William Lee Blackwood

German Hegemony and the Socialist International's Place in Interwar European Diplomacy

When the guns fell silent on the western front in November 1918, socialism was about to become a governing force throughout Europe. Just six months later, a Czech socialist could marvel at the convocation of an international socialist conference on post-war reconstruction in a Swiss spa, where, across the lake, stood buildings occupied by now-exiled members of the deposed Habsburg ruling class. In May 1923, as Europe's socialist parties met in Hamburg, Germany, finally to put an end to the war-induced fracturing within their ranks by launching a new organization, the Labour and Socialist International (LSI), the German Communist Party's main daily published a pull-out flier for posting on factory walls. Bearing the sarcastic title the International of Ministers, it presented to workers a list of forty-one socialists and the national offices held by them in Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Poland, France, Sweden, and Denmark. Commenting on the activities of the LSI, in Paris a Russian Menshevik émigré turned prominent left-wing pundit scoffed at the new International's executive body, which he sarcastically dubbed 'the International Socialist Cabinet', since 'all of its members were ministers, ex-ministers, or prospective ministers of State'.[1] Whether one accepted or rejected its new status, socialism's virtually overnight transformation from an outsider to a consummate insider at the end of Europe's first total war provided the most striking measure of the quantum leap into what can aptly be described as Europe's 'social democratic moment'.[2] Moreover, unlike the period after Europe's second total war, when many of socialism's basic postulates became permanently embedded in the post-1945 social-welfare-state con-

European History Quarterly Copyright © 2001 SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, Vol. 31(1), 101–140.
[0265-6914(200101)31:1;101–140;016197]

sensus that so profoundly transformed political culture throughout western Europe and helped pave the way for the death of ideology there, interwar Marxism, notwithstanding its undeniable heterogeneity, still meant something.[3]

In 1848, during a 'revolutionary moment super-national as none before or after', Marx used *The Communist Manifesto* and the pages of *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* to advance what, at the time, was a novel argument about the relationship between national and international change (postulating, for example, that revolutions in Poland and Prussia would mutually reinforce one another, and that the combined Prusso-Polish revolution should then wage war against Tsarist autocracy, the *bête noire* in his analysis of the international system).[4] Sixty years on from the spring of nations and amidst the seismic shifts caused by the First World War in the various societies, new-found socialist power at home did, true to Marx's dictum, translate into an increased ability to affect developments abroad — with the notable difference that now communism, not socialism, marched under the banner of international revolution. After 1918, the democratic left, in contrast, sought to transform the existing state structure from within, and, for the first and last time in the history of the entire left, the formulation and implementation of high diplomacy came to depend as much on parties that defined themselves as Marxist as it did on the more traditional venues of international politics. Whereas socialism remained a central domestic actor into the late 1930s, when the socialist–communist alliance forged in 1935 and known as the popular front became the great hope of anti-fascists everywhere, socialist diplomacy reached its apogee already in the mid-1920s. It was at this juncture that socialists tenaciously promoted Franco-German reconciliation at independent eastern Europe's expense, and, in a perverse twist, created the most important, though heretofore almost entirely ignored, element of continuity between the hopeful mid-1920s and the much darker late 1930s. Not the radical right, communism's extremist twin on the other end of the interwar political spectrum with its ruthless willingness to challenge the European status quo, but rather socialism set in motion a dynamic destined to render meaningful anti-fascism dead on arrival by the time the build-up to the Second World War began. Had socialism not pursued the type of pro-German diplomacy that it did after 1918 and thereby helped mightily to undermine the validity of the

post-1918 settlement in the east for the sake of 'saving' German democracy, it is easy to argue that Hitler's path to war, which began in earnest with the acquisition of Austria in March 1938, followed then in September by the infamous Munich accords and the final liquidation of independent Czechoslovakia one year later, would have been much more difficult, if not altogether unnegotiable.

Socialism's individual national histories between the wars, together with the popular-front era and the epic, internecine struggle on the left between communism and socialism, have garnered considerable attention. Yet the single most significant international aspect of Europe's 'social democratic moment' remains largely unstudied, because practically no attention whatsoever has been paid to socialism's indispensable contribution to the foreign-policy agenda associated with the right-of-centre politician and foreign minister of the Weimar Republic from 1923 to 1929, Gustav Stresemann. In October 1925, Stresemann rehabilitated Germany as a great power by signing the Locarno accords, the seminal event in European diplomacy between the Treaty of Versailles of June 1919 and the Munich accords of October 1938. At Locarno, Germany traded security in the west for the possibility of pursuing territorial revisionism in the east. Locarno had been preceded in August 1924 by an American-sponsored economic stabilization package, the so-called Dawes Plan, which helped set the European economy on a more even keel by regulating the German reparations debt and opening a flow of short-term American loans to the beleaguered Weimar economy. As early as 1921, discussions among Europe's socialists had staked out the contours of a Dawes-type response to the German economic crisis, though, to be sure, the critical driving force in this particular chapter of economic diplomacy was Wall Street's anxiety about the chain linking German reparations to France to French payments on British loans to British debts in the United States. Locarno, however, was a purely political arrangement made by the Europeans themselves, and it never would have happened had it not been for two things: the tilt to the left in France's internal politics in the summer of 1924, which enabled the Section Française de l'Internationale ouvrière (SFIO) to put its ideas about Franco-German reconciliation into practice, and, most crucially, the votes cast for the accords in the German parliament by the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutsch-

lands (SPD) at a point when it was the main opposition party to the centre–right cabinet then governing in Berlin. In anticipation of this collaborative enterprise, during the build-up to Locarno the French and German socialists collaborated to torpedo a comprehensive security arrangement supported by British Labour that, by covering all of Europe, would have erected a strong barrier to German territorial revisionism in the east, one which would have remained in place after Hitler's seizure of power in January 1933. In the first half of the 1920s, German hegemony transformed the socialist International into the most effective tool available at the time to German foreign policy. This striking fact is tremendously important for an understanding of how interwar diplomacy worked and, ultimately, failed. Yet it has been all but ignored. On the other hand, it is a commonplace that the Kremlin's bolshevik mandarins transformed the communist Third International into a blunt instrument of their international designs. In reality, however, European socialism was a much more effective pro-German force than communism ever could have been for Moscow.

Socialism's 'Germanification' became something of a commonplace well before the outbreak of the First World War. The left's helplessness in August 1914 can and should be attributed, in part, to German-inspired passivity vis-à-vis the capitalist state's plunge into the unanticipated slaughter. While important for an understanding of Marxist socialism's history as a movement dedicated, in Karl Kautsky's specious, intellectually facile words, 'to making revolution without being revolutionary', German dominance within the pre-1918 International did not have a determinative impact on the course of European history.[5] Because of the working class's growing and, if you will, 'negative' integration into the bourgeois status quo, it is difficult to envision any outcome other than what actually transpired in August 1914, when workers and their leaders everywhere succumbed to war euphoria. After all, Lenin's Zimmerwald appeal to wage war on war initially fell on deaf ears, and it took a full three years of total war, with the accompanying deprivations and heightened social antagonisms, before the militant anti-war message of what Lenin posited as principled internationalism began to resonate with any effect. Moreover, this development sprang above all from domestic factors, and not from vague notions of proletarian solidarity. This all changed in

1918, as internationalism ceased to be an abstract concept that 'existed only as a mood at world congresses and the like', albeit one that the master of state destruction, Lenin, transformed into an instrument for fomenting domestic radicalization through his appeal to 'wage war on war'.[6] When socialist internationalism became a driving force in the division of Europe consummated at Locarno, and thus a necessary precondition for the western democracies' abandonment of Czechoslovakia at Munich twenty years later, an act that left Hitler merely that much better prepared to conduct the war he then unleashed in September 1939, it acquired, for the first and last time in the movement's history, very real, very tangible — and very problematic — historical causality.

Socialists' willingness to distinguish between western and eastern Europe in a manner that clearly favoured German interests emerged in stark relief right after the armistice. Determined to put its own views about the postwar order on record before the Paris peace negotiations commenced, the still-existing Second International gathered in Berne in February 1919. Despite the differences that separated, above all, the French and Belgians from their German comrades, all of the western parties present in the Swiss capital found it easy enough to lend support to pro-German territorial postulates in eastern Europe. They accomplished this by rejecting Czechoslovak sovereignty over the German-inhabited areas of Bohemia and Moravia, castigating the prohibition of Austro-German union, condemning Poland's acquisition of an outlet to the Baltic, and questioning the incorporation of the entire Prussian partition into the Polish state. These four geopolitical features of the dual, national and social revolution then sweeping through eastern Europe were indispensable to Czechoslovak and Polish independence and, as such, were soon to find great-power endorsement in the St Germain and Versailles peace treaties.[7] During this early phase of postwar socialist diplomacy, British Labour played a key role. As Whitehall learned, at Berne the British Labour Party built a 'golden bridge for the Germans' and played 'into their hands'. Most tellingly, British diplomatic reporting recorded that the 'majority of [the International's] delegates listened to speeches of representatives from Poland, etc. with obvious impatience, thereby showing that in their view the question of nationalities is inconvenient as tending to hamper

reconstitution of the Internationale'.[8] In early 1919, this bridge remained a work in progress, and the other shore was still strewn with land mines dividing the French and Belgian socialists from the SPD.

