A wider Europe: the view from Moscow and Kyiv

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The dual expansion—the inclusion of new members in NATO and the enlargement of the European Union (EU) to incorporate some of the emerging democracies—will result in a wider Europe. But it will also produce 'outsider states'. No matter how frequently NATO and EU officials reiterate that they have no intention of redividing Europe, irrespective of how many 'partnership' agreements they offer to non-members, the inevitable consequence of admitting some countries to full membership of the organizations and excluding others is to produce 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. In relation to the EU, for example, those countries that are neither 'ins' (that is, already negotiating accession, as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are), nor 'pre-ins' (as Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria and Malta were categorized in October 1999[1]), are, by definition, 'outsiders'. This affects the way their citizens perceive the present position and future options of their countries, and their relationships with both 'insiders' and fellow 'outsiders'. As for NATO, exclusion from the expanding alliance influences the outsiders' security perceptions and the way they view their role in Europe. Exclusion, therefore, has important implications for the domestic and foreign policies that the governments of the outsider states adopt.

Russia and Ukraine are the most important examples of excluded states, if only because of their size and strategic significance. The Russian government has no objections to EU enlargement, including the membership of some of the Soviet successor states; but it does not seek EU or NATO membership for itself. The Ukrainian government, on the other hand, fervently aspires to EU membership. The response of both governments to new members joining NATO is far less positive. The Russian government protested very strongly against the first round of NATO expansion, and it is adamantly opposed to any further extension

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1 Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession, 13 Oct. 1999. IP/99/751, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_10_99/intro/index.htm>.

of NATO membership, particularly to include former Soviet states. Ukraine's constitution, which proclaims the country's neutrality, precludes NATO membership. At first, the Ukrainian government did not seem perturbed by the enlargement of the alliance; but Ukrainian attitudes are far less placid since NATO's air strikes against Serbia took place. Moreover, the government was, and remains, deeply concerned about Russia's response to NATO expansion. Exclusion, therefore, does not only affect the relations of Russia and Ukraine to the EU and NATO; it also influences their bilateral relationship.

Both the EU and NATO have attempted to allay Russian and Ukrainian anxiety about the enlargement of the organizations. When NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative was launched in 1994, Ukraine became the first newly independent state (NIS) to join the programme; and Russia signed its PfP framework document on 22 June that year. Once a firm decision had been taken on enlargement, NATO began to negotiate separate charters with Russia and Ukraine, making great efforts to ensure that they were adopted before the formal accession of new members. On 27 May 1997 the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation was signed by the Secretary-General of NATO and heads of state and government of NATO and the Russian President in Paris. A matching Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine was signed in Madrid on 9 July 1997.[2] Ukraine was also the first NIS to sign a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU on 16 June 1994—though it took EU member states until 1 March 1998 to ratify it. Russia's PCA was signed in June 1994, but its ratification was delayed because of the first war in Chechnya and it did not come into force until 1 December 1997. The European Council also adopted a Common Strategy on Russia in June 1999 to strengthen its relationship with Russia. The Russian government responded in October with a 'Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000–2010)'.[3]

These institutional attempts to assuage their concerns, and the cooperative and assistance projects which have been conducted under the aegis of PfP and PCA, have not prevented many Russians and Ukrainians from feeling isolated and marginalized as enlargement gets under way. This article examines their perceptions of Europe and of the effects of their exclusion. It is based on the published views of the foreign policy community in the two countries and on a set of interviews conducted with them in September and October 1999. To assess the perceptions of the ordinary public, the authors also set the agenda for, and observed, four focus groups conducted by local specialists, two of which

[2] The texts of the two documents can be found at <http://www.mod.uk/policy/nato/natoat50/foundingact.htm> and <http://www.mod.uk/policy/nato/natoat50/charter.htm.>.

