

# AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL

## SUDAN

3

### Rape of the Nuba

The NIF-run blockade against relief supplies to Nuba civilians in areas held by the Sudan People's Liberation Army may be over. A ground-breaking meeting between the NIF, SPLA and the UN agreed the terms for a resumption of aid following a damning UN report about NIF atrocities in the region.

## SOUTH AFRICA

4

### Down to work

The first real post-apartheid government starts work after President Mbeki opens parliament on 4 February. It will focus on economic and administrative reforms, as much as addressing apartheid's wrongs. Mbeki gets high marks for his leadership of government and his team of political heavy hitters takes shape.

## MOZAMBIQUE

5

### Going ahead

After four years of startling growth, Mozambique is set to be the world's fastest growing economy this year. December's presidential and parliamentary elections were rated as free and mostly fair. The main problems are with Renamo and its ambivalence about working with the ruling Frelimo.

## UGANDA

6

### Kaguta yekka!

Boycotted by the main opposition parties, the referendum on multi-party politics due in five months' time risks becoming an expensive farce. Even if President Museveni wants to bring back multi-party politics sometime, many of his comrades want to continue with his no-party system after he retires.

## POINTERS

8

### Nigeria, Congo-Kinshasa and Senegal

## SUDAN

### Falling out, falling in

**The row over Turabi leaves the National Islamic Front still in charge. It may now announce a referendum for the South**

The National Islamic Front is trying harder than ever to woo foreigners and the opposition, following the noisy quarrel between the NIF founder and leader, **Hassan Abdullah el Turabi**, and the general he promoted to president, **Omer Hassan Ahmed el Beshir** (AC Vol 41 No 1). Even while the insults were flying, General Omer insisted he had declared a state of emergency on 12 December mainly to 'save the dialogue' with the opposition and with other governments. However, Omer's faction of the NIF is no less avowedly Islamist or less determined to prosecute the war against southern Sudanese than Hassan el Turabi's faction.

Since the drama erupted, Khartoum has signed pacts with **Eritrea**, **Ethiopia** and **Uganda**, has successfully solicited backing from **Egypt**, plus **Algeria**, **Libya**, **Qatar** and the **United Arab Emirates**, and has praised a surprised **United States** for its 'change of policy'. Now it is stressing its attachment to the free market and liberalisation, and putting state-owned corporations up for sale.

The new government announced on 24 January is more solidly NIF than before. It includes both supporters (**Abdullah Hassan Ahmed**, **El Tayeb Ibrahim Mohamed Kheir**) and detractors (**Ali Osman Mohamed Taha**, **Ghazi Salah el Din el Atabani**) of El Turabi. Arab newspapers which had announced El Turabi's political demise now headlined 'lack of change'.

Most Sudanese believe the power-struggle was real enough but no serious threat to the NIF. Its favourite target, Egyptian President **Hosni Mubarak**, loudly declared his support for Omer against Turabi (whom Egypt had publicly blamed for the attempt to murder Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1995). Although renamed 'National Congress' last year, the NIF or '*Jebha*' (Front) is still widely known by its old title; it convinced many governments and commentators that Omer el Beshir (rather than the NIF inner circle) had overthrown Turabi, ended Islamist domination and installed a regime of pragmatic soldiers ready to welcome home the opposition and rejoin the international community.

### Leninist methods and religious zeal

The NIF has astutely portrayed Sudanese politics as mainly about personalities and sometimes as battles between civilians and soldiers. For the Western world, democratisation is stressed; for the Arab world, the military and, in particular, the strong leader. The NIF's strongest card abroad is the myth that it only 'cooperates', and not very efficiently, with a typical military government. This veils the NIF's totalitarianism, the complexity of its structures and the dedication of its members. To Leninist methods it adds its members' conviction that they are doing God's will. It is not Turabi who rules Sudan, even less is it Omer: the ruler is the NIF. An internal power-struggle may shake the Front but not destroy it; the dangers come from forces outside itself. This strength and cohesion has allowed Turabi to do more or less what he wants with his creation.

Turabi still holds the purse-strings. He forms companies run by young supporters, which in turn fund militias, special forces and security units. Turabi (68) has long specialised in promoting new cadres - hence the discontent of the middle aged group behind Omer (56). The increasing formalisation of Turabi's power triggered a revolt and a race to overtake him in talking to opposition parties. Hence it was Omer who met **El Sadig el Mahdi**, the Premier deposed in 1989 (and Turabi's brother-in-law) in **Djibouti** in November (AC Vol 40 No 24).

The NIF put its spin on its own power-struggle, because that struggle had been planned by the group behind Omer. Led by Vice-President Ali Osman, this group includes most of the NIF's key leaders, including the 'Group of Ten' who in December 1998 protested to Turabi about his way of running things. Omer resents being a 'figurehead' President and Ali Osman has been Turabi's rival at least since 1986, when he was persuaded to withdraw from the NIF leadership contest.

The public face of Omer's group this December was the NIF Number Three, Ghazi Salah el Din, medical doctor, Libyan-trained tank commander, **Afghanistani-trained Mujahid** and Minister of Culture and Information (which the NIF has made a key portfolio). Another member, it was widely believed, was security buff **Nafi'e Ali Nafi'e**. Whatever the outcome for Turabi, the NIF is still resolutely in place. Omer made this clear by emphasising his Islamist credentials and stressing that

# The men in charge

Lieutenant General **Omer Hassan el Beshir** has for the first time named a 'presidential assistant', plus four presidential advisors, 25 ministers, 19 state (junior) ministers and 25 governors for what are now called 'states'. As is the NIF practice, others with ministerial status may not have been named (AC Vol 40 No 13). The government is solidly NIF, plus token southerners. Omer is still boxed in by 'gatekeepers'; 'nc' means 'no change'.

● **Ali Osman Mohamed Taha**, Vice-President (nc): son of railway worker; from Sijana, Khartoum; secondary school with Omer; led University of Khartoum Students' Union in 1970s; lawyer, then judge; Social Planning (aka Social Engineering), then Foreign, Minister; Muslim Brotherhood MP after President **Nimeiri**'s 1977-8 'Reconciliation'; quiet, efficient operator.

● **Ibrahim Ahmed Omer**, Assistant to the President: aged early 60s; NIF since student; philosophy lecturer, U of K; set up Islamic Studies Department in 'Islamic period' of Nimeiri's reign; NIF MP; senior positions, NIF regime, latterly left his mark as Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research; Group of 10 (protest against **Turabi**).

