

# Forced Migration and Destination Choice: Armenian Forced Settlers and Refugees in the Russian Federation

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Liesl A. Riddle\* and Cynthia Buckley\*

## ABSTRACT

Many analysts have criticized resettlement institutions for placing displaced people in inappropriate and desolate areas. This article seeks to determine the extent to which the Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS) plays an active, systematic role in the placement of dislocated peoples, focusing on refugees (*bezhtentsii*) and forced settlers (*pereselentsii*) in the Russian Federation arriving from the Republic of Armenia.

Using data on regional-level forced migrations flows, we investigate structural- and choice-based models for the prediction of settlement patterns.

Findings indicate that variables associated with models of individual choice best predict the resettlement pattern for forced settlers and refugees from the Armenian Republic in the Russian Federation. Our findings question previously held assumptions regarding the meaning of refugee status and the influence of institutions on settlement location patterns.

## INTRODUCTION

The former Soviet Union has witnessed major population flows between the 15 successor states since 1991. While net flows are appreciably smaller than originally anticipated, the Russian Federation has become the most likely destination of migrants between the successor states. Large numbers of refugees and forced settlers seeking asylum in Russia have taxed the resources available through the Federal Migration Service of Russia (FMS), the administrative arm of the Federation responsible for assistance in the settlement of those forced

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\* Population Research Center and Department of Sociology, The University of Texas, Austin.

from their homelands (Kozlova, 1994). While government officials, demographers, and assistance recipients have harshly criticized the statistical record keeping and assistance provision of the FMS, it remains the sole administrative unit keeping wide-scale records on officially registered refugees and forced settlers as well as on the distribution of federal resettlement compensation.

The officially prescribed role for the FMS is to facilitate resettlement of individuals from areas of the former Soviet Union within the Federation, to assist with the resettlement of individuals from within the Federation, and to keep account of registered population movements. Its mandate was expanded recently to include prevention of illegal migration into and within the Russian Federation (“Report on Implementation...”).

However, the most important and challenging responsibility of the FMS is the integration of refugees and forced migrants into the social fabric of the Russian Federation. In 1996, nearly US\$ 90 million dollars were devoted to minimum payments for social protection, including organizational costs, emergency housing provision, job placement, and other services (“Report on Implementation...”). While officially refugees and forced migrants are granted the same rights as other citizens, the FMS plays an active role in directing resettlement patterns. Individuals granted refugee status are required to remain at their temporary residence site for no more than three months during which they are offered an officially proscribed list of approved areas of residence by FMS officials. Refugees and forced migrants select a location from the available list, or may choose to reside with relatives who must submit an official agreement for cohabitation (“Law of the Russian Federation...”).

Many analysts have criticized resettlement institutions in other countries for placing displaced persons in inappropriate and desolate areas (Gordenker, 1987; Jenny, 1984; and Meznaric, 1995). Our objective in this article is to determine the extent to which the FMS plays an active, systematic role in the placement of dislocated peoples, focusing on refugees (*bezidentsii*) and forced settlers (*pereselentsii*) in the Russian Federation arriving from the Republic of Armenia.<sup>1</sup> Using data on regional-level migration flows, we investigate whether the FMS settles displaced peoples in disadvantaged areas. We have selected a migrant stream with a particular expected resettlement preference – to relocate in urban areas already settled by their co-ethnics – to examine whether actual resettlement trends match expected patterns.

## CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE TERM “REFUGEE”

Theoretical and empirical literature clearly distinguish displaced peoples from other migrants in terms of migration motivation and destination choice (e.g. Gold, 1987; Gordenker, 1987; Jenny, 1984; and Meznaric, 1995). In such

analyses, displaced peoples are not viewed typically as being in a position to assess potential costs and benefits associated with various destinations. In extreme cases, their choice to move is seen as a means of physical survival. Often there is a disjuncture between a refugee's location choice and the resettlement location preferred by the host government (Gordenker, 1987). Faced with scarce resources to achieve numerous costly national goals, host governments generally demand minimization of administrative and monetary costs when directing resettlement programmes. Yet the most cost-effective areas are often quite different and distant from those desired by refugees themselves.

In many ways, destination preference runs counter to the very conceptualization of refugee status. The most widely quoted definition of a refugee is the legal language in the UN Convention on Refugees of 1951 and the Protocol of 1967. The 1967 Protocol defines a refugee as

“Every person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (U.N. Protocol of 1967 as quoted in Keely, 1981).

