

Engineering consent: the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the mobilization of American public opinion, 1939–1945

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Abstract: The role of private organizations and think tanks in the United States have been well documented. The Council on Foreign Relations in particular has been much discussed—less so, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This article seeks to fill that gap by exploring its influence on American public opinion during World War II. Based upon archival research, the essay examines the background of the key members of the Endowment, their outlook and the impact their work had in shaping US attitudes. Using Gramsci's notion of an 'historic bloc' wedded to the insights of the 'corporatist' school of American foreign relations, the conclusion reached is that the organization—along with other key bodies situated at the interface between the private and public spheres—played a not inconsiderable part in educating Americans for internationalism before the end of the war and the onset of the Cold War two years later.

To 'inform the minds and educate the attitude of this great new sovereign that is taking charge of foreign affairs' (US Senator Elihu Root, 1915)

Introduction

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) is one of the oldest foreign policy discussion and coordinating organizations in the United States. Formed in 1910, it has throughout its history been closely connected with the State Department, successive presidents, numerous private foreign affairs groups and the leaders of the main political parties. Although the Council on Foreign Relations is more generally acknowledged to have been at the heart of 'the American [foreign policy] establishment', Carnegie was also a highly significant organization in the critical period between 1939 and 1945.¹ Indeed, it has enjoyed a thoroughly respectable status within the American élite for 90 years. Yet it remains an organization that has received little scholarly attention. This article tries to fill that gap and, based upon archival sources, tries to show the full importance of the organization during the tumultuous period when American foreign policy shifted so decisively from an 'isolationist' to a more 'interventionist' orientation.²

¹ John B. Judis, 'Twilight of the Gods,' *The Wilson Quarterly*, Autumn (1991), pp. 43–4.

² Robert Divine's study, *Second Chance. The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II* (New York: Atheneum, 1967) provides a valuable, though sketchy, outline of the organization's activities over a quarter of a century. According to Ricard Higgott and Diane Stone, the CEIP remains influential today. See their 'The Limits of Influence: Foreign Policy Think Tanks in Britain and the USA,' *Review of International Studies*, 20:1 (1994), pp. 15–34. Clearly, the 'interventionist/isolationist' dichotomy is an oversimplification; and while isolationism may have been a myth according to William Appleman Williams, it seemed real enough in the 1930s and 1940s. The political actors of the day certainly believed it to be a force in the country (which it was), and their political-economic strategies were constructed upon such an understanding.

As this article tries to show, Carnegie was an important component of the US foreign policy establishment, even though it played no significant role in the actual making of policy itself. But influence can be exerted in a number of critical ways, and CEIP did this in at least five ways: assisting the globalist aims of policymakers; acting as a forum and clearing house for a myriad of internationalist groups; building bipartisan support for US foreign policy; helping challenge and undermine isolationist thinking; and finally in its more general promotion of ideas and policies favouring internationalism. Each of these areas of activity was focused on the importance of public opinion in foreign affairs with the aim of generating an enlightened internationalist citizenry that would back American global leadership in an age of revolutionary change.³

The analysis presented here also points to the emergence of an ‘historical bloc’ in the United States as it made the long, difficult journey to superpower status. This bloc consisted of elements from both the official machinery of state and from private life as well. Carnegie and related organizations were thus part of a ‘hegemonic project’. Such a Gramscian perspective in turn resonates with the corporatist school of American foreign relations⁴ who view this ‘project’ as the outcome of large-scale changes in the structure of the US political economy since 1900. Such changes, they argue, were evidenced by the rise of national and international corporations, powerful interest groups and governmental bureaucracies who together tackled key problems that eluded market-place solutions. The synthesis of such collaboration, according to corporatists, was an ‘organizational sector’ above party politics, market imperatives, and even narrow economic interests. In foreign affairs, this led to the projection abroad of a programme mainly benefiting internationally-oriented, capital-intensive firms and banks, as well as (to a lesser extent) government, farmers and labour. Carnegie with its business-world trustee connections was an important element within this sector.⁵ But it was not a functional bloc in the conventional corporatist sense, but represented the rise of the associations of organized knowledge that characterized the early years of the twentieth century.⁶ It was, in this regard, an intellectual counterpart of the corporatist bloc, the main function of which was to influence the hearts and minds of

³ Joseph Kraft provides support for the view that the CEIP embodied many of the key elements of ‘the Establishment’—defined as a group of men with an ‘Eastern classical, liberal education, moderate-liberal political views . . . rich enough not to worry about money . . . and strongly imbued with the notion that “public office is a public trust”’. Kraft claimed that the US foreign policy Establishment’s historic role was to win World War II and to ‘drive isolationism from the field, to make internationalism not only respectable but beyond serious question . . . to make foreign policy . . . bipartisan’. See his *Profiles in Power* (New York: New American Library, 1966) pp. 187–8. It must be borne in mind that ‘internationalism’ was not a monolithic movement. The CEIP was on the movement’s ‘conservative’ wing.

⁴ Gramsci, *Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971; translated and edited by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith); Robert Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations’, in Stephen Gill (ed.), *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Corporatism, as a concept used by American diplomatic historians, is not as comprehensive as that found in European political science. Corporatism in the former case refers to a far more informal set of arrangements and understandings than those commonly associated with, say, postwar tripartism in Britain.

