

Best of Times, Worst of Times, and Occupational Mobility: The Case of Soviet Immigrants in Israel¹

Rebeca Raijman* and Moshe Semyonov**

ABSTRACT

This article compares the incorporation of two groups of immigrants from the former Soviet Union into the Israeli labour market.

The first group arrived in Israel in 1979 and the second group arrived in 1990. The first period was characterized by a small number of immigrants (best of times), and the second period was characterized by mass migration (worst of times).

Using data sets assembled by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, labour force status of the two groups in Israel were examined four years after arrival (1983 and 1994, respectively). We found no difference in rate of labour force participation but considerable differences in the rate of occupational mobility between the two groups of immigrants.

Specifically, the data reveal that immigrants were able to find employment in both periods. However, during periods of mass migration, recent immigrants had experienced higher rates of downward occupational mobility and greater loss of occupational status.

INTRODUCTION

This article compares the incorporation of two groups of immigrants from the former Soviet Union in the Israeli labour market. The first group arrived in Israel during 1979 (hereafter the 1980 period), and the second group arrived in Israel in 1990 (hereafter the 1990 period). While the first period is characterized

* Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Haifa, Israel.

** Tel-Aviv University, Israel.

by a small number of immigrants (best of times), the second period is characterized by mass immigration (worst of times).

From a theoretical point of view, the comparison provides a unique opportunity to examine the thesis that *context* of immigration has significant consequences for immigrants' employment opportunities and patterns of occupational mobility (Portes and Bach, 1985; Portes and Rumbaut, 1990; Semyonov and Lerenthal, 1991; Light et al., 1993; DeVoretz, 1995; Lee, 1996). Specifically, we test the thesis that conditions during periods of mass immigration are especially detrimental to the occupational and economic opportunities of immigrants (Light et al., 1993). During periods of mass migration, recent immigrants experience high risk of unemployment and downward occupational mobility. This hypothesis will be tested in the Israeli context with regard to two groups of immigrants from the former Soviet Union.

THE SETTING

Israel is a society of immigrants and their offspring. Over 50 per cent of the Jewish population were born outside the state. Indeed the social, cultural, political and economic structure of Israel has been shaped by immigration. Jewish immigrants have arrived in Israel in a sequence of waves. The first arrived at the turn of the century mainly from European countries. The second arrived shortly after statehood (1948); most came as refugees from Moslem countries in Asia and North Africa along with survivors of the holocaust. During the first decade after statehood the population of Israel tripled, due mainly to the massive immigration of refugees. Immigration during the three decades that followed was more scattered and less systematic, characterized by a slow but constant stream of immigrants from North and South America as well as immigrants from South Africa, Eastern Europe, Ethiopia and Iran.² The analysis reported in this article focuses on two periods of immigration to Israel: the early 1980s and the early 1990s.

During the 1980s, the overwhelming majority of immigrants to Israel (101,000 between 1979 and 1983) arrived from Eastern European countries, predominantly from the Soviet Union. Because of its relatively "normal size", this intake did not create unusual pressure in the Israeli labour market. The labour force increased about 0.5 per cent per year and the rate of unemployment was about 4.5 per cent. An infrastructure of public housing and support was available for all new immigrants. Indeed, immigrants were given the opportunity to spend five or six months in absorption centres where they received intensive Hebrew instruction and assistance in finding employment. They also enjoyed interim subsistence loans, tax exemptions for cars, electrical appliances and other household goods. In addition, the government provided a wide variety of retraining courses for those whose previous training and experience

were not suited to the needs of the economy. By all standards, immigration during the 1980s can be viewed as taking place under what can be called “the best of times”.

The winter of 1989 was a turning point in immigration to Israel, reversing the declining trend during the previous decade. Following the downfall of the former Soviet Union, a mass of immigrants left the Soviet Republics to settle in Israel. From the State’s vantage point, this wave has been viewed as a dream comes true. Israel has become a homeland for thousands of immigrants who had not been able to leave the Soviet Union for many decades. However, what could have been a “dream” for the state, probably became a “nightmare” for many of the 400,000 immigrants who arrived between 1990-91 in a country of only 4.5 million residents.

