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Disaster at Darien (1698–1700)? The Persistence of Spanish Imperial Power on the Eve of the Demise of the Spanish Habsburgs

I

Between November 1698 and April 1700, a serious, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempt was made by the recently (1695) established Company of Scotland for Trading with Africa and the Indies to establish a Scots colony on the isthmus of Darien, in Spanish central America. Not surprisingly, this abortive project, which was typical of the way numerous states, large and small, sought in one way or another in the later seventeenth century to break into the lucrative colonial and overseas trades,[1] has attracted a great deal of attention from Scottish historians, for whom the failure figures largely in interpretations of the background to the Union of Scotland and England of 1707. For some, the failure of the project, and the loss of the substantial proportion of Scotland's liquid capital which it had mobilized (to say nothing of the loss of life and shipping), was a crucial blow to Scotland's economy, and ultimately to its independence; for others its failure merely exposed the realities of Scottish economic weakness and the need for economic and political integration with its larger and more powerful southern neighbour.[2] Despite their interest, Scottish (and English) historians have, again not entirely surprisingly — particularly given the problems of language and availability of source materials — largely ignored the crucial Spanish dimension to this subject. One recent survey of eighteenth-century Britain, for example, sees the explanation for the Darien fiasco as a choice between English indifference and Scottish incompetence.[3] Yet the interest of Scottish

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historians has at least rescued the Darien episode from complete obscurity. For it must be acknowledged that most studies of Spain and its empire in this period, including the two leading English-language surveys of seventeenth-century Spain by John Lynch — whose interest is above all Spanish America — and John Elliott, and Henry Kamen's more recent study of the reign of Carlos II, make little or no mention of it.[4] The lacuna is equally striking in the work of Spanish historians of late Habsburg Spain,[5] and among historians of the Americas and the Indies trade, for whom the buoyancy and character of that trade between c. 1650 and 1720 have been the main focus of discussion latterly.[6] Even more surprisingly, a recent study of early-modern Panama (and its defences) says little about the Scots incursion.[7] Finally, despite the fact that the Darien venture complicated relations between some of the European powers, the episode is also largely ignored by most modern surveys of international relations in this period, in which the Spanish Succession (and the Partition Treaties of 1698 and 1700) is, understandably, given pride of place in treatment of the interval between the end of the Nine Years War (1688–97) and the start of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14).[8]

This neglect is, of course, understandable. After all, Spain is widely perceived to have been in decline in the final decades of the seventeenth century, its wealth and power by now a mere shadow of what they had been on the eve of Philip II's despatch of an Armada against England in 1588. That decline was fittingly symbolized by the fact that Spain was now ruled by a physical wreck of a man in the person of the last Habsburg, the supposedly bewitched, or *hechizado*, Carlos II (1665–1700), whose lack of direct male heirs made the Spanish Succession one of the main foci of international affairs in Europe in the last decades of the seventeenth century and whose death was the end of Habsburg Spain.[9] In fact, however, although Spain was certainly relatively less powerful, and even dependent on the co-operation of its former enemies in meeting the challenge of Louis XIV's France, it is increasingly clear that Spain, or the Spanish 'Monarchy' as it was known to contemporaries (indicating the whole ensemble of territories in the Iberian peninsula, Italy, the Low Countries, Africa and overseas ruled by the Spanish Habsburg monarch from Madrid) was by no means finished in the reign of Carlos II. Spain remained (with Austria, the Dutch Republic, England and

France) one of the Great Powers, clearly distinguished by its vast territories and resources from the great mass of lesser powers in Europe, many of whom looked to the Spanish king for a helping hand in their own attempts at aggrandizement.[10] And, despite some setbacks, including the loss both of Portugal in the middle decades of the seventeenth century and of Franche Comté and Luxembourg (the latter recovered in 1697) to Louis XIV, the Spanish Monarchy both in Europe and overseas remained extensive, and therefore a great prize. It was precisely for this reason that Spain and its empire was the occasion for a major European war between 1701 and 1713.

Revisionist historians have done something in recent decades to correct the traditional image of a Spain in hopeless and irreversible decline. It would also be incorrect to suggest that previous historians of the Darien project have entirely ignored the existence or importance of the Spanish dimension, or of the abundant Spanish source materials.[11] However, for most revisionists, Spain itself (rather than its European or American territories) is the focus of interest; for many, too, the 1690s remains a decade of decay.[12] As for the Darien venture, most historians of this episode are primarily concerned not with what it reveals about the Spanish Monarchy but with its Scottish significance. Much more work needs to be done, on Spanish institutions, *mentalités*, politics and (foreign) policy in the reign of Carlos II, to rescue late Habsburg Spain from the larger historical neglect into which it has fallen. The present article seeks to go some way towards redressing the neglect by considering the Spanish response to the Scots colonizing attempt at Darien. Its object is, firstly, to show that, in the final years of Habsburg Spain, policy-makers in Madrid and administrators, soldiers and sailors in Spain and the Spanish Americas took the Scottish threat seriously, not least because they were determined to maintain that Monarchy; and, secondly, to demonstrate the continuing effectiveness of the Spanish 'system' of imperial defence in responding to that threat. This response was all the more impressive given that Spain had many other pressing defence commitments. The reaction of the Spanish Monarchy, and its ability, largely unaided, to beat off the Scots challenge, should also contribute, thirdly, to a better understanding not only of the seriousness with which the Scots enterprise was regarded in Spain and elsewhere — rightly in view of the extraordinary

initial success of the Scots Darien expedition — but also of the little real prospect the Scots had of long-term success in the face of the resilience of Spanish power. In addressing these issues, this study draws upon the vast wealth of Spanish archival materials. These include not only the extensive records (reports of the viceroys, admirals and other local commanders) of the Council of the Indies, the administrative body with overall responsibility for Spanish America, now in the Archivo General de Indias, in Seville. It also makes use of the extensive military and naval records produced by Spain's sophisticated military and naval administration (focused on the Council of War), now in the Archivo General de Simancas; and other naval records, including the Colección Navarrete, in the Museo Naval in Madrid. Finally, of course, there are the abundant diplomatic despatches considered by the Monarchy's foreign policy advisory body, the Council of State, also at Simancas.[13]

II

From the start, Spanish officials and policy-makers regarded with the utmost seriousness the incursion at Darien, where the first Scots expedition landed (in Caledonian Bay, founding New Edinburgh) in November 1698. Spaniards took it seriously because the Scots colony represented a menace at a number of levels. Firstly, there was the threat to Spain's prestige or reputation, no inconsiderable thing for a Great Power, especially one perceived as being in decline.[14] Equally important was the strategic threat posed by any foreign presence on the isthmus of Panama to the whole Spanish presence and dominion there. Don José Sarmiento de Valladares, Conde de Moctezuma, the Viceroy of New Spain, feared that the Scots might also seize both Panama and Cartagena, one of Spain's great naval bases in the Americas, and even cross the narrow isthmus of Panama, breaking into the Pacific Ocean itself.[15] The Scots at Darien were also dangerously close to Portobelo, one of the focal points, with Vera Cruz further north, of the so-called Carrera de Indias (the system of privileged access devised in the sixteenth century to channel the wealth of the Americas in favour of Castile and its monarchs). Portobelo was the destination of the annual *galeones* convoy from Seville, bringing Spanish and European goods to be

exchanged at the great fair there for silver and other colonial products which were then carried back to Europe. By the reign of Carlos II, the system of organized convoys between Spain and central America was working less well: between 1665 and 1700 only fifteen *flotas* and nine *galeones* arrived in Spain. Nevertheless, the wealth of the Indies remained important to Spain's economy and finances, not least in the form of the fixed royal share of bullion (the *quinto*) and other taxes, other more or less voluntary 'gifts' and loans, fines (*indultos*) imposed upon the trading community and the seizure, particularly in wartime, of private (and above all foreign) cargoes.

Spanish policy-makers would naturally, therefore, be concerned about an interloping foreign presence in the heart of the Americas, threatening not just the sources of that wealth but also the fleets which carried it to Spain.[16] A Scottish presence was also perceived in Catholic Spanish America and Madrid as a serious religious threat. Indeed, this was one of the aspects of the incursion which most concerned Spaniards. The danger of the introduction and spread of heretical and Protestant (or Reformed) opinions among the population of the Indies was one reason why the Viceroy of New Spain gave priority to the expulsion of the Scots in the spring of 1699 (see below). Nor should we ignore the link that might be made in Spanish minds between Protestantism and political subversion, a combination of which Spain had been the victim in the sixteenth-century Dutch Revolt. Educated Spaniards could not be unaware, either, of the fact that their own empire in central America was in part the surprising achievement of a relatively small force led against the Aztecs by the conquistador Hernán Cortés in the early sixteenth century. (The fact that Darien was one of the first points of entry into central America of the original Spanish conquistadores and that the Scots seemed to have established good relations with local Indians resentful of Spanish rule could only have strengthened the parallels between the two enterprises.)[17] In addition, the initial success of the Scots might encourage others to follow their example, and seek to establish their own colonies within the Spanish empire.[18] Not surprisingly, given these considerations, the Scots presence at Darien, once it was known, fuelled the faction fighting at the royal Court in Madrid. This was because, although the Cortes of Castile was effectively suspended throughout Carlos II's reign, a public opinion of sorts did exist (not least in the capital, Madrid).