In early 1919, the SFIO found itself in a particularly difficult position, as strong anti-German sentiments among the rank-and-file persisted amongst a swelling wave of social radicalization that soon pulled the bulk of the French party's membership into the communist camp at the tumultuous Tours congress of January 1920. Whereas the right wing of the French party went to Berne determined to lambast the SPD for the support it had lent to the German war effort and to wrest an open admission of war guilt from the mainstream German party, the SFIO's left-wingers were equally incensed by the SPD's post-November, anti-revolutionary alliance with the German military. With the blood of the recently murdered Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht on its hands, the SPD could hardly avoid association with what left-wing socialists viewed as a glaring failure to embrace real revolution. In anticipation of the Berne conference, the German government had dispatched the socialist Adolf Müller to serve as its new minister in Switzerland. Müller noted that while the 'English delegates' present in the Swiss capital expressed admiration for woman's suffrage in revolutionary Germany and the resulting presence 'of a whole host of women in the national assembly', the French, were 'strongly influenced by Liebknecht and Luxemburg's murders', for which, he was careful to add, they 'blamed [the SPD-dominated] German government'. For their part, the (very left-wing) Swiss socialists believed that the German 'social patriots' had 'murders on their conscience' and that, moreover, they were responsible for 'suppressing the revolution' in Germany, all of which flew in the face of one's 'sensibilities as a worker'.[9] On the more pragmatic side of things, Müller also established contact with Arthur Henderson, a leading figure in the British Labour Party and one of the Berne conference's main organizers. Henderson let it be known that he wanted the International to exert 'decisive influence on the course of the peace conference' soon to get underway in Paris. Should the Berne 'conference fail to produce results', Henderson contended, 'then the future peace would also be' flawed and ineffectual. Although the Berne conference had been organized against 'strong resistance from Paris', Henderson defined it as an ideal

forum in which to highlight concerns about continued instability in Germany and to emphasize German socialism's role as the guarantor of the new republican system there, while also making it clear that the new German government would have to deliver convincing evidence of its break with the past regime — above all, by condemning the violation of Belgian neutrality.[10]

Acknowledging the pro-German atmosphere at Berne and in an effort to make the best possible use of it, Müller contacted the German foreign minister personally to request official intervention in German press reporting in order to avoid the 'impression that official circles in Berlin are maintaining special connections to the Berne socialist conference and that Germany anticipates special foreign-policy advantages from the conference proceedings'. For 'the non-German participants' gathering in the Swiss capital, the German socialist-turned-diplomat explained, the need to avoid the appearance that Berne stood in 'opposition to the deliberations in Paris' was a matter of the 'greatest importance'.[11] Despite this auspicious beginning at a time when Germany lacked any other meaningful forum to air its grievances against the peace settlement and despite the striking socialist consensus that Germany and Austria had a right to demand a revision of the settlement's eastern clauses, a gulf arose in the west that British Labour's bridge could not span, at least not yet, all the more so because the Parti Ouvrier Belge (POB) absented itself from the Berne conference when it became apparent that Belgian workers could not stomach the prospect of a reconstructed International that would include the majority German socialists.[12] The air in Berne was poisoned even further by the fact that the SPD itself stuck to a very hard line on national as well as ideological issues — proof that the majority German socialists had yet to draw the requisite conclusions from their state's weakened international position. Yet Belgian and French diplomatic reporting on the Berne conference did detect a prevailing 'German atmosphere' among Europe's socialists, a recognition qualified by the observation that, on the whole, the International remained 'ententophile' and 'sympathetic to the entente'. At Berne, the International refused to make concessions to the Germans on the war-guilt determination and the reparations demands that went with it. It also expressed unconditional support for French control over Alsace and Lorraine. In other words, some form of German financial compensation for the

war-time destruction in Belgium and northern France as well as abandonment of any claims to Alsace and Lorraine were immutable, bottom-line realities that the German socialists would have to accept in order to exploit the International's willingness to question the legitimacy of the First Czechoslovak and Second Polish Republics' western borders.[13]

The Berne territorial resolutions that applied to Czechoslovakia and Poland demonstrated that the conference's 'German atmosphere' had the most relevance for these two newly independent states. Less than three months after the armistice, there could be little question that socialism was the most powerful and thus the most promising international force that could be used to promote German territorial revisionism in eastern Europe. Thanks to the recent socialist-led revolutions in Berlin and Vienna, Adolf Müller's aristocratic Austrian counterpart in Berne, Baron Haupt, argued that the socialists 'from the defeated countries [appeared] as domestic political victors', while 'the socialists from the Entente states', in contrast, limped about as 'fallen giants'. While they did come from victorious states, they had not only failed to take power at home, but they had suffered, or would soon suffer, setbacks in Lloyd George's 'khaki election' of December 1918 and the electoral victory of the *Bloc National* in November 1919. Precisely because of its assumption of state power, the SPD's prestige remained intact and was even enhanced where it mattered most: among European socialist leaders deeply concerned about German instability. Friedrich Ebert, the trained harness-maker who became Germany's first elected (by the National Assembly) president in February 1919, understood how to exploit the SPD's new standing. Scandinavian socialists urged Ebert to act decisively against all forces 'whose activity' constituted 'a crime against the working class and the revolution'. The SPD's vehement rejection of Versailles gave rise to concerns among the Scandinavian comrades that a continued allied blockade and a possible military occupation east of the Rhine would further inflame extremism in Germany. They advised that the Germans had little choice but to give into western imperialism, with the understanding that 'the peace treaty does not need to be viewed as something permanent'. In response, Ebert established that 'the Versailles conditions with their economic and political impossibilities are the greatest enemy of German democracy and the strongest impetus for

communism and nationalism'. German diplomats likewise appreciated the opportunities for pro-German propaganda aimed at Europe's socialists. During the Paris peace negotiations and after the Berne conference, they expressed displeasure with German socialists' perceived inability to capitalize on the pro-German sentiments within the International. These same professional diplomats also established direct contact with the International Socialist Bureau, which, for its part, used German diplomatic channels to implore the SPD to highlight the magnitude of Germany's 'republican' transformation in order to buttress the case for milder peace conditions.[14]

The first real breakthrough for the German cause within the International was not long in coming, and it predated by several years any comparable breakthrough for German diplomacy at the state level. In late July 1920, the Second International convened again in Switzerland, though this time in Geneva, and now just a little over one year after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, which the International had been unable to influence and which the SPD derided as an act of imperialism directed not against the pre-revolutionary 'German system, but against German socialism'.[15] Building on but also expanding the Berne precedent, the Geneva conference fully rehabilitated the SPD and proclaimed the war-guilt issue dead, and with this step European socialism began to blaze a trail that the great powers would later follow. The Belgians did attend the Geneva gathering, but the SFIO leadership, reeling from the Tours congress, where the majority of the French party had voted to join the communist Third International, stayed away. Having learned their lesson at Berne, the majority German socialists now deployed a notable set of interconnected arguments designed to lay the foundation for reconciliation with their western comrades. Although it did admit to failure in the struggle against German 'militarism' and 'imperialism', the SPD simultaneously established that the German revolution had taken place 'five years too late'. By implication, therefore, the creation of a 'republican Germany' had eliminated the root cause of German aggression. In a 180-degree reversal on its Berne position, the SPD went out of its way at Geneva to establish that the 'Alsace–Lorraine question no longer exists for Germany'. Having taken Henderson's admonitions to heart, the majority German socialists also now denounced the violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914 and the

German occupation regime in that country (something they pointedly refused to do at Berne). Finally, the Germans recognized the validity of reparations designed to 'make good the consequences of the attack that imperial Germany had undertaken' on Belgium and France. With German socialism having agreed to the necessary parameters, the International endorsed the outlines of an understanding confined to the west and predicated on the presumption that socialist-guaranteed republicanism within Weimar precluded future German revanchism.

The interrelated goals of European reconstruction and German stabilization necessitated the strongest possible position for socialism within Germany, and here again socialism played the role of a trailblazer of sorts. Once one assumed that Germany's well-being was essential for that of Europe, it was not far to the supposition that concessions to Germany in the east could help defang German nationalism and, in the process, strengthen German socialism and with it German republicanism and thus peace and prosperity in Europe. True to this formula, the International rewarded the SPD's Geneva pronouncements with a resolution against the 'one-sided' aspects of the postwar settlement that posed 'a hindrance to the creation of a lasting, final peace'. The Geneva conference took place just as the Red Army was approaching the gates of Warsaw, where the prospect of a bolshevik seizure of power led Polish workers to create volunteer brigades rather than heed the Communist International's appeal for 'permanent revolution', and the less-than-subtle condemnation of Versailles at such a dicey moment for the nascent Polish state led a Polish socialist to stand before the conference and declare that the socialist International was just as 'one-sided' as the communist Third International. Back in Warsaw, the other Polish delegate who had been in Switzerland vented his disillusionment with the International in an article entitled 'Under Western Eyes', a reference to the Joseph Conrad novel about members of the revolutionary Russian intelligentsia condemned to an abject, alienated existence in turn-of-the century Geneva.[16] Far from embracing the type of opportunistic revolutionary line that became such a hallmark of communist internationalism, in the summer of 1920 European socialism was well on its way to marking out a systematic course of treaty revisionism in the east.

Indeed, Belgian and French diplomatic reporting on the Geneva conference focused almost exclusively on the SPD's

acceptance of reparations and the party's renunciation of Germany's claim to Alsace–Lorraine. Even in the eyes of French officials, whose state was committed to an eastern alliance system anchored in Prague and Warsaw, German concessions in the west overshadowed the International's implicit assault on the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia and Poland. In fact, French diplomats credited the representatives of the tiny, right-wing Parti Socialiste Français present at Geneva with a 'patriotic' stance that 'always sought to defend the country's interests'. Almost identical comments were made by Belgian diplomats about the POB's role at Geneva, as the Belgian socialists earlier anti-German line abruptly passed into oblivion.[17] The PSF's role in the Second International at this point served to highlight the single-most eye-catching aspect of the Geneva conference: the formal division between right and left-wing socialist parties that took place when the latter refused to attend (after Tours, the SFIO was solidly on the left of the European socialist spectrum). But the real division at Geneva had to do with national, not ideological issues. If anything, a meeting like the Geneva one, which was dominated by British Labour and the SPD and thus free of the ideologically tinged nationalist bickering that had surfaced at Berne, facilitated political decisions in Germany's favour. When the International reiterated its condemnation of Versailles' eastern clauses and formally welcomed the SPD back into the socialist fold in the summer of 1920, it revisited the earlier Berne resolutions in a setting free of divisive debates about bolshevism, state power, and the meaning of revolution. While their decision was made easier because they did not have to deal with a strong left-wing surge at home, the Belgians' participation in the Geneva conference symbolized the shift toward ideology as a category defined not by debates about socialist theory, but rather by concrete economic and political concerns. Coming so soon after the POB's refusal to meet with the SPD and deemed a positive step by diplomats reporting to the Belgian foreign ministry, the POB's presence at Geneva was a harbinger of further developments to come.