The social and economic conditions that characterize the 1990 period were dramatically different from those in the 1980 period. Although financial aid, tax exemptions, retraining courses and different types of assistance were still available, government intervention in immigrant absorption has declined considerably (Doron and Kargar, 1993). Furthermore, the large number of immigrants created a serious shortage of jobs and housing. For example, in 1991 there were 30,000 engineers in the Israeli labour market. The intake of 200,000 immigrants included about 22,500 engineers. Similarly, 16,000 physicians and dentists were active in Israel by 1991 and Soviet immigration brought an additional of 6,500 physicians per year, thus doubling the number of this occupational group (Beenstock and Menachem, 1997). Most of the newly arrived professionals were unable to find jobs similar to those they left in the former Soviet Union. From their point of view, this period can be described as the “worst of times”.

We identify three factors that contributed to an increase in the occupational hardships and costs among immigrants during the second period compared with the first: the size of the immigration flow; unemployment rates, and occupational composition of immigrants. These factors are not mutually exclusive but rather interrelated. Economists have estimated that the flow of 300,000-400,000 immigrants in 1990-91 (compared with 57,650 in 1979-1980) implies a growth of 11.5 per cent in the annual labour force supply compared with 0.05 per cent during the 1980s (net of the natural growth of the native population) (Ofer et al., 1991). The 1990 period has also been associated with a high (9.8 per cent) unemployment rate compared with only 4.5 per cent in the 1980 period. High proportions of highly educated professional immigrants can generate pressure on specific niches in the labour market. Thus, while other immigrant societies (e.g. US and countries in Western Europe) are faced with flows of low skill immigrants, Israel has to deal with the massive flow of high skill immigrants. Consequently, Israel needs to generate jobs for an immigrant population characterized by specific (high) human capital endowments.

DATA SOURCES AND VARIABLES

Data for the present analysis were obtained from two different data sets assembled by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. Data relating to the 1990 period were obtained from a special survey conducted among recent immigrants from the former Soviet Union in 1994. A sample of approximately 3,300 respondents was selected from the population of immigrants arriving from the republics of the former Soviet Union to Israel during the last quarter of 1990 (63,900 immigrants aged 15 and over). Data for the 1980 period were extracted from the 20 per cent sample of the 1983 Census of Population. Each cohort of immigrants was examined four years after arrival in Israel.

In each survey respondents were asked for detailed information on social, demographic and labour force characteristics. In the 1994 Survey economically active men and women (age 25-60) reported employment status and occupation both in Israel and in the home country (the former Soviet Union). In the 1983 Census respondents were asked about social and demographic attributes as well as employment status, current (1983) and five years prior to the interview. This information enabled us to trace (for new immigrants) employment and occupational status in both country of origin and in Israel. For the purpose of our study we limited the analysis to men and women aged 25 to 60 years who immigrated to Israel from the Soviet Union in 1979 and 1990.

The variables selected for the analysis are those traditionally used in research on labour market activity and status of immigrants. These include: gender (male=1), age (in years), marital status (married=1), education (in years of schooling), place of residence in Israel (major regional categories) and knowledge of Hebrew (do not speak=1). Occupations were classified once using nine major occupational categories and once on Tyree's 100 point socio-economic scale for detailed (2 digit) occupations in Israel (Tyree, 1981).³

ANALYSIS

The demographic, social and labour force characteristics of "recent immigrants" from the former Soviet Union classified by gender and by time of arrival are presented in Table 1 (page 303). Differences between the two groups of Soviet immigrants are evident with regard to age and education. Immigrants in the 1980 period were slightly younger than those who had arrived in 1990. The 1990 immigrants, however, had completed more years of formal schooling than the 1980 immigrants. Both groups had considerably higher levels of formal education than the comparable Israeli workforce.

The data also suggest that in the 1980 period, immigrants were more widely distributed across regions in Israel. The 1990 immigrants were more concentrated in the urban centre of the country (about one-third around Tel Aviv compared with 25 per cent in 1980). Apparently, when government intervention in the process of immigrants' absorption was minimal, immigrants apparently gravitated towards urban centres where occupational and economic opportunities exist.

The data do not reveal considerable differences with regard to marital status and knowledge of Hebrew (over 80 per cent of both groups of immigrants were married and about 30 per cent had no command of Hebrew). Interestingly, after four years in the host society immigrants were able to find employment regardless of specific period of arrival.⁴ Ninety per cent of males and over 80 per cent of women who were economically active in country of origin were employed in Israel four years after arrival. Similar to Beenstock and Ben Menahem (1997), we found high rates of employment among recent immigrants to Israel.