⁵ Brian Balogh, ‘Reorganizing the Organizational Synthesis,’ *Studies in American Political Development*, 5:1, (1991), p.121.

⁶ Eldon J. Eisenach, *The Lost Promise of Progressivism* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994) is an excellent source for further documentation of such tendencies. See also, Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, *The Politics of Knowledge* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), p. 4.

the American public for globalism and against isolationism. Consequently, its work received firm support from State Department officials, providing an interesting example of what Ellis Hawley has termed the ‘associative state’ of the 1920s, of public-private cooperation.⁷

As Eakins has argued, foundations have been a key aspect of the development of corporate liberalism and, indeed, were a vital component of the ‘corporate liberal establishment’.⁸ Carnegie was also very well-connected with the Council on Foreign Relations, which stood at the heart of this sector.⁹ It was therefore a key intellectual component of the emerging corporatist order, connected with leading corporations, the state and with other key institutions, playing a vital role in the development of foreign affairs public and elite opinion during a turbulent period of American history. It is to these connections that we now turn, as it is these that made its role and influence possible.

Carnegie and the American elite

The original leadership of the Endowment—its Board of Trustees—was drawn from a narrow East Coast élite, with 27 of the 28 Trustees having been born before the Civil War. The Endowment’s authorized history states that they represented ‘the political and cultural establishment that dominated America . . .’,¹⁰ a view endorsed by Alger Hiss, the CEIP’s third President.¹¹

A detailed survey of the Trustees for the years 1939 to 1945 (inclusive) provides an indication of their elite socio-economic status as measured by birth, educational background, region of residence, corporate directorships and membership of other influential foreign policy organizations. On average, the Trustees numbered 28 for each year between 1939 and 1945, although the sample studied equalled 35 owing to turnover of membership. At least some information of the kind sought was available on 33 of the 35 men in the sample from sources such as *Who Was Who* and Shoup and Minter’s study of the Council on Foreign Relations.¹² Of the 27 Trustees on whom generational and regional information was available, seven had been born during the 1860s, ten in the 1870s, nine in the 1880s, and only one during the 1890s. Their average age therefore was between 50 and 70; and their formative years were those of post-Civil War America, the age of the rise of US national and global corporations, US imperialism and progressivism.

At birth, most Trustees lived outside the eastern seaboard (which accounted for 12 Trustees). The East Coast, however, provided the largest single group (by birth) compared with the other regions (Mid-West 7; West 3; South 4; born abroad 3). By residence most Trustees were based on the East Coast: 16 compared with six from

⁷ Balogh, p. 123.

⁸ David Walter Eakins, *The Development of Corporate Liberal Policy Research in the United States, 1885–1965* (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1966), pp. 520, 146.

⁹ Hogan, *The Marshall Plan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 97, 139. See also, Hogan, ‘Corporatism’, *Diplomatic History*, 10, Autumn (1986).

¹⁰ Larry L Fabian, *Andrew Carnegie’s Peace Endowment* (Washington, DC: CEIP, 1985).

¹¹ Alger Hiss Oral History Memoir, p. 50; Carnegie Corporation Project, Oral History Research Office, Columbia University.

¹² Lawrence Shoup and William Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977).

the Mid-West and three from each of the West and the South. In relation to higher education, 50 universities and colleges were listed by all Trustees, as many attended more than one. Twenty-one of the 50 university registrations were with Ivy League institutions, with Columbia (7) and Harvard (6) the most popular. Other elite colleges accounted for a further 18 registrations while ten registrations were for foreign universities. Fifty per cent of the sample of Trustees were also 'career' businessmen (16 of 33), involved in a wide range of economic sectors, with one of the best examples being Pittsburgh's Howard Heinz, President of H. J. Heinz Company from 1919 to 1941. Sixteen trustees were businessmen by occupation: in all, 33 Trustees were either presidents or directors of at least 84 corporations including General Electric and US Steel. Closely connected with the business world were the nine lawyers within the sample, five of whom were partners within their own practices, including John W. Davis and John Foster Dulles.

Several Trustees were highly active in business organizations, particularly Thomas Watson of IBM who played a leading role in the International Chamber of Commerce (as President), was a former director of the US Chamber of Commerce and of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), and member of the Business Advisory Council of the US Department of Commerce. Watson's fellow Trustee, Eliot Wadsworth, was Chairman of the US section of the International Chamber of Commerce (1937–45) and a Director of the US Chamber of Commerce (1934–40). Thirty-three Trustees had at least 42 'associations' with government/politics, including three US Congressmen and one state governor. The largest single agency of the federal government with which Carnegie Trustees were connected was the State Department (7 links), although there were three with the War Department, and one each with the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Of the 42 'governmental connections' identified, 32 (or 76 per cent) were directly concerned with America's foreign relations. Carnegie Endowment trustees were predominantly Republican (8) with four declaring themselves registered Democrats.

