.[63] In Germany, Wolfram von Eschenbach »describes the Muslims as being on par with the Christians in terms of their wealth, splendor, their courtly nobleness, education, and bravery« and even suggests »that religious conviction is irrelevant to […] [k]nighthood and courtly service«.[64]

III. The Missing Link: Race and Class

Sometime in the second half of the 10th century, an anonymous author in a British monastery wrote the ›Codex Exoniensis‹. It contains several riddles. One of them describes »se wonna þegn | sweart ond saloneb«, a servant who may have worked at the communal baking oven of a village. He is portrayed as shrouded in darkness – »a dark thane, | swarthy and dun-faced«.[65] This description did not stop one of the text's editors from speaking of »the dark thane, | a swarthy blackamoor«.[66] But the servant talked about here was no ›moor‹, he simply belonged to the labouring classes. He was not racialized but classified as a member of the lower orders of society.

Perhaps around the same time (but only passed down orally and put into writing in the 14th century), there existed the stratified social model of the Rígsþula. This Eddic poem relates how a Norse god fathers the different strata of a simple class society. Three women, referred to as the great-grandmother, grandmother, and mother, gave birth to his three sons. The first one »bore a swarthy boy« and »called him Thrall« (»Þræll«, meaning slave), the ancestor of the serfs. The second one had a baby (»Churl«/Karl, the freeman) who was »rosy and ruddy« and became the progenitor of farmers and artisans. The latter bore a son (»Jarl«/Earl), the founder of the nobility whose description reads: »Light were his locks, and fair his cheeks.«[67]

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grave Macmillan, New York 2011, pp. 21–38, p. 22 (›Irish‹, ›Scots‹); *John V. Tolan*, Saracens. Islam in the Medieval European Imagination, Columbia University Press, New York 2002, p. 127 (›Lithunians‹).

63 *Siobhain Bly Calkin*, Saracens and the Making of English Identity. The Auchinleck Manuscript, Routledge, Abingdon/New York 2005, p. 30.

64 *Heiko Hartmann*, Wolfram's Islam. The Beliefs of the Muslim Pagans in Parzival and Willehalm, in: *Albrecht Classen* (ed.), East Meets West in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Times. Transcultural Experiences in the Premodern World, De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston 2013, pp. 427–440, p. 432 (›on par‹), and *David F. Tinsley*, Mapping the Muslims. Images of Islam in Middle High German Literature of the Thirteenth Century, in: *Frakes*, Contextualizing the Muslim Other in Medieval Christian Discourse, pp. 65–101, p. 84 (›irrelevant‹).

65 *Paull F. Baum* (transl.), Anglo-Saxon Riddles of the Exeter Book, Duke University Press, Durham 1963, p. 32.

66 *William S. Mackie* (ed.), The Exeter Book, part 2: Poems IX–XXXII, Oxford University Press, London etc. 1934, p. 143, on p. 142 (original wording).

67 The Song of Rig, in: The Elder or Poetic Edda, part 1: The Mythological Poems, ed. and transl. by *Olive Bray*, printed for the Voking Club, London 1908, pp. 202–217, pp. 205 (›swarthy‹), 209 (›rosy‹), 213 (›fair‹). For the Rígsþula and the Exeter Book see e. g. *David Pelteret*, The Image of the

Justification for these differences was found in the book of Genesis (9, 20–27). Noah's curse – directed against his son Ham but imposed on his grandson Canaan – was used to justify social inequality. However, contemporary authors also used the curse in other ways. In Hugo von Trimberg's ›Renner‹, written around 1300, the curse was not restricted to serfs and slaves but also extended to Jews, heretics, heathens, and Christians who sinned against God: »Der vellet niht gemeine | Ûf de gebûr alterseine, | Er vellet ûf manige ander liute, | Als ich iu her nâch beduite: | Juden, ketzer, heiden | Und Kristen, die unbescheiden | Sint und unordentlîchen lebent | Und wider gotes willen strebent, | Ûf die vellet der selbe fluoch: | Als lêrent uns der heiligen buoch«.[68]

While the ›Codex Exoniensis‹ was being written, Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn Jarīr ibn Yazīd al-Ṭabarī drafted his ›History of the Prophets, Kings and Caliphs‹, in which he linked slavery to skin colour. Regarding the curse of Ham, he pointed to Noah's sons Shem, Ham, and Japheth and to various sources that identified Ham as the father of the »Abyssinians«, the »Blacks«, or the »Sudanese«. Moreover, Ham not only »begat all those who are black and curly-haired« but »wherever his descendents met the children of Shem [that means: the Arabs], the latter would enslave them«.[69]

Here, a religious narrative was used to legitimize slavery and, contrary to the wording of Genesis, was associated with the skin colour of Africans. However, this same narrative also found its way into the legitimation of other power relationships. As Paul Freedman has argued, during the Middle Ages the »institution of serf-

Slave in Some Anglo-Saxon and Norse Sources, in: Slavery and Abolition 23, 2002, no. 2, pp. 75–88.

68 *Hugo von Trimberg*, Der Renner, ed. by *Gustav Ehrismann*, vol. 1, Literarischer Verein in Stuttgart, Tübingen 1908, p. 58, vv. 1397–1406; cf. chapter 4, ›The Curse of Noah‹, in: *Paul Freedman*, Images of the Medieval Peasant, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1999, pp. 86–104.