In Table 2 (page 304) we estimate a set of logistic regression equations to evaluate the extent to which social and demographic variables exert differential effect on odds for being employed in the two periods.⁵ In equation 1 we estimate the relative odds of being employed as a function of age, gender, marital status, immigration cohort, education, knowledge of Hebrew, and occupation held in the former Soviet Union. In equations 2 and 3 the same model is estimated for males and females, respectively. In equations 4 and 5 separate models are estimated for the 1980 and 1990 cohorts.

In models 1, 2, and 3, we examine the impact of period of immigration on odds for employment (for the total population of immigrants, and for males and females, respectively). Surprisingly, in all three models cohort does not exert a significant effect on odds for employment. The chances of becoming economically active shortly after arrival were quite high and equal in 1980 and 1990. After four years in the host country most immigrants are able to join the economically active labour force.⁶

Regardless of the model estimates, we find that the odds for employment in Israel are likely to decline with age and to rise with knowledge of Hebrew. Odds for employment are likely to be higher for those who were economically active in the former Soviet Union compared with those who were not economically active, regardless of occupational category. Once occupational status in country of origin is controlled for, education exerts a net significant effect on odds for employment in the 1980 period but not in the 1990 period. Married persons are more likely to find employment than non-married persons but this effect is

more pronounced and significant among males than among females and in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Models 1, 4 and 5 (which include gender in the equation) demonstrate that odds for employment are considerably greater for men than for women in both periods (3.3 times greater in 1990 and 2.5 times greater in 1980).

The findings also suggest that occupation in country of origin exerts a significant effect on immigrants' chances of finding employment. In fact, the data indicate that those who were not economically active in the former USSR were least likely to be employed in Israel (when compared with all occupational categories). However, the odds for finding employment shortly after arrival were far greater for those who had semi-professional-technical and blue collar jobs in country of origin. This finding holds for both men and women and at both points in time.

It is interesting to note some meaningful differences in the effect of occupation in country of origin on odds for employment. Most noticeable is the decline in relative odds for finding employment among those who held high status jobs in the former Soviet Union (academic, scientific and managers). More specifically, the relative odds of immigrants in the high status category to be employed (compared with out of the labour force) has declined from 6.7 to 4.1 between 1980 and 1990 (equations 4 and 5). Apparently, opportunities for finding employment in high status occupations in the new country are considerably lower at the "worst of times" than at the "best of times".

OCCUPATIONAL CHANGE

Economic activity is only one aspect of immigrants' incorporation into the labour market of the host society. The literature suggests that when immigrants become economically active, they do so at an economic and occupational cost (e.g., Borjas, 1983; Chiswick, 1978a, 1978b; Green, 1995; Raijman and Semyonov, 1995, 1997; Semyonov, 1996; Beenstock and Ben Menahem, 1997). In the transition from country of origin to country of destination most immigrants experience downward occupational mobility.

The second question addressed in this analysis is whether and to what extent the occupational cost (or downward mobility) that immigrants experience was greater in the second period (worst of times) than during the first period (best of times). To this end, in Table 3 (page 305) we compare the occupational distribution and occupational status of immigrants in the former Soviet Union and in Israel.

The data reveal, rather forcefully, that immigrants' incorporation into the Israeli labour market had been associated with a considerable loss of occupa-

tional status and that the loss was especially pronounced among 1990 immigrants. Although immigrants were able to join the economically active labour force shortly after arrival, most had to change their original occupation. To be exact, 56 per cent in 1980 and over 80 per cent in 1990 had changed their original (major) occupation upon arrival to Israel. Furthermore, when the occupational status in country of origin was compared with current status, it becomes evident that, on average, immigrants had lost occupational status. The loss was extreme in 1990 (25.4 and 17.8 status points for women and men, respectively) and lower, but quite substantial, in 1980 (6.6 and 3.4 status points for women and men respectively). In effect, at least one-third of recent immigrants had experienced downward mobility in 1980 and about two-thirds (63.7 and 74.0 per cent for men and women respectively) had experienced downward occupational mobility in 1990.⁷ Although immigrants in both periods had experienced occupational loss upon arrival, the loss was much more dramatic in the latter period.⁸

The findings further suggest that specific patterns of occupational shifts had taken place in the transition from the former USSR to Israel. The data in Appendix 1 (page 310) indicate that the representation of recent immigrants in high status (professional-managerial and scientific-academic) occupations had declined and their representation in blue collar and service occupations had increased. This trend is more pronounced in the latter period (worst of times) than in the earlier period (best of times) and among women than among men.

