

# The future of revolutions at the *fin-de-siècle*

JOHN FORAN

Is the era of revolution over? Did it end in 1989? And was that such a long time ago, in any case? It doesn't necessarily seem to be over in places like Mexico (Chiapas), Algeria, Peru or Zaire, and may be just around the corner elsewhere (Egypt?). The discourse of revolution may be changing; the international loci and foci may be moving (with the demise of the Soviet Union and the tentative consolidation of democracies in Latin America); the actors may be changing (with more women and ethnic minorities active; though both have long histories of revolutionary activism)—all of this may be (arguably) true. But this article will argue that revolutions are going to be with us to the end of history, and—*pace* Francis Fukuyama—that is not in sight.

Social revolutions—in Theda Skocpol's now classic sense of 'rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures...accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below'<sup>1</sup>—are in fact relatively rare events by virtue of the deep degree of transformation they require to qualify as such. While the issue of 'how much' transformation is enough to merit the label 'social' is a vexing one, most analysts can agree on the list of twentieth-century social revolutions: Russia 1917, China 1949, Cuba 1959, Nicaragua 1979, Iran 1979 in the first instance; and, arguably, Mexico 1910–20, Vietnam 1945–75, Algeria 1954–62, and Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique in the 1970s, among others, if the definition is relaxed somewhat. (The dates here refer to the making, not aftermaths, of these revolutions, which were, it should be evident, processes more than 'events'.) Even with the more generous list, we have no more than a dozen instances in almost a hundred years, a 'rate' that would not yield quite yet a single further case since the momentous events of 1989 in China and Eastern Europe, themselves not classifiable as successful or quite social, respectively. Thus we shouldn't expect to see a great deal of revolutionary activity at any given time, and the prospects for 'success' (measured by the seizure of state power and the initiation of a project of social transformation) have *always* been poor.

Nevertheless, the question posed by the current craze for 'globalisation' in the social sciences and popular imagination is: has it become harder for revolutions to occur in a world of global corporations and commodity chains, global cultural forms, instantaneous communication and swift travel, the collapse of socialism, and a no longer bipolar political arrangement? This is the question which the present article will take up, employing a theory of the origins of Third World

social revolutions to date. The task is to explore the predictive utility of the comparative–historical revolutionary record, and to reflect on the current conjuncture in the light of the elements of this theory.<sup>2</sup> We shall do so by undertaking a brief survey of a number of current and quite recent instances of non-attempts at revolution, actual uprisings, one successful political revolution,<sup>3</sup> and several potential revolutions in Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Further reflections on the current conjuncture will be taken up in the conclusion.

### Theories of Third World social revolutions<sup>4</sup>

The study of social revolutions, and Third World revolutions, has taken a great leap forward since the 1979 publication of Theda Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions*, a structuralist *tour de force* that showed how international pressures could combine with state and class arrangements to produce political crises. Walter Goldfrank, John Walton, Jeff Goodwin, Theda Skocpol, Farideh Farhi, Timothy Wickham-Crowley and Jack Goldstone and his collaborators, among others, have produced important studies of sets of particular Third World cases.<sup>5</sup> These perspectives have all advocated multi-causal approaches to revolutions. The question today has become: what particular mix of causes is most useful as an explanation across (which) cases? All of the above theorists have emphasised structural approaches to revolution, often at the expense of agency and culture (Farhi has done the most with culture in this group). Many—including Goodwin, Skocpol, and Wickham-Crowley—have placed great emphasis on the particular kind of state that is most vulnerable to revolution, often at the cost of paying less attention to social structure and the economy. Gradually a consensus has emerged that both external and internal factors are at work, but in what ways and to what degree is not yet settled.

My own work draws on a number of the specific insights of this latest generation of scholars, but with its own particular synthesis that insists on balancing attention to such perennial dichotomies as structure and agency, political economy and culture, state and social structure, internal and external factors. Elsewhere I have argued that five interrelated causal factors must combine in a given conjuncture to produce a successful social revolution: 1) dependent development; 2) a repressive, exclusionary, personalist state; 3) the elaboration of effective and powerful political cultures of resistance, and a revolutionary crisis consisting of 4) an economic downturn, and 5) a world-systemic opening (a let-up of external controls).<sup>6</sup> Let us briefly examine each of these factors in turn.

The concept of dependent development, taken from the work of Latin American scholars Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, is a process that may be characterised as one of 'growth within limits': It refers to certain Third World economies, at certain moments in their history, that undergo both development—as measured by increases in GNP, foreign trade, industrial or agricultural output—combined with the negative consequences of the attendant social transformation in the form of inflation, debt, growing inequality, or overburdened housing and educational infrastructures, among others.<sup>7</sup> This

complex process defines a changing social structure that generates a few winners and many losers, giving rise to social and economic grievances among diverse sectors of the population, ranging from the urban working, middle, and under-classes, to rural peasants, farmers, and workers, crossing gender and ethnic lines as well. Both classic dependency and underdevelopment (as in much of the Third World), or real development (as in parts of east Asia), are less likely to produce such social dislocation.

The repressive, exclusionary, personalist state which so often (but not always) accompanies dependent development reposes on the combination of repression of lower-class forces and exclusion of both the growing middle classes and the economic elite from political participation. Such states possess an elective affinity for dependent development because they are good at guaranteeing order, at least for a time, but they also tend to exacerbate conflictual relations between state and civil society.<sup>8</sup> Dictators, particularly of the dynastic variety (either by monarchic succession or imposition of new generations) or of long-lived duration (whether through patently fraudulent elections or other means), epitomise this personalist type of rule. They fuel the grievances generated by dependent development, often alienating the upper classes from the state, and provide a solid target for social movements from below. Because of this, under certain circumstances, they facilitate the formation of a broad, multi-class alliance against the state, because middle and even upper classes may join with lower classes, feeling less threat of being overturned along with the state. Conversely, collective military rule, or rule by the military as an institution, especially when given a veneer of legitimation through regular elections, however fraudulent, tends to elicit more elite support and provide a less vulnerable target for cross-class social movements.

For this to occur, an opposition must coalesce. To capture the ideological dimension of this intervention of human agents onto the historical stage, I have developed the notion of 'political cultures of opposition and resistance' in my previous work.<sup>9</sup> To move from the structural determinants of the grievances produced by dependent development and the repressive, exclusionary, personalist state, broad segments of many groups and classes must be able to articulate the experiences they are living through into effective and flexible analyses capable of mobilising their own forces and building coalitions with others. Such political cultures of opposition may draw upon diverse sources: formal ideologies, folk traditions and popular idioms, ranging from ideas and feelings of nationalism (against control by outsiders), to socialism (economic equality and social justice), democracy (demands for participation and an end to dictatorship), religion (resistance to evil and suffering), and the like. Different groups, classes and actors will embrace complex combinations of these, sometimes weaving them into critiques of the regime with great mobilisational potential. How well these multiple political cultures are capable of bringing together diverse sectors into a broad and unified opposition, I shall argue, may spell the difference between success and failure. In any case, this factor insists on the irreducible role played by human agency and meaning in the making (or not) of revolutions.

The final element in the model is the emergence of a revolutionary crisis that both weakens the state and emboldens the opposition. This has two




FIGURE 1  
**Model of Third World Social Revolutions.**

determinants, one partly internal and the other external. Students of revolution from Alexis de Tocqueville to James Davies have insisted that economic downturns on the eve of revolutions sharpen existing grievances past breaking point.<sup>10</sup> Recent scholars have disputed this point, both for their general models and in particular cases.<sup>11</sup> I have found that it is present in virtually all successful cases.<sup>12</sup> When this factor is combined with a ‘world-systemic opening’ for change, a powerful conjuncture arises for revolutionary movements to succeed (this leaves open the question of the precise timing of such crises, which may precede or follow revolutionary mobilisation, but do seem to precede the taking of power). Such an opening refers to the letting up of external controls by the dominant outside power; it may be the result of distraction in the core economies by world war or depression, rivalries between one or more core powers, mixed messages sent to Third World dictators, or divided foreign policy when faced with an insurrection.<sup>13</sup>

The combination of all five of these factors makes for a favourable climate in which may thrive the sort of broad coalitions that fuel successful social revolutions. Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual schema just described.

My previous work has found these factors in the cases of the Mexican, Cuban, Nicaraguan and Iranian revolutions.<sup>14</sup> A subsequent study attempted to extend the model to the anti-colonial cases and instances of shorter-lived social revolutions (looking for broad similarities), and to contrast these with several types of ‘failure’ (failed attempts, reversals of revolution, political revolutions, and no attempt), looking for significant patterns among these types.<sup>15</sup> All of these failures or other forms of revolution lack at least one of the factors in the model.

The challenge now is to extend this solidly grounded comparative–historical analysis in a more speculative direction still, by looking at the contemporary situations that are most relevant to testing its hypothesised causal features. We shall do this by taking up four sets of cases in turn: 1) non-attempts at revolution in cases where one or more of the causes are present (Iraq since 1991, Zaire before 1996, Iran, Egypt, Cuba and the subtypes they represent); 2) unsuccessful revolutionary uprisings (Peru’s Shining Path, the Islamist movement in Algeria, and, in the not so distant past, China’s Tiananmen Square episode and the

uprisings in Iraq in 1991); 3) the recent *political* revolution in Zaire; and 4) a revolution-in-progress that may suggest the outlines of a somewhat new type of social transformational movement (the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico).

### **No attempt: the reasons why**

Let us begin this survey of the revolutionary present with a look at five situations where countries possess both a history of political agitation or instability and a number of the factors identified by the model as contributing to revolutionary outbreaks. This will serve to highlight the importance of various other factors which may be lacking or incompletely developed in each case, as well as suggest the conditions which would have to obtain for future revolutions to occur. This exercise will reveal the special salience of political cultures of opposition and the international conjuncture.

#### *Zaire and Iraq: dictatorship and (in)stability*

Iraq under Saddam Hussein and Zaire under Joseph Mobutu Sese Seko present exclusionary personalist regimes of the first order.<sup>16</sup> In Zaire, Mobutu presided for more than three decades over a process of growing deterioration and poverty.<sup>17</sup> When I first drafted this article in 1996, I noted that an exclusionary state and economic downturns, particularly in the last three years, would seem to favour Mobutu's ouster.<sup>18</sup> I argued that, while this could indeed come at any time, it was not likely to be the result of a social revolution, given the limits of economic development and disunity of the opposition. Development in Zaire has at no historical moment been of the order that the term 'dependent development' requires: since Mobutu gained control in 1965, there has been limited industrialisation, negative economic growth and little foreign investment outside the mineral enclave.<sup>19</sup> The international conjuncture is not to be overlooked, either. While increasingly unpopular in the Western circles which sponsored his rise and rule (Britain, France, the USA), Mobutu hung onto power into 1997 despite ever more widespread human rights abuses of the population generally and the opposition in particular. Here is one case where the difficulties of constructing an effective oppositional political culture, coupled with sheer underdevelopment, until late in 1996 precluded a revolution where we might otherwise expect one to occur.<sup>20</sup> Again, in early 1996, I predicted: this does not preclude the emergence of an effective civil opposition to the dictatorship; rather it highlights the importance of it for success. Unless such a formula is found and such an opposition articulates a political culture capable of galvanising the population and gaining international support or at least neutrality, the future would seem to hold further repression under Mobutu or the limited change that a military coup would bring. I shall discuss the recent events in Zaire later in this paper.