● Dr. **Ahmed Ali el Imam**, Advisor to the President on Authentication Affairs; previously Advisor, Religious Affairs; Group of 10.

● Major Gen. **El Tayeb Ibrahim Mohamed Kheir**, Advisor, Security Affairs: known as 'Tayeb Sikha' (Iron Bar) since NIF student days; medical doctor; Cabinet Affairs Minister post-1989 NIF coup and reportedly head, 'Islamic' or 'Revolutionary' Security; latterly Social Planning Minister; seen as **Turabi** man.

● Dr. **Nafi'e Ali Nafi'e**: Advisor, Peace Affairs (nc): agriculture graduate, U of California at Davis, **United States**; **Iran**-trained security officer, made major general and head internal, then external, security early 1995; officially replaced August 1995 after assassination attempt on President **Hosni Mubarak**, as sop to **Egypt**; secretly visited **Britain** 1999; Group of 10.

● **Abdel Basit Sabdarat**, Advisor, Legal and Political Affairs: lawyer; Communist, then Nimeiri supporter; defended Nimeiri people in post-regime trials; member, NIF Revolutionary Command Council's Political Committee.

● Maj. Gen. **Bakri Hassan Salih**: Advisor and Presidency Minister (nc): paratrooper; took army HQ in 1989 coup; a chief gatekeeper; ex-security supremo; personally interrogated prisoners, including botanist **Farouk Mohamed Ibrahim**, accused of teaching theory of evolution; ex-Interior Minister; Group of 10.

● **Abdullah Hassan Ahmed**, Cabinet Affairs Minister; Bank of Sudan Governor; latterly International Cooperation and Investment Minister (abolished); **Turabi** man.

● Gen. **Abdel Rahman Sir el Khatim**, Defence (nc): pillar of regime; retired as Brigadier, then RCC's Commissioner for Refugees (key post) 1989-1991; unusually, recalled to army, heading Moral Orientation section 1996-7; then Defence Minister.

● Dr. **Mustafa Osman Ismail** ('Mr. Smile'), External Relations (nc): Director General, Displaced People's Affairs (key post); RCC media expert post-coup, headed parallel foreign policy body, Friendship Committees, e.g. Khartoum-based Sudanese-British Friendship Committee; 1994, SG, **Turabi**'s Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC, officially dissolved 1996); good at being diplomatic.

● Maj. Gen. **Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein**, Interior (nc): Northern Region; ex-airforce engineer; NIF no. 2 in armed forces pre-1985; seen as **Turabi** man.

● **Ali Mohamed Osman Yassin**, Justice (nc): ex-Ambassador to UK and UN; seen as **Turabi** man.

● Dr. **Mohamed Kheir Ahmed el Zubeir**, Finance and National Economy: 55; economist; for long, one of few names in Sudan Foundation 'Who's Who' website run by **Sean Gabb**; RCC Economic Committee 1989; economic portfolios; previously head, Sudan Development Corporation (key post); seen as **Turabi** man.

● Dr. **Ghazi Salah el Din el Atabani**, Culture and Information (nc): medic and biochemist; as postgrad in UK, led Union of Muslim Students; in 1976

anti-Nimeiri attack by National Front (Muslim Brotherhood-Democratic Unionist Party-Umma alliance), he and **Mahdi Ibrahim** (later NIF Ambassador to USA) held off army at main Telephone Exchange; Omer's spokesperson against **Turabi**; married to sister of wife of **Mubarek Abdullahi el Fadl el Mahdi**, the suspended National Democratic Alliance SG; in 1993, told US News 'We represent a new trend in human experience'.

● **Ahmed Ibrahim el Tahir**, Federal Relations: lawyer; NIF MP working for implementation of Sharia early 1989; top legal and negotiation posts; chief RCC delegate to talks with Sudan People's Liberation Army-United and **Lam Akol**, Nairobi, May 1993; active in Zaghawa-Arab reconciliation, Darfur, 1994.

● Dr. **Awad Ahmed el Jaz**, Energy and Mining (nc): Commerce, Cooperation and Supplies Minister 1990; Cabinet Affairs 1993; Sudan-Chad-Libya High Committee and Sudan-Libya Integration Committee 1994; Energy, 1995; crucial to oil project; some Arab media had touted him as new security chief.

● Dr. **Qutbi el Mahdi Ahmed**, Social Planning: was NIF organiser in **Canada**; Canadian passport; Ambassador, Iran; state minister in Omer's office and head External Security 1996; Ottawa police opened human rights investigation 1998 (AC Vol 40 No 1).

● Dr. **El Haj Adam Youssef**, Agriculture and Forests: senior positions, including Governor, Dongola, then Kordofan.

● Prof. **El Zubeir Bashir Taha**: Higher Education and Scientific Research: U of K Vice-Chancellor; committed crusader, often goes south on Jihad.

● Maj. Gen. (Rtd.) **El Tigani Adam el Tahir**: Tourism and Environment: from Darfur; RCC 1989; Chad links.

● Gen. (Rtd.) **Ibrahim Suleiman Hassan**, Aviation: westerner; Deputy Chief of Army Staff, then Chief of Staff and Defence Minister.

● **Joseph Malwal Deng**: Survey and Physical Development: Bahr el Ghazal Dinka; ex-trades unionist; United Democratic Salvation Front.

● Maj. Gen. (Rtd.) **Alison Manani Magaya**, Manpower: Equatorian.

● **Abul Gassim Mohamed Ibrahim**, Health: often unwell; Nimeiri's Vice-President.

● Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin, Transport (nc): Shilluk; chemical engineer; once friend of northern secularists; with **Riek Machar**, broke from **John Garang** in 1991; both later joined NIF regime.

● **Bedriya Suleiman**, Cabinet Minister without Portfolio: only female in cabinet; with **Awad el Geed Mohamed Ahmed** and **El Nayal Abu Groom**, wrote Nimeiri's version of Sharia, 1983's September Laws; resurfaced with NIF in the Khartoum Council.

Among state ministers to be noted:

● Col. **Ibrahim Shams el Din**, Defence: previously Omer's Defence Advisor; 1989 coup-maker in 7th Armoured Brigade; with security buff **Fatih Erwa** (now UN Ambassador) in Juba during 1992 events.

● Ambassador **Ali el Nimeiri** (no relation), Foreign Affairs: as Nimeiri's security chief, reportedly improved conditions for Muslim Brothers; mostly in Ministry of Foreign Affairs since.

● **Amin Banani**, Justice: from Nyala; NIF since schooldays; chaired U of K Students' Union; law graduate; MP; in many NIF bodies.

