Postmodernism: A Critical Typology

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Despite its proliferation throughout the social sciences and humanities in the past few decades, postmodernism remains a curious lexeme of essentially contested concepts, disparate ideas, obtuse meanings, and political agendas. Postmodernist writings can only be described as an intellectual maelstrom and the postmodernist movement a diverse collection of followers who are neither united in intent, similar in focus or method, nor canonized in terms of theoretical precision. The nomenclature is confusing, fluid, and imprecise, the boundaries of conventional scholarship, theory, and understanding blurred and porous. Debates about theory have given way to meta-theory, meta-physics, and meta-history, leading to intellectual ruptures not perhaps seen since the Renaissance itself. Few, it seems, know what to make of the idioms and idiolects of the post, which, at various junctures, transpose from postmodernism to poststructuralism, positivism, postindustrialism, postphilosophy, postmarxism, or posthistoire—to name but a few. Literature, art, aesthetics, politics, and the advent of “discourse” and “dialogism” are again the celebrated emissaries of a “new” means to knowledge and understanding. At the end of the millennium, we find ourselves engaged in a project that, depending on one’s position, threatens either ruination or renewal.

I would like to thank Kalevi J. Holsti, Robert Jackson, Philip Resnick, and Robert Crawford of the University of British Columbia, Canada, and Martin Griffiths and Terry O’Callaghan of the Flinders University of South Australia for their insightful comments and suggestions in the preparation of this paper. Professor Charles Hale of the University of Texas also provided valuable feedback and suggestions for improving the manuscript for which I am most grateful. Finally, but by no means least, many thanks are due to Jim Poon who, on more than several occasions, kindly read the manuscript and offered numerous editorial suggestions.
This article attempts an appraisal of postmodern theory by exploring critically its various motifs and thematic features. It does so out of a desire to make sense of postmodernism and, more generally, to infer which of its many strands and perspectives might prove useful to the social sciences. To this end, the article is organized into two main sections. The first attempts to situate and make sense of the phenomena of “postmodernism” by locating contextually its relationship to modernity. I do this by offering two interpretive discussions of the leitmotifs of postmodernism as popularly understood: postmodernism as “negation” and postmodernism as “epochal change.” These discussions provide a brief introduction to the aims, issues, and concerns of postmodernists and illustrates the scope of the postmodernist “project.” The second section then develops a taxonomic/classificatory system to tease out the contrasting epistemic motifs evident among postmodernists. These are then assessed critically, and some tentative conclusions drawn as to which type(s) of postmodernism might prove germane for theoretical endeavor in the social sciences.$^1$

ON DEFINITIONS, DISCOURSE, AND DEBATE

For a “project” so tumultuous and far-reaching in its consequences, Chris Brown’s recent musing is most revealing, capturing the essence of this intellectual divide in a way that would seem to make irreconcilable the contrasts between them. Of postmodernism, he writes, “those that like this sort of thing will find this the sort of thing they like—those who do not, will not.”$^2$ And this, perhaps, has been the extent of intellectual debate to date—an intellectual rift interspersed with ritual denunciations and affirmations of likes and dislikes. For want of clarity, the “new interpretivism” has become little more than rehearsed statements of intransigence, spoken by those who announce and “celebrate” its arrival and those who would forestall its colonization and spread. Despite the devout “hopes of many cynics, the allure of postmodernism” remains undiminished, and the “salon lizards of theory,” as John Bowers describes them, “are yet to move en masse to any newer, more attractive fad.”$^3$

But what to make of these new idioms, new words, new thought habits, new theories, and of the “new scholarship”? How do we understand it; indeed, can it be understood? The answers are by no means uniform. Charles Newman, for example, sees postmodernism as a kind of incomplete nonidea that exists neither as a “canon of writers, nor a body of criticism.”$^4$ Harry Levin, by contrast, abjures postmodernism for its anti-intellectualism, while Irving Howe thinks it a mass cultural phenomenon “impatient with mind.” For John Gardner, on the other hand, it represents a new mode of “hyper-intellectualism.”$^5$ As to what constitutes the precise essence of the postmodern, few can agree, noting as does Dick Hebdige that
it becomes more and more difficult . . . to specify exactly what it is that “postmodernism” is supposed to refer to as the term gets stretched in all directions across different debates, different disciplinary and discursive boundaries, as different factions seek to make it their own, using it to designate a plethora of incommensurable objects, tendencies, emergencies. It becomes more and more difficult . . . to specify exactly what it is that “postmodernism” is supposed to refer to as the term gets stretched in all directions across different debates, different disciplinary and discursive boundaries, as different factions seek to make it their own, using it to designate a plethora of incommensurable objects, tendencies, emergencies. 6

While the postmodern lexeme is all about us—the object of classroom conversations, graduate papers, increasing numbers of dissertations, conference proceedings, and book titles—still it remains clouded in mystique and intellectually opaque. Offering a stipulative definition of postmodernism, or attempting to study it “objectively,” might thus prove more fruitless than productive. 7 For, unlike intellectual movements before it, postmodernism is less doctrine, creed, or canon than it is millennial anxiety and a sense of change in the “structure of feeling.” Postmodernism is thus best viewed not as a statement of principles, methodological formula, or a grand theory so much as a cathartic apostasy—a renunciation of faith in modernism, rationality, science, technology, and the philosophy of presence (representation). 8 In its most immediate form, postmodernism might thus be thought of as anti-modernist, rejecting the tradition of Enlightenment thought but not necessarily the emancipatory rationale that informed it. Indeed, there is in postmodern writings a feeling of “liberation,” a celebration of renewal, a sense that “boundaries” are everywhere being transgressed, new social mores established, new political identities forged, and new histories in the making. This might account for the intellectual muddle and elasticity of the concept itself, where “postmodernism” signifies an intellectual premonition of imminent change or impending closure. So, too, might this explain why postmodern writings have been adopted in such disparate milieus, connoting the assemblage of stylistic expressions in architecture, for example, or the landscape of political-economic changes in the nature of production and consumption; the mediascape of images comprising the “simulacra”; the crisis of representation and the allegoric tendency toward sign and symbol; the transformation of time-space dimensions with the revolutions in communications and transportations; the deconstruction of text and subject and the rise of intertextualism and intersubjectivity; or the repudiation of modernist philosophy accused of being atonal, logocentric, instrumentalist, and rationalist.

Thus, might we conceive of postmodernism not as a theory or theories but, as Hebdige argues, “a space, a ‘condition’ . . . where competing intentions, definitions, and effects, diverse social and intellectual tendencies and lines of force converge and clash.” 9 Postmodernism might thus be little more than a nonspace without meaning, a word that captures this sense of rupture and disjuncture but whose parameters it cannot identify. Attempting to “define” or elucidate postmodernism might, then, be an activity presaged to failure.

But the question remains: what to make of postmodernism, how to understand it, what might it do to theory, knowledge, and scholarship? Despite the inherent fussiness of the concept itself, there are, I would suggest, two dominant motifs in
Postmodernist writings. These might be called “negation” or “resistance” through intellectual disturbance and the notion of millennial anxiety through conceptions of epochal change.

POSTMODERN THEORY AS RESISTANCE AND DISTURBANCE

Postmodern theory is not complacent. Disturbance, disruption, reinscription, and the penchant to “rethink” knowledge are common to its sense of self. This might be why so few disciplines since the 1970s have been untouched by the temerity of postmodernist writings and readings. Philosophy, politics, music, film, sociology, geography, literary criticism, development studies, and international relations all display postmodernist intrusion. Infiltration and dissonance of seemingly unrelated debates and research areas bear witness to its disparate adaptation and adoption. Indeed, this is one of its unique features, its ability to be understood concurrently as a means of reading texts, a method for theoretical deconstruction, a form of political-economy, a variant of feminist writings, an epitaph to modernism, a post-avant-garde postexpressionist form of aesthetics, or a new hyperconsumer culture riven by image. By their very nature, postmodern writings display a predilection for eclecticism, tending to divaricate into numerous and often unrelated subject areas. But this has not been a process of melding into disparate intellectual milieus. Far from attempting to “colonize” existing “territories,” postmodernists have sought to “interrogate” and “disrupt” them. The underlying ideological matrix of postmodernism thus reveals its political strategy, an attempt to disturb the substructural basis on which modernist knowledge and “boundaries” are built. The greatest threat to modernist narratives and knowledge thus comes not from assaults on its epistemological edifice but when its medium of communication, its assumption of intersubjective communicative rationality, and its rules of rationalist engagement are circumvented via deliberate confusion, imprecision, and textual chicanery. For modernists, the threat of postmodern discourse lies in its stepping outside the dictates of rationalism and its refusal to be rational, precise, and commensurate. By design, postmodern writings are thus cryptic in form, enigmatic, and amorphous, a strategy that not only disrupts modernist narratives through language deracination but insulates the postmodern conduit from external assault. As Donald Kuspit notes, postmodernists are “protected by mystique,” their writings “rhapsodic,” “elusive,” “exhilarating,” and “used with licence.” Like a panacea, postmodernist literature is rich with linguistic parody, irony, meaning, and insight. By admitting only to “fecundity in dimensions,” postmodern writings shelter from critique, disguise their place of origin and essential meaning, and make themselves aeolian by their transient discursiveness. The very word postmodern, for example, has become a “floating signifier,” able to penetrate all facets of social theory by virtue of its imprecise dimensions and ability to assume innumerable meanings dependent on the context in which
it is employed. Postmodern discourse might thus be little more than textual and intellectual irreverence in an attempt to be a “spanner in the works” of modernity. Andreas Huyssen, for example, argues, less than kindly, that the use of eclecticism is a thinly disguised facade that spares postmodern theory the embarrassment of revealing its theoretical impression and meaningless nature. For Huyssen, postmodernism is little more than an “aesthetic simulacrum: facile eclecticism combined with aesthetic amnesia and delusions of grandeur.”\footnote{13}

Such textual and intellectual sabotage, however, serves their purpose, perplexing “modernists” who often seem bereft of responses to it. Traditional theorists like Christopher Norris or Alex Callinicos, for instance, display bewilderment at the ethereality, theoretical brevity, and reluctance of postmodernists to enunciate their epistemic motif beyond the errant practices of deconstruction.\footnote{14} Above all they are disenchanted at the unwillingness of postmodernists to abide by established rules for intellectual engagement: how does one rationally assess postmodern theory when postmodernists eschew all references to rationalist discourse? But they miss the point; this is the point of postmodern discourse: confusion, dissonance, and disruption.

Postmodernism can thus be understood as “political resistance” rather than theoretical innovation, a means of stepping outside the established practices of (Western) scholarship and infusing it with critical insight. The incorporeal nature of language destabilization, for example, allows postmodernists to attack the rigidities of modernist discourse, particularly the sanctums of logic and reason, and escape the “victimization” that they argue has led to their “exile,” “marginalization,” and “disempowerment.” Ethereality therefore becomes a political act of nonconformity and textual deconstruction a way of “undoing” and challenging the power hierarchy of modernist theory that presupposes conformity in method, logic, knowledge, and interpretation.

