Gender Frames and Collective Action: Configurations of Masculinity in the Pittston Coal Strike

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This article develops the concept of gender frame *for understanding major transformations in the collective action repertoires of social movements. Focusing on the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) strike against the Pittston Coal Group (1989-90), the article discusses the UMWA's traditional collective action repertoire and its innovation of nonviolent protest, widely employed during the strike. Interviews with major activists and UMWA staff and officers illustrate how the UMWA employed a gender frame of mining masculinities to initiate the new nonviolent strike action. The article concludes by suggesting how collective action repertoires and framing are linked and encouraging future research on gender frames in social movements.*

> "It is precisely the masculinity of mining as a task that gives gender its relevance."[1]

Coal mining is one of the most male-predominant industries in the United States. The nature of the work—underground, dangerous, and physically demanding—has marked it as one of the most romantically "masculine" occupations. The popular image of the coal miner is that of a man: brave, physically strong, militant, face blackened with coal dust, fiercely independent, anachronis-

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My work on comparative mining strikes owes much to my colleagues in political science, women's studies, and labor studies. I have benefited from discussions with Sidney Tarrow, Lee Ann Banaszak, Chris Howell, Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, David Meyer, Eve Sandberg, Mary Margaret Fonow, Myra Young Armstead, Mary Collar, Eric Karolak, Greg Kaster, Paul Mishler, Ruth Needleman, and Ellen Todd. An ideal location for considering the arguments made in this article was

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tically loyal to family and community, and violent: an image that resonates with traditional meanings of masculinity.[2] The history of mining strikes in the United States underscores the association of male miners with violence. Despite the fact that the preponderance of strike-related violence is company- or state-initiated,[3] the image of violent male miners, members of a violent union, persists.[4]

The Pittston Coal strike began on 5 April 1989, when seventeen hundred miners, members of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), struck the Pittston Coal Company in southwestern Virginia, and undertook picketing to suspend coal production at Pittston operations in Virginia and West Virginia.[5] Within a week, a Virginia Circuit Court judge issued an injunction against picketing. Precluded from legal picketing, the striking miners and their supporters turned to illegal disruptive action. Organized by the UMWA, the striking miners engaged in nonviolent civil disobedience until the strike ended, ten months later.

The UMWA strike against Pittston Coal was remarkable in many ways, and has often been identified as a major turning point for organized labor in the 1980s.[6] One of the most remarkable features of the strike was the UMWA's transformation of its collective action repertoire. Characteristic of the industrial strike tradition, the UMWA's strike repertoire had relied heavily upon conventional picketing to stop coal production during the course of contract negotiations. UMWA members rarely crossed picket lines to return to work, and the union's ability to discourage others from scabbing during strikes was the measure of its ability to achieve its contract goals. In 1989, however, the UMWA turned away from its conventional strike behavior and introduced nonconventional collective action as the foundation for achieving its strike goals. Peaceful mass sit-ins at plant gates and mine entrances became the hallmark of the UMWA's collective action repertoire in the Pittston Coal strike.

How did the UMWA, a union with an overwhelmingly male membership and an exclusively male international leadership, effect the transformation of its collective action repertoire from that of conventional picketing and associated strike violence to one of nonviolent resistance? Why did the UMWA male leadership not only turn away from its own history of violent resistance but embrace nonviolent

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This article is based in part on extensive interviews with Eddie Burke and Marty Hudson, two major field organizers for the Pittston Coal strike, and with Cecil Roberts, President of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) since 22 December 1995. Additional interviews were granted by former UMWA District 28 President Jackie Stump and UMWA former staff member Cosby Totten, and various members of the Coal Employment Project who were active in the Pittston Strike.

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civil disobedience in the face of state violence? How did the UMWA persuade its overwhelmingly male membership to change their strike behavior?

This article considers how the UMWA transformed the strike behavior of its members and how changes in traditional understandings of masculine strike action required a regendering of the role of male miners in the new strike context. In order to respond to changes in industrial relations, the economy, and state behavior, the UMWA leadership engaged in "gender framing," teaching its members new strike practices that were grounded in a new understanding of what it meant to be a "man" on strike. In considering the gender framing of collective action in the Pittston Coal strike, this article conjoins two social movement literatures. First, employing Charles Tilly's concept of "collective action repertoire," the article describes the conventional UMWA repertoire, with reference to the UMWA strike against Massey Coal in 1984, and discusses the process by which the UMWA leadership decided to transform its conventional collective action in the development of the Pittston Coal strike. Second, the new collective action repertoire is described as it unfolded during the strike, both in terms of the actions and in terms of the means by which the UMWA leadership reframed collective action in gender terms to facilitate the adoption of the new strike behaviors. As the new collective action repertoire was introduced, a gender frame that employed traditional mining masculinities was adapted as the foundation upon which the new repertoire rested. I conclude with a more general discussion of gender framing and collective action.