● Dr. **Ahmed Mohamed el As**, Internal Affairs: active in government departments.

● **Mutrif Siddig**, Peace Affairs (nc).

● **Ali Tamim Fartak**, National Industry: U of K graduate 1969; Bahr el Ghazal Youth and Sports Minister 1977-78; Commissioner, Bahr el Ghazal 1979 then Western Bahr el Ghazal; National Assembly Leader 1982-83; Governor, Western Bahr el Ghazal 1994-95.

● **Mohamed Haroun Kafi**, Federal Relations: Nuba; tried to undermine SPLA by setting up rival group: little success.

● **Gabriel Rorich Jur**, State Foreign Minister (nc): Episcopal (Anglican) Bishop; Church cancelled 'diocesan duties' after he joined NIF regime; used on Western and African forays.

'Jihad' (here meaning the war against the internal opposition) would continue, that the army 'would never let the south go' and that the 'Islamic project' would accelerate, with every primary school turned into a *khalwa*, teaching religion.

Only when the government was named on 24 January did early enthusiasts grow doubtful. The Cairo government, which had been bursting with offers of help (including 'security specialists'), lamely declared on 26 January via Foreign Minister **Amr Moussa** that 'the internal situation is an internal matter but will influence future reconciliation steps'. Khartoum promptly dispatched Gen. **Abdel Rahman Sir el Khatim**, who is still Defence Minister, a second time, with fresh assurances that Turabi had been 'sidelined'.

The new government contains more NIF veterans than its predecessors. Several prominent non-NIF ministers are out, notably **Mahdi Babbo Nimr** (whom El Sadig once handpicked as his Chief of Staff), **Badr el Din Suleiman** (once President **Ja'afar Nimeiri**'s Finance Minister and brother of **Ghazi Suleiman**, who is lawyer to *El Shifa* factory-owner **Salah el Din Idriss**), and Major Gen. (Retired) **El Hadi Bushra**, El Sadig's security chief in 1987, then a co-founder of the opposition Legitimate Command. A dozen or so ministers and governors are security specialists, some covertly. Some previously obscure figures, often promoted from government departments, are NIF cadres dressed up as technocrats.

### Southerners short-changed

As usual, southerners hold minor positions. **Lam Akol**, former leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Army-United, is still stranded at Transport. **Joseph Malwal**, one-time official of **Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon**'s Southern Sudan Independence Movement and previously Minister of Animal Resources, got the new post of Survey and Urban Development Minister: 'The United Democratic Salvation Front is not happy with the formation of the government because we were not consulted, we were totally ignored', he complained.

The UDSF (ex-SSIM) signed the 1996 and 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreements whereby the NIF agreed to a referendum on

southern 'self-determination'. The government has also agreed the referendum principle with Colonel **John Garang de Mabior**'s mainstream SPLA. Yet the NIF also maintains its insistence on unity: we understand Omer told President Mubarak that Turabi, not he, wanted southern self-determination. Southerners are now making a concerted move to demand this referendum. Early last month, southern leaders in the north, including former Vice-President **Abel Alier**, demanded a vote; a **British**-based southern group has been doing likewise; and Riek Machar left Khartoum for Europe two months ago and is now believed to be in Nairobi talking to Garang's SPLA. Many of Riek's soldiers in Upper Nile have defected back to the opposition.

These open demands for a referendum link into what is going on in the IPF, the Partners' Forum of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, which hosts the 'peace process' between NIF and SPLA. Western Partners, including Britain, tell Khartoum IGAD must remain the main forum, ahead of the Libyan-Egyptian Initiative. Many in the opposition National Democratic Alliance, especially the secularist 'New Sudan Forces', agree with this but worry about those pushing for a 'quick fix'. Some Partners respond to the Libyan-Egyptian Initiative by trying to get there first. It will be impossible to hold a free and fair vote in the depopulated south for many moons; Khartoum could announce a referendum as a delaying tactic.

The south's oil resources are a weak point for the NIF. Upper Nile's Unity Field oil project faces a two-pronged attack, which could become three-pronged if Riek's forces and the SPLA cooperate again. The pipeline was bombed again near Sinkat on 16 January; the NDA claimed responsibility, naming the Beja Congress. The BC, led by **Sheikh Omer**, is in the New Sudan Forces, along with the SPLA, Sudan Alliance Forces (Brigadier Gen. **Abdel Aziz Khalid Osman**) and Sudan Federal Party (**Ahmed Ibrahim Dirai**); the Beja are crucial to operations because of their knowledge of the mountainous north-east. Fighters see themselves as descendants of **Osman Digna**, who a century ago, 'broke the British square'.

The NDA's military Joint Command is little affected by the political manoeuvres involving Sadig's Umma Party and its old

## Rape of the Nuba

The United Nations may soon start flying aid to Nuba civilians in areas held by the Sudan People's Liberation Army. A UN-SPLA meeting on 31 January in Nairobi confirmed that relief programmes should start soon. The SPLA hopes this will stem the flight of Nuba into government-controlled areas seeking the food and medicines they lack.

Agreement had been reached at a low-key but ground-breaking meeting of UN, National Islamic Front government and SPLA in Geneva on 15 December. The UN has long overseen the supply of aid to SPLA-held areas in the south under Operation Lifeline Sudan. On paper, the Nuba Mountains agreement breaks the blockade of rebel-controlled areas imposed by the NIF after it seized power in 1989. The blockade has proved one of the most effective weapons in the *Jihad* (Holy War) declared by the NIF government in the Mountains in central Sudan. Yet as in the south, Khartoum may well halt flights at will.

The meeting in **Switzerland** followed two UN assessment missions to the Mountains. The first was fired on by government artillery on arrival and went ahead only after an appeal to Khartoum halted the bombardment. Khartoum officials nevertheless turned up and agreed to SPLA demands that all access to rebel-held areas be by air and not by land from government-controlled areas, and that the Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Society (NRRDS) should coordinate implementation.

In a 158-page report on its visits, the UN Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations (UNCERO) stressed collaboration with the NRRDS in order 'not to undermine the development efforts they have taken so far'. The report said civil society on the SPLA side was 'organised and pro-active', despite 'appalling high mortality'. It added that 'The *de facto* blockade has had severe repercussions on all sectors of the economy and in the provision of social services'. It also highlighted 'raids on villages, looting of livestock, abductions, rape, killing and maiming of civilians including the widespread use of landmines'. Murder, usually following abduction and rape, was the second most common cause of female mortality.

