

Spanish Military Cultures and the Moroccan Wars, 1909–36

Introduction

The deepest roots of military ideology in Spain in the first half of the twentieth century lay in the grievances resulting from the defeat of the armed forces in the Spanish–American War of 1898 and the consequent loss of the remnants of the overseas Empire. Whilst public opinion blamed the 1898 Disaster largely on the military, many officers felt they had been sacrificed by the politicians of the Restoration regime in order to ensure that it would survive the loss of empire.¹ When the army rose in revolt in 1923, the Disaster was the main backdrop to their self-justifications. The first words of General Primo de Rivera's manifesto on his seizure of power referred to the 'picture of misfortunes and immoralities' that had begun in 1898.² Nine years later, General Sanjurjo, remembering the moment when as a young lieutenant he had lowered the Spanish flag for the last time in Cuba, declared to a journalist shortly after the failure of his attempt to seize power in August 1932: 'All my life seems of little consequence next to the desire to make up for the Spanish '98.'³ In the novel *Raza*, Francisco Franco saw continuity between himself and the aggrieved admiral of the Spanish fleet sunk off the coast of Cuba.⁴ For the new dictator, the military insurrection of 1936 was the final revenge for the apparent injustice done to the military in 1898.

The Disaster widened the fissure between the military and civil society. In its aftermath, officers were subject to abuse and satire by a wide range of opinion expressed through jokes, cartoons, carnivals, songs and vaudeville. Anti-militarism was also the result of the system of military service, the almost exclusive

burden of which lay on the labouring classes, who could not afford exemption or a substitute. The growing divorce was exacerbated by the role the army had to play increasingly in a society undergoing an uneven and accelerating process of modernization. Owing to the absence of a modern police force (the Civil Guard having been fully militarized in 1878), the army had to be mobilized to deal with serious disturbances of public order. Industrialization and urbanization had created social tensions, and around these tensions anarchists and revolutionary socialists had begun to organize powerful movements of protest from the beginning of the new century. The use of the army to maintain public order eroded the ties that had existed in the nineteenth century between itself and sections of the popular masses. For all the apparent withdrawal of the military from political intervention, civilian rule in the Restoration system was heavily conditioned by military power.⁵

Moreover, the military had always seen itself as the guarantor of national unity against Carlist and cantonalist revolts. It therefore perceived the resurgence of regional nationalism in the early twentieth century as a threat to the integrity of the nation, which it was the primary duty of the army to preserve. The sensitivity of officers to the problem had been heightened by the nationalist revolt of the colonies, which they had seen merely as extensions of the motherland.⁶

Spain's new colonial enterprise in Morocco was not so much the result of pressure from the officer class for a fresh military role, or of the neo-colonial lobby seeking a stable environment for its investments, as the consequence of the insecurity of the governing elites in a new era of imperialist expansion. Because its reliance on dynastic and religious connections had failed disastrously in 1898, the Spanish government sought to engage in the volatile system of international relations. Britain's need for a buffer state between Gibraltar and French expansionism in North West Africa enabled Spain to take on a new colonial role in Morocco as part of European intervention to guarantee the stability of the Moroccan Empire for the benefit of capitalist investment. The result was that Spain took on a role in North Africa for which she had neither the colonial experience, the resources nor the support of the population. The opportunity was lost to restructure an inefficient and poorly resourced army. In the course of the intermittent wars with the tribes of northern

Morocco between 1909 and 1927, a new military culture called *Africanismo* was forged among an elite of colonial officers that was to form the foundations of military insurrectionism in the 1920s and 1930s.

The Moroccan campaigns, however, created cleavages within the military itself, the most important of which was that between officers based in the peninsula who formed in 1917 the corporatist lobby of the Juntas de Defensa (henceforth the Junteros) and those serving in Morocco who identified with *Africanismo*. The vast majority of officers were affiliated to the Juntas because of peer pressure; by Junteros, therefore, we mean those who actively campaigned for the demands of this military trade union. The Africanist–Juntero split has been considered by most historians as a division between the officers serving in the Moroccan war and those based in the peninsula and, by extension, between those favouring the investment by the state of the resources necessary to conclude the war and those who set out to block military reform vital to the Moroccan campaigns.

The most polemical difference concerned the question of promotion and pay. Officers serving in the peninsula were paid a relatively low salary, obliging them in many cases to seek part-time jobs to boost their take-home pay. While officers in Morocco claimed the importance of rewarding bravery and military skill in battle through pay and promotions, their counterparts argued vociferously that a closed system of promotion based purely on seniority was the only equitable arrangement. Another source of division exacerbated by the wars was the rivalry between different officer corps. The Juntas (or Comisiones Informativas, as they were later known) were strongest among the artillery and engineering corps, both regarded until then as the elite of the army and separate from other corps because of the greater length of technical training they underwent and their higher social status. The Africanists, on the other hand, were based largely among the infantry and cavalry units, which played a more crucial role in the Moroccan campaigns because of the nature of the war and the mountainous terrain of northern Morocco. The enemy was the extraordinarily mobile guerrillas who only appeared in great numbers when they could overrun outposts and disappeared into the landscape as soon as troops mobilized to counter their advance. There were Africanists among the artillery, engineering and General Staff corps. But the

culture of Africanism emerged above all in the campaign units of infantry and cavalry.

The deepening crisis of the Restoration system, partly the result of the unpopularity of the campaign and the drain on resources it represented, led the army, already invested with a powerful role in internal social and political relations,⁷ to turn against the State. The officers' sense of grievance was exacerbated by the fall in their real wages due to the inflation induced by the First World War. Yet this crisis was also due to the factionalism of the military that served to paralyse government reform and heighten the instability of the regime. The military revolt in 1917, which led to the creation of the *Juntas*, forced the government to introduce reforms benefiting officers in the garrisons in Spain. Unrest among Africanists in 1921 obliged the Conservative government to reintroduce promotion by merit. A year later it dissolved the *Juntas*. A combination of terrorism in Catalonia and military disgruntlement over Morocco, especially regarding the judicial and parliamentary enquiries into the responsibility for the 1921 military disaster, led to the military coup of 1923 led by Primo de Rivera. With his base in the army in Spain, the new dictator maintained at first the seniority promotion system. A further revolt among officers in Morocco and a new commitment on his part to end the war through military means led him to reverse this policy in 1925, abolishing the closed scale of promotion and dissolving the artillery corps which was most closely associated with the *Juntas*.