The next significant moment in the reassertion of German hegemony within the International came in the autumn of 1921, when the organization turned its attention to Upper Silesia and, in a turn of words that indicated just how profoundly a very specific understanding of 'European' interests had taken root,

deemed the great powers' decision to divide the region's industrial core between Germany and Poland 'ill advised both from the point of view of the political settlement of Europe and of the present industrial distress'. The International embellished this pro-German decision with the appropriate ideological justification in the form of a protest against 'such problems as this being settled in the interests of capitalist exploitation and in exactly the same frame of mind as animated diplomatists before the war, a frame of mind which regards people as being pawns in imperialist games and produces profit on great financial interests'. After the Ruhr, Upper Silesia was Germany's second-most-important coal and steel reservoir, and the International accepted uncritically the SPD's contention that German industrial capacity had to be preserved so that the Weimar Republic could pay the reparations whose legitimacy the German socialists had recognized at Geneva. In reality, the violent and very bloody-minded Polish–German conflict in Upper Silesia pitted a largely pro-Polish working class against German upper classes and state institutions. When delivered to socialist audiences abroad, the German argument about the region's importance for European 'reconstruction' sought to make the most out of the superiority of German working-class culture. According to the head of the SPD-affiliated trade unions, Carl Legien, the loss of Upper Silesia to the primitive Poles promised to intensify the 'psychological' impact of the draconian peace on the German working class, which, he argued, was committed to friendship with France, but found itself increasingly desensitized to 'bolshevism, imperialism, and other isms' because of sharply dropping living standards and the national indignities Germany was being forced to bear in eastern Europe.[18]

As a political and economic question linked to postwar reconstruction, Upper Silesia offered the SPD its first chance to advance a new argument about how best to heal Europe. Acting as the reporteur at the inauguration of a new body, the socialist inter-parliamentary committee, the SPD leader Otto Wels established that

> the great European questions like the great socialist questions can to-day be solved on an international basis only. To the questions of nationalities, the question of Austria, Upper Silesia . . . to the question of disarmament, of finance, of economic reconstruction there is but one answer. That answer is: the United States of Europe.

This was the first time that the slogan of a united Europe was broached in such an expansive manner in the socialist milieu, and the SPD's appeal went hand in hand with a remarkable proposal to redefine working-class internationalism. Instead of 'theoretical combinations', Wels contended that the International's activities should be based on 'a calculation of the actual factors of power'. Otherwise, he ventured, the International would find itself 'all too soon ship-wrecked on the rock of fact'.[19] Similar to the earlier dismissal of the war-guilt issue at Geneva in the push to achieve reconciliation in the west, the inter-parliamentary committee was created at German initiative (with British Labour's support). Unlike largely meaningless congress committees, however, which simply hammered out theoretically and nationally palatable resolutions on behalf of the International, this new mechanism was to have a permanent existence and to be entrusted with working out pragmatic positions around which the considerable number of socialist votes in Europe's parliaments could be mobilized, and it had one overriding purpose: to influence high diplomacy.

The International's opposition to the Upper Silesian settlement raised parallels to Marxist socialism's response to nationalism in eastern Europe before 1914. Then, a preference for large established states and their markets, together with false assumptions about small nations' alleged inability to withstand the homogenizing impact of capitalist modernization, had led to the articulation and acceptance of arguments against Czech and Polish independence. In this sense, after 1918 socialism merely continued along a well-trodden path. Yet there was one very important difference. Previously, socialist theory's vague commitment to a future revolution and the changes such a revolution would allegedly bring had translated into passive acceptance of multinational rule in eastern Europe and hence of the existing state system. After 1918, instead of revolutionary transformation of the state system, this same theory embraced collaboration with the bourgeois state, a conceptual turn that pointed unambiguously in the direction of an active international role for socialism. In 1922, a path-breaking study of Marxist theory and German foreign policy ascertained that working-class internationalism now provided 'horizontal' linkages useful to the German state at a time when it had only limited power in the 'vertically' ordered world of international relations. The 'new and multifaceted con-

nections between Marxist theory and national foreign policy' meant that international relations was no longer a subject best left to abstract pronouncements. Now, in a 180-degree reversal from the pre-1914 situation, diplomacy, according to the non-socialist political scientist who authored the work, had become one of the main focal points of German socialism's practical activities.[20] So, while the SPD reaped the benefits inherent to Marxist inhibitions about surrendering a region like Upper Silesia to a state like Poland, the German party also used the same issue to redefine internationalism. While marketable in grandiose, theoretically attractive rhetoric about a 'United States of Europe', this new brand of internationalism was unabashedly fixated on the pursuit of immediate state interests.

Between 1921 and 1923, the raging controversies over revolution, state power, class conflict, and socialist war-time policies divided Europe's socialists between the Second International and a rival organization known as the Vienna Union, sarcastically labelled the Second-and-a-Half International by the ever sharp-tongued, communist revolutionary journeyman extraordinaire, Karl Radek. At first glance, this intra-socialist split merely continued the fracturing begun during the war and thus offered yet another symptom of mainstream socialism's inability to staunch the flow of workers to the left — even the non-communist left. The Vienna Union did, to be sure, attempt to tread the ideological middle ground between communism and socialism. As its official English designation indicated, the organization was Austro-Marxist in orientation, though its German name, Internationale Arbeitsgemeinschaft Sozialistischer Parteien, gave no hint of this. Left-wing socialism was especially attractive to those parties which, like the SFIO, had seen their mass constituencies lurch to the left, or which, like the German socialists in Czechoslovakia, saw Austro-Marxism as a vehicle for promoting national autonomy. The Vienna Union's main source of sustenance was the division within German socialism between the mainstream SPD and its left-wing rival, the Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (USPD), the party created in opposition to the war in 1917 and the original stomping ground of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. The USPD boasted a more orthodox Marxist track record on a host of prominent issues, ranging from soldiers and workers' councils, socialization, and, last but not least, internationalist reconciliation with Germany's former enemies.

Most important, the Vienna Union's two-year existence coincided with the period when French socialism faced two major internal problems: resistance to collaboration with the 'social patriotic' SPD, and the meteoric rise of the Parti Communiste Français, which initially siphoned off the majority of the SFIO's following. As had become apparent at Bern, in addition to bearing the jackal's mark of German nationalism, the SPD also functioned as the bedrock of right-wing socialism (the British Labour Party did not even pretend to be Marxist). The potent mix of national and ideological factors that had fuelled the Franco-German disputes at Berne made it impossible for the SFIO to advocate open cooperation with the SPD during the immediate postwar years. Instead, it was left to the Vienna Union to create a link between French and German socialism, represented by the USPD. Contacts between this German party and the SFIO garnered very favourable coverage at the Quai d'Orsay, which viewed the USPD as the most promising left-wing option in Germany, one free of excessive nationalism and led by intellectually sophisticated politicians willing to accept the consequences of Germany's defeat. When the two German socialist parties reunited in 1922, French diplomats could only hope that the USPD leadership, which by this point had seen its mass following defect to the communists, would play a disproportionate role in the new party. On the surface, the Vienna Union was first and foremost an institution defined by ideology. Yet, precisely because it was so beholden to ideology, left-wing socialism failed to generate practical prescriptions for Europe's postwar problems. As the German foreign ministry learned, the Vienna Union did not hold forth much promise as an effective promoter of a policy designed to achieve 'a revision of the peace treaties and the realization of the German point of view about reparations'.[21] It did, however, have a very important practical role to play as a meeting ground for French and German socialists.

While left-wing socialism facilitated Franco-German reconciliation, the SPD assumed a leading position in the campaign to establish a clear dividing line between socialism and communism. Reporting back to the Comintern and the Politburo in Moscow on the April 1922 Berlin conference of the two socialist Internationals and the communist Third International, Nikolai Bukharin vented his frustration over the SPD's single-minded

commitment to reconciliation with the western comrades. Referring to 'fulfilment policy' (Erfüllungspolitik — the same concept that Stresemann would soon make his own), Bukharin noted that the SPD's determination to adhere to Versailles' terms imposed upon Germany in the west was 'greater than one could have expected'.[22] The Russo-German treaty signed at Rapallo on 16 April, that is immediately before the Berlin conference of the Three Internationals, took the world by surprise; the name Rapallo itself became 'the catchword for sudden, shocking, and spectacular, as well as dangerous, forms of cooperation between Germany and Russia'.[23] While Rapallo made it clear that official German diplomacy was willing to use ties with Russia to gain leverage in the west, the SPD went out of its way to disavow the eastern card in its own internationalist game. The Swiss socialists believed that the Second International went to Berlin determined from the beginning 'to sabotage' a united front with the communists. Moreover — and more importantly — they identified a key factor that complemented the SPD's leading role at the Berlin conference: the left-wing SFIO's desire that 'something be done internationally, so that [the French socialists] could once again gain ground among the workers in their country'.[24] Beneath the surface of ideological rhetoric fixated on the relationship between the two brands of socialism and communism, it was this confluence between French and German interests that established the Berlin conference's real meaning: the end of left-wing socialist attempts to push the democratic thread through the eye of the bolshevik needle at a point in time when the SFIO and the SPD were rapidly moving towards one another. Right after the Berlin meeting, German socialism re-established a united front at home, and the unrepentantly left-wing Swiss socialists, who would not join the European socialist mainstream until 1926, learned that 'the reunification taking place in Germany today' foreshadowed the marriage of the Second International and the Vienna Union. Moreover, like the reunification in Germany itself, which denoted 'the dissolution of the USPD at the cost of its principles within the SPD', it could be expected that a new, united socialist International would march under the banner of so-called practical internationalism already hoisted so effectively by the SPD within the Second International.[25] Otto Bauer and Friedrich Adler, the two leading Austro-Marxist theoreticians, realized that consolidation within German socialism made consolidation

within the socialist International inevitable.[26] As far as German interests were concerned, the dynamic within the SFIO meant that left- and right-wing socialism developed along complementary trajectories, and, taken together, their evolution in the early 1920s fleshed out what had already emerged in outline form at Berne: socialism's rise as *the* most important European foreign-policy instrument available to the Weimar Republic in the immediate postwar period.

As early as 1921, the two competing socialist Internationals, joined by trade-unionists from the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU), got to work on a package of economic prescriptions that later found their way into the American-sponsored Dawes plan of 1924.[27] These economic contacts then acquired an overt political dimension when Belgian and French troops occupied the Ruhr in January 1923 in response to a unilateral German moratorium on reparations. Militarized French control over Germany's most important heavy-industrial area heightened the fear that Weimar would succumb to extremism, and events such as the massacre of thirteen Krupp workers by French troops did play into the hands of radical German nationalists and communists alike. In June 1923, the communists' so-called Schlageter line completed the circular connection between right and left-wing extremism. This tactical turn was named after a right-wing German Freikorps thug who had fought in the Baltics against bolshevism and then against the French in the Ruhr, where he was shot by a French firing squad. Having embarked on yet another round of revolutionary agitation in Germany, Karl Radek declared that the Franco-German conflict in the Ruhr breathed new life into the 'corpse of the German fascist . . . our class enemy condemned to death and executed by the lackeys of French imperialism'. German 'nationalism, used earlier to strengthen the bourgeois governments', had now become, in Radek's words, 'a means of intensifying the existing capitalist collapse'.[28] The communist embrace of nationalism went hand in hand with an appeal for a broad united front 'from below' of workers and the lower middle classes. With the spectre of an extremist dictatorship in Germany looming large, socialists marched into the vanguard of the campaign to save Europe by rescuing Germany, and the diplomacy of the International shifted into high gear.

