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Social Movements and Participatory Democracy

Spanish Protests for Peace during the Last Decade of the Cold War (1981–1986)*

On the morning of 15 November 1981, over 200,000 Spanish citizens marched from Avenida Complutense to Ciudad Universitaria in Madrid. It was a human wave chanting for peace, disarmament, freedom, but above all, against Spain's entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On the wide esplanade in the university district, people of all ages, many of them with children, waved white handkerchiefs. As they marched, they listened to Ana Belén singing »La Muralla« (The Wall), a 1969 Chilean anti-war ballad, suppressed by Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship, which stressed the need to break down social and psychological barriers to make way for a different world.¹

Elsewhere in Europe, similar grassroots protests, calling for peace and an end to the arms race, were taking place. On 10 October, a month before the Madrid demonstration, about 250,000 people gathered in Bonn; 210,000 just two weeks later in Brussels; 410,000 on 21 November in Amsterdam; and about 200,000 each in Rome and Athens.² During the Madrid demonstration, some activists symbolically wrapped themselves in bandages, pretending to be victims of a hypothetical Third World War. In Spain, as in other European countries, the perceived threat of an imminent global conflict was widespread due to the worsening of relations between the two superpowers triggered by NATO's Double-Track Decision of 1979 to install Cruise Missiles and Pershing II intermediate range missiles in Europe. This fuelled the mobilisation of a heterogeneous movement for peace that lasted until 1986.³

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1 The Cuban poet Nicolás Guillén was the author of this song. Cf. *Fernando González Lucini*, *Veinte años de canción en España (1963–1983). Los problemas sociales y la solidaridad*, Madrid 1986.

2 The precise number of demonstrators is not clear due to conflicting sources. There are doubts concerning the official figures for the number of demonstrators in the first major Spanish peace protest of the so-called Second Cold War. The newspaper »Diario 16« numbered protesters at 300,000; »El País« reported 250,000 protesters; the Civil Governorship, in contrast, put the number at just 75,000. According to the research project »European Protest and Coercion Data« by Ron Francisco of the University of Kansas, there were 400,000 demonstrators in Madrid. Cf. *Eckart Conze/Martin Klimke/Jeremy Varon*, Introduction: Between Accidental Armageddons and Winnable Wars: Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Fears in the 1980s, in: *id.* (eds.), *Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear and the Cold War of the 1980s*, New York 2016, pp. 1–23, here: p. 5.

3 On the complex process through which the Double-Track Decision was taken, see: *Kristina Spohr Readman*, Conflict and Cooperation in Intra-Alliance Nuclear Politics: Western Europe, the United States, and the Genesis of NATO's Dual-Track Decision, 1977–1979, in: *Journal of Cold War Studies* 13, 2011, no. 2, pp. 39–89, here: pp. 41–43. *John Young*, Western Europe and the End of the Cold War, 1979–1989, in: *Melvyn P. Leffler/Odd Arne Westad* (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol. 3: Endings, Cambridge 2010, pp. 289–310. *Leopoldo Nuti/Frédéric Bozo/Marie-Pierre Rey* et al., *The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War*, Stanford 2015.

During this period, the concept of nuclear warfare was undergoing a radical change. In NATO's new military strategy, the use of nuclear missiles was no longer an absolute »evil« to be avoided at all costs but was seen – in a »limited« form – as a real possibility and even a necessity in order to win a possible conflict in the European theatre. While the wave of protests for peace in Spain was part and parcel of the pan-European cycle of transnational mobilisation against nuclear proliferation, its trajectory differed from other European peace movements and displayed national specificities.⁴ Spain was not one of the countries that had been chosen for the deployment of the »Euromissiles«. Thus, protests for peace acquired a pronounced anti-NATO and anti-American character in the aftermath of the fall of one of the longest periods of dictatorship in a European country.⁵

This article aims to analyse two major aspects of the Spanish anti-NATO groups and the ways in which they framed their protests during the 1980s.⁶ First, it helps to understand how the peace movement verbally formulated an ideal notion of democracy and what this framing entailed for Spanish society shortly after a tangled process of democratisation. Second, it explores the experimentation of Spanish grassroots groups with notions of participatory and direct democracy that included a form of self-government in which citizens would participate in shaping collective decisions in an environment of equality and deliberation⁷ during the period of consolidation of the country's new democratic institutions.⁸ The democratising practices implemented by these movements are the main topic of this study. Spanish mass demonstrations for peace became an experience of practising democracy in a country where, despite serious democratisation efforts, social structures remained largely hierarchical and inequitable.⁹

In this article, the Spanish anti-NATO movement will be analysed with regard to the collective forums for debate and opinion sharing on nuclear proliferation, the relationship between power and democracy, and the values and practices of a direct democracy which were to implement representative deliberation in the newly formed parliamentary monarchy. To address these issues, documents from Spanish peace groups (mostly minutes of their meetings) and anti-NATO publications during the first half of the 1980s have been consulted. In addition, leaflets and peace activists' pamphlets have been analysed in order to chart the ways in which activists articulated notions of self-representation as democratic and methods for interacting with the new democratic institutions.¹⁰

4 Benjamin Ziemann, A Quantum of Solace? European Peace Movements during the Cold War and Their Elective Affinities, in: AfS 49, 2009, pp. 351–389.

5 Cf. Lawrence S. Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition. A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement. 1971 to the Present, Stanford 2003, pp. 163f.

6 On the processes of framing meanings within social movements: David A. Snow/Anna E. Tan/Peter B. Owens, Social Movements, Framing Processes and Cultural Revitalization and Fabrication, in: Mobilization. An International Quarterly 18, 2013, pp. 225–242.

7 On the concept of participatory democracy, see: Rod Hague/Martin Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics. An Introduction, Basingstoke/New York 2013 (first published 1982), p. 43. Laurence Bherer/Pascale Dufour/Françoise Montambeault, The Participatory Democracy Turn: An Introduction, in: Journal of Civil Society 12, 2016, pp. 225–230.

8 Cf. Andreas Schedler, What Is Democratic Consolidation?, in: Journal of Democracy 9, 1998, no. 2, pp. 91–107.

9 Álvaro Soto Carmona, La evolución de la sociedad en la transición y la democracia, in: Javier Tusell Gómez/José Luis García Delgado/Juan Carlos Jiménez et al., Historia de España Menéndez Pidal, vol. 42: La transición a la democracia y la España de Juan Carlos I, Madrid 2003, pp. 500–557.

10 A good example on framing analysis in historiographical research on social movements: Luca Falciola, Il movimento del 1977 in Italia, Roma 2015.

I. PEACE MOVEMENTS AND DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES

The spark that ignited protests for peace was the decision by the Spanish government, led by the Union of the Democratic Centre (»Unión de Centro Democrático«, UCD) to accelerate Spain's entry into the Atlantic Alliance after the failed military coup in February 1981.¹¹ Although Spain did not become a member of NATO until May 1982, its geopolitical position during the Cold War meant that a special security and economic relationship had developed with the USA since 1953.¹² A substantial section of the Spanish population perceived the US as the dominant military power, which had allowed the Franco dictatorship to flourish in exchange for four air force and naval bases.¹³ Consequently, strong anti-American sentiments resurfaced in connection with the enlargement of NATO.¹⁴ In the popular imagination, the US was equated with a foreign force that had limited the sovereignty of the Spanish on their own territory, diminished their decision-making capacity and contaminated their traditional culture.¹⁵

In the immediate aftermath of Francisco Franco's death, the thorny issue of Spain's entry into NATO was put to one side for fear of endangering the smooth running of the democratisation process. The new political institutions dealt with this question only after the promulgation of the democratic Spanish constitution and during the consolidation period of the parliamentary monarchy.¹⁶ It was Spain's entry into NATO and, between 1982 and 1986, the demand for a referendum to leave the Atlantic Alliance which became the main rallying point for many Spanish peace organisations. Only after the 1986 referendum on

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- 11 On Spain's entry into NATO: *Charles F. Powell*, *El amigo Americano. España y Estados Unidos: de la dictadura a la democracia*, Madrid 2011, pp. 494–585; *Ángel Linares*, *La adhesión de España en la OTAN: notas para una revisión crítica*, in: *Historia Actual Online*, 2013, no. 32, pp. 23–30; *Javier Rupérez*, *España en la OTAN. Relato parcial*, Barcelona 1986.
 - 12 *Lorenzo Delgado*, ¿El »amigo americano«? España y Estados Unidos durante el Franquismo, in: *Studia Histórica. Historia Contemporánea* 21, 2003, pp. 231–276, available at URL: <<http://revistas.usal.es/index.php/0213-2087/article/view/5952>> [5.7.2018]. *Fernando Termis Soto*, *Renunciando a todo. El régimen franquista y los Estados Unidos desde 1945 hasta 1963*, Madrid 2005.
 - 13 After the so-called Madrid agreements (1953), the USA quickly installed four large military structures: the air bases at Torrejón de Ardoz (1957), near Madrid, one at Morón in Seville, the air base at Zaragoza (1958) and the air-sea base at Rota (1959) in Cádiz. There are only a few studies on American military bases in Spain. See: *Rocío Piñeiro Álvarez*, *Guerra y medio ambiente: una historia de la base aeronaval de Rota (desde 1953 hasta la actualidad)*, PhD Thesis, Cádiz 2004. In general on American military bases: *Alexander Cooley*, *Base Politics. Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas*, New York 2008.
 - 14 On Spanish anti-Americanism: *Antonio L. Golmar Gallego/Lourdes López Nieto*, *Anti-Americanism in Spain, 1808–2004: Facts and Opinions*, Paper prepared for the Workshop on Anti-Americanism in Comparative Historical Perspective, European Consortium for Political Research, Nicosia, April 2006. *Francisco Javier Rodríguez/Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla/Nicholas J. Cull* (eds.), *US Public Diplomacy and Democratization in Spain. Selling Democracy?*, London 2015.
 - 15 *Alessandro Seregini*, *El antiamericanismo español*, Madrid 2007. *Daniel Fernández de Miguel*, *La erosión del antiamericanismo conservador durante el franquismo*, in: *Ayer*, 2009, no. 75, pp. 193–221.
 - 16 The negotiations for the renewal of the bilateral agreements with the United States were another issue that underpinned the whole democratisation process. In 1970, American base infrastructure became property of Spain together with the Rota-Zaragoza oil pipeline; in 1976, these agreements acquired the status of »treaty«; in 1982, when Spain was already in NATO, the Friendship, Defence and Cooperation Agreement was signed, then revised in 1988. *Ángel Viñas*, *La negociación y renegociación de los acuerdos hispano-norteamericanos, 1953–1988: Una visión estructural*, in: *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea* 25, 2003, pp. 83–108.

NATO membership and the victory of the remain vote¹⁷ did these organisations start to lose their momentum and popularity.

