

Political Language and Wartime Propaganda in Denmark, 1625–1629

In recent years, the study of political theory in early-modern European history has largely been replaced by the study of ‘political language’ and ‘political discourse’, a shift that demonstrates, in the main, a greater appreciation for the complexity of European political thought before the Enlightenment. Historians of political language have turned increasingly to heretofore neglected sources, including lesser writings and pamphlet literature, to discern change and continuity in political mentalities; in addition, the study of court culture has at least highlighted the iconographic and constitutional significance of visual display and court patronage of the arts. For a state with a rich tradition of political literature — early Stuart England, for example — such sources provide an important ancillary to conventional constitutional history. For a state without such a tradition, like pre-absolutist Denmark, sources such as these are nearly all that we have. Oldenburg Denmark lacked a significant political literature before 1660, and the nature of the Danish constitution precluded the lengthy interchanges between monarchy and elites over the nature of sovereignty which appear so frequently in English history. An understanding of the Oldenburg constitution requires an examination of court ceremonial, court culture, and the popular press; only through these means can we discern the way in which the Danish monarchy presented itself, or the ways in which its subjects perceived it.

While historians of early-modern Denmark may not have yet uncovered what Malcolm Smuts termed ‘a visual language of power and authority’ in the seventeenth-century Oldenburg state,¹ the study of court culture has at least begun to figure prominently in early-modern Danish historiography. Steffen

Heiberg, Hugo Johannsen, and — most recently — Sebastian Olden-Jørgensen have examined royal patronage of the arts under King Christian IV (1596–1648) and in the early years of the absolute monarchy in Denmark. The near dearth of printed political literature in pre-absolutist Denmark, however, puts severe restrictions on the study of Danish political culture.²

Yet the study of political attitudes and mentalities does not require the existence of a literature that is expressly political in nature; these ideas may be manifested in other types of writing as well. In Denmark — as in much of Europe — the overwhelming preponderance of printed literature concerned religious or devotional topics, generally written by ordained clerics. Given the nature of church–state relations in seventeenth-century Denmark, it should hardly be surprising that this religious literature would, from time to time, reflect the clergy’s perception of the monarchy and perhaps the monarchy’s image as the king himself would have it. An examination of religious pamphlets and printed sermons from the time of the greatest constitutional crisis in early seventeenth-century Denmark — Christian IV’s military intervention in the Thirty Years’ War — reveals a great deal about the royal image. The king’s close relationship with the state Lutheran church meant that printed sermons and devotional literature would serve as a sort of propaganda, defending to the king’s subjects the necessity of war and of the attendant sacrifices they would have to make to support the war effort. This propaganda literature is significant in at least three ways: first, it is thematically unique in comparison with other European propaganda literatures from the period of the Thirty Years’ War; second, it serves as an indication of the degree of royal control over the state confessional church in Denmark; and finally, it exhibits a vision of the mission and majesty of monarchy that is altogether different from that previously projected in Danish political discourse. In other words, the pressures of war compelled the king to refashion his image, to assert a much enhanced role within the polity. It is this final consideration — the exercise of royal power and the perception of kingship embodied in Danish wartime propaganda — which concerns us here.

The tracts and printed sermons which make up the bulk of Danish propaganda from the time of Christian IV’s intervention in the Thirty Years’ War bear little resemblance to state- and church-generated propaganda from other European states during

the same period. These latter — including Charles I's defence of the Forced Loan, Richelieu's arguments in favour of French intervention against the Habsburgs, Gustav II Adolf's and Axel Oxenstierna's justification of a Swedish assault on the Holy Roman Empire, and the *apologia* of Elector Johann Georg for Saxon neutrality during the 1620s — make frequent use of confessional arguments, as does the Danish wartime literature, but here the similarity ends. While the aforementioned English, French, Swedish, and Saxon propaganda blames the inevitable onslaught of war on the actions of real or perceived enemies, thereby *externalizing* the factors which made war necessary, the Danish tracts and sermons focus the blame inwards. In other words, the Danish literature portrays the inevitable onslaught of war and calamity as the predictable result of the collective iniquity of the people of Denmark; war, like other disasters, is the inescapable manifestation of God's righteous wrath, visited upon Denmark for its sins. While this overall theme was hardly new in 1625, even in Denmark, its portrayal of the king was something of an innovation. For the king was fated to serve as the national saviour, prepared to sacrifice his wealth and his life for his sinful and ungrateful subjects. Such a messianic representation of the king simply has no precedent in Danish royal iconography before 1625, but it would colour the bitter constitutional aftermath of Danish defeat in the war against the Holy Roman Emperor.³

Kingship and the Oldenburg Constitution

The basic structure of the Danish constitution, as well as the background to Denmark's disastrous involvement in the Thirty Years' War, are certainly covered elsewhere, but are probably not sufficiently familiar to most early modernists. Prior to the royalist *coup d'état* of 1660, the characteristic constitutional form of Danish government was what later Danish historians have labelled *adelsvælden*, in which the responsibility of governance was entrusted to the joint stewardship of the elected king and the aristocratic Council of State (*Rigsrådet*). Together, these two elements made up the 'Crown of Denmark' (*Danmarks krone*), a concept not unlike that of 'king in parliament' in contemporary England. Although the king was recognized as the chief statesman of the realm, a coronation charter (*håndfæstning*) limited his

arbitrary powers, and in general major decisions had to be made in consultation with the Council of State. A small group of ministers (*Rigsebedsmændene*), almost invariably appointed by the king from within the ranks of the Council, assisted in the governance of the realm. Popular representative institutions, except at the local level, were all but non-existent; regular meetings of the Estates (*Stændermøderne*) would not become a feature of Danish or Norwegian government until the late 1620s. The monarchy remained nominally elective, but the Oldenburg dynasty had been in place since 1448, and in fact — if not in theory — kingship had been hereditary since the Lutheran Christian III had forced his way to the throne in 1536.

During the reigns of Kings Christian III (1536–59) and Frederik II (1559–88), and during the first half of Christian IV's reign, political life in Denmark was unusually harmonious. The tumultuous and violent reign of Christian II (1513–23) taught succeeding kings of the Oldenburg line the dangers of ruling without the Council; the chaotic interregnum of 1533–36, likewise, served as an object lesson to the Council that the absence of royal authority might well engender anarchy. The lack of significant confessional strife in the Oldenburg State after 1536 was a factor of no mean importance, but in the main the king and the aristocratic Council made a conscientious effort to maintain their potentially precarious balance in order to avert confrontation and instability. Indeed, until well into the 1620s there existed a close socio-political symbiosis between the king and the nobility, despite frequent clashes over foreign policy and fiscal issues.

Court culture and prevailing notions of kingship tended to reinforce the idea of the king as *primus inter pares*. Until the 1630s, the Danish court never approached most of its Continental contemporaries (or, for that matter, that of the Tudor or Stuart monarchs) in terms of ostentatious display, and had a great deal more in common with the austere courts of the impoverished north German territorial states. Danish court society was virtually devoid of titles and other distinctions of rank. Nor did the king attempt to set himself apart from his aristocracy, and the daily activities of court life cemented a closer working relationship between the two. The king and the foremost members of his court, together with their armed retainers (*svend*), comprised a formal military unit (*Hoffanen*). The kings — espe-

cially Frederik II, probably the consummate conciliar king in the history of *adelsvælden* — feasted and drank with their councillors, invited councillors to attend the baptism ceremonies of the royal children, and allowed the children of the leading families to be educated alongside *den udvalgte prins* (the Prince Elect, or heir apparent) and the dukes and princesses of the royal house. The Council, in other words, was more the king's *comitatus* than his constitutional opponent. Court ceremony may have been stiff, indeed almost Spanish in its formality, when foreign ambassadors were present, but the day-to-day relationship between the king and the Council was characterized by a rough-hewn conviviality and familiarity.⁴ When Christian IV, for example, made a sea voyage to visit his northern Norwegian domains in 1599, accompanied by a number of aristocratic companions, he insisted that his guests aboard ship refer to him as 'Captain Christian Frederiksen' and not by his royal titles.⁵ It is not difficult to understand why Christian IV and James I got along so famously during Christian's two visits to England in 1606 and 1614, or why the Danish king's indecorous behaviour during the first visit so appalled James's court.⁶

Adelsvælden, in this sense at least, died during the reign of Christian IV, well before the establishment of the absolute monarchy by King Frederik III in 1660. Ironically, for the first thirty years of his long reign, Christian IV seemed ideally suited to maintain the consensus between king and aristocracy necessary for conciliar monarchy to function smoothly. His father's association with the conciliar aristocracy had been especially close, but the young Prince Elect Christian (IV) — a mere boy of eleven when his father died in April 1588 — did not have much opportunity to witness Frederik II at work, in particular the manner in which Frederik managed his Council. Christian received most of his education and political training at the hands of the regency government which ruled in his stead until his formal coronation in 1596. Christian's political education was not intensive — his readings in political theory appear to have been limited to Erasmus' *Institutio principis christiani* — but as it was supervised by members of the aristocratic Council of State it was slanted towards the interests of the upper nobility, and doubtlessly was not replete with images of royal supremacy.⁷ The most famous theorist of *adelsvælden*, the councillor Arild Huitfeldt, composed a multi-volume history of Denmark for the

young king. This series, usually called *Danmarks Riges Kronike* (*Chronicles of the Kingdom of Denmark*), and especially the introductions to each volume, served as a didactic in the *speculum regale* tradition with a very simple message: successful and godly kings ruled with and through the aristocracy; while monarchy was necessary for political stability, kings who consistently ignored the interests of the aristocracy were invariably tyrants.⁸ Unlike his contemporary and brother-in-law James VI/I, Christian IV never revealed his vision of kingship in his extensive personal writings, but he did through his actions. He summoned the entire Council of State far more frequently than his father did, and appears to have scoffed at the idea of royal supremacy. His fierce prosecution of Christoffer Dybvad, the Danish academic who in the early 1620s had the temerity to suggest that Christian abolish the Council of State and establish a kind of popular absolutism, bears more than adequate testimony to the king's devotion to the political status quo.⁹

Christian IV and the Thirty Years' War

Limited monarchy may have prevailed for the first half of Christian IV's reign, but as in several European states the Thirty Years' War brought with it pressures that were too great for limited monarchy to bear. Unlike Frederik II, Christian IV had never demonstrated any great interest in the impending confessional and constitutional crises in the Empire, nor in the creation of a Protestant or anti-Habsburg coalition. He worked assiduously to augment Denmark's military, naval, and commercial power, but he lacked his father's astute grasp of international politics outside of Baltic Europe. The various crises leading up to the Thirty Years' War did not cause Christian IV any visible concern, and he harboured little sympathy for the Bohemian rebels in 1618.¹⁰

Nonetheless, Christian IV found himself dragged into the escalating conflict in the Empire. In part, this was because his support was courted both by the Habsburg and by their adversaries, especially the latter. And with good reason: his personal fortune was the greatest of any reigning monarch in Europe, the Danish navy was one of the most powerful on the Continent, and — most important — Denmark's geopolitical

position was strategically significant. For Christian IV — whose realms included not only the kingdom of Denmark itself (including the now-Swedish provinces of Blekinge, Halland, and Skåne), but also Norway, Iceland, Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and much of Holstein — controlled the Sound and all other approaches to the Baltic Sea, thereby making access to the lucrative Baltic trade dependent upon his good will. As duke of Holstein, he was an important prince of the Holy Roman Empire, clearly the most powerful German prince in the Lower Saxon Circle. By 1625, his aggressive acquisition of secularized bishoprics in northern Germany had given Christian IV nearly total dominance over the Weser and Elbe estuaries. And the extensive ties of blood and matrimony — with England and Scotland, Brandenburg, Saxony, Mecklenburg, and the Palatinate — ensured that the king was well connected.