Several authors have recognized the limited and insufficient scope of this definition (Keely, 1981; Gordenker, 1987; and Meznaric, 1995) and supplement it with the extension created by the Organization for African Unity in 1969, which includes individuals fleeing “external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order” in his or her country of origin (Holborn, 1975).

These definitions point to the immediacy and critical nature of the refugee's decision-making process and create an image of a desperate individual who is implicitly assumed to be better off at any destination other than his or her origin. Issues concerning choice, planning and destination preference are typically not addressed in discussions regarding refugee resettlement. This approach is clear in the 1992 legislative definition of refugees (*bezidentsii*) and forced settlers (*pereselentsii*) in the Russian Federation, under which refugees are persons without Russian citizenship who arrive or intend to arrive in the Russian Federation as a result of *actual* persecution or violence or *threat* of such violence due to political convictions, social status, religion, ethnicity, or language. Forced settlers are defined similarly but refer to only those who have established Russian citizenship (FMS, 1994; Andreev et. al., 1995).<sup>2</sup> According to this framework, refugees are seen as distinct from economic migrants, even though they may experience economic benefit from their move.<sup>3</sup>

## ARMENIAN REFUGEE AND FORCED MIGRANT RESETTLEMENT IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Armenian refugee and forced migrant inflows into the Russian Federation provides an opportunity to test the potential decisive institutional effect of the FMS resettlement programme. Armenians are often characterized by their powerful sense of ethnic identity and strong familial ties. This strong concept of community may make locations with pre-existing Armenian populations appealing to Armenian migrants. Established enclaves of co-ethnics could provide much-needed social networks for migrants, easing the costs associated with adaptation to their new environment (Hugo, 1981; Portes and Bach, 1985; Grieco, 1987; Massey et al., 1987; Massey, 1988; and Morawska, 1990). However, territories with substantial resident Armenian populations are quite dissimilar to typical FMS resettlement locations; they are often highly urban areas where cost of living is high and available housing scarce.

Armenian refugees and forced settlers comprise a small percentage of overall immigration to Russia (Figure 1, page 250). The majority of immigrants to the Russian Federation originate from the Central Asian republics (49.75 per cent), the Slavic nations of Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova (29.79 per cent) and the non-Armenian Caucas nations of Georgia and Azerbaijan (12.14 per cent). The remaining immigrant streams originate from the Baltic states (5.11 per cent) and other, mostly European, nations (16 per cent).

Armenia's contribution to the Russian Federation's immigrant population constitutes a substantial percentage of its 1989 national population. Between 1991-1995, approximately 5 per cent of the population of the Armenian Republic emigrated to Russia,<sup>4</sup> compared with 4.4 per cent of the population of Central Asian nations and 4.4 per cent of other Caucas nationals. Only 2.4 per cent of the Slavic nations' population and 2.2 per cent of the Baltic states' population emigrated to Russia during this period.

Armenian out-migration cannot be adequately explained by the out-migration of ethnic Russians alone, a process often touted as the main motivation for inter-republic migration in the early 1990s (Dunlop, 1993, 1994).<sup>5</sup> Although annual refugee/forced settler ethnic composition statistics are not available from the Russian FMS, existing data show that Armenia has long been an ethnically homogeneous nation (Figure 2, page 251), and that ethnic Armenians have dominated the migrant inflow from the Republic of Armenia to the Russian Federation (Table 1, page 252). Since Armenia possesses a substantial inter-marriage rate with non-Armenians, many Russian emigrants from Armenia could be those accompanying ethnic Armenian spouses (Fisher, 1980). Thus, it is assumed that ethnic Armenians comprise a substantial majority of all refugee movement from Armenia into the Russian Federation.<sup>6</sup>

Many Armenians have expressed a desire to leave their strife-stricken homeland. A 1993 survey of 1,200 residents of the Armenian cities of Erevan, Gyumri, and Ashtarak, found that 70 per cent indicated they would leave Armenia if given a chance, and 50 per cent of parents expressed the wish for their children to leave the country (Pogosyan, 1993). Frustrated and impoverished by increasing unemployment, vast underemployment, and shrinking real per capita GDP, the results of market reform measures and a costly border war with the Republic of Azerbaijan, many Armenians have left their homes to seek a better future. In addition, border regions with Azerbaijan continue to experience periodic outbreaks of warfare in relation to the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, forcing inhabitants to flee escalating ethnic hostilities.

