Peaceful versus Violent State Dismemberment: A Comparison of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia

VALERIE BUNCE

The past several decades in Yugoslavia, particularly the 1960s and 1970s, may not have been a fully enjoyable present, but they have become a respectable and even enviable past.[1]

INTRODUCTION

From mid-1991 to the end of 1992, three longstanding states in the eastern half of Europe—Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia—disintegrated. While these three states shared the same fate, however, the process by which these states ended varied significantly. The constituent republics in both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia agreed to end the state, and the dissolution of both of these states in December 1991 and 1992, respectively, was peaceful.[2] By contrast, some republican leaders in Yugoslavia contested the breakup of that state. As a result, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, beginning in mid-1991, was violent.

The purpose of this article is to account for this contrast. I will do so by engaging in a systematic comparison of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.

I would like to thank Abbey Innes, Sharon Wolchik, and Veljko Vujacic for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper and the U.S. Institute of Peace for its support of this project. This paper is based upon a larger study of the collapse of socialist regimes, the Soviet bloc, and socialist states. See *Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

POLITICS & SOCIETY, Vol. 27 No. 2, June 1999 217-237

THE LOGIC OF THIS COMPARISON

Such a comparison makes methodological sense because these three countries manage to strike a nice balance between two often competing goals of comparative inquiry: keeping the number of cases small enough to ensure knowledgeable comparisons yet large enough to vary outcomes and to limit (through matching) the range of plausible causes. Put more concretely, three cases constitute a manageable number. At the same time, these three cases are quite efficient from a comparative standpoint. On the one hand, the processes by which the states ended were different, with Yugoslavia representing one model and the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia another. On the other hand, the three states were alike in many respects—for example, all three countries shared such characteristics as a socialist past, a federated state during the socialist period, diverse domestic populations, and territorially concentrated national minorities. In addition, these three states all ended (whereas other states in the region, similarly situated, did not), the new states that formed were in every case successors to the republics that had made up these socialist federations, and the process of state termination was preceded in each instance by regime collapse.[3] Finally, all three of these states disintegrated in a short span of time. This, plus the collapse of socialist regimes, would seem to suggest that the domestic and international context of state dissolution was roughly similar in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Put succinctly, then, what we find when comparing these three countries is contrasting processes bookended by similar causes and similar consequences.

This means, in turn, that we are in a good position to isolate the factors that account for peaceful versus violent state dismemberment. Indeed, even a quick overview of these three cases calls into question a number of highly plausible explanations suggested by studies of one or another of these cases[4] and reinforced by the theoretical literature on nationalism, secession, and interethnic conflict.[5] For example, it has been suggested that one reason for the peaceful breakup of the Soviet state was its national-federal structure during the socialist era—a structure that divided the party-state into constituent republics (and other units), each of which was based upon a titular nation and endowed with its own institutions and elites.[6] With such well-defined nations and proto-states within the state and with bargaining between the center and the republics zero sum in outcomes and vertical and bilateral in process, the stage was set for regime weakening to go hand in hand with state multiplication. This, in turn, meant that the transition from one to many states could be both quick and relatively cooperative.

This argument makes sense, especially if we think about the conditions under which secessionist struggles become violent; that is, when the center uses force to defend existing state boundaries and/or when those involved in the struggle over boundaries and sovereignty joust over the makeup of new national and state units. However, this argument loses its luster once we add Yugoslavia and its violent end to the equation. Like the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia was

national-federal in design during the socialist era. Indeed, if a weak center and well-defined nations and states at the republican level were the key, then Yugoslavia, with its confederal structure the last fifteen years or so of socialism, should have been the most likely of the three socialist federations to move quickly and peacefully from one to many state units.

If explanations of the Soviet case do not travel well, then neither do some common explanations of the wars in Yugoslavia. For instance, it has been argued that the violent end of that state reflected such factors as considerable variation among the republics with respect to regime disintegration (e.g., liberal Slovenia vs. continuity of dictatorship in Serbia); a long history of interethnic tensions; cultural diversity, coupled with a poor fit between republican and national boundaries; a relatively high correlation between membership in a nation and access to socioeconomic resources; a large Serbian community residing outside of the Serbian republic that, with state weakening, quickly became a target of discrimination; and a focus by both the Serbian and Croatian political leadership on national grievances as the basis for mobilization of political support in a time of regime collapse.

There are, however, two problems with these arguments. First, the history of "international" relations within Yugoslavia has usually been one of either limited interaction or, if interactive, one of cooperation and not conflict.[7] Moreover, "international" relations within both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, during and before socialism, followed a similar pattern and included periods of considerable conflict.

Second, the conditions that describe the Yugoslav context, as articulated above, are precisely the conditions that describe the Soviet Union as well—and, to a lesser extent, Czechoslovakia. For example, as is evident today, the successor states of the former Soviet Union vary dramatically in terms of the liberalism of their politics and economics; the Soviet Union was just as diverse as Yugoslavia; there are twenty-five million Russians outside the Russian republic, or the RSFSR (with Russians constituting, like the Serbs, the largest national community in the state as a whole); and many national leaders within the Soviet Union (as with Slovak leaders within Czechoslovakia) used the national question to define their political agendas and cement their political coalitions. Indeed, all these considerations, plus the increasingly violent character of nationalist mobilization over the course of the Gorbachev era, led many analysts, within and outside the Soviet Union, to presume that the end of that state, if it were to occur, would be necessarily violent.[8] All of this leads to one conclusion: Yugoslavia, at least with respect to these considerations, does not emerge as distinctive.[9]

The trick in explaining violent versus peaceful state dissolution, therefore, is identifying factors that relate directly to the question of "international" conflict and cooperation and that, at the same time, produce a pairing of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia versus Yugoslavia. This is precisely what drives the analysis that follows. As we will discover, while institutional commonalities during the

socialist period explain the common outcome of state dismemberment, institutional *differences*, again during the socialist era, account for variations in how these states ended from 1991 to 1992. These institutional differences, moreover, produce the needed contrast between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, on the one hand, and Yugoslavia, on the other.