It was particularly sensitive to foreign policy issues and the fate of the Monarchy and could be exploited by those seeking to hound their opponents from office and power.[19]

III

The Scots incursion at Darien was by no means the only, or even the first, outside threat facing Spanish America in 1698. In the spring of that year Carlos II ordered the Viceroy of New Spain to fortify and settle Pensacola Bay in the Gulf of Mexico, to forestall a French colonizing expedition known to be heading there. In addition, the king ordered the despatch of a reinforcement for the Armada de Barlovento (or Barlovento fleet, created in 1598 for the defence of the Spanish Caribbean, and re-established in 1665–7), of three ships under the command of Don Martín de Aranguren Zavala, General of the Carrera de Indias (i.e. with overall responsibility for the defence of the Indies trade and communications) who was to take charge of the Pensacola expedition. On receiving these orders, the Viceroy ordered the levy of new infantry units in New Spain (to supply what was, at least until the reign of Carlos III in the eighteenth century, a rather exiguous military establishment in Spanish America),[20] the preparation for sea of vessels of the Armada de Barlovento, the appointment of commanding officers, and the preparation of military and other supplies. The expedition left Vera Cruz for Pensacola in October 1698 (the month preceding that in which the first Scots expedition landed at Darien) and in January 1699 it returned to Vera Cruz, having successfully completed its mission by establishing the *presidio*, or garrison of San Carlos de Austria.[21] Zavala's reinforcement had reached Cartagena in November 1698, too late to take part in the expedition. Nevertheless, the episode demonstrates that Spain was aware of the importance of defending its empire in the Americas, and that it was well able to deal effectively with foreign interloping, mobilizing local military and naval forces and supplementing them, if necessary, from Spain itself. In addition, the response to the French threat had reinforced Spanish power in central America just when the Scots were launching their colonizing efforts, as the Council of the Indies was aware when, in February 1699, it advised Carlos II to divert these forces (whether or not

the Pensacola expedition had carried out its earlier orders) against the more pressing problem of the Darien incursion.[22]

The return of the Pensacola expedition to Vera Cruz coincided with the receipt by the Viceroy of New Spain of a report from the Governor of Caracas of the passage of four Scottish vessels to settle the so-called Isla de Oro, off Darien. This intelligence, one of the benefits of Spain's extensive administrative system in colonial America, and yet another of the strengths of the Spanish 'system' there, was subsequently confirmed by the Governor of Havana (a linchpin of the Carrera de Indias and a focal point of shipping and information) and other Spanish officials.[23] Once again the Spanish war machine was put into operation by the Viceroy. Moctezuma ordered more infantry levies, the enlistment of sailors and the preparation of ships to rendezvous with the Armada de Barlovento, commanded by Don Andrés de Pez, at Cartagena. This flotilla was then to proceed against the Scots colony. The Viceroy also ordered Zavala's recently arrived three ships and those of the *flota* (i.e. those responsible for the defence of the *flota* convoy, which were now in the Caribbean) of Don Juan Baptista de Mascarua to join the Armada de Barlovento in this expedition, indicating that Spain had yet more naval resources at its disposal locally (i.e. those engaged in the Carrera de Indias) should it need them. In fact, when the Armada de Barlovento (five ships carrying 650 men) reached Portobelo in January 1699, it learnt that the Scots colony was smaller than had originally been believed, making it unnecessary to divert, or delay the return to Spain of, the *flota* (and disrupting the trade between Spain and the Indies). Since Zavala claimed his vessels were not ready and (following an outbreak of illness) lacked sufficient seamen, they, too, were unable to participate in the Spanish combined land and sea expedition to Darien early in 1699, under the Conde de Canillas, *Capitán General* (i.e. military governor) and *Presidente* of the *Audiencia*, or supreme court and administrative body of Tierra Firme (Panama). Canillas' expedition, which also included native Indian levies, totalled 1200–1500 men. Unfortunately, the rocky coastline at Darien was thought too risky for Don Andrés de Pez's ships (which were also said to be in poor shape), so that the Armada de Barlovento made little real contribution to the attack on the Scots colony. These problems were made worse by heavy winter rain, which made progress very difficult. Canillas' expedition could make little

headway and after an inconclusive skirmish with the colonists was forced to abandon its attempt to dislodge them. Canillas returned to Panama in April 1699.[24]

This apparent failure of the Spanish system in the Americas reflected some practical problems, and the fact that Spanish troops (and ships) were too scarce and valuable a commodity to waste.[25] Nor should Canillas' failure obscure the fact that, following this setback at Darien, that system was galvanized into further action. Indeed, the Viceroy of New Spain now gave priority to the expulsion of the Scots, something made easier by the fact that the French expedition to Pensacola had been forestalled and (since Louis XIV was unwilling to antagonize Spain) did not challenge the Spaniards.[26] For his part, Moctezuma was happy to give priority to the Scots at Darien because a confrontation with the French expedition risked a renewal of war against Louis XIV, with whom peace had only just been concluded in Europe at the end of the Nine Years War (Rijswijk, 1697). This risk did not really apply to any confrontation with the Scots, subjects of William III, Spain's erstwhile ally against the French king.[27] In May 1699 Moctezuma, for whom speed was of the essence (the crucial thing being not to allow the Scots colonists to establish themselves at Darien), issued orders for the provision of men and sailors. He insisted that Zavala did not, as the latter claimed, need to take crews for his three ships from the *flota* (whose return to Spain with its cargo of royal and private silver was being urged from Madrid, but whose departure had also been delayed by fears of attack by the Scots colonists). Later that same month the Viceroy, who had already ordered the supply of necessary funds to Zavala from the revenues of Mexico, ordered the recruitment of ships' crews.[28] The Viceroy's local preparations were supplemented by further measures in Spain itself, where an additional reinforcement, of two warships and one lighter vessel, commanded by Don Diego Peredo, and five infantry companies, was preparing early in 1699, at Cádiz, under the overall direction of the *maestre de campo general*, Don Juan Díaz Pimienta, who had recently been appointed Governor of Cartagena.[29]

This military and naval reinforcement from Spain reached Panama in June 1699. Orders had been sent to Moctezuma in the meantime to give priority over all other commitments to supporting this enterprise. In fact, however, by the end of June, the Scots had already abandoned their colony at Darien. It might be

thought that the Spanish reinforcement was redundant and even irrelevant to the failure of the initial Scots' colonization attempt. However, that would be to ignore the more important facts of Spanish hostility to the Scots' intrusion, already evident to the colonists, and of a determined Spanish effort on both sides of the Atlantic to respond to the Scots challenge. Although Zavala left Havana and the Caribbean, in October 1699, for Cadiz, believing that the Scots threat had been dealt with,[30] that determination and effort had resulted in the further strengthening of Spanish military and naval might in central America. This would stand the Spaniards in good stead when the second wave of Scots colonists arrived at Darien in November 1699.[31]

Since the news of the Scots departure from Darien in June 1699 would not be known in Madrid for some time, the reinforcement carried by Peredo's squadron was by no means the end of attempts in Spain to find answers to the problem of the interlopers. Carlos II also ordered, in June 1699, the immediate levy of two new companies of infantry, of 100 men each, accompanied by up to 50 'reformed' officers (i.e. those whose units had been reformed or reduced at the end of the Nine Years War and who were effectively without commands and who might take charge of any further companies levied) and 50 grenadiers (a type of shock force) and two military engineers to direct siege operations, as part of a much larger effort to recover Darien.[32] The two new companies were to be levied in Andalucía, in southern Spain, for obvious reasons. For one thing, it made good sense, given the urgency of the expedition, to recruit as close as possible to Cadiz, the port of embarcation for any expedition to America, not least because it reduced both the journey time from recruiting ground to embarcation port and the likely losses from desertion on the way. In addition, and despite Spain's economy difficulties and population losses in the seventeenth century, Andalucía remained one of the best populated regions of Spain (not least because of the wealth of the Indies, channelled through Seville and Cadiz) and thus an important recruiting ground as in the past.[33] Carlos II also ordered the Council of War to give the necessary orders to Spain's Captain General of Artillery for the despatch to Darien of a substantial quantity of munitions which had been calculated as necessary for the Darien operation.[34] A week later the Council of War decided that the Junta de Guerra de Indias, a joint committee of the Councils of War and the

Indies responsible for co-ordinating the military effort in the Indies, should assume overall responsibility for the Darien expedition. It also decided to ask the Viceroy of Catalonia, Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt, for the necessary military engineers from the Army of Catalonia, one of Spain's (and indeed the Monarchy's) main fighting units.[35] This feverish activity did not escape the notice of Louis XIV's ambassador to the Spanish Court.[36]

This reinforcement left Spain in October 1699.[37] It consisted of two vessels, the *Nuestra Señora de la Almudena y San Cayetano* (which had been purchased for the occasion) and the *Castilla*, under the command of admiral Don Francisco Salmón. They carried two companies of infantry of 100 men each, a number of 'reformed' officers (although the speed with which the reinforcement had been put together had prevented the original target figure of 50 being achieved) and a company of 50 grenadiers — in all about 300 men. Also on board were an experienced military engineer, Don Melchor Vélez de Guevara, two other experienced artillery officers, and substantial quantities of munitions including 500 rifles, 1000 quintals of powder, 2000 grenades, 1000 'bombs', and 6 mortars. Spain's ability to secure (in part by home manufacture) and supply these munitions, some of which had originally been assembled in connection with the earlier Pensacola expedition, was a further indication of the disparity between the resources of Spain and the Scots colonists. Salmón's flotilla was to be supplemented from local forces in the Americas. At the same time as this expedition departed, orders were sent to the Viceroy of New Spain to send the chief military engineer of that realm, to co-operate with Salmón's forces. Even before that date, in August 1699, the Viceroy of Peru, Don Gaspar Portocarrero, Conde de Monclova (an experienced soldier) whose viceroyalty included Darien, had been ordered to Panama to take overall charge of the operation against the Scots, and to provide between 500 and 600 men for the attempt from his viceroyalty. Similar orders to raise and despatch men were sent to the President of the *audiencia* of Guatemala. As before, Spain and its American empire were to make a serious co-ordinated effort to dislodge the colonists from Darien.[38]

Far more importantly, however, Salmón's military and naval reinforcement (which reached Cartagena in November 1699 and then moved on to Portobelo), was from the start conceived as the

advance guard of a much more substantial Spanish military and naval enterprise against the Darien colonists. Following reports that more ships had reached Darien, carrying not only Scots but also Irish and Danes, and that more were expected, it was recognized in Marid that a greater effort was required from Spain itself. It was therefore decided in June 1699 that, in addition to the few hundred troops carried by Salmón, another 2500 men should be levied in Spain to expel the interloping colonists. This much more ambitious expedition clearly required careful planning and would take some time. The Council of War was therefore instructed to give the appropriate orders to the Comisario General of Infantry (with overall responsibility for recruiting), so that the necessary recruiting districts could be assigned, not least to avoid unnecessary and fruitless duplication of recruiting efforts and their delay.[39] Subsequently, Carlos II appointed Don Pedro Fernández de Navarrete, a man with a distinguished service record, having commanded Spain's Flanders squadron, and *caballero* of the prestigious military order of Santiago, to command this much larger enterprise,[40] which was reckoned in October 1699 to require 4900 men in ships' crew of all types and troops.[41]