The Russian Federation is an understandable choice for refugees and forced settlers from the regions of the former Soviet Union generally, and Armenia specifically. Approximately 17 per cent of the world's 9 million Armenians live in the Russian Federation.<sup>7</sup> The historical relationship between Russia and Armenia has been close and far less contentious than relationships between Russia and other states in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Compared with the neighbouring state of Georgia, Russia is politically and economically more stable, and in contrast with the border states of Azerbaijan and Turkey, Russia may be more receptive to inflows of ethnic Armenians. Figure 3 (page 251) shows that there has been substantial net migration from the Republic of Armenia to the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet period.

Armenians in the former Soviet Union and presently in the Russian Federation tend to be highly educated urbanites, well-represented among the scholarly and artistic communities as well as in business (Bromlei and Skartan, 1983). Many from Armenia are urbanites. In 1993, 63 per cent of immigrants from Armenia to Russia were from urban areas of Armenia (GosKomStat Rossii, 1995b).

Ethnic Armenians traditionally serve as "middleman minorities" in this region, providing linkages between producers and consumers in the host nation economy (Bonacich, 1973; Arutyunyan, 1993; Buckley, 1997). In Russia and other host nations, diaspora Armenians assume the role of the Simmelian "stranger", fixed within the particular spatial group of the host nation yet distanced and differentiated from the host nation's culture. Because of their roles as middleman minorities and strangers, Armenians tend to live together in enclaves (Arutyunyan 1993; Bakalian, 1993; Kolack, 1991). In 1989, the majority of Armenians in the Russian Federation were concentrated in ten *oblasts* and autonomous areas (Table 2, page 252).

Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Armenians generally preferred to migrate to areas within the Union heavily populated by co-ethnics, and more specifically by persons from the same region within Armenia. *Zemlachestvo*, or

the importance to community and familial networks in determining destination choice, has long played an important role in migration within the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union (Buckley, 1991; and Korel, 1989). Migration destination is linked to the prior presence of group members and the density of social networks between those resident at the destination and migrants. During the last three years, settlement patterns of ethnic Armenians moving into the Russian Federation have assumed a systematic pattern, confirming the importance of *zemplachestvo*. In 1993-1995, the top three receiving territories within the Russian Federation were Krasnodarskii Krai, Rostovskaia and Stavropolskii Krai. In 1989, the ethnic Armenian population in these three territories comprised approximately 60 per cent of the total Armenian population in the Russian Federation (Table 2).

### STRUCTURAL VERSUS CHOICE MODELS OF RESETTLEMENT

What explains this concentrated pattern of resettlement? Are Armenian refugees and forced settlers similar to migrants in settlement patterns (indicating some potential for residence choice), or are resettlement patterns for refugees and forced settlers different? Previous studies on resettlement argue that refugees are not typically accorded input into residence location (Gold, 1987; Gordenker, 1987; Jenny, 1984; Meznaric, 1995). Rather, host governments – and in some cases supranational organizations – decide if refugees should be settled in the country of first possible asylum or whether they should be sent to third-country nations or even repatriated (Gordenker, 1987; Keeley, 1981). These structural approaches assume that placement choice is influenced mainly by a host country's perception of what benefits (if any) refugees have to offer the host nation, availability of local resources, and incentives proffered by supranational organizations. Thus, in general, refugees appear to be resettled in areas convenient for the host nation, not necessarily in the location most appropriate for the refugees themselves.

According to this structural model of resettlement, refugees are most often relegated to less densely populated rural areas where competition over housing and jobs are minimized (Gordecker, 1987). In remote areas, newcomers are less likely to incite hostility from local residents, and costs of settlement are much lower than in more dense, urban areas (Gold, 1987; Gordecker, 1987). If such a model explains Armenian resettlement patterns in the Russian Federation, one would expect Armenian refugees to settle in territories with a high proportion of rural population, low cost of living, low unemployment, and available housing. Settling refugees in such an environment would circumvent further stress on extremely taxed labour markets in the Russian Federation's urban areas and minimize resource strain.