A surprisingly similar case is presented by Iraq, a far more developed economic, military and political power. Indeed the presence of a marked degree of dependent development in Iraq since the rise of Saddam Hussein in 1979 and indeed for a decade or more before that, adds another of the features that the model requires for a revolution to occur and succeed. Iraq clearly stands among

the most educated, urbanised, industrialised and dynamic societies and economies of the Middle East over the whole period since the political revolution that overthrew the monarchy in 1958.<sup>21</sup> The rise of Saddam Hussein eventually crystallised what had been a collective exclusionary state into a personalist one.<sup>22</sup> Diverse political cultures of opposition exist in Iraq, including the long-standing Kurdish nationalist insurgency of the north and west, the militant Shi'ism of segments of the south around Basra and the shrine town of Karbala, and a struggling liberal reformist strand that would like to see a return to democracy. But, even during the intense international and internal crises provoked by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the US-led Allied response to it, the regime stood firm. The weaknesses of the opposition showed most clearly after most of the Iraqi army was crushed in the retreat from Kuwait in March 1991, and the rebellions in the south and in Kurdistan, while vigorous and determined, were unable to unite the centre of the country or coordinate their plans and visions for a post-Hussein Iraq. (Indeed their visions may have been rather more for a division of Iraq into several new states.) The remnants of the Iraqi army ruthlessly crushed the Shi'ite rebels in the south while the USA stood by (the world-systemic opening had quickly closed), then isolated and eventually contained the Kurdish threat after that. Despite the long-standing international blockade and a fairly severe internal economic downturn,<sup>23</sup> Saddam Hussein remains in power today in large measure because the opposition has been utterly unable to find a basis for unity and effective organisation of a nationwide resistance. The future appears to hold more of the same, unless the post-Mobutu Zaire scenario holds for Iraq too of a military putsch against the dictatorship, an outcome apparently favoured by US policy makers since March 1991.<sup>24</sup>

### *Iran and Egypt: repressive tolerance*

Even more remote from successful revolutionary challenge would seem to be the other Middle Eastern dependent developers of Iran and (arguably) Egypt. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, itself the product of a revolution against the shah (see the analogy with Cuba below), the political economy is a definite instance of dependent development, as it was under the shah since the early 1960s: the country has been and remains a regional economic giant with feet of clay. Urbanisation, rising GNP and oil-fuelled growth continue to produce only hardship for much of the urban and most of the rural population. The regime, however, has created a set of sturdy political institutions that have successfully outlived the charismatic Ayatollah Khomeini who, even as supreme religious authority from 1979 to his death in 1989, could not qualify as an exclusionary personalist ruler. This is not to deny that the rules of the political game restrict popular participation, but even the government's critics must acknowledge the ability of the regime to involve enough of the population in the process to make widespread opposition difficult.<sup>25</sup> The opposition draws on elements of Marxism (the Tudeh and Fada'ian), Islamic radicalism (the Mujahidin), secular and (yes) religious liberalisms (the remnants of the National Front and some of the followers of Mehdi Bazargan, respectively) and, at the opposite end of the spectrum, the royalist aspirations of the diehard supporters of the *ancien régime*.

All of the above operate largely in exile. This combination of relatively more inclusive rule and fragmented and dispersed oppositions means that dependent development and its occasional economic downturns, even coupled with international pressure emanating from the USA (and largely mitigated by the willingness of Europe, Japan, China and other countries to invest in and trade with Iran), make the short- and medium-term future look relatively calm, aside from occasional explosions of local popular unrest as have occurred over the course of the post-revolutionary era.<sup>26</sup>

Egypt under Hosni Mubarak is a less solid but nonetheless equally instructive case of the interplay of a government clever enough to legitimate itself without loosening its grip on power and an opposition that, however vigorous, seems thus far incapable of finding a way to build a broad coalition of forces to oppose it.<sup>27</sup> Since the political revolution that brought Gamal Abdal Nasser to power after 1952 Egypt has embarked on a precarious path of dependent development, first with Soviet aid, and then, after the transition to Anwar Sadat, in partnership with the USA. During this period the country has seen vast transformation and attendant upheaval of both the rural and urban social structures. Hosni Mubarak succeeded Sadat after the latter's assassination at the hands of militant Islamists in the army in October 1981,<sup>28</sup> and has controlled the political system since, using elections astutely to maintain his hold on power through the vehicle of the National Democratic Party, and to avoid the outright characterisation of his regime as personalist. Economic downturns have been common enough in the last 15 years; what is lacking in the Egyptian equation for revolution is the sort of united and broad-based opposition that would be required (as in Iraq, Iran and Zaire), as well as any world-systemic opening, given the close relations and extensive aid that have been forthcoming from the USA for over two decades. In terms of political cultures of opposition, the really radical Islamic groups are repressed by the government, but are very popular on university campuses. Egypt is still a secular state, but many people are religious. The appeal of Islam grows, in part because *both* secular alternatives have been discredited: socialism under Nasser and capitalism under Sadat have been tried and have 'failed', or at least been found wanting.

What does the future hold? One scenario—which we might term the 'Eastern European model'—would see the government democratising sufficiently so that the population turns its back on violent strategies for change, but this seems rather remote. Perhaps new social movements, involving students, intellectuals, women in various settings, the urban poor and others hold out a possibility for progressive change in the longer-term future. But the severity of the underlying economic problems is a large question mark hanging over Egypt's future, fuelling Islamic activism in the shantytowns of Cairo and the Delta and the villages of the south.<sup>29</sup> The most likely future therefore is one of further economic deterioration offset by US aid and support, with oppositional unity defused by the secular-religious divide and successfully 'managed' by the ruling party. Egypt, like Iraq above and Algeria below, would need a different set of relations among the secular left, the liberal democratic currents, and the variants of Islamic opposition to tilt the balance toward a revolutionary outcome.

*Cuba: the advantages of culture*

If Iran and (to a lesser extent) Egypt look reasonably secure, Cuba in the late 1990s represents an even more unlikely site of revolution. Dependent development, from a uniquely socialist point of view, has operated on the island since the 1959 revolution (an extension and redirection of capitalist dependent development before that). The enormous gains in quality of living indicators set Cuba apart from the rest of Latin America and the Third World and make it a candidate for real development, yet the problems of an aging sugar monoculture, incomplete industrialisation (which was designed to be complementary to the now defunct socialist bloc), and the inevitable poverty of the resource base of Cuban socialism make for the mixture of positive and negative indices we have termed dependent development.<sup>30</sup> Castro's grip on power is on the face of it an instance of a personalist regime, although its exclusionary character is rather more uncertain, as will become evident when we examine political culture in a moment. The cut-off of the Soviet subsidy in the early 1990s certainly created a severe economic downturn, with GNP dropping by as much as 40% from 1989 to 1992, trade shrinking drastically, oil imports plummeting, shortages in agricultural, industrial and infrastructural inputs, and attendant hardships for the population. Meanwhile, US pressure remains substantial, intensified by the February 1996 crisis provoked by the downing of two Cuban-American exile planes by the Cuban air force.<sup>31</sup>

Yet Castro remains rather securely in place despite the presence of these several features of the model. The explanation would seem to rest heavily on the resilience of the political culture of the Cuban Revolution as a substantial legitimating vehicle for the regime and the gains of the revolution. Cuban socialism, as a political culture, was neither a radical turn from the earliest stated objectives of the July 26 Movement nor a dutiful translation of the Soviet model into Spanish. In terms of its origins, the ideology of Castro's July 26 Movement before coming to power in 1959 was an already radicalised variant of 19th-century revolutionary hero José Martí's amalgam of anti-imperialist nationalism, humanism and sympathy with the poor. From its formation in 1955 the July 26 Movement had declared itself for the introduction of 'social justice' in Cuba; although its specific positions were often deliberately vague and consciously kept moderate in 1957–58 to attract a diverse social base, it was undoubtedly understood by many Cubans as capable of providing the land reform it openly announced in October 1958, as well as more independence from the USA and other radical goals.<sup>32</sup> Castro, like Khomeini in Iran, certainly modified his message for diverse constituencies, and muted it in the interest of keeping them together, but there should be little doubt that his radical followers understood his goal as one of relatively deep social transformation well before they came to power.<sup>33</sup>

Cuba surely represents one of the most successful cases in the history of revolutions of revolutionaries working within their pre-existing ideological horizons, but also going beyond and outside them, in the process elaborating new, re-visioned cultures of opposition to try to keep a revolutionary coalition together through a skilful process of consolidation. Unlike in Iran, Cuba's broad



populist coalition did not disintegrate (aided in this by the migration of oppositional upper and skilled middle classes in the early 1960s), but rather was held together even as the revolution radicalised into a project of deep social transformation. And it was held together, in no small part, by the enthusiasm of the population for the new socialist political culture. The longevity of the Cuban Revolution suggests that the process of elaborating effective political cultures requires complex negotiations between such ‘universals’ as Marxism–Leninism and much longer-standing notions of a specifically Cuban nationalism, democracy and ideals of social, racial and economic justice.<sup>34</sup> It was these inflections that gave the Cuban Revolution its particular imprint as a powerful force for socialist change within Cuba and, indeed, as a model for further rearticulation with other local traditions elsewhere (interestingly, never as successfully as in Cuba).

The question today, and the one on which the future of the Cuban Revolution would seem to hinge, is how much remains of this effervescent support for Castro and Cuban socialism inside the country? Somehow, Castro retains a level of public support, though how much is difficult to say. As one grocer put it: ‘To put up with things is a national custom’. And as Castro himself said at the depth of the economic downturn in 1993: ‘It is an epic struggle in which we find ourselves. We have had to give up many of the things in which we were involved, but what we will never give up is hope’.<sup>35</sup> The very intensity of the US animosity towards Castro, expressed in the form of the embargo and the successive tightenings of it undertaken by Torricelli, Burton, Jesse Helms and Bill Clinton, has been turned thus far by the regime to political capital, as it taps the wellsprings of Cuban nationalism and pride in their revolution. Economic change has come in the form of increased tourism, foreign joint ventures, and the ebb and flow of small private enterprises, but Cuba to date, and for the foreseeable future, showcases the advantages of political culture for sustaining revolutions (and thereby preventing counter-revolution) in a globalising world.