As in other European countries, this movement grew within in a predominantly left-wing cultural milieu. It generated a complex network of relations between the Communist Party of Spain (»Partido Comunista de España«, PCE)¹⁸; the radical extra-parliamentary leftist parties, in particular, the Maoist Communist Movement (»Movimiento Comunista«, MC); the Trotskyist Revolutionary Communist League (»Liga Comunista Revolucionaria«, LCR)¹⁹; as well as with the Catholic workers' groups – the Catholic Worker Brotherhood (»Hermandad Obrera de Acción Católica«, HOAC) and the Christian Worker Youth (»Juventud Obrera Cristiana«, JOC).²⁰ The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (»Partido Socialista Obrero Español«, PSOE) also supported the protests for peace initially, generating high hopes among its activists with its victory in the 1982 elections. The PSOE, however, would soon adopt a pro-NATO stance, making itself a target for anti-NATO demonstrations.²¹

It is possible to identify two major umbrella organisations that coordinated the activism of peace groups in Spain. Since 1983, the National Coordinating Organization of the Spanish Peace Groups (»Coordinadora Estatal de Organizaciones Pacifistas«, CEOP) had united anti-NATO grassroots groups, environmentalists, conscientious objectors, feminists and the extra-parliamentary left. By contrast, the pro-Communist Commission for Peace and Disarmament in Madrid (»Comisión de Acción por la Paz y el Desarme«, CAPD) had emerged from the social base of the parliamentary left that, in 1984, proposed the Mesa pro referendum (Table for the Referendum): an organisation calling for a referendum in order to decide collectively Spain's position regarding NATO.²² This group mainly brought together the peace groups of the PCE, although pacifist socialists, Catholic organisations, and UCD activists who were sceptical of military cooperation with the USA joined forces

17 Spain's NATO referendum has received surprisingly little scholarly attention: *Consuelo Val Cid*, *Opinión pública y opinión publicada. Los españoles y el referéndum de la OTAN*, Madrid 1996. *Beata Wojna*, Spain's and Poland's Road to NATO: The Problem of Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policy of a Democratising State, in: *European Review of History* 15, 2008, pp. 533–547.

18 On the relation between the PCE and peace groups, cf. *Emanuele Treglia*, *La última batalla de la transición, la primera de la democracia. La oposición a la OTAN y las transformaciones del PCE (1981–1986)*, in: *Ayer*, 2016, no. 103, pp. 71–96.

19 On the Spanish radical left and peace groups, cf. *Pablo Socorro Arencibia*, *El papel de la izquierda revolucionaria en la vertebración del movimiento anti-OTAN en el Estado español*, in: *Historia del Presente*, 2017, no. 29, pp. 137–150. On the history of Spanish radical left during the transition: *Consuelo Laíz*, *La lucha final. Los partidos de izquierda radical durante la transición española*, Madrid 1995.

20 On the history of these Catholic workers' groups: *Basilisa López García*, *Aproximación a la historia de la HOAC. 1946–1981*, Madrid 1995; *Florentino Sanz Fernández*, *La Juventud Obrera Cristiana: un movimiento educativo popular*, in: *Historia de la Educación* 20, 2001, pp. 95–115.

21 *Carlos Ángel Ordás*, *OTAN de entrada No. El PSOE y el uso político de la integración española en el Pacto Atlántico o cómo hacer de la necesidad virtud, 1980–1986*, in: *Carlos Navajas Zubeldía/Diego Iturrigar Barco* (eds.), *España en democracia. Actas del IV Congreso Internacional de la Historia de Nuestro Tiempo*, Logroño 2014, pp. 293–305. *Paul Kennedy*, *The Spanish Socialist Party and the Modernisation of Spain*, Manchester 2013.

22 This organisation was mainly comprised by leaders and militants of the Spanish and Catalan Communist Party, Workers' Commission (»Comisiones Obreras«, CCOO), Republican Left of Catalonia (»Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya«, ERC), Basque Country Left (»Euskadiko Ezquerria«, EE), the Andalusian Party (»Partido Andalucista«, PA), Democratic and Social Centre (»Centro Democrático y Social«, CDS), Socialist Action Party (»Partido de Acción Socialista«, PASOC), and other nationalist parties (i. e. »Izquierda Nacionalista Canaria«).

on some occasions.²³ Nevertheless, it is difficult to measure the specific weight of each group within the Spanish peace demonstrations.²⁴ In most cases, different groups protested together.²⁵ Ronald Reagan's visit to Madrid in 1985 was met by over 400,000 demonstrators of all ages and social groups.²⁶

Nevertheless, the persistence of an unresolved class conflict, which was the result of the ambiguous economic modernisation during the dictatorship, contributed to radicalising Spanish anti-NATO protest groups, which also took up workers' causes.²⁷ The economy and unemployment were other major issues taken up by every Spanish anti-war group.²⁸ For instance, according to the declarations of the CEOP in 1984:

»Remaining in NATO causes instability because it creates enemies. It forces us to take part in conflicts between military blocs. It strengthens the blockade policies and it turns us into a target of nuclear attack. In addition, military expenditure is increasing and the creation of new jobs is being hindered.«²⁹

The growth of the Spanish peace movement should be analysed in the context of what has been called »sociological pacifism« following Franco's dictatorship.³⁰ This term is used to describe a generic disdain for war and the military, brought about by the trauma of the Civil War and the direct support of Francoism by the armed forces. Moreover, Spanish peace groups displayed a fervent desire to overcome what they considered a limited democratisation process and the persistence of a Francoist idea of peace.³¹

In 1975, Spain reverted to democracy after more than forty years of dictatorship, and its people had to »learn« democracy through direct experience and through the new reality of the representative institutions. However, the democracy of the final decades of the twentieth century was not comparable to that of the beginning of the century, and neither was the democracy promoted and practised by the underground anti-Francoist opposition.

23 Cf. *Pablo Socorro Arencibia*, *La última batalla de la transición. Las organizaciones del movimiento anti-NATO*, MA Thesis, Oviedo 2015, pp. 35–47.

24 On the origins of the peace movement in Spain, cf. *Pedro Oliver Olmo*, *El movimiento pacifista en la transición democrática española*, in: *Rafael Quirosa-Cheyrouze y Muñoz* (ed.), *La sociedad española en la Transición. Los movimientos sociales en el proceso democratizador*, Madrid 2011, p. 271; *Enric Prat Carvajal*, *Moviéndose por la paz. De Pax Christi a las movilizaciones contra la guerra*, Barcelona 2007.

25 For instance, on the composition of the peace movement in Catalonia, see: *Enric Prat*, *Activistes de la pau: estudi sociològic i polític dels activistes del moviment per la pau de la dècada de 1980*, Barcelona 2008, p. 210.

26 Data included in the research project »European Protest and Coercion Data« by Ron Francisco (University of Kansas).

27 Cf. the interpretative model in order to compare social movements in different countries in: *Hanspeter Kriesi/Ruud Koopmans/Jan Willem Duyvendak et al.*, *New Social Movements in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis*, London 1995.

28 Cf. *Katarina Juselius/Javier Ordóñez Monfort*, *Wage, Price and Unemployment Dynamics in the Spanish Transition to EMU Membership*, Economics Discussion Paper No. 2008-20, available at URL: <<https://ssrn.com/abstract=1723639>> [5.7.2018].

29 Report meeting CEOP, 14–15 January 1984, p. 1, Communist Movement Archive, Federación Acción en Red, Madrid (AMC), (unclassified).

30 *Antonio Izquierdo*, *La conciencia pacifista española: un aporte estadístico*, Anuario sobre Arma-mentismo en España 1986, Barcelona 1986.

31 After the Civil War ended in 1939, the propagandistic rhetoric of Francoism was closely bound to the idea of peace. According to the Francoist interpretation of Spanish history, for the first time the Nationalist victory had allowed Spanish citizens to live in a lasting social peace without civil wars. Cf. *Javier Rodrigo Sánchez*, *Cruzada, paz, memoria. La guerra civil y sus relatos*, Granada 2013.

For instance, although political citizenship rights became universal, across sections of the public opinion the idea spread that such rights alone were not sufficient to form a solid democracy. Social rights, such as those to health, education, information, and gender equality, were now deemed essential and, therefore, action had to be taken to achieve or strengthen them.³² In that regard, it is interesting to return to the first major peace demonstration held in Madrid in 1981. The day after the demonstration, an editorial in the »El País« newspaper echoed the democratic sentiment of the protesters: »the people who gathered at Ciudad Universitaria did not do so only to reject the politics of military blocs and rearmament but, above all, to express their support for the constitutional order, democratic liberties and domestic peace«.³³

Although Spanish anti-NATO groups held differing views on the means to extend democracy in the final stages of the Cold War, they generally welcomed the newly-installed parliamentary institutions. The word »peace« became synonymous with »democracy«: peace would only be possible within a consolidated democratic process capable of transforming the attitudes and values of Spanish society. From this perspective, the expansion of democracy would subsequently also change Spain's relations with the rest of the world and move the country towards neutrality. Furthermore, popular grassroots mobilisation against NATO and military blocs introduced sections of Spanish society to a diverse array of interpretations and practices of democracy, moving beyond the pacts made by the political elites that drove the transition.³⁴ In fact, according to the definition of peace within a meeting of MC protesters and neighbourhood activists:

»Peace is not, as some people believe, respect for an imposed social order. We do not want the peace of the cemeteries or the apparent peace of fear. For true peace, there must also be justice and freedom. In sum, for us, peace is not only the absence of personal, physical and psychological violence. It is also the practice of social justice«.³⁵

An examination of these debates on democracy within the Spanish grassroots peace movement, which some anti-war activists perceived as the »last battle of the transition«³⁶, reveals the groups' willingness to make possible an »unpolitical democracy«, that is a democracy detached from political partisanship and one closer to these groups' idea of a superior truth and justice.³⁷

32 On different ideas of democracy in Spain, see: *Rafael Alday Escudero*, *Modelos de democracia en España*, Madrid 2013.

33 Una manifestación con dos lecturas (Editorial), in: *El País*, 17.11.1981.

34 On the relation between social movement and democracy: *Francesca Polletta*, *Freedom is an Endless Meeting. Democracy in American Social Movements*, Chicago 2002. *Amory Starr/María Elena Martínez-Torres/Peter Rosset*, *Participatory Democracy in Action. Practices of the Zapatistas and the Movimiento Sem Terra*, in: *Latin American Perspectives* 38, 2011, issue 2, pp. 102–119. *Kevin Mattson*, *Creating a Democratic Public: The Struggle for Urban Participatory Democracy during the Progressive Era, Pennsylvania 1998*. *Jane Mansbridge*, *Beyond Adversary Democracy*, New York 1980.

35 Dossier »Lucha por la paz 1987–1988«, Meeting »Activos por la Paz«, AMC, (unclassified). Spanish citations have been translated into English by the author.