Our survey utilizes data from the 1994 Russian microcensus concerning the estimated proportion of *oblast* level populations resident in rural areas, as well as estimated income required for the adult social minimum,<sup>8</sup> reported unemployment, and the number of newly constructed residential dwellings by *oblast* for year-end 1994. If a systematic, structural effect on refugee and forced migrant resettlement is occurring, we would also expect that the migration streams of non-Armenian refugees and forced settlers would predict where Armenian refugees are placed. As an indicator of the overall migratory stream, we utilize the number of registered non-Armenian refugees and forced migrants per 10,000 population for each *oblast* of the Russian Federation. If the FMS relocation process follows this structural pattern in terms of the relocation of Armenian displaced peoples, we would expect Armenian resettlement to be high in predominantly rural territories where the cost of living and unemployment are low. We would also expect Armenian refugee resettlement patterns to be similar to non-Armenian refugee and forced migrant resettlement distributions.

*H<sub>structural</sub>* : *Armenian refugee and forced migration resettlement will be high in rural areas where the cost of living and unemployment are low. In addition, Armenian refugee resettlement patterns will be similar to non-Armenian refugee and forced migrant resettlement distributions.*

In contrast, literature concerning the settlement choice of migrants places a greater emphasis on individual location preferences, long-term planning horizons and active decision-making. The traditional microeconomic model of international migration assumes that migrants have the choice to move or stay put, and are able to move when and where they please based upon the calculation of costs and benefits to a specific location (Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro 1969, 1976, and 1989; DaVanzo, 1980). In this framework, international migration is viewed as an investment in human capital; an individual moves where he/she believes he/she will be most productive over a specific period. For each location, costs of movement are subtracted from perceived future gains – both pecuniary and psychic. After comparing each alternative, the potential migrant eventually chooses the location where the expected discounted net returns are greatest (Borjas, 1990).

For the Armenian migrant, several factors might enhance the attractiveness of certain destinations in the Russian Federation. First, *zemplachestvo* might play a particular role in destination choice. Enclave social networks and familial ties in particular might decrease an Armenian migrant's perceived costs of movement to enclave areas. Second, urban locations might be attractive destination areas for Armenian migrants since their middleman commercial skills are particularly suited to the urban environment. Finally, movement to destination areas in close proximity to the Republic of Armenia might be perceived as less

costly and therefore more attractive to Armenian migrants. Thus, presence of an Armenian resident population, urban population, and close proximity to Armenia might be salient determinants of non-forced Armenian migration destination choice.

We posit that, if given a choice, Armenian refugee resettlement location preferences could be similar to those for non-forced migrants. If a choice-oriented model would better explain the resettlement pattern of Armenian refugees in the Russian Federation, we would expect them to settle in areas with a substantial proportion of resident Armenians, high proportions of urban populations, and close proximity to the Republic of Armenia. In addition to the indicators discussed above, we incorporate a 6-point scale to indicate *oblast* distance from the Armenian-Russian border and the reported proportion of the *oblast* population self-identifying as ethnic Armenian in the 1989 Soviet Census to the model.

*H<sub>choice</sub>* : *Armenian refugee and forced migrant resettlement will be high in urban areas with substantial proportions of resident Armenians that are close in proximity to the Republic of Armenia.*

## DATA AND METHODS

Our analysis evaluates the fit between structural and choice variables of resettlement and the residential location of Armenian refugees in the Russian Federation between 1993 and 1995. The dependent variable, intensity of Armenian resettlement, is defined the number of Armenian refugees who entered the Russian Federation between 1993-1995 per 10,000 population for each *oblast*.<sup>9</sup> Structural-specific variables in the model include average monthly cost of living, new housing construction, and the intensity of non-Armenian refugee and forced migrant settlement within a territory. Distance from the Republic of Armenia and the proportion of Armenian population in 1989 are the two choice-specific variables incorporated into the model. Per cent of urban area and unemployment are also included, for a structural argument would expect a territory's low percentage of urban area and unemployment to predict resettlement location, while a choice model would expect the opposite to be a prediction of settlement destination choice.