69 *Al-Ṭabarī*, The History of al-Ṭabarī (Ta'rīkh al-rusul wa'l-mulūk), vol. 2, transl. by William M. Brinner, State University of New York Press, Albany 1987, pp. 20 f. As al-Ṭabarī plays no part of the ›Cultural History of Race‹, the collection also misses his detailed discussion of the Zanj Rebellion (869–883), a famous revolt of black slaves against the Abbasid Caliphate. Already al-Jahiz had informed his readers that, according to the view of the Zanj, skin colour had nothing to do with divine punishment; »[b]lackness and whiteness« were »caused by the properties of the region as well as the God-given nature of water and soil and by the proximity or remoteness of the sun and the intensity or mildness of its heat« (*ʿAmr ibn Bahr al-Jahiz*, The Boasts of the Blacks over the Whites, transl. by Tarif Khalidi, in: Islamic Quarterly 25, 1981, pp. 3–51, here: p. 24). At that time, the name Zanj was used as a toponym for a region in East Africa, as an ethnonym for its inhabitants as well as for other African peoples, and as a socionym for black slaves (cf. *Marina Tolmacheva*, Toward a Definition of the Term Zanj, in: Azania 21, 1986, no. 1, pp. 105–130). The Zanj mentioned by al-Jahiz offered a long-lasting resistance against their enslavement (cf. *Ghada Hashem Talhami*, The Zanj Rebellion Reconsidered, in: The International Journal of African Historical Studies 10, 1977, no. 3, pp. 443–461). Along the Euphrates, they had already rebelled many times when, in September 869, a great revolt took place. At that time, al-Jahiz had just perished. The history of the revolt was than written by al-Ṭabarī (cf. *al-Ṭabarī*, The History of al-Ṭabarī [Ta'rīkh al-rusul wa'l-mulūk], vols. 36, transl. by David Waines, and 37, transl. by Philip M. Fields, State University of New York Press, Albany 1992 and 1987). The insurgents stood their ground longer than a decade. During this time, they also kept slaves themselves (cf. *Alexandre Popovic*, La révolte des esclaves en Iraq au III^{e}/IX^{e} siècle, Geuthner, Paris 1976, p. 130).

dom was thought to have arisen from Ham's sin and Noah's curse«. Ham therefore appears in several roles, as the ancestor of several peoples, Africans included, and of lower-class serfs. But »[f]or the Christian Middle Ages, […] Ham was not exclusively associated with Africa, Africans were not thought of as exclusively black, and blacks were not thought of primarily as slaves«.[70]

After the word race emerged in European languages, it was used in different contexts. Long before it acquired its modern anthropological meaning as a marker for global population classification, the term was used as an indicator in religious and socio-structural contexts. Initially, there was no categorical border between these uses and a social class could be called ›race‹ without being ›racialized‹ in the eventual sense of racial construction. Even during the formation of modern racism, when Karl Marx, in his ›Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts‹, referred to the working class as the »Sklavenklasse der Arbeiter« and the »Arbeiterrace«[71], this was not a sign of ›racialization‹ but rather an evidence of semantic ambiguity. However, it can also be viewed as an indication of the social challenge of racialization for the ruling classes, which not only involved disparaging outside others but also imposing the idea of equal status (of race) with those who had traditionally been viewed as inferior (due to their class). Here, it was not a question of metaphysical equality (such as that of souls before God), which would only be redeemed in the afterlife. It was a matter of social equality that was even supposed to be based on natural foundations, which simultaneously were the alleged basis of the division of social classes.

The complex and long-lasting melange of class and race is not a systematically analyzed topic in the ›Cultural History of Race‹, although it might have been approached from various perspectives. An auspicious possibility for such an analysis is given away in Peter Kivisto's approach to Max Weber in his chapter on ›Race and Ethnicity. Conceptualizing Difference in the Social Sciences‹ (6:107–124):

> »Weber's […] thinking about race and ethnicity was initially motivated by his critical reaction to biological racial theories, which was evident in a charged debated he had with Alfred Ploetz, a proponent of biologically deterministic race theory«. His »visit to the United States« and »his trip through the Deep South«, where »he visited Booker T. Washington's Tuskegee Institute«, »combined with his extended contacts with W. E. B. Du Bois led him to an appreciation of the sheer complexity and ethnicity in the United States, where a class society existed side by side with a caste system«.
>
> »The key text in question is ›Ethnic Group‹« in »Economy and Society«. »Weber defined ethnic group as ›those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or of memories of colonization and migration‹ […]. He goes on to contend that the belief may or may not be grounded in ›an objective blood relationship‹. There are three pertinent features to this definition that are worth highlighting. First, the ethnic group is a social construct […]. Second, racial groups are construed as a subset of ethnic groups […]. Third, the emphasis on those claiming group membership as the sole arbiters of defining the ethnic group fails to

70 *Freedman*, Images of the Medieval Peasant, pp. 86 (›curse‹), 93 (›Africans‹).

71 *Karl Marx*, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844, in: *id./Friedrich Engels*, Werke (MEW), vol. 40, Dietz, Berlin 1968, pp. 465–588, pp. 475 (›Sklavenklasse‹), 471 (›Arbeiterrace‹).

appreciate the obvious role of others in imposing group identities on the less powerful and more marginalized sectors of a society (surprisingly given Weber's usual attentiveness to power in social relations)« (6:118 f.).

This reading of Weber is astonishing in several respects: it overlooks Weber's distinction of natural race and social race and his belief that both exist and are of principal importance for the varieties of cultures; it glosses over Weber's evaluation of his trip to the United States; it treats Du Bois merely as a reference and does not highlight the similarities and differences in his and Weber's understanding of race; it ignores the essence of Weber's definition of ›ethnic honour‹; and it disregards his connection between class and race.

To begin with, Weber's ›thinking about race‹ was *not* motivated by a ›critical reaction to biological racial theories‹. On the contrary, he believed in the importance of race. In the introduction to the reprint of his ›Protestant Ethics‹ in the first volume of his collected works on ›Religionssoziologie‹, he stated that »[t]he author admits that he is inclined to think the importance of biological heredity very great«. Weber assumed that the »types of rationalization« developed »only« in the »Occident« were most likely due to »the differences of heredity«. However, he acknowledged that there was currently »no way of exactly […] measuring« these differences, because »comparative racial neurology and psychology« had not yet »progressed beyond their present and in many ways very promising beginnings«.[72]