One of the primary objectives of much postmodernist scholarship thus concerns itself with a form of deconstructive pluralism, deliberately designed to destabilize, or at least to challenge, the system(s) of knowledge premised on Western rationalism and derived from the Enlightenment. Where the project of modern political theory might be said to concern itself with the “good society,” to inventing rules, norms, standards, and defining objectives on the basis of some master blueprint or universal grand strategy, postmodern theory might be said to be its arch rival, committed to seeing an end to this (modernist) project. Yet, the alternatives it offers are all but invisible, especially when its aetiological basis is hidden beneath a complicated developmental historiography punctuated only by a disposition toward continental philosophy (in particular, French poststructuralist theory). Instead, postmodernists prefer the ether of the unspecified to the vexed realities of inscribed practices, disciplinary specialization, or concision in method and technique and appeal to an as yet unspecified set of “other” criteria as the appropriate vehicles for understanding postmodern theory. Consequently, post-
modernism continues to suffer from ill-defined parameters that betray an incomplete conception of itself and an inclination to self-contradiction, discursiveness, irreverence, and complicated forms of expression and self-explanation.\textsuperscript{15} 

On this reading, postmodern theory displays a central matrix remarkably simplistic and myopic in its theoretical and practical intent: the theoretical intent of \textit{negation} and the practical intent of \textit{resistance}. The postmodernist “project,” for example, is readily defined by its rehearsal of the litany of “horrors” and “injustices” carried out in the modernist era. Jim George, for instance, argues that postmodern theory is able to connect “the nightmarish dimensions of the Enlightenment dream” with the rise of the “rational subject” and “the experiences of Hiroshima and Auschwitz.” “The point,” he notes, “is that a celebration of the age of rational science and modern society cannot simply be disconnected from the weapons of mass slaughter or the techniques of genocide: [the] language and logic of liberty and emancipation” cannot be “detached from the terror waged in their names.”\textsuperscript{16} In this guise, postmodernism is understood as a deconstructive practice: “a textual activity, a putting-into-question of the root metaphysical prejudice which posits self-identical concepts outside and above the disseminating play of language.”\textsuperscript{17} The postmodernist project becomes an exercise in linguistic relativism through deconstruction, an attempt to tear apart and negate modernity and demonstrate the centrality of language in the construction of knowledge and truth. We can see this, for example, in the derisive language employed by postmodernists, who aim to repudiate “oppositional and relational thinking,” “deconstruct logocentric practices,” engage in “transformative ontologies,” disparage “master narratives,” make for a “polyvocal understanding,” “revalorize dialogical approaches,” “map new taste cultures,” present “counterhegemonic” views, and “transfigure monological” interpretations. This is a theoretical-textual process of “undoing” and a political process of \textit{resisting} modernist practices, modernist theory, values, and interpretations.\textsuperscript{18} Theory-knowledge, the precepts of truth, right and wrong, just and unjust, and other “logocentric” combinations, along with “master-narratives” premised on rationalist argument, are not merely questioned but delegitimized. This is not simply an attack on discrete theories waged from an alternative theoretical standpoint but a deconstructive effort to undo the activity of Enlightenment theory and knowledge. In this way, postmodernists can disparage modernist rationalism as instrumentalist, dismiss epistemology as foundationalist, and reject ontology as positivist. As the cherished centerpieces of Enlightenment thought and Western rationalism, these critical-intellectual tools are summarily dismissed as no longer useful and no longer legitimate.

One of the central theoretical matrices of the postmodernist project, then, is a repudiation of \textit{organonist} thought systems: an attempt to deconstruct inscribed means of reasoning and logic indicative of Western philosophy. This, undoubtedly, is what makes postmodernists so conspicuous and their project both
tenacious and tenuous. For while postmodernists are patently anti-modernist, their very rationality and purpose is prescribed by the logic of modernity, whether as an alternative to it or a reaction against it. Thus, the anti-logic on which postmodern theory is founded can itself be seen as the binary opposite logic of modernity, entrapping postmodernists within modernist logic if only because of their own anti-logocentrism. This makes postmodern theory vulnerable not only to criticism that it is unable to escape the very logic it chastises, but also because those criticisms it levels against modernist discourse invariably repudiate postmodern theory too. As Kate Manzo observes,

Even the most radically critical discourse easily slips into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest, for it can never step completely outside of a heritage from which it must borrow its tools—its history, its language—in an attempt to destroy that heritage itself. 19

POSTMODERN THEORY
AS EPOCHAL CHANGE

While we often think of the postmodern project as largely a deconstructive effort inspired by Continental theorists like Jacques Derrida, or a project of resistance to the “oppressive” discourses of modernity as with Foucault, postmodernism as a “periodizing” category and the theories it engenders are not so easily classified. What of those who claim the arrival of a postmodern era and a different set of sensibilities? Things are surely changing; we no longer inhabit an era understood as simply modernist, but one where hyperactivity in communications, transportations, trade, and electronic images presupposes a “new” set of political, social, economic, and transnational realities. 20 “That we live in postmodern times,” notes Wendy Brown, “is nearly inarguable,” albeit that there is no agreement “about the configuration of this condition, its most striking marker, implications, and portents.” 21

Recent history, of course, displays a strong proclivity for such conclusions. The eminent historian, Arnold Toynbee, for example, toward the end of the Second World War, concluded his magnum opus, A Study of World History, by noting that “the world had just entered the last phase of Western history—the ‘post-modern’ era, an age that would be marked by anxiety and despair.” 22 This sense of millennial anxiety, of absolute historical breakage and rupture, of “new” ages and “new” associations have been endemic themes in the social sciences and humanities, reflecting, perhaps, not only a fascination with change, science, technology, and the speed of innovation but a sense of new horizons as conceptions of “locality” and “space” have been obliterated with interplanetary travel, jet-setting tourists, indeed of interstate commuters who jet from London to Brussels to work and home again in time for dinner. Dazzled by such “transformations,” it is easy to speculate that we have entered a “new” historical phase, or at the very least that we are approaching the “end of [modern] history.” 23 In the last few decades of the
The recent tirade of studies on world order transformation, communications, and changing forms of governance, for example, point to a sense of fundamental transition not only in social, political, and institutional structures but how these necessitate change in mediums of inquiry and the theoretical apparatus to explain and understand these transitions. Many of these innovations, of course, are to be welcomed, deepening our theoretical understanding and knowledge. Yet, to suppose the dawn of a “new age” or that this “new age” is manifestly different from the past is at best premature and at worst misconceived.

Most generations are apt to be consumed with their own self-importance and their sense of difference from previous generations. But “difference,” “transformation,” or “change” does not necessarily equate with “new.” If we are in a “new” postmodern era, to what extent is this merely the consequence of the modernist epoch maturing, growing, and expanding? The notion of “new,” often expressed by the prefix “post” signifying disjuncture and breakage, is spurious. Social processes, economics, politics, and the human condition have not suddenly reinvented themselves in the space of a few short decades. Rather is the case that they have been subtly altered and affected by changing scientific innovations, technological progress, and attendant reorientations in knowledge and understanding. This is the way Anthony Giddens explains the so-called postmodern age, not as a “new” era but part of the unfolding tapestry of modernity, where the
radicalization and universalization of modernity now make its consequences manifest. Processes otherwise claimed as evidence of a “postmodern condition,” then, are more appropriately explained as the consequences of modernity that, through reflexivity, continually transposes its form, effects, and style. Thus, for example, the “new” forms of cultural expressionism that postmodernists claim are a reaction against the “monism” of modernist universality are more likely the logical consequence of technological innovations that make the mass transmission of ideas possible, as with, for example, the explosion of niche magazines that cater to specific (mass) taste cultures. Likewise, the fragmentation of political movements and the growth of special interest groups that postmodernists insist represents a “new political sensibility” that “celebrates diversity” might also be explained by the increasing spread and acceptance of liberal ideas that reject absolutism while embracing tolerance. So, too, the innovative styles and objectives of literary texts that have been coterminous with challenges to traditional conceptions of the role and purpose of theory are likely not so much instances of “postmodernist” theory as they are a reflection of the depreciation of Western literary influences through greater cross-culturalism due to global advances in literacy, communications, and travel. Likewise, the advent of “hyperconsumerism” that postmodernists claim is a result of the “simulacra” and the fixation with image and style is more obviously caused by materialist saturation, mass consumption, and mass marketing techniques and fabricated by the availability of the mass electronic and print medias. And far from the nation-state “withering away” in an era of “globalization,” more likely is the case that we are witnessing the universalization of capitalism and of a liberal world trade regime just as the nation-state too has become universalized as the preferred medium of territorial-sociopolitical organization. This is not a “radical disjuncture” from previous historical experience but the triumph of that experience on a global scale. The fact that Japanese wear Levi jeans while attending baseball games in Tokyo, or that the Chinese sample Big Macs in Beijing, or that a New Yorker can communicate via the Internet with a South African in “real time” is more accurately explained by the spread of modernity, technology, and, perhaps, the “Americanization” of global cultural taste preferences than it is by declarations of “new epochs,” “new cultures,” and “new worlds.” In other words, talk of a “postmodern age” is merely talk of the consequences of modernity, particularly developments in its constituent parts, namely liberal democracy, industrialism, capitalism, technology, and science. What postmodernists mistake as “new” cultural forms, or as “new” modes of production, are really consequences of old and well-established modernist practices: a case of old wine in new bottles.

In their haste to proclaim a “new” epoch, postmodernists have thus been inclined to myopia and ahistoricism, forgetting how instrumental and interrelated is the past to the present. As David Harvey notes, while many now employ the popular idiom of postmodernism, “the conditions of postmodernity are still very
much tied to [the] historical-geographical workings of capitalism’s inner logic.” But, as he also warns, this makes the “rhetoric of postmodernism . . . dangerous for it avoids confronting the realities of political economy and the circumstances of global power.” Indeed, any statistical survey of “global trends” will still find a world far from “global” in its experiences, standard of living, literacy, and the provision of basic necessities. The dialectics of hunger and famine, for example, still make for a “North-South” global divide, as do those of literacy, numeracy, or disease epidemics like cholera, dysentery, and premature death through privation. And while the word *globalism* is bandied about to signify absolute transformation in the sites of power and state sovereignty, still we know through statistical observation of military power and economic might that America is *the* global hegemon, consumes upwards of 60 percent of the world’s resources, is predominant in controlling the value of the world’s currencies through cross-rates with the “greenback,” controls the vast proportion of the world’s patents and patented technologies, supplies most of the world’s leading software applications for business and commerce, dominates the world’s pharmaceutical industry, is the leading producer of research in the social sciences and sciences, and is paramount in orchestrating a global liberal trade regime. For a world so supposedly “diffuse” and increasingly “plural,” the concentration of economic, military, political, and technological power can still be related via such modernist concepts as “power politics,” “realism,” “hegemony,” and “imperialism.” If anything, there is a strong case for the conclusion that global power and wealth are more concentrated today than previously. In what sense the global order is now a “postmodern” one resplendent with “globalized plural identities,” experiences, consumption patterns, or reading and writing habits thus remains extremely problematic. The experiences of modernization, the incidence of telephone communications, or the availability of modern medical expertise is remarkably dissimilar in Africa, large portions of Central and South America, or Eastern Europe, for that matter. To suggest the advent of a “postmodern age” before the vast majority of humankind has yet to experience the effects of modernity through modernization seems premature and reflects how parochial have “futurists” and postmodernists been in cataloguing the “new realities.”

For postmodernists who stress deconstruction and resistance, however, what is “new” about the “postmodern epoch” is not the centrality of power or production but the devolution of a central, sovereign, and authoritative center of interpretation and meaning. As Richard Ashley notes, European “peoples and places” long certain of their absolute presence as a centre of meaning and origin of authority, [have] had to accommodate their situation in a wider world of contesting cultures that at once effectively resist and effectively penetrate the European territory of truth.

This, for Ashley, is the essence of a “new” postmodern sensibility, a kind of relativistic-plural world full of competing interpretations with no sovereign center. Yet, this too might also be viewed a stage in the development of modernity:
the effects of modernization, for example, that colonize increasing parts of the
global political-economy and change the spatial dimension of geographic, eco-
nomic, and cultural relationships.

Regardless of their efficacy, the assumption of epochal change and new
realities has spawned a whole series of theories also variously labeled postmodern.
Most obviously, notions of a “postmodern era” have engendered new ways of
“doing theory.” Issues previously thought unimportant have become central,
conceptions of time and space have changed, new sets of questions and issues
have been raised, and a whole host of theories have arisen to address these issues.

This process has been common enough in the social sciences: a movement
away from essentialist grand-theoretic narratives toward multitheoretical perspec-
tivism and “islands of theory.” Arguably, this eclecticism in theoretical approaches
and ideas itself constitutes a “postmodern” sensibility: the notion that things are
too complex to be grasped by any one theoretical account. The late-modern world
is now variously understood to be composed of interpenetrating and multiple
realities, where complexity in social, economic, and political relationships is
further compounded by a multitude of electronic images, disparate cultural
influences, and changes in the dimensional referents of time and space due to
advances in transportations and communications. What this represents for post-
modernists is “a profound shift in the structure of feeling” in the “culture of
advanced capitalist” societies. 34 As Jane Flax observes,

Something has happened, is happening to Western societies. . . . Western culture is in the
middle of a fundamental transformation; a “shape of life” is growing old. The demise of
the old is being hastened by the end of colonialism, the uprising of women, the revolt of
other cultures against white Western hegemony, shifts in the balance of economic and
political power within the world economy, and a growing awareness of the costs as well
as the benefits of scientific “progress.” 35

For postmodernists, the complexity of these realities discounts the utility of
monotheoretical (essentialist) accounts. Instead, it suggests the need for multiple
theoretical analyses that avoid reflection on any one dimension in favor of a
reflexive understanding of relationships between social, political, and economic
dimensions.