### **(As yet) unsuccessful uprisings**

#### *Peru and Algeria: the limits of culture*

Two recent and still ongoing cases of revolutionary upsurge from quite different corners of the globe provide further evidence of the strength of the combination of ineffective political cultures of opposition, non-personalistic states and the international conjuncture in limiting revolutions’ success.

In Peru since the early 1980s a vigorous revolutionary civil war has been conducted by the Sendero Luminoso movement, aimed at toppling the civilian governments of first, centre-right populist Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1980–85), then centre-left APRA leader Alan García Pérez (1985–90), and presently free market populist conservative Alberto Fujimori (1990 to the present).<sup>36</sup> Gathering strength in the Andean provincial capital of Ayacucho after 1980 under the shadowy leadership of a charismatic intellectual named Abimael Guzmán (known as Comrade Gonzalo), the movement represented an alliance—however problematic—between radical intellectuals and the indigenous population of the

underdeveloped Andean highlands, proclaiming itself in pursuit of a whole new world. At its height in the late 1980s, the movement succeeded in establishing further bases of support in the shantytowns of Lima, the lowland capital, more clearly the site of dependent development and its contradictions in the Peruvian setting. Economic downturns occurred with some frequency in the late 1980s as Peru struggled with a huge foreign debt and as successive development strategies failed to control inflation and unemployment.<sup>37</sup>

Yet the movement failed even at its height to attract sufficient cross-class support to build a broad populist coalition for revolutionary, extra-constitutional social transformation in Peru. Indeed, it never sought such an alliance, a fatal flaw in its vision. Instead, explicitly targeting the traditional left, represented in the person of President Alan García (and to his left the optimistically named Izquierda Unida, as well as Peru's other armed revolutionary current, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement—MRTA), Sendero had alienated its natural allies in the political spectrum by the mid-1980s. The ability of political institutions to maintain formal democracy throughout the period also undercut middle-class support for the movement, and the terror tactics practiced in the highlands by the movement as it fought not just the army but all civil opponents probably also undermined its original social base to some degree.<sup>38</sup> Sendero's political culture was an idiosyncratic blend of Maoism, the French Revolution, Pol Pot, Peruvian revolutionary theorist José Carlos Mariátegui, and indigenous cultures of opposition, with a strong accent on revolutionary chiliasm, a cult of leadership, and the purifying effects of violence as strategy and goal.<sup>39</sup> Far more than the Marxism–Leninism of the revolutionaries in El Salvador in the same period, this ideology was not calculated to appeal to broad segments of the population, and never achieved a hegemonic claim even on the left.<sup>40</sup> Despite military repression and the *autogolpe* (self-coup) of 5 April 1992 by Fujimori that concentrated unusual (but not unlimited) discretionary powers in his hands, the political institutions of Peru never approximated an exclusionary, personalistic dictatorship.<sup>41</sup> And while dependent development has continued unabated, as has economic suffering for much of the population, Fujimori's neoliberal shock treatment has brought down inflation and reinstated the rhythms of international capital (aid, trade and investment). The international community (the USA followed by Europe), initially hostile to Alan García's plans to limit debt repayment as well as to the excesses of the counterinsurgency under Fujimori, had also swung behind Fujimori's political economic project by 1993–94, closing off any world-systemic opening from developing. Thus the fortuitous discovery and capture of Guzmán in September 1992 set back Sendero's project indefinitely and has put the movement clearly on the defensive. Now split into two factions, one following Guzmán's call from prison to negotiate peace, and the other, known as the Red Path, still committed to armed actions, its future prospects look bleaker than ever.<sup>42</sup> The same holds true for the MRTA, a far smaller guerrilla opposition which remains even further from power than Sendero Luminoso after its late 1996 hostage-taking of diplomats ended in a government rescue operation that killed all the participating guerrillas.

A different political culture animated what until quite recently looked like the most likely site of the world's next revolution in Algeria.<sup>43</sup>

Between 1954 and 1962 the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) succeeded in waging one of the great historical anti-colonial revolutions against France, ultimately taking power and proclaiming independence in 1962. The revolution, however, quickly turned authoritarian and conservative, with the military gaining control of the ruling party and running the economy in the name of 'African socialism' and using Islam as the state religion to push women out of paid work into their old roles.<sup>44</sup> For a while, in the 1970s, Algeria relied on oil revenues to keep the economy afloat through a process constituting an oil-led form of dependent development, but by the early 1990s the government had arrived at a dead end, no longer considered legitimate by the majority of the population. After riots and demonstrations for democracy in 1990, it announced elections in the fall of 1991, which produced an overwhelming landslide for the opposition Islamic Salvation Front (known by its initials in French as the FIS). The prospect of turning power over to Islamists split the ruling party, and a thinly disguised military coup occurred just before the final round of the elections scheduled for January 1992 (with Western banks and governments promptly granting a \$1.45 billion credit to ease pressure on the new military regime).

The world will thus never know if the Islamic party could have governed democratically or solved some of Algeria's massive economic problems because the old regime, backed by the West, has shown it will not give up power through democratic means. The FIS was driven underground, its leadership arrested, and some groups within it turned to guerrilla tactics. Over 20 000 Algerians have died in the violence since 1992, including government officials and FIS activists, but also many civilians and other public figures opposed to Islamic rule. From time to time the military government has promised to negotiate open elections, and these were duly held at the end of 1995, confirming the FLN in power under retired general and new president Liarnine Zeroual. The FIS—like the government—split over the issue, with a moderate wing taking part in 1995 and an intransigent opposition literally sticking to its guns. The FIS was excluded from the June 1997 elections, whose conduct was criticised by United Nations observers, and its military wing continued to engage in armed actions.<sup>45</sup>

An analytic assessment of Algeria's trajectory in light of the model suggests that the political culture of militant Islamism propounded by the FIS found significant but not quite clear-cut majority support in 1991–92.<sup>46</sup> When the government forced the issue by abrogating an FIS electoral victory, it approximated the exclusionary, near personalist type of regime that is most vulnerable to overthrow. But its repeated promises to negotiate created a small opening for it, and the natural response of the FIS to go underground and initiate a violent civil war undermined the latter's chances of building a broad coalition (already somewhat problematic on the electoral plane, as much of the anti-FLN-government population remained and remains fearful of an Islamic government as well). Finally, the international conjuncture has been most inhospitable to the FIS as even an electoral alternative to the FLN: in the anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim atmosphere stirred up by the 1991 Gulf War; the continuing isolation of Iran, Iraq, Libya and the Sudan by the West, led by the USA, and the strong economic and moral support tendered by successive socialist and conservative regimes in France to the FLN, it is hard to imagine anything like a world-systemic opening

in operation since 1990 in Algeria. The future here thus seems clouded by a political stalemate: splintered government and opposition circles that make political dialogue and economic reconstruction difficult for a tragically traumatised civil society.

*China 1989 and beyond: dependent development and the issue of democracy*

China is another post-revolutionary society where revolution has been placed back on the agenda in the past decade, in the form of the democracy movement that was repressed in June 1989. These events are in many ways the opposite of what happened in Eastern Europe, where peaceful movements to democratise society succeeded. The order of reform is also reversed: in Eastern Europe political reform is now being followed up by economic changes; in China there was a series of economic liberalisations in the 1980s after Mao's death that encouraged a certain amount of private enterprise, foreign investment and market relationships. These led by 1988 to various social problems—inflation, housing shortages, unemployment, growing income inequality, and a perception (undoubtedly true) of rampant corruption in the government and ruling Communist Party. There was thus a feeling among students, intellectuals and many others that what China needed were political reforms granting more democratic participation to mitigate the contradictions of dependent development and to solve the problems economic liberalisation was causing.

And so, between April and June 1989 a vast new social movement sprang up, initiated by students but soon joined by many workers and ordinary citizens, centred in Beijing but also present in many other cities.<sup>47</sup> The students engaged in non-violent forms of protest—demonstrations, occupying the huge central square of the capital, hunger strikes. When the number of protestors reached one million people, the government declared martial law. But for two weeks the demonstrators, now increasingly consisting of working people, prevented the army from entering the centre of the city. The government could tolerate student demonstrators; what terrified it was the organisation of the working class into independent unions, and the possibility that the army might not be reliable at repressing the movement. There was a great fear on the part of the entrenched ruling bureaucracy, led by octogenarian Deng Xiaoping, that the scenario that later transpired in Rumania, where the army and populace together violently overthrew the dictator Ceausescu, would occur in China. In the end, the movement was crushed by the army with substantial loss of life, not just of students in Tiananmen Square but of ordinary citizens trying to prevent the army from reaching the square.<sup>48</sup> In order to prevent this emerging cross-class solidarity and to wipe out the opposition for a generation, great violence was resorted to.

The future will be the judge of whether this attempt to liberalise the economy without democratising the state can succeed—a system which is sometimes jokingly referred to as 'Market Leninism.'<sup>49</sup> The question of whether China is on the verge of a second twentieth-century social revolution and the Chinese people will succeed in the next round of protests for democracy can also be thought through in terms of the model: if in 1989 we find the presence of dependent

development, a vibrant political culture of opposition, an economic downturn (or at least dislocations), a state that verged on an exclusionary personalist regime (albeit with deep ties to a section of civil society), and a world-systemic opening that might be described as 'permissive' (in the sense of no strong outside ally coming to the regime's aid), we can see how the country came so close to social and/or political revolution. The post-1989 conjuncture seems decidedly less favourable: the same structural conditions of dependent development and repressive regime obtain, to be sure, but the opposition was dealt a severe blow from which it has not recovered, the economy barrels along at high rates of growth, and the West stands more solidly behind the regime, which it views as a major economic player in the coming century. Unless the opposition finds ways to regroup, and this is coupled with the inevitable downturns ahead in the new economic cycle and tensions over human rights or other violations (*vis-à-vis* Taiwan or Hong Kong, for example, or China's support for international terrorism and arms races), the moment of revolution in China may have passed with the massacre of 1989.<sup>50</sup>

### **Recent events in Zaire: a political but not social revolution**

Since this paper was first written in 1996, a major political change has come to Zaire in the form of the overthrow of Mobutu by an armed insurgency led by Laurent Kabila's Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Zaire-Congo (ADFL).<sup>51</sup> Arising out of relative obscurity in October 1996, the rebels made short work of Mobutu's disintegrating national army in a long march to the capital, Kinshasa, where they took power in May 1997.