FEDERALISM VERSUS CONFEDERALISM

All three of these socialist states were national-federal in form and this explains, along with the expansion of opportunities for systemic change in the 1980s, why these states ended and ended when they did and why the other states in the region, so similar in circumstances, managed to survive regime transition with their borders intact.[10] However, within the overarching similarity of national federalism were some institutional differences—differences that provide some clues as to why the process of state dissolution was peaceful versus violent. One core contrast was between actual federalism in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia—that is, the existence of shared power based on territorial-administrative divisions—versus what could only be termed confederalism in Yugoslavia, or the domination of republics over the center.[11] Confederalism in Yugoslavia developed in response to a number of factors—for example, the passage of a new and highly decentralizing constitution in 1974, the decision after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to allow the republics to have their own territorial defense forces, and the growing segmentation of the Yugoslav market, including the banking system, along republican lines. Most proximate to the breakup of the state, however, was a final decentralizing factor: the death of Tito in 1980 and the introduction of collective decision-making units at the center that were based on equal votes allocated to each republic and province (along with the military as a "ninth" republic/province within central-level party organs).

As a result, Yugoslavia featured by the beginning of the 1980s a clear pattern that was to characterize the political economy of that system until its end: an ever-weakening economic and political center that was forced to work through the republics and their leadership in order to collect revenues, make and implement virtually all policies, and finally, forge linkages with the citizenry. This meant, not surprisingly, that the Yugoslav republics (and the two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina) were very strong. By the beginning of the 1980s, they had accumulated the resources necessary to act as virtually independent economic and political agents.[12]

The formal end of the Yugoslav state, then, was preceded for at least a decade by a process in which the state, precisely and ironically in strict accordance with ideological precepts, had withered away. Economic, political, and cultural sovereignty, therefore, had been parceled, and all three forms of sovereignty resided in the republics that made up the Yugoslav confederation—or what Sabrina Ramet[13] aptly termed at the time the Yugoslav "international system." Thus, while

struggles over power and reform immediately preceded, as well as caused, a sudden and rapid decentralization of the Czechoslovak and Soviet states, a decentralized political economy with full institutional expression was already in place by the time the Yugoslav regime and state came into serious question.

This had several important consequences for the process by which the Yugoslav state eventually ended. First, with the center eliminated as a key economic and political player, "domestic" politics and economics in Yugoslavia resided within each of the republics and provinces. Second, with political power and economic resources locked in at the regional level, the republics had both the means and the incentives to pursue distinct political and economic trajectories—and, not surprisingly, they did so. Finally, minus a center, bargaining within Yugoslavia became strictly horizontal, that is, interrepublican in form.

Thus, to focus on republican elites in particular, we can conclude the following. What confederalism meant in Yugoslavia, even by the early 1980s, was that republican leaders were powerful; they were pitted against each other and had a long record of conflicts with each other; they represented quite different economic and political, as well as national, constituencies; and they adopted, as a result, political and economic preferences that were widely divergent from one another. All this, plus the death of Tito, abysmal economic performance, and prolonged struggles over power and reform within and across the republics, ensured that Yugoslavia would become the first state in the socialist region to dismember. All this meant as well that the process of state disintegration in Yugoslavia would be, by regional standards, unusually entangled with regime disintegration, unusually prolonged in time span, and unusually conflictual.

THE DOMINANT REPUBLICS

A second key difference among these federal states was in the institutional endowment of the dominant republic—or Serbia within Yugoslavia, Russia within the Soviet Union, and the Czech lands within Czechoslovakia. During the socialist period, neither Russia nor the Czech republic was in fact allotted the same institutional status as the, purportedly, "lesser" republics making up their federations. In particular, both of these leading republics were denied their own communist parties, their own academies of sciences, their own media, their own ministries, their own secret police organizations, and the like.[14] Instead, their only connection was to the all-union or central institutions of the party and the state—a connection open, as well, to all others in the system and, it must be emphasized, defined in terms of socialism, not the nation.

This asymmetric federalism reflected the impact of several considerations—that Russians and Czechs were the numerically dominant group, and not minorities, within their countries; that they had, as a result, no special "needs" and, thus, a weak case for institutional "boosting"; and that they were, if anything, the representatives of the center and socialism. This meant, in combination with their sheer

size, that each of these republics within their respective federations was understood to require in effect institutional constraints, not empowerment. The metaphor drawn by Yuri Slezkine for the Soviet Union, then, seems to apply equally well to Czechoslovakia during the socialist era. If we imagine each of these countries as an apartment building and their titular nations as the communal apartments within that building, then the Czechs, like the Russians within their federation, functioned as "the hallways."[15]

From this vantage point, it is hardly surprising, therefore, that Russian national identity was far less developed and far more confused with Soviet identity than the identities of, for example, the titular nations of the Baltic states, Armenia, and Georgia.[16] As the historian Yuri Afanas'ev once responded to a question concerning his own identity as a Russian,

> This is difficult to say. I am Russian, certainly. I have been educated and brought up as a Russian. But I am more a Soviet, perhaps even a European, because it does not seem either necessary, useful, comfortable or even polite to be in the first place a Russian.[17]

The confusion between Soviet and Russian identity, along with the institutional weakness of the Russian republic and the absence of a clear historical tradition of statehood (because Russia was always poised between being a state and being an empire), help explain why Russian identity was so weak and, just as important, why Russian nationalist mobilization during the Gorbachev era was the proverbial dog that hardly barked.[18] Indeed, by 1990, when eyeing circumstances in the other Soviet republics and when joining in the battles against the center (including formal declaration of Russian sovereignty in June of that year), Russian politicians began to complain about the costs of institutional deficits. As Boris Yel'tsin bemoaned,

> If a clear violation of the Soviet of the Russian Federation takes place, then the [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet as the highest legislative organ of Russia must defend itself. But with what? It has no army, no KGB—what is it to defend its sovereignty with? It must do so by its laws.[19]

These worries led Russian leaders to take action on two fronts. They proposed a series of new, indigenous Russian institutions, and they converted all-union institutions into Russian ones. While the Czechs only did the same, once the state was in the process of formal dissolution, they did share precisely the same burdens as Russia. They lacked an institutional foundation for national identity, and they lacked as well both a state tradition and the kinds of institutions that served in the Slovak republic as the foundation for state-building. This in turn meant that the Czechs, like the Russians, did not define their political project as a nationalist one. Rather, as the large-scale protests in the fall of 1989 indicated, they defined their concerns in regime terms, that is, as ideological. However, it should be noted that it was in fact both national and ideological, since the issue was liberation of the nation and state from socialism and from Soviet domination.