72 *Max Weber*, Author's Introduction, in: *id.*, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, transl. by Talcott Parsons, 3rd imp., Scribner, New York and Allen & Unwin, London 1950, pp. 13–31, pp. 30 f. Weber's attack on Ploetz applied to the blinkered lecture of the latter, not to race science in general. He had made the case for the appointment of Ploetz to the board of the ›Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie‹ and had welcomed that this popular eugenicist presented a paper concerning the race problem to the first German ›Soziologentag‹ (cf. *Friedrich Lenger*, Werner Sombart 1863–1941. Eine Biographie, C. H. Beck, München 1994, pp. 202 f.). Hence, *Paul Weindling*, Health, Race and German Politics Between National Unification and Nazism, 1870–1945, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York etc. 1989, p. 141, correctly surmises that »Weber seems to have been criticizing academic imprecision and not the concept of race itself«. Weber's contribution to the discussion is documented in Verhandlungen des Ersten Deutschen Soziologentages vom 19.–22. Oktober in Frankfurt a.M., Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 1911, pp. 151–157. Here, he explicitly put on record his positive expectations concerning the future findings of race analysis for social questions: »Was wir von den Herren Rassenbiologen erwarten und was – wie ich nicht zweifle, gerade auf Grund des Eindrucks, den ich von den Arbeiten des Herrn Dr. Ploetz und seiner Freunde gewonnen habe […] – was wir von ihnen sicherlich irgend wann geleistet erhalten werden, das ist der exakte Nachweis […] der ausschlaggebenden Wichtigkeit ganz konkreter Erbqualitäten für konkrete Einzelerscheinungen des gesellschaftlichen Lebens« (p. 156). At the following Soziologentag, ›race‹ again was a topic and Weber repeated his warnings against using ›race‹ as an analytical concept as long as major theoretical questions remained unresolved – cf. Verhandlungen des Zweiten Deutschen Soziologentages vom 10.–22. Oktober 1912 in Berlin, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 1913, pp. 188–191: »Die eigentliche Frage im Rassenproblem […] ist heute auf den meisten Gebieten noch nicht einmal exakt zu stellen, geschweige daß schon an eine Lösung zu denken wäre« (p. 188). Ironically, he also referred to the historical dimension of the problem and called it a »scholarly crime« to use uncertain categories like ›race‹ in discussions about antiquity (»Es ist ein wissenschaftliches Verbrechen, heute, mit ganz ungeklärten Begriffen, auf dem Gebiet der Antike durch kritiklosen Gebrauch von Rassenhypothesen die freilich weit schwierigere soziologische Analyse umgehen zu wollen« [pp. 188 f.]).

Furthermore, Weber was quite outspoken in racial beliefs and statements. This is evident in his vilification of the Poles, who were used as an »example« to »illustrate [...] the role played by physical and psychological racial differences between nationalities in the economic struggle for existence«. According to Weber, due to their »lower expectations of the standard of living, [...] something which is either natural to the Slav race or has been bred into it in the course of its history«, the migration of agricultural workers from Poland to Germany would result in »German peasants and day-labourers in the east [...] coming off worse in a silent and bleak struggle for everyday economic existence in competition with an inferior race«.[73] And this also applies to Weber's comments after his ›trip through the Deep South‹ in the United States. Here, he and his wife visited Tuskegee, for Weber »the only place with a socially free atmosphere, particularly for the numerous half-Negroes, quarter-Negroes, and one-hundredth part Negroes whom no non-American can distinguish from whites«. His wife summarized that »[t]hey sensed above all the tragedy of the pariahdom of that ever-increasing mixed race of all shades from dark brown to ivory, people who by virtue of their descent and talents belonged to the master race [Herrenrasse]«, or, as he would have preferred, »Herrenvolk«. As a comparison, Weber remarked: »The semi-apes one encounters on the plantations and in the Negro huts of the ›Cotton Belt‹ afford a horrible contrast.« Later, near the end of the First World War, Weber would become upset about the »scum of African and Asian savages« in the colonial troops of the Entente Powers.[74]

His attitude toward Du Bois was quite different. As a self-declared »class-conscious bourgeois«, Weber believed that he treated class and race from a sovereign position. Although he did not racially promote Du Bois, he classed him as a »Gentleman« and as »the most eminent sociological scholar in the American southern states«, »with whom no white person can compete«.[75] He collegially corresponded with him and invited him to write a paper for the ›Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft‹.[76] He also agreed with Du Bois that the ›colour line‹ was a central social problem (and

73 *Max Weber*, The Nation State and Economic Policy (Inaugural Lecture), in*: id.*, Political Writings, ed. by *Peter Lassman/Ronald Speirs*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York etc. 1994, pp. 1–28, pp. 2 (›struggle‹), 8 (›Slav race‹), 14 (›inferior race‹).

74 Max Weber as quoted in *Marianne Weber*, Max Weber. A Biography. With a new Introduction by Guenther Roth, Transaction Books, New Brunswick etc. 1988, p. 296 (›atmosphere‹, ›semi-apes‹); the quote on ›pariahdom‹ is from Marianne Weber (p. 295), using her husband's terminology, with the addendum ›Herrenvolk‹ from *Max Weber*, Suffrage and Democracy in Germany, in: *id.*, Political Writings, pp. 80–129, here: p. 129; and *Max Weber*, Die siebte deutsche Kriegsanleihe, in: Frankfurter Zeitung, 18.9.1917, as quoted in *Hinnerk Bruhns*, Max Weber und der Erste Weltkrieg, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2017, p. 170 (›savages‹).

75 Max Weber in Verhandlungen des Ersten Deutschen Soziologentages, p. 164.

76 *W. E. Burghardt Du Bois*, Die Negerfrage in den Vereinigten Staaten, in: *Werner Sombart/Max Weber/Edgar Jaffé* (eds.), Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, vol. 22, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 1906, pp. 31–79. For an English version see *id.*, Die Negerfrage in den Vereinigten Staaten (The Negro Question in the United States), transl. by Joseph G. Fracchia, in: The New Centennial Review 6, 2006, issue 3, pp. 241–290; in this paper, a single sentence contains the words ›class‹, ›caste‹, ›nation‹, ›race‹, and ›state‹: »in the heart of the nation that had laughed about social prejudices and that had set itself the goal of erecting a state with the least conceivable class differences, there existed from the very beginning the worst of all caste differences that, unheeded, grew to a threatening girth, namely a slavery based on race and color« (p. 234).

was also eager to learn more about the relationship between class and race in the United States).[77] But though their approaches to racism showed some similarities, there also remained a significant difference.