It was the encroachment of Habsburg authority on Christian's lands in Germany, however, that finally moved the Danish king to action. The primary foreign-policy problem in Christian IV's reign had been Sweden's aggressive expansionism in the Baltic, and Gustav II Adolf's unremitting hostility towards Denmark, but the advances of Habsburg forces (and, concomitantly, of the Counter Reformation Church) in the early 1620s threatened his established territorial holdings in northern Germany. More precisely, these advances threatened his religion and his 'princely liberties'; like any German *Reichsfürst*, Christian IV treasured the decentralized nature of the Empire that allowed him to pursue his territorial policies in Lower Saxony without threat of interference from Vienna or Prague. As the army of the Catholic League began to threaten Lower Saxony directly, and as England, France, and the United Provinces importuned him to take up the common anti-Habsburg cause, Christian IV made the decision to defend his interests in Lower Saxony against the centralizing policies of the Habsburg.

Adelsvælden, however, would not allow so brash a move as an uprising against the emperor without the consent of the Council of State, and the Council did not share Christian IV's understanding of the crisis in the Empire. Christian IV, as duke of Holstein, saw considerable peril in the movement of the victorious Habsburg armies; the Council saw the war in Germany as a distant conflict that did not involve Denmark. The Council repeatedly foiled the king's attempts to become involved in the

German conflict between 1621 and 1624. With the promise of substantial foreign aid, however, Christian decided to pursue the war on his own, as duke of Holstein, without the support of Denmark itself. The Danish royal intervention of 1625–9 — known as the Lower Saxon War in German historiography and as *Kejserkrigen* (the Emperor's War) in Danish — was a significant blow to Denmark and to its king. A string of minor defeats in 1625 and 1626, a greater one at Lutter-am-Barenberge in August 1626, and even a failed diversionary campaign into Moravia were insufficient to crush the king's Lower Saxon army completely. As promised foreign aid failed to materialize, and as his minor German princely allies deserted him one by one, Christian bereft of substantial military or financial support from his own realm was gradually overpowered by the superior armies of the Empire and the Catholic League. Ultimately the Council of State, albeit reluctantly, came to the king's aid, and the recently summoned Estates pledged their support, but it was too late. In the autumn of 1627, the armies of Tilly and Wallenstein overran the last of Christian's German territories and crossed the frontier into Slesvig and Jutland. Only a series of brilliantly executed amphibious assaults along the Jutish and Baltic coasts, assisted by the still-powerful Danish fleet, staved off a complete Imperial victory, and allowed the conclusion of a surprisingly lenient peace settlement at Lübeck in May 1629.

Despite the unexpectedly happy outcome of the war for Denmark — Christian IV lost only his lesser Imperial possessions — the war marked the beginning of a major constitutional crisis. The Council blamed the destructive Imperial invasion of Denmark on the king's 'royal adventure' in Germany; the king, conversely, blamed the Council for its failure to support him until the last possible moment. For the remainder of the reign, the Council sought to find ways to limit the king's ability to make foreign and military policy, and Christian IV sought to sidestep these restrictions. Although the king was marginally successful in augmenting royal authority in these areas prior to 1643, a disastrous war with Sweden — the Torstensson War of 1643–5 — brought an end to Christian's constitutional endeavours. The last three years of the reign were a low point in the history of the Danish monarchy. Christian died in February 1648, broken, despondent, and bankrupt, a mere 'shadow king' in Steffen Heiberg's words.¹¹

Christian IV never attempted to alter radically the constitutional structure of the Oldenburg polity. His efforts to magnify royal authority never aimed at the destruction or complete subordination of the Council, and he seems to have rejected every opportunity that arose to do so. Christian IV did try, with a fair amount of success, to refashion prevailing notions of kingship in Danish political discourse. This self-conscious refashioning began with the monarchy's first attempts to produce propaganda for domestic consumption in the autumn of 1626. By that time, the defeat at Lutter-am-Barenberge had triggered the wholesale defection of Christian IV's German allies, and it was becoming increasingly apparent that foreign subsidies would not be forthcoming in the near future. The king sought the support of his Council and of his subjects; hence it was necessary for Christian to defend his motives in fighting the costly war in Germany. The Danish propaganda 'campaign' during the Lower Saxon War, however, was never very well organized. In Sweden, Gustav II Adolf and Axel Oxenstierna had prepared the population for a war in Germany several years before the actual landing at Peenemünde in 1630, in large part by means of royal instructions on preaching; in Denmark, the process of propaganda was entirely reactive. But the means of propaganda had already been prepared, well before Lutter, by the loyal Danish clergy. Christian IV had to do little more than sanction and supervise the dissemination of propaganda, the themes of which had been well established in sermons and religious literature.

The Clergy, the Monarchy, and the Mechanism of Propaganda

The Danish clergy would serve as the primary vehicle for royal propaganda during the Lower Saxon War. Previously, both Frederik II and Christian IV had employed 'royal historiographers' who frequently served as propagandists, but Christian IV's historiographer, the panegyrist Claus Christoffersen Lyschander (1558–1624), had died the year before the war began.¹² The Lutheran clergy more than made up for the loss. Although the Lutheran Reformation had been effected in Denmark at the accession of Christian III in 1536, it was only under Frederik II that a true confessional state church had emerged, and that most of the remaining vestiges of the Roman faith had been wiped out

at least in Denmark, if not yet in Norway and Iceland. Still, Frederik II had kept his church theologically vague, and crypto-calvinists — most notably the renowned theologian Niels Hemmingsen (1513–1600) — figured prominently throughout the ranks of the clergy.¹³ Christian IV was initially tolerant of crypto-calvinists, but by the early 1610s he had begun to demonstrate a preference for the growing orthodox (or Gnesio-Lutheran) faction in the clergy. The fall of the crypto-calvinist Oluf Jensen Kock in 1614 marked the true ascendancy of the orthodox clergy, as typified by the careers of Hans Poulsen Resen and Jesper Rasmussen Brochmand. The orthodox clergy remained fiercely loyal to the king well beyond the death of Christian IV in 1648, and would later play a significant role in the establishment of absolute monarchy in 1660.¹⁴

Royal support for and control of the church paid rich political dividends. Under the direction of Hans Poulsen Resen, bishop-superintendent of Sjælland, the clergy became a firm, if not especially vocal, protagonist of royal policy from the Lower Saxon War to the end of Christian's reign. The political leanings of the upper clergy are difficult to determine, but the upper clergy as a whole seems to have been strongly inclined towards royalism.¹⁵ Perhaps such a political stance would hardly seem surprising in a Lutheran state church, given the orthodox Lutheran position on the sanctity of legitimate secular authority. The lack of Danish texts on political theology from the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries renders any kind of generalization about this issue problematic at best, but scattered evidence seems to suggest that the clerical attitudes towards royal power had indeed changed during the half-century before 1625. In 1567, no less a personage than Niels Nielsen Colding, Frederik II's court chaplain, published *The most remarkable stories, passages and examples found in the Holy Scripture, on the duty . . . of authority*, an articulate if rambling defence of Denmark's brand of limited monarchy, predating Arild Huitfeldt's much more famous apologia for *adelsvælden* by almost three decades. Later ecclesiastical writings on political authority — notably Thomas Cortsen Vegner's eulogy for Michel Wibis (1624), Nelaus Poulsen Nested's *Clangor tubæ* of 1624 and his 1626 tract on the necessity of obedience to secular authority, and the relevant chapters of Jesper Rasmussen Brochmand's *Systema universæ theologiæ* (1633) — have a dis-

tinctly royalist tone, without the obeisances to *adelsvælden* which characterized Colding's work.¹⁶ Even though Frederik II in many ways dominated his clergy, frequently overstepping his bounds in appointing and dismissing superintendents and even individual parish priests, the Danish episcopacy did not hesitate to castigate him for granting pardon to the nobleman Laurits Brockenhus for murder in 1582.¹⁷ There are no exact parallels for the reign of Christian IV, but nonetheless it is hard to imagine the clergy protesting any of Christian IV's actions with similar boldness. Whether it was because the clergy agreed with Christian IV's policies, or because decades of royal intervention in ecclesiastical affairs had simply reduced the clergy to the level of mere servants of the king, the end result was the same: the clergy lent their support to Christian IV's intervention in the German war, tacitly or explicitly. Jesper Rasmussen Brochmand, for one, voiced his endorsement of royal foreign policy when, at the height of the war in Lower Saxony, he complained to a member of the Council of State about the nobility's reticence in assisting the king's military efforts: 'There is no-one who will implore God . . . [or] clothe himself in sackcloth and ashes for the king's welfare.'¹⁸

The clergy demonstrated their support for the king, and thereby disseminated propaganda, in two ways: first, through published sermons, broadsheets, and tracts; and second, directly from the pulpit. Given the relatively low literacy rate in the Oldenburg state (even by seventeenth-century standards), of course the second avenue would be the more effective one. To be sure, many sermons were published, as were the royal instructions on preaching. In this study, I have concentrated my efforts on published material, for two reasons. First, unpublished sermons dating from the time of the Lower Saxon War are virtually non-existent in any of the major Danish manuscript collections. Second, and more importantly, published sermons and devotional tracts reflect at least a measure of royal influence. There were relatively few printing presses in Denmark during the early seventeenth century, and nearly all of those were in Copenhagen.¹⁹ Strict royal censorship laws ensured that nothing could be published without the explicit permission of the king and of the senior faculty (the so-called *Højlerde*) at the University of Copenhagen; no published work — foreign or native — could circulate within the kingdom unless it had first been examined

and approved by these two parties. The Danish clergy still produced a substantial body of printed literature during these years. Between this literature and the printed sermons and royal instructions on preaching we can gain a fair view of what was being preached in Danish churches, as well as the way in which the episcopacy and the king himself recast the image of monarchy.