What had changed in the sociopolitical equation to facilitate this successful political revolution? Two of the 'missing' factors fell into place: Kabila's relatively successful mobilisation of an opposition to Mobutu, and a world-systemic opening occasioned by the West's acknowledgement that the ailing dictator could no longer be sustained. The political culture that Kabila has tapped is as yet difficult to evaluate critically: the journalistic accounts of his own background suggest deep revolutionary roots coupled with uncertain intentions for further popular mobilisation. It is clear that the armed movement succeeded on the widely popular minimal platform of ousting the dictatorship. In a useful early analytic assessment, George Wright considers the ADFL a 'Zairean-based multi-ethnic coalition', drawing on groups in all parts of the country.<sup>52</sup> On the other hand, its roots in the civilian opposition to Mobutu do not appear to run that deep, as shown by the banning of demonstrations in the capital and the arrest of civilian opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi on 26 June 1997.<sup>53</sup> The international conjuncture finally favoured the opposition's success as well: the end of the cold-war rationale for Western support of Mobutu; the spillover of a complex refugee situation in Rwanda; significant unrest in a number of the countries bordering Zaire; Angolan, Kenyan and especially South African efforts to broker a peaceful end to the regime; and the rapid spread of the movement itself took Mobutu's traditional supporters in France, Belgium and the USA by surprise. Led by the USA, these outside forces finally switched their strategy to trying to influence the new regime.

The result has been not quite the ouster I anticipated in 1996, but a successful political revolution nonetheless. The coming together of four of the five factors in the model may explain both the reasons for this success and its limits. There is not likely to be a thoroughgoing revolutionary transformation of Zaire (now renamed Congo) as the opposition is neither unified nor agreed on this, the social structural dislocations of dependent development do not exist in the country to fuel it, and the international community will not favour such an outcome. The degree to which Kabila can change social and economic arrangements thus seems likely to be rather circumscribed. The events in Zaire may herald a model for future political revolutions in Africa and elsewhere, but these will only rarely result in the deep social transformation of the great social revolutions.

### **Towards a new type of revolution?**

#### *Mexico: the first postmodern revolution?*

Our final case for discussion is the one which may suggest the outlines of the most likely—and most hopeful—face of revolution as the world faces the next century.

As the long boom of the 1940s through 1980 brought on a characteristic process of dependent development in Mexico, the long-ruling PRI (the unintentionally ironically named Institutional Revolutionary Party) has found in the last 10 years that it can no longer buy political stability with economic growth, which has come to a halt. Nor can it any longer try to legitimate itself by an appeal to nationalism as economic dependence on the USA grows. In the elections of July 1988 a new political force arose. Workers, peasants and professionals supported the left coalition known as the National Democratic Front, whose candidate was popular former president Lazaro Cárdenas's son, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. Cárdenas had left the PRI to run in a coalition with socialists and other progressives on a platform of land reform, income distribution and a moratorium on foreign debt payments. This was enormously popular and many—indeed most—observers believe that he actually won the election. But the government announced computer failures when it was counting the vote, and several days later declared its candidate, Harvard-trained economist Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the winner.<sup>54</sup>

From 1988 to 1994 Salinas de Gortari presided over a situation of political and economic crisis. Politically the PRI made implicit deals with the conservative opposition, the pro-business Party of National Action (PAN), in order to counter the challenge from the Democratic Revolutionary Party on its left (this is the current incarnation of Cárdenas' organisation, known as the PRD). Thus the PAN was allowed to win the 1989 elections for governor in Baja California, while the Democratic Revolutionary Party's candidates were deprived of their victories in Michoacán and Guerrero. In addition, serious violations of human rights continued on a daily basis, aimed at intimidating and in some cases eliminating dissident voices among intellectuals, labour leaders, peasants and other oppositional figures.<sup>55</sup>

Economically the government has been selling off state-owned industry

(including 70% of the petroleum sector, which is now in private hands), supporting the conversion of small communal land holdings into large agribusiness projects, and banking on a closer relationship with the USA symbolised by the negotiations for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The effects of the agreement are not easy to see with certainty. NAFTA will gradually eliminate all trade barriers between the two countries and permit unlimited expansion of US companies into the Mexican economy. It seems clear enough that it will unleash a third wave of US investment in Mexico, generalising the system of *maquiladora* factories that already exist along the border—industrial zones, many amounting to conditions of sweatshop labour, in which the workers, who are mostly women, are paid as little as 80 cents an hour for work that is tedious, difficult and environmentally dangerous.<sup>56</sup> The environmental problems caused by lack of safeguards along the border are atrocious, and the air of Mexico City (far from the border) contains so much lead from car pollution that it affects the IQ of newborn children, lowering it by as much as 10%.<sup>57</sup> Since wage differences between the USA and Mexico will not be legislated out of existence, it is fairly clear that there will be some loss of jobs by US industrial workers as their plants move south (this is why, when Clinton met Salinas de Gortari in January 1993 to discuss their relationship, there were US protestors outside the meeting place with posters that read, rather poetically, ‘Afta Nafta the Shafta’). In the long run, some analysts conclude jobs will be created in the USA since more US products will flow into Mexico. But this will push Mexican businesses producing for the home market into bankruptcy, costing jobs there.

Thus, while it is hard even for economists to add up all the consequences of adopting the agreement, it will clearly bind the two countries closer together, in what has to be an unequal relationship of dependency and a continuing, and deepened, process of dependent development. Salinas de Gortari staked his future on the pact which he argued would help Mexico grow, even if this meant becoming more of an appendage of the USA. Interestingly, the latest textbooks on Mexican history issued by the government contain some changes from previous editions when it comes to the history of the Mexican Revolution. Whereas the old fourth grade texts had said that Porfirio Díaz ‘was very bad for the life of Mexico, because the people were not given the chance to elect their leaders’, the new version teaches that the Porfiriato was a period of stability and peace, in which industrial growth occurred by attracting foreign investment. On the other hand, the revolutionary land reform programme of Zapata is *not* mentioned, nor is the name of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas uttered in the account of the 1988 election. The subtext seems to be that economic modernisation comes first, democracy second, in the priorities of the present administration.<sup>58</sup>

But there are political consequences to the rewriting of history, and the analogy of the Porfiriato with the present regime may be dangerous, for it begs the question: Is the Mexican Revolution finished, or not? The startling events of 1 January 1994 in the southern state of Chiapas underline this question.<sup>59</sup> On that day, the very day that NAFTA went into effect as a treaty among Canada, the USA and Mexico, some 2000 supporters (including 200 women)<sup>60</sup> of a previously unknown guerrilla group calling itself the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (the EZLN) seized a number of towns, labelling

NAFTA and its free-market reforms ‘a death sentence for the indigenous people of Mexico’.<sup>61</sup> While some of the rebels, who are almost all indigenous people of Mayan origin, have said their goal is ‘for socialism, like the Cubans have, but better’,<sup>62</sup> their demands have been for such things as land, health care, education and democratic elections. The most popular leader, a man long known only as Subcomandante Marcos,<sup>63</sup> issues poetic communiqués and uses the international media, including the internet, to make the call for radical reform.

The roots of this rebellion run deep: in the 1910 revolution and after, Chiapas was largely by-passed, as an elite of cattle ranchers and coffee growers ran the state allied to the PRI. About 60% of the workers of the state made less than the \$3.33 minimum daily wage in 1990; 30% are illiterate; one-third have no electricity and over 40% have no running water in their homes.<sup>64</sup> The government first reacted to the rebellion with massive army repression that resulted in 100 ‘official’ deaths (but as many as 500 in reality), numerous cases of torture and other abuses. It followed this with a series of promises and reforms: dismissal of the state’s governor, pledges of food and scholarship aid, and an agreement with the two national opposition parties to reform the electoral process (caps on campaign spending, equal access to the media, and so forth, but stopping short of allowing independent observers at the polls). They continue negotiating with the rebels, who have issued a set of four basic demands: ‘“economic demands” related to the poverty of Indians in Chiapas, “social demands” stemming from racism and other problems, a call for democratic liberties throughout Mexico, and issues related to the formal cessation of hostilities’.<sup>65</sup> When the government offered an amnesty, one of the leaders asked in a letter printed in the Mexico City newspapers: ‘What do we have to ask pardon for?...For not dying of hunger? For not shutting up about our misery? For having shown the rest of the country and the entire world that human dignity survives and is in their most impoverished people?’<sup>66</sup> Indeed, the world’s attention is now focused on the situation in Mexico so, in that respect, the rebels have already won a large measure of success. A lot of hard questions are being asked in Mexico about issues such as free elections and the economic consequences of NAFTA. As one graffiti in Mexico City has put it: ‘Chiapas is Mexico’.<sup>67</sup>

Meanwhile, later in 1994, elections were held once again. The PRI’s candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, was assassinated on 23 March 1994 in Tijuana, in what now appears to have been a power struggle between reformist and conservative wings of the party. His replacement as PRI candidate, the third consecutive US-trained economist who has governed Mexico, Ernesto Zedillo, was elected in August. In December 1994 interest payments on the debt of \$160 billion could not be met, causing the value of the peso to crash and leading to another bail-out by the banks (itself a sign of international—especially US—support for the regime) and a new round of economic belt-tightening for the people, in the form of a drop in wages accompanied by rising inflation and unemployment.<sup>68</sup> In the meantime, ex-president Salinas de Gortari had to flee the country, his brother in prison on charges of fraud, drug laundering and involvement in another political assassination (that of PRI Secretary General José Francisco Ruíz Massieu).

The rebellion in Chiapas poses some difficult and important questions for



students of revolution to ponder: what is the future of revolutions in a globalising world? Can Third World revolutionaries on the doorstep of the USA, facing a cagy 'institutionalised dictatorship', find new formulas to create the type of cross-class (and in Mexico, trans-racial) populist alliance that the historical record of social revolution suggests is required for success? And in the post-cold war era, what would 'success' look like, in any case? A few thoughts on this will be offered in the conclusion to this essay.

### Comparative lessons

The results of this survey are provisionally summed up in Table 1. We may also analyse these cases comparatively, using Boolean techniques of qualitative comparison. The first step in this process is to construct a 'truth table' showing all the cases and the hypothesised features of each. This is depicted in Table 2.

Boolean analysis allows us to sort these cases for the salient patterns among them. This involves representation of each case in terms of the presence, absence, or partial effectiveness of the five factors (here '1' becomes coded as a capital letter denoting factor A, B, C, etc, and '0' is denoted by a, b, c, and so forth). Thus, for example, the pattern for Zaire (row 1) can be represented as aBcDe, meaning that Zaire until 1996 possessed only the factors of an exclusionary, personalist state and an economic downturn (here we are coding ungenerously: thus '1 -' under world-systemic opening is considered as its absence; alternatively, and for other purposes (see below), a '1 -' may be considered the presence, or partial effectiveness, of the factor in question).