36 Different Spanish scholars and peace activists had applied this idea in order to describe the peace protests during the last stage of the Cold War in Spain. In particular, they underline the return to protest of different anti-Francoist groups with young Spaniards. Cf. *Antonio García Santesmases*, *Repensar la izquierda. Evolución ideológica del socialismo en la España actual*, Madrid 1993.

37 *Nadia Urbinati*, *Unpolitical Democracy*, in: *Political Theory* 38, 2010, pp. 65–92.

II. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE TRANSITION

The Spanish peace movement wanted to overcome the bipolar order in the final years of the Cold War. This international aim was inseparable, in the anti-NATO activists' master frame, from domestic criticism regarding the consensus-oriented model of the transition to democracy.³⁸ In order to understand how Spanish grassroots peace activists envisaged democracy, it is first necessary to consider that their mobilisation for nuclear disarmament and anti-NATO stance was fuelled by a profound disenchantment (*desencanto*) with how Spanish democratisation had evolved.³⁹

Unlike in Portugal, the transition process in Spain relied on controlled negotiations between reformist members of the Francoist apparatus and the democratic opposition. The aim of these talks was to avoid a potentially dangerous polarisation in the country, which had been destabilised by terrorist violence in the Basque Country and a collapsing economy. Despite the acceleration in response to a relatively high degree of social mobilisation, democratic transformation was brought about through bargaining between the political elites who gradually dismantled the authoritarian state. Agreements between the elites were in many cases sanctioned behind closed doors by strict party discipline. As a result, they did not directly involve Spanish society.⁴⁰ At the same time, the compromise of politically, not culturally, silencing the memory of the Civil War and the excesses of military dictatorship became trademarks of the transition.⁴¹ There was no purge of the main political and military elites of the dictatorship. The entire process took place in a spirit of reconciliation and amnesty between the various parties involved.⁴²

Thus, parts of the population saw the lack of a radical break with the dictatorial regime as evidence that the previous political system continued to affect the new democracy. Looking back in 2006, the Communist philosopher and peace activist Fernando Buey reflected on these connections:

»In a certain sense, one can say that the peace movement [...] was, in those years, on the other side of the current transition. In fact, with its protests, demonstrations and declarations, it brought to light all that political democracy had inherited from Francoism and all that the reform, which had been negotiated in 1976–1978, had fallen silent«.⁴³

Protest against the American bases and the bipolar order fell on fertile ground among the Spanish population who felt marginalised by the political dynamics of the transition and

38 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan described the Spanish transition to democracy as a »paradigmatic case« of a democratic transition based on political pacts. *Juan Linz/Alfred Stepan*, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, Baltimore/London 1996, p. 87.

39 On the so-called *desencanto* of a part of the Spanish society, cf. *Santos Juliá*, *Transición. Historia de una política española (1937–2017)*, Barcelona 2017, pp. 497–533; *Teresa M. Vilarós*, *El mono del desencanto. Una crítica cultural de la transición española*, Madrid 1998.

40 Cf. *Bonnie N. Field*, *Interparty Consensus and Intraparty Discipline in Spain's Transition to Democracy*, in: *Gregorio Alonso/Diego Muro* (eds.), *The Politics and Memory of Democratic Transition. The Spanish Model*, New York/Abingdon 2011, pp. 71–91.

41 *Paloma Aguilar Fernández/Carsten Humlebaek*, *Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy: The Legacies of Francoism and the Civil War*, in: *History and Memory* 14, 2002, no. 1–2, pp. 121–165.

42 *Paloma Aguilar*, *Justice, Politics and Memory in Spanish Transition*, in: *Alexandra Barahona de Brito/Carmen González-Enriquez/Paloma Aguilar* (eds.), *The Politics of Memory. Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies*, Oxford/New York etc. 2001, pp. 92–118. *Antonio Costa Pinto*, *The Authoritarian Past and South European Democracies: An Introduction*, in: *South European Society and Politics* 15, 2010, pp. 339–358.

43 *Francisco Fernández Buey*, *Prólogo*, in: *Enric Prat*, *Moviéndose por la paz. De Pax Christi a las movilizaciones contra la Guerra*, Barcelona 2006, pp. IX–XXII, p. XIV.

discouraged by the new democratic institutions.⁴⁴ This disenchantment led to a critique of the legacy of the Franco regime in the new democratic institutions. Consequently, under this approach, the peace activists saw the political apathy, low civic participation, and rigid party system that characterised the new democracy as part of the Francoist legacy.⁴⁵ Against this background, the protests for peace were able to unite all those Spanish citizens who were disillusioned with the newly-established democracy. They wanted something more than the institutions created by the UCD, but also more than was provided by social democratic *Realpolitik*. Indeed, the feeling of disenchantment was particularly strong with regard to the Socialist Party and the hopes for participation and social change that it had represented before the 1982 elections. In 1983, an anti-NATO activist asked:

»What has remained a year after the formation of a socialist government? Perhaps American gold has worked miracles. If [Felipe González and the PSOE] yield to pressure and blackmail, they will enjoy the ridiculous privilege of belonging to an armed alliance. Nevertheless, many, many citizens will think they betrayed a sacred principle. Here, almost everyone renounces war.«⁴⁶

The peace movement in Spain in the early 1980s was also the result of the difficulties and traumas of adapting to the new post-transition society. Many people did not accept the idea that citizen participation should be confined to the role of voter or TV viewer and the belief that the incorporation of citizens into party systems should only be achieved through electoral and parliamentary procedures.⁴⁷ The battles against NATO called for a different kind of transition, even though activists did not entirely reject the democratic system. Unlike the movements of '68, they tried to move within the new democratic institutions.⁴⁸ For these activists, democracy primarily implied an opposing view of Spain's position in the international arena. They considered it was impossible to accept Spanish's entry into NATO as a model for the new Spanish democracy. For instance, in the view of the Albacete anti-NATO committee, this constituted a clear example of the expropriation of sovereignty and representative institutions:

»What does supporting NATO entail for Spain? We would not be able to decide our international relations with other countries and [it would mean] the loss of national independence. [...] It would strengthen the militarisation of civil life and prevent the people from exercising democratic control over the army.«⁴⁹

Moreover, they could not accept US support of dictatorships in Latin America as a democratic model.⁵⁰ On this point, Carlos Otamendi, a leading personality in the Madrid anti-NATO movement, stressed that one of the reasons for the success of the Spanish peace

44 The word discouragement (*desaliento*) is used in: *Germán Labrador Méndez*, *Culpables por la literatura. Imaginación política y contracultura en la transición española (1968–1986)*, Madrid 2017, p. 404.

45 Cf. *José M. Magone*, *Contemporary Spanish Politics*, New York 2017 (first published 2004), pp. 32f.

46 *Ángel Lasierra*, *La OTAN. Ha llovido mucho*, Felipe, in: *Euroshima 1*, 1983, p. 2.

47 A detailed description of this difficulty in accepting some mechanism of the new democracy from the perspective of the literature in: *Méndez*, *Culpables por la literatura*, p. 404.

48 Spain lived the experience of May 1968 under the grip of Francoist censorship. However, its social effects were also felt in this country. Cf. *Kostis Kornetis*, *Tra Marat e Sade. Ripensare il Sessantotto »decentrato«* in Grecia, Spagna e Portogallo, in: *Donatella della Porta* (ed.), *Sessantotto. Passato e Presente dell'anno ribelle*, Milano 2018, pp. 107–134; *Patricia Badenes Salazar*, *Fronteras de papel. El Mayo francés en la España del 68*, Madrid 2018.

49 Leaflet *¿Qué es la OTAN?*, Anti-NATO Committee Albacete 1981, Salvador Seguí Foundation Archive Madrid (AFSS), (unclassified).

50 Cf. *Michael Cox/Timothy J. Lynch/Nicolas Bouchet* (eds.), *US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion. From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama*, Abingdon/New York 2013.

movement was: »the devaluation of the principle that it is necessary to defend Western values at all costs [...] and the loss of the ruling and military elites' credibility as a safeguard for peace«. ⁵¹

Spain did not have to follow the US model to become democratic, the Spanish supporters of NATO argued. However, those who supported Spain's entry into NATO also used the democratic issue as a frame of reference. According to this interpretation, NATO membership was crucial for overcoming the diplomatic isolation of Franco's Spain, for acquiring a foreign policy that was genuinely democratic and in line with other European countries, and for the modernisation and democratisation of the Spanish army. Moreover, according to the reasoning of the UCD, a referendum would represent a challenge to parliamentary sovereignty. ⁵² It was no longer necessary for peace groups to focus on a West-East bipolar model but rather to work towards building more democratic and peaceful relations between the North and South of the world. Indeed, one of the elements that characterised the Spanish pacifist movement was its strong solidarity with Latin American liberation movements. ⁵³

Secondly, in numerous texts of the Spanish peace movement, the opacity of the Spanish transition process has been associated with the secret dynamics of the Cold War. Spanish activists use the words »pact«, »silence« and »dictatorship« in numerous propaganda texts. For example, in a leaflet entitled »Neither NATO nor Bases«, written by an environmental collective in La Cebada district of Madrid, we read: »The dictatorial decision of the government to bring us into NATO without considering the will of the people underlines the need to provide information on this matter«. ⁵⁴ In the summer of 1980, an information leaflet from various pacifist associations, including Friends of UNESCO (»Club de Amigos de la UNESCO«), Association for Human Rights (»Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos«) and Association for Security and European Cooperation (»Asociación de Seguridad y Cooperación Europea«), declared: »For Peace, Not war pacts«. The same text once again correlates NATO with the loss of sovereignty on the part of the Spanish citizenry:

»We consider the state of dependency into which our country would be demoted as a result of its integration into NATO as an equally serious matter. This organisation has stated on several occasions that it would not tolerate a regime different from a liberal-democratic regime in a member state. This resulted in the exclusion of Portugal from Council meetings when the Carnation Revolution took place«. ⁵⁵

Furthermore, peace activists from La Cebada collective interpreted the Italian case of historical compromise ⁵⁶ as an example of undemocratic intervention by the USA in domestic affairs: »The possibility of communist politicians participating in governments of NATO member countries is not acceptable; an example is the strong pressure being exerted by the USA in Italy to prevent the Italian Communist Party from participating in the government«. ⁵⁷

51 *Carlos Otamendi*, *Perspectivas del movimiento pacifista*, in: *Zona Cero Extra*, July 1984, p. 9.

52 Dossier »España en la OTAN«, UCD International Relation Secretary, AFSS, (unclassified).

53 *Antonio*, *Pacifismo y movimiento de liberación*, in: *Zona Cero*, July 1984, p. 20.

54 Leaflet »Ni OTAN. Ni Bases«, La Cebada Collective, Madrid (1981–1982?), AFSS, (unclassified).

55 Leaflet »España en la OTAN? Por la paz. No a los pactos bélicos«, Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos, Asociación de Seguridad y Cooperación Europea, Consejo Español de la Paz, Club de Amigos de la UNESCO, Asociación de Ex-Presos y Represaliados Políticos, Summer 1980, AFSS, (unclassified).