Individual priests began a public defence of the war effort in Lower Saxony almost simultaneously with Christian IV's intervention in June 1625, but such efforts were not given any real measure of royal supervision until immediately after the defeat at Lutter-am-Barenberge in August 1626. By this point, as it became obvious that the king would need national support to prosecute the war effectively, Christian IV and his supporters must have realized that some form of propaganda was necessary. The king did this by proclaiming special *bededage* ('prayer-days'), to ensure that the clergy informed the laity about the importance of the war, and that the contact between clergy and laity would extend beyond the ordinary weekly observation of the Sabbath. Prayer-days were by no means unique to Denmark, nor were they unprecedented in the Oldenburg State. Christian III had made only occasional use of *bededage*, but Frederik II employed them somewhat more — there were approximately twenty-three groups of *bededage* during his twenty-nine-year reign. Up until 1626, Christian IV did not decree prayer-days more than once annually. In most cases, the kings proclaimed *bededage* to beg God's help and guidance in difficult times, for example in periods of pestilence or famine. In addition, Frederik II announced special prayers (*kirkebon*) for the beleaguered Protestant communities in the Netherlands and the German states during the 1570s and 1580s, and Christian IV had proclaimed a special set of *bededage* to celebrate the success of the Norwegian silver mines at Kongsberg and (simultaneously) the execution of the Catholic agent Arnold Weisweiler in 1624.²⁰

The prayer-days held from 1626 to 1629 differ considerably from their antecedents. First, they were held with much greater regularity than had been the case previously. The first *bededage* held during the war were proclaimed for a three-day period in April 1625, shortly after Christian IV had accepted the position of *Kreisoberst* (military commander) of the Lower Saxon Circle. Only one more set of prayer-days, in March 1626, was decreed between April 1625 and the autumn of 1626.²¹ The frequency of

prayer-days, however, changed dramatically in September 1626. Shortly after Christian IV's defeat at Lutter-am-Barenberge, as the king's 'royal adventure' became Denmark's burden, the Prince Elect Christian (V) and the Regency Council (*Regeringsrådet*, set up to govern the realm while the king was absent on campaign in Germany) promulgated a royal ordinance prescribing the observance of prayer-days once weekly. According to the terms of the Prayer-Days Ordinance (*Bededagsforordningen*) of September/October 1626, all residents of the larger towns throughout Denmark and Norway were required to attend a special church service every Friday; those residing in the countryside were to attend a prayer-day one Wednesday each month. Soldiers on duty in Lower Saxony were compelled to attend church services twice each week. All subjects were advised to pray and sing psalms with their families each morning and evening, and to devote some time each day to the study of the Scriptures. No meals could be served, publicly or privately, before service on the prayer-days, and all drinking and dancing were strictly prohibited for the entire day. Moreover, the superintendent of each diocese in Denmark and Norway was to arrange for the printing of prayers used in the *bededage*, so that 'the common man . . . can use and recite them'.²² If these strictures were insufficiently clear, further directives enforced attendance at church services and sobriety during the prayer-days. These edicts, especially the second Prayer-Days Ordinance (September 1628), attest to the importance Christian IV attached to the *bededage*.²³

The Prayer-Days Ordinance of 1626 is significant in a second way as well: it demonstrates a far greater degree of royal involvement. No prior *bededage* had been decreed by royal ordinance in such detail. Frederik II and Christian IV, prior to 1626, had left the content of the prayer-days' services entirely up to the episcopacy. The king specified only the dates of, and sometimes the reasons behind, the prayer-days.²⁴ The 1626 Ordinance, on the other hand, outlined the conduct and content of the *bededage* in great detail. The bishops still enjoyed considerable freedom in selecting appropriate scriptural texts for the sermons, but the Ordinance stipulated very precise guidelines for the substance of prayers and sermons.

The Prayer-Days Ordinance of 1626 is the most notable piece of evidence linking the monarchy to the dissemination of propaganda, but its precise authorship is unclear. While the ordinance

bears the names of the Prince Elect and the Regency Council, any significant participation by the former seems unlikely. The Prince Elect was not an especially diligent administrator. He shared his father's love for drinking and gambling, but to even greater excess, and would soon shock Denmark with his open liaison with a recently widowed young noblewoman. Nor is there any evidence that the Council of State discussed the draft of the ordinance during its meeting at Copenhagen in mid-September 1626 or at the noble assembly (*Herredag*) at Kolding in May.²⁵ The initial inspiration for the text of the ordinance seems to have been more theological than political. Although neither would take credit for the writing of the 1626 ordinance, two figures stand out in particular: Holger Rosenkrantz 'the Learned', a member of the Council of State, a wealthy and influential fiefholder (*lensmand*), and a noted theologian in his own right; and Rosenkrantz's close friend Jesper Rasmussen Brochmand, protégé of the orthodox Lutheran bishop Hans Poulsen Resen, professor of theology, and former tutor to the Prince Elect. The two had collaborated in an unsuccessful attempt to formulate an ordinance on church discipline in 1623,²⁶ and both were firmly convinced that the spread of war over the Continent in the early 1620s required national penance if Denmark hoped to escape God's wrath. Brochmand expressed disgust with the population of Denmark for their refusal to repent, and impatience with the central government for not enforcing popular penitence by fiat.²⁷ Shortly after the publication of the 1626 ordinance, Brochmand wrote to Rosenkrantz:²⁸

In vain you struggle, Rosenkrantz, and in vain I and the others as well, with the world about penitence. Now it has come to the point that the world, with deaf ears, disregards all kinds of admonitions. Punishment must now be awaited . . . For our enemies (the papists), though blinded by superstition, are at least in this regard keen-sighted, in that they show their contrition with sackcloth and ashes, with fasting, with perpetual prayer and the scourging of the body . . . while we, for whom the light of God's Word shines down in all its clarity, commit gluttony and lechery, and have given ourselves over entirely to the accumulation of wealth.

It does appear as well that the king sought a broader consensus from the clergy as well; the minutes of the synod at Roskilde show that the text of the ordinance was submitted to the synod, and possibly discussed there, as early as June 1626, three months before the promulgation of the ordinance.²⁹

Themes and Images

The propaganda literature, like nearly all Danish religious literature from the second half of the sixteenth century onwards, was overtly anti-Catholic in tone. While the Danish Reformation, as introduced by Christian III in 1536, had been gentle and gradual, both Frederik II and Christian IV had been uncompromising in their anti-Roman stance. From 1570 to his death in 1588, Frederik II had sought — actively though covertly — to fashion an international Protestant alliance in order to resist the aggression of Spain and what he perceived as a papal–Habsburg cabal; while tolerant of Melanchthonian and crypto-calvinist elements in the state Lutheran church, Frederik was openly distrustful of Catholics.³⁰ Christian IV was even more so, particularly after the failed Jesuit mission of Laurentius Nicolai Norvegus early in the reign, the emergence of rumours about a Spanish–Polish–papal plot to conquer and convert the Nordic kingdoms in 1603, and thoroughly substantiated reports of Jesuit and Dominican missionary activity within Denmark during the early 1620s convinced him that Rome was working actively for the demise of Lutheranism in the North. King Christian took strong measures to prevent the infiltration of Catholic missionaries and the possible exodus of young Danish noblemen to Jesuit schools to the south.³¹ The Lutheran ‘jubilee’ of 1617 witnessed an unprecedented outpouring of anti-Catholic tracts. The printed sermons, tracts, and songs of the *kejserkrigen* period were, naturally, bound to be stridently anti-Catholic as well, and portrayed the war as a war of religion.³² There were solid, pragmatic reasons for this. In the absence of nationalistic sentiment, only by portraying the war in this way could the Danish government — or the government of any other early-modern state — hope to engender unity and acquiescence; only xenophobia and fear of heretical conspiracies could evoke the necessary visceral popular reaction.

In this way and in others, the Danish propaganda literature from the Lower Saxon War is virtually indistinguishable from its predecessors. As a genre, it is neither remarkable, nor innovative, nor distinctive. In the main, it berates the people of Denmark for their licentiousness, immorality, godlessness, and disobedience, and promises swift divine retribution for these sins. Sins of the flesh, heresy, lack of piety, drunkenness and gluttony, and even the prevalence of immoral clothing styles came under harsh

attack from Danish clerics. Citing Jeremiah and Ezekiel, Danish religious writers warned that unless the Danes repented, they could expect God's vengeance by means of war and natural disasters. Such dire admonitions and prophecies, however, were evident — even predominant — in earlier post-Reformation religious literature, both in Denmark and throughout Europe. The bulk of spiritual literature published in Denmark between 1560 and 1625, much like that of the period 1625–9, was penitential in nature.³³

What is unique about this seemingly stale literary fare was also perhaps its greatest strength: it used familiar, commonplace themes, and arranged them in such a fashion so as to not only defend the king's military involvement in the Germanies, but also to elevate the king above his traditional place within the existing social and political hierarchy. And since strict censorship practices demanded that these writings pass under the scrutiny of the king and the *højlerde*, it stands to reason that this innovative presentation of majesty met at least with the tacit approval of both the king and the upper clergy. Moreover, this new political language would not be short lived, but would continue to dominate published *bededage* prayers in the 1630s, 1640s, and 1650s, and would even manifest itself in the voluminous political writings of the Norwegian cleric Christen Steffensen Bang in the late 1650s.³⁴ Whether inadvertently or deliberately, the Danish clergy created an unprecedented spiritual and constitutional role for the monarch, a new literary iconography that would serve the king well in the years leading up to the imposition of absolutism in 1660.

This is best observed if we examine the various tracts, published sermons, devotional pamphlets, and songs by theme rather than by piece. Taken in logical order, the predominant themes were: first, that the people of Denmark have sinned grievously, through their immorality, immodesty, toleration of heresy, pride, and lack of faith; second, that the Danes have been warned of God's holy wrath through innumerable signs, but the people of Denmark have ignored these; third, that God will inevitably punish this sinfulness, through war, plague, famine, and — in particular — a papal-Imperial onslaught; fourth, that the salvation of Denmark and the redemption of its collective sins lay in repentance and obedience to God and king; and fifth, that the king is the national saviour, sacrificing his life and fortune for his

nation, and hence in God's eyes is comparable to the hero-kings of the Old Testament and even, possibly, Christ himself.

Most obvious of all themes in the wartime literature are the time-worn accusations of Denmark's iniquity. The Prayer-Days Ordinance of 1626 instructed parish priests to remind their congregations of their 'grievous disregard for and neglect of ' God's holy word, as well as of the 'burden of our manifold and various iniquities and sins'.³⁵ The clergy needed little encouragement; wartime sermons and prayers written before the 1626 ordinance were quite blunt on this issue. 'We have scorned your commandments,' proclaimed Niels Heldvad, Christian IV's court astrologer and a popular religious writer, in a prayer written for the first wartime prayer-days in April 1625.³⁶

Our souls have rejected your law, and we have abandoned and departed from the promise that we made with you in holy baptism. We have conducted ourselves in an ungodly manner. We have done [all kinds of] evil.

Nelaus Poulsen Nested, in a printed prayer written for the German congregation at the Church of St Petri, Copenhagen, during the April 1625 prayer-days, wrote that³⁷

We have sinned and committed injustice. We have been ungodly and have strayed from [the example set by our] forefathers. We have strayed from your commandments and from your law.