[3] For the PCA with Ukraine, see the *Official Journal of the European Communities*, *OJ* L 049, 19/02/1998; for Russia's PCA agreement, see *OJ* L 327, 28/11/1997. The Common Strategy on Russia is published in *OJ* L 15, 24/06/1999. An unofficial translation of Russia's Medium-Term Strategy can be found at <http://presidency.finland.fi/frame.asp>.

were held in each country. The commissioned surveys which form part of the research project will only be conducted in 2000, so the survey evidence offered here comes from polls conducted by the Public Opinion Fund, the Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion and the USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction.[4]

Russia

While distinctions can still be made between the foreign policy views of 'liberal westernizers', 'pragmatic nationalists' and 'fundamentalist nationalists' in Russia, there are few genuine liberal westernizers left and none of them remain in policy-making positions.[5] *Liberal westernizers* favour a Western type of democratic market society for Russia and want good relations with Western countries. *Pragmatic nationalists* also favour democracy and good relations with the West, but they put Russian national interests first. They tend to believe that a market economy has to be adapted to specific Russian conditions. *Fundamentalist nationalists* believe that Russia can forge its own, specific path of development.[6] They see the West as hostile and are nostalgic for the Soviet (or even the Russian imperial) past.

Russia and NATO

It was the issue of NATO expansion, above all, that undermined the influence of liberal westernizers in Russian foreign policy. Both pragmatic and fundamentalist nationalists blamed them for making too many concessions to the West. Andrei Kozyrev, the most prominent liberal westernizer, is accused, for example, of making 'unforgivable mistakes' as foreign minister. One businessman maintained that Kozyrev had defended Western, not Russian interests. When Russia's membership of the Partnership for Peace was debated, liberal westernizers favoured signing up, pragmatic nationalists were hesitant and fundamentalist nationalists were unambiguously opposed. On the subject of NATO expansion, however, they were united, even if they had different reasons for objecting.[7] Whatever his private views, Kozyrev, like Russian officials and politicians of all persuasions, used every possible public opportunity to express

[4] The full project will involve nationwide opinion surveys, 16 focus groups (including four among military personnel), and approximately 140 elite interviews in the four countries concerned.

[5] These terms are simply a convenient way of categorizing views about Russian foreign policy. They are used in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison and Margot Light, *Internal factors in Russian foreign policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), where the authors point out that the analytical convenience of using these terms does not imply strict categories. There are overlaps between them, and some individuals change their views over time.

[6] A detailed blueprint is offered, for example, in Alexei Podberezkin, *Russkii put'*, 4th edn (Moscow: RAU-Universitet, 1999).

[7] For the liberal westernizer arguments about PfP, see the article by A. Konovalov and S. Oznobishchev in *Segodnya*, 26 March 1994. Alexei Pushkov's interview with Vladimir Lukin in *Moskovskie novosti*, no. 16, 1994 gives the pragmatic nationalist doubts. See also Alexander Sergounin, *Post-communist security thinking in Russia: changing paradigms*, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Papers 4, 1997, p. 52.

Russia's opposition whenever the possibility of NATO enlargement was mooted. After a *faux pas* in Warsaw, when he told President Walesa that Russia did not mind if Poland joined NATO, President Yeltsin has also always expressed disapproval of NATO expansion.

The NATO–Russia Founding Act was intended to reassure Russia that it could have a partnership with NATO even if enlargement proceeded. However, while President Yeltsin believed that the Act meant that NATO would have to consult the Russian government in the Permanent Joint Russia–NATO Council, NATO leaders stressed that Russia would have 'a voice in but not a veto over NATO's business'.[8] Russian analysts still considered NATO expansion 'a strategic error', but they accepted that Russia could not prevent it occurring.[9] The Russian public, however, believed that NATO expansion would harm Russia: in an October 1996 poll, 32 per cent thought that expansion would be bad for Russia; in March/April 1997, of the 22 per cent of respondents who were reasonably well informed about NATO, 62 per cent thought that expansion of the alliance would harm Russia.[10]

The admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO in March 1999 was followed by the adoption of a new strategic concept at the 50th anniversary NATO summit in Washington, and the announcement that the door to NATO membership remains open.[11] By then the new strategy was already being implemented against Serbia. Not surprisingly, the Russian response to expansion was extremely negative. Many Russians (66 per cent in a July 1999 poll) believed that it represented a direct threat to Russia.[12] Interviews in September confirmed these findings: both the foreign policy community and the general public across the political spectrum condemned NATO's air strikes against Serbia, disapproved of NATO expansion and argued that the new strategic doctrine undermined Russian security.