56 Cf. *Silvio Pons*, *Cold War Republic: The »External Constraint« in Italy during the 1970s*, in: *Antonio Varsori/Benedetto Zaccaria* (eds.), *Italy in the International System from Détente to the End of the Cold War. The Underrated Ally*, Basingstoke 2018, pp. 35–67.

57 Leaflet »Ni OTAN. Ni Bases«, La Cebada Collective, Madrid (1981–1982?), AFSS, (unclassified).

In summary, for the peace activists, NATO membership would entail a lack of political freedom and the imposition from above of a model of democracy that was not the model chosen by the Spanish citizens. A leaflet by the Association of Families and Friends of Political Prisoners (»Asociación de Familiares y Amigos de Presos Políticos«) called NATO the »tomb of peoples« because:

»NATO will bring us more armed forces, more police, more economic and technical benefits to fight against any movement which opposes the current system. From pacifists to armed groups, they are all persecuted by the fascist fanatics in the Pentagon. [...] The repression in the streets and prisons will escalate and reach unsuspected levels of sophistication. The enemy they want to fight is not the USSR but the Spanish people, among whom they want to eradicate even the slightest revolutionary sign«. ⁵⁸

Peace movement publications directly associated the Cold War with the oppression of freedom by the national-Catholic dictatorship. According to this interpretation, the USA had tacitly supported the Franco regime after the Second World War. On several occasions, the American and Francoist soldiers were symbolically linked in the visual propaganda of the Spanish peace movement. As in other European peace movements, NATO was associated with fascism and the restriction of democratic liberties. There were also recurring references to the trauma of the Civil War, especially the 1937 bombing of Guernica. ⁵⁹

The USSR was once again not included in this democratic quality assessment scheme. In fact, during a collective peace meeting, an activist concluded that: »The position regarding the USSR is not decisive – it does not outline the strategic line of the movement when defining its views on the fight against war«. ⁶⁰

According to peace activists, the escalation of tensions between the two superpowers had led to heightened military control directly related to the spread of civil and military nuclear power. To curb this supposed manipulation, peace groups protested for the inclusion of citizens' opinions in diplomatic and foreign policy decision-making. Citizen input, as in the domestic case of the Spanish transition process, had been removed from the rooms where the global balance of power was decided. As a result, the demand for transparency in military budgets became a common issue for Spanish peace activists. The Anti-NATO Committee of the Madrid neighbourhood of San Blas explained why: »Spain's entry into NATO would result in an increase in the state's military expenditure, reducing social expenditure [...]. In short, it would bring more poverty and unemployment«. ⁶¹ For this reason, many Spanish activists associated Spain's entry into NATO with a negative model of democracy. Instead, they supported the idea of a people's army rather than one in the traditional mould. They believed the continuing arms race was consolidating the army further in an undemocratic direction.

Moreover, in Spain, the fear of army interference in the country's political life was a constant feature of the transition process, and the expression »noise of sabres« was commonly used to express apprehension of military coups. ⁶² This fear helped to define a peace

58 Leaflet »OTAN Carceles – Tumba de los pueblos, Association of Families and Friends of Political Prisoners, 1981, AFSS, (unclassified).

59 Cf. the iconography of Pablo Picasso's painting »Guernica« in many murals realised by grassroots peace groups against NATO in all Spanish territory. Furthermore, the poster against the visit of the US Secretary of State George P. Shultz in December 1982 featured parts of Picasso's painting. Poster »Contra la visita del secretario de estado USA, Shultz, DL 1982«, 1982, Archive of the Spanish National Library Madrid, AHC/104973.

60 Dossier URSS – Some conclusions – CAO Madrid, s.d., AMC, (unclassified).

61 Leaflet »Contra los bloques militares. Fuera bases yanquis. No a la entrada en la OTAN«, Anti-NATO Committee San Blas (Madrid), January 1980, AMC, (unclassified).

62 *José García Caneiro/Eduardo Arranz Bueso*, The Military Transition to Democracy in Spain: Looking for a New Democratic Soldier, in: Papers Peace Research Institute Frankfurt 1, 2007, available at URL: <https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_downloads/Spain_1.pdf> [20.3.2018].

movement which, on many occasions, saw the military as a threat to democracy, despite the attempts to modernise it during the transition. The anti-NATO activist Eugenio del Río explained, in 1983, his main concern:

»The armies that currently exist cannot constitute the structure of a truly acceptable defence. Arms control and the exercise of military leadership by a specialised organisation whose members are not elected or controlled by the population [...] are incompatible with a sovereign defence system and self-defence for the people.«⁶³

For the Spanish groups, however, a system of democratic defence should be based on »the energies of the people, on popular organization, not on a force external to the people.«⁶⁴

Peace activists saw the anti-NATO protests as the last good opportunity to shape a different transition to democracy in which all key constituencies and groups of actors were involved, including those who had been marginalised by the process itself, such as women. It is true that Spanish women were able to vote for the first time in the first democratic elections of 1977, but it is also true that they were practically excluded from prominent posts within the parties. In the first parliament, of 700 members, only 21 deputies and six senators were women. In addition, in the first socialist government – defined as the government of change – there were no female ministers.⁶⁵

The anti-NATO groups, by contrast, tried to include people from social categories that had been excluded from the institutions negotiating the transition. This included not only women but also men who did not identify with the military model or patriarchal masculinity associated with Spanish parliamentary parties. On this point, María Gascón, a Madrid peace activist, concluded during a collective debate that peace was not only the counterpoint of the war but »a social situation of non-oppression and non-aggression. It helps to question the fundamental pillars (ideological, economic, and political) of a system that embraces the current situation.«⁶⁶

III. CREATING SOCIAL SPACES FOR PARTICIPATION: THE NEIGHBOURHOOD MOVEMENT

In the aftermath of the first march to Torrejón in January 1981, informal anti-NATO committees (»Comités anti-Otan«) were founded in neighbourhoods and factories across Spain.⁶⁷ They were organised by men and women who were concerned about their personal security in towns and villages near the four US air and naval bases.⁶⁸ They feared that entry into the Atlantic Alliance would cause Spain to be a target of an atomic attack because of

63 *Eugenio del Río*, *Mañana puede ser tarde*. Libro negro de la OTAN, Madrid 1983, p. 61.

64 *Ibid.*

65 Cf. *Giulia Quaggio*, *La cuestión femenina en el PSOE de la Transición*, in: *Arenal* 24, 2017, pp. 219–253.

66 *María Gascón*, *Mujer, Pacifismo, Militarismo*, in: *Zona Cero Debate*, July 1984, p. 9.

67 According to Donatella della Porta, citizens' committees are weakly structured groups of citizens who meet on a territorial basis. They predominantly protested to oppose interventions that would harm the quality of life on their territory or called for improvements in it. Cf. *Donatella della Porta* (ed.), *Comitati di Cittadini e Democrazia Urbana*, Cosenza 2004, p. 7. *Chiara Sebastiani*, *Comitati cittadini e spazi pubblici urbani*, in: *Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia* 42, 2001, pp. 77–114. *Massimiliano Andretta/Gianni Piazza/Anna Subirats*, *Urban Dynamics and Social Movements*, in: *Donatella della Porta/Mario Diani* (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements*, Oxford/New York etc. 2014, pp. 200–215. *Jeffrey M. Berry/Kent E. Portney/Ken Thompson*, *The Rebirth of Urban Democracy*, Washington 1993.

68 Local interests also mobilised lots of citizens during the 1970s in the USA. Cf. *Michael Stewart Foley*, *Front Porch Politics. The Forgotten Heyday of American Activism in the 1970s and 1980s*, New York 2013.

the presence of the US military bases. The sentiment of uncertainty over what could happen if Spain were to become part of the Atlantic Alliance and, after its official entry in 1982, the desire to leave it and remain neutral led many Spanish men and women to come together to debate and organise activities at a local level to fight for peace and disarmament.⁶⁹

Soon after the first groups had been founded, the anti-NATO Commission (CAO), an umbrella body of grassroots peace groups in Madrid, was established.⁷⁰ It published the journal »Zona Cero« (Zero Zone). In 1983, an article in »Zona Cero« recalled how these committees were formed in the wake of the protest march against Torrejón air base:

»[T]he first groups were born in neighbourhoods and workplaces. The movement was acquiring one of its main characteristics: its basic, participatory and democratic character. [...] There are more than 25 committees and local collectives that meet weekly, in addition to environmental groups, anti-militarist, alternative and objector groups [...]. It would be impossible to quantify what has been done by the different committees. Murals, propaganda stands, public events and ›solidarity festivals‹, meetings and information events, caravans of cars«.⁷¹

Thus, the initial impetus motivating the peace protests came from the subculture of civic activism and dissent that emerged from these neighbourhood groups during the early stages of the transition. As sociologist Manuel Castells recalls, the Spanish citizen movement represented a point of reference within the European urban movements during the seventies.⁷² Initially, this movement came as a spontaneous response to the poor living condi-

69 On the development of these anti-NATO citizens' committees, see: *Gonzalo Wilhelmi*, El movimiento por la paz en Madrid, de la transición al primer Gobierno socialista (1975–1986), in: paper at Congreso Internacional Historia de la Época Socialista España 1982–1996, 2011, available at URL: <<http://www.historiadelpresente.es/sites/default/files/congresos/pdf/41/ecosociedad/Wilhelmi.pdf>> [4.4.2018].

70 A testimony on CAO of a former activist at URL: <<http://www.nazanin.es/?p=6022>> [4.4.2018]. The first peace committees in Madrid appeared in 1979. In October 1981, the CAO was composed mainly by neighbourhood peace committees (Vallecas, Moratalaz, Barrio del Pilar, San Blas, Prosperidad, Aluche, Chamberí), town peace committees (i. e. Leganés, Getafe, Fuenlabrada), factory peace committees (i. e. Bimbo, Correos, Telefónica) and the Commission for Freedom of Expression (Comisión para la Libertad de Expresión), AEPDEN (Association for the Study and Protection of the Environment, Asociación de Estudios y Protección de la Naturaleza), MOC (Movement of Conscientious Objectors), MC, LCR and local groups of the PCE and PCEU (Unified Communist Party of Spain – Partido Comunista de España Unificado). Cf. *Pablo Socorro Arencibia*, La última batalla de la transición: las organizaciones del movimiento anti-OTAN, Trabajo de Final de Master, Oviedo 2015, p. 53, URL: <http://digibuo.uniovi.es/dspace/bitstream/10651/33159/6/TFM_%20Socorro%20ArencibiaPablo.pdf> [4.4.2018].