I. COLLECTIVE ACTION REPERTOIRES

Political movements develop a base of tactics, skills, and actions upon which they can rely strategically as they challenge authorities and make demands. Political movement actors know how to advance their demands in a conflictual context by turning to what Charles Tilly calls their "repertoires of contention."[7] Repertoires of contention consist of sets of learned behaviors that participants call upon and employ in specific social movement situations, and are manifested in "well-defined forms [of political participation] already familiar to the participants."[8] In his book *The Contentious French*, Tilly defines repertoires of contention as a "limited set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice."[9]

In employing different techniques, a group selects these collective action means from their larger repertoire: "people know the general rules of performance more or less well and vary the performance to meet the purpose at hand."[10] Groups rely on limited sets of actions, subsets of which are activated during the course of struggle with the state and/or with other groups. "People tend to act within known limits, to innovate at the margins of existing forms, and to miss many opportunities available to them in principle."[11] Groups employ specific actions, drawn from their experience, known to be successful for their group in the past. A political

movement will know that particular actions tend to succeed in achieving goals, and that movement supporters can be easily mobilized, given that they know, from experience, what to do.

At the same time, new learning can occur and new actions can be developed—or "imported" from other social movements. Repertoires change primarily through adaptation and in response to prior experience, "both the contender's own successes or failures and the contender's observation of other similar groups."[12] The most proximate struggles, and their results, have the greatest influence in repertoire transformation, although the universe of possible changes is restrained by the "limits set by the actors' own daily routines and conceptions of justice."[13] Just as not all actions are available to any given social movement, not all changes are possible.

Repertoire change, as well as repertoire development, is constructed through the practice and experience of collective action. According to Tilly, repertoire change "results from deliberate innovation and strenuous bargaining,"[14] takes place at the margins of the established repertoire, and succeeds only occasionally. When repertoire transformation is successful (and it is highly unusual for one repertoire to be completely replaced by another), the success comes "as a consequence of collective learning within strong structural limits."[15] Collective learning occurs, in struggle, in the context of "established identities and concrete social relations."[16] That is, "people create, adapt, apply, and deploy shared understandings—culture—in social interaction, just as the shared understandings they have at their disposal constrain their sense of what is possible and desirable."[17]

Changes in collective action repertoires, therefore, depend upon the frames of meaning employed by strategic actors in attempts to shift repertoire elements in the context of social movements. Although multiple components contribute to the possibility of repertoire transformation, recourse to collective identity, community norms, and shared frames facilitates the introduction of new collective action forms. By casting new collective actions in familiar terms, a social movement improves its chances for success in employing new repertoire elements and consolidating and incorporating them into a transformed collective action repertoire. Changes in repertoires of collective action, and their success, depend upon successful changes in social movement framing.

II. GENDER FRAMES AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: TRANSFORMING REPERTOIRES

If repertoires of collective action are "learned cultural creations . . . [that] emerge from struggle,"[18] they then simultaneously are based in and develop shared cultural understandings about the meanings that underpin collective social movement endeavor. As Arthur Stinchcombe suggests, "The elements of [a group's] repertoire are, then, simultaneously skills of population members and cultural

forms of the population."[19] These shared cultural understandings are forged in practice, contain and manage internal contradictions and inconsistencies, and are manifested and developed through action. Movement activists undertake active "signifying" work "that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction" or "framing."[20] The act of framing produces "collective action frames," whether for a single movement or in master frames employed by multiple movements. Collective action frames, in organizing and making sense of lived experience and perceptions, serve to identify social injustices, to focus and to summarize grievances, to organize disruptive action and to express disruption, and to posit oppositions and solutions.[21]