Kosovo had clearly been seen as a watershed. The attack on Serbia served to confirm the prejudices of those who held fundamentalist nationalist views. It revealed NATO in its true colours, one said; another argued that the conflict in Yugoslavia was simply a testing ground, and that NATO would make other attacks. Pragmatic nationalists pointed out that Kosovo had persuaded the army and the general public that NATO's new strategy represented a direct threat to

8 President Yeltsin's remarks are quoted in *Krasnaya zvezda*, 28 May 1997; President Clinton's Rose Garden speech appears in <http://www.nato.int/usa/president/s970514c.htm>. These contending expectations explain why there is a widespread feeling in Russia that more consultation should have taken place over NATO expansion.

9 Boris Kazantsev, 'Posledstviya rasshireniya NATO', *Mezhdunaronaya zhizn'*, 11–12, 1997, p. 20. See also I. Maksimychev, 'K kakim beregam plyvet Evropa', *Mezhdunaronaya zhizn'*, 10, 1997, pp. 29–36; P. Ivanov and B. Khalosha, 'Rossiya-NATO: chto dal'she', *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, 6, 1999, pp. 5–15.

10 'Opinion Analysis', Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA, Washington DC, 24 Jan. 1997, M-12-97 and 27 May 1997, M-87-97.

11 The new strategic concept and the Membership Action Plan are published in *The reader's guide to the NATO summit in Washington, 22–25 April 1999* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999).

12 Public Opinion Foundation Poll, 10–11 July, 1999. The results are available at <http://www.fom.ru/week/t1056_2htm>.

Russia. Focus group discussions confirmed this. They also revealed that NATO and the United States were widely seen as synonymous, with far less blame for the attack on Serbia attaching to European NATO members.

Russians are deeply concerned about NATO expanding further, particularly to include the Baltic states or Ukraine. Fundamentalist nationalists and some pragmatic nationalists predict a strong Russian response, suggesting variously that military spending would rise, that there would be a new arms race, that the 'nuclear factor' would be 'reconsidered', and that new allies would be found. For the most part, however, realism prevails; most people understand that economic weakness limits Russia's ability to respond. One academic of liberal westernizer persuasion summed it up as follows: 'Russia's political leaders will have to take measures, but I can't see what they can do. They have illusions, their rhetoric is strong, but there are no measures they could take. They may say that military spending will rise, but there is nowhere from which to take the money for military spending.'

Russia and the European Union

There is a great contrast between the widespread condemnation of NATO in Russia, and the positive views that are commonly held about the European Union. At first, perhaps, EU enlargement was perceived as an acceptable alternative to NATO expansion. Although the latter has taken place, extension of EU membership is still regarded favourably. On the other hand, there is a surprising amount of ignorance about the EU. One reason may be the low profile of international issues in general in Russia, compared to the attention given to the country's turbulent domestic affairs. Since relations with the EU are considered to be primarily economic and technical, and European integration is of no relevance to the daily lives of Russians, the EU gets little media coverage.[13] This explains why public awareness is low—although, given the amount of EU assistance which Russia receives, the European Commission might be disconcerted to find that in terms of influence, one focus group participant ranked the EU on a par with the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Union of Russia and Belarus.[14]

It is less comprehensible why some members of the foreign policy community who, on the face of it, ought to be better informed, seem to lack even name recognition of the EU. On the whole, people who identify with pragmatic nationalist views are better acquainted with the organization than fundamentalist

[13] Igor Leshoukov, *Beyond satisfaction: Russia's perspectives on European integration*, ZEI Discussion Paper C 26, 1998 (Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität), quote on p. 17. We are grateful to David Gowan for drawing our attention to this paper.