Interestingly, the academic world was relatively under-represented on the Board. Ten lectureships were declared by Trustees, constituting over 30 per cent of the sample, although only six of these were career-academics (18 per cent), including Professor James T. Shotwell, historian and international affairs expert (Columbia). In addition, there were three university presidents, including Nicholas Murray Butler (Columbia, 1901–45) and Henry M. Wriston (Brown, 1937–55). There were however ten Trustee connections with the press and radio, one of the most important being William W. Chapin, the Quaker from Philadelphia, who owned a number of regional newspapers in Chicago, Seattle and San Francisco; as did Peter Molyneaux who operated in Texas. The Trustees were also connected with a number of other prominent foreign affairs organizations such as the Institute of Pacific Relations, the League of Nations Association and the Woodrow Wilson Foundation. There were 16 such, but over half (nine) were with one organisation alone: the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and of these, six were CFR Directors.

Finally, most of the Trustees were members of various churches; and although information is available on only 15, all of these were Protestant. There were no Catholics and, less surprisingly, no Jews. Their cohesion was reinforced by membership in a wide variety of elite clubs. Twenty-nine Trustees, between them, held 153 club memberships. 24 memberships were accounted for by only three elite clubs—the

Century (in New York City—10), the Metropolitan (Washington DC—9) and the Cosmos (Washington DC—5). These were prominent as elite clubs but also popular among foreign policy ‘influentials’.¹³

These various affiliations constituted powerful sociological influences upon the lives and views of the different Trustees.¹⁴ Educated in East Coast universities, directors of international corporations, bearers of an elitist but progressive tradition and of a powerful internationalist—not to say imperialistic, impulse—the Trustees were globalists in an age when America was emerging as the balancing factor in the world with a seemingly unblemished record on the colonial question, and armed with moral superiority and a duty to lead.

The Carnegie Endowment’s world view

The Carnegie Endowment was a patriotic and non-pacifist ‘peace’ organization whose opposition to war was not, and was never meant to be, total, especially when vital US interests were involved. Invariably, in times of international conflict, it tended to back the Administration of the day. The leaders of the Endowment may well have appeared from afar to be well-meaning idealists; but upon closer inspection, they were as hard-nosed as any diplomat and policymaker in the world of *real politik*. In fact, Root and Butler were part of an Establishment that was combative by nature, valuing not only ‘virility, adventure, the strenuous life, strife . . .’ but also the ‘role of power in human affairs’.¹⁵

President Butler was a clear example of this muscular, no-nonsense attitude.¹⁶ His internationalism, however, never overlooked national-interest considerations, especially the view that American global influence had increased, was increasing and ought to be increased still further. As early as 1915, Butler commented that America was clearly emerging as a global power with larger ‘responsibility’ in international affairs, and that Carnegie ought to be preparing America to take ‘a new position of leadership’.¹⁷ Absolute commitment to US global leadership notwithstanding, however, there was room in his version of internationalism for a major position and role for Britain. As Robert Divine has commented, America’s internationalists of this period were largely of English/Scottish descent, and were often in awe of Britain’s cultural heritage.¹⁸ President Butler was acutely conscious of his ancestry. Yet sentimental though he may have appeared, Butler remained a hard-headed realist; and while Britain inspired deep emotions, this was not the principal reason for its political importance to the US national interest. This lay in the significance of Britain’s economic and financial role in the larger international system. Butler was

¹³ Shoup and Minter, p.87; p.92.

¹⁴ Dye, *Who’s Running America?* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1979), pp. 166–7.

¹⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 271–3.

¹⁶ In an address to the Pilgrims of New York entitled, ‘There Can be No Isolation,’ Butler consigned to the dustbin the ‘superstition . . . of isolation from world affairs’. The notion of isolationism, he claimed, had been ‘invented by those who have no conception of the facts of our history’. Speech to the Pilgrims, 28 January 1942, in GB I 57—Bound Addresses 1887–1946, Butler Papers.

¹⁷ Trustees annual meeting, 16 April 1915, pp. 6–7.

¹⁸ Divine, p. 22.

adamant that the US economy could only flourish within an expanding and prosperous world economy in which creditor nations like Britain and the USA, were sensitive to the needs of debtor nations.

But achieving leadership of the world, Endowment trustees knew, required a massive and effective campaign to educate public opinion. Indeed, it had been suggested to them by prominent public officials with foreign service experience who had felt constrained by the lack of knowledge and interest in foreign affairs among the population. President Elihu Root stated a working assumption of the Endowment when he observed in 1915 that while the ‘dynastic’ regimes of the world were disintegrating, the forward march of democracy meant new problems. ‘Democracies and the control of democracies brings with it its own dangers’, he warned, especially ignorance, misunderstanding, misconstruction, hasty judgement, ‘ignorance of rights, and still more ignorance of obligations . . .’. To ensure peace, Root concluded, we must ‘inform the minds and educate the attitude of this great new sovereign that is taking charge of foreign affairs’.¹⁹ Root’s attitude to public opinion was not at all dissimilar to that of Walter Lippmann’s as expressed in his 1922 essay, ‘Public Opinion’, in which he defended the need for a specialized democratic elite to ‘manufacture the consent of the governed.’²⁰

Mobilizing opinion

To implement its aims, the Carnegie Endowment subdivided its work into three areas: Intercourse and Education; International Law; Economics and History.²¹ With generous levels of funding—annual interest on the \$10m endowment and other *ad hoc* grants from its sister organization, the Carnegie Corporation—the Endowment was well placed to make effective interventions in the discussion of foreign affairs.²² The bulk of the expenditures were accounted for by the Division of Intercourse and Education, headed by Butler. In 1939, for example, Butler’s division spent over 65 per cent of the total CEIP budget, in excess of \$340,000.