Success clearly depended on naval as well as military power. It is almost a commonplace that the decline of Spain in the seventeenth century was accompanied by the reduction of its industrial and technical skills and capacity, including the shipbuilding industry of northern Spain in particular. This was not necessarily a problem, because Spain could buy what ships it needed abroad.[42] It could also resort to privateers, a common feature of naval warfare in early-modern Europe. They were particularly favoured where, for one reason or another, 'state' navies alone were inadequate, and had been widely used on all sides during the Nine Years War. In June 1699 Carlos II approved the grant of patents to Basque corsairs to operate against 'pirates' in Spanish American waters.[43] However, although it would be wrong to distinguish too rigidly between public and private in an age when the developing state still relied enormously on private financiers and contractors, it was the Spanish Habsburg state which bore the brunt of further efforts to dislodge the Scots. Indeed, we need to beware of exaggerating this aspect (as others) of Spain's so-called 'decline'. In the spring of 1699 four new ships (the *Santísima Trinidad*, the *San Francisco*, the *Santa María*

de Tesanos and the *Nuestra Señora de Begoña*) were being built in Cantabria for the Armada del Mar Oceano (the main Spanish fleet, created in the 1590s, which protected the eastern end of the Atlantic and was sometimes diverted to Mediterranean defence duties) and two galleons, for the Carrera de Indias, at Pasajes in Guipúzcoa. This suggests that Spain was well able to build new ships to satisfy at least some of its own naval needs and that Carlos II's government was embarking on a programme of naval rebuilding following the conclusion of the Nine Years War. These six vessels were intended to constitute the nucleus of the squadron which would form part of the larger Darien expedition now being prepared. The Spanish Monarchy, with its extensive military and naval resources (men, *matériel*, experience and organization) was thus gearing up to deal decisively with the Scots threat.[44]

However, while recognizing Spain's determination and capacity to defend its empire in central America, we must also acknowledge that its extensive defence commitments prevented it from diverting all of its equally extensive resources to the Navarrete expedition. More specifically, having just concluded the Nine Years War, the Spanish Monarchy then faced a serious challenge in north Africa between 1698 and 1700. In its expansive sixteenth-century phase, Spain had extended its empire across the Straits of Gibraltar into north Africa in the form of a string of isolated strongholds. These desolate outposts of the Monarchy, service in whose garrisons was often a form of punishment, were engaged in a long-running struggle (one which tends to get overlooked by Eurocentric historians) with their Moorish neighbours.[45] The latter were encouraged by Spain's enemies to distract Spain from the European struggle. During the Nine Years War, with French backing, the Moors had attacked Oran (in 1693) and Ceuta and Melilla (in 1695).[46] Another of these periodic crises blew up in 1698, with a renewed assault by the King of Morocco on Ceuta. In May 1698 the Spanish Council of State rejected an offer of galleys and troops for the defence of both Ceuta and Oran from Louis XIV, who clearly hoped to exploit Spain's inability to meet its defence commitments in order to gain ground in the developing struggle for the Spanish Succession. (Carlos II did, however, seek aid from neighbouring Portugal, rewarding the Portuguese with trading privileges in Spain's American colonies — an alternative and

more successful approach to securing access to the latter than that of the Scots.) More important, the fact that Spain was already engaged in a substantial struggle in north Africa when the Darien crisis blew up inevitably affected the attention and resources which Spain could divert to deal with the Scots threat.[47] Besides Ceuta and Darien, Madrid was also anxious about both the inadequacy of its garrisons in Navarra (the key to the defence of the western end of the Pyrenees) and — despite the King of Portugal's support in north Africa — military activity on the Portuguese side of the frontier (largely in anxious anticipation of Carlos II's death). These other concerns must be borne in mind when considering the Spanish response to Darien.[48]

Recruiting was already going on in Andalucía for north Africa (just across the Straits of Gibraltar, making Andalucía the favoured recruiting ground for this as for the Darien expedition) when Carlos II decided vastly to increase the Darien commitment to more than 2000 men. Inevitably, trying to meet the demands of both theatres of war soon created difficulties, necessitating tough decisions about military priorities. In September 1699, the King sent to the Council of War a consulta of the Junta de Guerra de Indias, suggesting that five companies of the *tercio* of Don Francisco de Luna, then at Melilla, be withdrawn for despatch to Darien.[49] This proposal was soon overtaken by another, reflecting increasing concern in Madrid that, if the Darien expedition did not get away promptly (before mid-December, when the Atlantic became more difficult for shipping), the efforts being made might be wasted. It was also felt that Ceuta, while close to Spain, would (for that very reason) never want troops for its defence, whereas Darien, if not dealt with promptly might be lost for good. In October 1699, Carlos II, referring to the need to give priority to the Darien expedition, informed the Marqués de Villadarias, Governor and Captain General of Ceuta, that it had been decided to withdraw from Ceuta the three most senior (reflecting the vital importance of experienced units, i.e. veterans, in an important operation like that at Darien) *tercios* of the Armada (i.e. 'marines'), those of Don Carlos de San Gil, Don Jorge de Villalonga and Don Antonio Varrientos. The Governor must therefore send back to Andalucía, where they were assigned recruiting districts by the Comisaría General of Infantry to bring them up to strength before their departure for Darien, those three *tercios*. The

Comisario General, the Conde de Corzana, would inform the *corregidores* (the chief justices and executives in those localities under the Crown's immediate jurisdiction) and *justicias* (the magistrates and officials who constituted the basic executive in all localities, both within and outside royal jurisdiction) whose co-operation was essential to the success of this operation. Carlos II himself informed the Duke of Alburquerque, Captain General of the Coasts of Andalucía, who was to use his extensive authority and influence to facilitate the recruiting, and the Governors of various Andalucian ports (including Cadiz and Sanlúcar de Barrameda) to the same end. To speed matters, the recruiting captains were promised bonuses to complete their companies, and Carlos ordered that extensive credit facilities to fund these operations be made available to Navarrete.[50] In case these measures did not attract enough recruits, it was also decided to forcibly levy numbers of vagabonds.[51] Clearly, by the autumn of 1699, and following the failure of Canillas' expedition, the Scots presence at Darien headed Spain's immediate defence concerns; and a tried and tested system of military and naval mobilization was in train in Spain itself to deal with it.[52]

It would be naive to expect that the preparation of an expedition on this scale would go entirely without hitch. Recruiting, for one thing, did not proceed as smoothly or quickly as had initially been hoped. At the end of October 1699, the *tercios* withdrawn from Ceuta were still in and about Gibraltar (where they had been landed), not having yet departed for their intended recruiting districts and quarters in and about Jaén, Córdoba and Granada. In late November, the Comisaría General of Infantry explained this delay on the grounds that the captains of the three *tercios* could not proceed until their precise numbers were known. Only then could the magistrates of the communities through which they must journey — and where they were to recruit and be quartered — be given a proper idea of their obligations (i.e. how many men they and their communities must provide for) until those men embarked for Darien at Cadiz. Only at the end of November 1699 did the companies of Villalonga's *tercio* leave Gibraltar for their assigned districts. Reflecting anxieties about Portugal, these now included Ayamonte and the *condado* de Niebla (the latter part of the patrimony of the Dukes of Medina Sidonia), in the Gulf of Cadiz and adjacent to the

border with Portugal. Carlos II sought to prevent further delay by ordering, in early December, the preparation of blank letters to cities and magistrates, to be sent to Navarrete, who could fill in the names as appropriate, but the initial deadline for the expedition's departure, mid-December, was looking increasingly unrealistic.[53]

The naval preparations for Navarrete's expedition also presented problems. Firstly, there was the difficulty of how to find the large numbers of seamen needed to crew the ships.[54] Already, in July 1699, the impossibility of finding all of them in Cantabria (and of clothing them) had been made clear to the Junta de Apresto de Armadas, the committee of the Council of War responsible for fitting out Spain's fleets,[55] although efforts could be made to find crews from among the seagoing populations of some of the other regions on the journey from Cantabria to Cadiz.[56] Secondly, the participation in the expedition of the four ships newly built in Cantabria and assigned to Navarrete's expedition was soon in doubt. At the start of October 1699, Don Mateo de Laya reported the arrival at Cádiz of the four vessels (the flagship, the *Santísima Trinidad*, the *Santa María de Tesanos*, the *Nuestra Señora de Begoña* and the *San Francisco*). However, and rather disturbingly, he was obliged to report a number of defects, the result largely of the need to get away from Cantabria before the bad weather set in and before the ships were completely ready — the pressure to mount an expedition to Darien thus contributing to these problems. The flagship was in good condition, but the two largest vessels, the galleons *Santa María de Tesanos* and the *Nuestra Señora de Begoña* needed substantial works. Fortunately, these could be carried out at Cadiz, making use of the dockyard facilities there. It was even hoped that the works might be completed in order to meet the December deadline. However, these hopes soon looked unduly optimistic. In November, the Junta de Guerra de Indias decided that the *Santa María de Tesanos* and the *Nuestra Señora de Begoña* could not accompany Navarrete's expedition. Subsequently, it ordered that the *San Francisco*, too, must remain behind.[57] In view of these difficulties, and the lack of alternative vessels, the departure of Navarrete's expedition was postponed by Carlos II until March 1700.[58]