[14] In 1990–5, the EU was the largest donor to the NIS. Russia was the largest NIS recipient, receiving 16.4 per cent of Official Development Assistance and 43.4 per cent of Technical Assistance (<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/nis/intro/index.htm>). Total Tacis funding to Russia in 1991–6 was ecu 927.89 million (<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/tacis/country_closeup/russia/cc_russ_facts.htm>). The total Tacis budget for 1996–9 rose to ecu 2.2 billion.

nationalists, one of whom insisted that 'if a European Union is formed, then Russia must be part of it.' Most pragmatic nationalists saw no threat in EU enlargement even if the Baltic countries joined, as long as the EU did not attempt 'to force Russia into a corner', to 'exclude it' or to 'turn it into a pariah'. Enlargement would serve to draw Russia closer to the EU, some thought; and fulfilling EU demands and conditions would benefit the Russian economy. Others were more wary, warning of a possible return to a divided Europe. None was clear, however, about what the potential hazards are of an expanding market which excludes Russia.

Officials in the relevant ministries are well aware of the possible negative consequences of EU enlargement. The anti-dumping measures regularly initiated against Russian exports on the grounds that Russia is a state-trading country (although the PCA refers to it as an economy in transition) have long been a source of friction. They know that problems will arise as the accession countries adopt the EU's *acquis communautaire*. Russia's trade relations with the central and east European (CEE) countries will be adversely affected, for example, as they gradually reorientate their trade towards the EU. At the same time, Russia's dependence on the EU, which currently receives 40 per cent of Russia's exports and provides 38 per cent of its imports, will grow. Although one journalist suggested to us that EU barriers would benefit Russia, enabling the re-establishment of protectionist policies which would revive Russia's real economy, this was not a view shared by these officials. There is also growing concern that when the CEE countries sign up to the Schengen Agreement, Russian citizens will require visas to travel. This is a particularly acute problem for Kaliningrad, which in due course will become a Russian enclave within the EU.[15] One analyst warns that the difference in the EU's respective treatment of the CEE countries and Russia will widen and deepen, with the 'risk of a "normative divide", and heightening feelings of isolation in Russia'.[16]

Ukraine

In Ukraine, as in Russia, a variety of views can be distinguished about the policies which would best improve the country's domestic situation. In relation to foreign policy, however, two broad preferences are apparent which can be usefully, though perhaps simplistically, represented as those who would prefer

[15] V. Pozdnyakov and S. Ganzha, 'Novye strany na poroge Evropeiskogo soyuza', *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, 3, 1999, pp. 37–44. On the EU's Kaliningrad dilemma, see Lyndelle D. Fairlie, *Will the EU use northern Dimension to solve its Kaliningrad dilemma?*, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Papers 21, 1999.

[16] Leshoukov, *Beyond satisfaction*, p. 12. Russia's Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000–10) reflects these concerns. Section 5 mentions 'the ambivalent impact' of enlargement on Russian interests and sets as a priority the task of 'achieving the best advantages' and 'preventing, eliminating or setting off possible adverse consequences' of enlargement. It calls for consultations to secure Russia's interests as the *acquis* is adopted in the CEE countries, and draws particular attention to Kaliningrad's problems. Russia's preference for EU rather than NATO expansion is also revealed. Section 1.5.2 calls for practical cooperation with the Western European Union in the area of security, 'which could counterbalance … the NATO-centrism in Europe'.