Popular devotional tracts isolated specific sins and shortcomings, particularly in terms of public morals. New clothing styles came under an especially fierce attack, as they were seen as either immoral or pretentious; one wartime pamphlet chided the lower orders for 'clothing themselves in such finery as though they were kings'.³⁸

The reward for such constant iniquity was clear, both from the Scriptures and from the troubles of the contemporary world: 'The wages of sin are death.' God would punish Denmark and all the world for such affrontery and disobedience. Yet the people of Denmark had no reason to complain, the propagandists wrote, for God had indeed given them fair warning. Indeed He had. Since the Reformation, the popular religious press in Denmark had fairly overflowed with reports of miracles and divine portents, at home and abroad. The frequency with which such reports appear in the diaries of noblemen and ecclesiastics demonstrates that such phenomena cannot be attributed solely to

the credulity of the unlettered; belief in miracles was still pervasive throughout Danish society.³⁹ Starting in the last third of the sixteenth century, Danish pamphlets and broadsides told of remarkable experiences: visions of crosses in the sky and of Christ himself, with bleeding *stigmata*; of grotesque births, animal and human; of conversations with angels and with the Virgin Mary. The message of such visions and portents was largely the same: the Danes must cast off their sinful ways or face the righteous wrath of God.⁴⁰

Even before Christian IV's intervention in the Lower Saxon War, the tenor of the times was sufficiently uncertain to inspire self-proclaimed prophets and prophetesses to call Denmark to repentance; the arrival of war on Denmark's doorstep brought forth a groundswell of visionaries and reports of miracles. A few respected clergymen, notably Nelaus Poulsen Nested and the astrologer Niels Heldvad, had themselves contributed to the vast body of miracle literature well before the war, but in the main Danish theologians had condemned such expressions of popular religious sentiment and would continue to do so after the war was over.⁴¹ During the course of the Lower Saxon War, however, even the episcopacy seemed willing to accept and even utilize reports of miracles and visions. Even senior clerics like Hans Mikkelsen, bishop-superintendent of Fyn and former chaplain to the Dowager Queen Sofie, took great interest in such phenomena without attempting to denounce or discredit popular religion.⁴² As the state church mustered its spiritual resources to support the king, it would seem, the clergy found it temporarily useful to embrace what it had in other times decried.

The miracles reported during the war were little different from those reported before, except in frequency. Peder Nielsen, rector of a church in the county of Holbo, North Sjælland, noted several heavy downpours of bloody rain in his parish in 1625. Visions of the humbled Christ abounded. Christian IV himself claimed to have seen Christ while at Rothenburg Castle in December 1625, an occasion which he noted in his diary and had memorialized in a painting.⁴³ Astral wonders — 'burning lights' in the night sky, the appearance of three suns during the day, visions of the Cross or of bloody swords in the clouds — were not lacking, and unnatural births were seemingly the order of the day. Deformed infants were accepted as signs of God's anger with Denmark, as were disturbing prenatal phenomena; one witness described, in

horrifying detail, the screams of an unborn infant within the mother's womb. A peasant in Jutland related how his cow gave birth to a calf with a human head; the calf implored its owner to atone for his sins and to tell his neighbours to do the same. All of these portents warned of the approach of disaster in the wake of God's wrath, and that 'our bloody sins demand a bloody punishment'. Nearly all of these marvels were recounted by legitimate Danish clergymen.⁴⁴

There were, however, signs of God's anger that no-one could deny: the increased incidence of famine, epidemic disease, and warfare just before 1625. The fact that 'the misfortunes of these present times' had figured prominently in penitential literature from the late sixteenth century onwards lent additional credibility to the propagandistic writings of the Lower Saxon War. Heldvad was hardly alone in interpreting the comet that appeared in late 1617 as a disturbing omen, and probably as a call for repentance.⁴⁵ Natural catastrophes, all of them manifestations of divine wrath, proliferated in the years before 1625. Both the Prayer-Days Ordinance and Heldvad's 1625 prayer listed 'pestilence, burning fevers . . . barren soil, hunger and famine, storms and foul weather, the tumultuous waves and roaring of the sea' as the most obvious signs of God's displeasure.⁴⁶ The manifold misfortunes that befell Iceland — part of the Oldenburg State — during the late 1620s only reinforced the commonly held idea that disasters were unambiguous divine admonitions. Clerics, in Denmark as well as in Iceland, could find no other reason behind the dramatic volcanic eruptions that wracked the island in 1627, or the terrifying raids by Algerian pirates along the Icelandic coast that same year.⁴⁷

But it was the visible spread of conflict on the Continent that the propagandists emphasized the most. Jens Dinesen Jersin, rector at the cathedral in Copenhagen and a prominent educational reformer, suggested in 1621 that the defeat of the Bohemian rebels at the White Mountain heralded an imminent Armageddon, and hence the End of Days. Hans Poulsen Resen, the orthodox bishop-superintendent of Sjælland, is known to have preached on this theme several times during the early 1620s.⁴⁸ 'A Sorrowful Watchman's Morning-Song', a collection of verses written by the Malmö preacher Jørgen Madsen Braad at the very beginning of the Lower Saxon War, observed that the German war was fast approaching Denmark:⁴⁹

Gone is the golden peace from all the king's realms . . . England and Spain are enemies; France and Italy want to devour each other; Hungary suffers from the pressures of the Turks; Bohemia is being persecuted for the faith and teaching of Christ . . . Sweden has drawn its sword against the vast power of Poland; Germany is scorned by the pope and is tormented terribly by war.

Yet the Danes simply could not or would not see the signs of the times for what they were. Braad's 'sorrowful Watchman' wailed:⁵⁰

O Denmark, have you gone blind in these most recent times? You are standing still in storm and wind that are afflicting your neighbours . . . O Denmark, how do you sleep while the flame draws near the powder-keg, and pay no heed to the punishment that hangs over you?

Neither would the people of Denmark listen to the word of God, despite their outward piety. Niels Heldvad confessed: 'although daily we hear your commandments and your will, yet still we are not attentive and obedient to your holy word, but live in an altogether ungodly fashion'.⁵¹

The people of Denmark had collectively ignored the many omens of God's anger, and had steadfastly refused to repent; war was at their very doorstep; the 'bloody sword' and the 'rod of iron' dangled precariously over their heads. The full measure of God's wrath was about to descend on prodigal Denmark. 'The miserable condition [afflicting] Christendom in these times,' explained the Prayer-Days Ordinance, 'draws closer to us each day . . . so that we might be beaten down in this manner.' Braad echoed, 'Now the bloody sword is at your door to wreak destruction.'⁵²

Neither the Ordinance nor the priests themselves minced words about the cause of God's anger. According to Nelaus Poulsen Nested, 'such [a fate], dear Lord, we sinners have well deserved, with our manifold and grievous sins, with epicurean confidence and contempt for your holy word'. Because the people of Denmark had strayed from God's calling and the Law, 'You were just to spare us not, but . . . punished us, O righteous God.'⁵³ Heldvad's prayer stated simply that 'our great sins and trespasses compelled [God] to punish us'.⁵⁴ The Prayer-Days Ordinance of 1626 was even more specific:⁵⁵

. . . the reason for the punishment [brought about by] God's righteous wrath is nothing other than the disregard and neglect of His holy Word among us, the

daily increase of our manifold and various iniquities and of the burden of our sins, the persistent hardness of our defiant, unrepentant hearts, because of which we daily abuse and scorn God's merciful patience towards us, and [will] merit God's wrath on His day of wrath . . . unless we promptly turn again to Him, and by His mercy and compassion we are saved.

Braad's watchman did not hesitate to make a more direct accusation: 'It was your well-deserved reward, as you well know, since you do not love the Son of God but often dishonour His death.' The war, and all its associated miseries, was divine punishment for all those who had strayed from 'God's Word and Law'. The connection was obvious: the wickedness of the Danish people was directly responsible for God's ire, and hence the rapidly encroaching threat of war.⁵⁶

God's punishment for Denmark would be severe. Invading armies would strike down the Danes without mercy, raping, killing, burning, and looting, even slaughtering the unborn in the womb. Jørgen Pedersen Hegelund, parish priest in Møgeltønder, promised that rich and poor, clergy and laity, sinful and righteous alike would see their property destroyed, their livestock wantonly killed, and would eventually face death themselves 'from musket, pike, and halberd'.⁵⁷

To the propagandists, the Danes, in short, bore a striking resemblance to the people of Israel in the years between the death of Solomon and the fall of Judah. Despite their favoured status in the eyes of God, earned by their adoption of the true Evangelical faith, their iniquity demanded punishment, and their faithlessness a demonstration of God's power. Predictably, Danish wartime propaganda relied heavily on Old Testament readings. This is true of Protestant propaganda from the Thirty Years' War in general. But while Swedish propaganda, for example, was more likely to draw its inspiration from the heroic deeds of the Maccabees, Danish propaganda literature was based largely on the comfortless prophecies of Jeremiah, Daniel, and, especially, Ezekiel. Both Heldvad and Braad, for example, based their wartime works on Ezekiel 21.⁵⁸

The choice of Scriptural references is significant. The Danes, unlike the Maccabees, were not struggling heroically to throw off the yoke of idolatrous oppressors. Instead, their enemies — the forces of the emperor and the pope — were merely instruments of God's wrath, and not a threat in their own right. This is not to say that Danish wartime sermons were devoid of anti-Catholic

themes; quite the contrary. In Frederik II's time, anti-Catholic sentiment had been evident even in secular literature.⁵⁹ The tone of Danish religious literature had become even more strident and militant since the Lutheran 'Jubilee' of 1617. Braad's 'sorrowful Watchman' warned that 'it is the pope's firm intent to reform Denmark' and that 'here comes the monk . . . with his false teachings'. Braad petitioned God to 'subdue the pope's bloody sword' and to 'strike down the pope/ give him his due'.⁶⁰ But in none of the wartime sermons and prayers do Denmark's enemies appear as the cause of the war. Oftentimes they are not even mentioned by name; Hegelund labelled them a people 'from a foreign land . . . whose language we don't understand', or as the 'Ninevites', the latter apparently a reference to Israel's Assyrian conquerors.⁶¹ One priest, with a similar message in mind, likened them to the Amalekites.⁶² The propagandists did not even attempt to look for political factors, real or perceived, behind the war on the Continent, nor did they seek an explanation outside of Denmark's sinfulness. The pope with his 'bloody sword' might seek to 'reform' Denmark with his 'false teachings', but the iniquity of the Danes justified this as divine punishment. This, perhaps, is the foremost difference between wartime propaganda in Denmark and that produced in the other anti-Habsburg powers. It is also the key to understanding the constitutional significance of this literature. Denmark's enemies appear only as the means by which God's will is enacted, passive tools in the hands of a vengeful God, and not as political actors with a will and an agenda of their own.⁶³

What, then, could the Danes do to remedy their desperate situation? Actually, there was little that they could do, save repent their sins, and even contrition and repentance would not entirely rescue Denmark from its well-deserved fate. All the writers concurred that punishment was inevitable, and that initially God would not listen to pleas for mercy. Hegelund wrote:⁶⁴

Still He has struck us down [and] has plagued us [for our] disobedience . . . in the fire [He has] purged and tried us, and taught us in the school of the Cross, so that we thereby might become pious, turn ourselves around, and come to Him.