Equally problematic was the funding of the Darien expeditions. Recruiting, clothing, lodging, provisioning, and the

miscellaneous additional expenditure associated with a substantial military and naval enterprise, were very costly[59] at a time when royal revenues were already heavily committed and just recovering from the vast outlay necessitated by the Nine Years War.[60] Typically, in June 1699 it was reported that the royal order for the casting of six bronze culverin cannons, for immediate despatch to the Indies, could not be done at Seville (one of the centres of Spain's armaments industry and well placed to supply the Indies promptly with munitions) for lack of funds, the money for it (i.e. to pay the *asiento*, or contract) not having been remitted from Mexico.[61] The financial difficulties provoked by the Darien expedition were intensified by the fact that the situation in north Africa (and elsewhere) required equally expensive efforts.[62] However, these difficulties should not mislead us. Although Madrid may not have been spending at the level of the 1630s, 1640s and 1650s, it was still able (and ready) to finance very substantial expenditure to defend the Monarchy. Spanish finance in Carlos II's reign remains inadequately explored, but it is very clear that the king's ministers were remarkably successful in funding the defence of empire by a variety of expedients. These included donatives (more or less voluntary gifts or levies) and loans from wealthy target groups such as Seville's commercial élite, in the latter case through the Casa de Contratación which controlled the Indies trade.[63] In October 1698, the Crown had asked the Seville merchant community (which had already made a special grant, or *servicio*, to the king) for more than 500,000 pesos to help it meet its many commitments. That community initially refused but, no doubt reflecting its own perception of the implications (for Seville's American trade and wealth) of the interlopers' presence at Darien, offered in August 1699 to lend 300,000 pesos, on condition it was used to expel the Scots.[64] By October 1699, nearly 200,000 pesos (the remnant of the earlier *servicio* and the first tranche of the subsequent loan) had been spent and officials were hard pressed to find the 25,000 pesos to be remitted to Cádiz to pay for the troop levies for the Darien force.[65] The shortage of funds could be relieved by local officials: in late October 1699, the *asistente* (or royal *corregidor*) of Seville sent 10,000 escudos to Gibraltar, to enable the *tercios* withdrawn from Ceuta for Darien to go to their winter quarters.[66] However, the want of ready money inevitably affected the project. In December 1699

Carlos II ordered the suspension of recruiting for the *tercios* destined for Darien, on the grounds that the departure of Navarrete's squadron had been put back and that the 25,000 pesos could not be found.[67]

Before considering the final realization of the Navarrete expedition, we need to consider one further resource which the Spaniards could draw on in their counter-attack at Darien: diplomacy, another of the neglected instruments of Spanish resilience in the later seventeenth century. Hitherto, the contribution of diplomacy to a successful outcome of the Darien episode for Spain has generally been thought to lie in William III's reluctance, in the interests of his larger, anti-French policy, to break with Spain in favour of his Scots subjects. There is clearly something in this notion of what might be called a 'passive' Spanish diplomatic triumph in the Darien affair.[68] However, Spanish diplomacy played a much more active role than this implies. As with its military and naval structure, Spain benefited from an extensive and experienced diplomatic network and expertise, built up in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. That network, often manned by able individual diplomats, was another source of valuable intelligence and also enabled Madrid to mobilize additional (foreign and domestic) resources in times of need.[69] Spain had no resident ministers in Scotland itself, but Carlos II's representative in London, the Marqués de Canales, an experienced diplomat, was an attentive monitor of the Darien scheme. In January 1696 he sent a printed copy (with a Spanish translation) of the Act passed by the Scottish Parliament in 1695 for the establishment of the Company to trade in Africa and the West Indies, suggesting that it would be in the Spanish king's interests to warn his Governors throughout the Indies, so that they could prevent the foundation there of interloping colonies.[70] Eighteen months later, Canales returned to the subject, describing his efforts, in co-operation with English merchants hostile to the Company, to oppose its progress. However, the project had been revived, Canales sending a printed copy of the new proposal for a trading Company and reporting the success of its agents in purchasing ships in Hamburg. Canales also expressed concern that he had had no real reply to his earlier report on the subject (which had been referred by the Council of State to the Council of the Indies). By early 1699, following the initial success of the Scots' expedition, Canales was understandably more concerned,

not least because the English apparently wished to establish their own colonies in supposedly uninhabited parts of the Spanish empire (in imitation of the Scots). He protested formally in London about the Scots colony, making very clear his government's annoyance, to the discomfiture of that of William III. More importantly, in the present context, Canales' intelligence reports, and the need to prevent what was shaping up (following the initial success of the Scots at Darien) as a *de facto* partition of Spain's colonial empire even before the death of Carlos II, helped convince policymakers in Madrid of the need to mount a serious counter-offensive in central America.[71]

Spanish diplomats elsewhere could also report directly on the activities of the Scots.[72] Some sent to Madrid intelligence about the Darien scheme obtained locally from English diplomats, further testimony both to the value of Spain's extensive diplomatic network and to the great interest taken in the Darien affair by more than just those immediately concerned in it.[73] In addition, Carlos II's ministers abroad might convince other European Courts of Spain's determination to root out the Scots colony and defend and preserve the Monarchy, and mobilize diplomatic support in London for Spain from the Courts of Catholic Europe. Those diplomats might also contribute more directly to the success of Spain's efforts to dislodge the interlopers from Darien. They could, for example, purchase (not least in the Dutch Republic, a centre of what we might call the late seventeenth-century arms trade) munitions of which Spain itself might be short.[74]

Spanish diplomacy was successfully deployed in Rome to get the Pope, Innocent XII, to grant additional funds to deal with the Scots' incursion, in the form of a special levy on the clergy of Spanish America. The clergy in the Spanish Indies (like that of peninsular Spain) was largely exempt from regular, direct taxation, although the Church did contribute to Crown revenues in various ways, notably specific grants originally assigned to the Spanish Crown in the sixteenth century to help it fight the 'infidel' (the Turks) in the Mediterranean, but which had to be renewed regularly by the Pope. Papal approval was also necessary for any extraordinary additional levies on ecclesiastical wealth. In 1693, Innocent (following persistent pressure from Carlos II's representatives in Rome) had granted the Spanish king permission to levy 1,000,000 escudos on the regular and

secular clergy of Spanish America in the form of a *décima* (or tenth), to finance defence measures against interloping heretic (i.e. non-Catholic) pirates. Unfortunately, collection of this sum was effectively blocked by the efforts of the nuncio in Madrid.[75] The Darien episode led the Spanish Crown, using its agents in Rome, including Cardinals Giudice and Aguirre, to renew its efforts to make this concession effective. In the summer of 1699, following the calling of a special Congregation of Cardinals by Innocent XII, who clearly shared Spanish anxieties about the consequences for the Catholic faith of the Scots presence at Darien, the Pope confirmed his earlier grant of a 1,000,000 escudos levy on clerical wealth in the Spanish Indies.[76]

As we have seen, the original deadline for the departure of Navarrete's expedition from Spain, mid-December 1699, had been acknowledged as unrealistic and a new departure date fixed, March 1700. In early February Carlos II issued orders (through the Council of Castille and the Comisaría de Infantería) for the levy of 3,000 men for the Darien expedition.[77] In April, the king also issued orders for the levy (voluntary if possible, but forced if necessary, given the urgency of the expedition) of sailors in the ports of Andalucía to crew the ships in Navarrete's expeditionary force.[78] But, clearly, there was delay and the expedition still had not left Cadiz by May 1700. This allowed one final threat to the expedition to emerge, reflecting both the degree to which Spain's ability to respond effectively to Darien could not be separated from its larger commitments and the fact that at the time Spaniards saw Navarrete's expedition as a substantial military and naval force in its own right. This new complication was provoked by the Partition Treaty concluded by William III and Louis XIV in March 1700, the details of which were soon known in Madrid, where the projected partition of Spain's vast empire was widely regarded as both insulting (not least to Carlos II, who still lived) and threatening. Typical of the response of the outraged was the Conde de Santesteban, a grandee with a distinguished service record (he had been Viceroy of Sardinia, Sicily and Naples) and who was a member of the Council of State. In a consulta of late May 1700 on the Partition Treaty and the Succession he expressed concern at the possibility of the English and Dutch securing the Indies (above all because of the threat of their introducing Lutheranism and Calvinism there). Santesteban's concern to preserve the Monarchy intact led him to

suggest offering it whole to Louis XIV for one of his grandsons, but he also thought that Spain's own military and naval resources must be looked to, to avoid the threatened partition. Accordingly, he proposed that the squadron being prepared at Cadiz for the Indies (i.e. Navarrete's Darien expeditionary force) remain in Spain, where it might be needed to deal with an even greater threat than that posed by the Scots.[79]

Santesteban's advice was not taken and, having completed the necessary preparations (including the payment of both seamen and troops), Navarrete's expedition at last left Cadiz for central America, sailing via the Canary Islands, in June 1700. It consisted of ten ships, including the *San Francisco*, the *Nuestra Señora de Begoña* and the *Santa María de Tesanos* (the repairs needed to enable these vessels to take part in the expedition having been completed) and 4800 men (little short of the 4900 thought necessary in October 1699). These comprised nearly 1800 ship's crew of one sort and another and over 3000 troops. The latter included two of the three *tercios* of the *Armada* recalled from Ceuta for the purpose (those of San Gil and Varrientos) and two Walloon companies (in place of the *tercio* of Villalonga, which was still quartered along the border with Portugal). The expedition also carried substantial provisions of all sorts, including 1,000,000 rations. Among these were full rations for the troops on board for just sixty days, reflecting both a desire to reduce the time spent provisioning in Cadiz (emphasizing again the urgency of the operation) and the knowledge that Navarrete could be supplied locally in the Indies. The Governor of Cartagena was ordered to provide Navarrete with fresh meat, fruit and vegetables, while orders were sent to the Viceroy of New Spain to send to Portobelo for Navarrete's squadron between 3000 and 4000 quintals of *bizcocho* (or cake) and another 2000–3000 quintals to Havana. In order to meet inevitable and unforeseen costs in the Indies, the Viceroy of Peru was ordered to send to Panama 500,000 pesos (from the recently granted ecclesiastical subsidy). The President of the *Audiencia* of Quito and the other senior administrative officials of Spanish America were also ordered to despatch various sums to Panama and Cartagena for Navarrete.[80]

Navarrete's orders were to head for central America, and rendezvous with the various units (those of Peredo, Salmón and so on) already there. The entire force should then depart for

Darien without delay, not least because of fears about the effects on his forces (and prospects of success) of both desertion and sickness. Don Mateo de Laya commanded the ships, but Navarrete enjoyed the supreme command and in the Indies was only to take orders from the Viceroy of Peru (who, as we have seen, was to lead the expedition against the Scots). Navarrete was to use force to expel the colonists if they were still at Darien and refused to go peacefully. If, once captured, the Scots colonists could not show patents from their king (William III), they were to be treated as pirates, and shown no mercy. Navarrete did not have as many veterans experienced in the use of arms as he would have wished (making him anxious for the success of his expedition).[81] But here at last was the Spanish counter-attack which was finally to remove the Scottish threat in central America, and for good. It would do so, among other things, because Navarrete's instructions included orders to consider the best means to defend Darien against future incursions, and to strengthen Spain's hold there, i.e. whether to effect earlier plans (1698) to build fortifications there (another reason to send military engineers on the expedition),[82] or whether, reflecting a long debate about the defence of Darien among Spanish soldiers, sailors and policy-makers, to rely on a (more mobile) locally based naval squadron. Navarrete's departure from Cadiz was accompanied by a flurry of letters from Carlos II to senior officials in the Americas, in an attempt to prevent that wrangling between the senior officers which so often undermined expeditions of this sort, whose success depended greatly on co-operation.[83]