Ukraine to adopt a '*Slavic choice*', and those who support a '*European choice*'. Communists and other left-wing groups, for example, favour the restoration of the Soviet Union or, at the very least, a Slavic confederation with Russia and Belarus. By definition, therefore, they reject membership of the European Union and are opposed to Ukraine's cooperation with NATO. They tend to blame the international financial institutions for the country's economic woes. Those in favour of a European choice tend to be centrists by political conviction. They are staunch defenders of Ukraine's sovereignty, in particular its independence from Russia, and they believe that close relations with Euro-Atlantic institutions would enhance it. On the other hand, they understand that Ukraine must have good relations with Russia, and they stress Ukraine's non-aligned status.[17] During this research, a third set of foreign policy views became discernible, consisting of disillusioned centrists who support Ukraine's European choice but feel profoundly betrayed by what they perceive as inadequate Western assistance. Deeply apprehensive of Russian policy in the former Soviet Union, they fear that Ukraine will, by Western default, slip into Russia's sphere of influence.[18]

Ukraine and NATO

Until the air strikes against Serbia, the Ukrainian government did not believe that NATO was a potential source of aggression against Ukraine; nor did it think that other states had the right to veto the decisions of the sovereign states which wanted to join NATO. Its main concern was Russia's response to expansion. It did not want Ukraine to become a buffer state in a divided Europe.[19] As arrangements for enlargement proceeded, the Ukrainian government concentrated on improving relations with Russia, while at the same time extending its cooperation with NATO within the PfP agreement and by negotiating a special partnership agreement. Both initiatives were successful. In May 1997, a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership and an agreement on the Black Sea Fleet were concluded with Russia. On 9 July 1997 the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership with NATO was signed.[20] According to an expert report on

[17] 'Slavic choice' views of Ukrainian foreign policy were represented by the election manifestos of Petro Simonenko, Natalya Vitrenko and Oleksandr Tkachenko. Leonid Kuchma and Gennady Udovenko both expressed 'European choice' views in their manifestos. For the election manifestos of all candidates in the 1999 presidential election, see *Pravo Vibory: President Ukraini 1999* (Kyiv: Smoloskip, 1999). The Strategy of Ukraine's Integration into the EU was adopted by presidential decree no. 615/98 on 11 June 1998.

[18] The fears of the disappointed centrists are represented by Scenario B_3 of the 'Alternative scenarios for the future of Ukraine' in O. Belov et al., eds, *Ukraine 2000 and beyond: geopolitical priorities and scenarios of development* (Kyiv: National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, National Institute for Strategic Studies, National Institute for Ukrainian–Russian Relations, 1999).

[19] Ilya Prizel, *National identity and foreign policy: nationalism and leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 400.

[20] On the importance of the friendship treaty, see Volodymyr Ohryzko, 'Zovnischnya polityka Ukrayiny: pohlyad i maibytne', *Akzenti Sychastnosti*, March 1998, pp. 173–9. On the Black Sea Fleet accords, see James Sherr, 'Russia–Ukraine *rapprochement*?: The Black Sea Fleet Accords', *Survival* 39: 3, 1997, pp. 33–50. The NATO charter can be found at <http://www.mod.uk/policy/NATO/natoat50/charter.htm>.

Ukrainian foreign policy, 'Ukraine has found an optimal model of relations with NATO, which … takes into account both the internal situation in Ukraine and the condition of external encirclement.'[21]

The general public seemed to agree that NATO expansion posed no threat to Ukraine. In an October–November 1997 opinion poll, 23 per cent thought that NATO admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic would be good for Ukraine, 16 per cent thought it would be bad, while 48 per cent did not know what to think. However, while 69 per cent of experts thought that Ukraine should also join NATO, the public was divided: 34 per cent agreed, while 31 per cent disagreed.[22]

NATO's air strikes against Serbia caused a shift in popular attitudes towards the alliance. In a May 1999 poll, 31 per cent blamed NATO for starting the war; 30 per cent supported Yugoslavia; and only 5 per cent supported NATO. In a July poll, an overwhelming 81 per cent felt that NATO was wrong to become involved militarily; moreover, the opinion was universal, regardless of age, gender, ethnicity or geographical location. Although 51 per cent still thought that Ukraine should pursue a policy of cooperation with NATO, the number who favoured closer security ties with Russia and the CIS grew from 50 per cent in December 1998 to 58 per cent in July 1999.[23]