However, if the Russian and Czech republics were institutionally weak, they were politically strong. During the socialist era, Russians and Czechs dominated their respective federations, not just in numerical terms, but also in terms of their representation in important economic, political, and military institutions. What we find for Russia and the Czech lands during the socialist era, therefore, is a contradictory state of affairs. As Gail Lapidus and Edward Walker have observed for the Russian case,

> The position of Russia within [the] . . . federation . . . was an anomalous one. On the one hand, Russia was the imperial center, and Russians were the beneficiaries of this position. At the same time, the conflation of Russia with the Union deprived Russia of both the institutional and the cultural attributes of national statehood.[20]

There was, in short, a gap between political power and institutional resources—for Russia and for the Czech lands. Looking ahead in our analysis, this gap played a key role in nudging developments within both of these republics toward a particular type of nationalism. This was a form of nationalism that rejected the regime and socialism but that did not require in any way a reexamination of the national question; that was free of the convenient substitution of nationalism for communism that took place in many of the "lesser" republics (either through the rebirth of communists as nationalists or through the rise from below of a nationalist and anticommunist movement); and that was able, as a consequence, to embrace both economic and political liberalization as highly attractive ideological substitutes for socialism. This in turn produced a particular set of leadership positions on the state question. Continuity of borders was preferred, not just because it was the status quo and would maintain existing patterns of Czech and Russian domination within their states, but also because border changes were irrelevant to the main issue: regime transition. However, for precisely the same reasons, the nationalism of Russia and the Czech lands could accept, if necessary, the establishment of new state borders along existing republican lines. This was particularly the case if the partition of the state enhanced the prospects for full-scale liberalization of politics and economics in Russia and in the Czech lands.

The Yugoslav story provides a sharp contrast. Especially by the second half of the 1970s, Yugoslavia featured *equality* among the republics. Thus, the Serbian republic had precisely the same economic, political, social, and cultural institutions as existed in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia. This meant that Serbia and its leadership had far more access to the resources available for nation- and state-building than was the case for either Russians and their leaders or the Czechs and their leaders. Moreover, Serbia, unlike Russia and the Czech lands, had a tradition of independent statehood—and, what is more, one that was established in the battlefield and that had long served as the foundation for Serbian national identity.

At the same time, Serbia was denied the political power that the Russian and Czech republics enjoyed. While Serbs were in fact overrepresented in the officer

corps of the military and in the secret police, they were underrepresented in all of those institutions responsible for making day-to-day decisions within Yugoslavia. This underrepresentation is evident if we measure it by the gap between the Serbian weight in the population versus the voting shares of the Serbian republic within the party and the government. Put another way, it is in Yugoslavia alone among the socialist federations that we find political bodies at the top of the system during the socialist period that were based strictly on one republic/province (and its titular nation), one vote, rather than on other principles that might have recognized the size of Serbia and the Serbian population and, thus, worked more in Serbia's political favor. This imbalance, moreover, affected economics as much as politics.

The underrepresentation of Serbia and Serbs can also be viewed from the standpoint of perception. For Serbs, what mattered most, perhaps, was the gap between their political representation and the Serbian presumption of their right to be the first among equals. This presumption reflected the impact of a variety of historical factors, including Serbia's sacrifice of its state to the formation of a larger Yugoslav entity after World War I and Serbian success when bargaining over state formation in defining that new and larger entity as unitary, centralized, and dominated by Serbia, complete with the Serbian royal family.[21]

As a consequence, it is not surprising that Serbs were resentful of Yugoslav developments following the adoption of the 1974 constitution. Their status and power within the federation, already too limited in their view, had declined sharply with decentralization and the establishment of full equality among the republics and provinces. Nor is it surprising that the crisis in Kosovo, which began in 1980 (and returned in fuller force in 1998), angered Serbs and quickly became a touchstone for the rapid development of Serbian nationalism. Kosovo was a province having great symbolic meaning for Serbs, given both its impressive collection of Serbian churches and other cultural artifacts and given as well its role as the site where Serbia had been defeated by the Ottoman Empire in 1389. Contemporary developments within Kosovo, moreover, seemed to summarize all too efficiently what had gone wrong with the Yugoslav experiment—given, for example, voting equality between Kosovo and Serbia, the declining proportion of the population that was Serbian (which was interpreted to be a function less of differential birthrates than harassment), and the increasingly restive nature of the very large Albanian majority.

What appeared in Serbia during the socialist era, then, was a pattern opposite to that found in Russia and in the Czech republic: considerable institutional resources at the republican level joined with considerable limits on political and economic influence within the federation. Again, looking ahead, it was that particular combination of strengths and weaknesses—or the joining of resources with resentments—that opened Serbian leaders and publics to a version of nationalism that was the mirrored opposite to that found in Russia and the Czech

republic. In particular, while the grievances underlying Russian and Czech nationalism focused on the costs of socialism, the concerns of the Serbs targeted two issues: the form of the state and the maltreatment of the nation. The issue of socialism, therefore, was not at the center of the picture.

At the same time, the solution to these grievances also varied. For Russian and Czech leaders, the goal was to end socialism, establish a democratic and capitalist regime operating within a federal state, and failing federalism, accede to the dismemberment of the state along strictly republican lines. This alternative had two advantages. The Czechs and the Russians could keep the central institutions as their own, and they could pursue their liberal agenda, unencumbered by their less liberal and at times recalcitrant neighbors in the "near abroad." By contrast, the solution for Serbian nationalists was reforming socialism, recentralizing the state, and failing that, establishing in the wreckage of the state a "Greater Serbia."

Thus, the violent end of Yugoslavia reflected not just the fact that the dominant republic there had a particular brand of nationalism that differed from its Russian and Czech counterparts with respect to grievances and goals. It was also that the Serbian leadership's second-order preferences were conducive to war in the event of state dismemberment, whereas the second-order preferences entertained by the Russian and Czech leadership, again in the event of state dismemberment, were not.

This leads us to a final institutional factor that distinguishes Yugoslavia from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia and that contributed in important ways to the level of violence accompanying the end of the state. That factor is the contrast in the structure, the mission, and the role of the military during the socialist era.