IV

Navarrete's expedition in the summer of 1700, then, was to be the knockout blow against the Scottish Darien colony as far as the Spaniards were concerned. However, by the time Navarrete reached Cartagena in September 1700[84] the Scots had already abandoned Darien for a second time, and this time for good, following Don Juan de Pimienta's combined land and sea expedition (including the ships and reinforcements — of men and munitions — of both Salmón and Peredo and substantial local levies) against the colony in the spring and the Scots' capitula-

tion, after the Spanish forces had breached their defences, in April 1700.[85] Navarrete was promptly recalled to Spain, the looming Succession crisis seeming to dictate a concentration of resources in home waters, with orders simply to leave in the Indies whatever military and naval reinforcements he and the local commanders thought necessary. Navarrete had, on his arrival in the Indies, already granted Pimienta's request for 300 of the 3000 troops he was carrying. Having subsequently sent another 100 men to strengthen the Spanish garrison left at Caledonia (following the expulsion of the Scots), Navarrete left a further 500 at Cartagena before he departed from the latter in November 1700, with most of his own squadron and that of Salmón (but leaving two vessels as a naval reinforcement against future incursions and pirates). Navarrete was obliged by storms to put into Havana (where he took advantage of the dockyard facilities to refit his vessels) and did not depart until January 1701, leaving another 200 soldiers at Havana at the request of the Governor. Navarrete's squadron finally reached Cadiz in March 1701.[86]

The fact that Navarrete's expedition had played no direct part in ending the Scots colonizing efforts might be thought to support the traditional image of a declining Habsburg Spain, largely unable to deal with the challenges to its power and dominion in its final decades. The forces mobilized in Spain in response to the Scots' incursion were certainly dwarfed by earlier Spanish expeditionary forces (and by some more recent ones mounted by other European powers).[87] The Spanish response to the Darien incursion (and particularly Navarrete's expedition) also took a long time to materialize. However, this was arguably the inevitable consequence of attempting to meet a great number of competing defence commitments. In addition, as the Nine Years War had recently shown, most of the other Great Powers, including Louis XIV's France and William III's England, sometimes found it equally hard to mobilize effectively their military and naval resources. Mounting an expedition across the Atlantic was especially difficult. But it should also now be clear that Spain's response to the Scots' Darien colonization scheme, culminating in Navarrete's expedition (Spain's most impressive overseas venture in the last years of Carlos II[88]), was appropriate, being based upon a realistic assessment of the danger that colony posed to Spain's imperial system; and that Navarrete's forces would

surely have destroyed the Scots settlement if the latter had still been occupied. As it was, Pimienta had already removed the threat, although he could not have done so without the reinforcements earlier supplied from Spain.[89] The military and naval reinforcement left in Spanish central America by Navarrete before returning to Spain would, finally, make another Scots attempt much more difficult.

The Spanish response to Darien has important implications for our understanding of late Habsburg Spain, and of Scotland's prospects on the eve of the Union of 1707. It would clearly be foolish to attempt to argue that Spain in the 1690s was anything like the power that it had been a century earlier. However, on the eve of its demise the supposedly declining Habsburg Spain could react determinedly, forcefully and successfully to threats to its position in the Indies and (as during the Nine Years War in Europe, when Spain's position in both the Low Countries and Italy had recovered some lost ground at the expense of Louis XIV's France[90]) had shown an impressive resilience. The scale of the Spanish reaction between 1698 and 1700 was clear testimony to the Spaniards' appreciation of the real and multi-faceted threat that a Scots presence in central America posed to Spanish prestige, dominion and power. As for the Scots, any discussion of the failure of Darien must also take full account of that Spanish determination and superiority in crucial resources and of the sheer impossibility, in reality, of the Scots muscling in on such a well-articulated power system. It was almost inconceivable that the Scots colony could survive without the support framework (diplomatic, financial, military and naval) — one experienced in supplying the sinews of war both locally, in the Americas, and over vast distances, across the Atlantic — that their Spanish opponents clearly did enjoy. For some this will no doubt reinforce the view that the Scots disaster followed from William III's failure to support his Scots subjects against Spain. But if Darien was, ultimately, a disaster for Scotland — a minor, peripheral European power — it was a triumph for a Spanish Monarchy which remained a Great Power and was by no means the desperate figure of legend on the eve of the advent of the Bourbons and the War of the Spanish Succession.

Notes

I should like to take this opportunity to thank the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland for its generosity in making a grant which enabled me to spend two weeks working on materials for this paper in Spain in 1996, the Department of History of the University of Dundee for purchasing microfilm (now deposited in the University library) of most of the relevant correspondence in the Archivo General de Indias in Seville, and Professor Chris Whatley of the Department of History of the University of Dundee for reading an earlier version of this paper.

1. C. 1680 the Regent of Savoy sought to marry her son, Duke Victor Amadeus II of Savoy, to the Portuguese Infanta, partly because this might open up the still vast Portuguese overseas trading empire to the Duke's subjects. The scheme failed, as did the Duke's own later attempts to realize his claims to the Spanish Succession, and thus secure Spain's world empire: cf. G. Symcox, *Victor Amadeus II. Absolutism in the Savoyard State 1675–1730* (London 1983), 82 (and passim).

2. Cf. G.P. Insh, *The Darien Scheme* (Historical Association, London 1947) J.S. Barbour, *A History of William Paterson and the Darien Company* (Edinburgh 1907); and F.R. Hart, *The Disaster of Darien. The Story of the Scots Settlement and the Causes of its Failure 1699–1701* (London 1930). That Darien soon became seen as a defining moment in Scottish history is suggested by a contemporary comparison of the economic downturn of the 1770s with the events of 1698–1700, cited in T.C. Smout, *A History of the Scottish People 1560–1830* (London 1969), 229. For a brief recent survey of the debate about the strength and prospects of the Scottish economy c. 1700, cf. C.A.W. Whatley, '*Bought and Sold for English Gold*'? *Explaining the Union of 1707* (Economic and Social History Society of Scotland 1994), esp. 28ff. Cf., also, D. Armitage, 'The Scottish vision of empire: intellectual origins of the Darien venture', in J. Robertson, ed., *A Union for Empire. Political Thought and the Union of 1707* (Cambridge 1995).

3. F. O'Gorman, *The Long Eighteenth Century. British Political and Social History 1688–1832* (London 1997), 56.

4. J. Lynch, *Spain under the Habsburgs, vol. 2: Spain and America 1598–1700*, 2nd edn (Oxford 1981); J.H. Elliott, *Imperial Spain 1469–1716* (London 1961); and H. Kamen, *Spain in the later Seventeenth Century, 1665–1700* (London 1980). R.D. Hussey, 'The Spanish Empire under Foreign Pressures 1688–1715', in J.S. Bromley, ed., *The New Cambridge Modern History [henceforth NCMH], vol. 6: The Rise of Great Britain and Russia 1688–1715/25* (Cambridge 1970), 360, does briefly describe the episode.

5. Cf. P. Molas Ribalta, *Manual de Historia de España, 3: Edad Moderna, (1474–1808)* (Madrid 1989); and ibid., ed., *Historia de España R. Menéndez Pidal, vol. XXVIII: La Transición del Siglo XVII al XVIII. Entre la Decadencia y la Reconstrucción* (Madrid 1993).

6. Neither J.O. McLachlan, *Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 1667–1750* (Cambridge 1940; reprinted Octagon 1974) nor J.H. Parry, *The Spanish Seaborne Empire* (Harmondsworth 1973), refer to the Darien venture. M.A. Burkholder and L.L. Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, 2nd edn (Oxford 1994), a good general survey, also ignores it. Perhaps the best recent English-language introduction to Spain's colonial trade is A. García-Baquero González, 'Andalusia and the crisis of

the Indies trade 1610–1720', in I.A.A. Thompson and B. Yun Casalilla, eds, *The Castilian Crisis of the Seventeenth Century. New Perspectives on the Economic and Social History of Seventeenth Century Spain* (Cambridge 1994), 115ff. This is a translation of a chapter from A. García-Baquero González, *Andalucía y la carrera de Indias (1492–1824)* (Seville 1986). J.M. Oliva Melgar, 'Realidad y Ficción en el Monopolio de Indias: una Reflexión sobre el Sistema Imperial Español en el Siglo XVII', *Manuscrits*, Vol. 14 (1996), 321–55, is both an important contribution to contemporary debates and a valuable tour d'horizon.

7. C. Ward, *Imperial Panama. Commerce and Conflict in Isthmian America 1550–1800* (New Mexico 1993), 178 and 255.

8. Cf. D. McKay and H.M. Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers 1648–1815* (London 1983); and S.B. Baxter, *William III* (London 1966). Earlier, however, Legrelle did pay some attention to the episode in his study of the Spanish succession: cf. Irish, op. cit., 3.

9. Cf. J.H. Elliott, 'The Decline of Spain', *Past and Present*, Vol. 20 (1961).

10. The Elector Palatine, brother of Carlos' second wife, Maria Anna of Pfalz-Neuburg, himself sought Darien from his brother-in-law in the late 1690s as a possible centre of commercial activity on his own account (seeing it as just the sort of launchpad to colonial wealth that the Scots expected their own expeditions to provide), Duque de Maura, *Vida y Reinado de Carlos II*, ed. P. Gimferrer (Madrid 1990), 563. Although Maura gives no references (his papers were among the minor casualties of the Spanish Civil War), where it can be checked his study is generally well founded.

11. F.R. Hart, in particular, made good use of the records of the Council of the Indies, and put all subsequent students of the subject in his debt by printing substantial numbers of, or extracts from them, in ibid., op. cit. Many of these and some other relevant Spanish source materials were briefly calendared in ibid., *Spanish Documents Relating to the Scots Settlement of Darien* (Boston, MA 1931).