If we adopt the 'ungenerous' interpretation of all variables that are to some degree absent in the 12 cases (China, Iraq and Zaire being counted twice in tables one and two), we may array the cases as shown in Table 3.

Simple inspection shows that the 12 instances produce 10 distinct patterns, with, interestingly, Iran and post-1989 China possessing the same pattern (two of the most unlikely candidates for further revolutionary change), and China in 1989 and Mexico today also giving the same pattern (two of the most revolutionary cases in the group). If the theory holds that it is the absence of one or more factors that precludes chances for successful revolution, then we may note that, in ascending order of revolutionary potential, we have Egypt (none of the factors in full force); Iran, Peru, and post-1989 China (only one factor); Cuba, Zaire before 1997, post-1991 Iraq and Algeria (two of the factors), and 1989 China, 1991 Iraq, 1997 Zaire and Mexico (three of the factors). If we do a simple count, we find that dependent development is present in seven of the cases (Iraq before and after 1991, Iran, Algeria, China before and after 1989, and Mexico); the personalist, exclusionary state in four of the cases (Zaire and Iraq at both time points); strong political cultures of opposition in two of the cases (China in 1989, Mexico); an economic downturn in eight of the cases (Zaire at both moments, Iraq in 1991, Peru, Algeria, Cuba, China in 1989 and Mexico); and a favourable world-systemic opportunity in just two cases (Cuba and 1997 Zaire). In these simple terms, it would seem that world-systemic openings, strong political cultures of resistance, and vulnerable states are the rarest of the elements in the

TABLE 1  
**Prospects for revolution at the Fin-de-Siècle**

	<i>Social structure</i>	<i>State</i>	<i>Political cultures</i>	<i>Conjunctural factors</i>	<i>Prospect/ outcome</i>
Zaire till 1996	Sheer under-development	Mobutu dictatorship	Divided and limited oppositions	Economic crisis/ indifferent world order?	Continued rule; coup possible
Iraq since 1991	Oil-led dependent development	Saddam Hussein dictatorship	Opposition divided among Kurds Islamists and weak liberal secular movement	Subsidised hardships/ pressures on Hussein but no support for oppositions	Continued rule; coup less likely
Iran	Oil-led dependent development	Semi-popular authoritarian Islamic government	Little internal opposition; divided and dispersed exile opposition	Subsidised hardships/ pressure from USA but support from Japan, Europe, China	Continued regime stability; occasional local protests
Egypt	Precarious process of dependent development	Authoritarian formal democracy under Mubarak	Strong Islamist challenge, with limited middle-class and upper-class support	Subsidised hardships/ strong Western support for regime, led by USA	Continued regime stability; potential Islamic challenge
Cuba	Dependent development without inequality	Personalist, but non-exclusionary regime under Castro	Very limited internal opposition; extremist opposition in Miami	Subsidised hardships/ strong pressures from USA only	Continued regime stability until Castro's death
China 1989	Socialist dependent development	Exclusionary, semi-personalist communist rule	Vibrant student/ worker opposition	Dislocations of capitalist opening/ potential opening?	Failed revolution

TABLE 1. *Continued.*

China since 1989	Socialist dependent development	Exclusionary, semi-personalist communist rule	Demoralised and exiled opposition	Dynamic economic growth/Western acceptance of regime	Renewed political stability amidst economic change
Iraq 1991	Oil-led dependent development	Saddam Hussein dictatorship	Islamic uprising in south; Kurds in north; no coordination	War crisis/no US support for opposition	Failed rebellion
Peru	A limited degree of dependent development	Democratic institutions (albeit Fujimori <i>autogolpe</i> )	A hard-core Maoist insurgency with limited cross-class support	Serious hardships/strong Western support	Continued institutional stability
Algeria	Oil-led dependent development	Exclusionary, but not personalist rule of FLN	Vibrant Islamist opposition with limited cross-class support, more hard-line after 1992	Frequent hardships/strong US and French support for regime	Continued low-level stalemated civil war
Zaire in 1997	Sheer under-development	Mobutu dictatorship	Rise of armed opposition under Laurent Kabila	Economic crisis/world powers abandon Mobutu	Outcome: successful political revolution
Mexico	Dependent development and NAFTA	PRI's shaky hold on power	Dynamic and flexible Zapatista insurgency with potential widespread public support	Continuing hardship and crisis/strong US support for PRI: could it evaporate?	Crucial struggle for hegemony among PRI, PAN and radical opposition(s)

TABLE 2  
**The future of revolutions: a Boolean truth table (0 = trait absent; 1 = trait present)<sup>a</sup>**

Cases	Favorable conditions					Potential for regime change <sup>b</sup>
	(A) Dependent development	(B) Repressive, exclusionary, personalist state	(C) Political cultures of opposition	(D) Economic downturn	(E) World-systemic opening	
<i>Type one: no attempt at revolution</i>						
1. Zaïre, 1990s-	0	1	0	1	1-	> 50% (downfall) <sup>c</sup>
2. Iraq, 1990s-	1	1	1-	1-	0	> 25% (downfall) <sup>d</sup>
3. Iran, 1990s-	1	1-	0	1-	1-	< 25% (stable)
4. Egypt, 1990s-	1-	1-	1-	1-	0	< 25% (downfall) <sup>e</sup>
5. Cuba, 1990s-	1+	1-	0	1	1	< 25% (stable)
6. China, 1990s-	1	1-	1-	0	0	< 25% (stable)
<i>Type two: attempted or ongoing civil/revolutionary wars</i>						
7. China, 1989	1	1-	1	1	1-	< 75% (rev)
8. Iraq, 1991	1	1	1-	1	1-	50% (rev)
9. Peru, 1980s-90s	1-	0	1-	1	0	< 25% (rev)
10. Algeria, 1992-	1	1-	1-	1	0	< 50% (downfall) <sup>f</sup>
11. Zaïre, 1997	0	1	1-	1	1	actual political rev
12. Mexico, 1994-	1	1-	1	1	0	50% (downfall) <sup>g</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Boolean analysis requires the presence or absence of variables. I have here, however, sometimes engaged in codings such as '1 -' to indicate the variable is present to a degree (and in one case, a '1 +' for dependent development in Cuba to indicate the degree to which development there has been more real than dependent). I discuss these codings in the text.

<sup>b</sup>Please recall my reservations about prediction from the introduction!

<sup>c</sup>Through coup or political demonstrations (in decreasing order of likelihood). This 'prediction' was made in an early 1996 version of this paper.

<sup>d</sup>Through coup or political revolution (in decreasing order of likelihood).

<sup>e</sup>Through electoral defeat, coup or political revolution (in decreasing order of likelihood).

<sup>f</sup>Through electoral defeat by the FIS, coup, or political revolution (in decreasing order of likelihood).

<sup>g</sup>Through electoral defeat by the PRD (possibly in alliance with the EZLN) or PAN, or national extralegal political movement (in decreasing order of likelihood).

TABLE 3  
**Patterns of variables in  
 potentially revolutionay  
 countries**

<i>Type one: no attempt at revolution</i>	
Zaire (till 1996)	aBcDe
Iraq (after 1991)	ABcde
Iran	Abcde
Egypt	abcde
Cuba	abcDE
China (1990s)	Abcde
<i>Type two: attempted or ongoing          civil/revolutionary wars</i>	
China (1989)	AbCDe
Iraq (1991)	ABcDe
Peru	abcDe
Algeria	AbcDe
Zaire (1997)	aBcDE
Mexico	AbCDe

present conjuncture, and that they are, crudely put, the factors that most often prevent revolutions from occurring. The 10 patterns that have failed to bring about a revolution can thus be arrayed:

$$\text{Failure} = aBcDe + ABcde + Abcde + abcde + abcDE + AbCDe + ABCDe + abcDe + AbcDe + aBcDE$$

Boolean techniques also allow these patterns to be simplified further: when two patterns differ in only one variable, that variable can be eliminated from the model (because the same result—in this case, no revolution—occurs whether it is present or not). For example, the pattern for Egypt (abcde) differs from that of Iran or China in the 1990s (Abcde) only in the presence or absence of dependent development (factor A); the two patterns can be simplified to bcde. When all possible combinations of five factors are thus compared, we arrive at the following formula for failure (or lack of revolutionary success):

$$\text{Failure} = BcDe + acDe + aBcD + Acde + ABce + bcde + Abce + acDE + abcD + AcDe + AbDe + bcDe$$

That is, 10 different patterns of four variables account for all 12 cases of failure. In fact, this same procedure can be repeated with these sets of four variables. The equation for failure then becomes:

$$\text{Failure} = cDe + acD + Ace + bce + AbDe$$

Finally, through a procedure known as the prime implicant chart, it can be discerned that the first pattern—cDe—is redundant, because the other four account for all twelve cases without it.<sup>69</sup> This means that the 12 cases, analysed in terms of why they have failed as social revolutions, sort into four multiple causal patterns.<sup>70</sup> Despite the occasional presence of A (dependent development) and D (an economic downturn) in these patterns, the conclusion appears to be

TABLE 4  
**Most likely paths to revolution in countries studied**

Zaire before 1997	aBcDE
Iraq after 1991	ABCDe
Iran	ABcDE
Egypt	ABCDe
Cuba	ABcDE
China 1990s	ABCde
China 1989	ABCDE
Iraq 1991	ABCDE
Peru	AbCDe
Algeria	ABCDe
Zaire 1997	aBCDE
Mexico	ABCDe

that it is the absence of *any* of the five factors that prevents success. In three of the four patterns, the world-systemic opening is absent (and in the fourth—acD—it is irrelevant); the same is true for the elaboration of effective political cultures of opposition. Each of the other factors (dependent development, an exclusionary, personalist state, and an economic downturn) is also absent or irrelevant in at least two of the patterns.

The same analysis can be performed using ‘generous’ codings: that is, considering any factor that is somewhat present (the many ‘1 – ’ entries in the table, as well as the one ‘1 + ’) to be fully present. The purpose of this assumption is to explain the most likely paths to revolution in these 12 cases which, after all, were chosen as among the most potentially revolutionary scenarios in the present global conjuncture. The cases then line up as in Table 4.