The report said SPLA leaders had 'taken a very strong stand against rape' in recent years and there appeared to be only 'sporadic' instances of rape by SPLA soldiers but neglected to note the evidence that most rape is done by Sudan government soldiers and militiamen, given *carte blanche* to loot, burn and pillage. The UN team had no access to the government's frontline areas or to the appalling 'peace camps'. Asked whether Nuba women were raped there, a 22-year-old Nuba who worked as a peace-camp guard before being captured by the SPLA, told *Africa Confidential*: 'Why not? They are raped in Kadugli'. This is the government-controlled capital of Southern Kordofan. Government troops are once more said to be on the move in the Mountains.

rival, the **Mirghani** family's Democratic Unionist Party (a rivalry also dating from colonial times). The JC's field commander, **Suleiman Milad**, was killed in action in mid-January. He was a northern Christian who regularly led operations to cut the Port Sudan road and liked to paint his name on the tarmac to show Sudan was a multicultural country.

The second prong of the attack on the oil project is the campaign in North America to persuade **Canadian** oil company Talisman to quit Sudan, by asking investors to sell their shares. Film of southern villages burned by government forces to make way for the oil project, along with their inhabitants, has helped to convince many. After the Texas Teachers' and California state pension funds had divested, New Jersey sold shares worth \$17.1 million on 27 January. The state **Chinese** National Petroleum Corporation, hoping to raise capital on the New York Stock Exchange, has hived off its 40 per cent of the Sudan venture to the newly formed PetroChina.

The NJ moves followed the return from Sudan of Canadian government Special Envoy **John Harker**, who had been to investigate accusations that Sudan used its airstrip at Heglig oil-base for its warplanes. The NIF denies this but Harker said of these denials: 'I can say categorically that this is complete, utter and absolute nonsense'. Talisman's British boss, **Jim Buckee**, says Talisman would leave Sudan only by selling its 25 per cent share; **Austria's** OMV and **Italy's** ENI are said to be interested. European Union companies also contributed via **Germany's** Mannesmann (pipeline), Britain's Weir Pumps and **Sweden's** **Lundin** Oil (adjoining concession). Departing **French** Ambassador **Michel Raimbaud** has just been awarded Sudan's top medal, the Order of the Two Niles (First Class). As the USA agonises over missing out and wonders whether to reopen its Embassy, the EU's policy of engagement with the Sudan government is expected to continue.

## **SOUTH AFRICA**

# **Down to work**

## **President Mbeki's new team is better equipped and coordinated - they'll need to be**

The first real post-apartheid government will start work after President **Thabo Mbeki** opens parliament on 4 February, focusing at last on economic and administrative reform, rather than on redressing apartheid's wrongs (AC Vol 41 No 1). The moral cause has shifted from anti-apartheid to pro-South Africa. indeed pro-Africa, where South Africa must lead because it has by far the continent's biggest economy (more than twice the size of its nearest rivals, **Egypt** and **Nigeria**) and more diplomatic clout.

There is a long road to travel. Economic growth at 3 per cent is marginally ahead of population growth; far from creating the planned 500,000 jobs, the government recorded a loss of 600,000 jobs in 1995-98. **Nelson Mandela** and Mbeki, respected on the world stage, have little influence within Africa. Savage wars rage on their African doorstep, in **Angola** and **Congo-Kinshasa**.

Seven months into his term as President, Mbeki is getting high marks from cabinet colleagues and civil service chiefs for his leadership of government business. They say there's a clearer sense of purpose than during the Mandela years, tighter management and more emphasis on outcomes. One price is a much bigger presidency, with 334 staff - nearly six times bigger than Mandela's,

and an annual budget of about US\$12 million.

Mandela delegated much government business to his deputy Mbeki, the President-in-waiting. There is no such role for Mbeki's Deputy President, **Jacob Zuma**, a former African National Congress intelligence chief and Zulu traditionalist, who leads the ANC's work in parliament and oversees relations with traditional leaders. Zuma watched Mbeki's back in the late 1980s, as the party moved towards negotiations with Pretoria. He copes with Chief **Mangosuthu Buthelezi** and Inkatha. Yet he is a junior partner, his office headed by **Dolana Msimang**, one of the four deputy directors general who answer to Mbeki's chief civil servant, the Director General of the Presidency, Reverend **Frank Chikane**.

The Minister in the Presidency, **Essop Pahad**, is Mbeki's close friend from Sussex University, **Britain**, and is Mbeki's enforcer in the ANC parliamentary caucus. However, the Presidency's most powerful servant is the mild-mannered Chikane, who was General Secretary of the Council of Churches during some of its toughest confrontations with the apartheid regime. He is a good organiser, keeping up with Mbeki's arduous work schedule.

## **New Labour, new ANC**

Mbeki's Presidency, like Britain's 'New Labour' government, talks a lot about policy coordination. It has increased government efficiency in four ways:

1. The Presidency's policy-making capacity has been strengthened. The key figure is **Pundy Pillay**, Deputy Director General for policy coordination and advisory services. The Cabinet Office, headed by another Deputy Director General, **Anne Letsebe**, is developing a similar research and advisory capacity.
2. Mbeki demands much of his ministers. He is an effective cabinet chairperson, with an impressive command of detail in each government department, frowning on ministers who refer his questions back to their officials. Six clusters of ministers with related portfolios meet regularly to improve coordination. For the regions, Mbeki schedules monthly meetings with the nine provincial premiers. The provincial governments run most of the educational, health and welfare services which take up almost half the government budget (after interest on debt). Cabinet ministers owe their jobs to Mbeki and may be sacked for poor performance, though some remain surprisingly unsacked, such as Home Affairs Minister Buthelezi, Intelligence Minister **Joe Nhlanhla** and Public Works Minister **Stella Sigcau**.
3. Chikane meets at least monthly with directors general of central state departments and of the nine provincial governments. Major administrative and implementation problems are signalled to Mbeki.
4. Mbeki's kitchen cabinet of political allies and protégés includes Essop Pahad, Chikane and **Joel Netshitenzhe**, the ANC's former propaganda chief, who heads the Government Communication and Information Service. Regarded as extremely clever, with a degree from the Lenin Party School in Moscow, he is able to reconcile, in lengthy policy documents, contradictions between the ANC leadership's views and those of its allies, the Congress of SA Trade Unions (Cosatu) and Communist Party (SACP) - or between what the ANC says and what it does.