One of the most important areas of the Division’s work was the education in foreign affairs of students across America and abroad. Its programme of establishing ‘International Relations Clubs’ (IRCs) began during World War I and expanded rapidly from 24 clubs in 1918 to over 1200 across the US and Britain, as well as 150 across three continents by 1940.²³ The Endowment targeted the smaller colleges and high schools in encouraging the IRCs because of their relative remoteness and limited resources. The Clubs normally met fortnightly to discuss material sent to them; they also met annually for a regional conference with speakers supplied by the Endowment. Although the number of clubs declined to 775 by 1943, mainly due to the War, US servicemen now began to join the ranks of students, business men and women.²⁴

¹⁹ Trustees annual meeting, 16 April 1915, box 19, file 1231.

²⁰ Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: Macmillan, 1941), p. 248; originally published in 1922.

²¹ Nicholas Murray Butler, *Across the Busy Years* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1939), p. 90.

²² In the year ending June 1939, for example, CEIP expenditure exceeded \$500,000 which, at today’s prices, exceeds \$5 m.

²³ *Divine*, p. 21.

²⁴ Butler, pp. 93–94, *Across the Busy Years*, vol. II; Trustees meeting, 9 December 1940; Trustees meeting, 13 December 1943, p. 40.

The IRCs were supplemented by around 4,000 ‘International Mind Alcoves’ (IMAs) in libraries in small, scattered communities. Consisting of between 30 and 100 books supplied by the CEIP, the Alcoves provided information not only on US foreign policy but also basic cultural and historical information on other societies. During the 1930s, a special effort was made to foster discussion of international economic cooperation most obviously to undermine provincialism and economic nationalism. This reached nearly three million people. In addition, their twelve annual regional conferences were fully and favourably reported in their local newspapers.²⁵ Indeed, it was Butler’s dearest wish to develop the ‘International Mind’ in the US, a set of attitudes that supported international cooperation.²⁶

The Carnegie Endowment’s reach into the American educational system even extended to funding of formal university courses on world affairs.²⁷ From the mid-1930s to the early 1940s, the Endowment also sponsored the Conferences for University Men, organized by the CFR for the brightest graduate students and young faculty of Ivy League and other elite universities.²⁸ Its financing of the Southern Council on International Relations (SCIR) based at the University of North Carolina’s Chapel Hill campus, also had a great, though indirect influence on school and college students throughout the South East. In 1945, for example, Eugene Pfaff, the Director of SCIR, reported to CEIP that the North Carolina Superintendent of Public Instruction had allowed him to place ‘international affairs kits’ in school libraries and had agreed to write to the schools ‘urging the use of such materials by teachers and students . . .’. Through this they would reach 1,150 school libraries in addition to the 100 public libraries they had supplied during the previous year.²⁹

Carnegie leaders were keenly aware of the need to attract newspaper and radio coverage of their work and ideas, and the Endowment’s News Service claimed to be able to gain 150–180 favourable newspaper editorials every month. It also retained a Madison Avenue firm to advertise its policies and literature. In addition, Butler had strong personal contacts with the New York press. Greco shows that, during one year, the *New York Times* alone published 94 CEIP articles.³⁰ It was the ‘novel medium’ of radio however that was deemed to be critical, and the Director of the Endowment’s Economics and History division, James T. Shotwell, was especially prominent in the radio initiative. In early 1940, Shotwell secured from the Columbia Broadcasting Corporation, a contract for a 13-week series of 15 minute broadcasts aimed directly at the isolationist delegates attending the Democratic and Republican conventions.³¹ In 1943, he then secured another 13-week contract for a series of half-hour programmes entitled ‘For This We Fight’, featuring speakers such as the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and John Foster Dulles. According to the Hooper audience ratings, four million Americans tuned-in each week, representing around

²⁵ Butler, p. 94, vol. II; Trustees meeting, 9 December 1940; Executive Committee (EC) meeting, 8 December 1941.

²⁶ Butler, p. 90, vol. II.

²⁷ Divine, p. 21.

²⁸ Conferences for University Men in CEIP Papers, IV: Organizations, CFR, boxes, pp. 354–6.

²⁹ Letter, Eugene E. Pfaff to Malcolm W. Davis, 2 February 1945, in CEIP Papers, box 359, IV: Organizations, file 65395.

³⁰ Op. cit., John Greco, *A Foundation for Internationalism: The CEIP, 1931–1941* (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Syracuse University, 1971), pp. 26–7.

³¹ Trustees meeting, 11 December 1939, pp. 33–5. The transcripts of the broadcasts were sent to listener study groups along with other discussion material, according to Divine, p. 32.