The Africanist–Juntero cleavage, however, should not lead us to underplay either differences within each faction or cross-allegiances. Historians have tended to regard the officer class of the Spanish army in Africa, for example, as a homogeneous and united elite.⁸ In fact, military culture was far more complex. It is true that the military displayed ideological unity on occasion, as is evident in the backing of many Junteros and Africanists for Primo de Rivera's coup. But within and not just between each faction, there were disagreements over the Moroccan campaign regarding not only both military strategy and relations with Moroccans but also the very nature of Spain's role in north Africa. Differences among Africanist officers were often misleadingly couched in terms of professional rivalry and polemics over personality.⁹ There was no clear dividing line between one faction and another but rather greater or lesser shades of dis-

agreement. Moreover, just as Africanists were posted to garrisons in Spain so Junteros fought in Morocco. The supposedly archetypal Africanist Franco was posted to Spain after several years in Morocco and became, for a brief while, a member of the Juntas. It was possible, therefore, to be both Africanist and Juntero, sharing the corporatist aspirations of the latter and some of the strategic aims of the former. And, of course, there were many officers, possibly a majority of those posted in Spain, who had no strong feelings about either side of the primary military divide.

This article is concerned primarily with the Army of Africa and argues that a range of different military cultures existed therein. After briefly defining the concept of military culture, we will seek to characterize these differences as well as the periods in which each predominated, relating them to the political events that occurred in Spain between 1909 and the beginning of the Civil War in 1936.

Military Cultures

Sociological studies of the army usually employ terms such as military generations or elites to differentiate models of military officers.¹⁰ Since this is a historical account, the term military culture will be used to distinguish between different *mentalités* and *modi operandi* of the officers in the Spanish Army of Africa. By military culture we mean the ideology, aspirations, practices and strategies shared by a significant group of officers that distinguish them from the rest of their fellow-officers. Unlike generational distinctions, the term cuts across the age of its participants. It also allows for a more complex description of the values and practices than the term 'elite', which tends to define differences on the basis of social fissures.

In this article, four military cultures are outlined as characteristic of the Army of Africa: Africanist, Juntero, peninsular and political. Although they coexisted, each enjoyed a period of hegemony within the army as a result of the course of military action in Morocco or the strategy of the Spanish governments over the Moroccan problem. It is difficult to identify well-defined military cultures in the earlier period of Spanish colonial expansion in Morocco between 1909 and 1912. Rather, there

were tendencies represented by individuals. A clearer division of cultures emerged during the First World War when the German military model began to influence the perceptions of many professional colonial officers. The expansionist campaigns of 1919–21 and the military disaster of Annual in 1921 then consolidated separate and competing cultures within the Army.

Africanists

Many of the Africanists had chosen to serve in Morocco because it offered them the opportunity for rapid promotion and better pay. The objective of the colonial army was to prepare the ground for the penetration into North Africa of western civilization as embodied by traditional Spanish values. Underpinning this mission was the belief that Spain was best equipped for this task because of her historic links with the Arab world. Through military and civil penetration into the area, Spain could grow into a colonial power with a status among nations denied to her in Spanish America and Europe. This could only be accomplished through the forging of a highly disciplined and professional army properly trained and equipped and led by officers hardened by the conditions of war and bolstered by the camaraderie and esprit de corps engendered by battle.

The Africanists were united ideologically by a sense of mission in Morocco to restore the prestige of the army and the nation. 'The African campaign,' Franco wrote in 1921, 'is the best training-school, if not the only one, for our Army, and in it positive values and qualities are put to the test, and this officer corps on combat duty in Africa, with its high morale and self-esteem, must become the heart and soul of the mainland army.'¹¹ The camaraderie of war in Morocco, as long as it was accompanied by a commitment to this mission, helped to erode the divisions between the different corps of the military that had set them apart as castes in the mainland army. The highly technical artillery and engineering corps and the small but prestigious group of pilots mixed socially with infantry and cavalry officers in camp and garrison life. Their collaboration on the fields of battle, especially after the Disaster of Annual, imbued many officers of the different corps with a shared hatred of the enemy and a common purpose of retribution. Nevertheless, because infantry and cavalry largely fought the military campaigns in Morocco, it was in their

ranks, as we have already argued, that new esprit de corps was most developed.

The Africanists shared a wholehearted contempt for garrison life on mainland Spain and, in particular, the activities of the Junteros, who blocked any serious reform of the army that might release the resources necessary for the campaigns in Morocco. They also distrusted the politicians of the Restoration system and deeply resented those civil elites who failed to recognize the sacrifices endured by the Army of Africa. Civil society in Spain was seen as tainted, flabby, full of compromises. These attitudes eroded any residual faith in the efficacy of the Restoration regime or indeed of a civilian regime. Africanism united officers who had fought in the 1895–8 colonial wars and had felt betrayed by the regime, and a new generation, defined by Busquets as the generation of 1915,¹² who experienced war for the first time in Morocco and felt increasingly bitter towards the same regime for its apparent failure to support them. The colonial campaigns were seen as the forge shaping a new military elite that would regenerate Spain. A leading Africanist officer, Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, in the editorial of the first edition of the Africanists' journal, *Revista de Tropas Coloniales*, written a few months after the 1923 military coup of Primo de Rivera, wrote that Spain's progressive fall into an 'abyss of anarchy' under the Restoration regime was halted by 'a few men of heart, who, risking everything, confronted the arduous task of resurrecting the spirit of Spain dulled by Muslim fatalism . . . to guide it onto the path worthy of its glorious history.'¹³

Similar principles also set the Africanists against other officers serving in Morocco, not all of whom could be described as Junteros, who continued to behave according to the traditional practices of the military in Spain. Among them were those who had not volunteered to fight in, but had been posted to, Morocco, and for whom military intervention there had little ideological or political appeal. Rather than undergo the harsh conditions of campaign life, some sought to spend as much time as possible in the more relaxed context of the garrisons in the main towns of Ceuta, Tetuàn and Melilla. As is evident in the report of General Picasso, the military magistrate in charge of investigations into the Disaster of 1921, several officers (including a leading Juntero) were in these towns rather than with their units when the military rout took place.¹⁴

Indeed, what evoked scorn from the Africanists and greater division among officers serving in the colonial army was the reproduction of the culture of peninsular military life in the Moroccan garrisons. Although womanizing was acceptable to the Africanists, other common practices such as nepotism, bureaucracy, corruption and gambling were deeply despised as typical vices of Restoration society and obstacles not just to the military campaign but also to the regeneration of Spain. Traditional military tactics, such as the deployment of large numbers of troops over a vast area, linked by isolated defensive posts difficult to supply, were also frowned on. Instead, the Africanists sought modern models of military tactics within the German and French armies. Thus some pushed for the use of toxic gas,¹⁵ planes and tanks in the Moroccan campaigns, although the use of the last of these had few positive consequences.