Frames are also employed as a basis for mobilizing new constituencies and for changing collective action, through what Snow et al. call "frame alignment processes,"[22] which serve to join social movement organizations' "interpretive orientations" with those of individuals. By focusing on frame alignment processes, Snow and his coauthors tell us, we can address the ways in which values and grievances are linked to the proclivity for action rather than quiescence; "participation in movement activities . . . is more likely given a positive articulation between beliefs about the object of action and the nature of that action."[23] Beyond linking values and the belief that collective action is necessary for resolving grievances, social movements have to persuade potential activists (and committed activists) that particular forms of action are essential for achieving the movements' goals. In many cases, social movements must persuade their own activists that a new form of action is necessitated and that conventional and familiar forms of action are no longer appropriate. In this regard, movement leaders and others must be able to adjust the movement's frame of meaning to accommodate proposed changes in action. Beyond mobilizing adherents and others to collective action, movement leaders must be able to mobilize potential activists to particular types of action rather than others. Hence, two mobilization tasks present themselves: (1) persuading potential activists to act collectively and (2) persuading activists to undertake that particular collective action. In mobilizing activists to particular actions, frame alignment—or frame realignment—may be a necessary precondition for transformation of a movement's collective action repertoire. As Swidler suggests, "When people are learning new ways of organizing individual and collective action, practicing unfamiliar habits until they become familiar, then doctrine, symbol, and ritual directly shape action."[24]

One important set of cognitive understandings and widely shared symbols is what I refer to as a *gender frame*. Both master frame and simple frame, a gender frame connotes both generalized and movement-specific understandings of difference embedded in conceptions of "women" and "men," and in "masculinities" and "femininities." Gender frames articulate and are based upon pervasive elements of gender difference that are transformed and adapted in collective action and that persist in their core characteristics. We can conceive of gender framing as

the active employment of gendered values, symbols, beliefs, and language that persist in the context of concerted collective action.

The process of gender framing is more or less visible in movement efforts to cast collective action in terms of men and women, men or women, masculine and feminine, and the invisibility of women or men. Because gender is both immediately proximate and yet often diffuse and so thoroughly embedded in "common sense"[25] as to be invisible, its presence in collective action can neither be taken for granted nor assumed away as irrelevant. Gender frames in social movements are evidenced in collective action, for example, where all speakers are male; where most leaders are men; where the discourse of grievances and tactics includes "fighting," military- or sports-based language; where tactics include all-women sit-ins or all women on the front lines of a demonstration; where no women are listed in injunctions against collective action; where men and women have gender-differentiated movement tasks;[26] and where male activists control outcome decisions. Some gender frames are more or less visible; others require excavation as well as explanation.[27]

Gender framing can serve to illuminate how transformations in a social movement's repertoire of contention can be effected. Because collective action repertoires can only be transformed if they are accompanied by a concomitant frame realignment, attention to both a movement's actions and its discourse is essential to understanding the means by which a movement adapts its responses in contentious interactions with the state or other actors. Specifically, gender framing was an essential component in the transformation of the UMWA's collective action repertoire in the Pittston Coal strike.[28] By realigning existing gender frames, based upon mining masculinities, the UMWA leadership was able to introduce nonviolent protest as a new strike action to a predominantly male rank-and-file membership. In the following pages, I discuss the traditional repertoire of the UMWA, the process of transforming the repertoire, and the use of gender framing, relying on mining masculinities, to effect the transformation.

III. THE TRADITIONAL REPERTOIRE OF THE UMWA

The traditional UMWA repertoire of contention rests upon strike action. In the event of the failure to negotiate a new contract, the UMWA would initiate a strike at the expiration of the old contract. Miners would leave work, or refuse to report to work, and pickets would be established. Occasional anonymous violence against property and against "replacement workers" or "scabs" would be employed to enforce the effectiveness of the strike. In undertaking a strike, the UMWA would collectively deny a coal company the ability to continue coal production, thereby damaging the company's capacity to meet orders for coal, jeopardizing its profitability and its relationship with its purchasers.