25 per cent of the available audience. From December 1943, the World Wide Broadcasting Foundation was airing CEIP radio programmes, 'Beyond Victory', from over 160 stations in America and by shortwave abroad.³² In Denver, the CEIP also provided financial assistance to the University of Colorado's radio programme on international relations and political issues—'History in the Making'. In addition, the Endowment assisted the Social Science Foundation (SSF) of Denver University, which broadcast its 'Journeys Behind the News', an almost entirely foreign policy-focused series. According to a survey by W. Harold Dalglish of the Council on Foreign Relations, the SSF mailed free programme scripts to 450 regional teachers in advance and to local public libraries; the programmes were regarded as 'required listening' by thousands of Colorado high school students and were also used by civilian and army study groups.³³ In 1944, Shotwell was asked by the State Department 'to edit the texts' of film scripts planned by several government departments, dealing with a range of foreign affairs questions. Seven films were in the process of production, he said, and the motion pictures industry had guaranteed to show them in their theatres. The potential impact of these films was enormous as 80 million Americans visited the cinema each week.³⁴

In addition to the media programme, the Carnegie also distributed its own publications. In 1939, it spent over \$36,000 on the production of pamphlets reprinting government documents and monographs, \$24,000 on its pamphlet, *International Conciliation*, and \$15,000 on the provision of 'public information': a total of \$75,000, or about three-quarters of a million dollars at today's prices.³⁵ In June 1945, Shotwell reported that the organization had sold 20,000 pamphlets, while the US War Department had bought thousands of copies of the Endowment's book, 'Axis Rule in Europe,' for its Army officers.³⁶

Although led by life-long Republicans, the Endowment did attempt to build bipartisanship on foreign policy matters. Considered marginal in the interwar years, with the election of FDR and the development of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Programme of Cordell Hull, many such internationalists began to back the Democrats. Butler, for example, was held in very high regard by both FDR and Secretary Hull.³⁷ He constantly wrote to them, encouraging them to continue on the path of internationalism and US world leadership.³⁸ It was entirely understandable then why isolationist Republicans like US Senator Gerald P. Nye felt compelled to attack what he saw as the 'Willkie-Roosevelt-Carnegie Foundation' axis.³⁹

One of the most important schemes to promote internationalism and bipartisanship was the Endowment's financing of a United Nations Association speaking tour by eight teams of Congressmen in 1943. With one Democrat and one Republican (including Harry Truman of Missouri and Walter Judd of Minnesota) each team aimed to stimulate interest in the internationalist Ball-Hatch and Fulbright Resolutions across all regions of the US. The Endowment's numerous local affiliates backed this initiative. Not only were these speaking tours highly important in

³² Trustees meeting, 6 May 1943; Divine, p.102; Trustees meeting, 13 December 1943.

³³ Dalglish, *Community Education in Foreign Affairs* (New York: CFR, 1946) pp. 8–9.

³⁴ Trustees meeting, 11 December 1944.

³⁵ EC meeting, 30 March 1938; expenses statement, 30 June 1939.

³⁶ Trustees meeting, 11 June 1945, pp. 23–8; Greco, p. 25.

³⁷ Letter, Duc de Richelieu to Mrs. N. M. Butler, 11 July 1944.

³⁸ Letter, Hull to Butler, 30 November 1939.

³⁹ Letter, Malcolm W. Davis to Butler, 21 June 1943.

winning new converts to the cause, they also strengthened the unity on foreign policy between Republicans and Democrats. In December 1943, the Trustees were informed that Senators and Representatives had praised the Endowment's local discussion centres as having 'played a very large part in bringing about the recent votes in both houses' in favour of postwar American global responsibility.⁴⁰

The Endowment also held adult education classes in international economics in the Mid West in cooperation with domestic business and other organizations, with the support of the departments of State, Interior, and Agriculture.⁴¹ It received regular reports from all of its 'cooperating organizations', including the Institute of Pacific Relations, the Mid-West Council on International Relations (Indianapolis), the League of Nations Association, the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, Foreign Policy Association, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, and many more. And through its even-handed approach, it gradually became the only organization which other groups would accept as coordinator of their various activities.⁴² Its leaders were passionately concerned about the fractured nature of internationalist activity and the threats to such efforts from party politics, conflicts between Congress and Executive, and the problems brought about by electioneering. W. W. Waymack, a trustee, for example, helped establish and lead the Non-Partisan Council to Win the Peace in 1943 in order to unite the groups, to coordinate their efforts and to crystallize public opinion.⁴³

One of the CEIP's cooperating organizations, the Commission to Study the Organisation of Peace (CSOP), was led by James T. Shotwell. He also worked closely with the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), writing a series of pamphlets for their membership on international questions. The unions then distributed these to a combined membership of six million workers. Such initiatives were vitally important, for as has been observed, 'labour's support was critical to the Establishment's hegemony in foreign affairs. It provided the crucial link between the higher circles and the average voter and was the most valuable defence against the recurrence of popular isolationism.'⁴⁴

Shotwell's Commission was also connected with a further 250 local groups, to which the CSOP distributed 400,000 items of internationalist material.⁴⁵ Shotwell and his equally energetic colleague, Clark Eichelberger, were (from mid-1942 onwards) members of the political sub-committee of the State Department's Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy. Inspired in part by this relationship, both Shotwell and Eichelberger refocused their attention on public opinion mobilization and established seven regional centres for the study of international relations in 1942; these in turn, coordinated yet more localized groups and forums. Through this work, the CSOP reached thousands of people through public events and distributed 2 million items of literature to 900 study groups across the country.⁴⁶ So important

⁴⁰ Divine, pp. 127–9; Trustees meeting, 13 December 1943; Dalgliesh, p. 3.