Underlying these Africanist considerations was a myth of national identity that formed part of a conservative nationalism renovated by Menéndez Pelayo in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The 'true' Spain was seen to lie in the martial spirit of the Reconquest, the discovery of America, the Counter-Reformation and the Second of May 1808 uprising against the French invaders. The ancestral Castile became a model for a renewed Spain. Nevertheless, there were differences within this nationalism. In contrast to utopian, rural and clerical currents, military nationalism tended to be modernizing and expansionist. This contradiction would remain a fundamental component of the Right in the decades that followed.

The Africanists also shared a curiosity towards, and even fascination with, Arab culture, in particular that of their main foe and sometime ally, the Berbers in the Rif mountains.¹⁶ There was a negative side to the Spanish myth of the Moroccan 'other', who was supposed to be characterized by fatalism, inconsistency and deceitfulness. On the other hand, the attraction of the Berber culture for the Africanists lay in the perceived *machismo* of its warriors, its religiosity and its sense of destiny, all of which suggested a common historical heritage and affinity with the right-wing myth of the Spanish race. These mythologized features of Moroccan 'other' helped to mould the Africanist sense of identity while the stark countryside and the extreme climate of the Rif provided the backdrop for a common culture of physical toughness. Contact with the inhabitants and the land of

Morocco thus deeply influenced the culture of the Africanists and heightened their sense of alienation from life in Spain. Franco later wrote: 'My years in Africa live within me with indescribable force . . . without Africa, I can scarcely explain myself to myself, nor can I explain myself to my comrades in arms.'¹⁷

Beneath the shared discourse of sympathy with Arab culture and support for peaceful penetration, there lay important differences of emphasis.¹⁸ Indeed, the greatest source of division among the Africanists was over the strategy of colonial penetration in Morocco. Before the Annual Disaster of 1921, the eastern front command under General Fernández Silvestre put the traditional Spanish military values of valour, dash and vigour above those of organization, military intelligence-gathering and colonial social relations. In his endeavour to penetrate deep into the Rif, Silvestre was encouraged by the king, Alfonso XIII. After Annual, officers increasingly viewed civil initiatives, such as the cultivation and protection of tribes friendly to Spain, as detrimental to pacification. As an officer avid for promotion, Franco was keen to display benevolence towards the Moroccans. 'In this land of light and mystery,' he wrote in the *Revista de Tropas Coloniales*, 'we have to raise the veil and identify ourselves with Moroccan feelings; the top military and political leaders cannot live in continuous divorce; we cannot turn our backs on the feelings of a people we have to educate.'¹⁹ However, his other contributions to the journal argued against civil action in favour of punitive military campaigns. He advocated that, in the joint campaign with France,

Blockade, hunger, lack of resources, weariness, constancy and time have to be our best allies; and meanwhile, to maintain offensive action in the rebel territories, constant punishment, and combined political action by the two nations, without showing any desire for prompt peace. There's nothing like desiring war to bring peace closer.²⁰

The most brutal expression of this militarist strategy was the Tercio or Spanish Foreign Legion, set up in September 1920 by Colonel Millán Astray with the help of Franco. The dehumanization of this force of volunteers from Spain and abroad, made up in part by ex-criminals and ex-terrorists, and veterans of the First World War who had failed to settle down to civilian life, was actively encouraged by its founders. Their depredations took place not just during military campaigns, during which they

massacred civilians, burnt villages and raped Arab women, but also in garrison towns; after bouts of drinking, the Legionnaires were well known for brawls, murder and rape.²¹

The dehumanizing effects of colonial war were not confined to the Legion. The massacre of thousands of Spanish soldiers in the debacle of 1921 led to a culture of retribution that sanctioned atrocities. Bombs were dropped on markets and settlements, and incendiary bombs set fire to cultivated fields. Toxic gas bombs made from chemical supplies from Germany were introduced in 1924 and dropped on civilian and military targets alike.²² Among the plans drawn up for the seaborne invasion of the Alhucemas area, the gateway to the centre of the Rif rebellion, was one by the officer responsible for the operation, General Ignacio Despujols. In his report, he advocated the use of toxic gas over the whole area, using ten times the quantity recommended by the German army based on its experience in the First World War.²³ Although toxic gas was a method used by all sides in that war, it was considered suitable only against military targets, and not, as in the case of the Moroccan campaigns, against civilians. The fact that the military authorities in Morocco and successive governments in Spain tolerated both the use of chemical warfare against civilian targets and the atrocities of the Tercio and other military units exemplifies the failure of the Restoration state's strategy in Morocco.

Other Africanists in the Spanish army, however, believed the most appropriate strategy in Morocco was one of tempering military action with the painstaking labour of winning over its tribes by persuasion, monetary rewards and the introduction of social infrastructure. They therefore favoured reducing military action as far as possible and preparing for civilian rule; thus they have been called *civilistas*, the equivalent of the enlightened Arabists of the British Army. This is not to say that they were opposed to toxic and incendiary bombing but that they felt it was not the most effective means of bringing about peace. They had played a more important role in the earlier stages of Spanish colonial penetration in Morocco, in particular under the more enlightened regimes of two High Commissioners, General Marina and General Jordana, between 1913 and 1918. One of the outstanding leaders of this tendency, Colonel Gabriel Morales Mendigutia, had warned General Fernández Silvestre several times in 1921 of the danger of pushing too far into the

uncertain territory of the central Rif, basing his judgement on military intelligence gathered from the information networks he had built up over several years.²⁴ Silvestre's disregard of his advice led to the Disaster of Annual, in which both officers died. The close links established by Morales with the Rif tribes over many years were evident in the way in which the Rif leader Abd el Krim returned Morales Mendigutia's body to the Spaniards, dressed in full regalia and with full honours, while Silvestre's body was never recovered.