Our data are culled from official sources published by the State Committee on Statistics of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation Federal Migration Service and the State Committee on Statistics of the Russian Federation.<sup>10</sup> OLS regression was employed to estimate the incremental contribution of each variable on the regional settlement patterns of Armenian refugees and resettlement patterns.<sup>11</sup>

## FINDINGS

The results shown in Table 3 (page 253) provide support for the choice model of resettlement. As predicted, the significant indicators of Armenian resettlement are high concentrations of Armenian residents within the territory and close proximity to the Republic of Armenia. Additionally, the structural variable, cost of living, was also found to be significant. Other structural variables, such as new construction, per cent of urban population, and unemployment rates, were not found to be primary predictors of settlement location. The model fits the data fairly well; approximately 30 per cent of the variance in Armenian resettlement intensity is explained. These results provide evidence that Armenian refugees may be playing a larger role in resettlement location than one would expect given the administratively controlled nature of their movement and the decisive role that institutions generally play in such situations.

The above results should be viewed with caution because Soviet and post-Soviet population data are somewhat questionable. Data on refugee and forced settler flows are plagued by problems concerning under-registration (Kozlova, 1994). Statistical reliability tends to correlate with economic development of a territory. Figures reported by more rural and less-administratively sophisticated territories might not provide accurate estimates of true migration inflows for Armenians and non-Armenians. Additionally, the construction variable might serve as a poor surrogate for available housing (housing may indeed be available in areas undergoing large new construction).<sup>12</sup> The unemployment statistic is also less than completely reliable. Unemployment compensation is minimal in the Russian Federation, and not all unemployed persons register. Finally, the distance variable proves problematic as the southern tier of the Russian Federation, the region closest to Armenia, is also the territory closest to the regional conflicts in Chechnya and Ossetia. These regions have seen a dramatic influx of registered and unregistered refugees.

Despite these limitations, this analysis calls into question the appropriateness of beliefs concerning refugee input and choice in settlement location in the post-Soviet context. Armenian refugees registered with the FMS are not settling in locations different from those expected if making this decision themselves. It is uncertain whether this can be said for all incoming refugees and forced settlers. Although the positive coefficient of non-Armenian refugee and forced migrant resettlement intensity suggests Armenian resettlement patterns might be similar to those of non-Armenians, this was not found to be a statistically significant relationship in the study.

One key explanation for this resettlement pattern could be that existing Armenian enclaves are beneficial not only to incoming migrants but also to the FMS itself. Perhaps the intense social and even financial support provided by

these networks actually decreases refugee and forced migrant dependence on state services. Ethnic network research reveals that such enclaves assist newcomers in numerous ways from contributing basic household essentials to providing employment and access to capital (Portes and Bach, 1985; Greene and Butler, 1996). These pre-existing ethnic networks might significantly minimize the costs of resettling refugees.

An additional contributing factor could be the often-cited ethnic affinity between Armenians and Russians (Ziam, 1984; Smith, 1992; Behrendt, 1993). Perhaps because of this affinity, Armenian refugees are able to exert more influence on their resettlement location. Similarly, the FMS may simply assume such refugees would be better off resettled in locations with high proportions of their co-ethnics.

## CONCLUSION

This study allows us to examine the extent to which a resettlement institution affects the distribution of refugee flows into a receiving nation. In research regarding refugee movement, it is unusual to acquire statistics concerning the *size* of refugee inflow, much less information regarding *destination*. The post-Soviet context affords a unique opportunity to utilize data that, though not perfect, are at least indicative of refugee resettlement patterns, thus opening this process for investigation and analysis.

While we would undoubtedly benefit from further data collection, both quantitative and qualitative in nature, the results of this exploratory study call into question the conceptual dichotomy of refugee and migrant which permeates much of the migration literature. In addition, our findings challenge previously held assumptions regarding the meaning of refugee status and the influence of institutions on settlement location patterns. Our results indicate that destination preference – not just available space – plays a substantial role in the resettlement of refugees. Preferences may include a desire to settle in areas in which co-ethnics already reside. In terms of Armenian refugees and forced settlers, such patterns of resettlement benefit both refugees and the Russian Government as co-ethnics may ease the social and economic burdens of resettlement for refugees and forced migrants.

While the Russian Federation has witnessed a substantial increase in number of refugees and forced settlers registered with the Federal Migration Service, the exact legislative definition and unique post-colonial context of this population transfer differs from stereotypical views of refugee movements. The findings in this investigation support the inclusion of destination preference into settlement-pattern analyses of refugees and forced settlers. Further investigations

regarding refugees and forced settlers should look closely at the nature of the population movement in question, as well as examine the goals, motivations and resources of not only refugees but also the institutions that direct refugee flows.