In this reading, all 12 cases possess at least three of the five factors to some degree. Iraq (in March 1991) and China in 1989 have all five, and indeed, both were at those moments a hairsbreadth away from revolution.<sup>71</sup> Mexico, Egypt, Algeria, Iraq since 1991, Iran, Cuba and Zaire in 1997 each possess four out of five of the factors, clustering in three distinct groups: the first four of these cases have all but the world-systemic opening, suggesting not only the significance of this factor, but constituting two (Mexico and Algeria) of the three (with Peru) cases where revolutions are actually being attempted at the present moment. Cuba and Iran constitute a second group, possessing all but the factor of a ‘revolutionary’ oppositional culture (ie opposed to the regimes, which are themselves products of revolution!). I have argued that these are two of the most stable cases in the group; surely this underscores the importance of political cultures of opposition in making revolutions (just as the first set of four underscores the significance of the world-systemic conjuncture in preventing—or, conversely, facilitating—revolutions). Zaire in 1997 is a third instance of the presence of four factors: in this case the coexistence of all but dependent development led to a political revolution. The remaining cases—Zaire before 1997, China since 1989 and Peru—each have three of the five, suggesting

relative stability, as well as the significance of the remaining factors in preventing revolution, in various combinations.

Let us now divide these into two subsets of cases: 1) stable or no attempt (Zaire before 1997, Iraq since 1991, Iran, Egypt, Cuba, China in the 1990s); and 2) an attempted revolution of some kind (Iraq in 1991, China in 1989, Peru, Algeria, Zaire in 1997 and Mexico). If Boolean analyses are performed on each set, the results are:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Stable/no attempt} &= \text{BcDE} + \text{ABCe} \\ \text{Attempted revolution} &= \text{BCDE} + \text{ACDe} \end{aligned}$$

In the first instance, there are two paths to non-attempts: BcDE in pre-1997 Zaire, Iran and Cuba means that the inability of an oppositional political culture to coalesce prevents revolution from breaking out (dependent development is irrelevant to this pattern), while in Egypt, Iraq after 1991 and China since 1990, ABCe suggests that the world-system is unfavourable to revolution (economic downturns drop out of this path). There are also two paths to attempted revolutions: The pattern ACDe in Peru, Algeria and Mexico suggests that revolution was attempted because of the presence of dependent development, political cultures of opposition and an economic downturn, in the absence of a world-systemic opening, with regime type irrelevant to the attempt. This means that revolutionaries here have launched movements regardless of the type of regime they faced or the international conjuncture. The second pattern—BCDE—found in 1989 China, 1991 Iraq and 1997 Zaire suggests that revolutions were attempted in the presence of all factors except dependent development, which is irrelevant to this pattern. Most significant here, these are the only cases in the revolutionary group where the world-system was at least somewhat favourable, and contain two cases of very near success—China and Iraq—and the one case of a successful political revolution. We note that, in all attempts, there are oppositional political cultures and an economic downturn; revolutionaries ignored regime type and the international conjuncture to their detriment, it seems.

Among the conclusions to be drawn from this exercise are demonstrations of the hypotheses that all five factors are needed for a social revolution to occur and succeed; that the most revolutionary situations are those in which four or five of the factors are present; and that of the five factors, three—political cultures of opposition, world-systemic opportunity, and a vulnerable state form—may be the most salient, but the absence of any of the five factors is sufficient to block revolutions.

### **Conclusions: the future of revolutions in a globalising world**

It is time to draw this exercise to a provisional close. I have promised some things in this conclusion. First are the questions posed by the events in Chiapas, and here I would only wish to open a larger discussion that must be continued elsewhere. I believe that Chiapas offers a new and hopeful model of revolutionary change for us to study, one which may go further than the classic cases of the past along the lines of creating a truly participatory, more democratic, less

racist and sexist society. And this in spite of the collapse of socialism and the proclamation of a new US-led world order on Mexico's front doorstep, and carried through by means among the more peaceful in the historical record of attempted revolutionary transformations. For now, we will have to wait and see how the rebellion goes; this may be a long wait unless some fairly substantial concessions are made by the government, for the rebels have said they are prepared to fight for 20 or 30 years if necessary. One future scenario would involve unacceptable levels of military repression, further governmental scandal and corruption, and economic mismanagement of a kind that might make the regime appear less open to reform and change as well as alienate the USA to the degree that all five factors would then be fully present (the classic path to social revolution). An alternative (and quite different) scenario would be the successful transformation of the EZLN into part of a new social movement and an electoral force capable of defeating the PRI in open and fair elections, which would then initiate a process of real change (the Chilean path in a new world context). Either way, Chiapas, writ large upon Mexico and beyond, could indeed transform what we mean by 'revolutionary success', if it prospers—a large 'if'.

As for the question of the future of revolutions in a globalising world, a few observations must suffice. This paper has highlighted the importance of the international conjuncture in the causality of revolution. Since this factor has always been important, the question must be refined: Has the international setting changed in ways that radically alter the prospects of revolutionaries succeeding?<sup>72</sup> The world economy is changing, to be sure, as transnational companies develop ever greater capacities to escape the regulation of states, control the distribution of profits along commodity chains, and depress the wages of workers. The bipolar world of the post-1945 conjuncture has also been qualitatively transformed with the demise of the USSR. North–South relations, however, remain hierarchical and unequal, meaning that dependent development as a process continues. Exclusionary, personalist states, while out of vogue in the post-1980 movement towards formally democratic polities in much of the world, are still an option for dependent developers (and this global democratisation process remains fragile). In the wake of the collapse of Soviet-style socialism, political cultures of opposition have lost one arrow—but only one—in the quiver of revolutionary cultures of resistance. The Third World left—like the First World's—suffered a shock and crisis of confidence in 1989–91, but it is already transforming itself creatively in various places (Chiapas among them). Economic downturns are endemic to capitalist business and other accumulation cycles and waves, and the neoliberal model that seeks hegemony in the Third World will periodically produce these along with dependent development.

That leaves the world-systemic opening to consider. The impact of the new global conjuncture on this factor is difficult to grasp fully, but it is far from uniformly dampening. The end of the Cold War may in fact have opened up opportunities for revolutionaries to operate if the other four factors are in place, precisely because the countries in question can no longer be treated as pawns in a larger geopolitical struggle between the USA and the USSR. Democratic revolutionaries and non-violent movements in particular may find new spaces in which to manoeuvre (here one thinks of the 1997 electoral gains of the former



guerrilla left in El Salvador). A USA that is no longer (or not yet) certain of the bases of its global political-economic strategic vision may also be loathe to intervene in conflicts in certain parts of the Third World, at least militarily. Thus present trends towards globalisation do not unambiguously portend a more limited scope for future revolutions. This study, at least, in surveying ten Third World sites of potential revolutionary instability since 1989, finds it far from the case that revolutions are headed for extinction as a species of social change in the near future. The odds for success will remain long and the difficulties of social transformation daunting, but this has always been the case.

In closing, I would submit the following reflection of Douglas Kellner on a related subject:

Whither, then, Marxism? Certainly it can no longer be regarded as the master theory and narrative it appeared to be in its classical forms, but it remains an important perspective for critical theory today. We continue to live in a capitalist society and as long as we do, Marxism will continue to be relevant. A reconstructed Marxism, a Marxism without guarantees, teleology, and foundations, will be more open, tolerant, skeptical, and modest than previous versions. A Marxism for the twenty-first century could help promote democracy, freedom, justice, and equality, and counterattack conservative ideologies that merely promote the interests of the rich and powerful. As long as tremendous class inequality, human suffering, and oppression exists there is the need for critical theories like Marxism and visions of radical social change that the tradition has inspired. Marxism will disappear either when the nightmare of capitalism is finally over or when a democratic and free society emerges that will produce its own philosophy and way of life. If Marxism has inspired such a project, then the doctrine can pass on to a happy obsolescence and the sufferings and struggles of those in the Marxian tradition will be redeemed.<sup>73</sup>

Substitute 'revolution' for 'Marxism', and 'path to social transformation' for 'critical theory' in this passage, and you have one of the basic conclusions of this essay.

---

## Notes

Many thanks to Eric Selbin and Jack Goldstone for detailed comments on the first version of this paper.

<sup>1</sup> Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p 4. In an article on the Iranian Revolution interestingly, she later modified this definition to read 'rapid, basic transformations of a country's state and class structure, and of its dominant ideology'. 'Rentier state and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution', *Theory and Society*, 11, 1982, p 265, emphasis added.

<sup>2</sup> I have decidedly mixed feelings about theorising revolutions in a way that encourages prediction. In a nutshell, this stems from a profound belief and background assumption in my scholarship that social change is directed in substantial part by the activities of people, and that no structuralist explanation can do justice to this irreducible element. This means that any model or theory of how people behave can be falsified by people themselves, in part because knowledge of such a theory alters the circumstances in which people act, and in part because people's actions can not be controlled and predicted by our theories about them (this is an insight taken up in the work of Anthony Giddens on structuration theory). As for predicting revolutions, on the one hand I feel that if the model I am developing is capable of explaining past instances, it is likely to be able to say something about the present and future too, but only with the caveats just noted. That is, the epistemological status of this exercise as prediction is dubious; a discussion understood in terms

of trends, of possible futures, or as educated guesses about potentials for change, is perhaps on more solid ground. I believe that 'scientific' prediction is a pernicious chimera in the social sciences and, appearances to the contrary, this study should not be read as an example of it, again for the reasons noted, as well as others. For two discussions of the role of prediction in the social sciences generally and in the study of revolutions in particular, see Michael Hechter, Timur Kuran, Randall Collins, Charles Tilly, Edgar Kiser, James Coleman & Alejandro Portes, 'Symposium on prediction in the social sciences', *American Journal of Sociology*, 100(6), May 1995, pp 1520–1626; and the contributions by Nikki Keddie, Timur Kuran and Jack A. Goldstone to Nikki Keddie (ed) *Debating Revolutions*, New York: New York University Press, 1995, constituting part one of the book: 'Can revolutions be predicted? Understood?'. I am among the sceptics in these debates about the utility of the exercise of prediction.

<sup>3</sup> A political revolution involves a change in the state with mass participation, but no deep social transformation afterwards.

<sup>4</sup> Most of this section is borrowed from another piece of mine: 'The comparative–historical sociology of Third World social revolutions: why a few succeed, why most fail', John Foran (ed), *Theorizing Revolutions*, London: Routledge, 1997, pp 227–267.

<sup>5</sup> Walter L Goldfrank, 'Theories of revolution and revolution without theory: the case of Mexico', *Theory and Society*, 7, 1979, pp 135–165; John Walton, *Reluctant Rebels: Comparative Studies of Revolution and Underdevelopment*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1984; Jeff Goodwin & Theda Skocpol, 'Explaining revolutions in the contemporary Third World', *Politics & Society*, 17(4), 1989, pp 489–509; Farideh Farhi, *States and Urban-Based Revolutions: Iran and Nicaragua*, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1990; Timothy P Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America. A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992; and Jack A Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr & Farrokh Moshiri (eds), *Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. For critical evaluations of much of this work, see John Foran, 'Theories of revolution revisited: toward a fourth generation?', *Sociological Theory*, 11(1), 1993, pp 1–20; and Foran 'Revolutionizing theory/ revising revolution: state, culture, and society in recent works on revolution', *Contention: Debates in Society, Culture and Science*, 2(2), 1993, pp 65–88.

