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Dimensions of state disruption and international responses

AMIN SAIKAL

ABSTRACT *In the post-Cold War period there has been a dramatic increase in the number of states which can be classified as* disrupted, *thus creating a major source of political, social and military turbulence and instability in world politics. The causes have been varied, ranging from the fragmentation of the national elite and breakdown of social order, ethnic antagonisms, ideological struggle, confessional or sectarian strife to legitimacy crises and separatism. This has focused attention once again on the future of the international system. This paper considers the nature of disrupted states, the external and internal sources of the disruption, and the options that are available to the international community, in particular whether there is an appropriate role for the United Nations.*

One of the most striking features of the post-cold war world is the dramatic increase in the number of states which in a variety of ways can be classified as *disrupted*. This has constituted a major source of political, social and military turbulence and therefore of potential or actual instability in world politics. While the causes of disruption have been numerous, stemming from both internal and external factors, the emergence of such states has quite properly rekindled debate on the future of the international system as one made up of an explosive mix of 'cohesive' and 'disrupted' states.

This paper has three objectives. The first is to look at variations in the form of the state, and forms of state–society interaction, and to outline what constitutes a disrupted as opposed to a cohesive state. The second is to examine the internal and external sources of disruption. The third is to touch on some responses which are available to the international community, especially in terms of conceiving an appropriate role for the United Nations. To illuminate its discussion the paper will draw on the examples of a number of states, but with a focus primarily on Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Pakistan.

Forms of state

At the start of the 21st century, debate about the role of states as political and territorial actors, and about their viability as building blocks of a stable post-cold

Amin Saikal is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (The Middle East and Central Asia) at the Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia.

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war international system, has gained potency. We are often warned of the increasing inability of states to cope with growth in social and economic disparities, scarcity and maldistribution of resources, and ethnonationalist demands and conflicts at both subnational and national levels (as examples of factors pressuring states from 'below'); and with the internationalisation of forces of the market, finance, mass communications, technological innovation, cross-border migration and environmental challenges (as examples of variables challenging states from 'above'). Some scholars have strongly argued that these have not only eroded state sovereignty, with some states fragmenting and losing their sovereignty so that in general the 'end of state sovereignty' may be in sight,[1] but have also rendered the statist international system obsolete and ineffective.

By contrast, others have suggested that, while anti-statist forces and disrupted states in the international system have increased in number and, in some cases, reached the point of being 'out of control',[2] so that disrupted states have become a main source of instability, this is more a manifestation of adjustments necessary in the transition from Cold War to post-cold war politics than anything else. They maintain that there is a variety of disrupted states, with some of them even having various 'hidden strengths'. As such, they contend that statism is still the dominant, functional factor in world politics and that this may remain so for the foreseeable future. Some argue that most of the statist power elites have skilfully managed the forces of globalisation and manipulated them in pursuit of their statist goals.[3]

Whatever the merit of these perspectives, it is clear that today the international system comprises states which range from the extremely cohesive to the highly disrupted. There has been in the 1990s a steep rise in the number of disrupted states, in both the political–administrative and territorial meaning of the words, with varying functional capacities. But, before proceeding any further, it is important to state what is generally meant in this paper by a 'cohesive' and a 'disrupted' state.

Perhaps the most important form of cohesive state is the democratic 'Westphalian' state, which is, as Georg Sørensen puts it, a consolidated nation-state with its own structural dynamic and relative autonomy. The relative strength of such a state can be measured by the degree to which it is characterised by the rule of law, tolerant pluralism and a vigorous civil society, as well as by the extent to which the state has the capacity to deliver services and to cope effectively with pressure from above and below. It is generally argued that the strength of this type of state is a normative reflection of the strength of society. Another form of cohesive state, but of somewhat diminishing significance given the transitions to democracy which have marked the past two decades,[4] is the territorial unit ruled by a stable autocracy, either totalitarian or sultanistic in form, marked by an ideologically unified elite and the exercise of non-legitimate forms of domination.