The UMWA had experimented with changing its traditional collective action repertoire in 1984, in its strike against the A. T. Massey Company, whose subsid-

iaries employed approximately two thousand miners in Kentucky and West Virginia.[29] In response to Massey's refusal to sign a new industry-wide agreement, the UMWA struck Massey, withholding labor and establishing picket lines at Massey coalmines and processing plants. In the context of an economic strike, with no operating contract, the Massey Company employed replacement workers, who crossed picket lines as scabs.[30] As confrontations between picketing miners and scabs increased, the UMWA leadership instituted mass demonstrations and mass sit-ins to stop coal production but also to control a potentially violent and increasingly unstable strike situation. In response, Massey sought and won a federal court injunction against the mass actions, and a state court imposed $200,000 in fines against the union.[31] As the UMWA withdrew from mass civil disobedience, the leadership lost their ability to control the actions of their members,[32] some of whom resorted to violent tactics.[33] The UMWA lost the Massey strike, which lasted for more than a year.[34]

Cecil Roberts, now President of the UMWA, reflected on the union's "old" repertoire in the Massey strike and on the imperative to change it:

> Now, in the Massey strike, when it first started, first week, people were like blocking the roads, throwing rocks, people got beaten, and we just said, "We can't have that. Because the end result's going to be the National Guard, the state police down there." And the Kentucky State Police has a horrible history of breaking strikes, and so—and they did, they came in, three hundred strong, riot gear on, and big long clubs, and it's—you can't contend with it.
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> [Although the UMWA leadership attempted nonviolent mass sit-downs in the Massey strike] . . . , the company got an injunction, then the company got us for contempt of court, and then the judge said, "We all are going [to] fine you two hundred and some thousand dollars if the picket continues." So we said, "Well, we can't afford to this kind of money," we told people we couldn't go out on the picket lines any more, en masse. Well, when we told them that, well, it also took [away] our ability to have everybody there, to give them orders, fourteen hundred people were spread all over eastern Kentucky and southern West Virginia. And pockets [of strikers] would say, "The hell with this," you know, basically. The next time you know, trucks are being shot and rocks going through windshields and who knows who was doing it? The courts effectively took control of that strike, out of the hands of the union. . . .
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> Ultimately, Massey withstood the violence and everything associated with it, lost a lot of money in the process, an individual was shot and died there, Hayes West, four people went to jail over that and are still in jail over it, that's another terrible end result of a violent strike, their lives ruined, their families ruined. So . . . , that's how we lost control. . . . [At Massey], we did the traditional thing for a union and that is obey the injunction, which destroyed the strike and begat violence, also.[35]

Roberts recounts the costs of ineffective collective action as well as those of complying with court injunctions against nonviolent civil disobedience, recognizing the failure of parts of the UMWA's traditional collective action repertoire. The experience of the Massey strike underscored the need to change strike tactics. It was clear to the UMWA leadership that the union could no longer rely upon its traditional repertoire of collective action. As the Pittston Coal Group prepared to

withstand a strike by the UMWA in 1988, the union sought to transform its conventional set of strike responses.

IV. TRANSFORMING THE TRADITIONAL STRIKE REPERTOIRE

The UMWA's ultimate reliance on its traditional strike repertoire in the 1984-85 Massey Coal Strike resulted in failure.[36] Two innovations during that strike were tested. First, the UMWA introduced a "selective strike initiative,"[37] where the union relinquished its traditional refusal to work without a contract. The conjunction of contract expiration and strike was replaced by the union's strategic willingness to continue work without a contract, allowing the union to determine a flexible strike deadline and creating unpredictability for companies with whom contract negotiations had not yet succeeded. In addition, the selective strike strategy permitted the UMWA to target one or two coal companies with strike action to focus their strike activities, put greater pressure on the companies involved and conserved the union's energy and strike funds for the smaller number of union members on strike than would be the case with a no contract, no work position.

Second, in the context of a selective strike strategy, the UMWA attempted to supplant traditional strike behavior with nonviolent civil disobedience. For three months, the UMWA staff "experimented" with passive, nonviolent resistance in mass demonstrations, in the course of which approximately eight hundred people were arrested.[38] The collapse of the new collective action form, in the face of legal injunctions at the federal and state levels and of increasing fines against the UMWA, revealed how unsuccessful reliance on the traditional strike repertoire had become. These two experiments during the Massey strike—the selective strike strategy and nonviolent civil disobedience—provided the basis for a transformed repertoire in the Pittston strike five years later.