⁴¹ EC meeting, 13 December 1937.

⁴² Memorandum, Shotwell to Haskell, 4 March 1942.

⁴³ Memorandum by Waymack, 11 March 1943, in CEIP Papers, IV: Organizations, box 354, file 63759, pp. 1–2.

⁴⁴ Trustees meeting, 6 May 1943, p. 42; Judis, p. 47.

⁴⁵ Trustees meeting, 9 December 1940.

⁴⁶ Divine, pp. 50–5.

was the CSOP in fact that it was the source of 18 of the 42 consultants attached to the US delegation to the San Francisco Conference in 1945. Little surprise, then, that when Shotwell later died, *The New York Times* could write of Shotwell—though this was as much a statement about the impact of the Endowment as it was about him—that he had ‘contributed mightily to the slow and sometimes painful shift in American public opinion from the isolation of the nineteen-thirties to the internationalism of today.’⁴⁷

It was Dean Acheson who suggested that American democracy operates best when it combines boldness of governmental initiative with the mobilizing energies of private citizens who form committees to back such initiatives.⁴⁸ The Carnegie President would certainly have endorsed such a view; after all, he was the living embodiment of such a citizen animated by the spirit of public service. According to Butler, too many men who fought for political office compromised their principles for votes. His own life-long political philosophy was founded up on the ‘distinction between the sphere of government and the sphere of liberty . . . It offers,’ he argued, ‘a sure foundation for the true philosophy of democracy, and it puts government in the place where it belongs, namely, that of subordination to the liberty which called it into existence . . .’⁴⁹ In practice, however, Butler did not maintain such a clear cut distinction and was very concerned that he remain close to Washington policymakers.⁵⁰

Governmental relations

Official policymakers were keen to utilize the opportunities to gauge and to influence public opinion that private foreign affairs organizations offered them: in part because they were sources of free information on the contours of public opinion, partly because they were open to official influence, partly because they were sources of expertise and experience, and partly because if anything did go wrong, they and not the government would have to shoulder the responsibility! And even though there was a formal distinction between private groups and government, one suspects that the former often took ‘a position on policy questions that department officials secretly’ held but could not ‘publicly advocate.’⁵¹

The evidence of such an official consciousness of the role and importance of private organizations is compelling. In practically every department of the New Deal and Wartime administrations, there was a Division or Department concerned with ‘public liaison’ or ‘public information’. From the Office of War Information, through to the Office of Civilian Defence (and its Office of Facts and Figures) to Commerce and of State, there was a keen concern for ‘the demand for leadership in

⁴⁷ Divine, p. 292; *New York Times*, 9 July 1965.

⁴⁸ Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: WW Norton, 1969), pp. 240–1.

⁴⁹ Butler, vol. I, p. 397; p. 13; p. 69.

⁵⁰ Butler, vol. I, p. 397. This attitude was further demonstrated in his widely-rumoured role as Harding’s ‘unofficial’ ambassador in Europe in the early 1920s.

⁵¹ Mark V. Nadel and Francis E. Rourke, ‘Bureaucracies,’ in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 5 (London: Addison-Wesley, 1975) p. 395.

the matter of ideas . . .'⁵² Given the philosophy and practice of Butler and his Trustees, there was always likely to be a very productive relationship indeed between the 'sphere of government' and the 'sphere of liberty.' And while Carnegie's Division of International Law did not formally join the Administration during the Second World War, it did focus most of its energies and expertise upon problems suggested by government officials.⁵³

While Endowment archives indicate that its officers did not set out to shape the government agenda in an aggressive fashion, the same cannot be said for public officials in relation to the Endowment. The State Department and the Office of War Information in particular were especially active in this regard. For example, When OWI Deputy-Director Arthur Sweetser heard that the CEIP was to hold a meeting of former League of Nations officials in August 1942, he immediately informed Leo Pasvolsky in the State Department because of the opportunity the meeting offered to the Department to utilize Carnegie for official purposes.⁵⁴ One of the most important areas of State Department-CEIP cooperation in the area of public opinion mobilization was the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program (RTAP) championed by Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. While Hull appreciated Butler's support, he wanted to take the matter further by securing the Endowment's support in a campaign to influence public opinion.⁵⁵

Another key figure in RTAP-promotion was John B. Condliffe, a Berkeley professor and Assistant Director of the CEIP's Division of Economics and History. In late 1943, Condliffe wrote a memorandum on the importance of international trade stressing that a series of research projects were required and that their results needed to be widely publicized. 'I know,' he said, 'this is what our friends in the State Department would like us to do.' The publicity committee, he concluded, 'should be an action group contacting influential business associations and planning a program of popular education'.⁵⁶ In June 1943, Condliffe reported to Leo Pasvolsky of the State Department that he was eager to do more public opinion mobilization work for the Department, especially in coordinating the activities of 'various important public groups.' He requested a meeting with Pasvolsky with regard to the 'choice,