On the other hand, a disrupted state is what Sørensen refers to as 'the post-colonial state', that is, the unconsolidated state in the periphery, often in an ongoing state of entropy.[5] The degree of disruption within such a territorial unit can be further measured by an assessment of such variables as personalisation

of politics, national divisions, arbitrary imposition of ideologically driven values and practices, as well as the degree to which the state is incapable of reflecting the complexity of society and managing pressure from above and below. It is also such a state which is often vulnerable to being physically ruptured, ending up in a situation of open civil conflict, foreign intervention or even occupation, and collapse of political, administrative and organisational arrangements, with its sovereignty either strained, eroded or divided. Disrupted states need not be suffering from complete state 'failure' or 'collapse'; rather, they are marked by varying *degrees* of incapacity, some of which can leave the remnants of the state as a significant player with which international actors may need to engage. It follows that disrupted states can come in different forms, of which five have proved to be fairly common.

The first comprises those states which have erupted into open conflict but have remained accepted as independent units within the international system, such as Afghanistan since 1978, Lebanon during its recent civil war (1974–1989) and Somalia after the overthrow of the regime of Mohammad Siad Barre. In each case, the standard criteria for the existence of a territorial state had been satisfied at some point in the past,[6] leading to widespread recognition of its distinctiveness. It is these states which are most likely to be labelled 'failed' or 'collapsed' states.[7]

The second comprises those which are contested by their neighbours in such a way as to thwart their attempts to secure a high-level of consolidation. Such disrupted states are often part of the detritus of the breakup of larger autocracies, and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, admitted to the United Nations on 22 May 1992 but subjected to an ongoing and orchestrated challenge from its Serbian neighbour, is a painful contemporary example.

The third comprises 'embryonic' states, in the form of territories occupied in circumstances of contested legality in which occupying forces are under challenge from local populations: powerful examples can be found in pre-independence Namibia, the Baltic States, East Timor, and to some extent Kashmir. Here the combination of compromised international legitimacy and contested local control is the key constituent of disruption.

The fourth comprises states which are being punished for either violating international law or international norms of behaviour and challenging the interests of a major power, as in the cases of Iraq in the wake of its 1990 invasion of Kuwait, or of Yugoslavia over its human rights violations in Kosovo and defiance of the United States and the European Union. Their disruption is reflected in a loss of control of territory or airspace to agents of the international community.

The fifth comprises states which are not in a situation of open disintegration but are gripped by strong undercurrents of instability and are held together mainly by the military as the most potent uniting force in the country. A prime example of such states is Pakistan, where political and social divisions, lack of a clear sense of national identity, economic decay, decline in law and order, escalation of violent sectarian and ethnic confrontation, and endemic corruption have seriously undermined the state's structures and governing apparatus. Had it not been for the country's military and security forces as its most important

centralising factors, some would argue that Pakistan would have faced disintegration sooner rather than later. It is also in this context that Pakistan's acquisition of a nuclear capability makes the country a peculiarly dangerous state.

Forms of disruption

Of course, the forms of disruption in these territorial units are many and varied, and can be either internal or external or both. The internal causes can be of various types.

First, they can stem from fragmentation of the national elite and breakdown of social order. No country better illustrates this than Somalia, where, following the overthrow of the regime of Mohammed Siad Barre in a popular uprising in the late 1980s, the national elite disintegrated, and revolutionary forces lost their unity of purpose and turned their guns on one another along the lines of personality, clan and tribal differences. As the fragile state structures collapsed, no single dominant group could emerge to fill the power vacuum and generate a necessary degree of national cohesion and national order. The overall effect was that Somalia's sovereignty was divided, plunging the country into a long-term state of group conflict—a conflict which continues to this day, and which has defied a series of international efforts to bring it to an end.[8]

Second, disruption can be driven by ethnic antagonisms, which in the absence of a robust state and corrective processes lead to open social conflict.[9] The intensity of conflict may be deeper in the states which are generally characterised as 'dual-ethnic' rather than 'multi-ethnic' states. A clear example of this is Rwanda, where in 1994 the conflict between ethnic Tutsis and Hutus resulted in one of the worst cases of genocide in history.[10] Although the level of violence has been contained, the factors underlying the conflict remain unresolved.