#### NOTES

1. Due to data limitations, we focus specifically on refugee and forced settler flows from 1993-1995.
2. According to resettlement legislation adopted 19 February 1993, if a citizen of the former USSR arrives in the Russian Federation and acquires Russian citizenship, he/she is able to enjoy the benefits of citizenship but remains classified as a forced migrant. See FMS, 1994.
3. Refugees are separated from inter-republic migrants. Refugees register through FMS form B in addition to residence registration (*propiska*). In accordance with the 1994 Russian laws on refugees and forced settlers, indication of "real danger" must be provided (FMS, 1994: 71-72).
4. This is a gross underestimation, for only registered refugees and forced settlers are included in this calculation. Those who migrate without officially registering with the FMS are not included in these figures.
5. Discussion of the migration of ethnic Russians from the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union into the Russian Federation has dominated the current literature of post-Soviet migration flows. See Dunlop (1993, 1994), Shevtsova (1993), Tashchenko (1993), Buckley (1996), and Zevelev (1996) for detailed analyses of this phenomenon.
6. It should be noted that refugee/forced settler data are available for 1994. In this year, 42 per cent of all refugee/forced settlers from Armenia were ethnically Armenian, and 41 per cent were ethnic Russians. This should not be viewed as the typical ethnic profile of refugee/forced settlers from Armenia to the Russian Federation, for 1994 (see Figure 2) was anomalous in terms of the substantial out migration from Armenia to Russia witnessed that year. In fact, it could be argued that the large number of Russians leaving Armenia in 1994 greatly contributed to the peak in migration from Armenia to the Russian Federation in that year.
7. Of the remaining 7.5 million, approximately 3.5 million reside in the Republic of Armenia, 1 million in the US, 400,000 in France, while the remainder reside in Western Europe, the Middle East, and other areas (Lang and Walker, 1987).
8. The "social minimum" is calculated quarterly to reflect the minimum level of income required for basic subsistence (Samorodov, 1992).
9. This format is necessary to control for substantial population size differentiation between the *oblasts* and autonomous areas of the Russian Federation.
10. Armenian and non-Armenian refugee streams are as reported in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 in *Statistics of National Migration of the Russian Federation*, 1993, 1994, and 1995 respectively. The 1994 total territory population is calculated for 82 *oblasts* and autonomous areas and is as reported in *Russia in Figures 1995*. 1994 is chosen as a base population because it is the midpoint estimation in the time period under

investigation, 1993-1995. Cost of living and new construction statistics are taken from *Russia in Figures 1995*. Distance is an ordinal measurement, ranging from 1 to 6 representing distance from the upper boundary of the Republic of Armenia. Proportion of Armenians resident in the territory is calculated as the number of Armenians within the territory in 1989, as reported by the 1989 Census of the USSR divided by the territory's population in 1989. Percentage of urban population is reported as in *Russia in Figures 1995*, and the unemployment rate is calculated as the number of unemployed within the territory at end of year 1994 divided by the mid-year population estimate for that territory in 1994 (as reported in *Russia in Figures 1995*).

11. Tests for potential multicollinearity were run on the model. No tolerances below .5 were found.
12. For example, new housing construction could be a reflection of economic growth; in prosperous economic times, families often move out of unsatisfactory housing and build new dwellings.

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
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FIGURE 1


ARMENIAN REFUGEES AND FORCED SETTLERS AS A PROPORTION  
OF TOTAL IN-MIGRATION TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,  
1991-1995\*



\* Baltic states include Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Central Asian nations are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Other Caucasus include Azerbaijan and Georgia, while Slavic nations include Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine.


Source: GosKomStat Rossii (1996a).

FIGURE 2  
ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA, 1989



Source: New World Demographics (1992).

FIGURE 3  
NET MIGRATION FROM THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA  
TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 1990-1995



Source: GosKomStat (1996b).

TABLE 1  
 ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF IMMIGRATION FROM THE REPUBLIC  
 OF ARMENIA TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 1993-1995

Ethnicity	1993	1994	1995
Armenians	19,849	37,960	28,771
Russians	6,717	4,878	2,809
Other	3,240	3,642	2,532

Source: GosKomStat (1993, 1994a and 1995).