Discussions on the Ruhr among the Belgian socialist leader-

ship illustrated how ideology and pragmatic concerns created a rationale for collaborating with beleaguered German republicanism. Using the decisions taken at the aforementioned reparations deliberations between the two socialist Internationals and the IFTU as their benchmark, the Belgian socialists considered German payments indispensable, albeit in a reduced and regulated amount. At the same time, they juxtaposed the need to extract money from Germany with the need to strengthen German socialism in the internationalist struggle against French 'reaction', which, they argued, threatened to turn the Ruhr into a communist bastion and, for good measure, to wreck the German economy once and for all. As the Belgian embassy in Paris reported, within France, governed at the time by Raymond Poincaré's anti-socialist Bloc Nationale, the vociferous condemnation of the Ruhr occupation by British Labour, the POB, and, most importantly, the SFIO gave rise to the perception that 'national policies [were being subordinated] to the interests of the proletarian class'. Belgian diplomatic traffic from Berlin made it clear that concerns about German instability extended well beyond socialist circles. Radek's activities in Germany were tracked closely and portrayed as an attempt to align Germany with Russia by harnessing German nationalism for communism, an argument that, it was correctly emphasized, attracted particular attention in official British circles.[29]

With a consensus about reparations already in place, the perceived convergence between right- and left-wing extremism in Germany motivated socialists to seek, for the first time, a comprehensive economic and political solution. Fuel for the socialist crusade to rescue Germany came from a flood of statements issued by the SPD and tailored to nurture the belief that the Ruhr crisis had driven the Weimar Republic to the precipice. In response, the SFIO went on record to the effect that the now-united German socialist movement had to exit the Ruhr crisis with its internal legitimacy intact. Addressing the German government's policy of passive resistance to the Ruhr occupation and the economic collapse it accelerated and forgetting all nationalist concerns, Salomon Grumbach, the same Alsatian socialist who had been one of the SPD's most vehement critics at Berne, made clear French socialism's resolve to see the 'German government compromise itself to such an extent that at the psychological moment the Socialists would be in a position to

give the coup de grâce to the Capitalist Government, and thus be able to assure France that the Nationalist danger in Germany had received the death blow', while the German chancellor's office learned that 'French diplomatic circles in Berlin' believed that 'the hope of French policy' lay with 'German socialism'. When the Ruhr crisis broke, the SPD and SFIO still officially belonged to the two competing and estranged socialist Internationals. Notwithstanding this difference in internationalist allegiance and in a step that confirmed the convergence between them and mainstream German socialism made apparent at Berlin, the French socialists (together with the Belgians, who remained loyal to the Second International) mediated between the SPD and the French government. German-formulated 'practical internationalism' had indeed entered into a qualitatively new phase.[30]

In the midst of the Ruhr crisis, but before the reunification of the two socialist Internationals in, appropriately enough, May 1923, the defining step in the reassertion of German hegemony over European socialism occurred. At the invitation of the SFIO, representatives of the British, Belgian, French, German, and Italian parties convened in Paris in March 1923. Meeting under the aegis of the inter-parliamentary committee that the SPD had been instrumental in creating two years earlier, the parties from the states that would later sign the Locarno accords linked European economic and political stabilization and vetted specific proposals to bring this about, with the understanding that they would then support the agreed-upon scheme in their respective legislatures. Directly anticipating the terms of the Dawes plan, they proposed that reparations be limited to a finite sum and that a large external loan be made available so that the Weimar Republic could 'rapidly restore her finances and stabilize the Mark, and at the same time provide for necessities for the reconstruction of the devastated districts' in Belgium and France. While they did continue to define reparations as 'an obligation of a moral nature', the socialists assembled in Paris wished to see German payments reduced to a sum that would reflect 'considerations of the means to restore the economic life of Europe in order to facilitate and develop exchanges and export trades and avoid a new and formidable economic crisis'. Moreover, for the first time, the Dawes-like economic postulates were embedded in a political formula, and this was authored by none other than

Rudolf Breitscheid, the ex-USPD leader and now the SPD's main foreign-policy expert as well as a close collaborator of the German foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann.[31] Breitscheid proposed nothing short of a blueprint for Locarno. He suggested that 'the powers composing the Rhine Navigation Commission would conclude a pact for the stabilization of the frontiers of the riparian states'. Once such an agreement came into force, Germany was to be 'freed from the economic and juridical restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles'. Finally, Breitscheid fashioned the template forged by the International at Geneva already in 1920 into a leitmotif for high diplomacy. 'The peace of Europe and the security of France,' he argued explicitly, 'are most surely guaranteed by a strengthening of the republic and democracy in Germany, the preliminary condition of which is the renunciation by the French government of a policy towards Germany which favours the nationalist and revengeful elements in Germany.'[32]

A 'confidential source' had alerted the French embassy in Berlin to the SPD's plan to use the forthcoming inter-parliamentary conference in Paris to work out a common socialist response to inter-allied debts, reparations, evacuation of the Ruhr, as well as a 'perpetual and unlimited pact of guarantee'. As would soon become apparent, however, the Germans were not interested in the latter. Detailed information about Breitscheid's secret, *limited* security proposal did not circulate. Had it become public knowledge at this stage, the socialist embrace of German territorial revisionism in the east would have unleashed a storm of criticism within the International, among communists, and on the right — in Poincaré's France as well as in Germany, where nationalists continued to make waves against Franco-German reconciliation. The French embassy in Berlin was apprised that secret discussions between French and German socialists had taken place in Berlin just before the Paris meeting of the socialist inter-parliamentary committee.[33] Well before the pro-German linkage of economic and political stabilization had gained acceptance in the capitals of the great powers, socialists, in other words, worked out, among themselves, the essence of the Dawes–Locarno package, and this was the result of the internal and imminently international dynamic within their own ranks which anticipated and ultimately enabled the more transparent and prominent steps undertaken in the realm of high diplomacy.

After the signal German success in Paris, political geography dictated that the International's pacification campaign move to Germany. Switzerland was no longer needed as neutral territory, so, two months after the Paris meeting of the socialist inter-parliamentary committee, Europe's socialists met in Hamburg to launch a new organization, the Labour and Socialist International (LSI). The French consul in the Hanseatic city saw the 'German national flag and the red flag' combined and hoisted as the banner of 'world revolution under German aegis'. At Hamburg, he argued, the French socialists revealed themselves to be 'dupes of their own persistent illusions and victims of their own irremediable credulity', because they willingly participated in the public lambasting of Versailles as the greatest problem facing Europe, and, in the process, lent credence to the portrayal of France as an equal if not greater threat to European stability than Germany. The French ambassador in Berlin viewed the Hamburg congress as the logical 'epilogue' to the unification of the SPD and USPD and a breeding ground for the florid rhetoric and pathos that Locarno would later unleash throughout the world. Franco-German reconciliation at Hamburg was 'embarrassingly' captured for posterity in the photo of a fraternal handshake linking Otto Wels, who already at Berne had emerged as one of the SPD's most strident and implacable defenders of German national interests, and the SFIO leader Alexandre Bracke.[34] Compared by Bracke to the embrace between a Russian and a Japanese socialist at the 1904 congress of the International, this public act marked the French party's final abandonment of the national and ideological concerns that had previously inhibited direct collaboration with the SPD. For the French diplomats closely observing the new International, socialist rapprochement was made that much worse by the LSI's embrace of pacifism, a step vividly captured in the appearance of the children of Hamburg, 'clad in white and crowned with flowers', who sparked 'intense emotions among the audience'. From this point on, pacifism laced with a strong dose of political relativism and material self-interest did indeed determine socialism's international policies. According to a Sûreté report sent from Prague, the new International was 'decidedly germanophile and slavophobe' and embodied the intent 'to overcome the will of France and Belgium, to undermine the Peace Treaties, and to force their revision'. As 'a German International', the LSI's chief

purpose was, the French intelligence service argued, 'to utilize the socialists of other countries to pursue national goals' couched in European rhetoric.[35]

On the one hand, such official sources could hardly avoid a critical tone at a time when the nationalists then governing in Paris and responsible for the Ruhr occupation were the favoured whipping boys of socialists all over Europe. On the other hand, Hamburg did differ fundamentally from the earlier socialist gatherings in Berne and Geneva, which, on the whole it will be remembered, received positive evaluations from Belgian and French diplomats. At Hamburg, Alexandre Bracke and Léon Blum, the French socialist with the greatest international cachet, delivered addresses redolent with vague endorsements of peace and international understanding and full of specific condemnations of the Ruhr occupation and the economic and territorial clauses of Versailles. To his credit, Blum did admit that 'the Versailles peace treaty has also created new states whose creation as such cannot be rejected by socialists, because it reflects the right to self-determination and the nationality principle'. This statement, however, merely confirmed the deep contradictions that plagued the SFIO's attitude toward Czechoslovakia and Poland — something that would emerge in very stark relief in the French popular-front government's policies towards Czechoslovakia between 1936 and 1938 and in the SFIO's subsequent endorsement of the Munich accords in September 1938. More to the point, the French socialist description of Europe's distress stopped short of a systematic analysis. At the LSI's inaugural congress, this was left to the German comrades, who presented an analysis of international affairs that combined theory and specific policy prescriptions into an intelligible, pragmatic whole — something they had already begun to do, it will be remembered, two years earlier when the International rejected the partition of Upper Silesia. Based on the acceptance of German reparations to Belgium and France and the doctrine of practical internationalism, the SPD's prescription for European pacification tendered to the new International could be reduced to the following theoretical construct: a 'United States of Europe' allegedly capable of counteracting the economic and political 'Balkanization' caused by the peace treaties. This amorphous programme depended on Germany's reincorporation into the international system as a full-fledged partner that, by necessity,

would play a central, and probably dominant, role in collective decision-making.