12. H. Kamen, op. cit., a major re-evaluation, deals only with peninsular Spain, while R. Stradling, *Europe and the Decline of Spain. A Study of the Spanish System 1580–1720*, (London 1981), nonetheless sees little positive in the 1680s and 1690s. The recent D. Goodman, *Spanish Naval Power 1589–1665. Reconstruction and Defeat* (Cambridge 1997), stops at 1665, but admits that there is no compelling reason for this. Many of these issues are discussed more fully in C. Storrs, 'The Army of Lombardy and the resilience of Spanish Power in Italy 1665–1700', *War in History*, Vol. 4 (1998), 371ff.

13. For these institutions, cf. E. Schäfer, *El Consejo Real y Supremo de las Indias*, 2 vols. (Seville 1935–47), I.A.A. Thompson, *War and Government in Habsburg Spain 1560–1620* (London 1976) and F. Barrios, *El Consejo de Estado de la Monarquía Española 1521–1812* (Madrid 1984).

14. Some of the concerns discussed in the present paragraph were articulated in the consulta of the Council of the Indies of 12 Feb. 1699, in Archivo General de Indias/Audiencia de Panamá [henceforth AGI/Panamá], legajo 160, printed in Hart, *Disaster of Darien*, op. cit., Appendix XIII, 251ff. and in Carlos II's instructions to Admiral Navarrete of May 1700, for his expedition against the second wave of Scottish settlement at Darien, in Museo Naval de Madrid, Navarrete Collection, Papeles correspondientes a la expedición del Darien [henceforth MN/Navarrete/Darien]. I should like to thank the Museo Naval for supplying a photocopy of this invaluable document. On prestige as a factor in Spanish policy,

cf. the review article by J.H. Elliott, 'A Question of Reputation? Spanish Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth Century', *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 55 (1983), 475ff. (although it deals with the period before 1665).

15. For Portobelo as the bulwark of Spanish empire in central America and beyond, cf. Anon., 'Copia Legal de Carta Escrita (por persona desapasionada, practica y inteligente) a confidente de Madrid, en razon de la poblacion de Escoceses en el Darien: operaciones executadas por los Ministros de su Magestad Catholica, desde que hizieron los enemigos su primer arrivo, hasta que por Capitulaciones, fueron desalojados: Todo con distincion, y claridad', Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, MS 19512 [henceforth Copia Legal]. I should like to thank the Biblioteca Nacional for supplying a photocopy of this (incomplete) Spanish account of the Darien episode. Don José may have been unduly pessimistic, but such pessimism was widespread and his fears were not completely unfounded: in 1680 English raiders had sacked Portobelo and crossed the isthmus of Darien to embark on buccaneering activity in the Pacific, Hussey, op. cit., 350. This traumatic episode was a constant term of reference among Spanish policymakers dealing with the Scots incursion in 1698–9.

16. The system of exploitation by monopoly and convoy is usefully described in Lynch, op cit., 187ff., Ward, op. cit., 19ff. and H. Kamen, op cit. 131ff. (including table of *flotas* and *galeones*). Spanish government finance in this period has not been as exhaustively studied as before 1665. Nevertheless, M. Garzón Pareja, *La Hacienda de Carlos II* (Madrid 1980), C. Sanz Ayán, *Los Banqueros de Carlos II*, (Valladolid 1988), and J.A. Sánchez Belén, *La política fiscal en Castilla durante el reinado de Carlos II* (Madrid 1996) are all useful, while in English the contribution of American bullion to Spain's international defence commitments is clarified in Kamen, op. cit., 131ff. In late 1693 Spanish ministers saw the *flota* (and its cargo), then en route to Spain, as the only means to fund a striking increase in Spain's army of more than 40,000 men for 1694; Alexander Stanhope to the Earl of Nottingham, 4 and 11 Nov. 1693, Madrid, SP 94/73 f.233 and 234.

17. The city of Darien was founded by one of the first conquistadores, Balboa, Parry, op. cit, 29. Spanish policy-makers certainly feared the local Indians would aid the Scots, consulta of Council of Indies, 12 Feb. 1699 (above), and were right to do so: Hart, *Disaster of Darien*, op. cit., 72–3.

18. That the English were inspired in this way by the initial Scots success is suggested by the Spanish ambassador, the Marqués de Canales, to Carlos II, 22 Feb. 1699, London, Archivo General de Simanecas, Council of State [henceforth AGS/Estado], legajo 3971.

19. The subject needs further investigation, but there are hints of the existence of some sort of public opinion in Spain, one responsive to foreign and imperial questions. Kamen, op. cit., 328ff. is the best English-language study of Spanish politics in this period. However, the present author would take issue with Kamen's view, articulated in *The War Of Succession in Spain 1700–1715* (London 1969), 26–7, that many Spaniards, regarded the larger Monarchy as a burden, willingly abandoned. On the contrary, defeat abroad probably fuelled a sense that things must improve and the struggle for power in Madrid. Cf. Maura, op. cit., 597–8, on the way the news of the Scots abandonment of their first colonizing attempt (below) headed off dangerous 'murmuradores antiministeriales' in Madrid. For the way the bread riots in Madrid of April 1699 (the most serious in early-modern Spain between the Comunero revolt of the 1520s and the Esquilache riots of 1766)

could become part of the power struggle at Court, cf. L.A. Ribot García, 'La España de Carlos II', in Molas Ribalta, ed., *Historia de España Menéndez Pidal*, op. cit., 130ff. and T. Egido, 'El mótín madrileño de 1699', *Investigaciones Históricas*, Vol. 2 (1980), 253ff.

20. Parry, op. cit., 330, and Burkholder and Johnson, op. cit., 150–1. This is not to ignore the strengthening of Panama's defences, particularly after the buccaneering attacks of Morgan (1668, 1671) and others, Ward, op. cit., 174–5. In 1697 the French had briefly seized Cartagena: A McFarlane, *Colombia before Independence. Economy, Society and Politics under Bourbon Rule*, (Cambridge 1993), 24.

21. Hussey, op. cit., 360.

22. Consulta of Council of Indies, 12 Feb. 1699, AG/Panamá/160, in Hart, *Disaster of Darien*, op. cit., Appendix XIII, 25ff. The royal order of 19 April 1698 regarding Pensacola and details of both the expedition to Pensacola and the arrival of Zavala's reinforcement are in the Viceroy's subsequent account, written at the end of 1699, of his conduct regarding the *flota*, in AGI/México/66. I should like to thank the AGI for supplying a photocopy of this report. For Zavala, cf. also Copia Legal, p. 7. For Spain's Atlantic defence system, cf. Lynch, op. cit., 187 and C.R. Phillips, *Six Galleons for the King of Spain. Imperial Defense in the Early Seventeenth Century*, (Baltimore 1986), 8ff. and passim.

23. Moctezuma to Carlos II, 14 July 1699, México, AGI/México/61, in Hart, *Disaster of Darien*, op. cit., Appendix XXI, 299ff. For Havana's role in Spain's transatlantic system throughout the early modern era, cf. J.R. McNeill, *Atlantic Empires of France and Spain, Louisburg and Havana 1700–1763* (Chapel Hill 1985), 85ff.

24. The story is narrated by Canillas himself, ibid. to Carlos II, 6 May 1699, Panamá, AGI/Panamá/162, in Hart, *Disaster of Darien*, op. cit., Appendix XVI, 261ff.; and by the Viceroy of New Spain, with copies of relevant letters, in AGI/México/66, cf. also Copia Legal, p. 4–5. (This is, in many respects, an apologia for Canillas); and J. Prebble, *The Darien Disaster* (London 1968), 165ff. According to Andrés de Pez to Carlos II, 10 June 1699, Portobelo, AGI/Panamá/160, in Hart, *Disaster of Darien*, op. cit., Appendix XIX, 293ff., who had denuded his ships of men for the abortive land-based assault, the retreat from Darien was further hastened by reports of English ships heading for Portobelo.

25. The argument of the Spanish officer, Don Juan Martínez Retes de la Vega, a veteran of Spain's wars against Louis XIV in Europe (he had served under William III during Louis XIV's so-called Dutch War) for abandoning the attack on the Scots colony on the grounds that to carry on would waste valuable soldiers (and be counter-productive in the long run), sent with Canillas to Carlos II, 6 May 1699 (above) was typical of the views of Spanish soldiers throughout the Monarchy where conservation was the watchword (and indeed of army officers throughout Europe) and should not be thought of as an unwillingness to fight symbolic of some more fundamental Spanish military decline.

26. P. Haffenden, 'France and England in North America 1689–1713', *NCMH*, Vol. 6, 500.

27. The Viceroy's letter of 28 March 1699 articulating his reasons for prioritizing the Scottish threat is in AGI/México/R3/66. It is briefly listed in Hart, *Spanish Documents*, op. cit., 6.

28. Cf. Moctezuma to Zavala, 20 July 1699, México, AGI/México/61, in Hart, *Disaster of Darien*, Appendix XXIII, 310ff. Zavala eventually left Vera Cruz

for Havana (en route for Darien) at the end of July, Zavala to Carlos II, 28 July 1699, Vera Cruz, AGI/México/61.

29. Cf. AGI/México/66, including reference to Carlos II's order to Moctezuma, 3 April 1699, to despatch promptly the *flota*; and Copia Legal, p. 6.

30. Zavala to Carlos II, 11 Jan. 1700, Cádiz, AGI/México/61, in Hart, *Disaster of Darien*, op. cit., Appendix XXIX, 338.

31. AGI/México/66 includes reference to orders from Carlos II to Moctezuma of 30 April and 13 May 1699, to give absolute priority to supporting the expedition against the Scots; Copia Legal, passim.

32. Cf. memorandum of measures ordered by Carlos II, 30 Oct. 1699, cited earlier.

33. Royal order of 8 June 1699, Archivo General de Simanecas, Guerra y Marina [henceforth AGS/GyM]/legajo 3100, 3114; Navarrete's Instructions, May 1700, MN/Navarrete/Darien. On 29 August 1699 Carlos II ordered the preparation of blank commissions for the two infantry captains (still not named) and one for a named individual as captain of grenadiers, AGS/GyM/3114. Cf., for Andalucía's population, F. Bustelo, 'La Población: del Estancamento a la Recuperación', in P. Molas Ribalta, ed., *Historia de España Menéndez Pidal*, op. cit., 509ff.