The specific patterns of occupational mobility between country of origin and country of destination (presented in Table 4, page 306) show the outflow percentages from each occupational category. There are clear differences in mobility patterns between the two periods. During the 1980s the downward movement was mostly within major occupational categories (i.e. engineer to technician); only a small percentage crossed the white collar – blue collar lines. In the 1990 period downward mobility was characterized by a different pattern: the mobility path was mostly across collar lines and was characterized by outflow from white collar positions to blue collar jobs (i.e. from engineer to manual or service occupations). For both periods, clerical and sales jobs are those associated with the highest rate of downward mobility; although the rate is more pronounced in the 1990 period.

The comparison between men and women reveals some meaningful differences. The flow into the “out of the labour force” category was considerably higher among women than among men in both periods. Likewise, the rate of downward mobility was considerably higher among women than among men. For example, in 1990 only 31.8 per cent of the immigrant women who had high status occupations in the former Soviet Union had attained professional jobs after arrival in Israel compared with 37.4 per cent among men. Of those who had high status occupations in country of origin, 5.2 per cent of men were out

of the labour force four years after arrival compared with 17.1 per cent among female immigrants.

In order to arrive at estimates of both *occupational retention* (immobility) and *downward mobility* in both periods, we calculated a series of logistic regression models. The results are presented in Table 5a and 5b (pages 307-308). Table 5a shows estimates of the odds of retaining occupation (major category) held in the former Soviet Union (or immobility rate). Table 5b shows estimates of the odds for downward mobility (from white collar to blue collar) in the transition from the former Soviet Union to Israel.

The findings presented in Table 5a reveal that odds for (immobility) occupational retention were considerably lower in 1990 than in 1980 (equations 1, 2 and 3). That is, the “worst of times” immigrants were less likely to retain the occupation held in country of origin. The negative effect of cohort was more pronounced for women (equation 3) than for men (equation 2). In addition, the odds for occupational retention were much lower for white collar occupations, especially clerks and sales workers, than for blue collar occupations (the omitted category).

Table 5b reveals that odds for downward mobility (from white collar to blue collar) were considerably greater in 1990 than in the 1980 period for both men and women, although the rate was more pronounced for men than for women (equations 1, 4 and 5). In addition, odds for downward mobility tend to decrease with schooling and with knowledge of Hebrew. The effect of age (with one exception) is negligible and insignificant. Rates of downward mobility vary across occupations and across periods.

To provide a clear illustration of rates of downward mobility experienced by recent immigrants in specific occupational categories, we estimated the actual predicted probabilities of mobility to blue collar occupations for different profiles of men and women.⁹ The estimated actual probabilities for different profiles of immigrants in both periods are presented in Table 6 (page 309).

The findings firmly support the argument that downward mobility is more pronounced in the period of mass immigration. In 1990 (worst of times), probability for downward mobility was twice as high than the probability in 1980 (best of times). For example, the probability for downward mobility for a male immigrant with scientific or academic occupation residing in Tel Aviv was 0.21 in 1980 and 0.51 in 1994. In a development town, the probability for downward mobility for a similar immigrant was 0.29 in the 1980 period compared with 0.61 in the 1990 period. It is interesting to note that for all occupational groupings, probabilities for downward mobility were higher for those who had clerical and sales occupations in the country of origin. When men and women are compared, it becomes apparent that the probabilities for

downward mobility were higher for men than for women in all occupational groupings.¹⁰ Finally, probabilities for downward occupational mobility were considerably higher in the periphery (where opportunities are scarce) than in urban centres.

CONCLUSION

The State of Israel, more than any other immigrant receiving society, is committed to the successful absorption of its (Jewish) immigrants. The State not only encourages immigration, but also implements programmes and policies that assist immigrants to settle in Israel, mostly through language training programmes, housing and employment. The findings reveal that the chances of becoming economically active four years after arrival were relatively high in both periods. Nevertheless, the data demonstrate that employment of recent immigrants is associated with substantial rates of downward occupational mobility.

The findings reported in this paper lend firm support to the hypothesis that rate of downward mobility is significantly higher in periods of massive immigration and economic stagnation. That is, despite social policies, *context* of immigration exerts the most pronounced effect on the rate of downward occupational mobility. The effect of period (context) is most evident even after controlling for social and demographic variables, human capital resources, and labour market experience in country of origin, and regardless of gender.