71 La CAO en la cabeza del movimiento por la paz, in: *Zona Cero*, 1983, no. 3, pp. 4–5, p. 4.

72 There is a rich historiography on the Spanish neighbourhood movement during this period, see: *Manuel Castells*, Productores de ciudad: el movimiento ciudadano de Madrid, in: *Vicente Pérez Quintana/Pablo Sánchez León* (eds.), Memoria ciudadana y movimiento vecinal. Madrid (1968–2008), Madrid 2008, pp. 21–32, here: p. 21; *Manuel Castells*, Urban Social Movements and the Struggle for Democracy: The Citizens' Movement in Madrid, in: *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 2, 1978, pp. 133–146; *id.*, The City and the Grassroots. A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1983; *Jesús Ibáñez*, Por una sociología de la vida cotidiana, Madrid 1994. *Carme Molinero/Pere Yàs* (eds.), Construint la ciutat democràtica. El moviment veïnal durant el tardofranquisme i la transició, Bellaterra 2010; *Pamela Radcliff*, Making Democratic Citizen in Spain. Civil Society and the Popular Origins of the Transition, 1960–78, Basingstoke/New York 2011; *Ivan Bordetas Jiménez*, Nosotros somos los que hemos hecho esta ciudad. Auto-organización y movilización vecinal durante el tardofranquismo y el proceso de cambio político, PhD Thesis, Barcelona 2012; *Teresa María Ortega López*, Trabajadores y vecinos. Una aproximación al movimiento obrero y vecinal en el tardofranquismo y la Transición. Granada, 1968–1978, in: *Alberto Ramos* (ed.), La transición política y so-

tions in Spanish metropolitan areas, which were created by the unbalanced development model of Francoism. Local grievances with housing, the remodelling of suburban neighbourhoods, the environment and, more generally, the urban revitalisation of the previous decade, also served as direct incentives for the Spanish peace mobilisations.⁷³

The citizens' movement was able to generate new social spaces in which not only Communist party militants but also young people and women without any party-political affiliation could express their own ideas. Thus, strictly material demands merged with demands for political democracy in a spontaneous, non-ideological way.

In other words, atomic fear pushed those who gathered in these committees to organise themselves at a local level. These citizens, while aware of the inevitability of Spain's entry into NATO, considered it harmful for their local communities. In contrast, the Soviet Union was perceived as distant⁷⁴ and having little bearing on the security and material well-being of Spain. Local battles against American bases rehabilitated the participatory vision of democracy spread by neighbourhood movements during the final years of the dictatorship.

The peace committees measured democracy in terms of quality of participation and, as a result, the idea of peace was closely tied to the ways in which citizens were involved in public life. »Zona Cero« was explicit about this: »It is not a matter of judging a society, but it must be pointed out that democracy is not only assessed by votes but also by its conditions and the freedom that citizens acquire and experience«.⁷⁵

The case of the peace collective in Zaragoza provides an insight into the practices of democracy within the Spanish peace movement and its consequences for post-Francoist society. The Collective for Peace and Disarmament in the city of Aragon was established to satisfy the urgent need for mobilisation due to the presence of the nearby US Air Force base.⁷⁶ Secondly, it effectively represented the ideal of decentralised democracy to which the peace activists tended. It arose from the call of the Catalan Committee for Peace and Disarmament, in October 1982, with the aim of organising a week for peace, the banning of the atomic bomb and other weapons of mass destruction. At this point, there was little time and the citizens had to rush to coordinate the mobilisation. Some citizens spoke to the Youth Council of Zaragoza intending to convene a meeting of all civic bodies in the auction room of the municipality.⁷⁷

Thus, the collective was organised during a meeting in the town hall, which over 50 people attended. During the meeting, it was concluded that a campaign had to be arranged to »de-marginalize the topic of peace in our cities«.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, »a controversial decision was agreed upon: this manifesto should be signed by all bodies except political par-

cial en Andalucía, Cádiz 2005, pp. 257–276; Ricard Martínez i Muntada, Movimiento vecinal, antifranquismo y anticapitalismo, in: *Historia, trabajo y sociedad* 2, 2011, pp. 63–90.

73 The historiography on the relation between the Spanish neighbourhood movement and the peace committees is still limited. Cf. Manuel Guerrero, *Veinte años de encuentros y desencuentros de las Asociaciones de Vecinos*, Madrid 1998, pp. 48f.

74 On the relation between Spain and the USSR during the Spanish transition, cf. Juan Carlos Pereira Castañares, *España y la U. R. S. S. en una Europa en transformación*, in: *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea* 15, 1993, pp. 189–206; Magdalena Garrido Caballero, *Las relaciones entre España y la Unión Soviética a través de las Asociaciones de Amistad en el siglo XX*, PhD Thesis, Murcia 2006.

75 Javier Sabada, *El tercer rostro de Jano es la caradura*, in: *Zona Cero*, 1985, no. 7, pp. 9–10, p. 9.

76 Concha Roldán, *Los Americanos en Zaragoza. La presencia de las Fuerzas Aéreas de Estados Unidos en la base: 1954–1992*, Zaragoza 1998.

77 Victor Viñuales, *Una historia breve pero densa. El colectivo por la paz y el desarme*, in: *Euroshima* 1, 1983, pp. 4–5, p. 4.

78 *Ibid.*

ties«.79 The origins of the Zaragoza peace collective were rooted in an idea of democracy in which the decision-making process did not depend on either the state or local bureaucracies but on the interpersonal solidarity of a grassroots movement and the networks it had developed over time. Within a short time, 75 citizen groups supported this manifesto. They came from heterogeneous backgrounds and included the Diocesan Catholic Action Board (»Junta Diocesana de la Acción Católica«)⁸⁰, the Scouts, the »Peña El Brabán« (a group that organised the celebration for the local patron saints), the CNT-A, an anarchist trade union, but also the Official College of Doctors and Graduates in Philosophy and Letters (»Colegio Oficial de Doctores y Licenciados en Filosofía, Letras y Ciencia«) and the Esperanto Group: »In practice it is clear that, faced with crazy and harmful mandarins, it is necessary to put up a common and very broad front«.⁸¹ The danger was sensed at a local level and this brought about intersectional solidarity against the decisions of the central institutions, or the mandarins, that is to say the bureaucrats, in Madrid.

The unity of such a diverse array of groups cut across their ideological differences. At least initially, it was based on the perception of individuals that they had to take urgent collective action. Yet after the first democratic local elections in 1979, it became apparent that municipal governments, dominated by the parties of the left, wanted to intervene in the work of the local peace groups. Proposals for participatory democracy were steadily replaced by the concept of citizen participation, which implied that local administrations could bring the activities of its citizens into the fold of formal institutions at the local level.⁸²

In the example of the Zaragoza Peace and Disarmament Collective, democracy was practised not only in terms of a union of heterogeneous groups but also in their practical organisation. The Collective organised a peace awareness week by convening general assemblies every Wednesday at the House of Catholic Action (»Casa de la Acción Católica«):

»[...] representatives from groups as well as independent citizens enter here without impediment. Most practical tasks are carried out by working committees formed only of those who want to contribute [...]. The main results of the week are: [...] above all, the consolidation of a small group of people who belong to different traditions and cultures (mainly Christian, Marxist and libertarian)«.⁸³

The Zaragoza Collective was officially established thanks to an assembly of citizens who wanted to continue mobilizing after the peace awareness week. The open-door assembly, much like in post-1968 movements, was the preferred form of decision-making and direct democracy.⁸⁴ Nevertheless, the Zaragoza Collective's interpretation of democracy was influenced by the peace groups, which intended to go beyond the assembly model of student movements. Above all, they wanted to avoid the danger of being stifled by the more influential leaders among them.⁸⁵ Liberal democracy relies on the principles of delegation

79 Ibid.

80 This was the local directive of the »Acción Católica Española« (ACE). On the history of the ACE: *Feliciano Montero*, *El movimiento católico en España*, Madrid 1993.

81 *Viñuales*, *Una historia breve pero densa*, p. 4.

82 Some scholars on the Spanish neighbourhood movement have diagnosed a crisis of this movement during the 1980s because of its absorption into local administrations. Cf. *Tomás Rodríguez Villasante*, *Historia del movimiento vecinal y retos para las democracias participativas*, in: *Pérez Quintana/Sánchez León*, *Memoria ciudadana y movimiento vecinal*, pp. 231–262, here: p. 237; *Tomás Alberich Nistal*, *Aspectos cuantitativos del asociacionismo en España*, in: *Documentación Social*, 1994, no. 94, pp. 53–74.

83 *Viñuales*, *Una historia breve pero densa*, p. 4.

84 On the role of assembly as a »theatre« in the 1968 movement, see: *Peppino Ortoleva*, *Saggio sui movimenti del 1968 in Europa e in America*, Roma 1988, p. 115.

85 Cf. *Jo Freeman*, *The Tyranny of Structurelessness*, in: *The Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 17, 1973, pp. 151–165.

and majority voting, yet the Zaragoza Collective rejected the principle of representation: »a person is only worth one vote and does not represent anyone but himself«. ⁸⁶ The Collective itself was not conceived as »a pacifist group to be run with a set routine«. There was no office of any kind: »There is no decision-making structure other than the assembly, through which everything passes. [...] There is no division between those who think and those who work manually because this separation encourages placing a harmful emphasis on power rather than participation«. ⁸⁷

The final aim was to create a more open and egalitarian societal structure that could pave the way for a deliberative democracy. ⁸⁸ In this sense, the peace movement differed from post-1968 mobilisation in its search for tolerance and through its practice of continuous debate and reasoned opinion sharing. It was a reflexive model of sociability that strived towards the construction of multiple critical public spaces. It was also oriented towards well-founded criticism and the development of topics that facilitated the construction of larger arenas for the exchange of ideas on peace and the nuclear danger.

Nonetheless, the small local groups aimed to assemble in larger forums and, from 1983 onwards, they did indeed hold larger collective meetings. The data are revealing: in the first national meeting of peace groups that took place in Zaragoza in 1983, about 60 organisations attended. ⁸⁹ By 1986, this figure had grown to 130 groups. ⁹⁰ In 1984, a dossier on the results of a peace meeting highlighted the positive trend of the Spanish peace movement in moving from the local to the national level: »It also indicates a tendency to consolidate national, regional, and provincial affinity for the coordination of these bodies and evaluates this as a positive tool. It would be advisable for choices to be made – if possible – by coordination groups or at least to aim for this objective«. ⁹¹

At the national level, the organisational model was identical to that of small local groups. However, there was no lack of conflicting positions to enrich the deliberative nature of the meetings. Some of the points that generated endless debates among Spanish peace activists are outlined in an Andalusian MC dossier:

»There are questions within this group that are today clearly grounds for division: for example, the topic of the form of our struggle (non-violence), the question of terrorism in the Basque Country, the feminist question, and solidarity with other struggles and social movements. On such issues, there are varying degrees of interest, or simply a lack of interest«. ⁹²

In summary, the disagreement between the activists arose from the possibility of justifying violent means in the struggle for peace (as in the case of Salvadorian and Nicaraguan

86 *Viñuales*, Una historia breve pero densa, p. 5.