⁵² Memorandum, JM Jones to Leo Pasvolsky, 'Further Memorandum on Public Relations', 20 November 1942, Records of Pasvolsky (Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 1938–1945), in RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, box 3 (1942) file 12. In addition, see memorandum by Raymond Rich (Chief, Division of Organized Groups) and Peter Cusick, 12 February 1942, in which they refer to the plan they worked out for pro-interventionist groups in New York in 1941–42, in Records of the Office of Facts and Figures, Decimal File of the Director, 1941–42, pp. 330–40, box 15, in RG 208—Records of the Office of War Information, National Archives, Washington, DC. Further references provided in Inderjeet Parmar, 'The Issue of State Power: A Case Study of the Council on Foreign Relations', *Journal of American Studies*, 29:1 (1995). See also, Benjamin Ginsberg, *The Captive Public. How Mass Opinion Promotes State Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1986) pp. 225–6.

⁵³ Trustees meeting, 13 December 1943, pp. 50–51.

⁵⁴ Letter, Sweetser to Pasvolsky, 22 August 1942, in Pasvolsky Papers, box 3, file 10.

⁵⁵ Letter, Hull to Butler, 26 November 1937; Butler to Hull, 27 November 1937, in Catalogued Correspondence. In November 1937, Hull wrote to Butler of opposition groups in America ignorant of the facts while the Department had a surfeit of information to make 'available to the public to offset and straighten out these oppositions'. That the CEIP contributed to the State Department's public opinion offensive is demonstrated by Butler's Annual Report for 1937, outlining his Division's efforts in rural areas to promote the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program among farmers.

⁵⁶ Memorandum, 'The Program of Studies of the Committee on International Economic Reconstruction,' Letter, Condliffe to Watson, 24 November 1943, pp. 1–2, in James T. Shotwell Papers, box 241—Committee for Economic Reconstruction 1940–44, Columbia University.

timing and treatment of these questions . . . so as to give the maximum help to official negotiations . . .'⁵⁷

The relationship of the Carnegie Endowment with various government Departments was clearly very close, obviously cooperative and mutually beneficial. In the service of a state that at the time had little reach outside of the main centres of power and influence within the US itself, the Endowment performed an especially valuable role. It also made it possible for policymakers to exercise influence in the domestic arena through a formally private association privy to confidential information and sensitive to official concerns. There was also the simple issue of effective policymaking. As has been noted, such official-private connections helped the State Department simply because the 'initiative' for a particular idea or policy appeared 'to lie with the outside organizations, [whereas very often] . . . the activities of these external groups' were 'actually instigated by the [state] agency itself.'⁵⁸

But how effective was the Carnegie Endowment in achieving its aims? According to one historian at least, there were a number of different groups during the Second World War—like Carnegie—that although small in number 'were capable of exerting great influence'. Indeed, according to Divine, by early 1945 a Gallup poll reported that 81 per cent of Americans believed that their country should join a world organization with police powers to enforce peace, a big increase upon earlier polls.⁵⁹ A contemporary report written by John Masland in 1943 came to much the same conclusion: private organizations did not create internationalism; however they did help in clarifying issues, crystallizing existing attitudes and mobilizing opinion in a certain direction.⁶⁰ The Carnegie Endowment 'also played an important role in promoting interest in world affairs'⁶¹ As a CEIP Trustee, W. W. Waymack, noted in a letter to Butler in 1942, Carnegie's educational efforts in the Mid West in particular had been especially effective, and over a 15 year period had done an enormous amount to stimulate interest in the world outside. Even in places like Iowa and neighbouring states, education by local people who knew the 'territory' had done a good deal to shift opinion from the parochial to the global.⁶²

Measuring 'influence' and 'effectiveness' is of course especially problematic. That said, the Endowment was certainly perceived to be influential, even (and perhaps especially) by those who sold advertising space in newspapers and on radio. Paul Lazarsfeld has pointed out that the advertising-revenue base of American broadcasting ensured that 'the bulk of the radio schedule' had 'to consist of programs' which reached 'large audiences'; and it appears that those sponsored by the Endowment did. The appeal of the organization's 'serious' broadcasts may well have lain in the fact that the organization established a successful network of 'listening

⁵⁷ Letter, Condliffe to Pasvolsky, 5 June 1943, in Pasvolsky Papers, box 4, file 7, 1943, RG 59.

⁵⁸ Nadel and Rourke, p. 394.

⁵⁹ Divine, p. 22; p. 252.

⁶⁰ Masland, 'Attitudes and Activities of the Organized "Peace" Pressure Groups, 1920-41', 29 March 1943, in Cordell Hull Papers, 'Subject File: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion in 1931-43', Microfilm Reel 35, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁶¹ Divine, p. 21.

⁶² Letter, W.W. Waymack (Editor and Vice-President, *Des Moines Register and Tribune*) to Butler, 16 March 1942, in Norman H. Davis Papers, 'CEIP', box 8, Library of Congress.

groups', to which it supplied transcripts and other material.⁶³ The State Department and other government agencies were equally impressed, and as we have seen were also very keen to utilize the CEIP, both as a source of expertise and for public opinion mobilization. Its massive educational programme had a nationwide reach, as did its series of publications. Politically, its important financing role in sending bipartisan congressional teams across America was considered most valuable, as was its funding of numerous local foreign policy discussion centres.