Behind the differences over strategy between the two wings of the Africanists lay an unarticulated but implicit discrepancy over the relationship between Spain and Morocco. Militarist Africanists, such as Millán-Astray, had few qualms about advocating the military conquest of Morocco as the first stage in the construction of a new empire.²⁵ In contrast, these other Africanist officers saw their action as a means towards the introduction of the supposed benefits of neo-colonialism to both countries.²⁶ Spanish counterparts of such British and French military Arabists as T.E. Lawrence and Marshal Lyautey, this small minority of more progressive officers, many of whom were either officials of the Spanish equivalent of the local colonial office, the *Oficinas de Asuntos Indígenas*, or officers in charge of the native troops of the *Regulares*, were more knowledgeable about and more deeply imbued with Arab culture.²⁷

Another of these *civilista* Africanists was Colonel (later General) Alberto Castro Girona. In cyclostyled instructions in 1923 to the Spanish colonial agency charged with relations with the inhabitants of Spanish Morocco, the *Oficinas de Intervención*, he argued that the agency should carry out 'all its work through the medium of the natural authorities, ensuring that they are the ones who are charged directly with executing the orders of the Majzen [Sultan's government], it being a general rule of conduct that we do not appear as dominators, since that is not our mission'. He also referred to Spain's policy in Morocco as being that of attracting and creating a rapport with its inhabitants.²⁸ Castro Girona was the most decided advocate of maintaining a balance of military and civil action or indeed of subordinating military action to civil initiatives. He therefore responded favourably to a confidential proposal, made via telegraph in December 1922 by the new government of García Prieto, to appoint a politician, Luis Silvela, as High Commissioner of the

Moroccan Protectorate.²⁹ He and other *civilistas* came under fire for seeking to secure peace through negotiations with the Yebala chief, Raisuni, on the grounds that it would not last.³⁰

The work of the *civilista* Africanists was overshadowed by the more spectacular activities of the militarists. The Rif campaign following the Disaster led to the consolidation of the militarist culture, dominated by a new military generation, the Generation of 1915, which reached the highest posts in the African Army during its course. Many of its members cut their teeth on the western front of the Spanish Protectorate in the campaigns against Raisuni and then led the post-Annual shock troops when they were transferred to the eastern front. Primo de Rivera's conversion in late 1924 to undiluted military action in Morocco strengthened the hold of militarist culture. Victory over Abd-el Krim and the pacification of Morocco in 1927, two years after the French and Spanish governments had reached agreement for a joint military campaign, raised the status of the militarist Africanists to that of national heroes.³¹

The new unitary spirit informing the army as a result of the Moroccan victory and the hegemony of the Africanists led to the creation by the Dictator in 1927 of the Academia General Militar in Zaragoza under the directorship of Franco. Crossing traditional corporate barriers, the AGM was dominated by militarist Africanist officers and its mission, as expressed in the relevant royal decree, placed more emphasis on the psychological preparation for combat than on military technique. The model of warfare that informed teaching in the AGM was not based on the lessons of the First World War or the strategic consequences of new military technology but on the entirely irregular colonial war in Morocco. The values that were transmitted were drawn from the mystique of the Legion, with its characteristic glorification of violence, struggle and death.³² At the same time, the Junta-dominated Escuela Superior de Guerra, manned principally by the more technocratic general staff, was replaced in the same year by the Escuela de Estudios Superiores Militares under the auspices of the AGM and therefore was dominated by the militarist Africanists.

Nevertheless, while many of the militarists went on to new posts on the mainland, *civilista* officers such as Castro Girona, Gómez-Jordana and Goded played an important role for a brief period between 1927 and 1931 in the renewal of links with the

subjugated tribes and the re-establishment of order in eastern and central Morocco.³³ Although they were separated after 1927, both tendencies of the Africanists were bound by powerful ties of camaraderie and loyalty forged during the military campaigns. For all their differences over strategy in Morocco, they shared a common core of nationalist and conservative values. Their long service in the Army of Africa, their lack of contact with the mainland, and the intensity of the wars had turned them into an elite of officers alienated from civilian politics at home and imbued with a strong sense of mission to redeem Spain from division and disorder.³⁴ Their alienation from the Second Republic was heightened by the closure of the AGM, so dear to Franco's heart, as part of Azaña's military reforms.³⁵

Thus the vast majority of Africanist officers, irrespective of their tendency, joined the uprising of July 1936.³⁶ Above and beyond their shared military culture, they were united around a common political culture characterized by authoritarianism and a right-wing mythology of patriotism that easily outweighed their previous internal divisions over the strategy employed in the Moroccan campaigns of the 1920s. Yet it is clear that many *civilista* Africanists became sidelined from the core of Africanism. It is likely that their willingness to collaborate with civil authorities jarred with the militarist Africanists. Again if we follow the career of Castro Girona, once regarded as a hero because he single-handedly negotiated the surrender of Xauen, the stronghold of Raisuni, he appeared to be marginalized by the military insurgents during the Civil War and his name subsequently disappeared from Francoist iconography. Others, however, such as Gómez-Jordana, became part of the new Francoist state apparatus.

Junteros

The Juntas arose in 1917, partly in response to the effects in Spain of the inflationary pressures of the First World War. Their immediate objective was to halt the growing inequality of pay between officers in the mainland garrisons and those serving in Morocco as a result of the system of promotions and monetary rewards for officers on active duty. Merit promotions had been a long-standing source of division within the Spanish army since the mid-nineteenth century. They had fostered favouritism and,

before the Moroccan campaigns of the twentieth century, the preference to careers of officers of the elite corps because they enjoyed special status. From 1909, however, merit promotions and bonuses became the reward to those, in particular in the Infantry and Cavalry, engaged in military action in Morocco. This system, in contrast, was felt to penalize officers on duty in Morocco in the Artillery and Engineering Corps, in the General Staff, and in the indigenous police corps, who had few opportunities to take part in military engagements.

Juntismo has been equated too simplistically with the prevailing culture of military life on the mainland. The Junteros were in fact activists of a military lobby seeking to defend and improve the conditions of garrison life. Their campaign for better military conditions and to prevent promotion based on merit in order to protect those officers who had no opportunity to display their abilities on the battlefield (or who sought to avoid war altogether) helped to consolidate the bureaucratic nature of the peninsular army. But they were not the *cause* of military bureaucracy. Thus the defects of military organization in Morocco were those typical of an old tradition long predating the creation of the Juntas (this will be analysed in the following section entitled Peninsular military culture).