87 *Ibid.*

88 A further practice in order to reform representative democracy is deliberative democracy. According to this concept, it is particularly important to discuss and to debate within the process of decision-making. Deliberation in democratic process would secure the public good through reason rather than through political power. Cf. *Christian F. Rostbøll*, *Deliberative Freedom. Deliberative Democracy as Critical Theory*, New York 2008.

89 Direcciones de los grupos participantes en el primer encuentro de organizaciones pacifistas, Zaragoza, May 1983, AMC, (unclassified). Another list of Spanish peace groups: *Por la paz en España*, in: *Derechos Humanos. Grupo de Información sobre el Desarme y la Paz*, November 1983.

90 Cf. *Socorro Arencibia*, *El papel de la izquierda revolucionaria en la vertebración del movimiento anti-OTAN en el Estado español*.

91 Acta de la Coordinadora Estatal de Organizaciones Pacifistas, Madrid, 30 June–1 July 1984, AMC, (unclassified).

92 Dossier »Información Movimiento Antimilitarista y por la Paz. Andalucía«, July 1983, AMC, (unclassified).

guerrillas⁹³) or the possibility of converting the peace movement into a »movement of movements«. ⁹⁴ On the latter question, suggestions were invited from other movements regarding the anti-NATO struggle, including the feminist and environmental movements on how to deal with the army and conscientious objection. These were not addressed in the same way by activists. For instance, the conscientious objectors and non-violent collectives who joined the peace committees voiced strong criticism of all armies (not just the Francoist army) and opposed all military spending. However, other peace groups did not support an anti-militarist line with the same intensity.⁹⁵ This was evident during Armed Forces Day (»Día de las Fuerzas Armadas«) in Valladolid in 1984, when protests did not receive as much support as anti-NATO demonstrations.⁹⁶

Ultimately, the central aim in experimenting with a bottom-up form of democracy, after years of dictatorship, was to seek unity and discussion between groups with different perspectives, and this distinguished peace groups from previous local endeavours during the anti-Francoist struggle: »This reality has the benefit of attracting the attention of vast sectors of the people. The danger of war, NATO, disapproval of the army [...] are issues that raise awareness in a large part of the population. [...] It also develops solidarity between different radical and reformist forces«. ⁹⁷

Issue-based discussions during the assemblies and the dissemination of information on nuclear developments became a central focus of local committees. »Zona Cero« often advised its readers that informational material on the risks of atomic weapons and on NATO was available for local committees or individuals with an interest in such issues. These were mostly Spanish translations of Edward P. Thompson's pamphlet »Protest and Survive« (»Protesta y sobrevive«)⁹⁸ and John Paul Lederach's writing on peace education (»Educar por la paz«), or essays such as »Mañana puede ser tarde. Libro negro de la OTAN« (»Tomorrow may be too late. Black book on NATO«) by Eugenio del Río, a former Maoist and MC leader.⁹⁹ According to some peace committees, the concept of democracy had to be understood as a form of citizens' empowerment. In other words, participatory democra-

93 Resumen Grupo Movimiento Pacifista y Movimientos de Liberación, II Encuentro Organizaciones Pacifistas, 1984, AMC, (unclassified). *Basajauna*, En torno a la violencia, in: Zona Cero Extra, July 1984, pp. 17–19.

94 Cf. *Joaquín Piñero Blanco*, Evolución de la idea de paz en los movimientos pacifistas durante el final de la dictadura franquista y la transición en España, in: *Pilar Folguera/Juan Carlos Pereira Castañares/Carmen García García* et al. (eds.), *Pensar con la historia desde el siglo XXI*. Actas del XII Congreso de la Asociación de Historia Contemporánea, Madrid 2014, pp. 3349–3371.

95 Cf. *Piños*, Militarismo y antimilitarismo, in: Zona Cero Extra, July 1984, p. 4.

96 *Carlos Yárnoz*, La celebración del Día de las Fuerzas Armadas coincide con la proliferación de polémicas sobre la OTAN y el pacifismo, in: *El País*, 27.5.1984.

97 *Ibid.*

98 Edward P. Thompson's work as historian arrived late in Spain. Nevertheless, his essays as peace activist were already translated in 1983. Cf. *Edward P. Thompson*, Opción Cero, Barcelona 1983 (first published in English 1982); *id.*, La guerra de las galaxias, Barcelona 1986 (first published in English 1985); *id.*, Nuestras libertades y nuestras vidas, Barcelona 1987 (first published in English 1985). All these books were edited by the Spanish publishing house Crítica. Cf. *Santos Juliá*, Thompson en castellano, tarde y mal, in: *El País*, 7.9.1993.

99 *Eugenio del Río*, Mañana puede ser tarde. Libro negro de la OTAN, Madrid 1983. Other books that were accessible to the citizens: *id.*, La razón de la fuerza, Madrid 1982; *Vicenç Fisas*, Crisis del militarismo y militarización de la crisis, Barcelona 1982. In addition, many dossiers compiled by the CAO (central Anti-NATO Committee in Madrid) were available on unilateralism/multilateralism, on the European Community and its security system and the papers of the Spanish peace groups during the conventions of the European Nuclear Disarmament movement in Perugia (Italy).

cy should be utilised not as a means of bestowing power on others but rather to increase the capacity of Spanish citizens to process information on a possible – and increasingly likely – nuclear war.

The activities of these groups posed a symbolic but nonetheless real challenge to the model of representative democracy, which had only been recently adopted in Spain. They embodied not only a forum for a bottom-up debate but also an alternative codification of democracy for Spanish society. According to anti-war activists, democracy was based not only on the binding legal power of laws or institutional decisions but also on the strength of collective orientation and opinion expressed through action and discussion.

In this regard, much like other peace movements in southern Europe, the Spanish peace movement made abundant use of symbolic referenda as an instrument of direct democracy. One group's essential demand was to hold a referendum so that the Spanish people themselves could decide whether the country should be part of the Atlantic Alliance. Numerous simulated referenda were held throughout Spain.¹⁰⁰ A local report described how workers at the Philips Group's Barcelona »Miniwatt« plant organised a referendum by setting out ballot boxes across the shop floor. Their ballot paper read: »Do you support Spain's exit from NATO and the dismantling of North American bases in our country?« From 5 a.m. until 5 p.m., ballot boxes were open for the 1,032 workers to answer this question. Results: 740 participants, 292 abstentions, 693 votes in favour of the motion.¹⁰¹

Another phenomenon connected with grassroots anti-NATO protests was the proliferation of free radio stations, which tried to spread information as an alternative to that provided by mainstream culture. By proposing different lifestyles, they tried to broaden the recently acquired right to freedom of information. For example, »Radio Cero« of the Anti-NATO Commission was set up in 1984 in Madrid. Between 1983 and 1987, many other independent broadcasters affiliated with neighbourhood groups flourished. Most of these radio stations firmly supported the campaign to leave NATO.¹⁰²

The visual repertoire of peace protests also invoked an idea of democracy that differed from mere political representation. In this sense, the methods adopted by local Spanish groups were not unlike those of other European protest groups during the latter stages of the Cold War. Marches, human chains, and the formation of silent cordons of activists on the streets aimed to evoke symbolically the principles of solidarity and collectivism and, therefore, the desire for shared participation in public decision-making. Another example of Spanish peace groups' democratising practices was the creation of murals. This was one of the most common activities carried out by local committees in Spain, which intended to raise awareness and take a stand against the Spain's entry into the Western bloc.¹⁰³ The

100 The inspiration for these referendums was probably the first British referendum, the famous peace ballot, which in 1934–1935 tried to ascertain public opinion on the League of Nations and collective security. *Martin Ceadel*, *The First British Referendum: The Peace Ballot, 1934–1935*, in: *The English Historical Review* 95, 1980, pp. 810–839. Another inspiration may have come from the Krefeld appeal of the West German peace movement (November 1980), which invited West German citizens to sign a pledge. Cf. URL: <http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1129> [5.4.2018].

101 *José Gutiérrez Álvarez*, *Miniwatt Philips. La memoria obrera*, Madrid 2003, p. 85.

102 *José Pérez Emilio Martín*, *Libertad en las ondas. La radio libre española y el discurso de la democratización de las comunicaciones (1976–1989)*, in: *Julio Pérez Serrano/Rebeca Viguera Ruiz* (eds.), *De la guerra al consenso: el lenguaje de la dictadura y la democracia en España*, Madrid 2013, pp. 285–294.

103 On the creation of murals during the Spanish transition and its aftermath, see: *Pedro Sempere*, *Los muros del postfranquismo*, Valencia 1977; *Alexandre Cirici*, *Murals per la Llibertat*, Barcelona 1977; *Tomás Muñoz Asensio*, *Arte Mural Urbano*, Madrid 1981–1991, Madrid 1993; *María Luisa Grau Tello*, *La pintura mural en la esfera pública de Zaragoza*, in: *Artígrama. Re-*

murals were created collectively by activists and neighbourhood movements with the involvement of some professionals and artists. One mural in Barcelona in 1977 even declared: »Don't vote. Paint!«.¹⁰⁴ Sometimes, people would grab paint and brushes to express their anti-NATO messages using the grey walls of the suburbs as their canvas. It is interesting to remember how, as portrayed in the iconography of the murals, the strength of the people united was able to break down barriers, drive out soldiers, and expel giant nuclear missiles.¹⁰⁵

For instance, the poster advertising the second »run for neutrality« on 16 November 1985 in Madrid, which had the support of numerous associations and districts in the capital, clearly expressed the strong participatory legacy of the citizens' movement among the peace activists.¹⁰⁶ In the centre of the poster stands the Puerta de Alcalá (Alcalá Gate), the meeting point for the race, and like the rays emanating from a large star, different groups of demonstrators are seen arriving. They arrive from every point in the city, or rather, from the suburbs – from Alcorcón, Vallecas, and Fuenlabrada – to protest in the heart of Madrid. For these movements, democracy was synonymous with territorial decentralisation, which was considered the best organisational instrument to gain better control of decision-making powers in foreign policy and national security. Moreover, the appreciation of the intimate dimension, its small scale and the concreteness, was a direct product of the political culture of the new social movements of the 1970s, from which the Spanish peace movement also drew inspiration.¹⁰⁷

The strong connections between local spaces, localised citizen movements, and the Spanish struggle for peace becomes clear when we consider that Spain was one of the European countries with the highest number of municipalities that declared themselves nuclear-free zones. According to an essay by researcher and activist Vicenç Fisas, at the end of 1983, 323 Spanish municipalities had taken the symbolic step of declaring themselves nuclear-free zones. There were 156 in England, 281 in Belgium and 86 in West Germany.¹⁰⁸ The same author explained the spirit that fuelled this symbolic process:

»What is expected here [...] is not the need for a new form of class struggle or a traditional revolution. The purpose is very simple in its formulation, even if complex and difficult in its realization: a break from collaboration with rulers in matters of security and international relations, and a break from the delegation of power that society and people have participated in for decades [...] The fundamental change that must be implemented concerns active participation in the disarmament process. If the people, the people in the street, the small communities, become aware that it is their security at stake, they will be able to take part in the formulation of this alternative strategy.«.¹⁰⁹

vista de Historia del Arte del Departamento de Historia del Arte de la Universidad de Zaragoza 27, 2012, pp. 637–640.