The central element of Weber's treatment of race and racism is ignored by Kivisto. Weber had no doubt that there was something like an »objective racial difference«. But as a sociologist he assumed that »[o]f course, race creates a ›group‹ only when it is subjectively perceived as a common trait«. This, however, requires »some common experiences of members of the same race« which »are linked to some antagonism against members of an obviously different group«. This implies that »[t]he resulting social action is usually merely negative«, resulting in »the belief in a specific ›honor‹ of their members, not shared by the outsiders, that is, the sense of ›ethnic honor‹«. Weber calls it an »honor of the masses« because »it is accessible to anybody who belongs to the subjectively believed community of descent«, not least for the lower classes. Weber considers »[t]he ›poor white trash‹« in the southern slave states as an ideal example to illustrate this. These »very often destitute white inhabitants […] were the actual bearers of racial antipathy, which was quite foreign to the planters. This was so because the social honor of the ›poor whites‹ was dependent upon the social déclassement of the [blacks].«[78]

These deliberations cover the relations of class and race – including the ›negativity‹ of racist socialization. It has an external orientation because it does not change anything about classist inequality. Its manual is as old as the history of class societies, as covered in the ›Cultural History of Race‹. Plato himself had lectured the citizens of Athens that they were unequal because the Gods mixed gold, silver, and iron and bronze into the blood of the different classes. But in relation to barbarians, they could nevertheless be proud of being »purely Greek and unmixed with Barbarian stock«.[79] This recipe was still prescribed by Adam Smith, who recommended that lower classes not compare their circumstances with the rich members of their own society (because they would come off badly) but rather use ›savages‹ for comparison, whereupon they would find that their situation was »much superior to that

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But despite also mentioning Robert Parks, Kivisto completely abstains from mentioning ›caste‹ and ›class‹ or even discussing their relation (perhaps because the publisher needed the space for the full-page portraits of Weber and Parks, without however considering Du Bois); for the background see *Aldon D. Morris*, The Scholar Denied. W. E. B. Du Bois and the Birth of Modern Sociology, University of California Press, Oakland 2015, and *Pierre Saint-Arnaud*, African American Pioneers of Sociology. A Critical History, University of Toronto Press, Toronto/Buffalo etc. 2009.

77 Cf. *Lawrence A. Scaff*, Max Weber in America, Princeton University Press, Princeton/Woodstock 2011, pp. 100 (colour line), 104 (class and race).

78 *Max Weber*, Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, ed. by *Guenther Roth/Claus Wittich*, University of California Press, Berkeley etc. 1978, pp. 385 (›difference‹ – ›negative‹), 390 (›honor‹), 391 (›masses‹ – ›[blacks']‹; Weber uses the wording »Deklassierung der Schwarzen«, whereas the translation applies the N-word); cf. *Wulf D. Hund*, Racism in White Sociology. From Adam Smith to Max Weber, in: *id./Alana Lentin* (eds.), Racism and Sociology, Lit, Wien/Zürich etc. 2014, pp. 23–67, here: pp. 46 ff.

79 *Plato*, Menexenus, in: *id.*, The Dialogues of Plato, ed. by *Reginald E. Allen*, Yale University Press, New Haven etc. 1984, pp. 329–343, p. 339 (245 c/d); for the class legend see *id.*, Republic, ed. by *Charles D. C. Reeve*, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis etc. 2004, p. 100 (415 a).

of many an Indian prince, the absolute master of the lives and liberties of a thousand naked savages«.[80]

Weber does not think this correlation through to the end[81], whereas Du Bois focused on the race question and linked it to class. At the ›National Negro Conference‹, he explained that the »hegemony of the white races […] attempts to make the slums of white society in all cases and under all circumstances the superior of any colored group« and to construe »white« as »the right of white men of any kind to club blacks into submission«. Later, he complemented this statement with the reflection »that the white group of laborers, while they received a low wage, were compensated in part by a sort of public and psychological wage. They were given public deference and titles of courtesy because they were white.«[82] And there is more to come. ›Whiteness‹, as colonialism and imperialism demonstrate, is a global relation, comprising the »chance for exploitation on an immense scale for inordinate profit, not simply for the very rich, but also to the middle class and the laborers«. By contrast, the »great majority of mankind« in America, Africa, and Asia »shares a common destiny« and »is despised and rejected by race and color«. For Du Bois, this was the »real modern labor problem«: »The emancipation of man is the emancipation of labor and the emancipation of labor is the freeing of that basic majority of workers who are yellow, brown and black.«

Against this backdrop, Du Bois argued that a »revolt against the domination of the planters over the poor whites« was doomed to fail because calls »for a class struggle to destroy the planters« were »nullified by deep-rooted antagonism to the Negro«: »the poor whites and their leaders could not for a moment contemplate a fight of united white and black labor against the exploiters«. Instead, »[m]ob violence and lynching were the inevitable result of the attitude of these two classes and for a time were a sort of permissible Roman holiday for the entertainment of vi-

80 *Adam Smith*, Early Draft of Parts of the Wealth of Nation, in: *id.*, Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. by *Ronald L. Meek/David D. Raphael/Peter G. Stein*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1968, pp. 562–581, here: p. 562; here, Smith referred to North America, but later he turned to the circumstances »of many an African king, the absolute master of the lives and liberties of ten thousand naked savages« as a point of reference (*id.*, An Inquiry into the Nature and the Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 2 vols., ed. by *Roy H. Campbell/Andrew S. Skinner/William B. Todd*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1976, vol. 1, p. 24).

81 Elsewhere, he even negates it: »The mere differentiation of property classes is not ›dynamic‹, that is, it need not result in class struggles and revolutions. The strongly privileged class of slave owners may coexist with the much less privileged peasants or even the declassed, frequently without any-class antagonism and sometimes in solidarity (against the unfree). […] A classic example of the lack of class conflict was the relationship of the ›poor white trash‹ to the plantation owners in the Southern States. The ›poor white trash‹ were far more anti-Negro than the plantation owners, who were often imbued with patriarchal sentiments« (*Weber*, Economy and Society, pp. 303 f.).