The Pittston Coal Strike

The UMWA strike against Pittston Coal Group began on 5 April 1989, fourteen months after the former contract expired. Pittston Coal, like Massey Coal in 1984, had refused to sign the master agreement negotiated with members of the Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA), withdrawing from the industry-wide pension and health care funds established for union miners in 1950. Retired workers' health insurance benefits, overtime and Sunday work requirements, and use of nonunion workers in mines represented by the UMWA were also at issue. Pittston Coal, attempting to negotiate a separate contract with the UMWA outside the collective BCOA agreement, positioned itself to provoke the UMWA to conventional strike action. Eddie Burke, a major field organizer in the Pittston strike, argues that

the main message [that Pittston] delivered to the [UMWA] members was the company wanted us to engage into an economic strike to enhance their bargaining position with the threat of permanent replacement workers. The company . . . moved several of its security guards into the coalfields prior to the . . . contract expiration. Also, the Virginia State Police heavily moved into the area in anticipation of a strike.[39]

As an additional provocation, at the contract's expiration Pittston cancelled health insurance benefits for fifteen hundred UMWA retired miners and their families, including disabled workers. At the time of the strike, Pittston Coal Group was the largest coal company in Virginia, employing twelve hundred miners. It was the fifteenth largest coal company in the United States, ranking second in coal exports, and it was the nation's largest exporter of metallurgical coal.[40] Pittston Coal Group, and its parent corporation, the Pittston Company, were well-prepared to withstand a traditional strike.

As the old contract expired on 31 January 1988, UMWA members continued to work in Pittston mines and coal-processing plants, as the leadership negotiated with Pittston Coal and began to prepare the membership for what Eddie Burke referred to as "a long and ugly strike."[41] The UMWA organized staff workgroups, developed extensive community support, publicized the UMWA's case through the mass media, undertook informational picketing, persisted in unfair labor practice charges against Pittston Coal with the National Labor Relations Board, and undertook training in civil disobedience.[42] The strike was only initiated after the National Labor Relations Board had declared Pittston guilty of unfair labor practices, transforming the legal context of the strike from an "economic" to an "unfair labor practice" strike, affording UMWA members additional legal protections.[43] The timing of the strike placed the union in a favorable legal context, as Pittston could not offer permanent jobs to new replacement workers.

During the fourteen months the miners worked without a contract, the union prepared them for a strike that was to rely on a transformed collective action repertoire. As one union official reported,

It's a matter of us preparing the people for what the company was about to do. . . . It happened to take fourteen months . . . to do the preparation. That preparation was a matter of meeting with the miners, their families, over the whole period, almost every day at the work sites, at the mines. When they'd get off work, there'd be somebody there talking to them, telling them what was going on in bargaining, what the company's position was, how hard it was going to be to win a strike. Because historically miners in this country want to strike immediately when a contract expires. It goes back long ago to the slogan "no contract, no work." So, it was difficult for the union to say we're not going to strike. It was a wise decision . . . , actually it was an educated decision to say we're not prepared to strike at this time.[44]

Learning Civil Disobedience: From Violent Resistance to Nonviolent Collective Action

The UMWA introduced “massive civil disobedience tactics as the Union’s main offensive weapon” during the Pittston strike.[45] This innovation was chosen by the UMWA leadership and international staff, in a series of meetings and discussions in 1987-88, and derived from the UMWA’s experience in the Massey strike. Cecil Roberts, then UMWA Vice President, explained that

> the decision had its roots probably in some bad experiences. In 1984, we went on strike against A. T. Massey. The first week of that strike was very violent. So Eddie Burke, my executive assistant, and Don Barnett, who works out of this office, were sent to the strike area that was eastern Kentucky and Mingo County, West Virginia, to try to get the strike under control, and [Eddie] used nonviolent civil resistance for several months there. That time it worked. However, in the latter stages of that strike, a state judge issued an injunction and then said if the union failed to remove all the pickets and all the activity from the strike scene, that he was going to fine the union. . . . We complied with his order and then the strike turned extremely violent again, because there was no way to control it.
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> And we pretty much lost that strike. It taught us a number of lessons and the least of which was that violence doesn’t work in today’s environment because federal, state agencies, federal government courts, both state and federal, the state police, all the branches of the government come down on you and break the strike. Those forces will always be used against you, but you’ve got to find a way to compete with them also on some level. Violence doesn’t work.[46]