This trend is generally constitutive of the new forms of postmodern theory in
political-economy. These tend to (1) subsume disciplinary boundaries; (2) con-
cern themselves with technoscientific change and their economic, political, and
social consequences in theses of the “postindustrial society”; (3) integrate into
theories of commodity production and consumption a theory of aesthetics and
cultural forms; (4) problematize claims and suppositions and expose them to
critical analysis; (5) contextualize knowledge claims, and in the context of
deconstruction theory “obliterate the boundaries between literature and other
disciplines” and reduce “all modes of thought to the common condition of
writing.” 36
Thus, if we are to approach an understanding of postmodernism, we must first realize that no one understanding is sufficient. Certainly its dominant constellations exist as deconstructive anti-modernist efforts, but this is not true of all postmodern theory or postmodernists. Increasingly, those who claim a postmodern heritage are not easily slotted into a deconstructionist mold but concern themselves with objective changes in technologies, economics, political organization, culture, and their reflexive effects on such things as interstate relations, interdependence, or consumption and production patterns. Consequently, the postmodernist lexicon is best understood as a generic shell that houses numerous commentaries on the condition of late modernity; some from a deconstructionist/resistance standpoint, others from a position of documenting change. What unites these forms of analysis is that all of them are reacting to the modernist project and the latent processes of modernization—whether this be a political commentary on the “nightmarish dimensions of the Enlightenment dream,” the consequences of changing social and political sensibilities in the era of mass communications, or on the end of the industrial era and the rise of a postindustrial one. In short, these commentaries are both a postscript to the modernist era and a preface to the consequences of that era which are now becoming evident.

A reading of postmodern theory as “epochal change” thus proves instructive. In this context, postmodern theory acts as a sequential marker or periodizing category, a metaphor that is both emblematic of changes in culture, history, society, and thought, while perhaps also contributory to them. Whether such changes are real or imagined, the point is moot. What is imagined today becomes tomorrow’s reality, and a great deal of postmodern theory is directed toward capturing this sense of change in the “structure of feeling,” which itself has reflexive implications for the way social and political relations are actually practiced. The uniqueness of postmodern theory therefore resides in its reflexivity, its ability to offer commentary on these changes and make them real. My quibble with postmodern theory does not reside in these observations but the extent to which these “changes” are the result of modernist attributes wrongly ascribed to a postmodern reality and detached from historical and genealogical moorings. To this extent, postmodern theory is oxymoronic, since the realities, changes, and sensibilities it deals with are themselves modernist in origin. Thus, while the two readings I have offered have obvious utility, by themselves they are unable to capture the depth of epistemological diversity within postmodern theory or the peculiarity of its inconsonant nuances. For this, a more substantial taxonomical system is required.

THREE TYPOLOGIES OF POSTMODERN THEORY

If postmodernists grapple with the modalities of late modernity, they do so in multifarious ways, many of which seem unrelated and dissimilar. As Pauline
Rosenau observes, there are “as many forms of post-modernism as there are post-modernists,” making postmodern theory a diverse amalgam of contending interests and approaches.\(^4\) Any classificatory scheme that attempts to order postmodern theory is thus prone to the dangers of oversimplification, not least because it will invariably reduce the breadth and diversity of postmodern theory to a few cursory categories. However, if we are to gain a systematic understanding of postmodernism and its diversity, then such typologies are not only heuristically necessary but indispensable.

The application of Weberian “ideal types” to postmodern theory is not new. Hal Foster divided postmodern theory into two schematic categories: a “Neoconservative” and “Post-structuralist” variety. Similarly, Pauline Rosenau wrote of “Affirmative” and “Skeptical” postmodernism, Richard Rorty of deconstructionist and “bourgeois postmodernism,” and Mark Hoffman of “critical” and “radical interpretivism.”\(^4\) While classifications of this nature are useful, they also betray a number of problems inherent in the construction of schematic “ideal types.” First, most “ideal types” rely on simple dichotomized categories that are restrictive and exclusionary (as with the above). Theories and theorists are never as neatly compartmentalized or clearly defined as many historiographical-epistemological narratives would suggest. And still fewer intellectual movements, let alone the postmodern one, can be captured adequately by single-variable categories like “poststructuralist” or “bourgeois.” Intellectual discourse and the manner in which ideas emerge, develop, and are employed and of how they interact reflexively with other theories and change their systemic structure are notoriously complicated questions. Moreover, the inscription of particular theorists and theories into discrete intellectual boxes is an activity far from objective and often infused with subjective bias and interpretation.

I do not pretend to offer any alternatives to these dilemmas but simply acknowledge the weaknesses implicit in the construction of classificatory schemes. These weaknesses, however, do not detract from the overall utility of schematic typologies as heuristic tools. Their continued use throughout the social sciences bears testimony to this. Classificatory schemes and processes of theoretical taxonomy are pedagogically indispensable if we are to appreciate the constituent parts of theories, assess their usefulness, and use them. For this reason, I also intend to employ a classificatory scheme that identifies thematic “ideal types” in postmodern theory.

While the criteria for the construction of ideal types are often subjectively derived, in the case of postmodern theory, a number of dominant thematic issues immediately suggest themselves. First, I have already identified the theoretical intent of some postmodern theories to negate and resist modernist discourse. Second, I have identified the use of postmodernism as a periodizing category denoting change in such things as culture, technology, science, politics, and economics. Third, I also indicated that new forms of theoretical analysis have
arisen in response to these “new” postmodern realities, theories that attempt an understanding of postmodern dynamics and why they came about.

These expressed concerns allow for the identification of three broad, and by no means inclusive, categories of postmodern theory. These I have called (1) technological or productionist postmodernism, reflecting the themes of technoscientific changes and their reflexive social, political, and economic effects; (2) critical postmodernism, reflecting the growth of new theoretical mediums and new ways of doing theory, particularly those concerned with assessing critically foundational propositions and contextualizing knowledge; and (3) subversive or deconstructive postmodernism, reflecting the themes of negation and resistance.

These can be summarized briefly.

*Technological or Productionist Postmodernism*

Technological or productionist postmodernism has a thematic matrix concerned with objective changes: that is, as a consequence of modernity and the spread and advance of science and technology, the traditional modernist dialectics of production and consumption, labor and capital, state and market, and so on have been transposed with reflexive effects on cultural forms, economics, and politics. These effects are represented, for example, in theories of the postindustrial society, postmaterialist society, or postclass society. As such, technological postmodernists tend to be concerned with ontological issues, framed in terms of spatial and temporal transformations in the matrix of production, consumption, and the new political-economy of signs, symbols, and codes. They also respond to what is perceived to be the “radical indeterminacy” of the “new aesthetics,” where traditional dialectics such as Left and Right politics, for example, become blurred “through the commutability of terms once contradictory or dialectically opposed.” Modernist categories like fashion, image, spectacle, art, politics, self, other, good, or bad, for example, all become lost amid a montage of hypercommunications that change the systemic basis of capitalist accumulation and the modernist logic of economy, culture, politics, and society.

*Critical Postmodernism*

Critical postmodernists seek to expose the foundationalist assumptions on which meta-theoretical knowledge systems are constructed. It is a relatively benign form of postmodernism whose genealogy can be traced directly to the critical social theorists of the Frankfurt school. Because of this, it is closely associated with many of the debates concerning the crisis in marxist theory and postmarxist discourse. Critical postmodernism is also concerned with the relationship between aesthetics and cultural forms and modes of production, attempting to construct a unified theory of aesthetics and culture within a marxist epistemology (the work of Antonio Gramsci, for example). As such, critical postmodernists tend to be concerned with methodological issues (the fact-value
distinction of positivism, for instance) and their project sympathetic to epistemology, grand narratives, and foundationalist-objective thought.

**Subversive-Deconstructive Postmodernism**

Subversive postmodernism displays a thematic concern with negation and resistance to modernist practices and discourse, primarily via a deconstructive-textual analysis of logocentric practices, modernist knowledge systems, and language. In particular, subversive postmodernists attempt to demonstrate how all knowledge is mediated by language and how the modernist referents of “reality,” “truth,” “reason,” and “logic” are fictive sociolinguistic constructs that act as mechanisms of social and individual control. Subversive postmodernism, through deconstruction, attempts to erect a “structure of resistance,” attacking what might be broadly called the Western-Judeo intellectual tradition and the politics of the Enlightenment. Their project is thus anti-epistemological and targets Cartesian-Kantian epistemology and the notion of philosophical foundations in theory and knowledge. For subversive postmodernists, knowledge is located in the fact of discourse and dialogism and situated in subjective-individual, and not universal, sites.

**EXCURSIONS INTO THE POSTMODERNIST LABYRINTH: THE MOTIFS OF POSTMODERN THEORY**

Let us turn now to a critical exposition of these three motifs as they occur in the writings of a number of leading postmodernists. As I have already mentioned, however, this task is made discursive if only because postmodernist writings tend to operate amid a series of contending motifs by virtue of their penchant for eclecticism. Consequently, I intend to treat these motifs as porous codifications rather than monothematic categories into which postmodernists can be slotted. These motifs are therefore advanced for purely analytical and heuristic reasons, to explore critically the epistemological and ontological constructions that underlie them.

**Postmodernism as Technological Change**

When writing about postmodernism, Fredric Jameson offers the mystic observation that it is both a new age as well as an inverted form of intellectual reflection. Postmodernism, he notes, “is what you have when the modernization process is complete and nature is gone for good.” It reflects an indulgent attempt at “theorizing its own condition of possibility, which consists,” notes Jameson, “in the sheer enumeration of changes and modifications.”

The postmodern concept is used to denote change, difference, and historical movement, as well as new forms of intellectual reflection, new theoretical issues, and new forms of theory. Historical or epochal change and the new forms of theory that have arisen are not mutually exclusive but, as Jameson insists, causally
connected: the latter consequent on the former. Jameson betrays his marxist
origins, particularly his reductionist penchant for seeing intellectual change the
product of changes in the nature of capitalist relations of production. For Jameson,
the postmodernist era becomes not so much a new era detached from the previous
but, like Giddens’s understanding, an era consequent on the manifestations of
modernity, particularly those transformations evident in capitalism, science, and
technology. In fact, Jameson writes of a “third stage” in the development of
capitalism—a mature capitalism that displays an inner logic and whose rationality
is defined by accumulation. This “third stage” incorporates into the marxist
production matrix culture and aesthetics, whereby there has occurred “some
fundamental mutation of the sphere of culture in the world of late-capitalism,
which includes a momentous modification of its social function.”

Jameson approaches what I have termed a technological or productionist
postmodernist: where postmodernism denotes a periodizing category expressing
objective changes in technology, culture, society, and politics as a consequence
of the modalities of late capitalism. For Jameson, this constitutes
a moment in which not merely the older city but even the nation-state itself has ceased to
play a central functional or formal role in a process that has a new quantum leap of capital
prodigiously expanded beyond them, leaving them behind as ruined and archaic remains
of earlier stages in the development of this new mode of production.

The postmodern era is one of new configurations, not least of them spatial,
which transposes social orders, the role and power of the state, and affects cultural
and political sensibilities.