The Hamburg congress established the LSI as an organization whose 'goal' was to replace 'capitalist' with 'socialist production'. 'Political and economic class struggle' provided the means to this end. These were hardly rigid parameters, though they did signal an end to the division between left- and right-wing socialism as well as provide a sufficiently non-dogmatic framework palatable to the non-Marxist British Labour Party. Furthermore, the LSI's 'resolutions in all international questions' were to be 'binding' for its member parties. Otherwise, it was argued, the new International would fail to become 'a living reality'. Whereas socialism remained a long-term goal, the political and economic steps necessary to achieve it were defined as incremental and immediate. Just as the German appeal for a united Europe remained an abstract aim associated with the poorly defined socialist future, the International's would-be identity as a centralized organization capable of dictating foreign-policy decisions to its members was a purely academic matter. (The same could hardly be said about the communist Third International, all of whose member parties had to incorporate the phrase 'section of the Third International' into their official names.) But the LSI's statutes did make it crystal clear that international relations would be the new organization's most important field of activity. In a direct reversal of German theory's impact before 1914, when the SPD had prevented the International from adopting an unambiguous anti-war position, German-formulated practical internationalism meant that the International could give concrete meaning to its resolutions on 'the struggle against the imperialist peace and the tasks of the working class' and on 'the international struggle against international reaction', both of which evoked staple socialist rhetoric. If ideal goals proved to be unattainable, and the 'United States of Europe' was clearly something for the *longue durée*, then less ambitious solutions could be entertained. One month after the SPD had altered its party programme by designating the creation of a 'United States of Europe' as its main international political goal, the great powers agreed on precisely such a solution at Locarno. The ever-critical Swiss socialists, who refused to join the LSI until 1926, dismissed the new organization as a 'fait accompli . . . conditioned' by the unification of the mainstream and left-wing socialist parties in Germany. They

also castigated the LSI for its failure to make a clear break with the disastrous past practice of so-called 'imperialist national defence'. Everyone understood that Locarno held open and probably heightened the prospect of a future limited German–Polish war in the east. Had such a war broken out, many socialists would no doubt have defined it as an act of German 'national defence' against Polish 'imperialism'. Not quite the same semantic formula as the one employed by the Swiss socialists; however, the basic meaning of the Swiss critique held true: in no way did the LSI interpret socialist ideology to mean that war was to be rejected as an instrument of international politics *a priori*.[36]

Following the undeniable coalescence of a pro-German socialist foreign policy, a shift to the left in British, French, and German politics set in motion a process that helped bring the security debate in Europe to a head and that also positioned the German and, in particular, the French socialists to act as foreign-policy arbiters in their parliaments. In late 1923, British elections paved the way for the first Labour cabinet. The British Labour Party's emphasis on collective security, combined with its well-known abhorrence of French imperialism and its oft-stated belief that Versailles required revision, favoured Germany and put the nationalist government then running France on warning. Just like Adolf Müller's earlier entreaties to avoid overt identification of German state interests with the Berne conference, the German ambassador to London cautioned Berlin against excessive public support for the Labour government, lest British Conservatives accuse the latter of 'receiving instructions not only from Moscow, but also from Hamburg'. For his part, the Czechoslovak envoy in London predicted that the Labour cabinet could count on the SFIO to apply pressure in Paris, while the Belgian embassy in London received confidential notification that British Labour intended to use the International to make headway with a socialist response to European instability. In consultation with the SFIO, the first Labour cabinet then pushed Dawes forward and seriously broached the collective-security question.[37]

Labour's brief tenure in power overlapped with the triumph of the *Cartel des gauches* in the French parliamentary elections of May 1924. For Müller, still serving as Germany's minister in Berne, the French elections signalled a turning point in 'the recovery of European politics', because of the 'unmistakable shift

to the left' that they denoted. The Belgian ambassador in Paris predicted that the Cartel and the Labour government would create an 'entente cordiale' in order to resolve the reparations problem and to strike a political deal with Germany. After the Cartel's electoral victory, German diplomatic traffic from Brussels and London also saw a new phase in Franco-German relations in the offing, an analysis seconded by the German embassy in Paris, which produced a steady stream of reports anticipating the appearance of new methods in French foreign policy. The intersection between the content and method of socialist postulates that had been worked out earlier, and state policies, came to the fore in the Paris embassy's suggestion that Berlin should respond to the *Cartel* not by ratchetting up the anti-Versailles rhetoric, but rather by underscoring Germany's willingness to meet reformulated reparations demands as a prelude to addressing the real issue: security and borders.[38] Following the left-wing victories in France and Great Britain, socialism's international policies received a powerful boost in the German parliamentary elections of December 1924, when German radicals of all stripes lost votes to the SPD and other parties committed, in the words of the Belgian diplomats, to the 'execution of the peace treaty and the Dawes plan'. These elections swung the German political pendulum back from the previous May, when the strong showing of nationalists, 'super-nationalists', and communists had produced a 'debacle' for the SPD and an 'incontestable success' for the German right.[39]

German hegemony within the Labour and Socialist International came to bear full force between the International's Hamburg congress and the great powers' Locarno conference. At a time when many observers saw the British Labour Party as the International's dominant party, the SPD used its blossoming relationship with the SFIO to derail socialist support for the Geneva Protocols, the first Labour cabinet's major — and very public — foreign-policy initiative, and one which diverged in important respects from the still-secret socialist security deal that had been struck earlier in Paris. As a collective-security scheme, the Protocols did justice to socialist theory: above all, through their intent to subordinate consequentially national interests to a greater, common purpose. Already in 1919, the preface to the (ultimately unpublished) proceedings of the Berne conference had identified 'the mission of the International to assume the

historic role of creator of a new Society in which collective beings will be as free as individuals'.[40] In keeping with precisely this logic, the Protocols condemned all wars of aggression, provided a transparent mechanism for defining a state as an aggressor, established the primacy of collective arbitration via the assembly of the League of Nations, and contained a strong juridical commitment to disarmament. Most important, the Protocols went further than even Versailles toward recognizing the inviolability of the post-1918 borders. Not only did they propose to remove from arbitration earlier decisions of the League, such as the division of Upper Silesia, they also made the revision of treaties and borders contingent on unanimous consent.

Although the Labour Party freely admitted that the Protocols could only 'lead to Treaty revision by consensus', a very unlikely prospect, in no way did British Labour Party's support for them mean that the party which had been the first to push for German socialism's rehabilitation had abandoned its strongly held belief that German territorial revisionism in the east was justified and necessary for long-term European stability. Labour pushed the Protocols because of the new form of international relations that they endorsed. Such systemic principles as 'the outlawry of war, which at length promises to make the League of Nations a beneficient reality', coupled with the promise of obtaining 'a reduction in the scale of Allied armaments, on land, in the air, and at sea, comparable to that imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles', received primacy over more immediate German territorial ambitions. Arthur Henderson and Ramsay MacDonald, the two Labour leaders most closely identified with the Protocols, insisted that genuine collective security would not block future changes in the map. Labour's support for the Protocols did, in fact, represent the most serious commitment on the European left to a new type of international system. Yet the concomitant belief that the peace treaties required revision in the east also brought to mind Léon Blum's unrealistic acknowledgement at Hamburg of the value of 'self-determination' in one breath and his acquiescence in the German determination to maintain freedom of manoeuvre in the east in the next breath. Labour's more principled position and the SFIO's opportunism created a gap in which German territorial revisionism remained the lowest common denominator and, moreover, one in which the SPD's support for so-called practical internationalism was

destined to carry the day. Disagreement caused by the Labour Party's support for the Protocols and the SPD's 'purely academic' support for them in favour of a security pact limited to the west illustrated just how far the German party had come with its systematic, gradualist approach designed to equate socialist international policy with the preservation of German republicanism and internal stability. While it busily worked to get the SFIO to eschew the Protocols in favour of Breitscheid's Paris initiative, the SPD emphasized the need to avoid public fissures in the International's ranks, lest they play into the hands of German socialism's extremist opponents at home.[41]

The Protocols' desire 'to perpetuate not only peace, but also the status quo' rendered them anathema to German foreign policy from the outset. The SPD made this confidential admission in early 1928. By this point, the international system had, by the German party's own admission, moved beyond equating 'peace with the maintenance of borders'. Both the Czechoslovak and the Polish socialist parties, neither of which knew about the western socialists' Paris agreement, embraced the Protocols as a consequential application of socialist ideology to international relations. The SFIO also went on record as supporting the Protocols. Their 'defeat', the French party informed the International, 'would mean a grave peril, and would be a terrible blow to the cause of peace'. But it was German socialism that was calling the shots, and the SPD told the International in no uncertain terms that the best attainable outcome would be a limited security pact based on an agreement between the French and German socialists. Using the tried-and-true line to derail the Protocols (which would, in any event, become a dead letter once the Zinoviev letter brought the first Labour cabinet down in October 1924), the need to solidify German democracy received prominent billing in the German socialists' campaign for a limited security pact. The SPD drew attention to the German nationalists' vehement opposition to any agreement with the west and the communists' simultaneous desire to portray the SPD 'and the entire International as allies of the German ultra-reactionaries'. A tangible gain in the form of a limited western security pact thus promised to kill both extremist birds with one stone.[42]

By this point, there could be no question that such concessions to German democracy promised to open new vistas for German

territorial revisionism in eastern Europe. The British Labour Party's International Advisory Committee warned of a 'limited military alliance or guarantee' of a type that 'has been in the past and may be again used for purposes other than those specified'. As British diplomatic reporting ascertained, however, the Labour Party's rejection of a limited pact and its support for the Protocols had little practical relevance, because the British could not override the Franco-German socialist bloc now setting the International's course. With the LSI gravitating toward a formal endorsement of Locarno against British Labour's wishes (something that did happen, though now with Labour's support, in November 1925 in London), a Czechoslovak diplomatic report that drew on inside information supplied by the Belgian socialists spoke of a 'worsening internal crisis in the Labour Party' brought about by Léon Blum's intense 'criticism of the British Labour Party' for its 'opposition to [a limited security] pact'. In close consultation with Carl von Schubert, state secretary in the German foreign ministry and one of Stresemann's closest assistants, the SPD mounted a sustained, high-level action to bring the SFIO in line with German thinking about 'the security question in the sense agreed upon' in conversations between von Schubert and German socialists. In early March 1923, just before the socialist Locarno in Paris later that same month, Breitscheid arranged a meeting in the German foreign ministry between von Schubert and Salomon Grumbach, the SFIO leader who had abandoned his earlier condemnations of the SPD for the internationalist crusade to save German democracy. This meeting made it clear that French socialism could be had for a security arrangement confined to the west. Breitscheid's concerted seduction of French politicians reaped enormous benefits. Already before the Ruhr crisis, British diplomats spied French politicians 'run[ning] after him . . . pursuing him all over Paris to discuss matters'. Nor did the ex-USPD leader and darling of the Quai d'Orsay make any secret of his conviction that German hopes hinged on whether French socialism would gain significant domestic influence.[43] No longer treading in the wake of British Labour, as it had to a certain extent done immediately after 1918 (and would again briefly after 1945), the SPD now pulled the strings of European socialism's realpolitik.