Netshitenzhe was the leading member of Mbeki's close friends in exile. Others include **Vusi Mavimbela**, his former security advisor (and, less formally, political enforcer) who was appointed late last year as Director General of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA, domestic security) to replace the much criticised **Sizakele Sigxashe**. Mavimbela, like many ANC security officers, was trained by the **East German** Stasi in the 1980s.

As Mavimbela took over the NIA, two of its former deputy directors general left - former ANC security official **Pete Ritcher** and former apartheid counter-intelligence expert **Mike Nelson**. In 1994, there was a predictably messy marriage between spies of the

old apartheid regime and the ANC's own spies. Mavimbela wants to repair the damage that followed; his leadership of the main intelligence agency puts security firmly under Mbeki, who takes intelligence and security very seriously.

**Billy Masethlha**, former head of the SA Secret Service (SASS, external intelligence), was another of Mbeki's exile protégés. In December, he was moved to be Director General of Buthelezi's chaotic Home Affairs Ministry. Masethlha must turn his mismanaged and corruption-ridden Ministry into a fully-fledged security department, coping with illegal migration and international crime syndicates.

Masethlha's successor at the SASS is **Hilton Dennis**, a former ANC intelligence operative in exile who was formerly SASS General Manager, Counter-Intelligence. His number two, and a strong contender for the top post, is **Barry Gilder**, a former ANC intelligence commander. Mbeki's relationship with the much abused Intelligence Minister Nhlanelahla baffles outsiders. Mavimbela might replace Nhlanelahla, if he does well at the NIA.

Foreign Minister **Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma**, ex-wife of Jacob Zuma, was recruited into the ANC from the Black Consciousness Movement by Mbeki in the early 1970s in **Swaziland**. She is clearly in the inner circle and often spends the evening at the presidential mansion with Mbeki and his wife **Zanele**. This irritates foreign-policy professionals, who criticise her diplomatic efforts. Mbeki's public relations frustrate journalists. **Parks Mankahlana**, formerly Mandela's spokesperson, has improved matters since June and will soon be joined by **Tony Heard**, a former editor of the *Cape Times* who has overseen press relations for **Kader Asmal**, the much admired former Water Minister, who has now been moved to Education, which is in crisis.

## View from Stellenbosch

Several white Afrikaans-speakers get a hearing at the Presidency, mainly on economic topics. Stellenbosch University Professor **Willie Esterhuysen** and his wife regularly dine at the Mbekis' and talk well into the night. Esterhuysen organised secret talks with the ANC in London in 1989, thus threading Mbeki into the Afrikaner establishment. His significance as an advisor should not be underestimated.

Other significant figures are **Moff Terreblanche** (stockbroker brother of Stellenbosch Professor **Sampie Terreblanche**), **Theuns Eloff**, who attended the 1987 meeting in Dakar, **Senegal**, of Afrikaners and key ANC officials, including Mbeki. Eloff now heads the National Business Initiative, bringing other Afrikaner thinkers such as **J.P. Landman** into the 'new SA'. **Brian Gilbertson** is not an Afrikaans-speaker but he funded Mbeki's book and fits well into the Mbeki circle.

As economic imperatives increasingly define the political agenda, Finance Minister **Trevor Manuel** and Trade and Industry Minister **Alec Erwin** grow in importance. So does **Tito Mboweni**, the ANC man who's now Governor of the Reserve Bank (AC Vol 41 No 2). There is applause, too, for the appointment of **Bulelani Ngcuka**, a lawyer and former ANC MP, as 'super Attorney General' and head of the Scorpions, an elite national law enforcement agency. For the first time since 1994, the authorities are tackling the organised crime syndicates that have wracked the country. Other applauded appointments include **Sipho Pityana**, moved from Director General of Labour to the same position at Foreign Affairs, a professional counterweight to the erratic Dlamini-Zuma.

Mbeki's placemen within the SACP and, to a lesser extent, Cosatu, create big difficulties for his left-wing critics within the

ANC-led alliance. Craftily, he arranges that the policies with which the left is most likely to disagree are implemented by ministers who are senior in the SACP. His trusted ally, **Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi**, the SACP's Deputy Chairperson, oversees job cuts in the civil service as Public Administration Minister. **Jeff Radebe** of the SACP Central Committee oversees the privatisation of state assets as Minister of Public Enterprises. **Sydney Mufamadi** of the SACP Politburo imposes changes in provincial and local government that deeply offend the trades unions. But his close friend **Charles Nqakula**, who chairs the SACP and is his parliamentary counsellor, ensures that his programme gets through.

---

## MOZAMBIQUE

# Going ahead

## The government is doing well but the opposition's problems are growing

After four years of startling growth, Mozambique is set to be the world's fastest growing economy this year (according to the Economist Intelligence Unit). Moreover, the presidential and parliamentary elections on 3-5 December were rated as free and, mostly, fair. President **Joaquim Chissano** was sworn in again on 15 January, having won 52.3 per cent of the presidential vote against 47.7 for his rival, **Afonso Dhlakama**; in the voting for the national assembly, Chissano's ruling *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Frelimo) scored 48 per cent and took 133 of the 250 seats, against 38.81 per cent and 117 seats for Dhlakama's *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (Renamo). It looked a solid win, but some analysts have criticised Western observers for glossing over poll irregularities.

The main problems now lie within Renamo, which has remade its image after its apartheid-sponsored terror campaigns in the 1980s. Yet it still looks uncomfortable with democratic ways. At first, it rejected the declared election results, grudgingly accepted them when the Supreme Court declined its suit, then openly contravened the law governing party administration - a provocation that seems designed to undermine the national reconciliation which has underpinned the last few years of political and economic stabilisation.

On the government side, Chissano's new 22-member cabinet brings in fresh blood while retaining its tested core. **Pascoal Mocumbi** remains Prime Minister; other key ministers who keep their jobs are **Leonardo Simão**, **Almerino Manhene** and one of Chissano's close advisors, **Francisco Madeira**. After five years under a civilian, the Defence Ministry goes to a former general, **Tobias Dai**. Renamo may exploit the fact that the President and his two top ministers, Mocumbi and Simão, are all Shangaan, as was the late President **Samora Machel**.

Two growth areas, fisheries and tourism, get their own ministries. There are three female ministers, against only one previously. The new team of deputy ministers, governors and ambassadors has not yet been announced. A few ex-ministers swiftly found private-sector jobs, the fastest being **Eneas Comiche**, formerly Minister in the Presidency for Economic and Social Affairs, chosen the day after he left government to chair the Board of the Commercial Bank of Mozambique.