However, it would be naive to suppose Jameson only a technological postmod-
ernist. He also displays a keen understanding of how theory is transformed in the
postmodern epoch. For example, he is intimately involved in transforming marxist
theory from its reductionist and essentialist economism into a reflexive theoretical
understanding of the connections between cultural forms and political and eco-
nomic structures. Thus, we can also see his writings contiguous with the motifs
of critical postmodernism, particularly his attempts to integrate a cultural-aes-
thetic dimension into (post)marxist theory and continue the critical theoretic
tradition of the Frankfurt school. In fact, Jameson’s project is readily understood
as critical through his continued commitment to marxist categories like “class,”
“mode of production,” and “capitalism.” In Jameson’s writings, these categories
still assume a central ontological position as substructural and foundational
elements responsible for social relations. These categories, as in all marxist theory,
remain central analytical tools in Jameson’s effort to uncover the foundational
elements responsible for postmodern life and to explain historical movement and
transformation. Because of this, he insists that postmodernism “should not be thought of as purely a cultural affair.”51 Rather, he urges,

I must remind the reader of the obvious; namely, that this whole global, yet American, postmodern culture is the internal and superstructural expression of a whole new wave of American military and economic domination throughout the world: in this sense, as throughout class history, the underside of culture is blood, torture, death, and terror.52

Jameson’s response to the postmodern era, then, is to infuse marxist theory with an understanding of culture and aesthetics while integrating them into a theory of the modes of production. This, for Jameson, explains not only the dynamics of capitalist accumulation and of technological and scientific innovation but ultimately reveals capitalism and its economic-social matrix to be the driving force of history.

Scott Lash, on the other hand, takes a slightly different perspective. For Lash, postmodernism represents the cultural subterfuge of postindustrial society, particularly the “deepening of commodification.” Here, postmodernism is a cultural phenomenon with economic and political consequences: where commodified images are performative of accumulatory practices for capitalism and where the “transvaluation” of image and aesthetics “displace class culture.”53 The result is the transformation of the universal proletarian into a cognitariat, displacing its political activism with spectatorism that pluralizes left political culture.54 Class culture ceases to exist, the dialectics of class and capital no longer “drive” history, and those social agents previously thought central in the historical dialectic are superseded in the postmodern age.

Charles Jencks has drawn similar conclusions but argues that different mechanisms have been responsible for these outcomes. Jencks, for example, conflates postmodernism as a cultural phenomenon with postfordism, an economic phenomenon, and reflexively implicates each in the other’s change. Here, the postmodern condition represents “kaleidoscopic and simultaneous” changes:

from mass production to segmented production; from a relatively integrated mass-culture to many fragmented taste cultures; from centralised control in government and business to peripheral decision-making; from repetitive manufacture of identical objects to the fast-changing manufacture of varying objects; from few styles to many genres; from national to global consciousness and, at the same time, local identification.55

This position is similar to Jameson’s, locating the dynamic of postmodernity within technoscientific changes that have reflexive cultural and aesthetic implications. Jameson, for example, understands the postmodern era as merely a new mode of production,56 where production enters the ether of image, aesthetics, symbol, sign, and space:

What has happened is that aesthetic production today has become integrated into commodity production generally: the frantic economic urgency of producing fresh waves of ever more novel-seeming goods (from clothing to airplanes), at ever greater rates of turnover,
now assigns an increasingly essential structural function and position to aesthetic innovation and experimentation.\textsuperscript{57}

Jean Baudrillard goes further, declaring that the dawn of the postmodern era, with its technological implications, marks “the end of labour,” the “end of the era of production,” and “the end of political economy.”\textsuperscript{58} Baudrillard is one among many who welcome such innovations and transformations. These signal not merely a new economic dialectic but a political and cultural one, where “new” political sensibilities symbolize the “end” of modernist referents like “class,” ascriptive and discriminatory “gender roles,” or socioeconomic “hierarchies” that “privilege” some while “marginalizing” others.\textsuperscript{59} The “postmodern condition” is thus understood to be profoundly liberating, portending to a “new” era that offers more choice, more freedom, more consumption, and more possibilities for emancipatory politics.

Unique to all these interpretations is a celebration of the “postmodern age” as a “global process,” whereby social, political, and territorial boundaries are “tumbling down” and in their place a new transnational mode of sociocultural-economic production is emerging. Like the great historical transformations before it, this one too is greeted with optimism, beholding the promise of a “technological fix” to the problems of global relations via, for example, the emergence of a “global community” through hypercommunications technologies such as the “information super highway,” or by promising to render war dysfunctional to the political economy of postindustrial states. In the new “information age,” states will acquire wealth not through territorial conquest, plunder, and pillage but by generating new technologies, new markets, new goods and services, and by achieving higher levels of education and innovating the technoscientific basis of the “new economy” to make themselves “globally competitive.” The language and discourse will be familiar to all, rehearsed daily by Wall Street barons, economists, and political leaders alike.

Amid these platitudes and announcements of “new worlds,” however, there also lurks a more pessimistic strand of writings that fear the “postmodern age” and its technological consequences. Those very processes otherwise identified as “liberating,” some argue, are leading to greater misery, dehumanization, and cultural disintegration. Dick Hebdige, for instance, sees postmodernism as nihilistic, and the “post-modern age” as modernist but “without the hopes and dreams which made modernity bearable.”\textsuperscript{60} For Hebdige, postmodernity is what comes after an age of illusion, optimism, and certitude; an age where the omnipotence of Faustian technology and its grounding in reason, science, and industry, made possible the writings of grand narratives and emancipatory projects: Marxism, Freudianism, Liberalism, new moral and social orders. The age of modernity was the age of illusion. Postmodernity, however, is the age of disillusion, bewilderment, and cynicism. Postmodernists now attack the “age of reason,” critique Enlightenment thought, and react to the “excesses” of utopian reason founded on
the simplistic themes of “Truth, Justice and Right.” Jean-Francois Lyotard, for example, insists that postmodernism constitutes a “libidinal history” that “refuses to indulge” in the “complacency of knowledge,” asserting instead that there exists “no privileged standpoint for deciphering” truth. Postmodernists no longer see the pursuit of knowledge as means to “truth” and “certitude,” but an intellectual mode of production used for legitimation that masks the power it wields and those whom it serves. Behind Lyotard’s words lurks The Will to Power of Friedrich Nietzsche and the nihilism inscribed in the fin-de-millenium. This is an epoch that comes at the end of history, a “twilight time of ultramodernism,” for Kroker and Cook, where “the death of the grand referent of God” that so preoccupied Nietzsche anticipates the ruins of the “postmodern condition”—nihilism, that “lightning-flash” that illuminates the sky for an instant only to reveal the “immensity of the darkness within.”

Metaphors of this hue betray the pessimism inherent in the “Postmodern Scene,” one symbolic of a new dark age in the “dying days of modernism . . . as western culture runs down towards the brilliant illumination of a final burnout.” Many technological postmodernists thus encapsulate what Scherpe terms an “eschatological consciousness of the apocalypse,” since they contemplate the “end” of modernity, the rise of cynicism, and the triumph of nihilism in the face of declining identity, purpose, and meaning. This is the “age of posthistorie, the end of the world.”

The defining moment for technological postmodernists of this variety is the relentless advance of technological society and the subsumption of all forms of human and scientific rationality unto its logic. Arthur Kroker, for example, writes of the “possessed individual,” one entrapped in an eerie simulacra of “virtual reality” where all original experience has evaporated. For Kroker, postmodernism is a commentary on technology. It refuses “the pragmatic account of technology as freedom,” progress, liberation, and development and, instead, represents the “tragic description of technology as denigration.” The hitherto dominant dialectics under modernity—technological progress, freedom from the constraints of nature, economic growth, increased human welfare, freedom, and emancipation are now displaced: hope is gone. The “new information age” might thus be little more than the subsumption of liberal individuality, where advances in technology deprive us of culture, feeling, and expression and reduce us all to automatons. In the end, each of us is dehumanized, reduced to so many numbers as our taste preferences, consumption patterns, credit histories, Social Security payments, banking practices, and television viewing habits are recorded, analyzed, and manipulated by centralized bureaucracies and computers.

For technological postmodernists, then, objective changes in information, computer, and communication and production technologies, coupled with “new” taste cultures and political movements, have transposed power relations, the workings of capital, relationships between states, and the importance of knowl-
This, for example, is the conclusion of Lyotard, who notes, “Our working hypothesis is that the status of knowledge is altered as societies enter what is known as the postindustrial age and cultures enter what is known as the postmodern age.”

**Postmodernism as Critical Epistemology**

Raymond Morrow rejects all these interpretations and argues that postmodernism is an intellectual mirage that masks a critical (leftist) form of epistemology. For Morrow, postmodernism is “what remains in the shambles of the Marxist and neo-Marxist theoretical positions, the best of what is left of the left.” Alex Callinicos explains postmodernist discourse in similar terms, seeing contemporary postmodernists the leftovers of the “political odyssey of the 1968 generation.” That generation has now entered middle age, the middle class, middle management, administrative and university positions, “with all hope of socialist revolution gone—indeed, often having ceased to believe in the desirability of any such revolution.” As Callinicos argues,

This conjuncture—the prosperity of the Western new middle class combined with the political disillusionment of many of its most articulate members—provides the context to the proliferating talk of postmodernism . . . [and] the acceptance by quite large numbers of people of certain ideas.

Callinicos dismisses postmodernism as a feel-good movement by those who wish to accommodate their political feelings with the excesses of their “overconsumptionist” lifestyle. By turning to the politically benign spheres of culture and aesthetics, Callinicos thinks postmodernism a veiled and pathetic attempt to rid the leftovers of the “1968 generation” of their consumer guilt. Postmodern theory thus attempts to depict the consumption of cultural goods as a process of individuation; an individual act of uniqueness, difference, and dissimilarity; and a means of political disassociation from modernist mass production and conformity in style and design. But for Callinicos, this is only capitalism in a different form, and postmodernists the embourgeoised ex-radicals of the 1990s. They are, in Callinicos’s understanding, old-guard traitors who grasp at an “aesthetic pose based on the refusal to seek either to comprehend or transform existing social reality.” The consumption of cultural goods becomes the palatable political act of resistance commensurate with a middle-class lifestyle: “resistance is reduced to the knowing consumption of cultural products.” Thus, as Callinicos argues,

The discourse of postmodernism is best seen as the product of a socially mobile intelligentsia in a climate dominated by the retreat of the Western labour movement and the “overconsumptionist” dynamic of capitalism in a Reagan-Thatcher era. From this perspective the term “postmodern” would seem to be a floating signifier by means of which this intelligentsia has sought to articulate its political disillusionment and its aspiration to a consumption-orientated lifestyle. The difficulties involved in identifying a referent for this
term are therefore beside the point, since talk about postmodernism turns out to be less about the world than the expression of a particular generation’s sense of an ending.76

While I have sympathy with this interpretation, I also think Callinicos’s position belittles much postmarxist literature and the insights it offers. Certainly, the “1968 generation” is germane to an understanding of leftist postmodernism, but this is only one facet of its intellectual tapestry. First, we need to distinguish between those conservative and pro-consumptionist postmodernists, who celebrate discursive styles and materiality and whom Callinicos makes the target of his criticism, from those whom I have identified here as critical postmodernists. These postmodernists continue a leftist tradition of critical interpretivism under the banner of postmarxism, particularly in their writings on capitalism and, more recently, on the politics of aesthetics and culture. Where I disagree with Callinicos is that I do not see the “turn” to aesthetics and cultural forms as something “new” but rather the contemporary equivalent of the Frankfurt school of critical social theorists operative during the 1930s; those who retreated from the practical politics of socialist revolution because of disillusionment at the rise of German national socialism. The same is apparent of the “1968 generation:” disillusionment at the failure of socialism and the triumph of capitalism, as Callinicos correctly points out, but not a moral ambiguity and resignation to consumptionism so much as a turn to theory and a theoretical critique of these phenomena.

Thus, I prefer to understand critical postmodernists as (post)marxist political émigrés deprived of their historical destiny due to the triumph of neo-liberalism and capitalism. These theorists have turned their attentions to articulating critical social and political theories that attempt to uncover the epistemic structures responsible for postmodern social, political, and economic life.77 And just as the critical social theorists of the Frankfurt school did it by turning to the politics of aesthetics and culture, so critical postmodernists do the same today.