In the 1924 inaugural issue of *Die Gesellschaft*, the new theoretical journal of Weimar German socialism, the leading SPD

theoretician Rudolf Hilferding, author of a turgid tome, *Finance Capital*, and the man whose theoretical delusions later helped hamstring SPD's response to the depression and hence the rise of Nazism, published an article entitled 'Problems of the Times'. In it, Hilferding established that global capitalism was no longer producing ever-greater imperialist tensions. Instead, he argued, the economic imperatives of internationalization were paving the way for common policies that would bind capitalist states to one another in cooperative arrangements. Simultaneously, Hilferding admitted that the redistribution of power in Europe after 1918 precluded forceful revision of the peace treaties, but this was a moot point, since he established that internationalization was erecting systemic obstacles to war among capitalist states by creating ever-stronger links between their economies. Similar to the SPD's advocacy of practical internationalism, this was a heterodox definition of international political economy that entailed a revision of the orthodox Marxist understanding of the relationship between capitalism and war. Instead of devoting their energies to 'transcending capitalism', socialists should, Hilferding suggested, look 'to create new forms of international political order through a consistent policy which limits the sovereignty of individual nations in the interest of a transnational organization'. As a 'practical political task' keyed to the long-term goal of a 'United States of Europe', socialist internationalism could and should be used to support the foreign policies of capitalist governments. Writing after the LSI had been launched but before Dawes and Locarno had transformed socialist diplomacy into great-power diplomacy, Hilferding substantiated the German party's policies within the International. Even more important, he justified and anticipated the socialists' post-Dawes embrace of Locarno at the expense of the more ideologically correct Geneva Protocols.

The Russian mensheviks, together with the Swiss socialists diehard adherents of what passed as orthodox Marxism, were not impressed by the new journal, which, they felt, made 'a sad impression' due to the 'very many ministers' involved in it and 'the very many unsound statements' it made. This dismissal of *Die Gesellschaft* was accompanied by criticism of the LSI's putative inability to treat seriously even such 'western questions' as the policies of the SFIO and reparations. The mensheviks also mistakenly believed that the International had taken a 'unified

negative position' toward a security pact limited to the west. According to the menshevik perception, concern about the material 'position of the German working class' constituted 'the sole question' which inspired 'effectiveness' and collective initiative within the International. Skewed by theoretical blinders, this interpretation missed the point entirely. For the mensheviks, the LSI's disavowal of 'pure' Marxism rendered the International ineffective in international politics and denoted British dominance at German expense. In reality, nothing could have been further from the truth.[44]

After this period of intense, secret manoeuvring among Europe's socialists, the intent to secure western reconciliation at the price of eastern insecurity entered the limelight in mid-October 1925, when the world's attention abruptly turned to the town of Locarno, a small resort in southeastern Switzerland. It was here that the foreign ministers of the great powers met to finalize an agreement that stabilized Germany's eastern borders only. In London, *The Times* christened Locarno the 'genuine Treaty of Peace', 'a very great and liberating event' destined to be 'a landmark in European history'. In Paris, *Le Temps* paid homage to 'an outstanding act in the development of European politics' that inspired joy 'throughout the world, wherever people long for peace and dignified labour'. In Berlin, the middle-of-the-road *Vossische Zeitung* predicted that Locarno would enter the history books as the place 'where nations . . . succeeded in finally attaining real peace' by putting down a 'milestone on the path to a closer union of the European states'. Germany's other major liberal daily, the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, hopped on the same bandwagon, praising 'a great historical fact' and 'the ascendance of the "European spirit"'. On the other side of the Atlantic, the *Chicago Daily Tribune* headlined with the dramatic announcement — 'Powers Due to Sign War Death Knell', while the *New York Times* offered an even more sensationalist announcement — 'France and Germany Bar War Forever'. Manhattan's largest religious venue, the Cathedral of St. John the Divine, staged a 'solemn service of thanksgiving for the signing of the treaties of Locarno'. In Moscow, Locarno sparked very different reactions. *Pravda* featured a headline on 'Germany's Capitulation at Locarno'. Speculation about secret anti-Soviet clauses was embellished with appropriate caricatures. One featured corpulent bourgeois statesmen leering and encircling a stalwart, lean, and

determined German proletarian with fists clenched to resist capitalist encirclement. *Pravda*'s indignation grew out of the realization that Locarno dealt a serious blow to Soviet–German cooperation. The aura of peace, stability, and prosperity that extended from Germany, through France and Great Britain, and on across the Atlantic was enhanced even further by the belief that Locarno marked the end of Germany's flirtation with Russia, a connection expressed in the following manner by the *New York Times*: 'Germany Turns From East to West, Western Europe Consolidates and Russia Is Excluded'.[45]

Viscount D'Abernon, the British ambassador to Berlin and, together with his unlikely accomplices from the International, a key actor in the behind-the-scenes negotiating that culminated in a security pact confined to the west, explained why Locarno had been chosen over Geneva. As the seat of the League of Nations, the latter — certainly not an obscure resort — was the most plausible site for grand, headline-capturing acts in the service of peace and mutual understanding, but, with its own Geneva conference of 1920, the International had set in motion a process that made Geneva undesirable. In the British aristocrat's opinion, the atmosphere there contained 'too much Polish and Czecho-Slovakian perfume'.[46] Disdain for the two newly independent states to Germany's east formed an important part of the vaunted Locarno spirit, though little evidence to this effect could be gleaned from public statements in the west. At Locarno, Czechoslovakia and Poland's borders were, in the oft-cited words of an Italian diplomat, reduced to 'second-class' status. Moreover, in no way did Locarno eliminate the possibility of a future war between Germany and her eastern neighbours; indeed, the multilateral guarantee extended to the Franco-German borders effectively hamstrung France's ability to aid its eastern allies, whether by a repeat of the Ruhr episode or by an implied threat of force. Later, the fateful step taken by France at Locarno would be likened to an ostrich burying its head in the sand so that it could remain oblivious to the 'spirit of Munich' already lurking in the air.[47]

Only one socialist was present at Locarno: Emil Vandervelde, the foreign minister of Belgium and the leader of the POB. In this respect, the caricaturists and editorialists of *Pravda* had got it right. Locarno was indeed a bourgeois affair. But the socialist contribution to it was decisive. Most immediately, the parlia-

mentary support given to the treaties by the opposition SPD guaranteed the Reichstag majority without which they would not have been ratified in Berlin after the main right-wing party chose to bolt from the cabinet rather than to endorse Locarno. Reminiscent of Radek's 'Schlageter line', the German right and the communists both condemned Locarno as a sell-out, just as earlier the Nazis and the communists had castigated Dawes as an act of enslavement to foreign capital. More profoundly, the road map to Locarno was full of conceptual and policy milestones laid first by European socialism: the rejection of the Czechoslovak and Polish borders and Berne, the SPD's rehabilitation at Geneva and the embrace of western reconciliation there, a Dawes-type socialist understanding about reparations, the cold shoulder given to the communist International at the time of Rapallo, the socialist response to the Ruhr crisis, and, finally, the creation of a socialist Locarno right before the launching of the Labour and Socialist International. All of these steps were reinforced by German-formulated practical internationalism's unique ability to promote Franco-German reconciliation, as well its related ability to translate new parliamentary power into meaningful diplomatic manoeuvring — an attribute strengthened even more by the fortuitous election results in Great Britain, France and Germany. To be sure, the Geneva Protocols had threatened to deflect German socialism from its single-minded aim of dividing Europe, but the internal socialist history surrounding the Protocols' demise demonstrated that even theoretically pure and sensible proposals could not halt German socialism's hegemonic juggernaut.

European socialism's uncritical and unwavering commitment to German republicanism as the key to European stability ultimately debased effective, international socialist solidarity when it counted most. As the Czechoslovak crisis was heating up in 1938, a Polish socialist, who had just returned from a special meeting of the International, assured the Czechoslovak socialists that democratic Europe would support them in an armed struggle with Nazi Germany. Claiming to speak directly for the International, he insisted that Czechoslovakia resist any pressure from the conservative British government that 'would weaken the security of the state and its defensive capabilities'. In April 1937, the SFIO, which was then governing France through the popular front, had assured the Czechoslovak socialists that France would

'regard a violation of Czechoslovak territory as an attack on France', a gesture that led the Czechoslovaks to proclaim that the 'Socialists of the Entire World are Behind Czechoslovakia.' Once the chickens hatched at Locarno came home to roost, such assurances, like the socialist International itself, proved to be hollow. Notwithstanding the anti-fascist rhetoric that the popular front throve on, the SFIO succumbed to the wave of pacifism that engulfed France during Munich — after all, socialism itself had begun to promote pacifism and to question the legitimacy of Czechoslovakia's borders a full two decades earlier. The feeling of 'immense relief' that swept over France and the 'remarkable moderation' in the SFIO's public response to Munich attested to the corrosive toxicity of the unimaginative pacifism that had surfaced in Hamburg back in 1923.[48]

Emil Vandervelde took little solace from Munich's achievement: 'the preservation of peace for a certain time'. The POB leader professed to be 'full of disgust with respect to France', which had 'insisted on a division of the [Czech] borders' and where people had 'proposed to rename a street "September 30th"' to commemorate the day the Munich accords were signed. In a conversation with von Schubert at Locarno, Vandervelde had bemoaned Polish 'chauvinism' and agreed with the German diplomat's assessment that 'the current [Polish–German] borders are untenable and must be altered at the appropriate time'. Thirteen years later, with the Locarno spirit having given way to the Munich spectre, the leading socialist Locarnite could only note that 'all of this breaks my heart'. As the Czechoslovak socialists realized when confronting their wrenching abandonment by the SFIO, the International 'means nothing for us now', just like the Belgian socialists' condolence telegram to Prague, which expressed 'sympathy and gratitude for the sacrifice on behalf of peace' and 'admiration for the dignity with which the undeserved' fate imposed by the great powers had been accepted in Prague.[49]

As the institution whose policies paved the way for appeasement, however, the International was far from meaningless. Traditionally, appeasement has been identified with the right, not the left. While it is true that the appeasers themselves feared the social and political consequences of another war and international communism more than they feared the upstart German corporal-turned-dictator, the roots of appeasement extended

back to Locarno and hence to the socialist diplomacy that played such an instrumental role in dividing Europe. Had socialists not abandoned real collective security in the first half of the 1920s, there would have been no Locarno. Without Locarno, Munich might very well have not taken place, and the French socialists in particular might have demonstrated more backbone instead of welcoming a decision that, once it was followed by the German occupation of the rest of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, gave Hitler access to important arms-production facilities which equipped the Wehrmacht with a substantial amount of Czech-produced tanks and artillery for the invasion of France in the summer of 1940. Because it played such a decisive role in the choice of options, socialism became the single most important institutional actor in interwar European diplomacy, during a period when ideology dominated politics in a way that it never had before or ever would later (at least in western Europe). Like the statutes of the LSI, socialist ideology may have been soft, but given the opportunities created for German manipulation, it was far from meaningless. Indeed, it is not the traumatic crisis of August 1914 that should be regarded as the most problematic chapter in European socialism's history, since this was the largely inevitable result of a hollow ideology, but rather post-1918 socialist diplomacy, which developed the way it did precisely because internationalist ideology acquired real meaning for the first and last time in the movement's history. While the International's failure to mobilize its member parties against the First World War laid the foundation for a permanent and debilitating split on the left, socialist actions in the international arena during the 1920s created a truly international foundation for a type of diplomacy that, once implemented by states following the path blazed by socialists, became an indispensable component of the dynamic that eventually sucked Europe into yet another and even more horrific conflict.