After the Danes had been duly chastized, and had mended their ways, God would come to their aid. He would scatter and destroy their nameless foes, demonstrating His power and love for His

chosen people by rescuing this northern Jerusalem. It was hardly coincidental that Heldvad recited Ezekiel's prophecies about Gog, king of Magog.⁶⁵ Only God Himself could save Denmark, and all human endeavours would be in vain. Braad enjoined the Danes not only to repent and pray, but also to 'pay taxes willingly', and to obey authority without question, since 'it is not in your place to [complain]'.⁶⁶

God had, however, provided Denmark with a champion. All of the wartime propaganda — with the notable exception of the Prayer-Days Ordinance — agreed that the king would be the human agent of salvation. Christian IV figures prominently in the printed sermons and prayers, usually just as the complete and utter destruction of Denmark appears inevitable. Braad depicted the king as a 'brave warrior', a 'lord and hero who is true to the Word of God'; Denmark is fortunate to have such a prince, who 'struggles with great danger for the pure teaching of God's Word'. To Anders Arrebo, a respected poet and former bishop-superintendent of Trondheim, the king's intervention in the German war showed Christian IV to be 'an admirable guardian and defender of God's Word and His Church'.⁶⁷ 'Even his name is Christian,' punned Albert Wegener, preacher at Hadelen.⁶⁸

But Christian IV was more than just a pious and brave king. He was the equivalent of the great Hebrew warrior-kings, and maybe even ranked above them. Both Heldvad and Arrebo compared the king to Hezekiah, Jehoshaphat, and 'Israel's first Joshua', and implored God to favour Christian as He had these ancient warriors. Virtually all of the propagandists labelled Christian IV as the David or Solomon of his people. Occasionally, however, the writers went further still, with descriptions of the king that were all but Christ-like. Braad not only praised the king for risking his 'life and blood' for sinful and ungrateful Denmark, but also considered him to be a saviour who fought off 'our enemies a thousand fold so that nothing shall harm you', and who fulfilled a higher function as well: 'He struggles for our salvation, for the faith and honour of God.'⁶⁹ In 'Torcular Christi', a sermon cycle written for Holy Week in 1626, Anders Arrebo portrayed the king as a faithful shepherd:⁷⁰

He has drawn [strength] from the inspiration of the Holy Spirit against the enemies of Christ's church, and as a faithful shepherd he stands in the gate on the sheep path, so that the wolf shall not enter [in order to] murder and cut down

his poor sheep or wickedly drive them away; and this shows His Majesty to be the kind of man and lord that God seeks, as Ezekiel says, for he stands in the breach night and day for his country, with an inner and spiritual calling.

Albert Wegener strayed even closer to blasphemy. 'O Lord,' he wrote in 1625, 'his name is Christian, and he has become a Christ in baptism; for the sake of Christ, Your beloved Son, he intends to struggle and fight a Christian battle against the enemies of Your Christendom.'⁷¹ Christian IV did indeed struggle for the welfare and security of his people, but he did more than that. He sacrificed himself to atone for their sins; he fought for their salvation.

Propaganda, Social Discipline, and the Language of Royalism

The Lower Saxon War was, in a way, a thorough vindication of the prophecies of the Danish clergy. The 'Ninevites' did indeed invade the northern 'Jerusalem' as the armies of Tilly and Wallenstein swept over the Slesvig frontier in September 1627; the subsequent occupation of Jutland witnessed much destruction of property and even a half-hearted attempt to reintroduce Catholicism. With only minimal assistance from the Council of State — Christian IV had by now learned the value of relying upon the formerly defunct Estates for financial support — the king ultimately managed to drive the Imperial and League armies from Jutland by combining a diversionary campaign in Pomerania with a series of amphibious assaults along the Jutish coast. Though it was the Danish fleet that made this strategic combination work well, it was the king who was primarily responsible for planning and directing the campaigns of 1628 and 1629. The success of these operations, the reticence of Wallenstein to continue the war any longer than necessary, and Christian IV's skill at feigning determination to continue the war with promised Dutch, English, and Swedish aid, turned a potential disaster into something approaching triumph for Denmark. At the beginning of the negotiations at Lübeck early in 1629, the emperor and his allies were hopeful for a partition of Danish lands, crushing war reparations, or both; when the treaty was signed in May 1629, Denmark was not diminished in land, and the king was only slightly diminished in prestige and Imperial

titles. The Peace of Lübeck was hailed as a ‘miracle’, and rightly so.⁷² It is easy to see how Christian’s subjects, clergy and laity alike, could perceive in the outcome of the Lower Saxon War the hand of God at work through their king.

The Danish clergy celebrated the Lübeck settlement just as enthusiastically as they had the king’s participation in the war. An outpouring of songs, tracts, and sermons greeted the peace as the predictable conclusion of the conflict: the Habsburg–League enemy had fulfilled its role as the instrument of God’s wrath, punishing Denmark for its wickedness, and the king had fulfilled his role as the saviour of Denmark. To be sure, no man could claim the glory that rightfully belonged to God; only God’s forgiveness of a repentant Denmark and only the irresistible power of the Almighty could save Denmark. But the king, and the king alone, had served as the vessel of that divine forgiveness and power. The war had proven that Christian IV, through his piety and the righteousness of his cause, found favour in the eyes of God above all other Danes.⁷³

This interpretation of the war was not universally accepted. The Council of State in particular had reason to dispute it. The war had been destructive and costly, and had brought Denmark within a hair’s breadth of subjugation and partition. The Council, which had repeatedly warned the king against participation in the war, saw in the intervention a disturbing precedent, and sought to curb the king’s ability to formulate and execute an independent foreign policy. Christian IV, for his part, believed that the only way in which he could maintain his reputation and simultaneously avoid war with either Sweden or the emperor was through armed neutrality and constant diplomatic activity, a policy that would demand an increased military establishment and a great deal of cash. Throughout the 1630s and 1640s, the two former partners in *Danmarks krone* jockeyed for position as rivals; while the Council attempted to place institutional restrictions on the king’s ability to raise and spend revenue for military purposes, Christian IV sought to circumvent these restrictions and lessen the Council’s authority by augmenting his personal income (primarily through the Sound dues and other commercial levies), leaving vital posts in the upper bureaucracy vacant for extended periods of time, and appointing individuals from his personal ‘party’ amongst the aristocracy — the so-called ‘sons-in-law’ (*svigersønnerne*) — to membership on the Council.

There was likely considerable support, especially amongst Denmark's growing mercantile classes, for Christian IV to establish a hereditary, absolutist regime in partnership with the reinvigorated Estates. There is no evidence, however, that the king ever contemplated such a move, much less sought to implement it. Perhaps, as has been argued elsewhere, Christian IV was simply no revolutionary, and was too thoroughly imbued with the ideology of *adelsvælden* to dismantle the Council even when it stood directly in his path. It is nonetheless manifest that the king endeavoured to augment the royal prerogative at the expense of conciliar power.⁷⁴ In this enterprise, the prayer-days and the literature they engendered served a useful purpose for the king, both in the additional areas of royal power they created and in the political language that emerged therefrom.

In German late Reformation historiography, it has become a commonplace — thanks in large part to the researches of Gerhard Oestreich, Wolfgang Reinhard, and Heinz Schilling, among others — that 'social discipline' was a major component of the confessionalization process in the German territorial states. Social disciplining allowed the early-modern state to 'consolidate its territorial boundary, to incorporate the church into the state bureaucracy, and to impose social control on its subjects'.⁷⁵ In Denmark, which shared a common religious heritage with the Lutheran territorial states of northern Germany, this process is evident from the establishment of the Lutheran state church in 1536. The practice of enforcing social discipline by means of the state church, however, was by no means a regular part of Danish political or religious life until the Lower Saxon War and the Prayer-Days Ordinance of 1626. Prior to 1626, church disciplinary measures in Denmark aimed largely at regulating the moral behaviour of the clergy and controlling the activities of heterodox Protestants and obdurate Catholics, the latter group particularly in Norway and Iceland. The central government had also intervened frequently in individual cases involving moral lapses of a serious nature, such as incestuous or bigamous marriages.⁷⁶ With the Prayer-Days Ordinance of 1626, the Danish state — or, more accurately, the king and the episcopacy — for the first time attempted to 'impose social control' on all its subjects, by regulating popular piety and thereby intruding into the private lives of the population at large. The two Prayer-Days Ordinances of 1626 and 1628 enforced attendance at church not only for the

weekly observation of the Sabbath but for regular, supplemental church services as well, strictly regulating public behaviour on these days. The episcopacy worked closely with the king in this process, and suggested measures that were even more severe: Hans Mikkelsen proposed in 1629 that all heads of household be compelled to lead their families in prayer each morning ‘when the prayer-bell rings’, although he gave no hint as to how such a measure could be enforced.⁷⁷ To be sure, the prayer-days, with their forced attendance at frequent worship services, were not popular,⁷⁸ and with the conclusion of the Lower Saxon War these events did not continue on such a frequent basis as had been the case during the war. But they did continue to be observed, and with greater frequency, regularity, and royal supervision than was done prior to 1625. Printed royal proclamations for prayer-days, accompanied by detailed liturgical instructions, appeared frequently throughout the 1630s, 1640s, and 1650s.⁷⁹

The same ostensible concern for the moral conduct of the Danish population led immediately to church legislation that went far beyond the narrow confines of the Prayer-Days Ordinances. Holger Rosenkrantz and Jesper Rasmussen Brochmand had discussed plans for a new ordinance on church discipline as early as 1623, but only Denmark’s defeat in the Lower Saxon War lent the impetus necessary for action. In January 1629, Christian IV convened a committee consisting of several state councillors and leading clergy to work out the means of improving *disciplina ecclesiastica*. The finished product — the ‘Ordinance on the office and power of the Church regarding the unrepentant’ of 27 March 1629 — marked not only the ultimate triumph of orthodox Lutheran theology in Denmark, but also a watershed in the history of royal power in the Oldenburg state: the point at which the king assumed the ability to regulate public morals, and thus allow royal authority to intrude upon the private lives of all his subjects. Much of the 1629 ordinance dealt with the education of the common clergy, but the first and most significant of its three main components granted ordinary priests extensive powers to discipline wayward parishioners — those who had violated the sanctity of the Sabbath, were frequently absent from worship services, or who otherwise led unseemly lives, and threatened the unrepentant with penalties ranging from public penance to permanent banishment.⁸⁰

The king’s unprecedented involvement in regulating the

behaviour of his subjects may not have been a victory for Christian IV in his constitutional struggle with the Council of State, but it did represent, at the very least, an expansion of the royal prerogative into areas of public and private life over which neither the Council nor the monarchy had ever attempted to assert control. But it is the language of these edicts, and of the prayer-days and wartime propaganda literature that anticipated them, which best demonstrates the changing constitutional position of the king within the political hierarchy of the Oldenburg State. The portrayal of the king evident in the wartime literature served two primary functions. First, and most immediately, it absolved Christian IV of blame for his role in the Lower Saxon War. The writings of Heldvad, Nsted, Braad, and others deflected aristocratic criticism of royal policies. Denmark, they said, did not suffer on account of the king's foreign ambitions. War and suffering were the inevitable results of widespread iniquity, in which the aristocracy was tacitly implicated as well. Even in the 1629 ordinance on church discipline this proved to be a convenient fiction. The king was not the problem, but rather the solution.