34. Carlos II to Don José Pérez de la Puente, 8 June 1699, AGS/GyM/3114.

35. Consulta of Council of War, 15 June 1699, AGS/GyM/3100. Although focusing on the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the following studies nevertheless give a valuable insight into the general structure (and explain the terminology) of Spain's armies: G. Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567–1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries* (Cambridge 1972); R. Quatrefages, 'The Military System of the Spanish Habsburgs', in R. Banon Martínez and T.M. Barker, eds, *Armed Forces and Society in Spain Past and Present* (Columbia 1988), and L. Ribot García, 'El Ejército de los Austria. Aportaciones Recientes y Nuevas Perspectivas', *Pedralbes*, Vol. 3 (1983), 89ff. For a rare study of one later seventeenth-century Spanish army, cf. Storrs, op. cit.

36. Maura, op. cit., 574–5.

37. Cf. memorandum of measures ordered by Carlos II, 30 Oct. 1699, in earlier note.

38. Cf. Navarrete's instructions, May 1700, MN/Navarrete/Darien, para. 14ff. and the account of Salmón's force in C. Fernández Duro, *La Armada Española desde la Unión de los Reinos de Castilla y de Aragón*, 9 vols (Madrid 1894–1903), vol. 5, 300ff. Monclova's three-year term as Viceroy having expired, he was due to be replaced in the summer of 1699 by the Conde de Eril, a creature of Carlos II's queen. However, in view of the Darien crisis, and Monclova's experience and ability (he had been Governor of Oran when that place was under Moorish attack from 1681), his tenure was extended for another three years; Maura, op. cit., 575. In early July 1699, Carlos II ordered the preparation of blank commissions, for the senior military posts of *maestre de campo general, general de artillería* and *sargento general*, to be sent to the Viceroy of Peru for the force he was preparing, AGS/GyM/3114.

39. Cf. Memorandum of measures ordered by Carlos II, 30 Oct. 1699 (above) and consulta of 29 June 1699, AGS/GyM/3114. The general system of recruiting, and its organization, is well described by Thompson, op. cit., 107ff.

40. Cf. Carlos II to Secretary of Guerra de Tierra, 16 August 1699, AGS/GyM/3114, approving attached consulta of *Junta de Guerra de Indias* on the supply of bombs for the Darien expedition and ordering the Council of War to give the necessary orders. For Navarrete's earlier career, cf. Navarrete to [Philip V of Spain?], 12 June 1703, Cádiz, MN/Navarrete/Darien.

41. Consulta of 8 Oct. 1699, AGI/Panamá/161 f. 443ff. For the composition of ships' crews, cf. Phillips, op. cit., 140ff.

42. Cf. consulta of 18 March 1699, on letter from Don Bernardo de Quiros, Spanish minister at the Hague, reporting a Dutch offer to build ships for the Spanish fleet, AGS/GyM/3906.

43. AGS/GyM legajo 3114. Cf. memorandum of measures ordered by Carlos II to eject the Scots at Darien, 30 Oct. 1699, Madrid, AGI/Panamá/161, in Hart, *Disaster of Darien*, Appendix XXVIII, 322ff. (at p. 327). On the wide use of privateers, cf. J.S. Bromley and A.N. Ryan, 'Navies', *NCMH*, Vol. 6, 790ff. There is little in print on Spanish privateering, but E. Otero Lana, *Los Corsarios españoles durante la decadencia de los Austrias. El Corso español del Atlántico peninsular en el siglo XVII (1621–97)* (Madrid 1992) is a good introduction to the subject. On the 'privatization' of warfare by governments, cf. I.A.A. Thompson, op. cit., passim.

44. Order of Carlos II, 22 June 1699, AGS/GyM/3114 and memorandum of measures ordered by Carlos II, 30 Oct. 1699 (above). For the poor state of Spanish shipbuilding ca. 1640s, cf. Lynch, op. cit., 186; and in the 1690s, Kamen, *War of Succession*, op. cit., and G.J. Walker, *Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade 1700–1789* (London 1979), 94. For a more positive view, cf. Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century*, op. cit., 115. Phillips, op. cit., an account of the building of six vessels for Philip IV in the Basque shipyards in the 1620s, is also useful. Despite its general argument there is evidence of an upturn in (from?) the 1660s in Goodman, op. cit., 136–7 and Appendix D. Cf., also, ibid., 140 and 144 for efforts under Carlos II to ensure greater Spanish self-sufficiency in naval supplies. Generally, on the Spanish navy in this period, cf. C. Fernández Duro, op. cit., vol. 5, passim.

45. Early modern Spanish Africa is another sphere which still awaits its historian, but cf. F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (London 1975), passim; R. Pike, *Penal Servitude in Early Modern Spain* (Wisconsin 1983), with a useful map of the whole, 42; and J. Mathiex, 'The Mediterranean', *NCMH*, Vol. 6, 554. In 1681 the Governor of Oran had perished, with nearly all of his 300 infantry and 150 cavalry, on a punitive expedition against Moorish raiders, Maura, op. cit., 274.

46. Stanhope to Nottingham, 22 July 1693, Madrid, SP94/73 f. 180; same to Hopkins, 11 May 1695, and to Vernon, 13 and 27 July 1695, all Madrid, SP94/74 f. 30, 41 and 43.

47. For the French king's offer, 1698 and the response of the Council of State (which was divided on the matter), and the resort to Portugal, cf. Maura, op. cit., 526–7 and 563. The Spanish king was also able to reject Louis XIV's offers of help to expel the Scots from Darien, made via the Pope and the *nuncio* in Madrid, by referring to the Scots first evacuation, Carlos II to Pope Innocent XII, Oct. 1699, San Lorenzo (del Escorial), AGSE/Estado/3091.

48. Cf. various consultas in AGS/GyM/3099 and AGS/Estado/4044. A very good idea of Spain's many commitments (and the rapid switch of units from one theatre to another) at this juncture is given by the brief individual regimental

histories in Soto de Clonard, *Historia Orgánica de las Armas de Infantería y Caballería Españolas desde la Creación del Ejército Permanente hasta el día*, 16 vols. (Madrid 1851–62), esp. vol. 8.

49. Consultas of 7 Sept. 1699, AGS/GyM/3115 and of 18 Sept. 1699, AGS/GyM/3101.

50. Cf. consulta of 8 Oct. 1699, AGI/Panamá/161 f. 443ff. The captains were promised 10 escudos for the first 10 recruits presented at Cadiz, 15 escudos for the next 10, 18 escudos for an additional 20 (which would take their companies to 40 men), 25 escudos for the next 20, and 30 escudos for the 40 men who should bring their companies up to 100 men.

51. Cf. consulta of 23 Dec. 1699 for Carlos II's decision (on earlier *consulta* of 21 Oct. 1699) to use vagabonds on the Darien expedition, and the despatch of appropriate orders to the President of the Chancillería of Granada, governors and corregidores, AGS/GyM/3909. (It was pointed out that 300 vagabonds were already being levied for Ceuta.)

52. Carlos II to Marqués de Villadarias and to Duke of Albuquerque, 16 Oct. 1699, San Lorenzo, and Carlos II to Don Pedro Fernández Navarrete, Almirante General of the Armada del Mar Oceano, 21 Oct. 1699, all in AGS/GyM/3908.

53. Cf. Duke of Alburquerque to Carlos II, 29 Nov. 1699, Puerto de Santa María, AGS/GyM/3913; and Don Antonio Ortiz de Otalora to Conde de la Corzana, 4 Dec. 1699, AGS/GyM/3911; and the map of Andalucía (indicating these territories) in P. Pierson, *Commander of the Armada. The Seventh Duke of Medina Sidonia* (Yale 1989), 2.

54. Navarrete to Don Antonio Ortiz de Otalora, 25 Oct. 1699, Cádiz, AGS/GyM/39.

55. Consulta of 1 July 1699, AGS/GyM/Mar/3906. In 1607 Philip III had ordered the compilation of a register of seamen in Guipúzcoa, a measure extended to the rest of Spain in 1625, partly to facilitate the supply of sailors for the royal fleets. However, this system, the so-called *matrícula de mar*, does not seem to have worked entirely effectively before it was overhauled in the eighteenth century, cf. A. O'Dogherty, 'La Matrícula de Mar en el Reinado de Carlos III', *Anuario de Estudios Americanos*, Vol. 9 (1952), 347ff., G. Desdevises du Dezert, *La España del Antiguo Régimen* (Madrid 1989), 504ff. and Goodman, op. cit., 181ff. A full modern study of the *matrícula* is to be desired.

56. Cf. consulta of 19 Dec. 1699, AGS/GyM/3906, on letter from Marqués de Astorga, Governor of Galicia, about the levy of crews for the four vessels in Galicia.

57. Consultas of 17 Oct. 1699, AGS/GyM/3906, 20 Oct. 1699, AGI/Panamá/161 f. 560; and 26 Nov. 1699, AGI/Panamá/165 f. 679; Navarrete to [?], 19 Nov. 1699, Cádiz, AGS/GyM/3914. In 1694–5 the English and Dutch fleets had wintered at Cadiz, partly because of its dockyard facilities, J. Ehrman, *The Navy in the War of William III* (Cambridge 1953), 526.

58. Cf. consulta on state of preparation of Navarrete's force, 26 Jan. 1700, AGI/Panamá/164 f. 87ff.

59. Cf. account of costs of providing for Don Jorge de Villalonga's *tercio* until its departure, enclosed with Duke of Alburquerque to Carlos II, 29 Nov. 1699, Puerto de Santa María, AGS/GyM/3913.

60. Cf. Garzón Pareja, op. cit., passim.; Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century*, op. cit., 357ff.

61. Consulta of 28 June 1699, AGS/GyM/3114.

62. In 1699 Madrid was applying substantial sums for the fortifications of Cadiz, Gibraltar and its north African *presidios*, cf. various consultas in AGS/GyM/3099. In July 1700, all assignations of funds from the so-called *Cruzada* revenues (i.e. the government's share of the proceeds of the sale of papal bulls) were suspended on the grounds of the needs of the besieged Ceuta (as part of a larger effort to raise funds for military needs in Catalonia, Guipúzcoa, north Africa and so on), Maura, op. cit., 632–3.