<sup>6</sup> John Foran, 'A theory of Third World social revolutions: Iran, Nicaragua, and El Salvador compared', *Critical Sociology*, 19(2), 1992, pp 3–27; Foran, *Fragile Resistance: Social Transformation in Iran from 1500 to the Revolution*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993; and Foran, 'The causes of Latin American social revolutions: searching for patterns in Mexico, Cuba, and Nicaragua', in Peter Lengyel & Volker Bornschier (eds), *World Society Studies*, volume 3: *Conflicts and New Departures in World Society*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993, pp 209–244.

<sup>7</sup> See Fernando Henrique Cardoso & Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, trans Marjory Mattingly Urquidí, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1979; and John Foran, 'An historical–sociological framework for the study of long-term transformations in the Third World', *Humanity and Society*, 16(3), 1992, pp 330–349.

<sup>8</sup> The vulnerabilities of this type of state are now widely agreed upon in the literature on revolutions; all that varies is the terminology used to characterise it. Thus, in Wickham-Crowley's colourful language, it is a 'mafiaocracy'; for Farhi, 'personalist authoritarianism'; for Goldstone, a 'neopatrimonial' state; for Matthew Shugart, a 'sultanistic regime'. See Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution*, p 9; Farhi, *States and Urban-Based Revolutions*; Jack Goldstone, 'Revolutions and superpowers', J R Adelman (ed) *Superpowers and Revolution*, New York: Praeger, 1986, pp 38–48; and Matthew Soberg Shugart, 'Patterns of revolution', *Theory and Society*, 18(2), 1989, pp 249–271. Robert Dix probably first identified the weaknesses of this type of state in 'Why revolutions succeed and fail', in *Polity*, XVI(3), 1984, pp 423–446.

<sup>9</sup> See Foran, *Fragile Resistance*; Foran 'A theory of Third World social revolutions'; Foran 'Discourses and social forces: the role of culture and cultural studies in understanding revolutions', in Foran (ed) *Theorizing Revolutions*, pp 203–226, London and New York: Routledge, 1997. As I make clear in that chapter, this concept draws on the work of A Sivanandan, James Scott, Farideh Farhi, Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall and Antonio Gramsci, among many others.

<sup>10</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, trans Stuart Gilbert, Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1955 [1856]; and James C Davies, 'Toward a theory of revolution', *American Sociological Review*, 27, 1962, pp 5–19.

<sup>11</sup> On Iran, for example, see Mansoor Moaddel, *Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

<sup>12</sup> Foran, 'The comparative–historical study of Third World social revolutions'.

<sup>13</sup> This notion was pioneered in 1979 by Walter Goldfrank, who refers to it as a 'permissive world context' in 'Theories of revolution and revolution without theory'. It turns somewhat on its head Skocpol's attention to international pressures as the cause of revolution in the case of the powerful agrarian empires she studied.

<sup>14</sup> Foran, 'A theory of Third World social revolutions' and 'The causes of Latin American social revolutions'.

<sup>15</sup> Foran, 'The Comparative–historical sociology of Third World social revolutions'.

<sup>16</sup> Saddam Hussein, it is true, legitimates his rule through institutional arrangements that include elections. And

- Fidel Castro in Cuba does the same, apparently. But I shall argue that Hussein and Mobutu are the closest to the pure type of dictator that has proven vulnerable to revolution, in the mould of Porfirio Diaz, Batista, the shah of Iran, or Somoza, whereas the Cuban Revolution has deep roots in Cuban society, and the current Iranian regime, though less solidly legitimated, can claim something similar.
- <sup>17</sup> Peter Evans has used Zaire as the prototype case of his evocatively labelled 'predatory state'. Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995. The predatory state is one in which maximisation of individual wealth by an elite takes precedence over and prevents attainment of collective social goals.
- <sup>18</sup> This earlier version, with these speculations, appeared as a 1996 working paper of the International Institute at the University of Michigan.
- <sup>19</sup> Evans reports World Bank and other data showing a decline in per capita GNP of 2% a year since 1965, as well as a destruction of the road system from 90 000 to 6000 miles. Evans, *Embedded Autonomy*, p 43.
- <sup>20</sup> Zaire is discussed in Richard Snyder, 'Combining structural and voluntarist explanatory perspectives: paths out of sultanistic dictatorships', forthcoming in H E Chehabi & Juan J Linz (eds), *Sultanistic Regimes*. Some of the disarray of the opposition before 1996 is conveyed by John Darnton, 'Zaire drifts into anarchy as authority collapses', *New York Times*, 24 May 1994. Other relevant works include Winsome J Leslie, *Zaire: Continuity and Political Change in an Oppressive State* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993; Makau wa Mutua, *Zaire: Repression as Policy: A Human Rights Report*, New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1990; Michael G Schatzburg, *The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988; Cindy Shiner, 'Zaire's weighty crisis persists', *Africa News*, 36(1), 1992, pp 1-3; and C Young, 'Zaire—the shattered illusions of the integral state', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 37(2), 1994, pp 247-263.
- <sup>21</sup> On the political economy of Iraq see: Marion Farouk-Sluglett & Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship*, London: Kegan Paul, 1987.
- <sup>22</sup> On the nature of the regime see Samir al-Khalil, *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989; Middle East Watch, *Human Rights in Iraq*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990; and CARDRI (eds) *Saddam's Iraq—Revolution or Reaction?*, London: Zed Press, 1985.
- <sup>23</sup> Economic conditions in Iraq have been hard, especially in 1991-92, followed by some stabilisation (and continued hardship) at a lower level of activity since.
- <sup>24</sup> A White House official said on 18 March 1991: 'We had been assuming all along that Saddam would survive the war and that he would survive the current fighting in Iraq. The feeling was that after the dust settled, and Iraq found itself still saddled with sanctions and war reparations payments, they would start looking for scapegoats and Saddam would eventually fall'. *New York Times*, 18 March 1991. Hopes are aroused periodically by reports of internal disagreements among Hussein's inner circle, most recently when two of his sons-in-law defected in August 1995; when they returned in February 1996, they were gunned down in a Baghdad street, *New York Times*, 25 February 1996.
- <sup>25</sup> This refers to a successful process of consolidation of the revolution, in addition to its institutionalisation. On this distinction, see Eric Selbin, *Modern Latin American Revolutions*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993.
- <sup>26</sup> On developments in Iran since 1989, see Anoushiravan Ehteshami, *After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic*, New York: Routledge, 1995; Massoud Karshenas & M Hesham Pesaran, 'Economic reform and the reconstruction of the Iranian economy', *Middle East Journal*, 49(1), 1995, pp 89-111; Homa Omid, *Islam and the Post-Revolutionary State in Iran*, New York: St Martin's, 1994; Haggag Ram, 'Crushing the opposition: adversaries of the Islamic Republic of Iran', *Middle East Journal*, 46(3), 1992, pp 426-439; and Saeed Rahnama & Sohrab Behdad (eds) *Iran After the Revolution, Crisis of an Islamic State*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1996. For scattered evidence of local agitations and unrest inside the country, see *New York Times*, 1,12 June, 1992; 5 April/30 May 1995.
- <sup>27</sup> On Egyptian political economy, see Galal A Amin, *Egypt's Economic Predicament: A Study in the Interaction of External Pressure, Political Folly and Social Tension in Egypt, 1960-1990*, Leiden: E J Brill, 1995; Robert Springborg, *The Political Economy of Mubarak's Egypt*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989; and Derek Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990*, London: Routledge, 1993. On the opposition, see Karim el-Gawhary, 'Report from a war zone: Gama'at vs government in Upper Egypt, *Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)*, Report, number 194/95, May-June/July-August 1995, pp 49-51; Giles Keppel, 'Islamists versus the state in Egypt and Algeria', *Daedalus*, 124(3), 1995, pp 109-127; and Patrick D Gaffney, *The Prophet's Pulpit: Islamic Preaching in Contemporary Egypt*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994.
- <sup>28</sup> Like many Middle East specialists, I prefer the term 'Islamist' to 'fundamentalist' because of the imprecision and stereotypical connotations of the latter (among other reasons).
- <sup>29</sup> Casandra, 'The impending crisis in Egypt', *Middle East Journal*, 49(1), 1995, pp 9-27.
- <sup>30</sup> In what sense was Cuba dependent on the USSR? Eighty percent of trade was with that country and there was the yearly subsidy of \$3-5 billion that was used to keep Cuba going. But was the USSR exploiting Cuba in the way we usually mean when we speak of dependency? It was not making a profit in Cuba. The