Second, not only did the propaganda distance the king from the immediate and long-term causes of the war, it also distanced him from the Council of State. The Prayer-Days Ordinances, and the sermons and tracts associated with it, do not mirror the constitutional spirit of *adelsvælden*, for they represent the king as a political entity separate from and morally superior to the Council of State. Earlier Danish propaganda and panegyric, to be sure, had praised the king effusively for his bravery, military skill, and piety; propaganda written during Denmark's last successful conflict with Sweden, the Kalmar War of 1611–13, lauded Christian IV's religious integrity and martial qualities, even calling the king the 'good shepherd' of his people. But this early propaganda gave equal acclaim to the king's armies, the nobility, and the Council of State. Even Lyschander, the royal historiographer and panegyrist, attributed Denmark's victory in the Kalmar War equally to king and Council.⁸¹

Danish propaganda from the Lower Saxon War, on the other hand, is distinctively royalist in tone. It does not attribute the war to the military ambitions of the king or of the nation, nor does it predict the triumph of royal arms, but rather that of the Almighty. Most important, however, it portrays Christian IV's

struggle as a solitary one. The propagandists attributed no credit at all to either the nobility in general or to the Council of State in particular. Christian IV fought alone, as much a tool of the divine will as were the forces of the emperor, for the salvation of his wayward subjects in the manner of a King David or, perhaps, a Messiah. The Council is conspicuous only by its absence. Even if the nobility and the Council were not specifically mentioned in the wartime literature, implicitly their opposition to the king's involvement in the war placed them directly in opposition to the will of God. It should be noted, however, that the Council was by no means opposed to the employment of prayer-days. Even though the Council, as a body, played no role in the formulation of the 1626 ordinance, it readily supported the king's proposal for additional ('extraordinary') prayer-days during its meeting at Kolding in August 1627.⁸² Exactly why the Council would have approved this measure, which ran counter to its political interests, is difficult to explain. It may have done so out of pious respect for the church, or simply because there was nothing innovative about the prayer-days themselves. The records of the Council meeting at Kolding are silent on the matter, but in any case the royal proposal was not debated at length.

Just as the king's intervention in the Imperial conflict would leave its mark on the constitutional development of the Oldenburg state up to the imposition of absolutism in 1660, so too did the images employed in the wartime propaganda affect Danish political language and culture at court for the next three decades, or at least for the remainder of Christian IV's reign. The prayer-days and the accompanying literature introduced new elements into court culture and political iconography, which complemented Christian IV's attempts to free himself from the restrictions imposed by the Council of State. There is no question that royal patronage of the arts was far more lavish and opulent after 1629 than it had ever been before; indeed, the difference between pre-1629 and post-1629 court culture in Denmark is akin to the difference between the culture of James I's court and that of Charles I. Christian IV expended much cash and personal energy to attract first-rate artists and artisans to Copenhagen: musicians like Heinrich Schütz and painters like Karel van Mander the Younger and Abraham Wuchters graced the court with their presence throughout the 1630s and 1640s, particularly during and after the elaborate celebrations that accompanied the

wedding of Prince Elect Christian (V) and Magdalena Sibylla of Saxony at Copenhagen in 1634.⁸³

The opulence of the post-war Danish court was not its only distinguishing feature, or even its most obvious one. The paintings, court ceremony, and celebrations, and even monumental architecture from the later part of Christian IV's reign emphasized the widening gulf between king and aristocracy that had first emerged during the Lower Saxon War. Royal portraiture frequently depicted the king on horseback, in one instance accompanied by noble retainers on foot. Christian IV also placed great emphasis on the past glories of the Danish royal house and his descent from the great warrior kings of Denmark. While graphic depictions of royal genealogy were by no means unusual in Denmark or Europe in the early seventeenth century, the public nature of two of Christian's proposed projects was: in 1638 the king ordered the construction of a 'pyramid' in the centre of Copenhagen, upon which his genealogy was to be carved 'so that one can easily see and read everything'; five years later, he made arrangements for a similar family tree to be carved on a now-unknown statue, quite possibly an equestrian piece that was never actually produced.⁸⁴

The elevation of the king from parity with the Council was one element adopted by Christian IV from the wartime propaganda; the close association of the king with the Almighty was the other. Although there have always been close ties between monarchy and the divine in European political culture, the intimate nature of this relationship seen in the religious literature from the Lower Saxon War — not to mention Christian IV's famous vision at Rothenburg in 1625 — was something entirely new in Danish political discourse. Danish royal iconography from the last eighteen years of Christian IV's reign drew heavily on this new ideological element. Comparisons between Christian IV and the Hebrew warrior-kings, a marked feature of the wartime propaganda, were frequently evident in religious literature of the 1630s and 1640s, the prayer-days ordinances of that period, and even in art: one painting, which once adorned the university library above the Church of the Holy Trinity (*Trinitatiskirken*) in Copenhagen but which has since been lost, depicted 'Christian IV and King David in one body'.⁸⁵ The special affinity between Christian IV and Christ persisted to the end of the reign as well. Prayers written for the *bededage* throughout the 1630s, 1640s,

and even the 1650s repeatedly referred to the messianic role of the king and to Christian IV himself as a 'Christ in baptism'.⁸⁶ Graphic depictions of this relationship abounded as well: the placement of the royal monogram above crucifixes on parish-church altars; a painting (no longer extant) in the king's oratory at Frederiksborg Castle, portraying Christian IV bowing before Christ (probably a representation of the vision at Rothenburg in 1625); even Christian IV's bizarre apotheosis portrait from 1644, popularly known as 'Christian IV. i dampbad' ('Christian IV in a steam-bath').⁸⁷

As the king sought to acquire political independence from his former partner, the Council of State, he also sought to justify this by emphasizing the uniquely divine nature and mission of monarchy. This was simply inconsistent with the ideology of *adelsvælden*; indeed, they appear to be indicative of a monarch who has decided to place himself above the petty concerns of his ruling aristocracy. They are, rather, the beginnings of a culture of royalism, derived from the vision of monarchy first witnessed in the propaganda literature of the late 1620s.

After 1629, *adelsvælden* quickly proved itself to be a bankrupt concept in practice. Christian IV was not the man, however, to replace limited monarchy with absolutism. That would be left to his son and successor, Frederik III — a man who, unlike Christian IV, had no especial affection for the traditional constitution — to carry through in 1660. But by accepting the role cast for him by the Prayer-Days Ordinances and the religious literature of the Lower Saxon War, Christian IV intentionally dispensed with the characteristic spirit of limited monarchy; by arrogating to himself, through the clergy, the power to control social discipline in his realms, he expanded the competence of the sovereign into areas over which the conciliar aristocracy had little or no control. Christian IV may not have attempted, or even contemplated, the establishment of absolute monarchy, but the changing nature of the kingly office and royal power after 1625 permanently altered the political culture of the Oldenburg polity. It would be unreasonable to argue that the Danish propaganda from the Lower Saxon War constituted the first step on the path that led ultimately to the imposition of absolute monarchy in 1660, but it clearly assisted in the creation of a political climate that was conducive to such a radical constitutional change.

Notes

1. R. Malcolm Smuts, 'Art and the Material Culture of Majesty in Early Stuart England', in Smuts, ed., *The Stuart Court and Europe: Essays in Politics and Political Culture* (Cambridge 1996), 86.

2. Steffen Heiberg, 'Art and Politics: Christian IV's Dutch and Flemish Painters', in *Art in Denmark, 1600–1650*, Leids Kunsthistorisch Jaarboek 1983, (Delft 1984); Sebastian Olden-Jørgensen, 'Statsceremonial, hofkultur og politisk magt i overgangen fra adelsvælde til enevælde — 1536 til 1746', *Fortid og nutid*, (1995), 3–20; Hugo Johannsen, 'Regna firmat pietas. Eine Deutung der Baudekoration der Schlosskirche Christians IV. zu Frederiksborg', *Hafnia*, (1974), 102–6, 131; idem, 'Den ydmyge konge. Omkring et tabt maleri fra Christian IV's bedekammer i Frederiksborg slotskirke', in *Kirkens Bygning og Brug. Studier tilegnet Elna Møller* (Copenhagen 1984), 127–54.

3. Sverker Arnoldsson, 'Krigspropagandan i Sverige före Trettioåriga Kriget', *Göteborgs Högskolas årsskrift*, Vol. 47 (1941); Diethelm Böttcher, 'Propaganda und öffentliche Meinung im protestantischen Deutschland (1628–36)', *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte*, Vol. 44 (1953), 181–202; Silvia Serena Tschopp, *Heilsgeschichte Deutungsmuster in der Publizistik des Dreißigjährigen Krieges. Pro- und antischwedische Propaganda in Deutschland 1628 bis 1635* (Frankfurt a.M. 1991); Richard Cust, *The Forced Loan and English Politics, 1626–28* (Oxford 1987), 47–50, 55; William F. Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State* (Princeton 1972); Gustave Fagniez, 'L'Opinion publique et la polémique au temps de Richelieu', *Revue des questions historiques*, Vol. 60 (1896), 442–84; Bodo Nischan, 'Propaganda in an Age of Ideological Division: The Case of Saxony in the Thirty Years' War', *Journalism History*, Vol. 4 (1977), 23–9; Max Grünbaum, *Über die Publizistik des Dreißigjährigen Krieges von 1626–1629* (Halle 1880).

4. English ambassadors wrote perhaps the most detailed accounts of life at the Danish court under Frederik II and Christian IV. In particular, see for Frederik II: Sir Thomas Bodley to Sir Francis Walsingham, 28 June 1585, Public Record Office (London), SP75/1/125–130; Peregrine Bertie, Lord Willoughby de Eresby, to Walsingham, 25 October 1585, PRO SP75/1/153. For Christian IV: 'The Earl of Leicester's Journal of his Embassy to Denmark in 1632', Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Report on the Manuscripts of the Right Honourable Viscount de L'Isle, V.C. . . . Volume VI* (London 1966), 12–38.

5. Holger Frederik Rørdam, ed., 'sivert Grubbes Dagbog', *Danske Magazin*, Series 4, Vol. 2 (1873), 389.

6. Sir John Harington, *Nugae Antiquae* (2 vols, London 1804), Vol. 1, 348–51; G.P.V. Akrigg, *Jacobean Pageant, or the Court of James I* (Cambridge, MA 1963), 79–84; G.B. Harrison, *A Jacobean Journal* (London 1941), 322–9.

7. Troels-Lund, *Christian den Fjerdes Skib paa Skanderborg Sø* (2 vols, Copenhagen 1893); Christian Molbech, 'Historiske Bidrag til Kundskab om Christian IV.s Optragelse og Ungdomsundervisning', *Historisk Tidsskrift (Dansk)*, Vol. 3 (1849–50), 245–306; Steffen Heiberg, *Christian 4. Monarken, mennesket og myten* (Copenhagen 1988), 10–49.

8. Arild Huitfeldt, *Danmarks Riges Krønike* (10 vols, facsimile reprint Copenhagen 1976–8); Niels Nielsen Colding, *De besynderligste historier/ Sententzer oc Exempler/ som findis i den hellige Scrifft/ om Øffrighedz Kald/ Regiment oc Bestilling* (Copenhagen 1567); Knud Fabricius, *Kongeloven. Dens Tilblivelse og*

Plads i Samtidens Natur- og Arveretlige Udvikling (Copenhagen 1920), 72–8.

9. Fabricius, op. cit., 78–9.

10. The following paragraphs are based largely on my interpretation of Christian IV's foreign policy; see Paul Douglas Lockhart, *Denmark in the Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648: King Christian IV and the Decline of the Oldenburg State* (Selinsgrove 1996); idem, 'Religion and Princely Liberties: Denmark's Intervention in the Thirty Years' War, 1618–1625', *The International History Review*, Vol. 17 (1995), 1–22. For opposing viewpoints, see, i.a., Leo Tandrup, *Mod triumf eller tragedie. En politisk-diplomatisk studie over forløbet af den dansk-svenske magtkamp fra Kalmarkrigen til Kejserkrigen* (2 vols, Århus 1979); Theodor Christiansen, *Die Stellung Königs Christian IV. von Dänemark zu den Kriegereignissen im deutschen Reich und zu den Plänen einer evangelischen Allianz 1618–1625* (Kiel 1937).