The distinguishing feature of critical postmodernists is their movement away from any praxiological intent toward theoretical endeavors: a position that Callinicos sees as an abrogation of moral responsibilities. This movement toward theory was partly necessitated by the various poststructuralist critiques of marxist theory that emerged during the late 1960s and 1970s. In particular, marxist meta-theory was attacked vigorously for its reductionist, essentialist, determinist, and structuralist ontologies. The ensuing in-house debates, coupled with rapid changes in the global political-economy and the rise of diverse social movements, cast still more doubt over the ability of marxist meta-theory to explain contemporary phenomena. The result, however, has been a theoretical reformulation of marxist theory through critical epistemological and ontological debates. Postmarxists have been at the forefront of these retheorizations, attempting a continuation of marxist and critical theoretic traditions, but via new theoretical forms.78 Subsequently, as Raymond Morrow has pointed out, the theoretical project of postmarxism was reconceived as a fourfold project.
to regain a sense of the empirical importance of economic structures and state mediation, without relapsing into instrumentalist or structuralist reductionism; to develop a theory of cultural struggle which challenges static conceptions of hegemony and domination; to articulate a theory of cultural forms which could draw upon advances in semiotic theories of communication; and to provide an approach to the subject which preserved the agency structure dialectic and incorporated a theory of resistance . . . [that does not rely on] . . . expressivist conceptions of totality and related understandings of ideology and subjectivity.79

Critical postmodernists, then, attempt to integrate into their theoretical conduit a theory of cultural forms and aesthetics while shedding the reductionism and structuralism of marxist theory. For Perry Anderson, this was a reactive project illustrative of how the fortunes “of theoretical work on the left” are inversely related to “the fortunes of left-wing politics” at large.80 Callinicos was therefore correct to suppose that critical postmodernism was born from the failure of left radicalism of the “1968 generation.”81 Those very conditions that made for a crisis in left-wing politics were, in retrospect, the making of Leftist theory, channeling creative energies toward theoretical innovation and an interrogation of hitherto dominant narratives. Consequently, as Laclau and Mouffe observe,

Left-wing thought today stands at a crossroads. The “evident truths” of the past—the classical forms of analysis and political calculation, the nature of the forces in conflict, the very meaning of the Left’s struggles and objectives—have been seriously challenged. . . . [A] question-mark has fallen more and more heavily over a whole way of conceiving both socialism and the roads that should lead to it.82

Critical thinking has been transformed. The simple slogans of “class struggle” and revolutionary emancipation have given way to more complex theoretical undertakings that challenge notions of patriarchy, gender, linguistics, science, and power. The patriarchal elitism of an all-male vanguard leading male workers from the factories to freedom is now understood as both hollow and just another form of domination: the sweatshops erected in Soviet Russia in the name of socialism, for example, were no different from those during the English industrial revolution. This does much to explain the current character of Leftist postmodern theory that, by and large, has championed the politics of “inclusion” under the banner of “political correctness.” Totalizing meta-narratives conferring ontological centrality on certain key groups (the white male working class, for example) have been abandoned in recognition of the “proliferation” of social movements that now constitute the spectrum of left politics (feminists, ethnic and religious minorities, sexual minorities, ecological activists, human rights activists, the disabled, etc.).

Despite Callinicos’s conclusions, then, critical postmodernists remain faithful to classical varieties of critical thought but extend their purview to cultural and linguistic forms of analysis. The result is a more eclectic and less centered critical theory that assaults not just the practices of capitalism but the entire modernist edifice that valorizes such practices (cultural practices, aesthetics, patriarchy, etc.).83 This is the sense in which Zygmunt Bauman conceives of postmod-
ernism—“modernity conscious of its true nature” and reactive to its “diseased state,” particularly universalizing meta-narratives exclusionary of “marginal voices” and the suffocating mental straitjacket of scientific logic. The political compass of critical postmodernism is thus inclusionary and “marked by a view of the human world as irreducibly and irrevocably pluralistic, split into a multitude of sovereign units and sites of authority, with no horizontal or vertical order.”84 Consequently, contemporary critical theory abandons the pretensions of objectivity and refutes the existence of a realm of residual “truth” and “meaning.” Instead, the postmodern enterprise “reveals the world as composed of an indefinite number of meaning-generating agencies, all relatively self-sustained and autonomous, all subject to their own respective logics and armed with their own facilities of truth-validation.”85 Subjectivity, in other words, and a “sensitivity” to the milieu from which one “views the world” make for a new “identity politics” (“black politics,” “gay politics,” “green politics,” “feminist politics,” etc.) and with it the division of intellectual spaces in search of their respective histories and experiences (“gay studies,” “women’s studies,” “black studies,” etc.), or, what some might term a kind of methodological individualism pushed to its extreme.

This position defines implicitly the relationship of critical postmodernists to radical politics, for they challenge the precepts of modernist discourse that, through “objective” and “universal” standards, “inscribes inequality”—the distinction between mass culture and the avant-garde, for example, the hierarchies of class and meritocratic practices, or the value patterns that reify science over the humanities, men over women, and facts over values. And it is these themes that feed directly into the epistemic motifs of subversive postmodernists and lead to the practices of deconstruction.

Postmodernism as Subversion

Subversive postmodernists attempt to dismantle these value-hierarchies and the belief that universalization can bestow justice through instrumental rationality.86 They do so through the “politics of inclusion” or, in more radical contexts, through deconstructing logocentric practices, binary logic, and the presumption that we can speak for the marginalized (other).87 These deconstructive practices I have attributed to subversive postmodernists since they attempt to dismantle Organonist knowledge systems that, by and large, have been the hallmark of the Western intellectual tradition.88 In this sense, the project repudiates epistemology and attempts, instead, to establish a postfoundational view of the world. The champion of the American postmodern movement, Ihab Hassen, for example, argues that the intent of subversive postmodernists is the destruction of the Western cogito:

It is an antinomian moment that assumes a vast unmasking of the Western mind—what Michel Foucault might call a postmodern episteme. I say “unmasking” though other terms are now de rigueur: for instance, deconstruction, decentering, disappearance, dissemination,
demystification, discontinuity, difference, dispersion, etc. Such terms express an ontological rejection of the traditional full subject, the cogito of Western philosophy. They express, too, an epistemological obsession with fragments or fractures, and a corresponding ideological commitment to minorities. . . . To think well, to feel well, to act well, to read well, according to this episteme of unmasking, is to refuse the tyranny of wholes; totalization in any human endeavor is potentially totalitarian. 89

This project attempts an “explosion of the modern episteme, in which reason . . . [is] . . . blown to pieces.” 90 Consequently, the entire modernist edifice that is valorized by reason and rationalist discourse is challenged. Subversive postmodernists, for example, celebrate “difference,” “discursive practices,” and repudiate ideas of “universal truth claims,” rationality, or representationalism. Rather, the world is seen from a relativist position, with no single arbiter or knowledge system able to judge between truth claims. This assaults modernist theory and destabilizes the idea of logic and reason as the road to truth, fact, knowledge, and ultimately to certitude in our understanding of the physical and social worlds. Faith in science and theory-knowledge is eroded. For subversive postmodernists, “truth” is in the eye of the beholder, not the test tube of a scientist, the theory of a mathematician, or the methodology of rational argument. 91 Interpretation replaces absolute knowledge and epistemology, where, for example, “physics too” becomes “only an interpretation and arrangement of the world . . . and not an explanation of the world.” 92

This extreme position is evident in the unruly mixture of Continental poststructuralism and American philosophical pragmatism that emerged throughout the 1980s. Richard Bernstein notes that this made for an era filled with “suspicion” toward “reason, and of the very idea of universal validity claims that can be justified through argument.” The entire Enlightenment project and its legacy have come under attack, where in postmodernist circles there is a “rage against humanism” and a movement seeking the “delegitimation” of “European modernity.” 93 David Harvey maintains that this movement seeks an end to the age of reason and rejects “any project that . . . [seeks] . . . universal human emancipation through mobilization of the powers of technology, science and reason.” 94 For subversive postmodernists, these modernist referents are not the agents of liberation but things to be liberated from.

The deconstruction of modernist discourse, logic, and reason and, with it, the attack on and repudiation of epistemology are thus the major occupations of subversive postmodernists. Richard Rorty attributes these deconstructive practices to the “Cartesian-Kantian” traditions of philosophy. These, Rorty argues, “attempted to escape from history” by externalizing and objectifying reality to erect a foundationalist tranhistorical knowledge. 95 Antithetic to this tradition, postmodernists have rediscovered contextualism and, like Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger before them, attempt to teach a “historicist” lesson: that knowledge in all forms and varieties is contaminated by the language used to describe it, by ideology, by historical milieu and culture. 96 Modernist narratives of the “univer-
sal” and “transhistorical” genre are, accordingly, rejected. Lyotard, for instance, argues that we can no longer “organize the multitude of events that come to us from the world . . . by subsuming them beneath the idea of a universal history of humanity.”

“Totalizing narratives” not only exclude marginal voices but also assume the ontological centrality of certain groups, creating a theoretical exclusivity in the way specific groups are made the targets of emancipation or the objects of narratives. Feminists, for example, point out that the history of humankind has been told as the “history of Mankind,” North American Indians that “American history” has only narrated the history of white European settlement of “unoccupied” lands, and peoples of the Southern Hemisphere that so-called world history has been told from the perspective of eurocentric narratives of European expansionism and colonization. Modernist theory is therefore charged with becoming overly myopic, where the exclusivity of theoretical categories like “working class” or “white males,” for example, become the sine qua non for “justice” and “liberation” or the privileged subjects of historical narratives. Learned traditions, in other words, are merely the textual inscriptions of those who have been privileged enough to write; white males of largely European descent who, either wittingly or unwittingly, have replicated and legitimated the social and political order from which their privilege is derived. For subversive postmodernists, the social sciences and humanities are merely representations of these privileged narratives, or, more correctly, “fictions” evolved as practices, whose “reality” is only so because so many are duplicitous, or simply duped, into replicating these practices that they become coterminous with the “events” and “facts” of the social and political world. In this way, subversive postmodernism is more properly understood not merely as a site of critical reexamination but one of “deconstruction,” “intertextual readings,” “dissident thought,” and a relocation of the temporal plain of perception to include such mediums as place, space, and contextualism, as well as gender, identity, signs, symbols, and images as ingredients in the intersubjective construction of “truth,” meaning, and reality. Boundaries otherwise used as means of demarcation and intellectual ordering devices, postmodernists understand as mediums of “modernist exclusion,” mechanisms of “marginalization” that have “silenced” voices, or, still worse, have been used in the service of specific interests to plunder and pillage peoples of wealth and well-being. For subversive postmodernists, the point is a political one, as Chris Brown notes, “in the twentieth century the instrumental rationality of the West has so often found itself at the service of dubious causes that it has become itself politically suspect.” The once privileged status of Western thought is no more, but collapsed under the mantra of its own contradictions that, postmodernists claim, opens up new sites of thinking space and leads to dialogism. For postmodernists, this is a place where “we can learn things about ourselves by studying our history and reading our literary inheritance . . . [but only after] we have removed the monological tendencies past readings
have assigned to these genres” (emphasis added). History, in other words, is to be rewritten, or at least written from the perspective of those who have not written it before—women, people of color, gays and lesbians, indigenous peoples, and so forth.

The project of subversive postmodernists has thus been to deconstruct privileged representations, totalizing emancipatory projects and meta-discourses. Instead, they champion “discontinuities” and seek to include otherwise marginalized voices in multifarious discourses that are tempered through relativity in language, interpretation, culture, and history. At base, this is a reaction to the (non)history of silence and an attempt to speak, write, and be read as people of color, lesbians, women, feminists, gays, Japanese Americans, or any number of “other” voices expunged from “mainstream” history. Identity politics is thus the most obvious outgrowth of subversive postmodernism, where, argues Stanley Aronowitz, the effects “of de-territorialization of production on the patterns of everyday life” makes for a lost sense of place, purpose, and meaning. “In the absence of orientating instruments, to avert existential bewilderment,” and substituting (poorly) for more comprehensive political analysis, subversive postmodernists “resort to fierce assertions of ‘identities’ to know/invent who, where, and what they are.” This, notes Wendy Brown, is as “much a signifier of powerlessness as a redress of it,” an attempt to reclaim the “integrity of communities producing identity,” rather than to have them submerged beneath the “boundless commodification of cultural practices” or the “cross-cultural meldings and appropriations” of late capitalism, where, for example, underwear is sold to us by the “all American white, heterosexual, middle class, blond haired, blue eyed boy next door.” The lesson is as simple as it is profound. We are not all heterosexual, white, middle class, male, or “American”; rather, what we all are is different. Yet, as Brown also notes, “identity politics permits positioning without mapping, a feature which sharply distinguishes it from (Marxian) class analysis and reveals its proximity to (liberal) interest group politics.” In the end, then, “identity politics” might be less inspired by postmodernism than a symptom of its “disorienting effects” and its dismemberment of meaning, place, origin, and purpose.