SOCIALIST MILITARIES

States can use words, laws, money, and/or armies to protect their boundaries against secessionist pressures. All three of the federalized socialist states used words, laws, and money to defend themselves. However, only in Yugoslavia did the military (the Yugoslav National Army, or JNA) play a central role in the dismemberment of the state. This occurred, initially, through military intervention to save the state—as when the JNA sent in tanks in response to the Slovene removal of federal signs along its borders and Slovene occupation of border outposts and customs offices. Later, as in Croatia and Bosnia, the JNA again intervened on the basis of a similar rationale. However, in these cases, the JNA had allies within the republics: the secessionist Serbian minorities within both of these republics (along with the free-riding Croatian minority in Bosnia).

By contrast, the military stood on the sidelines while the Czechoslovak state was dismantled. In the Soviet Union, the military was deployed, but in minimalist, short-term, and rather half-hearted fashion—as in the Baltic states in early 1991 and as with the participation of segments of the military in the attempted coup d'état in August 1991. However, when the Soviet state was formally dismantled in

December 1991, the military was not a participant. Indeed, throughout the fall of 1991, the Soviet military had consistently resisted invitations to become more involved.

The contrast, therefore, is between an activist military in Yugoslavia, which contributed significantly to the violent dismemberment of that state, versus a passive military in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, which contributed in both cases to a peaceful end to these states. The question then becomes: why the difference in these three socialist militaries?

One distinction that can be drawn is in the structure of these institutions. The confederal character of the Yugoslav party and state had created an unusually confused chain of military command. While the Soviet Union also presented some problems in this regard,[22] as did Czechoslovakia (because of changes in the Warsaw Pact following the invasion of Czechoslovakia),[23] the Yugoslav case represented an extreme variation on a general socialist problem. In particular, in Yugoslavia authorization to deploy military force at home and abroad could come, variously, from the state and the party collective presidencies (separately or together), from the prime minister, from the minister of defense, and/or possibly from representatives of the military at the highest levels of the party and the state.[24]

To this must be added two related points. One is that the JNA had close connections in particular with one republic: Serbia. This reflected, among other things, Serbian historical connections to the military, the convergent interest of the military and the Serbian republic in maintaining a centralized and socialist state, and finally, the overrepresentation of Serbs in the officer corps of the JNA.

The other is that only in Yugoslavia do we find the existence of territorially based militias that were under the control of the republics and that had unclear linkages—in terms of function as well as command and control—to the central military, let alone the central political structure. This proved to be crucial in the process of state-building at the republican level and in the leakage of weaponry to minority populations. It was also important in the brief skirmishes in Slovenia, where the wars of secession began and where the Slovene territorial defense forces were pitched against the JNA.[25]

When combined, all of these factors point to a simple conclusion. Yugoslavia was unusually well positioned for praetorian politics. What further contributed to such a possibility was the legitimacy accorded the JNA as a domestic political actor. Again, the contrast with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia is sharply etched. In Yugoslavia, the military's mission was defined as much in domestic as in international terms. This reflected such factors as the historical role of the military in defending the Yugoslav state and Yugoslav society against fascism and in building support for socialism from the ground up during the Second World War; the interdependence, beginning with the revolution, between the legitimacy of the regime and socialism, on the one hand, and the legitimacy of the military, on the

other; the political influence accorded the JNA as a consequence of its role as one of the few institutional representatives of the center and, thus, of the Yugoslav idea; and finally, the fusion of the domestic and international functions of the military, given the equal weight placed on domestic and foreign threats to the survival of Yugoslavia and Yugoslav socialism.

Because of these and other factors, then, the JNA was a powerful domestic political player throughout the socialist era in Yugoslavia. This was indicated, for example, by its direct representation at the highest level of the party apparatus (beginning with the Croatian crisis in the early 1970s) and by a twenty-year history of domestic interventions—for example, in the Croatian crisis of the early 1970s, in Kosovo in 1981 (where martial law was declared for the first time in postwar Yugoslavia), in Slovenia in 1988 (albeit primarily political in form), and again, in Kosovo in 1989.[26]

It is fair to say, then, that socialist Yugoslavia was held together by three forces: Tito, the party, and the army. When Tito died and the party became fully republicanized by the early 1980s, all that was left to defend both the regime of socialism and the state of Yugoslavia—and the only organ that defined its mission in precisely those terms—was the military. The military, as a result, came to be the only counterweight to the decentralization and the interrepublican conflicts over reform and power that dominated Yugoslav politics during the 1980s. And the military was, for the same reasons, easily threatened by developments during that decade—not just the political and economic turmoil of that period which, characteristically, threatened both the state and socialism, but also the reduction in the military's legitimacy and resources, given direct and unprecedented criticisms of the military in the liberalized atmosphere of Slovenia in the mid-1980s, on the one hand, and, on the other, cuts in its defense budget, beginning in the second half of the 1970s.[27]

The involvement of the military in the process of Yugoslav dismemberment, then, was not surprising. There was a long history of such interventions, and the process of secession challenged the dual mission of the military as the defender of the state and socialism. As Milos Vasic and Filip Svarm have summarized,

> The process of the destruction of Yugoslavia can be understood best through the history of the ruination of the military; one without the other cannot be understood. Confronting choices between watching over communism or the state, the military managed to lose both.[28]

The Czechoslovak case could not be more different. There, the military was kept separate from civilian life in general and domestic politics in particular. This was typical of those Eastern European militaries that were fully integrated into the Warsaw Pact structure—a point that is also relevant for explaining patterns within the region as a whole in peaceful versus violent regime collapse.[29] In the case of the Soviet Union, the military was also subservient to civilian authority—a practice that was rooted not just in decisions taken by the Bolsheviks after the Civil

War and the demobilization that followed, but also in the long expanse of Russian history prior to the socialist epoch. In contrast to, say, many countries in Latin America, dictatorship in Russia has long been premised on civilian control over the military.

In addition, the role of the Soviet military was clearly defined in international and not domestic terms—as one would expect for a highly professional military situated within a long-established regime and state and concerned with all those issues involved in constructing and then maintaining global power status. Indeed, it was this mission and the ways in which the war in Afghanistan and the Gorbachev reforms produced a divided and immobilized, rather than a divided and interventionist, military that allowed the Soviet military to function as a bystander while leaders of the Soviet republics began to divvy up the state.[30] Finally, unlike Yugoslavia, the overrepresentation of Russians in the officer corps was not combined with a dominant republic rich in institutions. Thus, Yel'tsin, with his political base in the RSFSR, lacked the institutional capacity to deploy the military in order to achieve his aims—even if he had so wanted.