An expert report warned that, as a result of the war, Ukraine would find itself 'in a zone of uncertainty, in a space between the Russian–Belarussian union and countries of North Atlantic orientation'.[24] Elite interviews in October corroborated that there was considerable apprehension within the foreign policy community following the war, intensifying the perception that Ukraine occupied an isolated position on Europe's new dividing line. For those who support a Slavic choice, NATO's attack simply confirmed that 'the United States wanted to show who was boss in the world and to demonstrate that the world is unipolar'. 'What', we were asked rhetorically, 'if the West suddenly decides it doesn't like the new leader in Ukraine?' But even those who supported President Kuchma's European policy expressed disquiet that 'Kosovo undermined a lot of work that had previously been put into "selling" NATO to the public.' In Ukraine, as in Russia, anti-NATO sentiment translated into antipathy towards the United States. As one interviewee told us: 'Not all the people realize that NATO consists of many nations; actually, it is seen as an American institution.' Focus group participants also saw NATO as an instrument

[21] 'The state and prospects of Ukraine's foreign policy: expert discussion', *Foreign and security policy of Ukraine 1998/1999* (Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, 1998), p. 27. The experts who participate in this monitoring programme comprise foreign ministry officials, Supreme Rada deputies, senior military officers and leading journalists.

[22] 'Opinion Analysis', Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA, Washington DC, 24 Feb. 1998, M-28-98; *Foreign and security policy of Ukraine 1998/1999*, p. 12.

[23] For the May 1999 poll, see *Foreign and security policy of Ukraine 1998/1999*, pp. 78–80. The results of the July poll can be found in 'Opinion Analysis', Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA, Washington DC, 2 Sept. 1999, M-172-99.

[24] 'Geopolitical context of the situation around Kosovo: a view from Ukraine', *Foreign and security policy of Ukraine 1998/1999*, pp. 46–52, quote on p. 52.

of the United States and were convinced that the American administration had taken the decision to attack Serbia.

With few exceptions, most of our interviewees thought that if NATO were to expand further, Ukraine would not be directly affected. But they believed that further expansion would be an indirect threat because of the reaction it might provoke in Russia. As one interlocutor pointed out, 'it is uncomfortable for Ukraine to be between Russia and NATO, and if the Baltic states enter NATO, it will be much worse.' They ruled out the accession of Ukraine itself to NATO for four different reasons: it would infringe Ukraine's neutral status; it would be unacceptable to the public; Ukraine could not afford it financially; and it would provoke a hostile response from Russia. Disillusioned centrists, on the other hand, feel let down by NATO's lack of regard for the financial losses Ukraine incurred as a result of the war against Serbia. They do not rule out Ukrainian membership of the alliance. Instead, they call on NATO to study 'the difficulties and hardships' which hinder Ukraine's possible membership and to 'take preventive measures by *developing a specific course* for each potential member-state'.[25]

It is clear that while the expansion of NATO causes some concern in Ukraine, it is a far less salient issue in Kyiv than it is in Moscow. The issue of Ukraine's relationship with the EU preoccupies the foreign policy community far more.

Ukraine and the European Union

If Ukraine's neutral status deters the political classes from contemplating NATO membership, the European identity proclaimed by the current leadership is perceived to dictate the country's membership of the EU. The presidential decree on the Strategy of Ukraine's Integration to the European Union states: 'The national interests of Ukraine require identification of Ukraine as an influential European country, full-fledged EU member.'[26] Yet Ukraine's relationship with the EU is the source of much frustration and bitterness. According to one analyst, the problem is mutual misunderstanding: Ukraine does not comprehend the complex nature of the integration process, while the EU does not grasp that Ukraine has no alternative to European integration: the choice is not whether to be, or not to be an EU member, but whether to be a normal European country or not. In the words of another, the EU can be faulted for lack of enthusiasm and lack of strategic vision, while Ukraine's political leaders sometimes act as if they expect to achieve 'integration by declaration'.[27]