82 *W. E. Burghardt Du Bois*, Evolution of the Race Problem, in: Proceedings of the National Negro Conference 1909. New York s.d., pp. 142–158, pp. 153 f. (›slums‹), and *id.*, Black Reconstruction. An Essay Toward a History of the Part which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York 1935, p. 700 (›psychological wage‹); for the following quotes see *id.*, The Souls of White Folk, in: *id.*, Darkwater. Voices from within the Veil, Hartcourt, Brace and Howe, New York 1920, p. 43 (›profit‹), and *id.*, Black Reconstruction, pp. 15 f. (›great majority‹, ›emancipation of labor‹), 27 (›poor whites‹), 701 (›Roman Holiday‹).

cious whites.« These racist amusements obviously did not take place in antiquity. ›Rome‹ was either a generalized metaphor for the sadistic treatment of black people (as »the ugliest way | To torture Negroes in the fiercest fashion« in Claude McKay's poem ›A Roman Holiday‹) or a particular reminiscence of the lynching of Charley Sheppard in Rome, Mississippi, delineated by William Pickens in a report captioned ›A Roman Holiday‹ in ›The Crisis‹, edited by Du Bois.[83]

Du Bois's deliberations on race and class as well as on race and racism are mostly ignored in the ›Cultural History of Race‹.[84] Concerning the former, he by and large remains the ›scholar denied‹, though he not only discussed the link between race and class but, also, early on »the growing differentiation of classes among Negroes«, including the consequences of its being acknowledged or ignored for the discourse of race.[85] This has been linked with elitist and patriarchal tendencies in Du Bois thinking. But no matter what, it also comprised a painful insight into the functioning of racism, which tries to stabilize the classist stratification of the discriminators by disregarding the social differentiation of the discriminated.

This can be illustrated by a picture which was part of the large compilation of photographs collected in four volumes for the Negro Exhibit shown in 1900 as part of the Exposition Universelle in Paris.[86] It shows David Tobias Howard, a successful undertaker from Atlanta (Georgia) together with his mother Fannie Howard and his wife Ella Branner Howard in a two-horse carriage driven by a coachman (see Figure 4).[87] Obviously, he wanted to present himself and his family as members of the respected black urban upper class. The local newspaper declared him »perhaps the most respected representative of his race by white and black alike« in his town. But it also left no doubt why it celebrated his way »From Slavery to Riches«, described in an article with this header and the subtitle »Pioneer Negro Points Way to Racial Understanding«. Whatever the author of this text may have written or the typesetter interpreted, in its printed version it reads »David Howard was born in 1849 as the property of Colonel Howard […] upon a plantation in Crawford country«. Later, as a successful businessman, he declared that his »principles of business […] were taught him as a young body servant« by his »master« and remembered that both of

83 *Claude McKay*, A Roman Holiday, in: The Liberator 2, 1919, issue 7 (July), p. 21; *William Pickens*, A Roman Holiday, in: The Crisis 36, 1929, issue 3, pp. 79–80 and 96.

84 Cf. *Morris*, The Scholar Denied, who, p. 131, even reckons that »Du Bois's approach to slavery and race generally is best seen as a political sociology stressing power, violence, exploitation, ideological dominance, and class relations«.

85 Cf. *W. E. Burghardt Du Bois*, The Negroes of Farmville, Virginia. A Social Study, in: Bulletin of the Department of Labor 14, 1898 (Washington: Government Printing Office), pp. 1–38, here: p. 38.

86 See in detail *Shawn Michelle Smith*, Photography on the Color Line. W. E. B. Du Bois, Race, and Visual Culture, Duke University Press, Durham etc. 2004.

87 Cf. *Eugene F. Provenzo Jr*., W. E. B. Du Bois's Exhibit of American Negroes. African Americans at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham/Boulder etc. 2013, p. 55; for the situation of affluent people of colour see *Loren Schweninger*, Black Property Owners in the South 1790–1915, University of Illinois Press, Urbana etc. 1990; for the photograph see Library of Congress, URL: <http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/cph.3b17327> [5.5.2023]; on Howard, see David T. Howard. The Man Behind the Name, URL: <https://atlantaspastrevisited.com/2017/04/07/david-t-howard-pt-1-the-man-behind-the-name/> [5.5.2023]; there, the article quoted below is documented as being from ›The Atlanta Constitution‹, 7.10.1920.

them »cried« when he left him after emancipation. He went to Atlanta, where he worked as a »personal servant« of another white benefactor, from whom he, after the employer »died in the arms of his beloved servant«, inherited a substantial sum of money, the starting capital of his own business. And despite his prospering enterprise, »[h]e declared that no sane thinking negro wanted social equality with the white race«. According to him, »most of the trouble arises from the fact that the two races come in closest touch which each other at the bottom of the scale – the worst elements of both races are the more intimate, while the best elements live apart«.

Figure 4: Race and Class – Social dynamics and the colour line

To visualise the racist dimension of the photograph, we need only imagine the Howard family is on its way to the train station some years later. Here, they will be reminded by law, railway officials, police, and white crowds that ›living apart‹ means forcible segregation. It includes the social dimension of race, put into only a few words by Du Bois: »[T]he black man is a person who must ride ›Jim Crow‹ in Georgia.«[88] In this case, class did not help, as Emanuel Love, president of the black Baptist Foreign Mission Convention and minister in the Baptist church of Savannah, Georgia, had to learn in 1889, when he seated himself in the first-class car of a train. He had a first-class ticket, but the train had no first-class section for black passengers. One of the white travellers cabled to a station ahead where, as Love reported later, »a dozen rough looking men boarded the train and ordered us out of the car. We didn't go, and we were assaulted. […] I think some of us would have been killed« without the »interference of the conductor.«[89]

88 *W. E. Burghardt Du Bois*, The Superior Race. An Essay, in: The Smart Set 70, 1923, no. 4, pp. 55–60, here: p. 60.

89 Emanuel K. Love, quoted in *Arthur Remillard*, Southern Civil Religions. Imagining the Good Society in the Post-Reconstruction Era, The University of Georgia Press, Athens/London 2011, p. 61; for the background see *Barbara McCaskill*, Georgia, in: *Nikki L. M. Brown/Barry M. Stenti-*

As nuanced as Du Bois's approach to the relation of class and race is, it proves to be deficient in his treatment of the connection between race and racism. His discussion is marked by a significant gap – the absence of the category of ›racism‹ in his oeuvre.[90] Forced to engage with ›race‹ as a result of social relations shaped by white supremacy, he tried to transform ›race‹ into an instrument of criticism and resistance. This implied that he also upheld questionable dimensions of the concept of race, which is inextricably linked to an essentialism of difference.