The data underscore considerable rates of downward occupational mobility in both periods. Nevertheless, the rate of downward mobility (or occupational loss) was much more pronounced in 1990 than in 1980. Furthermore, mobility patterns are different in the two points in time. In the “best of times”, the shift took place mostly within high status occupations (i.e. from engineer to technician). In the “worst of times”, mobility took place mostly across collar lines (i.e. from engineer to sanitation worker). Indeed, context of immigration exerts the most significant effect on the patterns of labour force incorporation of immigrants.

In light of these findings one may cast doubt on the effectiveness of the State’s social policies aimed at assisting immigrants. However, when considering the massive immigration (both in terms of volume and time interval) to Israel, and the fact that many of the immigrants (especially during the second period) were actually refugees, one has to consider the possibility that without government help and support, downward occupational mobility and the social turmoil associated with it could have been substantially greater.

NOTES

1. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the ISA Meeting in Quebec, RC28 on Stratification and Social Mobility, August 1997 and at the International Conference "Immigrants and Their Transition to a New Labour Market" organized by the Pinhas Sapir Center for Development at Tel-Aviv University, March, 1998. The authors wish to thank Yinon Cohen and the reviewers for their helpful suggestions, and Yasmin Alkalay and Hadas Mandel for their help in organizing the data.
2. For a detailed description of immigration flows to Israel see Goldscheider, 1996.
3. Tyree's (1981) 100-point "occupational status" was computed as the first principal component of factor analysis for average education and average income of occupation. This socio-economic scale is highly correlated ($r > .9$) with scales of occupational prestige in Israel (Kraus, 1976). Although the scales were estimated for the Israeli society, they are very similar to prestige scales in other societies. As demonstrated by Treiman (1977), hierarchies of occupational prestige and the basic structure of occupational hierarchies are similar across societies and cultures. In both data sets "Knowledge of Hebrew" was coded 1 if respondent does not speak Hebrew; 0 = other.
4. It is important to note that two years after arrival, the labour force participation rate of the 1990s immigrants in Israel was much lower than the employment rate of immigrants in the 1980s. The figures are not reported here for the sake of parsimony.
5. The logistic regression model for the log odds of employment is:

$$\text{Log} \left(\frac{i}{1-i} \right) = \text{Log } O_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \dots + \beta_n x_{in}$$
 where O_i is the conditional odds of being employed, given the explanatory variables.
6. In separate analyses, not reported here, we found that two years after arrival cohort had a significant effect on odds for employment. Immigrants arriving in the 1990 period had considerably lower odds for joining the economically active labour force compared with the 1980 immigrants.
7. In 1980, despite the loss, the occupational status of the recent immigrants was not lower than the average Israeli (Jewish) labour force. However, in 1990, despite their relative high education, the average status of recent Soviet immigrants was substantially lower than the average status among the Israeli labour force.
8. Additional information and insight into the occupational loss associated with immigration can be obtained from the comparison between immigrants' occupational distribution in the former USSR and Israel presented in Appendix 1. Indeed, the values of the index of dissimilarity presented at the bottom of the Appendix clearly indicate that the differences were far more pronounced in 1990 than in 1980. Specifically, in 1980 22.6 per cent of men and 27.5 per cent of women would have to change (major) occupational category in order to retain the same occupational distribution they had in the USSR. In 1990, however, almost twice as many immigrants (40.1 per cent of men and 50.5 per cent of women) would have to change (major) occupations to retain the same distribution they had in their country of origin.
9. In order to estimate actual migration probabilities, independent variables were given values corresponding to different assumed traits, and these values were inserted into the following equation to generate predicted probabilities:

$P = 1/(1 + e^{-BX})$, where **B** is the vector of coefficients estimated in Table 5b, **X** is the vector of assumed characteristics, and **P** is the predicted probability.

10. This finding can be explained by the different occupational structure of men and women in both country of origin and country of destination. The higher rates of downward mobility in both periods can also be explained by difference in quality of academic education between the two countries. However, we have no data to test such an argument.