Third, disruption can be a product of ideological struggle, as in the case of Cambodia and Afghanistan. Whereas Cambodia from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s was dominated by a struggle between Marxists of various stripes, as well as more pro-Western forces, Afghanistan was disrupted by contestation between Soviet-backed communists and Islamists in the 1980s.[11] The result in both cases was the incapacity of the state to function as a consolidated whole, to exercise sovereignty over its internationally recognised territory, or to claim the degree of distributive power which could generate a high level of national cohesion.

Fourth, disruption can have confessional or sectarian roots, as in the case of Lebanon during its civil war, or Afghanistan since the rise to power of the ultra-orthodox Taliban militia from 1994. The Lebanese civil war had a strong confessional and sectarian dimension underlined by a conflict between not only the Muslim and Christian segments of its population but also within each of these segments along more specific sectarian lines. Although with regard to Afghanistan this dimension has been limited to the conflict between the dominant Sunni Taliban and the Shi'ite minority, it has nonetheless deepened the problems of Afghanistan as a disrupted state, most notably when the Taliban massacred 2000 Hazara Shia in August 1998.[12] In this respect, another illus-

tration is the civil war-ridden Sudan, where the northern Muslim majority has been locked in a protracted violent conflict with the southern Christian and animist minorities, at the cost of rupturing the Sudanese state for years.

Fifth, disruption can arise from the collapse of the revenue base of the state, and this may be through loss of foreign aid or domestic sources of income. For example, had it not been for a sharp decline in foreign aid, in the mid-1960s, especially from the US, Afghanistan might have not fallen prey to serious economic difficulties and consequent political disruption in the 1970s. This development was critical in making the country vulnerable to political–social unrest and a Soviet-backed communist takeover, disrupting the country to its foundations.[13] Similarly, the Iraqi state's distributive powers and social–economic programmes might not have been curtailed and it might not have lost control over the country's northern and southern parts, if it were not for its loss of oil revenue in the wake of the UN embargo following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Although the imposition of the UN embargo has paradoxically enabled the Iraqi regime to regain some of its political and social control through the distribution of rations, it still does not compensate for the degree of disruption that its loss of full oil revenue has generated.

Sixth, internal disruption can stem from a specific legitimacy crisis, especially through the loss either of traditional mechanisms of legitimation and the ability to institute a viable alternative, or of a charismatic leader. This has particularly been true in the case of Afghanistan, where, following the communist coup of 1978, the traditional process of elite settlement and elite legitimation, backed by a Grand Council (*Loya Jirgah*) representing different social strata, irrevocably broke down, leaving the communists and their successors without any process of legitimation with which a majority of the Afghan population could identify. In respect of the loss of a charismatic leader, the case of Yugoslavia is most notable. The death of President Josip Broz Tito generated a legitimacy crisis which his successors could not arrest or rectify—a crisis which played a pivotal role in the subsequent disintegration of Yugoslavia and rupture of its core, ie Serbia. The same, to some extent, was true of Ethiopia, where the overthrow in 1974 of the long-standing Emperor Haile Selassie plunged the country into a state of political, economic and ideological disarray for nearly two decades.

Seventh, disruption can also arise from separatism on regional, ethnic and religious grounds. This is illustrated not only by the case of Sudan, but also the embryonic states of Kosovo and Jammu and Kashmir. Separatism on regional and ethnic grounds also explains the Kurdish struggle for a state of their own, which in relation to Iraq has helped further to weaken the Iraqi state, and in regard to Turkey has resulted in protracted violent unrest in the country's Kurdish-dominated southeast.