By chance, the same issue of the ›Crisis‹ in which Pickens's ›Roman Holiday‹ was published also contains a short notice concerning Liberia (in the section ›Along the Color Line‹): »The Firestone Company has at present 30 000 acres planted in rubber trees in Liberia.«[91] Du Bois had visited the country in 1923/24 as a personal ambassador of the president of the United States and a member of a delegation investigating the possibilities of rubber cultivation and export. He may have genuinely believed that »white capital« from America could »do a fine and unusual job in imperialism« by helping Liberia establish »a local organization of control without a rigid color line«.[92] However, by 1929, he should have known better. At that time, the League of Nations received accusations that the Liberian government was using and even trading in forced labour. The State Department of the United States viewed this as an opportunity »to undermine the country's sovereignty, turn international public opinion against the republic, and promote Firestone as Liberia's savior«.[93] They chose Charles S. Johnson, then chair of the Department of Sociology at Fisk University, as their delegate for the international commission appointed to investigate the accusations. The final report was blunt: »The Commission finds that forced labor has been made use of in Liberia«, »that none of this labor has been paid«, that »contract laborers […] have been recruited under conditions of criminal compulsion scarcely distinguishable from slave raiding and slave trading« – but also »that the Firestone Plantations Company consciously employs any but voluntary labor on its leased rubber plantation«.[94]

When asked to comment, Du Bois fully grasped the situation. However, he limited himself to criticizing the pressure exerted by white imperial states and private capital on Liberia, whose »chief crime is to be black and poor in a rich, white world; and in precisely that portion of the world where color is ruthlessly exploited as a

ford (eds.), The Jim Crow Encyclopedia, 2 vols., Greenwood Press, Westport/London 2008, pp. 323–328.

90 On one of the extremely rare occasions he used the word, he did so not voluntarily but in answer to a question referring to it – cf. *W. E. Burghardt Du Bois,* [Letter to Will W. Alexander], 26.11.1943, in: *[id.]*, The Correspondence of W. E. B. Du Bois, ed. by *Herbert Aptheker*, vol. 2, University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst 1976, p. 370.

91 The Crisis 36, 1929, issue 3, p. 92.

92 *W. E. Burghardt Du Bois*, Liberia and Rubber (1925), in: *id.*, International Thought, ed. by *Adom Getachew/Jennifer Pitts*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York etc. 2022, pp. 91–99, here: pp. 98 f.

93 Cf. *Gregg Mitman*, Empire of Rubber. Firestone's Scramble for Land and Power in Liberia, The New Press, New York etc. 2021, p. 122.

94 *Cuthbert Christy/Charles Spurgeon Johnson/Arthur Barclay*, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry into the Existence of Slavery and Forced Labor in the Republic of Liberia, United States Government Printing Office, Washington 1931, pp. 133 f.

foundation for American and European wealth«.[95] By contrast, he did not address the impact of black colonialism[96] on the country's situation and the relationship between its people. Only two short sentences indicate that he was very well aware of its impact. In these brief remarks, he suggests that »labor supply for modern industry in Africa always tends to approximate slavery because it is bound up with the clan organization of the tribes«. Additionally, he mentions that there was »serious trouble […] with the Krus«.

While the first statement is an extenuation, the second disregards anti-colonial resistance. With the arrival of the Americo-Liberians, the country became a settler society. As early as 1886, Thomas Stewart, who held degrees in Laws and Theology and had worked as a professor in both South Carolina and in Liberia, wrote that at the beginning of colonization »the relation between the native and the Negro emigrant from America has been that of master and slave«.[97] Resistance to this situation was widespread. Already in 1825, after the Kru (as well as other tribal people) had been excluded from the first constitution, there were »periodic skirmishes«. After independence, there was even an armed conflict in which the government sent troops to fight against the Kru in 1855. More significant uprisings happened in 1912 and again in 1915, and it was not before 1920 that the Kru revolts were defeated »with the help of the U.S. military«.

One reason Du Bois did not adequately address the conflicts in Liberia is his race-centred analysis, which effectively acknowledged the racist dimension of white America's pressure and interventions in Liberia while disregarding the racist dimension of the conflicts between black American settlers and indigenous peoples. This is highlighted by his argumentation in similar situations before and after his writings on Liberia, such as his views on Ethiopia, Japan, and antisemitism.

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95 *W. E. Burghardt Du Bois*, Liberia, the League and the United States (1933), in: *id.*, International Thought, pp. 100–116, here: pp. 115 f.; for the following quotes see ibid., pp. 106 (›slavery‹), 109 (›Krus‹).

96 Cf. *M. B. Akpan*, Black Imperialism. Americo-Liberian Rule over the African Peoples of Liberia, 1841–1964, in: Canadian Journal of African Studies 7, 1973, no. 2, pp. 217–236, who writes of the settlers from America »that in spite of their colour, they were, as a rule, as foreign, and lacking in sentimental attachment to Africa as were European colonialists elsewhere in Africa like the British, the French, the Portuguese, and the Spaniards« (p. 219).

97 *Thomas McCants Stewart*, Liberia. The Americo-African Republic, Jenkins' Sons, New York 1886, p. 77; the text continues: »The former American slave treated the African freeman as if he had no rights which were worthy to respect […]. The natives of Liberia have been to the emigrants from America just what these ex-slaves were to the whites of the South. They have been defrauded, beaten with stripes, and made to feel that they were inferior beings«; for the following quotes see *Jeffrey Gunn*, Outsourcing African Labor. Kru Migratory Workers in Global Ports, Estates and Battlefields until the End of the 19th Century, De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston 2021, pp. 185 (›skirmishes‹), 192 f. (›troops‹); *Christine Whyte*, A State of Underdevelopment. Sovereignty, Nation-Building and Labor in Liberia 1898–1961, in: International Labor and Working-Class History 92, 2017, pp. 24–46, pp. 30 f. (1912, 1915); *Alan Huffman*, Mississippi in Africa, Gotham Books, New York 2001, p. 180 (›U.S. military‹). *Cedric Robinson*, DuBois and Black Sovereignty. The Case of Liberia, in: Race and Class 32, 1990, issue 2, pp. 39–50, here: p. 48, has taken for granted that Du Bois's position was shaped by »class arrogance« and »petit-bourgeois nationalism«. However, because of his own point of view, he does not realize that Du Bois's race-centred analysis of racism might comprise analytical problems.