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TABLE 1
 DISTRIBUTION OF DEMOGRAPHIC, SOCIAL AND LABOUR FORCE
 CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET IMMIGRANTS IN ISRAEL
 BY PERIOD AND BY GENDER
 (mean, standard deviations and percentage)

Variables	Cohort 1979		Cohort 1990	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
Age	39.8 (9.6)	40.5 (10.5)	41.3 (9.2)	41.7 (9.5)
Years of schooling	12.0 (4.4)	11.8 (4.2)	14.5 (2.7)	14.4 (2.5)
Marital Status				
Married	87.4	80.2	87.9	78.6
Divorced-widowed	4.4	16.3	4.0	16.3
Single	8.3	3.6	8.1	5.1
Knowledge of Hebrew % Does not speak	30.8	34.6	35.8	29.4
Residential Distribution				
Tel-Aviv and Central	25.3	26.1	35.0	34.7
Hafia and suburbs	14.7	15.1	14.4	14.8
Jerusalem	7.4	6.4	3.3	4.3
South	18.6	18.8	13.4	12.5
Development towns	34.1	33.5	34.0	33.8
Percentage in the labour force (Russia)	87.2	72.1	95.7	89.6
Percentage in the labour force (Israel)	89.1	71.2	93.2	79.7
Percentage in the labour force (of those employed in Russia)	94.5	82.6	94.6	81.3
N	689	812	701	799

TABLE 2
LOGISTIC REGRESSION PREDICTING EMPLOYMENT
4 YEARS AFTER ARRIVAL

Variables	Total (1)	Males (2)	Females (3)	Cohort 1980s (4)	Cohort 1990s (5)
Cohort (1990 = 1)	-.13 (.13)	-.18 (.25)	-.11 (.15)	-	-
Sex (Males = 1)	1.1* (.13)	-	-	.92* (.16)	1.2* (.19)
Age	-.04* (.01)	-.05* (.01)	-.04* (.01)	-.03* (.01)	-.05* (.01)
Marital Status (Married = 1)	.52* (.13)	1.6* (.27)	.06 (.16)	.02 (.19)	1.1* (.19)
Knowledge of Hebrew (Do not speak = 1)	-.88* (.13)	-.87* (.24)	-.89* (.15)	-.72* (.18)	-1.0* (.19)
Schooling	.05* (.02)	.04 (.03)	.05* (.02)	.07* (.02)	-.00 (.04)
Occupation in home country ^a					
Scientific-Academic Management	1.4 (1.7)	2.1* (3.4)	1.1* (2.1)	1.9* (3.2)	1.4* (1.9)
Semi-Professional and Technical	1.9* (2.1)	2.6* (5.1)	1.6* (2.2)	1.7* (2.8)	1.9* (3.2)
Bank & Sales	1.2* (.19)	1.1* (.41)	1.1* (.21)	1.2* (.24)	1.2* (.34)
Service & Blue Collar Occupations	1.9* (.17)	2.3* (3.0)	1.6* (.22)	2.1* (.22)	1.4* (.32)
Constant	1.04	1.5	1.6	.59	2.2
χ^2	607.1	204.9	313.5	380.2	248.0
N	(2,960)	(1,372)	(1,588)	(1,460)	(1,500)

^a The omitted category is out of the labour force.

TABLE 3
 LABOUR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS
 OF SOME IMMIGRANTS IN ISRAEL BY COHORT AND BY GENDER
 (mean, standard deviations and percentage)

Variables	Cohort 1979		Cohort 1990	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
Occupational Status (Russia)*	49.7 (23.6)	51.9 (21.4)	60.3 (23.0)	63.7 (20.2)
Occupational Status (Israel)*	46.5 (22.4)	45.8 (23.0)	42.4 (23.0)	38.8 (22.2)
Occupational Cost**	-3.4 (16.0)	-6.6 (15.2)	-17.8 (24.6)	-25.4 (21.0)
Occupational Mobility				
% Immobility	44.0	44.5	19.8	17.5
% Upward mobility	23.8	12.7	16.5	8.5
% Downward mobility	32.1	42.8	63.7	74.0
N	689	812	701	799

* See note 2 for further details regarding the construction of the variable occupational status.