It could be argued that, given the post-war rise of isolationist sentiment in the immediate post-war years, the Endowment was not as effective as some might have thought at the time. Against this, however, must be set the longer term effects of its educational activities. The Endowment's work was, in part, specifically targeted at 'strategic elites'. As Key has pointed out, it is those 'small blocs of opinion-holders . . . [that] . . . energize—or brake—the machinery of state.' That grouping, once solidified, cohesive and supportive of a particular policy orientation, forms a definite part of the political-ideological landscape with agenda-setting power. And the function of CEIP activity was to provide this grouping with a political vocabulary with which to defend and promote its viewpoints. Moreover, there are strong reasons to suppose that if this work had not been done before 1945, postwar US foreign policy might have taken a radically different direction from the one it did in the end. For by helping create a consensus for internationalism it made it that much easier for politicians to resist the lure of isolation that beckoned when the war finally concluded.⁶⁴ To this extent, it was not just the postwar threat of the Soviet Union but the work done by bodies like Carnegie before the onset of the Cold War that made America's 'rise to globalism' feasible.

Conclusions

The Carnegie Endowment was not a pressure group in the normal pluralistic sense of the word; rather it was an elite group with power and access seeking to strengthen governmental resolve and promote a particular set of foreign policies. It worked closely with government officials; and government officials were keen to work with it and other private groups. This type of partnership was not entirely novel however. As corporatist historian Ellis Hawley has noted, there was already an established tradition (one that had emerged in early twentieth century America) of 'enlightened private orders enlisted in the national service and working with public agencies to advance the common good . . .' Hawley suggests that such a development—the managerial-institutional revolution or organizational synthesis—constitutes 'the core of American history.'⁶⁵ Certainly, the Carnegie Endowment was a policy research

⁶³ Lazarsfeld, *The People Look at Radio* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1946), pp. 11–12; p. 82; p. 95. In an earlier study, Lazarsfeld argued that 'listening groups should be more successful where they tie in with ideological movements;' in *Radio and the Printed Page. An Introduction to the Study of Radio and Its Role in the Communication of Ideas* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1971), p. 127. (Originally published in 1940).

⁶⁴ Key cited by J. N. Rosenau, *Citizenship Between Elections. An Inquiry into the Mobilizable American* (New York: The Free Press, 1974), p. xxxiii.

⁶⁵ Ellis W. Hawley, *The Great War and the Search for a Modern Order 1917–1933* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, Second Edition), pp. v–vi.

and dissemination organization that was part of the new ‘organizational sector’ that bridged the state-society divide and, very importantly, connected the managers with various segments of American public opinion. Hawley asks whether such developments represented a transitional phase in the American state-building process. There is no clear cut answer to this; but there was undoubtedly a trend by agencies of the American state to enhance their domestic infrastructural power in foreign policy debate and discussion. But there was always an ambiguity insofar as private organizations regarded themselves as independent entities—as being for the state but not necessarily of it. Given the voluntarist republican tradition in the United States, such organizations in fact remained profoundly suspicious of state power.⁶⁶

According to Hogan, corporatism is characterized by ‘elites in the private and public sectors [who] collaborate to guarantee order, progress and stability; and . . . [that such] . . . collaboration creates a pattern of interpenetration and power-sharing that makes it difficult to determine where one sector leaves off and the other begins. . . .’⁶⁷ The Carnegie-state relationship would certainly appear to correspond to this model. Its Trustees also behaved in a manner discussed by Gramsci, by joining and, in part, constructing an alliance across social classes, involving farmers, unions and the main political parties. Indeed, it is clear, as both McCormick and Ferguson have separately acknowledged, that there are numerous points of convergence between Gramsci’s ‘historical blocs’ of forces and actors and the ‘organizational sector’ emphasized by corporatists,⁶⁸ and that a synthesis may enhance the ability of corporatism to better explain conflict and change, and the relationship between state and society.

At the heart of the CEIP-state relationship however was a shared world-view, similar cultural backgrounds and a shared hope that America would assume its ‘rightful’ position as world leader. Such ‘ideological’ unity rendered the ambiguity inherent in the relationship between the state and Carnegie unproblematic. The same ‘softly-softly’ approach that made the Endowment a most acceptable ‘honest broker’ among private internationalist organizations, rendered it a most acceptable organization to the foreign policy elite. Together, the state and the Endowment were partners in the development of a set of ideas and policies, and in the dissemination of such ideas and policies, designed to mobilize popular support for an internationalist project to be built on the ruins of the isolationist *status quo*. It was a project, mainly by design, to ‘engineer consent’ for a reorientation of US foreign policy, and the construction of a new world order.

⁶⁶ Hawley, ‘The Discovery and Study of a “Corporate Liberalism”,’ *Business History Review*, 12:3 (1978), pp. 309–20.

⁶⁷ Hogan, ‘Corporatism,’ p. 363.

⁶⁸ Thomas J. McCormick, ‘Drift or Mastery?’ *Reviews in American History*, December (1982); Thomas Ferguson, ‘From Normalcy to New Deal’, *International Organization*, 38:1 (1984).