- problem now is that after the Soviet Union's collapse, as Russia goes through the process of putting its own economic house in order, it has long since concluded that it can no longer afford to subsidise Cuba.
- <sup>31</sup> See the flurry of articles in the *New York Times*, 27, 28, 29 February, 1, 15 March 1996.
- <sup>32</sup> On Castro's views and the July 26 Movement's positions, see Terence Cannon, *Revolutionary Cuba* (New York: Thomas Y Crowell, 1981. pp 54–57, 97; United States National Archives (USNA), 737.00/8-458, Foreign Service Despatch 5, Park Wollam, Santiago de Cuba, to State Department, 4 August 1958, p 11; 'Ideario economico del Veinte y Seis de Julio', found in USNA, 837.00/3-959, Foreign Service Despatch 982, Gilmore, Havana, to State Department, 9 March 1959; and Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution*, pp 176–178. The arguments in this and the next two paragraphs are taken from Foran, 'Discourses and social forces'.
- <sup>33</sup> Interestingly the reception of Castro's message in the USA echoes the Cuban side of the story, both in its diversity and diffuseness, but also in the transparency of its reading by radicals. See the extraordinary revisionist account of these matters by Van Gosse, *Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America and the Making of a New Left*, London: Verso, 1993.
- <sup>34</sup> This reading contradicts Forrest Colburn's thesis (in *The Vogue of Revolution in Poor Countries*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994) that Third World revolutionary regimes have been uniformly Marxist–Leninist in political culture. Cuba is, to be sure, Marxist–Leninist, but *à la cubana*.
- <sup>35</sup> Quotes are from the *New York Times* 11, 12 January 1993.
- <sup>36</sup> A sampler of recent works on Peru and Sendero Luminoso would include: Manuel Jesús Granados, *El PCP Sendero Luminosa y su Ideología*, Lima: EAPSA, 1992; Nelson Manrique, 'Political violence, ethnicity and racism in Peru in time of war', *Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies*, 4(1), 1995, pp. 5–18; Philip Mauceri, 'State reform, coalitions, and the neoliberal *autogolpe* in Peru', *Latin American Research Review*, 30(1), 1995, pp 7–37; 'Fatal attraction: Peru's Shining Path', *North American Report on the Americas*, XXIV(4), 1990/1991; David Scott Palmer, 'Rebellion in rural Peru: the origins and evolution of Sendero Luminoso', *Comparative Politics*, 18, 1986, pp 127–146; David Scott Palmer (ed), *The Shining Path of Peru*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1992; David Pion-Berlin, *The Ideology of State Terror: Economic Doctrine and Political Repression in Argentina and Peru*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989; Deborah Poole & Gerardo Renique, *Peru: Time of Fear*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1993; Linda J Seligman, *Between Reform and Revolution: Political Struggles in the Peruvian Andes, 1969–1991*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995; Orin Starn, 'New literature on Peru's Sendero Luminoso', *Latin American Research Review*, 27(2), 1972, pp 212–226; Susan J Stokes, *Cultures in Conflict: Social Movements and the State in Peru*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995; and Simon Strong, *Shining Path: The World's Deadliest Revolutionary Force*, London: Harper Collins, 1992.
- <sup>37</sup> Per capita GNP declined by 20% from 1988 to 1989. Benjamin Keen, *A History of Latin America*, Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin, 1996, p 405.
- <sup>38</sup> There is no doubt that the army engaged in a vicious counterinsurgency in the countryside against Sendero. Sendero denies that it has practised terror against non-military targets, but this has been documented to some degree, at least. A lively discussion of the politics of Sendero from various points of view has taken place on the internet on the 'marxismist' (marxism@jefferson.village.virginia.edu for 17 February and 3 March 1996).
- <sup>39</sup> Selbin, *Modern Latin American Revolutions*, p 148.
- <sup>40</sup> I have elaborated on the thesis of the limits of the political culture of the Salvadoran left in 'Discourses and social forces'.
- <sup>41</sup> 'Polls showed that between 70 and 90 percent of the public approved of the *autogolpe*'. Keen, *A History*, p 407. However suspect, this appears to indicate real support among some segment of the population.
- <sup>42</sup> Daniel Wayne, 'Shining Path endures', *Latnamerica Press*, 21 March 1996, pp 1, 8.
- <sup>43</sup> This discussion is based on a reading of the English-language press, especially the *New York Times* and the *Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs*. Recent scholarly work on the movement includes Abdellah Hammoudi & Stuart Schaar (eds) *Algeria's Impasse*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Center of International Studies, 1995; Robert Mortimer, 'Islamists, soldiers, and democrats: the second Algerian war,' *Middle East Journal*, 50(1), 1996, pp 18–39; Reporters Sans Frontières, *Le drame algerien: un peuple en otage*, Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1994; and Susan Waltz, *Human Rights and Reform: Changing the Face of North African Politics*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995.
- <sup>44</sup> Val Moghadam, 'Gender and revolutions', in Foran, *Theorizing Revolutions*, pp 137–167; and Marnia Lazreg, 'Feminism and difference: the perils of writing as a woman on women in Algeria', in Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller (eds), *Conflicts in Feminism*, New York: Routledge, 1990, pp 326–348.
- <sup>45</sup> *New York Times*, 26 June 1997.
- <sup>46</sup> Interestingly, elections require less popular support for a regime change than the great social revolutions. The classic case of a narrowly elected revolutionary regime is that of Salvador Allende's Popular Unity government which took power in Chile in 1970 with 36.6% of the vote.
- <sup>47</sup> On the movement and its background, see Craig Calhoun, *Neither Gods nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for Democracy in China*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994; and Joseph

- Fewsmith, *Dilemmas of Reform in China: Political Conflict and Economic Debate*, Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1994.
- <sup>48</sup> Robin Munro, 'Who died in Beijing, and why', *The Nation*, 11 June 1990, pp 811–822.
- <sup>49</sup> The situation in China today is covered in Li Minqi, 'China: six years after Tiananman', *Monthly Review Press*, 47(8), 1996, pp 1–13.
- <sup>50</sup> For a prediction of a far less stable future for China based on the factors of population growth, faltering agriculture, and rising popular discontent, see Jack A. Goldstone, 'The coming Chinese collapse', *Foreign Policy*, 99, 1995. A recent journalistic report suggests that the current student generation's outlook is decidedly more pro-regime and nationalistic than that of 1989. Patrick E Tyler, 'China's campus model for the 90s: earnest patriot', *New York Times*, 23 April 1996. The demobilisation of student political fervour is also chronicled in Jianying Zha, *China Pop: How Soap Operas, Tabloids, and Bestsellers Are Transforming a Culture*, New York: The New Press, 1995.
- <sup>51</sup> My sources for these events include a reading of the international press, especially the *New York Times* and the UK *Guardian Weekly*, which ran dozens of articles on Zaire in the first half of 1997.
- <sup>52</sup> George Wright, 'Mobutu was "Chaos"', *Z Magazine*, June 1997, p 39.
- <sup>53</sup> *New York Times*, 27 June 1997.
- <sup>54</sup> This account of contemporary Mexico draws on Keen, *A History* and James Cockcroft, *Mexico: Class Formation, Capital Accumulation, and the State*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983. Other useful titles include Roger Bartra, *Agrarian Structure and Political Power in Mexico*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993; JM Cypher, *State and Capital in Mexico: Development Policy since 1940*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990; Nora Hamilton, *The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982; and Philip Russell, *Mexico under Salinas*, Austin, TX: Mexico Resource Center, 1994.
- <sup>55</sup> Keen, *A History*, p 301.
- <sup>56</sup> Susan Tiano, *Patriarchy on the Line: Labor, Gender, and Ideology in the Mexican Maquila Industry*, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1995. The first wave of US investment occurred during the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz (1876–1910), the second between the 1940s and 1970s.
- <sup>57</sup> UTNE Reader, January/February 1993, p 94.
- <sup>58</sup> *New York Times*, 21 September 1992; and *Latinamerica Press*, 10 December 1992.
- <sup>59</sup> On Chiapas, see Tom Barry (with Harry Browne), *Zapata's Revenge: Free Trade and the Farm Crisis in Mexico*, Boston, MA: South End Press, 1995; Thomas Benjamin, *A Rich Land, A Poor People: Politics and Society in Modern Chiapas*, Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1989; George A Collier (with Elizabeth Lowery Quaratiello), *Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas*, Oakland, CA: Food First/Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1994; Dan La Botz, *Democracy in Mexico: Peasant Rebellion and Political Reform*, Boston, MA: South End Press, 1995; Philip Russell, *The Chiapas Rebellion*, Austin, TX: Mexico Resource Center, 1994; John Ross, *Rebellion from the Roots: Indian Uprising in Chiapas*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1995; and *Shadows of Tender Fury: The Letters and Communiqués of Subcomandante Marcos and the Zapatista Army of National Liberation*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1995. The works of anthropologist Jan Rus are also crucial for understanding the rebellion, among them 'Land adaptation to global change: the reordering of native society in highland Chiapas, 1974–1994', in *Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe*, 58, 1995, pp 82–91.
- <sup>60</sup> On women see *Santa Barbara News Press*, 21 January 1994. The Mexican paper *La Jornada* (9 March 1996) reported a demonstration of 5000 indigenous women in San Cristobal de las Casas on International Women's Day, 1996.
- <sup>61</sup> *Latinamerica Press*, 20 January 1994, quote rephrased.
- <sup>62</sup> *New York Times*, 4 January 1994.
- <sup>63</sup> The Mexican government revealed his name in February 1995, hoping to undermine his incredible charismatic popularity, which seems not to have happened. *New York Times*, 11 February, 5 October 5, 1995; and *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 February 1995. Rafael Sebastián Guillén Vicente is variously described as 'a prize-winning sociology student', former professor of communications, son of a furniture salesman from Tampico, and comrade of the Sandinistas.
- <sup>64</sup> *New York Times*, 4, 9 January 1994.
- <sup>65</sup> According to the *New York Times*, 26 January 1994.
- <sup>66</sup> *New York Times*, 23 January 1994.
- <sup>67</sup> *New York Times*, 21 January 1994. It is worth noting that there are reports of local guerrilla insurgencies in 'a wide array of places', according to a personal communication from Eric Selbin, 6 May 1996.
- <sup>68</sup> On daily life in Mexico today, see Judith Adler Hellman, *Mexican Lives*, New York: New Press, 1994. On US support for the regime, see Jeff Garth & Elaine Sciolino, 'IMF head: he speaks, and money talks', *New York Times*, 2 April 1996.
- <sup>69</sup> All of these features of Boolean analysis are clearly explained in Charles C Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987.

- <sup>70</sup> Note the assumption in this kind of work that there may be multiple paths to the same outcome. A second assumption is that causality tends to be conjunctural; that is, that combinations of factors produce outcomes.
- <sup>71</sup> Or, as E P Thompson described England in 1831–32, ‘within an ace of a revolution’. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, New York: Vintage, 1966 [1963], p 817; see also pp 808–809.
- <sup>72</sup> For other analyses along somewhat similarly sceptical lines, see Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow & Charles Tilly, ‘To map contentious politics’, *Mobilization*, 1(1), 1996, pp 29–31; and Sidney Tarrow, ‘Fishnets, internets, and catnets: globalization and transnational collective action’, forthcoming in Michael Hanagan *et al*, *The Past and Future of Collective Action*.
- <sup>73</sup> Douglas Kellner, ‘The end of orthodox Marxism’, in Antonio Callari, Stephen Cullenberg & Carole Biewener (eds) *Marxism in the Postmodern Age: Confronting the New World Order*, New York: Guilford, 1995, p 40.

# The Round Table

## EDITOR

**Peter Lyon**, *Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, UK*

Supported by an International Editorial Board

Founded in 1910, **The Round Table** provides analysis and commentary on all aspects of international affairs. The journal is the major source of coverage of the policy issues concerning the contemporary Commonwealth and its role in international affairs, with occasional articles on themes of historical interest.

## SUBSCRIPTION RATES

*Volume 86, 1997, 4 issues. ISSN 0035-8533.*

*Institutional rate: EU £168.00; Outside EU £198.00; North America US\$364.00.*

*Personal rate: EU £44.00; Outside EU £50.00; North America US\$92.00.*



CARFAX

*Carfax Publishing Limited*

*PO Box 25 • Abingdon • Oxfordshire OX14 3UE • UK*

*Tel: +44 (0)1235 401000 • Fax: +44 (0)1235 401550*

*E-mail: sales@carfax.co.uk • WWW: http://www.carfax.co.uk*



CARFAX