Notes

1. František Soukup, *Revoluce práce*, vol. 2 (Prague 1938), 1363; 19 May 1923 *Die Rote Fahne*. Henry De Man, *The Psychology of Marxian Socialism* (New Brunswick 1985), 312.

2. A fresh comparative study that focuses on the Swedish and German cases is

Sheri Berman, *The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe* (Cambridge 1998).

3. One need only think of the German socialists' delayed post-1945 rejection of dogmatic Marxism, which did not take place until the adoption of the Bad Godesberg programme in 1959, much later than, say, the Dutch, Belgian, and French abandonment of the orthodox definition of 'class struggle'. It was precisely the Bad Godesberg programme that formed the indispensable prerequisite for the German party's transformation into a *Volkspartei*, a people's party, which could then participate as an increasingly significant actor in the consensus-based politics of the Federal Republic. Across the board in post-1945 Western Europe, the abandonment of militant Marxism went hand in hand with the acquisition of real political power by socialists. While there were plenty of people on the interbellum left — most prominent among them the Belgian theoretician, Henryk De Man — who were willing to question the utilitarian value of continued adherence to Marxism, this same type of inverse relationship between de-Marxification and practical politics hardly obtained between the wars, for a whole host of reasons that cannot be discussed here.

4. Lewis Namier, *1848: The Revolution of the Intellectuals* (New York 1964), 1.

5. The most concise and most elegant study remains James Joll, *The Second International, 1889–1914* (New York 1955). For a pre-1914 study of the German impact, see Robert Michels, 'Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie im internationalen Verbande', in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 25:1 (1907), 148–231. Useful also are: Wilfried Knauer, 'Die Kritik französischer Sozialisten an der deutschen Sozialdemokratie zur Zeit der II. Internationale 1889–1914', in Wilhelm Alff, ed., *Deutschlands Sonderung von Europa 1862–1945* (Frankfurt 1984), 79–148; and Erich Matthias, 'Kautsky und der Kautskyanismus. Die Funktion der Ideologie in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie vor dem ersten Weltkrieg', in *Marxismus-Studien*, zweite Folge (Tübingen 1957), 161–97; Jürgen Rojahn, 'War die deutsche Sozialdemokratie ein Modell für die Parteien der Zweiten Internationale', in *Internationale wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung* 22:3 (1991), 291–303.

6. Henry de Man, *The Psychology of Marxian Socialism* (New Brunswick 1985), 322.

7. The International's Berne territorial resolutions were not specified in more detail until April 1919, when its Permanent Commission convened in Amsterdam to offer formal socialist counter-proposals to the peace treaties. The resulting documents drew almost verbatim from proposals submitted by the Austrian and German socialists. 'Allgemeine Resolution die territorialen Fragen betreffend', 'Resolution über die Österreichischen Länder', and 'Resolution über die deutsch-polnischen Grenzfragen', in Gerhard Ritter, ed., *Die II. Internationale 1918/1919. Protokolle, Berichte und Korrespondenzen* (Berlin 1980), vol. 1, 343–8. 600–1.

8. 8 February 1919 Bern–London report, Public Record Office (PRO), FO 371/4309.

9. 1 February 1919 Berne–Berlin telegram, in Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (Bonn), Wk. 2c, vol. 13; 26 January 1919 Sitzung des Parteivorstandes, in Schweizerisches Sozialarchiv (Zürich), SPS-Archiv, MFC 2.

10. For evidence of Müller's extensive pre-conference contacts with Henderson, see 20 January 1919 Berne–Berlin telegram, in PAdAA, Schweiz, Po 5, vol. 204; as well as 28 January, 1 February 1919 telegrams (which make it clear

that Henderson, in particular, was feeding Müller information about the topics to be discussed by the International and the need for the German socialists to make certain concessions so that the International could move ahead with the plan to influence the peace negotiations), in PAdAA, Wk. 2c, vol. 13. One Dr Guttmann, a member of the German Berne mission supplied Brockdorf-Rantzau with a series of undated, confidential reports on discussions with Huysmans and Henderson, which contain the above-cited Henderson statements — see PAdAA, Nachlaß Brockdorff-Rantzau.

11. 28 January 1919 Müller–Rantzau telegram, in PAdAA, Wk. 2c, vol. 13.

12. Reports on the Belgian party's decision to abstain from the Berne conference stressed the Belgian workers' anti-German attitudes. Party elites invariably attached more significance to the International than did the rank-and-file. The Belgian leadership supported the attempt to revive the International with the Germans. 4 February 1919 Bern–London report, in PRO, FO 371/4309; 5 February 1919 Brussels–Paris 'Conférence Internationale de Berne. Abstention belge', in ADdMdAE, Europe 1918–1940, Sous-série: Internationale, vol. 395.

13. 27 January 1919 Bern–Paris 'La Conférence socialiste internationale de Berne', and 14 February 1919 'Le Congrès de Berne (Remarques et impressions)', in ADdMdAE, Europe 1918–1940, Sous-série: Internationale, vol. 395. 21 February 1919 Bern–Brussels 'Conférence Internationale ouvrière et socialiste de Berne', and February 1919 'Le Congrès International socialiste de Berne (Remarques et impressions)', in AdMdAEdB, file 10.813.

14. 20 February 1919 Bern–Vienna 'Die politischen Konsequenzen der Intern. Sozialistenkonferenz in Bern', in Archiv der Republik (Vienna), Neues Politisches Archiv, box 686; 27 December 1918, 23 May 1919 Stauning–Ebert letters, and 16 April 1920 Ebert–Branting letters, in Agnes Blänsdorf, 'Friedrich Ebert und die Internationale', in *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 9 (1969), 420–6; 2 May 1919 The Hague–Berlin 'Schlußbericht' and the attached internal memo, in PAdAA, Europa Generalia, Arbeiter- und Sozialistenkongresse, vol. 12; 19 April and 23 July 1919 The Hague–Berlin reports, especially 'Ausführungen Huysmans über die Stellungnahme der Internationale zu Deutschland', in Bundesarchiv (Koblenz), Akten Alte Reichskanzlei, R43I/2677.

15. Heinrich August Winkler, *Von der Revolution zur Stabilisierung. Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik, 1918–1924* (Berlin 1985), 215.

16. For the text of the resolution on the war-guilt question and the text of the accompanying resolution on the peace treaty and the League of Nations and the Polish response, see *Bericht vom zehnten Internationalen Sozialistenkongress in Genf 31. Juli bis 5. August 1920* (Berlin 1979), 10–11, 16, 19–22. Mieczysław Niedziałkowski, 'W oczach zachodu — sprawa polska na kongresie genewskim', in 20 August 1920 *Robotnik*.

17. 3 August 1920 Geneva–Paris 'A.s. Congrès de la IIe. Internationale', and 7 August 1920 Prague–Paris Sûreté (renseignement du Suisse) 'A.s. les délégués français au Congrès de la IIème Internationale qui tenir à Genève', in ADdMdAE, Europe 1918–1940, Sous-série: Internationale, vol. 379; 3 August 1920 Bern–Brussels 'Le Congrès socialiste de la 2e Internationale à Genève' in AdMdAEdB, file 10.813.

18. 24 October 1921 declaration by Executive of the Second International, in International Institute for Social History (Amsterdam), Labour and Socialist International, file 85; 1921 statement 'Die Unteilbarkeit Obserschslesiens', and

Legien's 27 November 1921 presentation to the extraordinary trade-union congress in London, in Historische Kommission zu Berlin (Berlin), Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund Rest-Akten, NB 146, 175.

19. 27 June 1921 Executive meeting, in IISH, LSI, file 3.

20. Hans Rothfels, 'Marxismus und auswärtige Politik', in Paul Wentzcke, ed., *Deutscher Staat und deutsche Parteien. Beiträge zur deutschen Partei- und Ideengeschichte* (Munich 1922), 308–41.

21. 17 January 1920 Berlin–Paris 'Efforts pour la formation d'un nouveau parti socialiste', 25 March 1920 Berlin–Paris 'Notice sur les partis de gauche', 15 June 1920 Berlin–Paris 'Les socialistes allemands et les négociations économiques franco allemandes'. 26 October 1920 Berlin–Paris 'Socialistes françaises et socialistes allemands', 27 September 1921 Berlin–Paris 'La politique étrangère au Congrès de Goerlitz', and 27 September 1922 Berlin–Paris 'Unification socialiste', in ADdMdAE, Europe 1918–1940, Sous-série: Internationale, vol. 318, 319; 28 February 1921 Vienna–Berlin 'Stellungnahme zur Revision der Friedensverträge und zur Wiedergutmachungsfrage', in PAdAA, PA II, Po 19, vol. 1.

22. 5 April 1922 Bukharin Berlin–IKKI telegram, and his 9 May 1922 report to the IKKI, in RTsKhiIDNI, fond 495, opis 1, delo 49 and 51. Lenin closely followed this pursuit of the 'Rapallo option' on the left.

23. Peter Krüger, 'A Rainy Day, April 16, 1922: The Rapallo Treaty and the Cloudy Perspective for German Foreign Policy', in Carol Fink, ed., *Genoa, Rapallo, and European Reconstruction in 1922* (New York 1991), 49.

24. 11 April 1922 'Sitzung der Geschäftsleitung', in SSa, SPS-Archiv, MFC 3.

25. 29 August 1922 'Sitzung der Geschäftsleitung', in SSa, SPS-Archiv, MFC 3.

26. 27 June 1921 Bauer–Adler letter, 1 July 1921 Adler–Bauer letter, and 9 August 1921 Adler–Bauer letter, in Verein für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung (Vienna), Altes Partei-Archiv, folder 84/26, 27, 34.

27. The first such meeting was held in March 1921 as a gathering of the Second International's executive committee and 'parliamentary groups'. It brought together the SPD, the British Labour Party, the Belgian Labour Party, and the irrelevant Parti Socialiste Française. In July 1922, however, the second reparations conference brought the SFIO into direct contact with the SPD under the aegis of a meeting between the Second International, the Vienna Union, and the International Federation of Trade Unions. See the transcripts in IISH, LSI, files 2 and 44.