THE GAMES OF STATE DISMEMBERMENT

Despite the commonalities of socialism and federalism, then, there were, nonetheless, three key differences in the institutional design of Yugoslavia versus that of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia—differences that affected in important ways how these states came to an end. In particular, the Yugoslav federation was far more decentralized than its Czechoslovak and Soviet counterparts. This produced what was by Soviet and Czechoslovak standards an unusually weak center and republics that were unusually strong, distinctive, and combative.

At the same time, the dominant republic within Yugoslavia, or Serbia, was rich in institutional resources but impoverished with respect to political power—a pattern precisely opposite to that found in the dominant republics of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, or Russia and the Czech lands, respectively. This produced two kinds of nationalisms that had enormous implications for how the state ended—and, for that matter, the regime transitions that followed. One, as in Serbia, was ethnic in content; based upon a convergence between strong national institutions and considerable national resentments; and committed to socialism within a recentralized state or, failing that, within a new state significantly larger in size than the existing Serbian republic. The other form of nationalism, as in Russia and the Czech lands, was primarily civic in emphasis; constrained in its nationalist agenda by weak republican institutions and a tradition of political dominance; and committed, above all, to ending socialism and constructing a liberal order in its place. As for the larger state context within which this transition would occur, the preference of both Czech and Russian political leaders was for either building a genuinely federal system or, if that were out of the question, new

states that corresponded precisely in their borders to the existing lines demarcating the republics.

A final institutional contrast was that the JNA was the guardian of socialism and the state, it had long functioned as a central player in the domestic politics of socialist Yugoslavia, and it continued to do so once the regime and state began to unravel. By contrast, both the Soviet and the Czechoslovak militaries were, by mission and practice, outward looking, not inward playing. This tradition continued once the regime and the state began their exit from the political stage. How, then, did these institutional differences affect the actual process of state dismemberment? Much of the answer to that question has already been provided. However, one useful way of summarizing these developments in a manner that is both parsimonious and comparative is to treat the dissolution of the Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslav states as a game. Indeed, what is striking about such an exercise is that the assumptions underlying the notion of a game—which are often violated in games constructed by social scientists—are in fact met in these three instances of state dissolution. Thus, it can be argued that there were in fact a limited number of key players in each of the three cases—in particular, Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yel'tsin in the Soviet case; Sloboban Milosevic, Franjo Tudjman (the leader of Croatia), Milan Kucan (the leader of Slovenia), and the JNA in the Yugoslav case; and Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar (the leaders of what came to be the Czech Republic and Slovakia, respectively). At the same time, the preferences of these players are easy to construct and easy to rank, given what has already been argued. Finally, in all three cases, the state ended following bargaining over the design and the future of the state.

From the perspective of gaming, we can argue that the peaceful end of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia was a product of two major factors, each of which flowed directly from institutional considerations dating from the socialist era. First, the military was excluded from the game. Second, because of the particular combination of political power yet institutional deficits within the Czech and Russian republics, the leader of each of these two dominant republics defined nationalism in a manner that minimized resentments toward other nations and that focused, instead, on the following preferences: (1) the rejection of socialism; (2) support of a transition to capitalism and democracy; and (3) support of the continuation of the state, albeit one that was genuinely federal in its functioning. With regard to the final preference, which was, unlike the first two, negotiable and not fixed, a second option was entertained—that is, in the event of state breakup, support for dismemberment along strictly republican lines. What made the fourth option necessary was the behavior—or at least the strategic threats—of the other republics making up the federation. What made it tolerable for both the Russian and Czech leadership was the bonus of getting control over the institutions of the center in the bargain and getting what would be, in all likelihood, an easier and more rapid transition to capitalism and democracy, given the exit of those regions

likely to stall, if not sabotage, the liberal agenda. Thus, while the ideal outcome was liberal democracy and capitalism in an integrated state, the second most attractive outcome was liberal democracy and capitalism in a reduced state. In this sense, the end of both the Czechoslovak and Soviet states was peaceful because the leader of the dominant republic in each of these cases could still get what he most wanted.

Within these similarities between the Soviet and Czechoslovak cases, however, there were several differences—differences that, nonetheless, contributed as well, albeit in contrasting ways, to the peaceful end of these two states. Let us turn, first, to the Soviet case. What helped that state dismember peacefully, in addition to the reasons already noted, were the following characteristics peculiar to the Soviet context: the sheer size of the Russian Federation, which made losing the larger entity more palatable; the guarantee, highly attractive to Yel'tsin, that Gorbachev would be finally defeated, not because he was deposed but, rather, because the country he led was in effect deposed; and the halfway house represented by the Commonwealth for Independent States (founded in December 1991 in conjunction with the dissolution of the state), which allowed Russia to have a forum within which to express its regional dominance while also allowing the leaders of the other republics, with their varying commitments to independent statehood and their varying fears of rupture with Russia, the attractive option of being at the same time independent of, yet still connected to, Russia.

Finally, the very structure of struggle during the Gorbachev era had the complicating effect of diversifying the domestic trajectories of the republics—which meant, in effect, a dispersion of republican preferences. However, at the same time, there were important compensatory pressures that overrode these differences—in particular, the incentives for interrepublican cooperation as a result of their shared opposition to the center in general and Gorbachev and his approach to reform in particular. It was the latter that dominated the former and that produced ratification of a series of bilateral treaties between Russia and other republics in the year and a half preceding the end of the state. These treaties assured the lesser republics of continued access to the Russian economy in exchange for legal guarantees concerning the security and the rights of Russian minority populations. As a result, cooperation, not conflict, dominated the game of Soviet state dismemberment, and Russian fears about their nationals in the "near abroad"—which could have challenged Russian acceptance of state dismemberment or tempted Russia to expand on its republican borders—were put to rest.