When the new parliament met on 14 January, international

persuasion, as well as the Supreme Court's finding, had helped to cancel Renamo's threatened boycott. The oldest deputy, who read his colleagues their oath of office, was the 75-year-old Renamo man **Luís Matsangaissa**, younger brother of **André**, the party's first leader, killed fighting against Frelimo in 1979.

**Eduardo Mulembwe** was reappointed Speaker for a further five-year term. The other Frelimo people on the Assembly's Standing Commission are **Veronica Macamo** (first deputy Speaker), **Armando Guebuza** (head of Frelimo's parliamentary group and strongly tipped to succeed Chissano as party leader), **Teodato Hunguana**, **Margarida Talapa**, **Bonifacio Gruveta**, **Mateus Katupha** and **Sergio Vieira**.

Renamo gets seven places on the Standing Commission; its former chief, **Raul Domingos**, Dhlakama's most serious rival, was demoted in favour of the obscure **Ossufo Quitine**. The other members are **Leopoldo Ernesto** (second deputy Speaker), **Vicente Ululu** (former second deputy Speaker), **David Alone**, **Angelina Enoque** and **Agostinho Murrial**.

The parties' regional strength roughly matched that shown by the 1994 elections. Frelimo made some gains in the north but Renamo keeps control over large areas there and in the centre. In the south, where Renamo's vote was insignificant in 1994, it did slightly better this time, which might show that voters want to restrain Frelimo's power. The 5.3 million votes cast represented 74 per cent of registered voters, down from the 88 per cent turnout of 1994 but efforts to register as many people as possible may have unduly swollen the roll).

In fact, Renamo did surprisingly well, considering that it ran a low-key campaign on scant funds, some of which were put up by business people associated with the party. One, **Rahil Khan** (AC Vol 39 No 2), was rewarded by being placed first on the party list for Maputo city. Frelimo's far larger resources included access to state facilities, which it used throughout 1999 in preparation for the contest.

Chissano may take his close call in the presidential race as a warning shot from the electorate. Yet Renamo, having made its protest, demanded a recount and (with its coalition partners) boycotted Chissano's inauguration, cannot now agree on what to do next. Though the law provides that all political parties must maintain headquarters in the capital, Renamo has moved its HQ from Maputo to an office in Beira, inaugurated by Dhlakama on 23 January. This office, managed by party Secretary General **João Alexandre**, is to house the secretariat staff, while Dhlakama keeps his own office in Maputo to coordinate the work of the Renamo-led coalition.

The state-run daily *Noticias* gave warning that Renamo's action marked a new phase of instability and on 24 January, the Justice Ministry referred the case to the Attorney General and Public Prosecutor; they passed it on to the Supreme Court, which has power to deregister the party, thereby disqualifying its representatives and removing both their salaries and the funds they bring to the party. **Máximo Dias**, veteran leader of the *Movimento Nacionalista Moçambicana* (Monamo), wants Renamo to follow the rules and has been trying to cool things down.

Dhlakama says Renamo intends to set up its own administration in the six provinces where it won a majority: this sounds like separatism. After inaugurating the Beira HQ, he duly set out on a tour of party power-centres in the six central and northern provinces and Cabo Delgado, calling it a fact-finding mission to draw up a new strategy. Others thought he was trying to hide the party's divisions and shortage of skilled supporters.

Apart from the demotion of Domingos, several capable Renamo Assembly members have been marginalised, including party Spokesperson **Jafar Gulamo Jafar**, a lawyer. Renamo's first peace-time party congress (AC Vol 40 No 13), originally scheduled for July 1999, has been continually postponed. The congress would enable members openly to debate strategy, rather than wait for their unpredictable leader to improvise a response to events. Dhlakama might not welcome that and feels vulnerable - which is precisely why he has replaced Domingos by the unknown Quitine. Under Domingos, Renamo might modernise itself and present a more credible alternative to Frelimo's successful grip on power.

---

## UGANDA

### Kaguta yekka!

#### President Museveni's popularity cannot hide falling support for 'no-party' politics

The ruling National Resistance Movement says it's not a political party, that political parties are unnecessary, divisive and promote ethnic separatism. It proposes a referendum, to be held between 3 June and 2 July, to ask Ugandans if they want to return to multi-party politics. At present, opposition parties are legal organisations, which may make statements to newspapers though they cannot participate as parties in any poll or hold rallies and demonstrations. Their leaders have already called a boycott of the referendum. The government refuses to change its timing, its (not yet determined) rules or its (as yet unformulated) questions.

The man behind the 'movement' (no-party) system is President **Yoweri Kaguta Museveni**, in power since January 1986. He insists there are big differences between his system of politics and the unlamented one-party states that dominated Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. The NRA, Museveni says, is not a party but an all-inclusive organisation operating at local district and central government levels. The President, widely regarded as an admirable and uncorrupt rescuer of his once desperately divided nation, fends off donor pressure to install Western-style multi-party politics. In this, he is far more successful than his neighbour and old rival, **Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi**.

Moi buckled when donors unprecedentedly cut off aid in 1991, until he made moves to dismantle Kenya's oppressive one-party state. Museveni has been shrewder and can anyway point out that multi-party Kenya remains oppressive and corrupt, as well as bankrupt. He took power as victor in a bloody civil war but since then has never resorted to the state-sponsored violence used in Kenya. Uganda's state corruption, though growing fast, has never been comparable to Kenya's and Museveni genuinely tries to suppress it. His economic policy team is impressive, pushing through deep reforms against deep opposition.

As philosopher-king, Museveni argues that multi-party politics can't work in Uganda till there is a substantial, prosperous and educated middle class. Without that, it will return to the ethnic violence it knew under Presidents **Milton Obote**, **Idi Amin Dada** and others. Yet the pressure is mounting. Museveni's government is losing popularity; after a decade of growth rates above 8 per cent, the economy is slowing down. Uganda's intervention in **Congo-Kinshasa** is widely seen as pointless and ruinously expensive. Nobody seriously thinks that Museveni and his NRM will lose the referendum but without organised opposition, the vote would be no

more than an expensive farce, failing either to boost the government's legitimacy or to help its critics.

The elections for a Constituent Assembly in 1994 brought an 87.5 per cent national turnout. By contrast, the multi-party referendum is a mess. The government could have tweaked the rules and extended the campaigning time, to allow most opposition parties to participate. Those in government who favour that approach say it's now too late.