** Occupational cost = Occupational Status in Israel - Occupational Status in Russia.

TABLE 4
 OUTFLOW PERCENTAGES
 FOR IMMIGRANTS IN ISRAEL, BY PERIOD AND BY GENDER
 (occupations in the Soviet Union to occupations in Israel)

Cohort 1979						
Occupation in Russia		Occupation in Israel 1983				
		High Status	Clerks/Sales	Blue Collar	Not in Labour force	Total
High Status	Males	68.7	4.2	23.8	3.3	100
	Females	64.9	12.5	11.6	10.0	100
Clerks/Sales	Males	8.6	20.0	54.3	17.1	100
	Females	3.8	34.3	38.1	23.8	100
Blue Collar	Males	6.5	2.9	86.1	4.5	100
	Females	1.6	8.1	69.4	21.0	100
Not in labour force	Males	19.8	4.9	23.5	51.9	100
	Females	11.9	5.5	25.2	57.3	100
Total	Males	31.7	4.7	52.2	11.5	(57.5)
	Females	28.3	13.2	29.9	28.6	(70.6)

Cohort 1990						
Occupation in Russia		Occupation in Israel 1994				
		High Status	Clerks/Sales	Blue Collar	Not in Labour force	Total
High Status	Males	37.4	5.2	52.2	5.2	100
	Females	31.8	13.9	37.1	17.1	100
Clerks/Sales	Males	19.4	16.1	51.6	12.9	100
	Females	2.2	11.0	63.7	23.1	100
Blue Collar	Males	6.6	4.8	83.4	5.2	100
	Females	3.2	10.5	61.1	25.3	100
Not in labour force	Males	6.9	6.9	48.3	37.9	100
	Females	15.7	10.8	41.0	31.5	100
Total	Males	25.2	5.6	62.3	6.9	(69.5)
	Females	23.3	12.8	43.5	20.5	(79.4)

TABLE 5a
 LOGISTIC REGRESSION PREDICTING THE ODDS
 FOR OCCUPATIONAL RETENTION 4 YEARS AFTER ARRIVAL

Variables	Total (1)	Males (2)	Females (3)	Cohort 1960s (4)	Cohort 1990s (5)
Cohort (1990s = 1)	-1.1* (.10)	-.96* (.14)	-1.2* (.15)	-	-
Sex (Males = 1)	.10 (.10)	-	-	.30 (.15)	.16 (.13)
Age	.01 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.01* (.01)	-.02* (.01)	-.01 (.01)
Marital Status (Married = 1)	-.41* (.14)	-.57* (.23)	-.35* (.17)	-.52* (.21)	-.30 (.18)
Sc schooling	0.8* (.02)	.11* (.02)	0.4 (.03)	0.8* (.02)	.07 (.03)
Knowledge of Hebrew (Do not speak = 1)	-.34* (.12)	-.12 (.15)	-.65* (.20)	-.14 (.18)	-.54* (.17)
Occupation in home country ^a					
Scientific-Academic Management	-.77* (.14)	-.82* (.18)	-.53* (.25)	-.02* (.23)	-1.3* (.19)
Semi-Professional and Technical	-.39* (.15)	-.94* (.22)	.15 (.24)	.05 (.21)	-.80* (.20)
Clerk & Sales	-1.2* (.19)	-1.7* (.37)	-.86* (.25)	-.68* (.24)	-2.1* (.35)
Constant	-.43	-.32	-.29	-1.3	-.50
X ²	228.24	114.0	142.2	67.6	91.5
N	(2,062)	(1,009)	(96.3)	(677)	(1,205)

^a The omitted category = Service and Blue Collar Occupations.

TABLE 5b
 LOGISTIC REGRESSION PREDICTING THE ODDS
 FOR DOWNWARD OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY
 AMONG NEW IMMIGRANTS 4 YEARS AFTER ARRIVAL
 (from white collar to blue collar occupations)

Variables	Total (1)	Males (2)	Females (3)	Colorit 1980s (4)	Colorit 1990s (5)
Colorit (1990s = 1)	1.3* (13)	1.3* (20)	1.4* (17)	-	-
Sex (Males = 1)	.64* (12)	-	-	.91* (23)	.54* (14)
Age	.01 (01)	.01 (01)	.01 (00)	-.00 (01)	-.02* (01)
Marital Status (Married = 1)	.46* (16)	.70* (30)	.41* (18)	-.01 (29)	.63* (18)
Schooling	-.18* (03)	-.21* (04)	-.15* (03)	-.20* (03)	-.16 (03)
Knowledge of Hebrew (Do not speak = 1)	.43* (15)	.37 (21)	.46* (19)	.27 (27)	.48* (16)
Occupation in home country ^a					
Scientific-Academic Management	-.62* (18)	.10 (32)	-.97* (23)	-.84* (34)	-.58* (23)
Semi-Professional and Technical	-.40* (18)	.38 (33)	-.74* (21)	-.46 (28)	-.36 (23)
Constant	.69	1.3	.23	2.4	1.3
X ²	290.3	118.9	165.2	113.5	104.2
N	(1,662)	(685)	(977)	(611)	(1,051)

^a The omitted category = Clerks and Sales Occupations.