Regardless, the constitutive elements of subversive postmodern politics are found in its celebration of diversity, “in the regional cultural diversification accompanying the relentless process of global integration, and in the discovery of differences infinitude.” These are exaggerated in “topographical articulation and complexity,” where “plurality” and “difference” mean that politics, society, and economics are “no longer reducible to class society or interest based politics” but, at the same time, are “never innocent of power and stratification.” For some, this might be little more than a “new ageism,” the “me” generation, for example, or the perversion of liberal individualism into a kind of hyperindividuality. Whatever the case, monological interpretation, collective politics, or the politics of mass loyalty and mass identity give way to complex individuation, crisscross-
ing identities, and multiple perspectivism. More important, this conception signals a loss of faith in the idea of “common destiny” or “collective” purpose, where history is stripped systematically of “progress,” “god,” “teleologies,” “iron laws of development,” or “any other reason,” so that human beings become the sole creator and repository of all that there is: a kind of species-centrism where there is no ultimate essence other than ourselves. Postmodern theory thus becomes “the infinite task of complexification” and not, as with modernist theory, a process of simplification and meta-theoretic generalization. Universalism is abandoned for particularism, macro-theory for micro-theory and micro-politics, and the dimensional referent of time (history) is now interspersed with place, space, and identity to emphasize complexity and contextuality.

Contextuality, particularism, and relativism become the analytic nostrums that separate the grand designs of modernist discourse from the specificities of poststructuralism. This has enormous consequences for the way postmodernists engage in, use, and understand the aims of theoretical activity and in the way they conceive of and explain, for example, the workings of power, capitalism, oppression, or emancipation. Unlike the structural monism of much marxist and neo-marxist literature, postmodernists view the modalities of power and oppression as intricate, localized, and divergent. Michel Foucault, for instance, combined a poststructuralist account of power and oppression with a postmodernist critique of rationality and science and abandoned grand narratives for particularistic historical genealogies. Unlike his structuralist predecessors, Foucault depicted power as “irreducibly plural,” thriving at the microcosmic levels of society. And grappling with the “modalities of power” and discourse politics, he argued, was the problem that had “to be solved.” Foucault’s work, then, was an attempt at understanding the “political status of science and the ideological functions which it could serve.” And his historical genealogical documentaries were extensions of this project; attempts at demonstrating “how objectifying forms of reason (and their regimes of truth and knowledge) have been made”: that, in fact, they are historically contingent rather than naturally inscribed. His genealogical accounts of power in the prison and asylum, for example, reoriented political theory away from an a priori assumption of its imposition to a precise account of how “power” is made, matures, and infects. The political and social problematic of power is thus diffused and no longer contained by modernist referents like “the state” or “the sovereign” but, instead, reveals itself to be everywhere. Power is in “gender, class, race, ethnicity, and sexuality; in speech, writing, discourse, representation, and reason; in families, curricula, bodies, and the arts.” Every facet of the social and political becomes a site of “power,” “struggle,” and “resistance,” so that all is politicized, eroding all constructed “boundaries” that otherwise define, describe, and name social, political, and economic entities/concepts. This is theory from the bottom up—genealogical, meticulous, and incisive of the workings of power in institutional, societal, and individual bodies. So, too, is it
subversive, both in its political ambitions and its implications for modernist theory, seeing “truth” and “knowledge” as socially constructed and performative of oppressive tasks. This is what Lyotard meant when he wrote of the “terror of theory”—theory used as power, “knowledge” used to oppress, “truth” used for legitimation.112

Given this conception of theory, it is hardly surprising that faith in theory-knowledge has been eroded and its deconstruction sought, principally through linguistic analyses and the pejorative use of language games. Language has proven the ultimate weapon for subversive postmodernists, enabling the “destabilization” of the very nexus of representation and communication that otherwise makes theory-knowledge possible. Consequently, theory itself is now problematized by subversive postmodernists, as textural analysis acquires a political utility in its demolition of modernist theories of representation.113

This demolition has proceeded along two avenues. First, subversive postmodernists have inverted the classical subject-object divide on which modernist-scientific enquiry proceeded to represent “reality,” a simple process of problematizing the role of the subject as neutral and of the a priori existence of the object (reality). As Michael Ryan notes, the postmodern movement has discovered “that what were thought to be effects in the classical theory of representation can be causes; representations can create the substance they supposedly reflect.”114 In other words, the observatory act is no longer considered neutral but proactive, which, for postmodernists, inevitably changes the significance and political capacity of theory.

Second, assumptions of communicative rationality have been challenged by destabilizing language and attacking the possibility of accurate representation and communication. Modernists like Habermas, for example, insist on the fixity of meaning in language and on “communicative rationality,” where speaker and hearer are rationally committed to the task of reciprocal understanding.115 Similarly, Robert Brandom argues that “the essential feature of language is its capacity to represent the way things are,” to “take truth to be the basic concept in terms of which a theory of meaning, and hence a theory of language, is to be developed.”116 Subversive postmodernists, however, reject this and see language as socially constructed, at best a partial and imperfect intermediary between subjects. Language is unstable: “no statement ever has a determinate meaning,” no word a fixed denotation, all referents are transient, and meaning is an interpretive enterprise that varies from subject to subject.117 The “authorial point of view,” for deconstructionists, cannot be related to readers, since text and subject are not as one but separate, and the act of reading, as of writing, is an intertextual and intersubjective process that is multilayered and unique to each text and reader.118 As Harvey notes, “writers who create texts or use words do so on the basis of all other texts and words they have encountered, while readers deal with them in the same way.” Acts of reading and writing become a “series of texts intersecting with other texts,
producing more texts,” such that this “intertextual weaving” takes on “a life of its own.” The “postmodern condition,” then, is one where universal language is dead and sites of specialized languages have emerged—the university, the workplace, the bureaucracy—so that “effective communication” can never be guaranteed and “radical misunderstanding” results. A crisis of representation ensues.

Subversive postmodern theory thus provides a critique of representation and the modern belief that theory mirrors reality, taking instead “perspectivist” and “relativist” positions that theories at best provide partial perspectives on their objects, and that all cognitive representations of the world are historically and linguistically mediated.

In North America, this position is best exemplified in the work of Richard Rorty, where knowledge approaches what Rorty calls a “post-philosophical culture,” a postrepresentational view of knowledge that is propositional and nonfoundationalist. Knowledge, particularly that type of knowledge generated in the social sciences and humanities, is not approached as a confrontation between the “knowing subject and the object of inquiry” (knowledge simply seen as the mirror of nature, for example), but as an ongoing conversation between “knowing subjects.” In other words, knowledge is rooted in a socially constructed discourse and attempts to move beyond this, as with the Cartesian-Kantian traditions of inquiry that established “Western philosophy-as-epistemology” are fallacious.

The abandonment of accurate representation “as the touchstone of knowledge” is, to say the least, “unsettling,” repudiating the modernist habit of assuming a realm of “reality” and “truth” outside the subject and our language. Postmodernists ask us to rely on a theory-knowledge generated merely by chatting “away in a post-Wittgensteinian room whose mirrors reflect nothing but the lost contexts of . . . [our] . . . own good sense.” As Trimbur and Holt observe,

To imagine human culture and the quest for knowledge as a conversation between persons instead of a confrontation with reality may appear to lock us in a “prison house of language,” a hermeneutic circle that offers no release, no standpoint to get outside our discursive practices in order to show how things really are.

Subversive postmodernists, however, dismiss these concerns. In the writings of Derrida, we find a deeper malcontent and a resolve to slay the “Hydra of Western logocentrism.” Derrida’s deconstructionist project aims to “uproot,” “decompose,” “undo,” “dismantle,” and “overturn” Western metaphysics through textual analyses of philosophical writings. The aim is not, it should be noted, a complete dismissal of Western rationalism, since Derrida recognizes this to be impossible, but an attempt “to transform [such concepts], to displace them, to turn them against their presuppositions, to reinscribe them in other chains, and little by little to modify the terrain of our work and thereby to produce new configurations.” Derrida hopes this will coalesce into a “structure of resistance” to the
dominant mode of conceptuality that, to date, under the auspices of Enlightenment thinking, has led to the violence of exclusion in which certain groups, peoples, voices, thoughts, and modes of conceptualization have been marginalized, exiled, and disenfranchised.  

The defining moment for subversive postmodernists obviously rests in the political act they recommend: resistance. The politics of negation dominates their agenda, particularly the want to tear down the modernist edifice and subvert its practices. However, subversive postmodernists are not consistent in this project but contradictory, pragmatic, and opportunistic. As Pauline Rosenau notes, postmodernists are not “concerned with categorical epistemological rigor or total coherence” and “relinquish intellectual consistency in exchange for political relevance.” Witness, for example, the way subversive postmodernists portend to be avowedly anti-theoretical, a position that is not only deduced from theoretical activity but presented as part of a theoretical discourse and comprising theoretical propositions. As Norris sardonically observes, the act of theoretical negation is itself a “form of theoretical endeavour, including such attempts to discredit other kinds of theory while smuggling one’s own back in, so to speak, by the side entrance.” Many of the charges laid against modernist theory thus seem somewhat futile since they also implicate postmodernists in similar theoretical crimes. To denounce “truth” claims or foundationalist theory and epistemological philosophy, for example, is an inherently foundationalist position presupposing some singular and superior insight beyond modernist understanding; dare one say an appeal to a higher realm of “truth” and a better conception of the “good”? Similarly, denouncing reason and logic while engaging in a meticulous discourse that is well reasoned, logically rigorous, and cumulative in its critique suggests the very use of those tools they attempt to destroy. Further, by attacking value hierarchies, subversive postmodernists champion the cause of the “oppressed,” “marginalized,” and the “disempowered,” displaying a keen awareness of “right” from “wrong,” “good” from “bad,” and a zealous preoccupation with such modernist themes as “social justice,” “emancipation,” and “liberation.” And if, as subversive postmodernists insist, language is imprecise, effective communication is impossible, and culture is running down toward allegoric illiteracy amid a simulacra of electronic images, it seems highly unusual for so much effort to be placed on the enunciation of postmodernist theory and its communication through language and the written word; writing and reading for subversive postmodernists should surely be a barren and improbable task. Why, we might ask, do postmodernists feel the need to deconstruct modernist knowledge systems if language is so imprecise and communication so ineffective?

Contradictions of this type inflame the passions of those who would see an end to postmodernism. Christopher Norris dismisses postmodernism as quasi-postural political correctness interspersed with “deconstructionist word spinning nonsense.” This sentiment is shared by Eric Hirsch, who objects to the “decadence
of literary scholarship” and the debasement of scholarship and language through “anti-rationalism, faddism, and extreme relativism.” For Hirsch, scholars are right to feel indignant toward those learned writers who deliberately exploit the institutions of scholarship—even down to its punctilious conventions like footnotes and quotations—to deny the whole point of the institutions of scholarship, to deny, that is, the possibility of knowledge. It is ethically inconsistent to batten on institutions whose very foundations one attacks. It is logically inconsistent to write scholarly books which argue that there is no point in writing scholarly books.

Alex Callinicos attributes this “farcical” and “light-minded playfulness” to a Western intelligentsia suffering from an “apocalyptic mood” as they confront the end of the millennium. He blames, in particular, two French theorists, Derrida and Foucault, who, through stressing the fragmentary, plural, and heterogeneous character of reality, have attempted to deny “human thought the ability to arrive at any objective account of that reality and reduced the bearer of this thought, the subject, to an incoherent welter of sub- and trans-individual drives and desires.” The “success enjoyed” by postmodernists, he concludes, is “quite out of proportion with any slight intellectual merit their work might have.”