104 *Id.*, Cuando los muros hablan. Una aproximación a la pintura mural en el espacio urbano durante la Transición, in: *Arte y Ciudad. Revista de Investigación*, 2013, no. 3, pp. 71–90, here: p. 73.

105 Cf. the collection of anti-NATO mural photos given by Alejandro de Diego in 2014 to the Salvador Seguí Foundation in Madrid.

106 Poster 2. Carrera popular por la neutralidad. OTAN No. Bases fuera, 1985, Archive Foundation Pablo Iglesias (AFPI).

107 *Susanne Schregel*, The Spaces and Places of the Peace Movement, in: *Cristoph Becker-Schaum/Philipp Gassert/Martin Klimke et al. (eds.)*, The Nuclear Crisis. The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s, New York/Oxford 2016, pp. 173–188, here: p. 174f.

108 Spanish figures on nuclear-free zones are impressive. Nevertheless, Belgium had more nuclear-free zones per capita.

109 *Vicenç Fisas*, El desarme en casa. Municipios desnuclearizados y desarme regional, Barcelona 1985, p. 9.

Clearly, the practice of declaring nuclear-free zones represented a further example of a new conception of democracy that decentralised powers and functions in order to embrace new forms of self-management. These procedures contemplated foreign policy and international diplomacy in such a way as to combat what »Zona Cero« called »a regulatory democracy in the shadow of NATO«. ¹¹⁰

IV. UNPOLITICAL DEMOCRACY

In Spain, many peace activists were troubled by the political parties' increasing interference in their collective mobilisation. Analysing a similar phenomenon of tension in Italy, Donatella della Porta shows how the peace movement's frequent cooperation with left-wing parties (especially the Communist party) was at odds with the search for autonomy from a party system that was beginning to be seen as delegitimised. ¹¹¹

The endorsement and interference of newly legalised parties also became a point of friction within the Spanish movement for nuclear disarmament. A report from a 1983 meeting of the Communist Movement underlined this refusal of political partisanship in large sections of the peace movement:

»all left-wing opposition [...] is more and more interested in driving this movement (noting the unusual interest of the PCE to place itself at the head of the peace movement). [...] The peace movement also involves rather problematic aspects. There is a strong tendency towards a certain utopian vision, that is to say, to see itself as a mouthpiece of the most transcendent political and social demands [...]. In other words, the incentive to form a »pacifist party« may be stronger than those existing in other movements [...] and, therefore, the tendency to declare war against traditional parties can proliferate with greater ease (where they lump together reformists and revolutionaries)«. ¹¹²

This dossier echoes several patterns that were prevalent within the Spanish peace movement. First, the Spanish Left's drive to politicise the movement, but also its feeling of rejection by these peace groups. Second, resistance to political interference problematised the parties: it was the direct result of the interaction of several cultural milieus within the movement, especially non-violence, the libertarian milieu of the post-68 movements, and also the particular interests of neighbourhood associations. Carmen Magallón Portolés, a peace activist in Zaragoza, looks back at an alternative conception of politics that criticised Spain's mainstream parties: »It seemed to us they were professionals in politics. In contrast, we wanted a policy to emerge based on our lives and, starting from our own experiences, we wanted to carry out a critique of the system in favour of freedom of expression«. ¹¹³

Magallón Portolés continues by laying out the »anti-political« motivations of her Collective for Peace and Disarmament:

»We started to discuss the issue of peace with the people. People who had been disappointed by the Communist Party or revolutionary organizations. Precisely because of this disappointment, we decided that the Collective was for individuals and outside party influence. We did not consider any representation other than ourselves. [...] Our collective was a movement of citizens. Not of ideology. We had already had enough with this in the past«. ¹¹⁴

110 *Manolo Revuelta*, *El Estado Felipista. Una democracia policial a la sombra de la OTAN*, in: *Zona Cero*, 1986, no. 10, p. 10.

111 *Donatella della Porta*, *Movimenti collettivi e sistema politico in Italia*, Bari 1996, p. 114.

112 Dossier »Sobre nuestra relación con el movimiento por la paz« by Javier A. Dorransoro, 27 May 1983, AMC, (unclassified).

113 Interview by Giulia Quaggio with Carmen Magallón Portolés, Madrid, May 2017.

114 *Ibid.*

The relationship of the peace movement with the Spanish left-wing parties was confrontational but also based on mutual solidarity. The peace movement required support to promote the peace issue in Parliament, and without party support this would be virtually impossible. From 1981, almost every left-wing party began seeking its own branch in the peace and anti-NATO movement in order to win over public opinion.

From 1981, after an initial total lack of interest in the issue of Euromissiles and nuclear disarmament, the PCE became progressively more active on the issue of peace and Spanish withdrawal from NATO, in an attempt to regain public support after the poor election results during the transition. Following the Italian Eurocommunist strategy, the party also aimed to demonstrate that it was taking up the centre ground between the two Cold War blocs. In the party's journal, »Nuestra Bandera« (»Our Flag«), the political motives behind its support for peace mobilisation were made clear:

»[I]t forms part of the Eurocommunist strategy for social transformation [...]. The objectives of the pacifist movement that is currently developing in Europe are converging [...] with the PCE's policy [...]. It is good to coordinate citizens for peace and disarmament. They should be organised, and this should form the basis of society, not superstructures or intermediate bureaucracies«.¹¹⁵

Increasingly, PCE militants began working intensively in local peace grassroots groups, as they had already done in neighbourhood associations during the latter years of Francoism.¹¹⁶ They also began to organise summer festivals in the name of nuclear disarmament in an effort to gain public support and, therefore, votes. The aim of the party secretary Gerardo Iglesias was to create a pioneering ensemble of left-wing grassroots groups and movements to fight the PSOE, which, once in government, reversed its stance on NATO and supported Spain's continued membership. Therefore, the peace movement primarily served as a tool to help overcome the Spanish Communist Party's low ratings.

Similarly, the splinter parties on the left of the PCE, such as MC and LCR, aimed to utilise local peace groups to promote their own message within Spanish society. The militants of these parties formed a minority within Spanish anti-NATO committees, but they were very active in their attempt to win more members. For example, regarding the Collective for Peace and Disarmament, a report by the MC explained:

»The first initiative [of the collective of Zaragoza] [...] was said to have a broad social base and, for this reason, prevented political parties from participating. [...] We and the other parties could not stop this, being a very large collective, and the majority of members having no party affiliations. The issue then evolved because, at times, the Collective asked political parties for money and the explicit support of their militants. Other times, they asked the parties not to appear in public initiatives or face criticism«.¹¹⁷

Such inherent contradictions in the relationship between parties and peace committees were not confined to the PCE or radical-left organisations but were also apparent within the Socialist Party. After the demonstration of 15 November 1981, the PSOE gave life to »its« peace movement, the Movement for Peace, Disarmament and Liberty (»Movimiento por la Paz, el Desarme y la Libertad«, MPDL).¹¹⁸ The organisation's activities continued de-

115 *Francisco Herrera*, El movimiento pacifista europeo, in: *Nuestra Bandera* 111, 1982, pp. 54–59, p. 59.

116 Cf. *Juan Andrade*, El PCE y el PSOE en (la) transición. La evolución ideológica de la izquierda durante el proceso de cambio político, Madrid 2015, p. 72.

117 Dossier: »De la organización del MC en Zaragoza«, June 1983, AMC, (unclassified).

118 The founders of the MPDL were above all Socialist politicians and former Communist militants, intellectuals, and university professors. Cf. the MPDL Bulletin, Boletín Informativo Mensual n. 1, 1983, AFPI. On the history of MPDL, see: Dossier of the MPDL Directive Board, February 1982–March 1985, PSOE Secretary of Citizen Participation, B. 125-G, Folder Y, doc. 2.

spite the subsequent pro-Atlantic stance of the socialist government. The PSOE's strategic goal was, in fact, to demonstrate to Spanish citizens its interest in the issues of peace and European security, and from an alternative perspective to that of anti-government peace groups. The PSOE saw it as a question of promoting a pacifism that sought to strengthen multilateral disarmament (not unilateral positions), domestic security within the European Community, and diplomatic contacts beyond the Iron Curtain, while the sensitive issue of NATO was left purposely aside. However, an internal dossier revealed that the PSOE was not satisfied with the results obtained by its movement from a social viewpoint: »Regarding the MPDL, it is important to point out a) its bad relations with the pacifist movement as a whole [...], b) its internal situation is not favourable to the overall strategy of the PSOE, c) its attempt to develop campaigns beyond CEOP goes no further than press releases and good intentions«. ¹¹⁹

Ultimately, the key objective of the grassroots peace groups was to occupy a social arena that would overcome the limits of formal leadership in terms of individual autonomy, responsibility and the heterogeneity of its contributors. Their greatest fear was co-optation by the old left. In summary, they tried to avoid the politics of professional politicians but also the personalities of the new left. As a result, the parties themselves were forced to become more open and negotiate with these movements. Most importantly, there were major repercussions in terms of democracy and political culture within the same party organisations of the Spanish left that still focused largely on class conflict.

This was the case with the MC and LCR, the only two parties that survived the decline of the Spanish revolutionary left at the beginning of the 1980s. They came from a strong doctrinal and heterodox Marxist tradition, which opposed what they defined as »bourgeois democracy«. The direct contact between anti-violence activists, environmental and feminist groups within the peace committees led to important changes in the groups' actions and ideological orientations. Regarding the MC's militants, »action for peace meetings« were set up. These were arenas for debate where militants could freely express their opinions. ¹²⁰ Self-criticism became an essential ingredient of these meetings, as revealed in the dossiers. Similarly, during a 1983 meeting of its central committee addressing the question of the anti-war movement, a spokesperson for the LCR explained: »It is necessary for the party to change the way it intervenes on this issue [...]. We want to build the widest-ranging movement possible«. ¹²¹ The argument that mobilisation for peace should acquire a mass dimension relied upon the coexistence of different political traditions, from grassroots Christian groups to the radical left. This was an attempt to break through the ideological moulds that had shaped the left in the previous decade and had had a significant impact in terms of democratic codification.

During a meeting in 1984, the philosopher and peace activist Francisco Fernández Buey argued:

119 Dossier »Síntesis de los datos más significativos del movimiento pacifista en 1985«, 1985, b. 114-A, PSOE Secretary on Citizen Participation, AFPI.