The presence of Junteros in the Spanish Army of Africa has been largely ignored.³⁷ Yet there were officers serving in Morocco who were activists of the Juntas or sympathizers with their aims. Most of these officers were normally based in the peninsula and had been posted to do service in the Army of Africa. At the same time there were others who could be defined as Africanists but who also supported the corporatist values of the Juntas.³⁸ Tensions between the Africanists and the Junteros therefore focused initially on questions of professional military structure and not on strategy or the mission of the African army. José Riquelme y López Bayo epitomizes the over-rigidity of the orthodox Juntero/Africanist classification for, as a *civilista* Africanist and as President of the Melilla Infantry Junta, he was both. Having completed many years of service in the Infantry in Morocco, Riquelme was appointed in 1916 as second in command to Morales in the colonial agency, the Oficinas de Intervención, where the future leader of the Rif insurrection of 1921–7, Abd-el-Krim, worked under his direction. In June 1921 he became head of the indigenous police, the post he held when

the Disaster occurred a few weeks later.³⁹ Between 1916 and 1921, therefore, Riquelme's work among native soldiers and the tribes of the Rif went unrewarded while many of his fellow officers in the Infantry in Morocco enjoyed the benefits of the promotion system. At the same time, through his work in the colonial agency, he was committed to the *civilista* Africanists' objective of maintaining a balance of military and civil action and delegating the administration of the Protectorate as much as possible to the local Moroccan authorities.⁴⁰

The Disaster of 1921 turned the professional differences between the Africanists and the Junteros on the mainland into political divisions. As ultimate arbiters of an increasingly weakened system, each was courted by the King and by politicians of the two Restoration parties. The Junta lobby sought to discipline the officers of the Army of Africa for the military rout. The Africanists, on the other hand, blamed the Juntas for the defeat on the grounds that they had blocked the resources that should have been spent on the Army of Africa and that their officers had allegedly been reluctant to go to war. They argued, furthermore, that one of the main causes of the Disaster was the system of obligatory military service imposed in the Army of Africa as a result of the Juntas' pressure. This had led to the use in battle of poorly trained and unenthusiastic troops, along with their officers whose only desire was to get back home as soon as possible.

The myth thus arose equating the Juntero culture with a peninsular military model characterized by battle-shyness and bureaucracy. The already difficult relations between Africanist and Juntero officers who had forged their careers in the Moroccan campaigns deteriorated as a result. Moreover, ideology began to play an increasing part in their divisions. The leaders of the first Juntas had declared a largely rhetorical commitment to the overthrow of the old Restoration system, behind which, as we have argued, lay predominantly professional grievances. From 1921, Juntero activists moved uncertainly towards progressive ideas.

The 1923 coup of Primo de Rivera, a Junta sympathizer, exacerbated the tension because of Primo's initial commitment to withdrawal from Africa and his advocacy of promotion by seniority. Although he was backed by Africanist generals, Primo drew up his Military Directorate entirely from brigadier-generals representing the military regions in the peninsula and his mani-

festos was couched in the language of the Juntas. The leading military Africanist General Emilio Mola wrote that after Primo's coup the Junteros 're-emerged . . . sometimes landing marvellous civil posts through their political connections, or posts in the secretariats created by the Dictator and also the best posts in Africa when the war appeared to die down'.⁴¹

Primo's plan to abandon the Spanish Protectorate was swiftly modified into a withdrawal of the military to a strategically secure line of defence that left most of the territory in the hands of the Rif nationalists under Abd el Krim. Despite their support for the coup, the Africanist officers had been deeply opposed to any retreat in Morocco. They made their feelings clear to the Dictator when he visited the Protectorate in the summer of 1924. At a dinner given him by the Legion, the then Lieutenant-Colonel Franco made a speech against any retreat and the Dictator's speech arguing for withdrawal was greeted with silence.⁴² Another leading Africanist, General Sanjurjo, recently appointed by Primo de Rivera as Commander-General of the eastern sector, argued vehemently against evacuation in confidential correspondence with the Dictator and refused his offer of appointment as High Commissioner.⁴³ The British consul in Tetuàn commented:

The army of occupation, judged even by Latin standards, more nearly resembles a Greek debating society in its passion for politics than a fighting instrument; internal criticism is freely indulged in and its energies are dissipated in advocating this policy and condemning that . . . [Primo de Rivera] cannot have failed to observe the distinctly anti-Directory atmosphere. In the military casino officers have been heard even to inveigh against the King.⁴⁴

After the retreat to the new lines of defence, an operation that cost many thousands of lives, Primo changed his Moroccan policy in response to pressure from the military Africanists under the influence of new military circumstances. He now moved towards plans for a decisive military intervention that would start with an amphibious invasion of Alhucemas, the heart of Abd el Krim's operations. He also turned against his erstwhile supporters in the Juntas, abolishing the closed scale and imposing the system of promotion by merit. Decrees to that effect in 1925 and 1926 led to an attempted coup, the Sanjuanada, by artillery officers on the mainland supported by Junteros in Morocco such as Riquelme. The events deepened the political cleavage between

Africanists and Junteros; the former remained loyal to the Dictator and the King, who was well known for his sympathies towards them, while the latter supported the advent of the Republic in 1931. The same fault-line existed in 1936 on the outbreak of the military insurrection. While those Africanists still serving in Morocco joined the rebellion, many of the Junteros, including some who had done service in Africa, remained loyal to the Republic.

Peninsular military culture

A third military culture can be identified in the Army of Africa distinct from either the Africanist or Juntero cultures. It was that of officers stationed in Morocco who had no special vocation for military service in the colony and who brought to garrison life and field campaigns in Morocco the values and practices of military life in mainland Spain. As we have already argued, peninsular military culture has usually been contrasted with Africanist culture and equated simply with Juntero culture. Yet there were many officers serving in the Moroccan campaigns before and after the Disaster of 1921, possibly even a majority, who identified with neither the Africanists nor those Junteros who had volunteered for service in Africa.⁴⁵

Most of the officers belonging to this culture had technical and organizational knowledge but little training for military operations in Morocco. They tended to be wedded to the fulfilment of orders and regulations and more concerned with the technical aspects of military life, such as transport, stores or organization, than with the honours that might be won on the battlefield through audacity and initiative. Many had accumulated years of experience of these bureaucratic pursuits on the mainland and self-conversion to warrior practices was no easy or welcome task. Indeed, they probably aspired to a more comfortable posting back to Spain. They tended to value the order of the garrison over the uncertainties of the field campaigns and the strict accounting of war matériel over the risks of their employment in the battlefield. Many sought to make up for the paucity of their salaries, as officers did on the mainland, by seeking extra work as company administrators or managers, despite the repeated ban on part-time jobs imposed by the Spanish High Commissioners in Morocco.⁴⁶ Unlike the Africanists, they did not identify to any

great extent with the work of the Spanish Protectorate and many sought to avoid the more onerous duties attached to it.⁴⁷ In fact Peninsular culture was hardly appropriate for the colonial army in Morocco.