The “success” of postmodern theory seems all the more amazing when one considers its spurious relativism. Derrida and Foucault, for example, both abandon objectivity, embrace perspectivism and relativism, and deny the privileging of any one narrative over others. Yet, both these theorists proceed to insist that we should reject modernist for postmodernist narratives and adopt a postmodern interpretation of the world. This position is no less absolutist than the one expounded by their modernist counterparts. As Eric Hirsch observes, for postmodernists, “all principles are subject to a universal relativism except relativism itself,” which leads him to ask,

But whence comes its exception? What is the sanction, in a world devoid of absolutes, for its absoluteness? We are never told. This question, so absurdly simple, yet so embarrassing to relativism, is never answered by even the most brilliant of the cognitive atheists.

TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF POSTMODERNISMS

Despite Hirsch’s insightful comments, this perhaps is not the way to judge the agency of postmodern theory and its effects on theoretical discourse. We cannot, as is clear from the foregoing, speak of a singular postmodern theory and dismiss all for the shortcomings of one particular strand. As Jameson noted, “no one post-modernist can give us postmodernism.” This is where the typology developed here proves useful by helping us disentangle and discriminate between different postmodernisms. It allows us to tease out the “good” from the “bad,” as it were, and make some preliminary observations about which type of postmodern theory might prove useful to social scientific research and the generation of theory knowledge from those that will not. There are, of course, limitations to such a
typology dependent on one’s positional ontology vis-à-vis the question of modernity. From my perspective, I remain committed to modernist referents like “rationality,” “progress,” “justice,” “emancipation,” and indeed conceptions of the “good” and “bad.” These, naturally, infer my particular disposition to the different types of postmodern theory identified in this essay, as they will, obviously, to those who gravitate more to the anti-modernist camp. My particular theoretical vista is thus colored by my commitment to the project of epistemology, a belief in some kind of minimal foundationalism, and my belief in the program of theory-knowledge as a means to “truth” and progress in the human condition. I am, in a word, a modernist, unconvinced by the proclamations of “new ages,” of the technobabble of tumultuous social/political change and “new worlds,” or of the merits of “identity politics” as a new means of political praxis and self-understanding. The typology developed here, is, then, above all else, a means for understanding the political as practiced by those who would subvert modernity in the name of “new” utopias. Applied in such a manner, the typologies of subversive, critical, and technological/productionist postmodernism allow us to draw a number of analytical conclusions about the relative merits of each.

First, the project of subversive postmodernism can be seen as contrary to the project of the social sciences, designed not so much to generate knowledge as disparage knowledge spawned through Enlightenment thinking and the precepts of rationality and “science.” At its most elemental, it is a project of disruption and an attack on the complacency of knowledge generated in modernist quarters. Not that this is all bad. There is much good to come from a “shake-up” of the academy; from a reexamination of our ontological, epistemological, and axiological foundations; and from the types of practices that ensue from certain modes of conceptualization and analysis. Pointing out “silences” and omissions from the dominant discourse is always fruitful and necessary but, arguably, also accomplished under theories and paradigms and from critical quarters that are not necessarily “postmodernist” and that do not seek to “undo” all knowledge simply on the basis of imperfection. Modernist discourse is not unreflective, can make autonomous corrections, engage in revisionist history, identify injustices and crimes of exclusions, and extend representation to groups that were otherwise not previously represented (think of liberalism or socialism, for example!). This, after all, is why we understand modernity to be “progressive” and history a forward-moving narrative that is self-effusive. More important, given the self-defeating contradictions endemic to subversive postmodernism, especially its specious relativism, it requires no great mind to postulate that the use of modernist/rationalist/Enlightenment discourse will better make the case for a progressive politics of ever greater inclusion, representation, and justice for all than will sloganistic calls for us “to think otherwise.” The simple and myopic assumption that social change can be engineered through linguistic policing of “politically incorrect” words, concepts, and opinions is surely one of the more politically lame
(idealist?) suggestions to come from armchair theorists in the past fifty years. By the same token, the suggestion that we engage in revisionism of the sort that would “undo” modernist knowledge so that we might start again free of “silences,” “oppressions,” and “inequalities” also smacks of an intelligentsia so idealist as to be unconnected to the world in which they live. The critical skills of subversive postmodernists, constrained perhaps by the success of the “West,” of Western capitalism, if not liberal democracy as the “legitimate” form of representation, and having tried unsuccessfully through revolution and political uprising to dethrone it previously, have turned to the citadel of our communal identities and attacked not parliaments or forms of social-political-economic organization but language, communication, and the basis of Enlightenment knowledge that otherwise enables us to live, work, and communicate as social beings. Clever though this is, it is not in the end compatible with the project of theory knowledge and takes us further away from an understanding of our world. Indeed, its greatest “contribution” is to “celebrate” the loss of certainty, where, argues John O’Neill, “men (sic) are no longer sure of their ruling knowledge and are unable to mobilize sufficient legitimation for the master-narratives of truth and justice.” To suppose, however, that we should rejoice collectively at the prospects of a specious relativism and a multifarious perspectivism and that, absent any further constructive endeavor, the great questions and problems of our time will be answered or solved by this, speaks of an intellectual poverty now famed perversely as the search for “thinking space.”

In the case of critical postmodernism, the typology I developed here helps elucidate its constitutive elements as an epistemological program in the tradition of marxism or the critical social theory of the Frankfurt school. There is much to recommend this particular variety of postmodern theory, especially as a means of understanding the interstitial articulation of the economic, political, and social and of the systemic social relations this gives rise to in the context of historical change. It too has identified the nemesis of “master narratives,” of their tendency to exclusiveness and “marginalization,” but not in a way that rejects foundationalism or the emancipatory project of the Enlightenment. If anything, critical postmodernism is an attempt to refine this emancipatory project, extending its rationale beyond the legacy of its European origins and into the postcolonial era so as to encompass those who were either ignored by its “Western” origins, or those who were the oppressed objects of its expansionist success. At base, it is the “best of what is left of the left,” socially progressivist, and astutely aware of its role as “critical theory.” More important, it has proven the life raft of marxism, shedding marxism of its teleological determinism, economism, essentialism, and crude structuralism in a way that makes it relevant, and insightful, to the contemporary workings of socio-political-economic relations. This is most evident, for example, in its elegant conceptualization of the heightened engagement between cultural and aesthetic sensibilities and their incorporation into commodity pro-
duction—or what some might see as the articulation of a postmodern mode of production where image, style, culture, and aesthetics transform the consumption-production dialectic so that acts of consumption also become mediums of cultural/aesthetic production. This has important consequences for our understanding of the “new” economy, of how wealth generation has transformed itself from fordist/industrial production into a production matrix situated as much in the fashion (board) rooms of Milan, Giorgio Armani, Versace, Hollywood, or the computer-image manipulators of Microsoft, as in the industrial empires of Ford or General Motors. Again, ironically, it is probably those who are most opposed to capitalism, the critical postmodernists cum reborn marxists, who are best equipped to explain its transformations, contradictions, the systemic properties of its ever-evolving modes of production, and the consequences of its social and political articulation. This, alone, makes critical postmodernism of continuing utility to the social sciences—if not for its technical insights, then certainly for its critical-analytical commentary on the condition of late capitalism and late modernity.

Finally, the typology I identified as technological or productionist postmodern theory would seem to be of most pertinence to social scientists. This most closely approximates a traditional social scientific research agenda, providing a methodological guide for assessing critically systemic change and theorizing its objective effects on our social institutions. Like critical postmodernism, technological postmodernism also reimagines capitalism and its late-modern mode of articulation, situating this amid a radical indeterminacy as the logic of capital accumulation and circuits of capital are complexified and sped up by technological innovation. The early modern dialectics of capital, class, and state, on which so much of contemporary social, political, and economic theory has been based, technological postmodern theory shows to be increasingly redundant. This has far-reaching implications for the social sciences, challenging our traditional understanding of borders, for example, or of the efficacy of governmental public policy in an era of transnational capitalism where capital mobility robs the nation-state of its economic sovereignty. Analytically, such a perspective might be expected to reinvent the social sciences in a manner that makes them cognizant of the technocapital regime of accumulation and the effect this has on the spatial location of power and the sites of production and consumption. Yet, this is not a fatuous celebration of “globalization,” or announcements of “new worlds,” but a project cemented in understanding the manner in which technology, revolutions in communications, late capitalist modes of production, and the concomitant implications this harbors for the articulation of social, political, and economic space changes the systemic relationships of our social and political lives. Analytically, this might be translated into studies of political and economic territory, the relocation of sovereignty, and the implications of this for state control over fiscal and monetary policy, or the adequate provision of social housing, employment
creation, or the alleviation of child poverty. Or, in terms of cultural studies, for example, we might imagine a social science imbued with an understanding of the incorporation of cultural aesthetics into commodity production, the production of global cultural goods/icons like “Levi jeans,” “Coca Cola,” the “golden arches” of MacDonald’s, or the standardization of cultural consumption habits with universal signifiers like “Chinese takeout,” “pizza,” or “American hamburgers.” While perhaps innocuous in their own right, they do symbolize a universalizing trend that affects values, ideas, and political sensibilities. More important, technological postmodernism is not bereft of understanding the articulation of power in such a setting, noting the seemingly contradictory trends of “globalization” at the same time as global wealth and power are often coalescing around increasingly few hegemonic centers. In this sense, technological postmodern theory displays an affinity for Gramscian method, seeing “power” in ways that are not simply tied to the production of guns and tanks but located in the means of control over cultural goods, patents, and aesthetic commodities like film and television images. This, moreover, is linked to an understanding of postfordist economics that move away from mass-production to “niche” and “just-in-time production” techniques, allowing for large production runs but in a way that accommodates taste variances on a global scale. In other words, late-modern production methods, coupled with the diversification of late-modern cultural habits, feed off each other, providing the basis for more consumptive demand of dissimilar cultural products and in turn reproducing the late-modern mode of production. This is important, not least for the fact that it displaces “class culture,” perhaps “nationalism,” too, commercially manufacturing multifarious “identities” that, while profitable to capital, create an atomized political culture otherwise not able to command our collective loyalties. This, of course, might be little more than Liberalism taken to its logical extreme, where “interest group” politics, “single-issue” group perspectives, and hyperindividualization mitigate against “collective,” “national,” “societal” perspectives. Whatever, it spells a reconfiguration in the articulation of “national” political practices, of the manner in which political campaigns are conducted, and of those symbols otherwise used as a unifying signifier for the “national” polis.

While technological postmodern theory is not suggesting that the substantive nature of politics has changed, or that the logic of capital has been transformed, it is suggesting that new dialectics present us with the need for new analytical tools if we are to understand and theorize late modernity. This, perhaps, is what makes it so attractive to the project of the social sciences, acting like a barometer to the change that is taking place and of how this affects our societal institutions and their operation. But, rather than surrender us to the technobabble of prognostications that announce, for example, how the Internet will yet cook our meals, modulate our household energy consumption, or allow us to “telecommute,” technological postmodern theory reiterates the need to analyze the politics of “power,” who controls the new technologies, who benefits, and who does not.
Indeed, it reaffirms the importance of “old” questions, the “who, why, and how” type questions. Innovations, change, and development take place in the context of political systems, economic markets, and social institutions, reminding us that issues of control, profit, power, and wealth still lie at the heart of social scientific analysis. In this context, both technological and critical postmodernism have a role to play in the social sciences, helping us understand the origins and mechanics of the “new global political economy” of transnational relations, transformations in the sources of global power and hegemony, or the emergence of a transnational ethic situated in liberal democracy. Indeed, feminist theory and explorations of gender identity and construction, as well as anthropology, cultural studies, and sociology, have all been centrally influenced by this genre of theoretical work.

CONCLUSION

In the end, of course, postmodern theory is perhaps best understood in terms of its effects on our sensibilities in the era of late modernity, where the modernist referents of science, industry and technology, and faith in the application of reason and logic experience a crisis of confidence; where the modernist project is now questioned; and where the end of the millennium suffers from malaise. These events, be they real or imagined, allow us to understand the revisionist concerns of subversive postmodernists, the catalogue of technological innovations recorded by technological postmodernists, and the search for new understandings by critical postmodernists. John O’Neill sees in these concerns the ongoing battle between the division of our reason; “divided once and for all into the subrationalities of science, art, and ethics.” Yet, he notes, we have not experienced any “settlement in this process.”