The division of the Czechoslovak state was different in the sense that there was no center in this instance that could function, as in the Soviet Union, to override the political and economic differences between the republics and to forge, as a result, interrepublican cooperation. Instead, such cooperation evolved in the Czechoslovak context through rather different channels. One key factor was the absence, in direct contrast to both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, of large

minority populations residing outside of the republic/states. Another, again in sharp contrast to the other two cases, was the relatively limited socioeconomic differences between the two halves of Czechoslovakia—reflecting, in large measure, the success (obviously more in economic than political terms!) of regional redistribution as a mechanism for state integration and political stability in the years following the crisis of 1968, with its defining features of reform communism, Slovak nationalism, and the Soviet invasion.[31]

Finally, and again distinct to Czechoslovakia when compared to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, was a more proximate factor of importance that was the end result in effect of the other two: the existence of relatively limited differences in the preferences of the two leaders responsible for dismantling the state.[32] Thus, both Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar rejected socialism, and both favored economic and political liberalization (though Meciar was far less committed than Klaus to full-scale democratization). Moreover, both were backed in their views by public opinion in their respective portions of the country. Where they differed was in the details. Klaus wanted fast economic reform and one federalized state, whereas Meciar wanted slower economic reform and, for reasons of domestic political support within Slovakia, a confederalized state (with the latter demand often embedded in a larger and not-so-veiled threat of actual divorce). What this meant was that, while first-order preferences did not match, second-order preferences could and, given the electoral results of the mid-1992 elections, eventually did. Thus, Klaus could get the economic reform he wanted and maintain political power in the Czech lands, and Meciar could do the same in Slovakia. Whereas neither the public nor the president, Vaclav Havel, wanted to divide the country, such a division made sense because of the congruent political and economic interests of the two adversaries, Klaus and Meciar. In this way, the Czechoslovak state ended—but without virtually anyone, including Vladimir Meciar, who really championed that outcome.

In many ways, then, Klaus, exactly like Yel'tsin, settled for less state but, by shedding the periphery, gained more reform and, arguably, more power. And for precisely these reasons, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia at the end of 1992, like the end of the Soviet Union a year earlier, was a velvet, rather than a violent divorce.

The game of state dismemberment in Yugoslavia was different on all counts. First and most obviously, the military was a player. Second, Yugoslavia combined in many respects the worst of both the Czechoslovak and Soviet worlds but without any of their compensatory assets. Thus, like Czechoslovakia, the bargaining process was interrepublican, and like the Soviet Union, the differences among republics and, thus, among their leaders, was substantial. As a result, the Yugoslav game was one in which republics were very different but lacked the incentives to identify common ground. Conflict, in short, was built into the game of dismemberment, and this conflict, if anything, expanded, when moving down the scale of

republican elite preferences. Finally, the combination of resources and resentment in the dominant republic produced a form of Serbian nationalism that actually widened the differences among republican leaders with respect to the future of socialism, the state, and reform. This guaranteed that the state would end and increased the likelihood that the process would be violent.

What guaranteed that the breakup of Yugoslavia would be violent were three factors. Two have already been noted: the particular focus of Serbian nationalism, along with its capacity to reproduce a similar form of nationalism in Croatia, and second, the role of the JNA as an extension, at first accidental and then later quite deliberate, of Serbian national interests. The third was the presence of large Serbian minorities in both Croatia and Bosnia. This was, it must be emphasized, a factor that was less important in and of itself (as the Russian case reminds us) than through its interaction with those institutional characteristics, already noted, that distinguished Yugoslavia from the other two socialist federations.

Thus, the institutions that made Yugoslavia unique among the socialist federations in Eastern Europe were precisely what guaranteed that the end of that state, unlike the end of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, would be violent. However, it is worth noting at the same time that Yugoslavia's story, while unusual for the region, is, from a larger comparative and historical perspective, typical of what happens when states end—and typically tragic.

CONCLUSIONS

A, if not the, most vexing problem in social inquiry is finding ways to narrow down the range of possible and plausible explanations. Put simply, varied outcomes are desirable, but variation in causes is not.[33] For comparativists, this means coming up with a mixture of cases that are small enough to facilitate knowledgeable comparison but that allow, at the same time, for divergent results and a constrained set of causes.

A comparison of the dissolution of the Yugoslav, Soviet, and Czechoslovak states allows us to meet these conditions. This is because these three erstwhile states dissolved in different ways, yet they resemble one another in a number of important respects. Thus, just as Yugoslavia ended through war and the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia through a peaceful process, so these three countries feature, at the same time, certain overarching similarities that, according to theories and individual case studies, should have produced a common process of state dismemberment. Thus, for example, these three countries shared a socialist past; the immediate context of regime transition; the national-federal design of the state during the socialist era; ethnic diversity (including the territorial concentration of national communities); a history, albeit infrequent, of both secessionist pressures and interethnic conflict; and most obviously, the outcome of the story—or the dissolution of the state along republican lines. We can also point to some other commonalities, also logically related to violent versus peaceful state breakup, that fail

to produce the needed contrast between Yugoslavia, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, on the other. For instance, nationalism was a far more potent force in socialist Yugoslavia and socialist Czechoslovakia—and, indeed, during the interwar period as well—than it was in the Soviet Union (until its last years); Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union had genuine communist revolutions, whereas Czechoslovakia did not; the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were far more diverse in their national composition than was Czechoslovakia; Czechoslovakia had been federated far more recently than either the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia; Czechoslovakia was the only birepublican federation; and both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia had significant numbers of the dominant national group residing outside their home republics.

A comparison among these three countries, therefore, allows us to eliminate a number of explanatory factors. What then emerged as central to violent versus peaceful state dissolution were three factors, all institutional in nature and all dating from the socialist experience. The first was the degree of decentralization of the federation; the second, the power of the largest nation versus its institutional endowments; and the third, the politicization of the military. Thus, Yugoslavia ended violently because the federation had been for so long decentralized; because Serbs were less powerful than their numbers (and their history) would indicate, yet empowered at the same time by the institutions of the Serbian republic; and because the Yugoslav military had long been a domestic political actor and was opposed, by mission and interest, to the dismantling of the state. By contrast, the Czechoslovak and Soviet federations were more centralized until regime transition produced a rapid decentralization of the political and economic context. At the same time, the largest nations, or the Czechs and the Russians, respectively, were dominant in political terms but deprived of institutional resources. Finally, the military in both of these countries was excluded from the games of state dismemberment—an exclusion in keeping with their role during socialism when they were encased in the Soviet bloc.