120 On the revolutionary left during the Spanish transition: Cf. *Gonzalo Wilhelmi*, *Romper el consenso. La izquierda radical en la Transición española (1975–1982)*, Madrid 2016; *Josepa Cucó Giner*, *Recuperando una memoria en la penumbra. El movimiento comunista y las transformaciones de la extrema izquierda española*, in: *Historia y Política*, 2008, no. 20, pp. 73–96, here: pp. 73–76; *Consuelo Laíz Castro*, *La izquierda radical en España durante la transición a la democracia*, PhD Thesis, Madrid 1994.

121 Internal Bulletin n. 3, »La campaña electoral del referéndum OTAN«, LCR Central Committee, 1–2 February 1986, (Doc 8.15), available at URL: <<http://cdn.vientosur.info/Capitulo%208%20PDFs/Doc.%208.15.pdf>> [4.6.2018].

»A feature [of the Spanish peace movement] that is worth highlighting is [...] the autonomy of the movement from political organizations and the appearance of a new political confluence with an enormous degree of organizational relaxation [...]. It is not a question of the apolitical but something, I believe, in many ways new [...]. A radical criticism, sometimes really radical, of the traditional way of doing politics and, in contrast, a suggestion for a new way of doing politics, in which morality and ethics return to the political fold«. ¹²²

In fact, in Spain, questions over nuclear war brought about important changes in the political currents that preserved the classical Marxist conception of war as a means to revolutionary change. It generated new critiques and independent perspectives on the function traditionally attributed to violence and the labour movement. ¹²³ For instance, during the first half of the 1980s, the journal »Mientras Tanto« reflected extensively on the reconsideration of emancipatory communist thought in the light of criticism from pacifist, feminist and environmental groups. ¹²⁴ At the same time, peace protests gave greater visibility to the »Izquierda Socialista« (Socialist Left) political tendency within the PSOE, with the consequent opening up of a tense debate on the party's internal democracy and Felipe González's increasingly centralised leadership and its exclusion of dissenting voices. ¹²⁵

The real issue was, then, whether to convert the peace movement into a political party in order to have a direct impact on the Spanish representative system. There were some organisational attempts in this direction. For example, during the 1982 election campaign, the CAO, together with the Environmental Coordination and the Women's District Coordination, created an »alternative platform« in Madrid. Its »aim was not to take part in the election campaign (an issue about which we have been quite clear), but to make possible a new, unified space between different social sectors and to make their distinct voices heard through street protests«. ¹²⁶

Nevertheless, the PCE tried to change its electoral strategy by attempting to incorporate the demands for pacifism directly into the traditional socialist agenda. A few months before the elections of June 1986, »Izquierda Unida« (United Left) was born with the purpose of bringing to parliament the new demands of social protest, together with the traditional issues of the workers' movement. ¹²⁷ The election result was disheartening: the new party only received 4.63% of the overall vote. This showed that, although Spanish social movements could be mobilised at street level out of a spontaneous urgent need to improve specific material conditions, this did not convert into votes at the ballot box.

V. CONCLUSION: PEACE AS A DEMOCRACY OF DISTRUST TOWARDS THE POLITICAL ELITES

The rise of a democracy, according to Pierre Rosanvallon, entails both a promise and a problem for society: »a promise insofar as democracy reflected the needs of societies founded on the dual imperative of equality and autonomy; and a problem, insofar as these

¹²² Paper by Francisco Fernández Buey, Logroño 24 February 1984, AMC, (unclassified).

¹²³ *Jaime Pastor Verdú*, *La evolución del Marxismo ante la guerra y la paz*, Madrid 1989, pp. 380–410.

¹²⁴ »Mientras Tanto« is a journal founded by the former Communists Manuel Sacristán and Giulia Adinolfi in 1979 in opposition to the Catalan Communist Party. Cf. *Enric Prat*, *Trayectorias y efectos del movimiento pacifista*, in: *Mientras Tanto*, 2004, no. 91–92, pp. 123–137.

¹²⁵ Cf. *Guillermo León Cáceres*, *El ruido y la furia. Izquierda Socialista y el referéndum sobre la OTAN (1984–1986)*, in: *Ayer*, 2016, no. 103, pp. 97–122.

¹²⁶ La CAO en la cabeza del movimiento por la paz, in: *Zona Cero*, 1983, no. 3, p. 5.

¹²⁷ On the relation between the PCE and the peace movement regarding the fundaments of United Left, cf. *Carme Molinero/Pere Ysàs*, *De la hegemonía a la autodestrucción. El Partido Comunista de España (1956–1982)*, Barcelona 2017.

noble ideals were a long way from being realized«. ¹²⁸ In Spain, peace groups were a direct expression of the democratic reconfiguration and social distrust following the elites' political management of the transition. Periods of great social change such as the democratisation of Spain after Franco usually result in heightened suspicion towards authority. ¹²⁹ Anti-NATO groups exemplified such domestic suspicion, which increased due to worsening relations between the superpowers and the nuclear threat. Interpreting the narratives of this movement can contribute to moving beyond a traditional linear history of democracy and put Spanish democratic disenchantment in a new light.

It is still not possible to trace social apathy during the consolidation period of Spanish democracy. Indeed, the peace movement's breakthrough contributes to questioning the idea of a »Mediterranean syndrome« ¹³⁰, the widespread conviction that civil society was extremely weak in Southern Europe, a territory consequently unsuited to social mobilisation. The study of peace mobilisation could be beneficial to gain an understanding of this still unexplored part of Spanish society and its relation with democratic institutions. However, this should not be seen in terms of the depoliticisation of and decline in citizen activity but as the beginning of a process of reconceptualisation of the political and the boundaries of democracy. Framing ideas and perceptions on democracy of the Spanish peace groups effectively demonstrates the ambiguity of the relationship.

During the first half of the 1980s, members of the anti-Franco movement who had lived most of their lives under dictatorship, together with young people who did not really know what liberal democracy involved – except for some occasional contacts with their European contemporaries –, took to the streets in support of neutrality and to protest against Spain's entry into NATO. Moreover, during these large-scale protests, citizens from different cultural milieus (libertarian, Marxist and Catholic) shared views on and discussed an alternative model of democracy.

This model differed deliberately from the Western framework of democracy – both from the newly established liberal system of a parliamentary monarchy and from the revolutionary democracy that many activists had supported during the previous decade. The unity of these ideologically diverse groups would have been unimaginable during the struggle against the dictatorship: the path to unity was made possible by their rejecting both the highly ideologised early years of the transition and the political partisanship of social protest.

A common assumption was that US democracy was not a good example for a country such as Spain to follow, which had experienced a difficult history in terms of democracy and held a peripheral position in the bipolar order. According to the rampant anti-Americanism of many peace protesters, the USA's democratic model represented a regulatory and controlling democracy. Consequently, in their minds, Spain's new democracy had acquired the same status due to its alliance with NATO.

In protesting against war and NATO, the Spanish peace movement practiced a different form of democracy in terms of participation, decentralisation and inclusion of societal actors, particularly those that had been excluded in the transition process, such as women

128 *Pierre Rosanvallon*, *Counter-Democracy. Politics in an Age of Distrust*, Cambridge 2008, p. 2.

129 Ulrich Beck has also connected this distrust to technological change in modernity. Cf. *Ulrich Beck*, *Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity*, New Delhi 1986 (first published in German 1986).

130 On the concept of »Mediterranean Syndrome« see: *Antonio La Spina/Giuseppe Sciortino*, *Common Agenda, Southern Rules: European Integration and Environmental Change in the Mediterranean States*, in: *Duncan Liefferink/Philip Lowe/Arthur Moll* (eds.), *European Integration and Environmental Policy*, London 1993, pp. 211–236. See also the reflections in: *John Karamichas* (ed.), *New and Alternative Movements in Spain. The Left, Identity and Globalizing Processes*, Abingdon/New York 2014.

and conscientious objectors. The weakness of the Spanish peace movement – much like other European peace groups – to change the outcome of the country's security policy does not negate the importance this movement had in negotiating alternative concepts of democracy and practicing them in everyday life.¹³¹ The peace activists strove for a direct participatory democracy as a response to the perceived limitations of the transition regime's accountability. Spanish anti-NATO groups represented not only a campaign against nuclear weapons and for unilateral disarmament but, above all, a more generalised critique of the new democratic reality and social life after the negotiated transition.

In the minds of these groups, the quality of democracy could only be improved by citizen participation in local decision-making in contrast to what was perceived to be a sterile electoral democracy. Peace in Spain was directly associated with the ideal of forging a democracy from the bottom up, and its roots were established in the civic mobilisation of the neighbourhood movement in the early years of the transition. In contrast to literature that has noted a deep crisis in neighbourhood policy during the first half of the 1980s, peace committees were extremely successful in re-activating these local networks.¹³² Spanish peace groups envisioned another way of participating in Spanish political life and influencing opinion through the new, partially organised structures of the grassroots committees and central peace-coordinating bodies. In these meetings, deliberation was central, any form of delegation was to be avoided¹³³ and direct democracy in the form of symbolic referenda was promoted.

As we have demonstrated on the basis of the available primary sources, during these long talks, participants tried to reach agreement on Spain's position within the bipolar order, the issue of nuclear weapons and, more generally, military and domestic security following the dictatorship. As they tried to establish common ground, they were particularly fearful of addressing potentially divisive questions in depth. One of these issues was the relationship between violence and peace, i.e. the potential use and justification of violence for the purposes of revolutionary transformation, as in the case of Latin American guerrillas. In contrast with the social movements of the 1960s, Spanish peace groups were wary of dealing with highly conflictive issues and, in order to attract wider support, preferred to keep to the common, generic topics of war and neutralism. Ultimately, they wanted to showcase viable alternatives to state control. Thus, they marked a decisive break with the Franco dictatorship, in which the state had permeated all areas of social life. But the peace movement also wanted to retain its autonomy against the recently legalised and still developing political parties.

131 *Benjamin Ziemann*, *Situating Peace Movements in the Political Culture of the Cold War*. Introduction, in: *id.* (ed.), *Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA during the Cold War*, Essen 2008, pp. 11–40, here: pp. 17f.

132 Most of the historiography on the Spanish neighbourhood movement has identified a period of crisis in the social activity of this movement after the first local elections in Spain in 1979 and the absorption of a part of their activities in left-wing parties or in local administrations. Cf. *Anna Alabart*, *El moviment associatiu veïnal quaranta anys després: un balance*, in: *Revista Nous Horizons*, 2009, no. 195, pp. 34–41.

133 »A movement that aspires to represent a social majority cannot close the doors of its national coordinating organisation to anyone, to any collective, however small or extravagant it may seem; but it would be its death [...] if it did not aspire to reach agreements [...] to learn from other experiences, to listen to other arguments«. Cf. Dossier CAO »Reflexiones para el debate de la Coordinadora Estatal de Organizaciones Pacifistas, avanzar también en el terreno organizativo«, 27 March 1985, ACM, (unclassified).