Internal sources of disruption are often paralleled, or even driven, by *external* sources, which are themselves many and varied. They include direct foreign intervention, as in the case of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia; 'creeping invasion', as in the case of Pakistan's attempt to gain control over Afghanistan through the Taliban militia;[14] funding of separatism, as in the case of assistance by Iran under the Shah to the Iraqi Kurds,[15] and recently Syria's help to the Kurdish PKK to enable Kurdish

secessionism in southeastern Turkey; and unintended destabilisation from events occurring elsewhere, as may arise through refugee flows, or increased apprehension on the part of minorities as they witness discrimination of co-ethnics elsewhere.[16] The influx of large numbers of Afghan refugees into Pakistan following the Soviet invasion and the degree of long-term dislocation and resentment that this generated in the country, especially in its Northwest Frontier Province, is a case in point.

In almost all cases the depth and breadth of disruption, and the intensity of conflict, prove severe when internal causes are accompanied by external ones. In such situations, disruption can be more enduring and resistant to a viable resolution than is the case otherwise. Afghanistan, once again, provides one of the most potent examples in this respect. Although the causes of disruption were initially rooted in the domestic situation of the country, where the disintegration of the national elite, crisis of legitimacy, mosaic nature of the society and the decline in foreign aid interacted to undermine national stability, it was ultimately the Soviet intervention and the processes of counter-intervention by the international opponents of the USSR which fundamentally destructured Afghanistan.[17] This altered the internal dynamics of the country so much that more than a decade after the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan remains wide open to frequent realignment between internal and external forces determined to maintain the status of the country as a disrupted state for a long time to come. As the Soviet invasion compromised domestic power structures, Pakistan as the key regional player countering the invasion relied on the changed domestic structures to enforce its own 'creeping intervention' following the collapse of Soviet-backed communism in early 1992. As a result, Afghanistan has been caught in a spiral where disrupted domestic structures and foreign intervention keep feeding on one another. Furthermore, criminal networks engaged in narcotics trade have a strong interest in preventing the reconsolidation of effective political structures, as do terrorists for whom Afghanistan has become a base.[18]

In addition, again in almost all cases, disrupted states end up with either an authoritarian or concealed authoritarian rule, or alternatively as divided and conflict-ridden states, where not only are armed groups pitched against one another for internal reasons of their own, but these groups are helped by outside actors in pursuit of conflicting wider interests. In the latter case, disrupted states become battlefields for proxy wars, with some of these states functioning either partially or fully at the behest of one or more of their neighbours. Afghanistan, Lebanon and Congo, for example, fit the bill well. Afghanistan is not only divided between various fighting armed theocratic–ethnic forces, but is also a country where its neighbours are fuelling the conflict, with Pakistan being the main protagonist and the dominant influence. Similarly, Lebanon, while possessing a concealed authoritarian rule, maintains its stability at the behest of neighbouring Syria, with Israel occupying its southern part in competition with Syria.[19] In a similar vein, the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the Kabila regime has turned out to be almost as authoritarian as its brutal predecessor, is as much a victim of internal divisions and conflict as it is a subject of outside interference, with the country's neighbours intervening on behalf of either the

Congolese government or the opposition forces. Given the major UN involvement in the Congo from 1960–63,[20] it is bitterly ironical that it again faces disruption of the kind that in other circumstances might prompt demands for humanitarian intervention. The capacity for history to repeat itself never ceases to amaze.

Responding to state disruption

Whatever the forms and causes, disrupted states pose serious humanitarian and non-humanitarian problems in the areas of civil–military relations, both within the state and in the international system. In domestic terms, disruption can blur the distinction between civilian and military spheres of operations and responsibilities, or generate conditions that enable armed organisations, whether armed militias or state military machines, to dominate the civilian sphere. The end result is rule by one or many armed groups along the lines of *de facto* territorial divisions, or by the military as the only organised force capable of holding the state together. Such rule is enforced at the cost of, in the first case, state sovereignty being divided and the civilian sector pulverised and suppressed, or, in the second case, state sovereignty being maintained in a technical sense, but with civil society subjugated to the needs of the military. In either case, international governmental and non-governmental organisations are confronted with serious difficulties and dilemmas in dealing with such states. Any action to help such states would have to be weighed against contradictory consequences and fear of what might come next once the mission were accomplished. For example, an international military intervention in Somalia or for that matter Kosovo, carries with it the difficult dilemma of when the military interventionist role will wind back so that competent and acceptable civilian authority can carry the process of state reconstruction forward.