11. Heiberg, *Christian 4.*, 352–451; J.A. Fridericia, *Danmarks ydre politiske Historie i Tiden fra Freden i Lybek til Freden i Brønsebro* (2 vols, Copenhagen 1876–81); Knut Mykland, *Skiftet i forvaltningsordningen i Danmark og Norge i tiden fra omkring 1630 og inntil Frederik den tredjes død* (Bergen 1974); Lockhart, *Denmark in the Thirty Years' War*, 207–77.

12. P.M. Stolpe, *Dagspressen i Danmark, dens Vilkaar og Personer indtil Midten af det attende Aarhundrede* (4 vols, Copenhagen 1878–82), Vol. 1, 93.

13. The best survey of ecclesiastical affairs under Frederik II remains the account of Bjørn Kornerup, in Hal Koch and Bjørn Kornerup, eds, *Den danske kirkes historie*, Vol. 4 (Copenhagen 1959), 135–79.

14. Alex Wittendorff, "'Fire stolper holder et skidehus". Tidens forestillingsverden', in Svend Ellehøj, ed., *Christian IV's Verden* (Copenhagen 1988), 232–4. It should be noted, however, that the clergy's role in the constitutional shift of 1660 was a passive one, at least in comparison to that played by the commercial classes. See Carl-Johan Bryld, *Hans Svane og gejstligheden på stændermødet 1660* (Odense 1974).

15. Frede P. Jensen, 'Peder Vinstrup's tale ved Christian 4.s kroning. Et teokratisk indlæg', *Historisk Tidsskrift (Dansk)*, Ser. 12 Vol. 2 (1967), 375–94; Thomas Cortsen Vegner, *Øffrighedens æresmycke oc rette Klædebon* (Copenhagen 1624).

16. Niels Nielsen Colding, *De besynderligste historier/ Sententzer oc Exempler/ som findis i den hellige Scrifft/ om Øffrighedz Kald* (Copenhagen 1567); Nelaus Poulsen Nsted, *Clangor Tubæ Basune-Liud* (Copenhagen 1624); idem, *Quæstio. Det er: Spørmaal/ om det er imod en Christen Kierlighed och Oprictighed/ at der forordnis i den Christen Menighed Observatores, eller Beforere/ som skulle giffue flittelige act paa dem/ der modvillige offuertræde Guds oc Kongens Low* (Copenhagen 1626); Thomas Cortsen Vegner, *Øffrighedens æresmycke oc rette Klædebon/ Huor med de skulle være prydet og ziret* (Copenhagen 1624).

17. 'Theologorum Academiae Hafniensis Pauli Matthiæ et Nicolai Hemmingii, Svar og Erklæring, angaaende Manddraberes . . . benaadning', 1582, Det kongelige Bibliotek (Copenhagen, Denmark), Håndskriftsamlingen, GKS 3302, 4°.

18. Jesper Rasmussen Brochmand to Holger Rosenkrantz, 1626/7 (?), quoted in Ludvig Helveg, *Den danske Kirkes Historie efter Reformationen* (Copenhagen 1857), Vol. 1, 347–8.

19. Harald Ilsøe, *Bogtrykkerne i København og deres virksomhed ca. 1600–1810* (Copenhagen 1992), 39–59.

20. Christian IV to the bishop-superintendents, 28 January 1598, V.A. Secher, ed., *Corpus Constitutionum Daniæ. Forordninger, Recesser og andre kongelige Breve, Danmarks Lovgivning vedkommende* (6 vols, Copenhagen 1887–1918), Vol. 3, 64; ‘Ordinance on Monks, Jesuits and other papist clergy’, 28 February 1624, *ibid.*, Vol. 4, 147–9; Christian IV to Hans Mikkelsen, bishop-superintendent for Fyn, 6 March 1624, Landsarkivet for Fyn (Odense, Denmark), Fyns bispearkiv, Stiftets almindelige breve 1622–50; Oskar Garstein, *Rome and the Counter-Reformation in Scandinavia. 4: The Age of Gustavus Adolphus and Queen Christina of Sweden, 1622–1656* (Leiden 1992), 112–83.

21. *Kancelliets brevøger 1624–26* (Copenhagen 1925), 549.

22. *Hvorledis den Høybaarne Første oc Herre/ Her Christian den Femte/ Danmarckis/ Norgis/ Wendis oc Gottis Udvalde Printz/ Hertug udi Sleßvig/ Holsten/ Stormarn oc Dithmersken/ Greffue udi Oldenborg oc Delmenhorst/ Udi hans Kongl: Mayestatz fraværelse til Regieringen forordnet/ med Danmarckis Rigis Raad haffue for got anseet/ At visse Bede oc Bedrings Dage/ offuer disse Riger oc Lande/ udi disse besuerlige Tider/ skulle/ nest Guds hielp/ anstillis oc holdis* (Copenhagen 1626); *Kancelliets brevøger 1624–26*, 543; *Regesta diplomatica historiæ Danicæ*, Ser. 2 (Copenhagen 1907), Vol. 2, 742.

23. Ordinances of 22 February, 24 February, and 2 September 1628, in Secher, *op.cit.*, Vol. 4, 404–5, 421–3.

24. See, for example, the instructions given by Poul Madsen, bishop-superintendent of Sjælland, to Hans Laugesen, bishop-superintendent in Ribe diocese, 5 September 1569, Landsarkivet for Nørrejylland (Viborg, Denmark), C4/303.

25. Kristian Erslev, ed., *Aktstykker og Oplysninger til Rigsraadets og Stændermødernes Historie i Kristian IV's Tid* (3 vols, Copenhagen 1883–90), Vol. 1, 474–91.

26. *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, 366, 384–5.

27. *Ibid.*, 366, 384–5; J. Oskar Andersen, *Holger Rosenkrantz den Lærde* (Copenhagen 1896), 199–205.

28. *Dänische Bibliothec oder Sammlung von alten und neuen gelehrten Sachen aus Dännemarck* (6 vols, Copenhagen 1737–47), Vol. 3, 213–15.

29. ‘Acta Synodi Dionysianæ Roskildæ 1626’, Det kongelige Bibliotek (Copenhagen, Denmark), Håndskriftsamlingen, Kall. 489, 4^o.

30. Frede P. Jensen, ‘Frederik II og truslen fra de katolske magter. Linjer i dansk udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik 1571–88’, *Historisk Tidsskrift (Dansk)*, Vol. 93 (1993), 233–77.

31. Lockhart, *Denmark in the Thirty Years' War*, 39, 108–10; Klaus D. Jockenhövel, *Rom–Brüssel–Gottorf. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der gegenreformatorischen Versuche in Nordeuropa 1622–37* (Neumünster 1989), 51–109; Garstein, *op. cit.*, 72–183.

32. See, for example, Jesper Rasmussen Brochmand, *Gudelig underuißning: Om It Guds Barn/ vden sin siælis største skade oc Saligheds forderffuelse/ kand den Papistiske Religion antage* (Copenhagen 1627).

33. See, inter alia: Iver Bertelsen, *Formaning til en christelig oc alvorlig Poenitente* (Copenhagen 1561); Hans Lauridsen, *Siælebog* (Copenhagen 1587); Mogens Nielsøn, *Forklaring Offuer den gamle Kirckesang Et Lidet barn saa lysteligt* (Wittebergh 1613); R. Hans Pedersøn, *Enn Ny Sang om en Hiertens Bon oc Formaning til Gud/ at hand icke vilde straffe oss i sin Vrede* (Copenhagen 1587); Nelaus Poulsen Nested, *Lamentatio eller: En hiertelig Begrædelse/ offuer den megit*

forfærdelig oc gruelig/ Guds værdige Naffns/ Pijnes/ beeske Døds/ oc dyre Sacramentis vanbrug (Copenhagen 1622); Stolpe, op. cit., Vol. 1, 48–66; N.M. Petersen, *Bidrag til den danske Literaturs Historie*, Vol. 3: *Det lærde Tidrum* (Copenhagen 1868), 139–48.

34. Christen Steffensen Bang, *Politia Christiana, sive Status politici descriptio* (Christiania 1656); idem, *Dend IV. Hoffuedlærdomb udi Lutheri Haus-Taule kand kaldis/ Respublica Christiana, sive Officium Subditorum* (Christiania 1657).

35. *Hvorledis den Høybaarne Første oc Herre . . . til Regieringen forordnet . . . At visse Bede oc Bedrings Dage . . . anstillis oc holdis.*

36. Niels Heldvad, *En Christelig oc Gudelig Bøn/ Som alle Onsdage effter Predicken/ udi Kongelig May: aff Danmarcks Lande/ Hertogdome oc Stiffter etc. den 20 Aprilis/ Aar 1625 beskicket/ forordnet oc befalet er/ at bede oc læse* (Copenhagen 1626).

37. Nelaus Poulsen Nested, *En hiertelige Bøn/ som bedis med stor Andæctighed i de Tydske Kircher/ i denne farlig Krigs Tid/ for vor Naadige Herre oc Konge/ Kong Christian den 4/ huis Majestat den Nedersächische Creissis Førster oc Stender haffue udvalt til deris Creiß Øffuerst/ Den meenige Mand i disse Riger til lige saadan hiertelige Bøn oc Suck/ for hans kongelige Majestat at opvecke* (Copenhagen 1625), 4–5.

38. Jørgen Madsen Braad, *En Bedrøffuede Vecters Morgensang oc klagelig Formaning til alle Christne i Danmarck; om Guds grumme Vredsens Ild/ som er optendt i den gantske Verden; om den gruelig Krig oc Blodstyrning/ som flyder offuer alle Land; Oc om Pawens vdragnet Suerd oc wnaadige Tyranni: Hoss Gud Fader aff Christi Naade/ ved Bøn oc Leffnitz forbedring/ at tage til Hierte oc affverge inde* (Copenhagen 1627), verse 29.

39. L.S. Vedel Simonsen, *Hr. Jørgen Brahes Levnetsbeskrivelse* (Odense 1845), 25; ‘Om en siun som Jep fisker hafver seet og bekiendt for Her Jørgen Brahe Ao 1621’, *Landsarkivet for Fyn* (Odense, Denmark), Karen Brahes Bibliothek, Håndskriftsamlingen E IV, 3.

40. *Enn ny Vise/ om en Underlig Fødsel/ som er sket i Væ i Skaane/ den 7. Majj Aar 1581* (Copenhagen 1581). See also works cited in note 33.

41. Stolpe, op. cit., Vol. 1, 64; Holger Frederik Rørdam, ‘Nicolaus Heldvad. Et Litteratur- og Kulturbillede’, in Rørdam, ed., *Historiske Samlinger og Studier vedrørende danske Forhold og Personligheder især i det 17. Aarhundrede* (4 vols, Copenhagen 1891–1902), Vol. 4, 1–64, 329–424; H.V. Gregersen, *Niels Heldvad, Nicolaus Heluaderus. En biografi* (Copenhagen 1957).

42. Entry for 11 June 1627, in Anne Riising and Mogens Seidelin, ed., *Biskop Hans Mikkelsens dagbøger 1626–41* (Odense 1991), 19.