With the exception of the campaigns of 1909 and 1912–15, colonial rule between the beginning of military intervention in Morocco and the creation of the Juntas in 1917 was dominated by this culture. It was characterized by operational stagnation, absence of clear military objectives, lack of co-ordination among military commanders, and contradictory strategies over how to exploit military victories.⁴⁸ Its relative incompetence derived not just from an earlier lack of restructuring and reform but also from Spain's neutrality in the First World War, which had not allowed officers to learn its strategic lessons. Just as the 1898 Spanish–American War exposed the backwardness of the Spanish army, the Disaster of 1921 revealed its relative weakness as a colonial army of occupation. There were frequent disagreements between Africanist officers armed with the new colonial values of military intervention and officers recently posted to Morocco who were imbued with peninsular culture.⁴⁹ What exacerbated these problems was the fundamental contradiction of government policy over Morocco. Maintaining control over the Protectorate was considered vital for Spanish foreign policy but the cost of military operations had to be kept to a minimum because of domestic pressures on the state budget. The result was almost endemic indecisiveness or delay in decision-making.⁵⁰

The consequent lack of resources and the ambiguity of instructions sent to the High Commissioners in Morocco consolidated a culture of relative apathy in the military command at least until 1919.⁵¹ The fulfilment of garrison duties tended to be casual. From 1913, military campaigns involving potential loss of life were entrusted to native troops, while non-combatant expeditions into the field were considered onerous and therefore evaded when possible through feigned illness, special leave, bribery or alternative postings arranged through *amiguismo* or family contacts.⁵² Relations with Moroccans were not cultivated and few officers bothered to study their language or customs. Indeed, dealings with tribal chieftains were considered a torture to be avoided at all costs.⁵³ Service in Morocco for these officers tended to be relatively brief, neither playing an important role in their military career nor influencing their decision over which

side to support in the Civil War; the decision was often the result simply of where they found themselves in the first days of the insurrection.⁵⁴

Political military culture

The phenomenon defined as the political military culture is a characteristic of the Army of Africa during the Second Republic that has also been largely ignored in the historiography. While much has been written about the domestic military reforms introduced by the Republican government, military culture in the army in Morocco is seen as relatively unchanged between the pacification of Morocco in 1927 and the Civil War.⁵⁵ Yet many officers appointed by the Republic to serve in the Army of Africa, although their knowledge and experience of colonial work was extensive, were promoted or posted there for political reasons rather than military needs. Many of them were of lower rank than other officers who had served in Morocco and were appointed above all for their perceived loyalty towards civil power as represented by the Republic and for their supposed ability as organizers and technicians. Many, too, came from an older generation than that of the 1915 Africanists. Their military provenance encompassed all the forces and military corps but mainly the specialized corps least identified with Africanism.⁵⁶ Azaña's criteria for the selection of officers of the high command were clearly their political reliability and their technical abilities. It was no coincidence that some, such as Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer and Manuel Romerales Quintero, were Freemasons, since the Spanish Masonic Lodge largely supported the Republic.⁵⁷

Azaña's main objective was to build links between the Republic and the Army of Africa in order to ensure its loyalty. His first action was to replace one of the leading Africanists, General Sanjurjo, with a civil High Commissioner, López Ferrer. Under the latter, the new officer appointees were charged with monitoring opinion amongst officers, guarding against conspiracy, and defusing tensions due to cuts in the Army of Africa's budget.⁵⁸ As a group, therefore, they shared at least initial support for the aims of the Republic and common objectives that were essentially political.

Azaña had set out to reduce considerably the size of the Army of Africa. General Mola claimed in 1935 that it had been practi-

cally dismantled.⁵⁹ But Azaña's government felt unable to reduce its core, the Regulares and the Tercio, because it was under pressure from France to maintain fighting units in Morocco. The government's efforts to create the infrastructure on which a civil colonial administration could be built were also hampered by lack of resources. Azaña was also exasperated by the little progress he felt his officers were making despite their loyalty. 'Morocco,' he wrote in his diary on 4 January 1933, 'is the Achilles' heel of the Republic.'⁶⁰ Yet when his government was succeeded by increasingly right-wing coalition governments, most of his appointees in the Moroccan army remained at first in their posts, unlike their counterparts on the mainland. Only in 1935 were the first appointments made to Morocco of well-known Africanists, such as Mola and Franco, owing in some measure to the part they played in crushing the Asturian rebellion of 1934.

On the outbreak of the Civil War, the majority of officers we have identified with the political military culture in Morocco remained loyal to the Republic. However, the uprising there was immediately successful, despite the fact that leading generals suspected of conspiracy such as Franco had been posted elsewhere. Most of the Republican officers were arrested, put on trial and imprisoned, while Romerales was executed. On the other hand two of Azaña's appointees, who in the meantime had been posted back to Spain, aligned themselves with the military rebels. These were Cabanellas — for all his Republican credentials — and the military commander of Huesca, Gregorio de Benito Terraza, who conspired with Cabanellas, his immediate superior, against the Republic.

Hence Azaña's misgivings between 1931 and 1933 were more than justified. He had had little room for manoeuvre, however. France had insisted that a Spanish military presence in Morocco continued to be necessary. Without the resources to establish a colonial army of recruits loyal to the Republic, Azaña had to keep the Regulares and the Tercio in place and rely on the intuition of the officers he had appointed to Morocco to watch for any potential conspiracy. The intensified politicization of officers of the Tercio and Regulares during the Asturias uprising in 1934, when many of their units were employed to crush the miners, laid the basis for the revolt of July 1936.

Conclusion

By identifying different cultures within the officer corps of Spain's Army of Africa between 1909 and 1936, we have tried to show that it was not, as it appears in most historical accounts, a united, homogeneous bloc. The first expression of this orthodoxy was that of Ortega y Gasset, who claimed immediately after the Disaster of 1921 that 'Morocco turned the scattered soul of our Army into a closed fist.'⁶¹ We have argued, on the contrary, that different tendencies persisted within the army in Morocco and that much more than has generally been believed it was permeable to tensions and events originating on the mainland. Divisions among Spanish officers were professional in origin but became ideological because politics in Spain depended on the support of the military. The conflict between Junteros and Africanists, in particular, became one between supporters and opponents of the Primo de Rivera regime, while the King's identification with the Dictatorship helped to draw the Junteros towards support for the Republic. Nor was this division one that separated the mainland from the colonial army since the Juntero culture existed within the Army of Africa; indeed, the Disaster of 1921 can be viewed in part as a consequence of the demoralization caused by the predominance therein of these latter cultures.