[25] O. Honcharenko and B. Parakhonsky, 'Main conclusions and recommendations', in Belov et al., eds, *Ukraine 2000 and beyond*, pp. 10–11, emphasis in original. They derive some support from Zbigniew Brzezinski, who does not rule out eventual NATO membership for Ukraine. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'A plan for Europe', *Foreign Affairs* 74: 1, Jan./Feb. 1995, pp. 26–42.

[26] 'On Approvement the Strategy of Ukraine's Integration into the European Union', Decree no. 615/98, 11 June 1998, unofficial translation. See also Volodymyr Horbulin, 'Nasha meta, Nasha dolya—Mistse Ukrayiny v suchasniy Yevropy', *Polityka i Chas*, no. 1, Jan. 1996, pp. 3–8. Cited in Tor Bukkvoll, *Ukraine and Europe*, Chatham House Papers (Pinter/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), p. 66.

[27] Olekasndr Pavliuk, 'The European Union and Ukraine: the need for a new vision', Policy Paper, East–West Institute, July 1999, p. 2; James Sherr, 'Ukraine's new time of troubles', G67, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Oct. 1998, quote on p. 12.

At a practical level, the EU has been slow to ratify and implement agreements (it took nearly four years, for example, to ratify the PCA). It is the largest bilateral provider of technical and financial assistance to Ukraine (3.9 billion euros from 1991 to 1998) and the EU share in Ukraine's overall trade volume has grown from 8.7 per cent in 1994 to 19 per cent in 1998. But the EU criticizes Ukrainian protectionist measures, its refusal to abandon plans to construct new nuclear reactors and its slow progress in implementing structural economic reforms. Ukrainians, in turn, complain that the EU has not allocated the assistance it promised for the decommissioning of Chernobyl, that it imposes limited quotas on Ukrainian textiles and that it applies anti-dumping measures against its chemical and steel products.[28]

Ukrainians are particularly disappointed about their omission from the list of 'pre-ins' announced at the December 1997 Luxembourg European Council and confirmed at the October 1999 Tampere European Council.[29] Ukraine is economically in no worse a condition than the pre-ins, several interviewees insisted, and it should not be treated as a second-class power. At the very least the EU should give a firm indication that it wants Ukraine to be a member. It is noteworthy that while the foreign policy community in general blames the EU for Ukraine's lack of progress towards integration, officials who have responsibility for economic matters are far more aware that the problem is, to a large extent, within Ukraine. They complain that little has been done to implement the strategy set out in the presidential decree. It is time, according to one report on the problems of integration, that the tendency 'to require some special attitude and to ask to take into account the country's peculiarities' was rejected, since 'no state can develop normally … if its domestic rules and economic laws … differ from those generally accepted in the world.'[30] The foreign policy community tends to believe that the public is ignorant and apathetic about the EU. Participants in the focus groups, however, were fairly well informed both about the problems and pitfalls of membership, and about the potential advantages.

Blaming the EU for the slow speed of integration might, perhaps, be unjustified. But there are good grounds for the acute concern most members of the foreign policy community feel about the consequences for Ukraine once EU enlargement gets under way. It is not only the accession countries which will join the Schengen Agreement, for example. Under pressure from the EU, the pre-ins will also sign up. Ukrainian shuttle traders and migrant workers will be severely affected, many interviewees pointed out, and so will Ukraine's conventional trade with the CEE countries. If Ukraine bows to pressure and also introduces a stricter visa regime, its relations with Russia, Moldova and Belarus will be affected. At a conference held in Yalta in September, President Kuchma appealed to the EU not to create a new 'paper curtain' of travel

[28] Pavliuk, 'The European Union and Ukraine', pp. 5–7.
[29] Ohryzko, 'Zovnischnya polityka Ukrayiny'.
[30] 'The state and prospects of Ukraine's foreign policy', p. 23.

restrictions in place of the 'iron curtain'.[31] He did not point to the irony that the governments who preached free trade and freedom of movement to the Soviet leadership and the post-socialist governments were now closing their markets and their borders to the people whose freedom they had demanded.