Thus, just as the institutional commonality of national-federalism assured that these three socialist states—and only these—would end when the regime collapsed, so institutional differences assured that Yugoslavia would end differently than either the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia. The socialist past in general and its institutional characteristics in particular seem to explain, therefore, both why these states ended and why they did so in different ways.

This conclusion has several implications that can only be sketched, due to space limitations. The most concrete one is that many of the most common explanations of "international" conflict and cooperation and violent versus peaceful processes of secession have been found wanting. Thus, such factors as, say, the territorial compactness of nations, the national diversity of secessionist regions, the existence of large diaspora populations, the presence of a state organized along national-federal lines, the commitment of the center to maintaining existing

state boundaries, and the relationship between the political power of nations and their socioeconomic resources are all lines of argument that seem to do a poor job of differentiating among our cases.[34]

At the more general level, this analysis reinforces the claim that institutions matter—especially when they are understood as historical in origin and as forces that organize interests, allocate incentives and resources, and thereby define bargaining over the distribution of power and privilege. Institutions, moreover, are even important when they would appear to be unraveling and, thus, when the political environment has become more fluid. In this sense, institutions, even at the point of seeming collapse, manage, nonetheless, to organize politics in highly disorganized times. This, in turn, reminds us that the past is important, even when there appears to be a sharp break with that past. This is as true for our concern here—or where durable states suddenly divide—as for other concerns that have invited considerable interest in the postsocialist world, for example, the power of the socialist past after socialism.

Indeed, if institutions do matter, they matter particularly in their details. Thus, embedded in the commonality of national-federalism were a series of institutional differences—differences that were not widely observed but that proved crucial once the focus shifted from the fact of state dismemberment to the variable ways in which that happened. To borrow from Mies van der Rohe, therefore, God was in the institutional details.[35]

NOTES

1. Tibor Varady, "Minorities, Majorities, Law and Ethnicity: Reflections on the Yugoslav Case," *Human Rights Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (1997): 17.

2. This paper concentrates, therefore, on events surrounding the formal dissolution of these three states. Thus, I will not be dealing with subsequent struggles, peaceful or violent, over new state boundaries, such as have occurred within the Russian federation in the cases of, say, Tatarstan and Chechnya. However, it is worth noting in passing that (1) the pattern of secessionist demands testifies to the power of both the compactness of national minorities and their institutional resources in shaping demands and outcomes and (2) the deployment of the Russian military in Chechnya testifies to the role of the military as a contributor to violence and to the complications introduced by an absence of historical legitimacy for such interventions in Russian (and Soviet) political history.

3. By regime transition, I do not mean to imply the founding of new democracies. In some cases, this was what happened, but in most of the region, the transition was from a political and economic monopoly (which was the defining feature of socialist dictatorships) to an oligopoly. For variations in political and economic outcomes following the collapse of the communist monopoly, see, for example, M. Steven Fish, "The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Postcommunist World," *East European Politics and Societies* 12, no. 3 (1998): 31-78, and Karen Dawisha, "Post-communisms's Troubled Steps toward Democracy: An Aggregate Analysis of Progress in the 27 New States," Paper published by the Center for the Study of Post-Communist Societies, the University of Maryland, College Park, 1997.

4. For explanations of the war in Yugoslavia, see, for instance, Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings

Institution, 1995); Lenard Cohen, *Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993); Branka Magas, *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-Up, 1980-1992* (London: Verso, 1993); Laura Silber and Allen Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (New York: Penguin, 1996); John Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Roger Hayden, "Constitutional Nationalism in the Former Yugoslav Republics," *Slavic Review* 51 (1992), 654-73; and the helpful book review by Gale Stokes, John Lampe, Dennison Rusinow, with Julie Mostov, "Instant History: Understanding the Wars of Yugoslav Succession," *Slavic Review* 56, no. 1 (1996): 136-60. For explanations of the end of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, see, for instance, Karen Henderson, *Czechoslovakia: Cutting the Gordian Knot* (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer, 1994); Carol Leff, *The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nations versus State* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997); Jiri Musil, ed., *The End of Czechoslovakia* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995); Robert Cox and Erich Frankland, "The Federal State and the Breakup of Czechoslovakia: An Institutional Analysis," *Publius* 25, no. 3 (1995): 71-89; and John Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Union* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

5. See, for example, Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Donald Horowitz, "Patterns of Ethnic Separatism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23, no. 2 (1981): 165-95; James Fearon and David Laitin, "Explaining Inter-Ethnic Cooperation," *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 4 (1996): 715-35; Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security* 18, no. 1 (1994): 5-39; Michael Hechter, "The Dynamics of Secession," *Acta Sociologica* 35 (1992): 267-83; and Peter Gourevitch, "The Reemergence of 'Peripheral' Nationalisms: Some Comparative Speculations on the Spatial Distribution of Political Leadership and Economic Growth," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 21, no. 3 (1979): 303-22.

6. See, for example, Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Also see Valerie Bunce, *Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chap. 3, for a more detailed analysis of national federalism (and its regional equivalent, the Soviet bloc), which focuses not just on institutions and identities, but also on the structure of the regime and bargaining between the core and the periphery.

7. See, especially, Drago Roksandic, *Srbi i Hrvatskoj od 15 stoljeca do nasih dana* (Zagreb: Vjesnic, 1991); Chip Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994/1995): 130-66; and Randy Hodson, Dusko Sekulic, and Garth Massey, "National Tolerance in the Former Yugoslavia," *American Journal of Sociology* 99, no. 2 (1994): 1534-58.

8. For evidence on these points, see, for example, Mark Beissinger, "The State as Constructor of Nationalism: Nationalist Mobilization before and after the Soviet Union" (paper presented at the conference on Communism, Post-Communist and Ethnic Mobilization, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 21-22 April 1995); Chauncy Harris, "The New Russian Minorities: A Statistical Overview," *Post-Soviet Geography* 34, no. 2 (1993): 1-27; and William Zimmerman, "Markets, Democracy and Russian Foreign Policy," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 10, no. 2 (1994): 103-26. For a more systematic evaluation of these arguments, see Bunce, *Subversive Institutions*, chaps. 4-6.