In the case of Ethiopia, Du Bois treated it as a shining example of Africa's long-lasting illustrious history (as in his pageant ›The Star of Ethiopia‹) and as a paragon of black sovereignty and resistance (along with Haiti and Liberia).[98] He criticized white imperial attacks on Ethiopia but discussed neither the long history of the institution of slavery in Ethiopia nor Ethiopian imperialism, which almost doubled the territory under its control between 1872 and 1896 alone.[99] When, however, he referred to Japan in one of his comments on the ›Ethiopian question‹, he mentioned the former's imperial policy. Japan had »seized Korea, Formosa and Manchuria«, was »penetrating Mongolia and widening her power in China«. In so doing, »[s]he has used the same methods that white Europe has used«. »And yet«, Du Bois proceeded, there was the »vast difference« that this policy was not »based on race hate for the conquered, since racially these latter are one with the Japanese«.[100]

It is certainly true that Du Bois's understanding of ›race‹ was characterized by a strong social component. But it is also true that he never completely discarded the biological dimension of ›race‹ – just because it is inextricably interwoven with the category. Nevertheless, he did develop the idea of a broader range of racism when he reflected on his visit to the Warsaw Ghetto. This allowed him to connect his understanding of racial discrimination with other forms of racism and to develop »a broader conception of what the fight against race segregation, religious discrimination, and the oppression by wealth had to become«. However, instead of exploring the implications of this broader perspective for the discussion of race and racism and their relation to classism, Du Bois subsumed this complex interrelationship under the category of ›race‹: »[T]he race problem in which I was interested cut across lines of color and physique and belief and status and was a matter of cultural patterns.«[101]

Here they are: ›biological race‹, ›religious race‹, ›social race‹, and ›cultural race‹, all of them still present in the ›Cultural History of Race‹, where »race is sociocultural and biopolitical« (Asa Simon Mittman, 3:167) and religious racism is incarnated

98 Cf. *David Krasner*, ›The Pageant Is the Thing‹. Black Nationalism and The Star of Ethiopia, in: *Jeffrey D. Mason/J. Ellen Gainor* (eds.), Performing America. Cultural Nationalism in American Theater, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 1999, pp. 106–122, and *James Quirin*, W. E. B. Du Bois, Ethiopianism and Ethiopia, 1890–1955, in: International Journal of Ethiopian Studies 5, 2010/11, issue 2, pp. 1–26.

99 Cf. *Giulia Bonacci/Alexander Meckelburg*, Revisiting Slavery and the Slave Trade in Ethiopia, in: Northeast African Studies 17, 2017, no. 2, pp. 5–30, and *Saheed A. Adejumobi*, The History of Ethiopia, Greenwood Press, Westport/London 2007, p. 28.

100 *W. E. Burghardt Du Bois*, Inter-Racial Implications of the Ethiopian Crisis. A Negro View, in: Foreign Affairs 14, 1935, no. 1, pp. 82–92, here: pp. 88 f. And indeed, the Japanese racism towards Koreans or Chinese did not actually stem from ›racial hatred‹ (even though it borrowed elements of European racial thinking in this direction – cf. *Rotem Kowner*, Japan and the Rise of the Idea of Race. The Meiji Era Fusion of Foreign and Domestic Constructions, in: *Yoneyuki Sugita* [ed.], Social Commentary on State and Society in Modern Japan, Springer Nature, Singapore 2016, pp. 31–48). And under certain conditions, it functioned as a means of identity formation and self-assertion as well as of distinction even in a foreign racist environment (cf. *Stefanie Affeldt/Wulf D. Hund*, Conflicts in Racism. Broome and White Australia, in: Race and Class 61, 2019, issue 2, pp. 43–61, esp. pp. 52–55).

101 *W. E. Burghardt Du Bois*, The Negro and the Warsaw Ghetto, in: Jewish Life 6, 1952, no. 7, pp. 14–15, here: p. 15.

in the »Christian race« (Geraldine Heng, 2:105). »Race separates Christian from Jew« (Dennis Austin Britton, 4:24) and »Jewish women had intersectional identities involving their racialized religion and their gender in medieval thirteenth-century England« (Dorothy Kim and Michelle M. Sauer, 3:134). »Gomes Eanes de Zurara's Chronicle of the Discovery and Conquest of Guinea (composed in the 1460s […])«, »brings us towards the inception of modern racial schemata« (Steven F. Kruger, 2:167) and »[i]t is not quite true that there were no white people in medieval Europe, but their whiteness was not our whiteness« (Sarah Salih, 2:139). In short and looking back, »just because the racial categories we know had not yet been constructed does not mean that the ancient Greeks did not have a concept of ›race‹« (Jackie Murray, 1:142).

To be sure, some authors make caveats. In her discussion of early meanings of ›race‹, Roxann Wheeler points out that »none of these definitions of race functioned in the way that the scientific racial classification of humans deriving from the Enlightenment did« (4:166). In discussing the emergence of ›race‹ in religious conflicts, Robert Bernasconi warns that »one should beware of projecting a biological racism onto this discourse. Fifteenth-century ideas of heredity and race are distant from twentieth-century or even from eighteenth-century natural history« (4:69). Nevertheless, many authors move elements of modern race thinking through the centuries under the guise of an unbound and vague understanding of ›race‹. David Kaufman, in his discussion of ›Race and Science‹ in antiquity (1:67–82), resorts to a dangerous construction. To reveal that »Aristotle's work […] anticipates modern scientific racism, insofar as it […] provides a naturalistic basis for contemporary racial stereotypes« (1:76), he even connects Aristotle's reflections on the »blood of animals« with his descriptions of »the character profiles of […] peoples« (1:74). But he conceals Aristotle's deliberations on the failure of nature to properly embody and thereby visualize the difference of masters and slaves.[102]

Although all authors agree with the statements »that there are no biological races« (Gerald E. Allen and Alan Templeton, 6:86) and that »there are many forms of oppression that can take on the form of racism« (George J. Sefa Dei and Asna Adhami, 6:160), many of them (most notably in the first three volumes) conflate race and racism, de-contextualize and de-historicize race, retroject it to epochs where it did not exist and, as a result, fail to itemize the diversity of racisms as well as their particular connection with other forms of social classifications. And although several authors touch on the topic class and race and, occasionally, even address the ›unifying‹ function of racism (Geraldine Heng, 2:99), they also argue »that class […] cannot be disentangled from race« while simultaneously calling for »a complete understanding of the transhistorical problem of racism« (Asa Simon Mittman, 3:178). This leads to a categorical inversion so that the development of the broad scope of the word ›race‹ into the anthropological category ›race‹ is passed off as proof of the as-

102 Cf. *Aristotle*, Politics, p. 9 (1254b, 25 ff.): »Nature tends […] to make the bodies of slaves and free people different too, the former strong enough to be used for necessities, the latter useless for that sort of work, but upright in posture and possessing all the other qualities needed for political life […]. But the opposite often happens as well: some have the bodies of free men; others, the souls.«

sertion that »[e]arly usages show that the word ›race‹ did in fact racialize people« (Dennis Austin Britton, 4:21).