This can involve very difficult and delicate choices. For example, any attempt to assist a state like Pakistan with *positive* incentives to retrench the role of the military in politics, heal its national divisions, lift its standard of living and improve its human rights record carries the risk not only of inadvertently helping the military to strengthen further their own position, but also of prompting the nuclear-capable military to opt for more foreign policy adventures, either in relation to Afghanistan or Kashmir, to deflect outside pressure. In the same vein, the difficulties facing NGOs are no less potent. In the absence of a nationally acceptable authority, their humanitarian operations in a disrupted state can inadvertently help the very organisations and groups in such a state which are responsible for the perpetuation of the disruption.[21] There have been numerous cases of NGOs being accused of inadvertently producing such consequences in Afghanistan, where their operations have been skilfully manipulated by the Taliban and their Pakistani backers to enforce their rule rather than enable the Afghan people to determine their own future. International actions in and in relation to disrupted states are also subject to serious problems of geostrategic, political and resource competition and of coordination between the governmental organisations and NGOs and the forces with which they deal in disrupted states.

This has been evident as much in Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan as in Kosovo since the military victory of NATO.

This brings us to perhaps the most difficult questions of all: is the present international system capable of coping effectively with the problems arising from the increasing number of disrupted states; and what forms should the actions of governmental and non-governmental organisations take in helping such states to contain and reverse the negative consequences of disruption? This has engendered a range of prescriptive responses, reflecting differing methodological and ideological perspectives. These responses have been advanced as ways to understand and explain the changes in the role of states and address their consequences. In general, the formulations are premised on an understanding that there is now a definite need either to reorientate or, if possible, drastically to restructure the 'statist' international system in order to promote a more viable one in its place; or to retain the statist system but contain the current changes and their consequences in such a way as to make the statist systems work more effectively. The most salient of these formulations can be divided into three clusters.

The first, whose origins can be traced to Kantian views, postulates that the current international system of states and its associated agencies—most importantly the United Nations—has increasingly proved to be inadequate in dealing with inequities in world politics in general, and problems of disrupted states in particular, and emphasises the need for a positive reassessment of the ideas of 'global society' and 'global federalism'.[22] These ideas initially gained some scholarly credibility in the 1960s and 1970s to underscore the need for a new and more humane international system. However, they lost much of their gloss in the context of an upsurge in the competitive geopolitics of the later cold war era, when wider scholarly emphasis was placed on the Hobbesian view of international relations that characterised the international realm as one of power politics among sovereign states.[23]

A new variant of those earlier ideas has lately emerged. While emphasising that the 'world is moving rapidly toward a more integrated economic, cultural and political reality' or 'set of circumstances' identified as 'geo-governance', this variant seeks the creation of conditions to give rise to what it describes as 'humane governance'. By this it means 'a set of social, political, economic, and cultural arrangements that is committed to rapid [growth of] transnational democracy … 'the extension of the primary democratic practices [and] global civil society.[24] It recognises the limitations and difficulties in achieving this goal, but argues, in the words of Richard Falk: 'To the extent that global civil society becomes a reality in the imagination and lives of its adherents, the reality of territorial states will often recede in significance even though it may never entirely disappear. In some settings, states under inspired leadership might engender strong loyalties precisely because the outlook is compassionate and globalised.[25] Furthermore, it emphasises the fact that 'humane governance' can be achieved without a world government, and proffers it as the most likely course of development. It considers this as the best way to create a new, viable international order, in which states may not disappear altogether but alter to the point that they will be able to cope with challenges facing them and live in more

peaceful zones of common interests and security. Further, it advocates the strengthening of a reformed United Nations as a truly global body, with the necessary degree of independent authority and operational capacity to deal with world problems, including those of the disrupted states, free of world powers' geostrategic rivalry.