9. Many analysts assumed that the breakup of Czechoslovakia would be peaceful and that Czechoslovakia, as a result, would be the "deviant" case within the region. However, the empirical basis for such a prediction is thin. While it is true that regime transition in this instance was unusually quick and thorough, it is also true that conflict between Czechs and Slovaks—or at least their respective leaders—had a long history. It was far from accidental,

for example, that both Croatia-Bosnia and Slovakia were constructed as puppet states during World War II. Moreover, because Czechs and Slovaks had very different readings of what happened and who gained from normalization following the Soviet invasion in 1968, the differences between these two countries, if anything, increased during the last decades of socialism (though their socioeconomic differences declined).

10. This argument, along with a similar analysis of regime collapse, is elaborated in Bunce, *Subversive Institutions*.

11. On the eve of state collapse, both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union had become in fact confederal systems. This had to do with constitutional changes (which were implemented to some degree in Czechoslovakia in 1990-1991 but only proposed in the Soviet Union through the draft of the new Union Treaty) and with more informal dynamics reflecting the weakening of the state along with the regime. For definitions of federalism and confederalism, see, for example, William Riker, *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), and Daniel Elazar, "International and Comparative Federalism," *PS* 12, no. 2 (1993): 190-95.

12. See, for instance, Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, and Susan Woodward, *Socialist Unemployment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Milica Zarkovic Bookman, "The Economic Basis of Regional Autarchy in Yugoslavia," *Soviet Studies* 42, no. 1 (1990): 93-109; Stephen Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision-Making since 1966* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); Sabrina (Pedro) Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1963-1983* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984); and Dennison Rusinow, ed., *Yugoslavia: A Fractured Federalism* (Washington, DC: Wilson Center Press, 1988).

13. Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism*.

14. See, for instance, John Dunlop, "Russia: Confronting a Loss of Empire," in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 43-72; Leff, *The Czech and Slovak Republics*; Carol Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Sharon Wolchik, "The Politics of Ethnicity and the Break-up of Czechoslovakia," *East European Politics and Societies* 8, no. 3 (1994): 153-88; and Sharon Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia in Transition: Politics, Economics and Society* (London: Pinter Press, 1991).

15. Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," *Slavic Review* 53, no. 2 (1994): 414-52.

16. See, for example, Iuri Arutiunian and Leokadia Drobizheva, *Mnogobrazie kul'turnoi zhizn'i narodov SSSR* (Moscow: Mysl', 1987); A. V. Kirkh, P. E. Iarve, and K. P. Khaev, "Etnosotsial'nai differentsiia gorodskogo naseleniia Estonii," *Sotsialogicheskie issledovaniia* 3 (1988): 30-35; and Veljko Vujacic, "Historical Legacies, Nationalist Mobilization and Political Outcomes in Russia and Serbia: A Weberian View," *Theory and Society* 25, no. 4 (1996): 763-801.

17. Quoted in Roman Laba, "How Yel'tsin's Explanation of Ethnic Nationalism Brought Down an Empire," *Transition* 2 (12 January 1996), 7.

18. For evidence on this point, see Beissinger, "The State as Constructor."

19. Quoted in Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia*, 31.

20. Gail Lapidus and Edward Walker, "Nationalism, Regionalism, and Federalism: Center-Periphery Relations in Post-Communist Russia," in Gail Lapidus, ed., *The New Russia: Troubled Transformation* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), 80. It is a telling observation, for example, that both the Czech republic and Russia, upon independence, immediately converted those all-union institutions into their own state institutions.

21. See, especially, Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). On the development and character of Serbian nationalism, also see, for instance, Vujacic, "Historical Legacies."

22. See, for example, Condoleeza Rice, "The Party, the Military, and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union," *World Politics* 40, no. 3 (1987): 55-81; Timothy Colton, *Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); Thomas Nichols, *The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); and David Holloway, "State, Society and the Military under Gorbachev," *International Security* 14, no. 3 (1989/1990): 5-24.

23. Chris Jones, *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact* (New York: Praeger, 1981).

24. James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), and Miroslav Hadzic, "Ratno udeo JNA," in *Filozofija i drustvo VI: Teorijske pretpostavke razumevanja raspada Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, 1994): 189-208.

25. What also must be recognized was that the brief war in Slovenia reflected two contradictory influences. On the one hand, the Yugoslav National Army (the JNA) was dispatched to Slovenia to protect Yugoslavia. On the other hand, Milosevic and the leader of Slovenia, Milan Kucan, had already made a prior and secret agreement to allow Slovenia to leave. See, especially, Veljko Kadijevic, *Moje vidjenje raspada-vojska bez drzave* (Belgrade: Politicka izdavacka delatnost, 1993), and Borisav Jovic, "Dnevnik srditog predsednika," *Vreme International*, 13 November 1995, 40-44.

26. There is also some evidence that the JNA prepared for the wars of secession by, for example, demilitarizing the territorial militias (which proved to be particularly important in Croatia), changing the local command structure, and redrawing the boundaries of military districts, all prior to the breakout of war. On these points, see, for instance, Borisav Jovic, "Presecanje Hrvatske," *Vreme International*, 27 November 1995, 40-43, and Milos Vasic and Filip Svarm, "Generalski crni petak," *Vreme International*, 25 December 1995, 26-29.

27. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 63-67; Vasic and Svarm, "Povrtac v stanje."

28. Vasic and Svarm, "Povrtac v stanje," 12.

29. Bunce, *Subversive Institutions*, chap. 4.

30. Holloway, "State, Society and the Military;" John Lepingwell, "The Russian Military in the 1990s: Disintegration or Renewal?" in Douglas Blum, ed., *Russia's Future: Consolidation or Disintegration* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 109-26.

31. On the declining socioeconomic gap between Slovakia and the Czech Republic, see, for example, Josef Brada, "The Slovak Economy during the First Year of Independence," in *East-Central European Economies in Transition* (Washington, DC: Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 1994), 518-30.

32. On why Vaclav Havel, the president, was excluded from the game, see Sharon Wolchik, "The Politics of Ethnicity," and Wolchik, "The Czech Republic: Havel and the Evolution of the Presidency since 1989," in Ray Taras, ed., *Postcommunist Presidents* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 168-94.

33. See, for instance, Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

34. Refer to nn. 5 and 6.

35. An observation that resonates with recent arguments in the literature on rational choice. See Robert H. Bates, Rui J. P. de Figueiredo Jr., and Barry Weingast, "The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Transition," *Politics and Society* 26 (June 1998): 221-56.