With a commitment to mass nonviolent civil disobedience, the UMWA leadership undertook to educate its field organizers and local staff in preparation for the Pittston strike. Although other tactics were employed in the strike, nonviolent civil disobedience was the only major collective action form that was introduced to the membership through long-term planning and explicit instruction. Techniques of peaceful mass disruption were taught to UMWA staff and membership through specific training sessions.[47] As early as 1987, national and local union officials were being educated about civil disobedience. In January 1989, a one-day seminar was held to teach UMWA staff members techniques of civil disobedience. In the fourteen-month period preceding the strike, UMWA staff members and organizers worked to educate the coalfield communities in Virginia, explaining how to undertake nonviolent resistance and why the tactic was essential in the event of a strike. Notices published in the *United Mine Workers Journal* outlined sit-in participation and nonviolent resistance techniques. Cecil Roberts explained,

> During this period of time, we talked to the workers about how we should strike once we went on strike, that being nonviolent civil resistance and how important that was, because you can’t win a strike in today’s environment or in the environment that existed then, by being confrontational or violent. And so it took a lot of education to convince the workers that’s what they should do.[48]

Marty Hudson, a UMWA staff member and major field organizer for the Pittston strike in its early days, explained how the staff taught union members and their supporters to undertake nonviolent civil disobedience.

It was a training process for us. I mean, you've got to go back to the point that we, actually the staff, had people come in in the late '80s, you know, we had staff meetings in the field. And people trained us to say, you know, I mean, how do you get the attention of the public. How do you get people to recognize your cause? How do you get people on your side? How do you make people believe this corporation's treating you wrong? And it was a matter of us getting educated first. I mean, all of us understand civil rights, and all of us understand the movement, and all of us, you know, understand that it worked . . . for the Southern Christian [Leadership] Conference and . . . you know, it works. So, it was a matter that we're not necessarily, that we weren't opposed to it, but it's new again to this labor union who obviously, you know, people saw us as rough around the edges. Once we were convinced that this way would work . . . , we had practices. Here's how it's going to happen, you know. . . . You're going to sit in the road. . . . Somebody's going to come and pick you up. . . . If you want them to drag you, that's up to you.[49]

Civil disobedience and nonviolent passive resistance occurred in mass sit-downs, involving striking miners, members of their families and local communities, and other supporters.[50] These actions were aimed at blocking the entrances to mining operations and coal processing plants. The first such action was initiated on 18 April 1989, and was followed by a variety of actions on a regular basis between April 1989 and January 1990. By 28 April 1989, state police had arrested 122 strike activists on felony charges and 1,060 supporters on misdemeanor grounds; by December, that number increased to 2,886 (of which 211 involved felony charges). The workplace entrance sit-ins constituted the largest confrontational collective action of the Pittston strike.

Beyond its commitment to nonviolent civil disobedience, the union specifically rejected violence as a response to Pittston and to the security force Pittston hired during the strike. Explicit explanations about the inefficacy of violence were provided to union members before and during the strike. Marty Hudson argued that violent tactics were no longer useful in a contemporary strike context:

In this day and time when unemployment's like it is, you can do the violence you want to do to a replacement worker, or you can beat him up, or you can send him home, but there's another one there. There's another one there to take his place. And the battle's not against him, you know, it's against this corporation, it's against, actually against the state. It's against the system. So, it was a matter of these fourteen months, telling people, we're going to do things different here.

And in those fourteen months it was an education to say, you know, here's what will work. My message to them was, "You can do what you want to do in southwest Virginia. You can burn down [coal] tipples or you can do whatever, but if you don't get your message out of these hills, nobody's ever going to give a damn about what happens down here. And I still remember saying that a thousand times because, you know, you got to say it and say it and say it before people believe it. And it's the truth. If you don't get the message out of

those mountains, nobody'll give a shit about 'em. And nobody would. The strike would still be going on today if they hadn't done what they did.[51]

Burke also recounted a story of joking about the inefficacy of violence in contemporary strike situations:

> The key staffers of us that was down there said, "Well, okay, get you a goddam rock and go out and kill a truck." [Laughs.] "Here, pick one up sometime. Go kill a truck. You know, that'll do it. Maybe you's can get it to go through that rail, the steel girder they got in front of the radiator. Maybe a little bit of that rock will break off and get in that radiator and kill that truck." What are you going to do? You know . . . you keep trying to come back to reality on it.[52]

As the UMWA repudiated violent tactics and insisted upon mass nonviolent passive resistance as the strike's key form of collective action, the leadership used a language of masculinities to disparage violent behavior as foolhardy and "macho," which served to validate nonviolent passive resistance as consistent with manliness. In the process of jettisoning a major component of its traditional collective action repertoire and teaching the rank-and-file membership the new collective action of civil disobedience, the UMWA leadership realigned the collective action frame that underpinned the union's traditional repertoire. The UMWA "regendered" its strike repertoire by reconfirming the importance of masculinity to strike behavior and by positioning passive resistance as consistent with an enduring mining masculinity. As the UMWA radically reformed its strike repertoire, the language employed by the leadership maintained continuity in associating mining masculinity with strike action. Through gender framing, the UMWA engaged in frame realignment as it innovated with its repertoire of contention.