The second cluster of formulations reflects a belief that, parallel to the absence of a better alternative to statism, the conditions are growing for civilisational clashes in world politics.[26] It contends that it is imperative to manage forces which have emerged to undermine the statist system in such a way as to accelerate democratisation across the globe, on the one hand, and provide for modifying world political and security systems in ways which would be based on a regionalisation of world order[27] within the framework of a regime of checks and balances, derived from theories of balance of power, concert of powers, deterrence and containment, on the other.[28] These formulations uphold the position of the US as the only post-Soviet superpower capable of playing a central role in the creation of such a system in order to ensure its pivotal global status and prevent the rise of any other comparable power. They imply that in this way the US will not only pre-empt any serious challenge to its own interests, but will also prevent any further destabilisation in world politics, without overstretching itself or incurring too many costs. They envisage that the UN will remain, more or less, in its present state of existence, ie playing a peripheral role *vis-à-vis* the interests of major powers in world affairs, but perhaps picking up the pieces in postwar disrupted contexts such as that which we are presently witnessing in Kosovo.

The third cluster of formulations arises from a conviction that, for better or worse, statism is most likely to be dominant in the next century and that, on the whole, the assertion that there is 'post-cold war chaos' in world politics is more of a myth than reality. It suggests that the efforts of world powers, most importantly the USA, should be not to create a new world order, but essentially to reclaim what was created during the Cold War and what emerged in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union.[29] Some scholars proffer constructive engagement, diplomacy and regional confidence-building as the means to enhancing security within and between states, and for dealing with challenges facing states and the international system from subnational sources and the forces of globalisation.[30] This cluster essentially seeks the strengthening of the UN and its associated agencies only in this context.

Whereas the proponents of the first formulation wish to see a wider managerial role for the United Nations in the direction of global governance, the second one emphasises the need for the United Nations to assume a counselling role. The third tends to favour a role for the UN somewhere between management and counselling as the most practical way to enable the organisation to survive challenges confronting it, and yet at the same time achieve a position whereby it would be able to have substantial input in shaping a more peaceful and stable world.[31] Time will tell which of these visions is most likely to be realised.

Whatever other proposals may eventuate, it is clear that disrupted states and the challenges with which they confront the international community are

unlikely to go away or diminish. If anything, the contrary may prove to be the case in the new century. The time has certainly come for urgent, bold actions to address the issue. A failure to do so may lead to the world becoming a more painful and disturbing one in which to live than was even the case during the dark century to which we have bid farewell. It is all too clear that there is a need for a concerted, collective approach to the problems of disrupted states. Anything short of such a response, supported by all or most of the major powers under the auspicies of the United Nations, is unlikely to have the reach and capacity to manage the problem effectively.

Notes

[1] See Joseph A Camilleri & Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992. On the debate about sovereignty, see also Samuel M Makinda, 'Sovereignty and global security', *Security Dialogue*, 29 (3), 1998, pp 281–292. An important earlier work which sought to raise some of these issues for discussion is Robert H Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

[2] See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Out of Control: Global Turmoil, on the Eve of the 21st Century*, New York: Collier Books, 1993, esp Parts III–V.

[3] For details, see Peter Dauvergne, 'Weak states, strong states: a state-in-society perspective', in Dauvergne, (ed), '*Weak and Strong states in Asia–Pacific Societies*, Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1998, pp 1–10.

[4] For a discussion of these transition processes, see Guillermo O'Donnell & Philippe C Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, Baltimore, MD Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986; Giuseppe DiPalma, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990; Samuel P Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman, CK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991; Leslie Holmes, *The End of Communist Power: Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993; Juan J Linz of Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996; Gretchen Casper & Michelle M Taylor, *Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, and Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996; and Richard Rose, William Mishler & Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies*, Baltimore MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.