This hypertrophy of ›race‹ obscures the emergence of different racisms linked to different class societies. ›Race‹ is substituted for the heterogeneous manifestations of racism. Whether purportedly barbarian or savage, infidel or heretical, impure or polluted – all ›others‹ are ›racialized‹. Thus, the ›transhistorical‹ understanding of race inadvertently reveals the inevitable essentialism of its construction, even in the critical use of the category. This corresponds with the telling (and exclusive) decoupling of race and racism in cases where race is the foundation of resistance. From the close affiliation of race with racism, we should not conclude »that racial thinking inevitably led to racism […]; anti-colonial movements probably show most clearly that racial thinking was not tantamount to acting like a racist« (Roland Cvetkovski, 5:20).[103]

Yet again, such a conclusion is analytically one-dimensional and even politically superficial. Recall the use of ›racism‹ by the Césaires and by James quoted in the first paragraph of this paper.[104] Of course, the authors knew that this use of language was paradoxical. They fought against racism as a form of discrimination that was racialized as a result of colonialism, which led to the social constitution of co-

103 This sentence ends with the reference »(Mbembe 2013)« = *Achille Mbembe*, Critique de la raison nègre, La Découverte, Paris 2013. That is, to put it mildly, a decidedly nonchalant way of referencing: just read the whole book in its original French version and you will find the evidence for the assumption. But as already shown, references in the ›Cultural History of Race‹ can be quite capricious. Hence, what does Mbembe say about ›race‹? Among other things, that »[p]ar principe de race, il faut par ailleurs entendre une forme spectrale de la division et de la différence humaine susceptible d'être mobilisée aux fins de stigmatisation et d'exclusion, de ségrégation par lesquelles l'on cherche à isoler, à éliminer, voire à détruire physiquement un groupe humain« (p. 88); and that »panafricanisme« as »[d]iscours de l'inversion […] puisera ses catégories fondamentales dans les mythes auxquels il prétend s'opposer et reproduira leurs dichotomies« (pp. 138 f.). The author could of course have quoted from the English translation but refrains from doing so (see *Achille Mbembe*, Critique of Black Reason. Duke University Press, Durham etc. 2017, pp. 55 and 92). Nor does he mention that Mbembe recommends not only to study Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon but to »[r]elire« them »aujourd'hui« (p. 234).

104 See footnotes 2 and 3. The characterization of Césaire's position as racism came from different political camps. In a later interview, he communicated that »Communists would reproach me for speaking of the Negro problem – they called it my racism. But I would answer: Marx is all right, but we need to complete Marx« (An Interview with Aimé Césaire. Conducted by *René Depestre* [1967], in: *Aimé Césaire*, Discourse on Colonialism, with a new introduction by Robin D. G. Kelley, Monthly Review Press, New York 2000, pp. 79–94, here: pp. 85 f.). The general background of this controversy lay in unresolved questions with regard to the relations of class and race, debated in black radical circles as well as in the Communist International – cf. *Hakim Adi*, Pan-Africanism and Communism. The Communist International, Africa and the Diaspora, 1919–1939, Africa World Press, Trenton etc. 2013; *Oleksa Drachewych/Ian McKay* (eds.), Left Transnationalism. The Communist International and the National, Colonial, and Racial Questions, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal 2019; *Minkah Makalani*, In the Cause of Freedom. Radical Black Internationalism from Harlem to London, 1917–1939, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 2011; *Holger Weiss* (ed.), International Communism and Transnational Solidarity. Radical Networks, Mass Movements and Global Politics, 1919–1939, Brill, Leiden 2017.

loured races.[105] And there were enough participants in this struggle who pointed out the ambivalence of the concept of race used in this context. Nearly two decades later, Frantz Fanon observed that »the Manichaeanism of the colonist produces a Manichaeanism of the colonized«. Aware of the relations of class, race, and racism, he discussed the »[a]ntiracist racism« of the anti-colonial movements and the danger that the actions of the »colonized bourgeoisie« would »become increasingly tinged with racism«. Although initially a matter of »defensive racism«, it might »lay the foundations for a racist philosophy that is terribly prejudicial to the future of Africa« and, as a result, pave the way »from nationalism to ultranationalism, chauvinism, and racism« and end up in »émeutes proprement racistes«.[106] That last phrase is mistranslated as »outright race riots« in the English edition …

105 From this perspective, Césaire explained that »la négritude […] ne comparte ni racisme, […] ni exclusivité, mais au contraire une fraternité avec tous les hommes« (in an interview with Lilyan Kesteloot in June 1959, cited in: *Thomas A. Hale*, Les écrits d'Aimé Césaire. Bibliographie commentée, in: Ètudes françaises 14, 1978, no. 3–4, pp. 221–498, here: pp. 417 f.).

106 *Frantz Fanon*, The Wretched of the Earth. With commentary by Jean-Paul Sartre and Homi K. Bhabha, Grove Press, New York 2004, pp. 50 (›Manichaeanism‹), 89 (›antiracist racism‹), 103 (›bourgeoisie‹), 110 (›defensive racism‹), 108 (›racist philosophy‹), 103 (›racism‹, ›race riots‹); for the French quote see *Frantz Fanon*, Les Damnés de la terre. Préfaces de Jean-Paul Sartre and Alice Cherki, postface de Mohammed Harbi, La Découverte, Paris 2002, p. 151.