On the contrary, our science tries to rule our politics and economy, while our economy largely dominates our art and morality, if not our science. At the extreme edge, our art and morality try to impose their rule upon our science and political economy—but they generally lack the stamina.

In some ways, the postmodernist project is a contribution to understanding this interstitial battle between the “subrationalities” of art, science, ethics, politics, and economics—a contribution to exploring the human condition and its various constituencies in search of new meaning and understanding.

To what end these approaches will prove beneficial, however, to what end their concerns and depictions of current realities prove accurate, remains problematic. What does seem obvious, though, is the continuing desire for understanding; the need to examine, comprehend, and make sense of events; and, consequently, the need for theoretical endeavor. Despite “nihilistic despair” or charges of “epochal change,” most of us will wake up tomorrow confronted by a world much the same as today, one that experiences the recurring problems of inequality, injustice, war,
famine, violence, and conflict. Various problems will emerge and solutions to them will be sought. These, surely, cannot be “deconstructed” as the subversive postmodernists insist but only “reinscribed” as new questions. And while we might problematize current knowledge and interpretations; question our faith in science, reason, and logic; or reinscribe questions in new contexts, to suppose these endeavors contrary to the activity of theory and the search for meaning and understanding seems plainly absurd. If we abandon the principles of logic and reason, dump the yardsticks of objectivity and assessment, and succumb to a blind relativism that privileges no one narrative or understanding over others, how do we tackle such problems or assess the merits of one solution vis-à-vis another? How do we go about the activity of living, making decisions, engaging in trade, deciding on social rules, or making laws if objective criteria are not to be employed and reason and logic abandoned? How would we construct research programs, delimit areas of inquiry or define problems to be studied, if we abandon rationalist tools of inquiry?

Perhaps if only for the fact of its abstractness, postmodern theory has enjoyed a certain aloofness in the social sciences and humanities, often sheltered from critical analysis because of its obtuse language and ethereal forms of representation. In some respects, of course, this has been intentional. Subversive postmodernists, in particular, have tried deliberately to distance themselves from orthodox scholarship and, through their confrontationalist and aggressive styles, have managed to subdue opposition that would otherwise be vocal. Orthodox theorists, confused both by its nomenclature and their discursive styles, have been defensive and reticent to analyze systematically postmodern theory, confusing the motifs of one particular strand with all postmodernisms. Dialogue between these schools has thus been mute. And while this might reflect the unwillingness of postmodernists to respond to criticism, it also reflects the brevity of criticism to come from orthodox theorists, many of whom are plainly on the defensive. Rarely have modernists known how to respond to allegations that implicate them and the “age of reason” in mass slaughter and genocide, the active marginalization of minority groups, the oppression of women and nonwhite peoples, the disfiguration of the environment, the brainwashing of subjects into prespecified modes of conceptualization that serve instrumentalist purposes, and the degradation of knowledge and universities to proactive instruments of social control and legitimation. Both Richard Ashley and Robert Walker, for example, two theorists of international relations, charge that positivist/structural realists have tended to act as gatekeepers to their discipline, and, in the process, have been apt to “conspicuous displays of violence” against “students, junior faculty, scholars of color, feminists, and other disciplinary marginals.” Much of the postmodernist conduit along with these allegations have simply been dismissed as “politics from the fringe.” Few have seen the need to analyze critically postmodern theory, most have left it alone in the hope it might go away, and nearly all have been baffled
(and some intimidated) by its imperceptible vernacular. The lack of vigilance or, more precisely, the surrender of conventional standards of appraisal, have enabled subversive postmodernists to infiltrate nearly "every imaginable theoretical discussion" and modernists to dismiss all postmodern theory on the basis of the actions and writings of a few. Indeed, of those who have tried to resist the postmodernist tide or even subject it to critical analysis, the cult of political correctness accompanying it has stigmatized its detractors as vagabonds of reason and oppression. The "terror of theory," it seems, has also used in the service of postmodernism.

As a preliminary offering, this essay has attempted to transcend this gulf of nondiscourse. If nothing else, I trust it behooves readers to a judicious examination of the alternatives and their implications before we pronounce the death of the "age of reason" and the closure of the "Enlightenment project." I for one am not prepared to make the mighty jump from modernist to postmodernist "theory" without first understanding what such a move would mean for the social sciences, its disciplines, and intellectual endeavors. Yet, I also appreciate the sense of change and disjuncture that permeates all facets of our social existence and, ostensibly, changes the nature of political discourse. The next stage in our collective endeavors must thus concern itself with such an examination if intellectual discourse is to be saved from a series of discrete debates conducted in isolation from one another, where modernist and postmodernist perspectives speak only to themselves and not to each other. Save for this, perspectivism and "islands of theory" threaten to make the social sciences the "anything goes" academy. At least with a preliminary classificatory scheme with which to approach the plethora of theory labeled "postmodern," the task of assessing its relevance and understanding its sites and sources of origin might now begin.

NOTES

1. These themes comprise part of a broader study from which this article is drawn. See D.S.L. Jarvis, International Relations and the Challenge of Post-Modernity: Defending the Discipline (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, forthcoming).


5. Ibid.


7. Indeed, defining "postmodernism" is an improbable task as Richard Devetak notes when he writes, "Unfortunately, a clear definition of postmodernism that will meet
with general agreement is precisely what is not possible. Not only is the definition and meaning of postmodernism in dispute between proponents and critics, but also among proponents. Sometimes the different understandings of post-modernism amount to fairly minor differences of emphasis, sometimes they result in significantly divergent theoretical trajectories and conclusions. If there is anything clear about post-modernism it is that its meaning and definition is a source of great contention.” In the end, Devetak’s solution is to proceed to discuss “postmodernism” in the context of a “programmatic and nominalistic approach,” a method I have otherwise adopted in this essay. See the discussion in R. Devetak, “Postmodernism,” in Scott Burchell and Andrew Linklater, eds., Theories of International Relations (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996), 179-80.


27. Elkins, Beyond Sovereignty, 3.

28. Of these “new” theoretical forms, the most obvious and successful has been the introduction of a spatial dialectic into social theory and political-economy. See, for

29. See, for example, the volume by J. N. Rosenau and E. O. Czempiel, eds., Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).


37. In this genre, see, for example, M. Berman, All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity (New York: Penguin, 1988).


42. Naturally, I do not insist that these categories constitute discrete boundaries. Rather, I use them as typologies or, in the Weberian sense, as “ideal types” for heuristic purposes in disentangling the assemblage of literature labeled postmodernist. Moreover, I recognize that such typologies are liable to be confusing since many so-called postmodernists straddle the typologies presented, easily slipping into two or more of these categories simultaneously.


47. F. Jameson, *Postmodernism: Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham, NJ: Duke University Press, 1992), ix. Jameson is referring here to the grand ethos of Western-Enlightenment narratives that depict history as a process of “Man” against “Nature.” Progress and development have thus been defined in terms technological referents that attempt to build barriers and put a distance between “man” and nature or “tame nature.” Thus, the building of elaborate artificial environments that “shut nature out” as with “modernist architecture” or, more simply, the sense that nature was “now under control” are the West’s domestication of agriculture and the ample provision of food, shelter, and clothing so that “Man” was now free to pursue art and other aesthetic past times. This narrative is particularly evident in the context of the settlement of the “new world” with the “taming of the American West” as “nature” was brought “under control” via massive land clearing projects, farming settlement, and the extension of transportation links.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid., 47-48.

50. Ibid., 412.

51. Ibid., 3.

52. Ibid., 5.


59. This is not to suggest that Baudrillard is announcing the end of discrimination or exploitation. Rather, that the traditional dialectics that were responsible for exploitation and discrimination under modernist-industrial modes of production have now changed. As Douglas Kellner notes, “Modernity for Baudrillard is . . . the era of production governed by the industrial bourgeoisie. The era of simulations by contrast is an era of information and signs governed by models, codes and a system of general economy.” The “oppression of the masses,” “the exploitation of the workers,” the class basis of extraction of a surplus, and so on—all these dialectics are now replaced by the postmodern “system of general economy.” See Kellner, *Critical Theory and Society*, 60-92. See also J. Baudrillard, *Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings*.


61. Ibid.

62. J. F. Lyotard, *Toward the Postmodern*, eds. Robert Harvey and Mark S. Roberts (London: Humanities Press, 1993), 91. Lyotard, of course, is referring to the “arrogance” of Enlightenment thought, which assumes rationality the only means to “truth” and understanding. For Lyotard, there are many roads to truth, and no one knowledge system is capable of proving itself more superior to any other. For postmodernists like Lyotard, then, “truth” is understood as a relativist-textual concept, since outside of the “text” there are no extra-textural referents that can establish “truth” beyond reasonable doubt. Foundational knowledge and “truth” claims are thus seen as illusions generated by textual practices.


73. Ibid.

74. Ibid., 170.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., 170-71.

77. From this definition, my use of the term critical postmodernism should be apparent. Unlike subversive postmodernism, critical postmodernism is not adverse to “truth” claims, epistemology, or foundationalist propositions but, in fact, looks for such systemic properties to explain the configurations in social, political, and economic life. However, this is not to say that its understanding of “truth” is not subjectively situated—it is and very much tied to the emergence of “identity politics,” as discussed later in this article.


85. Ibid.
86. Contrary to my position, Bryan Turner argues that the relationship of postmodern theory to radical politics is problematic depending on how one views the modernist project and its relationship to traditionalism. See B. S. Turner, ed., Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity (London: Sage, 1990), 10.
87. This is not meant to suggest a similarity in approach as with Michel Foucault or Jacques Derrida, for example. Fairly obviously, both these theorists attack modernity from radically different perspectives, the former with the use of psychoanalytics and the latter via textual deconstruction. Needless to say, these are very different methods. Rather, I am simply suggesting here a similarity in the practical intent that each aims to achieve: a disruption in the project of modernity.
88. The term Organonist I use derivatively from the Greek word Organon, referring to the body of writings by Aristotle of the same title. Aristotle used the word to refer to a process or series of steps leading toward knowledge, particularly the “problem of knowledge: what is it, how it is acquired, how it is guaranteed to be true, how expanded and systematized.” Aristotle’s Organon, then, developed a system of reasoning or logic as an instrument of thought that became the basis of the Western intellectual tradition and valorized in “reason” and “logic.” See H. Tendennick and E. S. Forster, eds., Aristotle: Organon (London: William Heinemann, 1938).
90. Ibid.
98. This is a central theme not only in the work of Lyotard but, more obviously, Michel Foucault. See M. Foucault, *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 32-75, 239-56.

99. A category, incidentally, that postmodernists often see the preserve of “white males,” exclusionary of ethnic, religious, linguistic minorities and women, and so on.


101. Ibid., 229.


103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid., 70.


114. Ibid.


126. Logocentrism is interchangeably used with Western metaphysics, denoting the tendency in Western rationality to think in terms of “dialectics” and “binary oppositions.” Thus, the penchant to establish binary opposites as in hierarchy/anarchy, positive/negative, present/absent, and so on is representative of logocentric practices that, notes Jonathan Culler, “assumes the priority of the first term and conceives the second in relation to it.” More important, though, logocentric practices establish value patterns, where the first term, the logos, as in *hierarchy*, for example, is seen as superior to its binary equivalent *anarchy*. See the discussion in J. Culler, *On Deconstructionism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982), 93. See also R. Rorty, *Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 107-18.


131. Of these themes, particularly the move toward inclusivity of marginal groups, Bryan Turner notes the corollary of postmodernism with liberalism: “the postmodern critique of hierarchy, grand narratives, unitary notions of authority, or the bureaucratic imposition of official values has a certain parallel with the principles of toleration of difference in the liberal tradition.” Perhaps, then, we are dealing with a radicalized liberalism rather than a fundamentally new theoretical lexicon. See Turner, *Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity*, 11.


134. Ibid.

136. Ibid., 170.