63. For donatives, cf. I.A.A. Thompson, 'Castile: Polity, Fiscality and Fiscal Crisis', in P.T. Hoffman and K. Norberg, eds, *Fiscal Crises, Liberty and Representative Government 1450–1789* (Stanford 1994), 174. In this and in his 'Castile: Absolutism, Constitutionalism and Liberty', ibid., Thompson sees the abandonment of its Great Power pretensions by the Castilian Crown as a key to explaining the fiscal and political/constitutional history of Carlos II's reign, for example making reform affordable. I would argue, however, that its continued Great Power pretensions pushed the Castilian Crown in the direction of changes aimed at raising funds for defence purposes. This was not least because, although revenue may have fallen from about 24 million ducats (1665) to about 20 million during Carlos' reign as a whole, expenditure could (e.g. in 1674, during the so-called Dutch War, and when Spain was also having to deal with a serious revolt in Sicily) soar to 23 million ducats (the highest figure since 1504 in Thompson's table, published ibid., 157–8). Many (but not, of course, all) of the 'reforms' identified in Sánchez Belén, op. cit., passim, were effected during the many wars of Carlos II's reign and should above all be regarded as wartime fiscal devices.

64. Sánchez Belén, op. cit., 275. This sort of bargaining between the Crown and those sectors of Castilian society with wealth to tap is clearly one factor in the effective demise of the Castilian Cortes in the reign of Carlos II. Of the total, 200,000 would only be supplied when the ships' crews and troops were to be paid (i.e. when the expedition was about to leave).

65. Cf. memorandum of measures ordered by Carlos II, 30 Oct. 1699 (above) and consulta of 4 Nov. 1699, on Navarrete's letter of 25 Oct. 1699, AGS/GyM/3911. According to Maura, op. cit., 596, 80,000 of the 300,000 pesos were diverted by a needy government to fund a royal *jornada* (or excursion) to the Escorial in the autumn of 1699 following Carlos II's 'bewitching'. Just how is not clear.

66. Consulta of 6 Nov. 1699, AGS/GyM/3101.

67. Cf consulta on state of preparation of Navarrete's force, 26 Jan. 1700, AGI/Panamá/164 f. 87ff.

68. It is worth noting in this respect, however, not least for the insight it offers into perceptions in Madrid of the relationships between the Iberian realms which formed part of the Habsburg Monarchy, that Carlos II's ministers were sceptical of the claim that England and Scotland were distinct realms (and that the English should not be punished for the misdemeanours of the Scots), comparing the relationship to that between Aragon and Castile. According to Spanish policy-makers, an international agreement concluded by Carlos II (i.e. a peace treaty with the King of England) was binding on all their realms (Aragon and Castile in the case of the former, England and Scotland in that of the latter): consulta of Council of Indies, 16 May 1699, on memoire received from William III's envoy, Alexander Stanhope, and on despatches received from Carlos II's minister in London,

AGI/Panamá/161, in Hart, *Disaster of Darien*, op. cit., Appendix XVIII, 285ff.

69. Despite its impressive range and its extensive documentary legacy at Simancas (or perhaps because of this) Spanish diplomacy in this period has hardly been studied. However, a number of younger Spanish scholars are showing interest in it. Cf. Storrs, op. cit, 371ff.

70. Cf. consulta of Council of State, of 15 March 1696, on Canales' report from London, of 1 Jan. 1696, on formation of Darien Company, AGS/Estado/3970. He feared that once they had established a foothold in the Spanish dominions the Scots would be difficult to dislodge.

71. Cf. consultas of Council of State of 3 August 1697 on Canales' letter of 9 July 1697, and of 1 March 1699 on Canales' letter of 22 Feb. 1699, both in AGS/Estado/3971. (On the latter occasion, the Conde de Frigiliana articulated many of the arguments noted above as to the nature of the threat posed by the Scots at Darien.) Cf. also Canales to Carlos II, 24 Sept. 1699, London, on learning that morning of reports from Jamaica of the Scots having abandoned Darien, AGS/Estado/3971. There are very brief details of other diplomatic despatches in Hart, *Spanish Documents*, op. cit., passim. Canales' remarks on the character of the Scots (and English) represent one of the few general assessments of the Scots by one of those involved in countering the Darien threat. Copia Legal, p. 1, also includes a number of rather pejorative observations, on the 'insatiable ambition', 'depraved spirit' and desire for gain of the Scots, which seem to be inspired more by the author's reaction to Darien than to any real knowledge or understanding of the Scots.

72. Cf. D. Antonio Navarro to [?], 16 August 1697, AGI/Panamá/159 f. 658, reporting the Scots purchase of ships in Hamburg.

73. Cf. consulta of Council of State, 24 Nov. 1699, on two letters from Bazán, Carlos II's envoy to the Court of Duke Victor Amadeus II of Savoy at Turin, AGS/Estado/3660, 129, 130, 131. The Duke of Savoy's own diplomats provide interesting insights into the complexities of Anglo–Spanish relations in the wake of the Darien attempt. According to his minister in London, a libel published there venting Scots grievances against William over Darien was attributed by some to the Spanish ambassador. Canales was said to be hoping in this way to distract William from the partition negotiations (above); conte di Pieta to Victor Amadeus, 1 Oct. 1699, London, AST/LM/Gran Bretagna, m 86.

74. Maura, op. cit., 575.

75. Cf. AGI/Panamá/159, 162, passim.

76. Consulta of Council of State of 8 and 20 August 1699, AGS/Estado/3091; and of 15 Sept. 1699, AGS/Estado/3091, on request of nuncio that Carlos II appoint the clergy who must oversee the levy. Since the Pope did not believe that the Scots' initial evacuation of Darien in the summer of 1699, was the end of the matter (exhorting Carlos II to ensure no possibility of their return), that evacuation did not affect the ecclesiastical subsidy, consulta of Council of State, 24 Dec. 1699, AGS/Estado/3091. These representations are clearly those mentioned in Carlos II's letter to the Marqués del Carpio, summarized in Hart, *Spanish Documents*, op. cit., 14. A fuller study of the papal reaction to the Darien affair is to be desired. The decision of the Seville merchant community to advance 300,000 pesos in the summer of 1699 was founded in part on the hope of being repaid out of this subsidy.

77. AGI/Panamá/182 f. 388ff.

78. Carlos II to Navarrete, April 1700, AGI/Panamá/182 f. 542ff. Not entirely surprisingly, the Cádiz authorities sought to be exempted (at least in part) from the levy (or repartimiento), which inevitably reduced the availability of men to crew merchant vessels and so the port's business, AGI/Panamá/182 f. 634ff.

79. Maura, op. cit., 624–5. Cf., also, Ribot García, op. cit., 151–2.

80. Navarrete's instructions, May 1700, MN/Navarrete/Darien; and account of ships, crews and troops, AGI/Panamá/165 f. 611ff. (Of course, few official statistics in this era should be taken completely at face value.) For the provisions carried by Navarrete's expedition, cf. Navarrete to Carlos II, 19 June 1700, off Cádiz, MN/Navarrete/Darien. On the issue of victualling, a massive and time consuming task in its own right, cf. generally Goodman, op. cit., 151ff.

81. Cf. Navarrete to Carlos II, 19 June 1700, off Cádiz, MN/Navarrete/Darien, complaining of the violent behaviour of many of the new recruits and lamenting his lack of veterans.

82. For these plans cf. consulta of Council of Indies, 12 Feb. 1699, AGI/Panamá/160, in Hart, *Disaster of Darien*, op. cit., Appendix XIII, 253.

83. Carlos II to Governor and Captain General of Province of Tierra Firme, and President of Audiencia in Panama, and same to Governor and Captain General of island of Trinidad and of Guyana, 14 May 1700, MN/Navarrete/Darien. Similar letters were sent to the President of Santo Domingo and the Governors of Caracas, Puerto Rico, Maracaibo and Santa María.

84. Navarrete to Philip V, 17 March 1701, Cádiz, MN/Navarrete/Darien.

85. Cf. Pimienta's campaign diary, and Canillas to Carlos II, 14 April 1700, AGI/Panamá/164, both in Hart, *Disaster of Darien*, op. cit., Appendix XXXI, 353 ff. and XXXIII, 396ff.; Copia Legal, p. 13; Barbour, op. cit., 145ff.; Ward, op. cit., 178 (and references). The Viceroy of Peru had not reached Panama in time to lead the expedition.

86. Cf. Don Antonio de Ubilla to Navarrete, 27 July 1700, Madrid, MN/Navarrete/Darien, enclosing Carlos II's orders to return to Spain (thus preventing his carrying out the other parts of his mission, outlined in his original instructions) on news of the Scots' final withdrawal from Darien; and Navarrete to Carlos II, 27 Oct. 1700, Cartagena and 17 March 1701, Cádiz, MN/Navarrete/Darien. For a very brief account, cf. Fernández Duro, op. cit., Vol. 5, 300ff.

87. They did not compare with the armada of 56 ships, carrying 12,463, men sent in 1625 to deal with the more serious threat represented by the Dutch incursion in Brazil, Goodman, op. cit., 21, to say nothing of course of that sent against England in 1588. In 1688, William of Orange and the Dutch Republic had mounted an expedition against England of even greater dimensions than that of Philip II, J.I. Israel, 'The Dutch Role in the English Revolution of 1688/9', ibid., ed., *The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Background and World Impact of the British Revolutions of 1688–9* (Cambridge 1991), passim.

88. According to Maura, op. cit., 635, Louis XIV was so impressed by the preparation of Navarrete's expedition that he mistakenly believed that it was intended to carry to Spain one of the Austrian Habsburg Archdukes (rivals of his own grandsons for the Spanish Succession).

89. The first *flota* since 1698 reached Cadiz in March 1701 with a rich cargo of silver and colonial goods, H. Kamen, *War of Succession*, op. cit., 178–9. The appropriateness of the response has to be qualified by the observation that, at least

initially, the Spaniards greatly exaggerated the strength of the Scots: cf. Hart, *Disaster of Darien*, op. cit., 97 and passim.

90. Cf. Storrs, op. cit., passim.

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