At the same time, the minority *civilista* military culture in Morocco had for a while offered Restoration governments the opportunity to create a stable civil-military colonial administration in Morocco along the lines of the French Moroccan colony. There were colonial officers who, at times of peace, showed respect for the Moroccan cultures and a neo-colonial, paternalist concern to extend to them the supposed benefits of western civilization. However, none of them believed the Rif Republic to be legitimate and their most prominent representatives appeared to sanction the brutal methods of war against the Moroccan enemy. The politicians had been unwilling or unable to invest the resources necessary for a neo-colonial enterprise such as that envisaged by these officers. The vacillations of ministers and the events of the Annual Disaster led to the hegemony of an Africanist culture dedicated to purely military solutions in Morocco. Their predominance in the Army of Africa meant the subordination of a more enlightened civil-military culture. The last years of the colonial campaign moulded the majority of

Africanist officers into a politically interventionist caste united by a sense of camaraderie, an alienation from mainland politics, and a cult of exotic heroism, all of which survived the Republic's attempts to disperse their leaders. It was a culture that the reformist governments of the Second Republic proved unable to tame or domesticate.

Notes

1. Victor Concas y Palau, *La escuadra del almirante Cervera* (Madrid 1900, 2nd edn), 5 and 153–5.

2. From *La vanguardia*, 13 September 1923, reproduced in Genoveva García Queipo, 'Primo de Rivera', *Cuadernos de historia* 16, no. 269 (1985).

3. *La nación*, 23 November 1932.

4. Ramón Gubern, *Raza: un ensueño del General Franco* (Madrid 1977), 30.

5. Manuel Ballbé, *Orden público y militarismo en la España constitucional (1812–1983)* (Madrid 1983); Joaquim Lleixá, *Cien años de militarismo en España: funciones estatales confiadas al Ejército en la Restauración y el franquismo* (Barcelona 1986); Rafael Núñez Florencio, *Militarismo y antimilitarismo en España (1888–1906)* (Madrid 1990).

6. For further analysis, see Sebastian Balfour, *The End of the Spanish Empire, 1898–1923* (Oxford 1997), chap. 6.

7. Lleixá, op. cit.

8. See, for example, Gabriel Cardona, *El poder militar en la España contemporánea hasta la guerra civil* (Madrid 1983); Stanley G. Payne, *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain* (Stanford 1967); and Carolyn P. Boyd, *Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain* (Chapel Hill 1979).

9. For example Gómez-Jordana y Souza, Conde de Jordana in his book, *La tramoya de nuestra actuación en Marruecos* (2nd edn, Madrid 1976), makes a vicious personal attack on another leading Africanist, Alberto Castro Girona, for what were probably differences of strategy (p. 19). Another Africanist general, Joaquín Fanjul, referred to his colleague, José Sanjurjo, also an Africanist, as a general with little standing and preparation for military command (FAMM, leg. 394, carpeta 7).

10. As in the well-known study by Julio Busquets Bragulat, *El militar de carrera en España. Estudio de sociología militar* (Madrid 1971), or the more recent study by Miguel Alonso Baquer, 'La selección de la élite militar española', in Mario Hernández Sánchez-Barba (coord.), *Historia social de las Fuerzas Armadas españolas*, Vol. 5 (Madrid 1986), chap. 18.

11. *Papeles de la Guerra de Marruecos. Diario de una bandera* (Madrid 1986; 1st edn, 1922), 85–6.

12. Busquets, *ibid.*

13. 'Nuestro propósito', *Revista de Tropas Coloniales*, January 1924, Año 1, Número 1.

14. Juan Picasso González, *Expediente Picasso* (Mexico City 1976, facsimile edition), 137, 402, 417, 421, 427, 459, 534.

15. See below.

16. See, for example, the numerous drawings and illustrations of Berber customs and daily scenes in the *Revista de Tropas Coloniales* (edited for a while by Franco himself), including some by Mariano Fortuny and M. Bertuchi.

17. From F. Franco, *Palabras del Caudillo 19 abril 1937 – 31 diciembre 1938* (Barcelona 1939), 314.

18. Jesús Martínez Paricio, 'La percepción del cambio en los militares: la mentalidad militar', in *Libertades públicas y Fuerzas Armadas. Actas de las jornadas de estudios celebradas en el Instituto de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Complutense* (Madrid 1984), 137–47. Martínez Paricio identifies two models of soldiers not dissimilar from the typology delineated above: the 'warrior soldier' and the 'optimistic [*esperanzado*] soldier'. However, he does not locate this difference within military Africanism.

19. *Revista de Tropas Coloniales*, January 1924, 6.

20. 'Sistemas rifeños', *Revista de Tropas Coloniales*, 1925, 2.

21. Details from a veteran, Luys Santa Marina, *Tras el águila de César. Elegía del Tercio 1921–1922* (Barcelona 1939); see also the testimony of General Batet in Hilari Ragner, *El General Batet* (Barcelona 1996).

22. Rudibert Kunz and Rolf-Dieter Müller, *Giftgas gegen Abd el Krim. Deutschland, Spanien und der Gaskrieg in Spanisch-Marokko 1922–1927* (Freiburg 1990), and PRO WO 188/765.

23. The plan was not carried out, almost certainly for tactical reasons. Real Academia de la Historia, Archivo Romanones (AR) 58 37 (Informe reservado).

24. According to the testimony of Emilio Alzugaray Goicochea in the Picasso report, *Expediente Picasso*, 412–13. However, Silvestre had approved of Morales's work inasmuch as it had saved Spanish lives and paved the way for deeper military penetration: Letters to Berenguer on 12.11.1919 and 8.7.1920 in Legajo Silvestre, Servicio Histórico Militar, Comandancia General Melilla, Apéndice 55.

25. José Millán-Astray, 'Necesidad de permanecer en Africa', *Revista de Tropas Coloniales*, May 1924. See also Francisco Bastos Ansart, *El desastre de Annual* (Barcelona 1921), for a reflection of these views.

26. See, for example, Manuel del Nido y Torres, *Marruecos. Apuntes para el oficial de intervención y de tropas coloniales* (Tetuán 1925).