[5] For details, see Georg Sørensen, 'A state is not a state: types of statehood and patterns of conflict after the Cold War', in Muthiah Alagappa & Takashi Inoguchi (eds), *International Security Management and the United Nations*, New York: United Nations University Press, 1999, pp 24–42.

[6] See James Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.

[7] For further discussion, see I William Zartman, 'Introduction: posing the problem of state collapse', in Zartman (ed), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Boulder CO. Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp 1–11.

[8] On the situation in Somalia, see John Drysdale, *Whatever Happened to Somalia?* London: HAAN Associates, 1994; Terrence Lyons & Ahmed I Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995; Virginia Luling, 'Come back Somalia? Questioning a collapsed state', *Third World Quarterly*, 18 (2), 1997, pp 287–302

[9] The genesis of ethnic conflict has been widely discussed in recent years. See Donald L Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995; Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993; Michael E Brown (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993; Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism*, New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1994; Ted Robert Gurr & Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*, NY, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994; Milton J Esman, *Ethnic Politics*, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1994; Russell Hardin, *One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995; and HD Forbes, *Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture, and the Contact Hypothesis*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997.

[10] See *Leave None to Tell the Story; Genocide in Rwanda*, New York: Human Rights Watch, March 1999.

[11] On Afghanistan, see Barnett R Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*, New Haven CT; Yale University Press, 1995. On Cambodia, see MacAlister Brown & Joseph J Zasloff, *Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers 1979–1998*, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.
[12] For details, see *Afghanistan: The Massacre in Mazar-i Sharif*, New York: Human Rights Watch, November 1998.
[13] Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, pp 296–297.
[14] For particulars, see William Maley (ed), *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban*, New York: New York University Press, 1998, esp the chapters by Amin Saikal, Anthony Davis and Ahmed Rashid.
[15] Amin Saikal, *The Rise and Fall of the Shah*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980, p 141.
[16] For more detailed discussion, see David A Lake & Donald Rothchild, 'Spreading fear: the genesis of translational ethnic conflict', in Lake & Rothchild (eds), *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998, pp 3–32.
[17] On these interactions, see Amin Saikal & William Maley, *Regime Change in Afghanistan: Foreign Intervention and the Politics of Legitimacy*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.
[18] See John K Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism*, London: Pluto Press, 1999.
[19] See William Harris, *Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions*, Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997.
[20] See Arthur Lee Burns & Nina Heathcote, *Peacekeeping by UN Forces from Suez to the Congo* London: Pall Mall Press, 1963.
[21] For the most extreme recent version of this argument, see Edward Luttwak, 'Give war a chance', *Foreign Affairs*, 78, (4), 1999, pp 36–44.
[22] For early assessment of the ideas, see Richard A Falk, *This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human Survival*, New York: Vintage Books, 1972.
[23] For a discussion of the Hobbesian view, see Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.
[24] Richard Falk, *On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics*, Pennsylvania, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996, p 2.
[25] *Ibid*, p. 212.
[26] Samuel P Huntington. 'The clash of civilizations', *Foreign Affairs*, 72(3), 1993, pp 29–49. For a more elaborate restatement of Huntington's argument see Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
[27] Brzezinski, *Out of Control*, Part 5.
[28] See Paul Dibb, *Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia* Adelphi Paper 295, 1995 Oxford: Oxford University Press, for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995.
[29] G John Ikenberry, 'The myth of post-cold war chaos', *Foreign Affairs*, 75 (3), 1996, pp 79–91.
[30] See James L Richardson, 'Asia–Pacific: the case for geopolitical optimism', *The National Interest*, 38, 1995, pp 28–39.
[31] See Amin Saikal, 'Emerging powers: the cases of China, India, Iran, Iraq, and Israel' in Alogappa Inoguchi, *International Security Management and the United Nations*, pp 61–82.