28. Heinrich A. Winkler, *Von der Revolution zur Stabilisierung. Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik 1918 bis 1924* (Berlin 1985), 580–1.

29. 11, 12, and 30 January 1923 'Seance du Conseil General', in Archief en Museum van de Socialistische Arbeidersbeweging (Ghent). 1 June 1923 Berlin–Brussels 'L'exécution de Schlageter', 30 June 1923 Berlin–Brussels 'Déclarations de MM. Radek et Oustinoff', 22 August 1923 Berlin–Brussels 'Le mouvement communiste allemand. Activité du communiste russe Radek', 20 September 1923 Berlin–Brussels 'Le mouvement communiste en Allemagne. L'activité du communiste russe Radek', and 9 January 1924 Paris–Brussels 'L'internationale et la politique intérieure française', in Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de Belgique (Brussels), Correspondance Politique Légations Allemagne and France.

30. 17 March 1923 'Central European Summary', in PRO, FO 371/8723. 9 April 1923 report, based on French diplomatic sources, on socialist activities

surrounding the Ruhr occupation, in BA, AAR R 43 I/2662. Voluminous documentation on the socialist response to the Ruhr is contained in IISH, LSI, files 57, 107, and 110, and SAI, file 1408, as well as PRO, FO 371/8717 and 8725.

31. The links between the SPD and official German foreign policy only emerge clearly when studied from the hitherto unexplored perspective of the International and the individual parties. Stresemann's personal secretary did record in his memoirs that, because of his temperament and arrogance, 'Breitscheid's activity in the interest of Stresemann's foreign policy was confined to contacts to foreign social democratic parties.' See Henry Bernhard, *Finis Germaniae* (Stuttgart 1947), 82. In addition to his activities on behalf of Stresemann and Locarno in the Reichstag's foreign-affairs committee, Breitscheid also published a piece in a 1926 collection of articles on the various German parties' stances towards foreign affairs. In it, he publicly aligned the SPD with Stresemann's rendition of 'fulfilment policy'. 1 July 1925 meeting of the foreign affairs committee, in PAdAA, Büro des Staatssekretärs, FS, vol. 10. Rudolf Breitscheid, 'Das außenpolitische Programm der Sozialdemokratie', in *Europäische Gespräche*, vol. 4 (April 1926), 169–75.

32. 28–9 March 1923 'Interparliamentary Conference at Paris', in IISH, LSI, file 60. The English text of the document is a direct translation of Breitscheid's proposal.

33. 26, 27 March 1923 Berlin–Paris telegrams, in ADdMdAE, Europe 1918–1940, Sous-série: Internationale, vol. 384.

34. 21, 22, 24, and 25 May 1923 Hamburg–Paris reports, in ADdMdAE, Europe 1918–1940, Sous-série: Internationale, vol. 384. After an April 1933 meeting of the LSI's executive devoted to the new regime in Germany, Henryk Erlich, a Polish Bundist later executed by the NKVD, expressed dismay about Wels' unrepentant German nationalism. Wels, according to Erlich, had hindered the LSI from taking a firm anti-German position, despite Hitler's declaration of a 'bestial war of destruction against Germany's 600,000 Jews'. 6 April 1933 Erlich–Adler letter, in IISH, SAI, file 2536.

35. 30 May 1923 Berlin–Paris 'Congrès socialiste de Hambourg', and 29 May 1923 Sûreté (renseignement Prague) 'A.s. conférence internationale socialiste de Hambourg', in ADdMdAE, Europe 1918–1940, Sous-série: Internationale, vol. 384. The large amount of official French material on the Hamburg congress includes three lengthy, very detailed reports bearing the imprint of the Berlin embassy's 'Social Studies Service', which had at least one emissary present at the congress. Most of the material was addressed to Poincaré personally as prime minister and foreign minister.

36. Speeches by Otto Wels, Alexandre Bracke, Rudolf Hilferding, and Léon Blum, and the congress resolutions, in *Protokoll des Internationalen Sozialistischen Arbeiterkongresses in Hamburg 21. bis 25. Mai 1923* (Glashütten im Taunus 1974), 13–18, 53–70. The 'Statuten der Sozialistischen Arbeiterinternationale' and 'Resolutionen' are printed in the accompanying *Beschlüsse des Internationalen Arbeiterkongresses in Hamburg*, 2–13. A new passage in the international political section of the SPD programme, which Breitscheid quoted verbatim in the aforementioned 1926 article, endorsed 'European economic unity' and 'the construction of a United States of Europe'. See *Sozialdemokratischer Parteitag 1925 in Heidelberg* (Glashütten im Taunus 1974), 10. 19 December 1922 'Sitzung der Geschäftsleitung' and 'Grundlage der Internationale' appended to 24, 25 March

1923 'Sitzung des Parteivorstandes', in SSa, SPS-Archiv, MFC 3, 4.

37. 20 December 1923 London–Berlin report, in PAdAA, PA III, England, Po 5, vol. 3. 10 December 1923 London–Prague 'Anglické volby', in AMZV, Pz, Londýn. 19 December 1923 London–Brussels 'Politique Anglaise — Elections', in AdMdAEdB, Correspondance Politique Légations Grande Bretagne. Labour did have to respond to conservative accusations that membership in the International subordinated the party to a higher, transnational authority — see 8 February 1924 position paper from the Labour Party's Joint International Department, in PRO 30/69 (MacDonald Papers)/226.

38. 12 May 1924 Bern–Berlin telegram, in Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (Bonn), Politische Abteilung II, Frankreich, Po 5, vol. 8. 13 May 1924 Paris–Brussels 'Les élections du 11 mai', in AdMdAEdB, Correspondance Politique Légations France. 13 May 1924 Brussels–Berlin telegram, 14 May 1924 London–Berlin telegram, and 14, 15, and 22 May 1924 Paris–Berlin reports, in PAdAA, op. cit.

39. 6 May and 11 December 1924 Berlin–Brussels 'Elections allemandes', and 6 May 1924 Paris–Brussels 'Les élections allemandes', in AdMdAEdB, Correspondance Politique Légations Allemagne, France.

40. Ritter, *Die II. Internationale 1918/1919*, 188.

41. 25 February 1925 'Amendments to the Protocols', in Archives of the British Labour Party (Manchester), International Advisory Committee 2/334. Labour Party's 'Draft Memorandum on the Geneva Protocol', Arthur Henderson, *Labour and the Geneva Protocol* (London 1924); Ramsay MacDonald, *Protocol or Pact: The Alternative to War* (London 1924); *Manchester Guardian* 'Labour Hostility to the Pact Proposal', 'Socialists and the Protocol. A German Misunderstanding. Pressure Not Exerted by the Labour Party', 4 and 6 April 1925; and 8 April 1925, SPD-LSI letter, in IISH, SAI, file 1175.

42. March 1928 SPD position paper 'Stand der Sicherheitsfrage', in IISH, SAI, file 849. For the Polish socialists' take on the Protocols, see Mieczysław Niedziałkowski, *Położenie międzynarodowe Polski i polityka socjalizmu polskiego* (Warsaw 1925), 21–4, and 'Wielki dzień w Genewie', in *Naprzód*, 5 October 1924. For the Czechoslovak party's virtually identical analysis, see Josef Chmelař, 'Politika ženevského Protokolu', in *Zahraniční politika* 3: 21 (1924), 1147–51, written by the socialist editor of the Czechoslovak foreign ministry's official analytical periodical, 'Ženeva a Marseilles', in *Nová svoboda* 2:35 (1925), 257–8, and 'O zenevský protokol', in *Právo lidu*, 5 December 1924. December 1924 SFIO-LSI memorandum on collective security, and 30 March, 2 April, and 3 April 1925 SPD-LSI letters, in IISH, SAI, file 1175.

43. October 1925 'Memorandum on the Pact of Locarno', in ABLP, IAC 2/340. 4 August 1925 Paris–London report on conversation with Blum, and 18 September 1925 Paris–London report, in PRO, FO 371/10737, 10740. 14 August 1925 Brussels–Prague 'II. Internacionála a garacní pakt', in AMZV, Pz, Brusel. 3, 20 February, and 9 March 1925 records of von Schubert conversations with Hilferding and Breitscheid, in PAdAA, BSts, FS, vol. 1, 3. 7 November 1922 Berlin–London report, in PRO, FO 371/7539. 27 November 1922 Breitscheid statements, in BA, AAR R43 I/2662.

44. Rudolf Hilferding, 'Probleme der Zeit', in *Die Gesellschaft* 1:1 (1924), 1–17. 1923 'Obrashenie k sotsialist. partiiam', and Russian report on 5–7 June 1924 meeting of the LSI Executive Committee, in Hoover Institution Archives, Boris

Nikolaevsky Collection 732/7. 'Rabochii Internatsional i marksistskie partii', and 'V rabochem Internatsionale', in *Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik* 4:4 (25 February 1924), 7–8, and 4:12/13 (20 June 1924), 12–13.

45. *The Times*, 16 October 1925; *Le Temps*, 16 and 17 October 1925; *Vossische Zeitung*, 16 and 17 October 1925; *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 16 October 1925; *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 16 October 1925; *New York Times*, 16 and 18 October and 14 December 1925; *Pravda*, 15 and 18 October 1925.

46. Lord D'Abernon, *An Ambassador of Peace*, vol. 3 (London 1930), 182.

47. Paul Reynaud, *La France a sauvé L'Europe* (Paris 1947), 47–8.

48. 4 June and 26 August 1938 Warsaw–Prague reports, in AMZV, Pz, Varšava. *Právo lidu*, 19 May 1937. 30 May 1938 London–Brussels 'Attitude des milieux travaillistes à l'égard de la politique du Gouvernement, en matière de réarmement', and 29 September 1938 Paris–Brussels 'La question tchécho-slovaque', in AdMdAEdB, Correspondance Politique Légations Grande Bretagne.

49. 3 October 1938 'Séance du Conseil Général', in AMSAB, 9 October 1925 Vandervelde–von Schubert discussion, in PAdAA, BSts, FS, vol. 15. 25 October 1938 Výkonný; výbor protocol, in AČsSD, fond 71/6. 3 October 1938 'Séance', op. cit.

William Lee Blackwood is Assistant Professor of History, Yale University. He is the author of several articles, including 'Socialism, Czechoslovakism, and "the Munich Complex", 1918–48', *International History Review* and 'Czechoslovak and Polish National Democracy at the Dawn of Independent Statehood, 1918–19', *East European Politics and Society*. He is currently working on a book, *Socialism and International Politics in Europe, 1918–38*.