TABLE 6
 PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF DOWNWARD MOBILITY
 AMONG SPECIFIC OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS IN TWO DIFFERENT SETTINGS
 - RUSSIAN IMMIGRANTS 4 YEARS AFTER ARRIVAL

Urban Centre (Tel Aviv)				
	Cohort 1979		Cohort 1990	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
Scientific-Academic and Management	0.21	0.12	0.51	0.35
Semi-professional and Technical	0.25	0.14	0.56	0.40
Clerks/Sales	0.33	0.21	0.66	0.51

Periphery				
	Cohort 1979		Cohort 1990	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
Scientific-Academic and Management	0.29	0.18	0.61	0.45
Semi-professional and Technical	0.33	0.21	0.66	0.50
Clerks/Sales	0.43	0.28	0.74	0.60

APPENDIX 1
 OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET IMMIGRANTS IN ISRAEL
 BY PERIOD OF ARRIVAL AND BY GENDER
 (percentage)

MALES				
	Cohort 1979		Cohort 1990	
	Russia	Israel	Russia	Israel
Academic and Scientific	26.2	20.0	35.0	17.4
Semi-professionals	13.3	12.0	13.0	8.8
Managers	2.9	2.2	13.0	1.1
Clerks	3.4	3.5	1.6	2.8
Sales	4.0	2.4	3.0	3.2
Services	5.1	6.4	1.8	9.4
Skilled-Unskilled	45.0	53.6	32.6	57.4

FEMALES				
	Cohort 1979		Cohort 1990	
	Russia	Israel	Russia	Israel
Academic and Scientific	22.5	16.8	42.3	12.1
Semi-professionals	28.7	22.9	26.7	17.3
Managers	0.8	0.5	4.9	—
Clerks	18.4	15.2	9.1	10.5
Sales	4.0	2.9	3.7	5.5
Services	7.1	13.2	5.1	30.8
Skilled-Unskilled	18.6	28.4	8.3	23.9

BELLE ÉPOQUE, MAUVAISE ÉPOQUE
ET MOBILITÉ PROFESSIONNELLE:
LE CAS DES IMMIGRANTS SOVIÉTIQUES EN ISRAËL

L'article compare la façon dont deux groupes d'immigrants de l'ancienne Union soviétique se sont intégrés au marché du travail israélien.

Le premier est arrivé en Israël en 1979, le second en 1990. La première période se caractérise par un petit nombre d'immigrants (la belle époque) et la seconde par une immigration massive (une mauvaise époque).

En utilisant des séries de données rassemblées par le Bureau central de statistique d'Israël, les auteurs ont examiné la situation de la population active des deux groupes en Israël quatre ans après leur arrivée en 1983 et 1994 respectivement. Il n'a été constaté aucune différence dans le taux d'activité de la main-d'oeuvre mais des différences considérables dans le taux de mobilité professionnelle entre les deux groupes d'immigrants.

En termes plus précis, les données révèlent que les immigrants ont pu trouver des emplois au cours des deux périodes. Toutefois, pendant les époques de migration massive, les immigrants récemment arrivés ont connu des taux plus élevés de mobilité professionnelle descendante et une plus forte détérioration de leur situation professionnelle.

LA MEJOR ÉPOCA, LA PEOR ÉPOCA
Y EL CAMBIO PROFESIONAL:
EL CASO DE LOS INMIGRANTES SOVIÉTICOS EN ISRAEL

Este artículo compara la incorporación de dos grupos de inmigrantes provenientes de la ex Unión Soviética en el mercado laboral de Israel.

El primer grupo llegó a Israel en 1979 mientras que el segundo llegó en 1990. El primer período se caracterizó por un número reducido de inmigrantes (la mejor época), mientras que el segundo período se caracterizó por migraciones en masa (la peor época).

Utilizando una serie de datos acopiados por la Oficina Central de Estadísticas de Israel, se examinó la condición de la fuerza laboral de los dos grupos en Israel cuatro años después de su llegada (a saber, en 1983 y 1994 respectivamente). Entre estos dos grupos de inmigrantes no había diferencia alguna en la tasa de participación de la fuerza laboral, pero sí importantes diferencias en la tasa de cambio profesional.