43. R. Nyerup, ‘Kong Christian den IVdes egenhændige Optegnelser i hans Skriv- og Reisekalendere’, *Magazin for Reiseiagttagelser*, Vol. 4 (1825), 549; C.F. Bricka, J.A. Fridericia, and Johanne Skovgaard, eds, *Kong Christian den Fjerdes egenhændige Breve* (8 vols, Copenhagen 1887–1947), Vol. 8, 420 n.2; Johannsen, ‘Regna firmat pietas’; idem, ‘Den ydmyge konge’; Holger Rasmussen, ‘Christian IV’s syn’, *Fynske Minder 1957–59*, (1960), 60–75.

44. Peder Nielsen, *Blods Tegn i Grested i Holboe Herred* (Copenhagen 1625); ‘Enn Selsom Siun, med Paamindellsee, Som til sand omuendellsee och Bedring i daglig Liiff och Leffnet, om wi wille endnu undgaa Gudtz Wrede och Straff . . . skeed i Judland i Wiborgh Stict . . . i Julij Maaned Aar 1629’, *Landsarkivet for Fyn* (Odense, Denmark), Karen Brahes Bibliothek, Håndskriftsamlingen A VI,

80; Thorbern Jacobsen Hasebart, *En kort Fortegnelse/ paa atskillige Guds vredis Varseler/ som sig haffue tildragett vdi Skanne Stigt/ fra Aar Christi 1620 til 1626* (Copenhagen 1627); Hans Nielsen, *Sørgeligt Spectackel oc Vundertegn Nu nyligen seet paa et nyfødt Pigebarn vdi Mørckøye liggendis i Socklundsherret vdi Gladsaxe Sogn* (Copenhagen 1625); Nelaus Poulsen Nsted, *Om et vanskabt Pigebarn* (Copenhagen 1625); *Vnderlig oc ofuer-naturlig Fødsel, seet i Nagskou i Laaland, Aar 1628 . . . Oc Blod-Tegn Som nu nylig ere seet baade udi Fyen* (Copenhagen 1629). Peder Nielsen and Hans Nielsen were both parish priests; Hasebart was parish priest in Lund, dean in the county of Torna, and the son of Christian IV's court physician. The final pamphlet contains reports from several parish priests.

45. Niels Heldvad, *Nicolai Helduaderi Resolution oc Forklaring, paa den Ny Comet oc Wuanlige Stierne, som bleff seet vdi Novembri oc Decembri Maanet, Aar effter Guds Byrd MDCXVIII*

46. Heldvad, *En Christelig oc Gudelig Bøn, 1–2; Hvorledis den Høybaarne Første oc Herre . . . til Regieringen forordnet . . . At visse Bede oc Bedrings Dage . . . anstillis oc holdis.*

47. Torstein Magnussen, *Sandferdig oc kort Iszlandiske Relation, Om det forferdelige oc gruelige Jordskelff, som skedde for Østen paa Iszland, hoss Tyckebeey Kloster* (Copenhagen 1627); Folmer Dyrhund, *Tatere og Natmandsfolk i Danmark* (Copenhagen 1872), 62–5.

48. Andersen, op. cit., 200.

49. Braad, op. cit., v. 6–10. Braad was parish priest at the church of St Nicolai in Malmö.

50. Ibid., v. 1–2.

51. Heldvad, *En Christelig oc Gudelig Bøn, 1.*

52. *Hvorledis den Høybaarne Første oc Herre . . . til Regieringen forordnet . . . At visse Bede oc Bedrings Dage . . . anstillis oc holdis*; Braad, op. cit., v. 20.

53. Nsted, *En hiertelige Bøn, 5.*

54. Heldvad, *En Christelig oc Gudelig Bøn, 1.*

55. *Hvorledis den Høybaarne Første oc Herre . . . til Regieringen forordnet . . . At visse Bede oc Bedrings Dage . . . anstillis oc holdis.*

56. Braad, op. cit., v. 22.

57. Jørgen Pedersen Hegelund, *Tvende Nye Sange, Den Første/ Kortelig beskriuer den ynckelige oc bedrøuelige Indlands/ Saa vel som flere Landers Tilstand oc Leilighed udi denne Krigstid . . . Den Anden/ Er Davids LXXIX. Psalme* (Copenhagen 1629).

58. Wolfgang Harms, 'Gustav Adolf als christlicher Alexander und Judas Makkabaeus. Zu Formen des Wertens von Zeitgeschichte in Flugschrift und illustriertem Flugblatt um 1632', *Wirkendes Wort*, Vol. 35 (1985), 168–83.

59. Jensen, 'Frederik II og truslen fra de katolske magter', 268–9; Anders Sørensen Vedel, *Antichristus Romanus* (Copenhagen 1571).

60. Braad, op. cit., v. 21, 26, 36, 46.

61. Hegelund, op. cit., v. 4, 15.

62. Niels Christensen Winther, *En hiertelig tilbørlige Tacksigelse/ for den ynckelig oc meget dyrebare Gylden Fred/ som os saa gandske naadeligen ved vor Freds Første oc Herre Jesum Christum/ uden all Menniskelig Forordning i alle maader/ aff Faderlig medynck oc blotte Miskund skencket oc gifuen er* (Copenhagen 1630).

63. Heldvad, *En Christelig oc Gudelig Bøn*, 3; Jacob Gregersen Landskrone, *Errindring om Den store oc vnderlige Velgierning/ huilcken oss er vederfare/ der vdi/ at all Naadsens Gud har saa Naadeligen/ Ja ræt Faderligen vddreffuit vore Fiender aff Judland* (Copenhagen 1629); Nsted, *En hiertelige Bøn*.

64. Hegelund, op. cit., v. 16.

65. Braad, op. cit., v. 32, 33, 35–7. For a striking pre-war parallel, see: Nelaus Poulsen Nsted, *Clangor Tubæ Basune-Liud: huor ved Jericho Mure maa falde ned/ oc Madianiter Guds Biørns Fiender offuervindis* (Copenhagen 1624).

66. Braad, op. cit., v. 23, 44.

67. Anders Arrebo, 'Torcular Christi', in Vagn Lundegaard Simonsen, *Anders Arrebo. Samlede skrifter* (5 vols, Copenhagen 1965–84), Vol. 3, 415. It should be noted that Arrebo, a noted theologian, had good reason to seek the good graces of the king; he had been dismissed from his position as bishop-superintendent at Trondheim in 1622 for scandalous behaviour at several weddings. Erich Pontoppidan, *Annales Ecclesiae Danicae Diplomatici, oder nach Ordnung der Jahre abgefasset und mit Urkunden belegte Kirchen-Historie des Reichs Dännemarck* (4 vols. Copenhagen 1741–52), Vol. 3, 729–31.

68. Albert Wegener, *Krieges und Sieges Gesang/ nebst Einem Christlichem Gebeth* (s.l. 1625), v. 4.

69. Braad, op. cit., v. 38, 39.

70. Arrebo, op. cit., 415.

71. 'Ein Christlicher Gebeth ansetzo Täglich zu sprechen', in Wegener, op. cit.

72. Thyra Sehested, *Cantsler Christen Thomesen Sehested* (Copenhagen 1894), 59.

73. Hans Poulsen Resen, *Pro Pace Adeo insperata et tali tempore vere divina, Gratiarum actio congratulatioque solennis* (Copenhagen 1629); Jesper Rasmussen Brochmand, *Pro Pace Praeter spem mirabiliter restituta . . . Gratiarum actio* (Copenhagen 1629); Winther, op. cit.

74. Mykland, op. cit.; Leon Jespersen, 'Ryresolutionen og den jyske borgerbevægelse 1629', *Historie*, new series, Vol. 17, 1–34; Steffen Heiberg, "'De ti tønder guld". Rigsråd, kongemagt og statsfinanser i 1630'erne', *Historisk Tidsskrift (Dansk)*, Series 13, Vol. 3 (1976), 25–58; E. Ladewig Petersen, 'War, Finance and the Growth of Absolutism: Some Aspects of the European Integration of Seventeenth-Century Denmark', in Göran Rystad, ed., *Europe and Scandinavia: Aspects of the Process of Integration in the 17th Century* (Lund 1983), 33–49; Lockhart, *Denmark in the Thirty Years' War*, 215–77.

75. R. Po-Chia Hsia, *Social Discipline in the Reformation: Central Europe, 1550–1750* (London and New York 1989), 3.

76. This subject has not received much attention in Danish historiography. The reader is advised to consult the thorough survey of Danish ecclesiastical history by Hal Koch and Bjørn Kornerup (Koch and Kornerup, op. cit.).

77. Hans Mikkelsen to Christian IV, 20 October 1629, Rigsarkivet (Copenhagen, Denmark), Dansk Kancelli B.160/1629.

78. Jesper Rasmussen Brochmand to Holger Rosenkrantz, 8 October 1626, *Dänische Bibliothec*, Vol. 3, 215.

79. See, for example: Jesper Rasmussen Brochmand, *Formaning til Geistlighedens udi Sielands Stict* (Copenhagen 1644), and the ordinance on 'ordinary prayer days' of 9 February 1631, Secher, op. cit., Vol. 4, 530–4.

80. *Forordning Om Kirckens Embede oc Møndighed mod wbofderrige Sampt om*

atskillige Geistlighedens Forholdt (Copenhagen 1629), also in Secher, op. cit., Vol. 4, 447–77; Andersen, op. cit., 203–5.

81. Hans Henriksen Bang, *En liden Kriegs Sang oc Bøn, som alle Danmarckis oc Norgis Rigers oc deris underliggende Landers oprictige Undersaate bør hiertelig at siunge oc bede i denne tid* (Copenhagen 1611); Anders Arrebo, *En gantske Kort Extract offuer den store Lycke oc Seyeruinding* (Copenhagen 1611); Claus Christoffersen Lyschander, *Den Calmarnske Triumph. Gud Almechtigste til Tacksigelse* (Copenhagen 1611), in Flemming Lundgreen-Nielsen et al., *C.C. Lyschander's Digting 1579–1623* (2 vols, Copenhagen 1989), Vol. 1, 272–92.

82. Erslev, op. cit., Vol. 2, 30, 35–6.

83. Mara R. Wade, *Triumphus nuptialis danicus. German Court Culture and Denmark: The 'Great Wedding' of 1634* (Wiesbaden 1996); Olden-Jørgensen, op. cit., 8–9, 18–19.

84. Christian IV to Corfits Ulfeldt, 23 October 1638 and 10 May 1643, in Bricka, Fridericia, and Skovgaard, eds, *Egenhændige Breve*, Vol. 5, 338, and Vol. 8, 120–1.

85. Henrik Bramsen, *Symbolik i Christian den Fjerdes arkitektur. Med særligt hensyn til Trinitatis-komplekset i København* (Copenhagen 1982), 62. The close association of Christian IV with the Old Testament kings may also explain the frequent appearance of Hebrew inscriptions in royal iconography from the 1640s, including coinage and the still-visible rebus on the observatory tower (*Rundetårn*) at the church of the Holy Trinity in Copenhagen. H.D. Schepelern, 'Den lærde verden', in Ellehøj, op. cit., 298–9.

86. 'Samling af prædiker' 1637–54, Landsarkivet for Fyn (Odense, Denmark), Karen Brahes Bibliothek, Håndskriftsamlingen A VII, 2.

87. Johanssen, 'Den ydmyge konge', 146; Rasmussen, op. cit., 60–75.

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