TABLE 2  
 REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
 WITH HIGH CONCENTRATIONS OF ARMENIANS, 1989

Region	Number of Armenians	Percentage of regional population	Percentage of Armenian population in the Russian Federation
Russian Federation , in which:	532,390	0.3	100
Republic of Buryatia	2,269	0.2	0.4
North Ossetian Ssr	13,619	2.2	2.6
Chechen and Ingush Republics	14,824	1.2	2.8
Alygeiskaia A.O.	10,460	2.4	2.0
Krasnodarskii Krai	182,217	3.6	34.2
Stavropolskii Krai	72,530	2.6	13.6
Irkutskaiia	2,833	0.1	0.5
St. Petersburg G.	12,070	0.2	2.3
Moscow G.	43,989	0.5	8.3
Rosovskaia	62,603	0.1	11.8
Chitinskaia	1,860	0.1	0.3
Total	419,274		78.8

Source: GosKomStat (1989).

TABLE 3  
 OLS REGRESSION RESULTS, INTENSITY OF ARMENIAN  
 REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT ON STRUCTURAL  
 AND CHOICE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Independent variables	Coefficients	Standard errors
<i>Constant</i>	1.322	.433
<b><i>Structural variables:</i></b>		
Average monthly cost of living	-4.16E-03*	.002
Construction of new housing	-5.461E-06	.000
Non-Armenian migration stream expressed as a percentage of total territory population 1994	9.474E-04	.002
<b><i>Choice variables:</i></b>		
Percentage of Armenian population within the territory	.263*	.247
Distance from the Republic of Armenia	-.108*	.059
<b><i>Shared variables:</i></b>		
Percentage of the population that is rural	-9.799E-04	.007
Unemployment rate	6.717	6.046
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>.289</b>	

\* p < .1

MIGRATION FORCÉE ET CHOIX D'UNE DESTINATION :  
MIGRANTS À DESTINATION IMPOSÉE ET RÉFUGIÉS ARMÉNIENS  
DANS LA FÉDÉRATION DE RUSSIE

De nombreux analystes ont reproché aux organismes de réinstallation d'implanter des personnes déplacées dans des régions impropres ou désertes. L'objet de cet article est de déterminer dans quelle mesure le Service fédéral russe de la migration prend une part active, systématique, à ce mode de réinstallation de personnes déplacées, notamment dans le cas des réfugiés (*bejentsii*) et des migrants à destination imposée (*pereselentsii*) arrivant dans la Fédération de Russie depuis la République d'Arménie.

En exploitant des données sur les courants de migration forcée au niveau régional nous avons étudié des modèles structurels et des modèles fondés sur le choix individuel, qui servent tous deux à prévoir les tendances générales des mouvements de réinstallation.

Les conclusions révèlent que les variables liées aux modèles de choix individuels sont le meilleur instrument permettant de prévoir les tendances de la réinstallation, dans la Fédération de Russie, de migrants à destination imposée et de réfugiés originaires d'Arménie. Ces constatations s'opposent aux hypothèses précédemment avancées concernant la définition du statut de réfugié et l'influence que les organismes peuvent avoir sur le profil général des lieux d'implantation.

MIGRACIÓN FORZADA Y ELECCIÓN DEL DESTINO:  
COLONOS Y REFUGIADOS FORZADOS ARMENIOS  
EN LA FEDERACIÓN DE RUSIA

Numerosos analistas han criticado a las instituciones de reasentamientos por establecer a las personas desplazadas en zonas inadecuadas y desoladas. El presente artículo trata de determinar en qué medida el Servicio Federal de Migración ruso desempeña un papel activo y sistemático en el asentamiento de poblaciones deslocalizadas, centrándose en refugiados (*bezhentsii*) y colonos forzados (*pereselentsii*) en la Federación de Rusia, procedentes de la República de Armenia.

Basándose en datos sobre migraciones forzadas en el nivel regional, hemos investigado los modelos estructurales y basados en la elección para predecir las características de los asentamientos.

Los hallazgos realizados indican que las variables asociadas a los modelos de elección individual son las más apropiadas para predecir las características de

reasantamiento en la Federación de Rusia de colonos forzados y refugiados procedentes de la República de Armenia. Nuestros hallazgos vienen a impugnar ideas previas relativas a la importancia del estatuto de los refugiados y a la influencia de las instituciones en las características de ubicación de los asentamientos.