Political parties as such are banned from campaigning and denied state funds (which the NRM, advocating the 'movement system', would receive). The main opposition parties are long-established: the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), Democratic Party (DP) and a faction of the Conservative Party (CP). Newer parties and pressure groups opposing the referendum include JEEMA, headed by a failed 1996 presidential candidate, **Muhamad Kibirige Mayanja**; the Free Movement (TFM), mainly academics from Makerere University; and the National Democratic Front.

Last July's Referendum Act provides for supporters of both sides - the movement and multi-party systems - to form National Referendum Committees (NRC), funded by the Electoral Commission. In October, Museveni named the 20-member Movement National Referendum Committee (MNRC). It is headed by Al Hajj **Moses Kigongo**, Vice-Chairperson of the NRM, who was also head of Museveni's presidential campaign in 1996, and includes twelve ministers and seven Members of Parliament. Opposing them, the Multi-Party National Referendum Committee (MPNRC) consists of several new political groups led by obscure novices, whom the mainstream opposition parties accuse of being NRM decoys. The MPNRC's Chairperson is **Nelson Ocheger** of Action for the Restoration of Democracy, a 34-year-old former journalist. Its members deny any connivance with the NRM, saying their opposition party critics are discredited party hacks. A founder member of Action for the Restoration of Democracy, **Charles Rwomushana**, has pulled out over money wrangles.

## The donors' call

Diplomats from the European Union, **Japan** and the **United States**, chaired by the **British** High Commissioner, **Michael Cook**, form the donors' Referendum Group 2000. They have been trying to get the opposition to stop the boycott, arguing (like the NRM) that the referendum is required by the constitution, which must be respected. Cook said in December that the best way for those who want a different system would be to participate fully in the referendum. He added that by boycotting it, oppositionists were running away from responsibility and failing to prove their popular support.

Opposition members reply that the constitution-making process was manipulated by the NRM. They point out that elsewhere in Africa, donors tie financial aid to democracy and good governance - yet they support the NRM's monopoly of power. International groups such as New York-based Human Rights Watch regard the NRM as indistinguishable from a state-funded political party. The donors, having pledged about US\$3 million towards 'civic education', set benchmarks for assessing the referendum's fairness, transparency and inclusiveness.

The referendum also divides the NRM, where there is growing criticism of state corruption and arbitrary rule. Last November, Colonel **Kiiza Besigye**, a former National Political Commissar and now a Senior Advisor to the Defence Minister, wrote a paper detailing opportunism, dishonesty and arbitrariness in the NRM leadership. Besigye, a key member of the NRM (and Museveni's doctor during the guerrilla war) argued that the Movement's broad-

based inclusiveness had been eroded in the pursuit of short-term political gain. His paper provoked much soul-searching but, in December, Museveni told the Parliamentary Movement Caucus that he must face a court martial. Officers aren't supposed to discuss political issues without permission. Besigye is unapologetic and there has been no court martial.

The NRM's National Political Commissar, **James Wapakhabulo**, concedes that there are factions within the Movement. Outspoken member of parliament **Winnie Byanyima** argues that the NRM should compete for power like any other party. The Ministers of Public Services, **Amanya Mushega**, and Constitutional Affairs, **Jehoash Mayanja-Nkanji**, agree. Some NRM dissidents want a return to multi-party politics through a credible referendum; others argue that, whatever the referendum says, multi-partyism is inevitable and the NRM should prepare for it. Hardliners, such as the suave Minister of State in Charge of Regional Cooperation, **Amama Mbabazi**, say political parties have got nothing to offer Uganda and never will have.

The NRM would win any referendum, whatever its rules. It might then imitate **Tanzania's** ruling party a decade ago. Tanzanians voted by referendum to continue the one-party state but leaders of the single party, *Chama cha Mapinduzi*, decided nonetheless to open up to multi-party politics. More and more strategists in the NRM argue that the aim should be to manage the pressure for change, rather than fight a losing battle. Wapakhabulo warned that the NRM shouldn't just continue in power simply because the people said so in a referendum. Museveni's NRM derived its legitimacy from the atrocities committed by previous multi-party and military regimes; young voters who did not experience those horrors are less convinced and ask the NRM why it won't compete.

Museveni himself is the product of past political disasters and his best argument against parties is their appalling record. Few believe that, under him, the NRM can revert to a multi-party system that failed. In 1989, the NRM was supposed to be getting ready to return to multi-party politics but parliament extended its term by five years. Museveni used this to prepare a new constitution, organise elections, defeat some armed rebels and start rehabilitating the wrecked infrastructure. He also ensured that the movement system (no-party politics) was constitutionally entrenched.

Whatever he now intends (and he still keeps in close touch with the grassroots) some senior NRM people want the system preserved. In 2001, Museveni is set to be elected for his last five-year term. NRM frontrunners believe they'll do better if the succession race is run without distractions from opposition parties.

### Visit our website at: [www.africa-confidential.com](http://www.africa-confidential.com)

Published fortnightly (25 issues per year) by Africa Confidential, at 73 Farringdon Road, London EC1M 3JQ, England.  
Tel: +44 171-831 3511. Fax: +44 171-831 6778.

Copyright reserved. Edited by **Patrick Smith**. Deputy: **Gillian Lusk**. Administration: **Clare Tauben**.

Annual subscriptions, cheques payable to Africa Confidential in advance:  
UK: £278      Europe: £278  
Africa: £258      US:\$697 (including Airmail)  
Rest of the World: £361  
Students (with proof): £79 or US\$126

All prices may be paid in equivalent convertible currency. We accept American Express, Diner's Club, Mastercard and Visa credit cards.

Subscription enquiries to: Africa Confidential, PO Box 805, Oxford OX4 1FH England. Tel: 44 1865 244083 and Fax: 44 1865 381381

Printed in England by Duncan Print and Packaging Ltd, Herts, UK.

ISSN 0044-6483

# Pointers

## NIGERIA

### Russian steal

At least five major Western banks were involved in the transfer, in 1996 and 1997, of 973 million Deutschemark (US\$512 mn.) of Nigerian state funds to accounts linked to the son of the late military leader, General **Sani Abacha**, and his business associates, according to documents uncovered in a London High Court case. The Nigerian government is suing Abacha's son **Mohammed** and his associate **Atiku Abubacar Bagudu** for renegeing on an out-of-court deal last August for the return to the Nigerian Treasury of the funds in dispute.

The Court case centres on a Nigerian scheme to buy back some \$1.5 billion of debt owed to **Russian** state contractor Tiajpromexport, owed for building the non-functioning Ajaokuta Steel complex. The trial opened on 1 February and may run for six weeks. The involvement of Western banks in Abacha's and Bagudu's transactions will fuel demands for tighter controls on banks transferring vast amounts of state funds into private bank accounts.

The Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd., according to the document, played a leading role in structuring the debt buy-back. The Nigerian government alleges more than \$270 mn. was diverted into accounts controlled by Abacha and Bagudu. Mecosta, a **British** Virgin Islands' company set up by Mohammed Abacha, his late brother **Ibrahim**, and Bagudu, acted as intermediary in the purchase of the Russian debt. The Central Bank of Nigeria, under Governor **Paul Ogwuma**, disbursed at least two tranches of DM486.5 mn. in May 1996 and April 1997 for the purchase of Russian bills of exchange.

The CBN's payments to Mecosta were based on a buy-back price of 53 per cent of face value but in fact, the Russians were selling it for just 26 per cent of face value. Nigerian officials say that Mecosta and its directors took the other 27 per cent and diverted it into accounts held by several companies linked to Bagudu and Abacha.

Instructions from **Anthony Ani**, then Minister of Finance, show that a first payment equivalent to \$317 mn. in May 1996 was made to the London branch of ANZ, which had been nominated as escrow agent for the bills of exchange. According to Bagudu, it was ANZ bankers who originally sought to broker the transaction for Mecosta. In October, instructions were given by Ani for a further tranche to be paid into Mecosta's Citibank and Merrill Lynch accounts in Frankfurt. The deal was concluded when a final tranche of \$317 mn. was transferred into Mecosta accounts with Goldman Sachs and Citibank in Zurich and New York.

The Nigerian government's efforts to enforce its deal with Bagudu last August are complicated

by an earlier agreement endorsed by the Attorney General **Kanu Agabi**, between Bagudu and the *Compagnie Noga*. *Noga*, which built the grand Hilton Hotel in Abuja, is owned by **Swiss**-based tycoon **Nessim Gaon**, who first began brokering the buy-back in 1991. Russia owed Gaon for barter commodity deals he had arranged and agreed to surrender bills of exchange on the Ajaokuta debt if the Nigerian government would endorse the deal. Gaon claims he was later cut out by Abacha in favour of Mecosta. Parallel actions by Gaon and the Nigerian federal government have succeeded in freezing over \$700 mn. in Swiss accounts.

## CONGO-KINSHASA

### UN-convincing

Almost all the participants claimed victory in the United Nations Security Council's special session on Congo-Kinshasa, convened by **United States'** Ambassador **Richard Holbrooke** on 24-26 January. US and **British** diplomats speak of real progress on getting a UN force into Congo. UN officials are to draw up detailed proposals for the despatch of a military observer force of 500 plus another 5,000 troops for logistical back-up. They would make up the Joint Military Commission's monitoring force. By the end of this month the UN Security Council is expected to authorise the despatch of this force.

But questions remain about the mandate it will have: a purely non-interventionist military observer role or a more robust brief for the troops to take offensive action to protect civilians and prevent atrocities. Most of the troops would be drawn from UN member states in Central and Southern Africa, with some technical officers from Europe and North America. The plan is to use **Zambia** as the base for one of the UN's biggest peacekeeping operations.

But unless the various government and rebel armies in Congo end the fighting, there's little hope of substantial Western backing for any UN force. Holbrooke's meeting did make headway on implementing last August's Congo peace agreement signed in Lusaka, specifically on the pursuit and disarming of the *ex-Interahamwe* forces operating alongside Congolese government soldiers and on the promotion of Congo's national dialogue on political reform.

President **Laurent-Désiré Kabila** insists he didn't give an inch. Beaming, notably plump, applauded by his Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Information, flanked by his American lobbyists and wearing an *abacost* jacket like those once sported by **Mobutu Sese Seko**, Kabila said all his concerns had been met, gleefully but inaccurately claiming that Britain and **France** had named **Rwanda** and **Uganda** as aggressors.

The Rwandan, Ugandan and Congolese rebel delegations, all of whom met with senior UN officials and Western ministers, also claimed progress had been made. But the more

independent opponents of Kabila saw things differently: **Jean-Pierre Bemba's** Uganda-backed *Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo* (MLC), said it was not worth turning up; **Etienne Tshisekedi**, chief of the most powerful unarmed opposition movement, preferred to make a trip to **South Africa** to see **Nelson Mandela**.

## SENEGAL

### Positively 4th street

President **Abdou Diouf's** plans for a fourth term in office face two big obstacles in the 27 February elections: growing militancy and coordination among the opposition parties and **France's** dwindling enthusiasm for propping up African incumbents. And if things go badly wrong, Senegal's army may decide to follow the **Ivorian** example (AC Vol 41 Nos 1 & 2) and step between the warring politicians. For now, the usually fractious opposition parties and the leading candidates, **Mustapha Niasse**, **Djibo Kâ** and **Abdoulaye Wade**, have formed the *Front pour la Régularité et la Transparence des Elections* to press for a clean vote. They can't agree, though, on a common presidential candidate to face Diouf.

The opposition has discovered that two sets of ballot papers have been printed, one in Senegal and one in **Israel**, by the Compaq company. The Interior Minister, General (Rtd) **Lamine Cissé**, who's not linked to any party, said he had ordered the papers without consulting Diouf or the the First Secretary of the ruling *Parti Socialiste*. Oddly, he claimed the two sets of ballots would prevent fraud.

Diouf's old adversary Wade, head of the *Parti Démocratique Sénégalais*, called for demonstrations and protests from 2 February and threatened that party militants would meet any attack by the gendarmerie 'blow for blow'. Both Kâ, an ex-PS member and leader of the *Union pour le Renouveau Démocratique*, and former Foreign Minister Niasse of the *Alliance des Forces du Progrès* say they'll release embarrassing inside information about the PS and Diouf's record in office.

Like their predecessors, the last national elections in 1993 ended in violence, accusations of fraud and the gaoling of opposition candidates. These polls seem set to follow the pattern. The Quai d'Orsay in Paris is taking a less overtly engaged stance on elections in Francophone states since the Ivorian coup. It would be difficult for Premier **Lionel Jospin** to shore up a disputed victory by Diouf if the opposition showed convincing evidence of fraud. President **Jacques Chirac** is more likely to help: he is godfather to Diouf's youngest daughter and we hear of financial cooperation between Chirac's Gaullist *Rassemblement pour la République* and Diouf's PS. But as the Abidjan coup proved, there are strict limits to the French presidency's interventionist powers these days.