Conclusion

Perceptions of exclusion and potential isolation are strong in both Russia and Ukraine, but they were produced, at first, by different fears: in Russia by the prospect of NATO expansion, in Ukraine by disappointment that EU membership proved so difficult to attain. At first Russians regarded EU enlargement with equanimity, while Ukrainians did not think that NATO expansion was a direct threat. More recently, Russians have begun to realize that EU enlargement may affect their economy adversely. At the same time, the reality of the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO and the probability of further expansion have heightened Ukrainian anxieties about becoming a vulnerable buffer between two belligerent blocs. As a result, a sense of frustration and impotence has intensified in both countries. Whereas Russians are afraid of being confined to the periphery of Europe, Ukrainians dread being isolated in the middle.

Russians and Ukrainians share more than perceptions of exclusion and isolation. Both societies have undergone a search for a national identity since the Soviet Union disintegrated, and in neither case is the search complete. The political schism in both states is as much about identity as it is about economic system and political structure. In each of the two countries, the relationship with the other state is an integral part of the identity crisis. Whereas the loss of Ukraine contributed more, perhaps, than the loss of any other part of the Soviet Union or Russian empire to Russia's identity crisis, for Ukrainians the most urgent task in establishing an independent state was to define an identity which was separate from Russia. This makes both Russians and Ukrainians highly sensitive to the policies adopted by the other.

Both have chosen a European identity, but in neither country is that identity finally fixed. Executive power in Ukraine currently lies in the hands of politicians who are committed to Ukraine's European choice. Although President Kuchma emerged the victor in the November 1999 Ukrainian presidential elections, the outcome was not a foregone conclusion. Moreover, a sizeable minority of Ukrainian citizens voted for the Communist Party in the 1998 parliamentary elections.[32] The confrontation which has characterized Ukrainian executive–legislative relations seems certain to continue, and this will affect the rate at which Ukraine can adopt and implement policies that reflect Ukraine's European choice.

[31] Paul Goble, 'Giving Yalta a new meaning', RFE/RL Newsline 3: 178, Part II, 13 Sept. 1999.

[32] The Communist Party captured 24.7 per cent of the party list vote and 37 of the 114 single mandate seats.

In Russia, too, the current president and government are committed to a European identity (though increasingly with a patriotic and anti-Western tinge). The Duma, however, contains a sizeable number of parliamentarians with fundamentalist nationalist views.[33] In Russia, as in Ukraine, the executive and the legislature are frequently in conflict, making it difficult to adopt legislation which convinces Europe of Russia's commitment to economic reform. Russia faces parliamentary elections in December 1999 and presidential elections six months later. There may be fewer fundamentalist nationalist deputies in the Duma in the year 2000 than in the present parliament, but friction with the executive is likely to continue, at least until there is a new president in the Kremlin. It is too early to predict the outcome of the presidential elections, but the next Russian president will not be more pro-European than Yeltsin.

Ukraine and Russia are extremely sensitive to one another, and particularly to the relationship of the other to Europe. Both are outsiders in relation to the dual expansion of Europe, but each would become even more isolated if Europe (either NATO or the EU) seemed to favour one at the perceived expense of the other. Delicate balancing is required, both in the Russian–Ukrainian bilateral relationship and in the relationship of NATO and the EU to each. And, whatever form those relationships eventually take, Russian and Ukrainian elites and the wider publics they represent all hope that they will be negotiated through discussion with their former adversaries, not imposed upon them.

[33] In November 1999, 257 of the 450 deputies in the State Duma belonged to parliamentary factions identified with fundamentalist nationalist views.