27. In addition to Generals Jordana and Marina and Colonel Morales, the most prominent *civilista* officers included Castro Girona, Berenguer, Nido y Torres, Capaz y Montes, Cogolludo y Cebollino, Asensio Cabanillas, Blanco Izaga, Sousa, Goded, Beigbeder and Gómez-Jordana y Souza.

28. A. Castro Girona, 'Instrucciones sobre la organización y funcionamiento de las oficinas de intervención', 28 April 1923, Tetuán (García Figueras archive), 2–3. For the views of another *civilista*, see Manuel del Nido y Torres, *Marruecos. Apuntes para el oficial de intervenció y de tropas coloniales* (Tetuán 1925).

29. Archivo General de la Administración (Alcalá de Henares), M11, 81/3, 1922, Sección 15: Africa.

30. Gómez-Jordana, *La tramoya*, 46–8, 51. [Raisuni may be better known to Anglophone readers as Raisuli (ed.)]

31. In addition to those already mentioned, the militarist tendency included: González Carrasco, Martínez Anido, Mola, Sanjurjo, Yagüe, Orgaz, Varela, García Aldave, Saliquet, Ponte, Fanjul, Dávila, Vigón, and Manso de Zúñiga.

32. Carlos Blanco Escolá, *La Academia General Militar de Zaragoza (1928–31)* (Barcelona 1989).

33. These generals, assisted by other *civilista* officers such Asensio, commander (later General) Capaz, and captains Cebollino and Cogolludo, were involved in most of the pacification plans for the territory.

34. José Ortega y Gasset, *España invertebrada* (Madrid 1921).

35. Paul Preston, *Franco: A Biography* (London 1993), 80.

36. An exception was the much decorated *civilista* Africanist Osvaldo Capaz Montes, who had led troops in the recapture of Xauen in 1926 and was responsible for what was regarded as a model of colonial action in disarming the last pockets of rebels between 1926 and 1927. Knowing about the 1936 military conspiracy, he had refused to join it and had obtained leave to go to Madrid where he was arrested and murdered during the events of 22 August. Guillermo Cabanellas, *La guerra de los Mil Días: nacimiento, vida y muerte de la II República española* (Buenos Aires 1975), vol. 2, 1186.

37. For example in Payne, *Politics and the Military*, and Preston, *Franco*.

38. Juntero activists or sympathizers serving in Africa included Generals Burguete, Aizpuru, Tuero and Navarro and officers such as Nuñez del Prado, Lacanal, Sirvent, Jiménez Arroyo, Salcedo, Fontán, Ros Hernández, Alcántara, García Esteban, Ugarte, Pardo and Alzugaray.

39. Although, according to his testimony, he was on sick leave at the time: Picasso, *ibid.*, 400–11.

40. See Tomás Borrás's interview with Riquelme in 'La opinión de Riquelme. ¿Qué política debe seguir España en su zona?', *El sol*, 20 September 1921.

41. Quoted in Cabanellas, *La guerra de los Mil Días*, vol. 1, 118, n. 36.

42. Preston, *Franco*, 45.

43. SHM R573, legajo 403, carpeta 8.

44. Report to the Consul-General in Tangier, 27.7.24, PRO FO 636/6.

45. Among these were Generals Pintos, Alfau and Aguilera, and officers such as Sánchez Monge, López Pozas, Masaller, Fernández Mulero, Llamas, Mingo, Gallego, Armigo, Aymat and Almeida.

46. See for example FAMM, Fondo Documental Mortera, caja 4; also Rafael López Rienda, *El escándalo del millón de Larache* (Madrid 1922), 144–7.

47. Walter B. Harris, *France, Spain and the Rif* (London 1927), 79ff.

48. During this period, according to Boyd, 'the dedicated Africanists were overshadowed by an unedifying majority of opportunists and malcontents'. Boyd, *op. cit.*, 40.

49. Such as that in 1909 between the Africanist High Commissioner General Marina and General Pintos, recently posted to Morocco. The latter's disregard for Marina's instructions led to the Disaster of Barranco del Lobo in which he lost his life alongside many Spanish soldiers. Marina refused to attend his funeral. On the other hand, the policies of the High Commissioner in Ceuta in 1913, General Alfau, aroused much anger amongst Africanist officers such as Silvestre.

50. Allendesalazar, *op. cit.*, 186.

51. Baquer, *op. cit.*, 45.

52. See, for example, the testimony of Juan Guixé in *El Rif en sombras (Lo que yo he visto en Melilla)*, n.p., n.d. [1921].

53. In a letter written shortly after the Annual Disaster, Abd el Krim himself denounced this attitude towards the local tribes prevalent, in his view, amongst a majority of Spanish officers: Mohammed Tahtah, *Entre pragmatisme, réformisme et Modernisme. Le rôle politico-religieux des Khattabi dans le Rif (Maroc) jusqu'à*

1926 (Leiden 1995), 140. A typical portrait of these officers is painted in the autobiographical novels of Arturo Barea, *The Track* (London 1943), and Ramón Sender, *Imán* (Huesca 1992, 1st edn, 1930).

54. As Stanley Payne stresses in *Spain's First Democracy: The Second Republic, 1931–1936* (Madison 1993), 365.

55. For example, Michael Alpert in *La reforma militar de Azaña* (Madrid 1982), 309, argues that Azaña failed to extend Republican policies of military reform to Morocco. Victor Morales Lezcano, in *España y el Norte de Africa: el Protectorado en Marruecos (1912–1956)* (Madrid 1984), 91–7, includes useful information about the Republic's military reforms in the Army of Africa, but does not suggest, as we do here, that these reforms created a new culture or caste of officers.

56. Baquer, *op. cit.*, 65. Azaña's political appointees included García Boloix, José Jurado, Benito Terraza, Miaja, Álvarez Buylla and Blanco.

57. Another General appointed to Morocco who was a Freemason was Agustín Gómez Morato: Azaña, *Obras completas*, 214–15, 232, 234, 315, 539.

58. Azaña, *Diarios, 1932–1933. Los cuadernos robados* (Barcelona 1977), 125–6, 265.

59. Emilio Mola, *Obras completas* (Valladolid 1940), 1111–20.

60. Azaña, *Diarios*, 125–6. About one of his generals, Azaña wrote (376): 'In fact, Gómez Morato is a chatterbox and an idler whose only concern is not to lose his post, the only means of support for his copious family.'

61. *España invertebrada* (15th edn, Madrid 1967), 82.

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