V. MINING MASCULINITIES AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

The UMWA's transformation of its collective action repertoire depended upon a regendering of its former strike repertoire to accommodate the gendering of nonviolent passive resistance, at the point of its introduction to the repertoire. In transforming their collective action repertoire, the UMWA leadership was undertaking to teach its male members how to do the new strike action but also how to remain men. The UMWA was engaging in "an active process that creates and recreates gender,"[53] linking "the ways that men create and sustain gendered selves with the ways that gender influences power relations."[54]

In making this claim, I do not mean to attribute an intentionality to the UMWA strike leadership that would suggest explicit, conscious decisions and discussion about what it means to be a man on strike. The UMWA leadership and field organizers intentionally and explicitly shifted their major collective action component in the Pittston strike, evidenced by the interview data cited in this article. The language employed by the leadership—in training their membership, in persuading them to adopt and to maintain nonviolence, and in exemplifying their rhetoric in

their own actions—was both highly gendered and clearly tied to the purpose of shifting the UMWA's collective action repertoire from one that included violent action to one that was grounded in nonviolent passive resistance. The UMWA leadership's use of a gendered strike rhetoric facilitated the adoption of the new nonviolent tactics, as striking miners were learning them.

In theorizing about the relationship between collective action repertoires, on one hand, and gendering collective action, on the other, I rely on the scholarship of "men's studies" and "masculinity studies." Major critiques of this scholarship focus on the field's neglect of "those who suffered at the hands of dominant men's privileged positions,"[55] of whom working-class men in the context of a year-long mining strike are emblematic, and where "conventional social science has favored the interests of dominant men."[56] As Hearn and Collinson claim, "What is rare is an explicit attempt to develop a gendered analysis of men and their economic class position."[57] At the same time, however, class-based analyses have given little attention to how understandings of gender and masculinities have sustained, challenged, or undermined class relations. As Ava Baron claims, "Despite the fact that labor history primarily has been about men and their institutions, their gender has been treated as 'natural' and, therefore, has been invisible in our research."[58]

To discuss "masculinity" is in itself problematic. First, masculinity is not a singular characteristic, and hence "masculinities" is a more appropriate terminology. Although continuities among masculinities are identifiable, no single masculinity has universal meaning.[59] Masculinities vary not only by historical and cultural context, but by age, ethnicity, generational cohort, sexual orientation, race, class background, and even gender.[60] Second, "masculinities" is not a fixed category but rather the result of process, practice, and action, so that masculinities unfold and develop in the course of particular contexts. These contexts include political and legal structures, confrontational situations involving groups of men and sets of male-predominant institutions, and hegemonic and nonhegemonic class and community values, among others. As in the case of the Pittston strike, masculinities are often made during a struggle whose outcome appears uncertain to those in the midst of contentious class interaction.[61]

Key features uniting masculinities have been identified in the literatures of men's studies, gender studies, and labor studies. These include "heroism, leadership, agency,"[62] "physical prowess, strength and stamina,"[63] engaging in "tough work,"[64] and access to or exercise of power. R. W. Connell links "mainstream masculinity . . . (in the advanced capitalist countries at least) to power, organized for domination, and resistant to change because of power relations."[65] Power for working-class men is fundamentally grounded in men's bodies, and working-class men's expressions of power are, Connell suggests, "increasingly defined as possessing force alone."[66] To reiterate the popular image of the coal miner, referenced at the beginning of this article, the qualities of courage and heroism, physical strength and capacity for violence, independence, militancy, fierce loyalty to

family and community, all located in a male heterosexual body, mark traditional mining masculinities and intersect with “mainstream” or “hegemonic” masculinity.[67]

The UMWA’s traditional collective action repertoire was heavily gendered in its explicit as well as implicit associations with “being male.” Mining masculinities developed in the context of a male-predominant mining industry and men’s experience with violence. First, the bituminous coal mining workforce in central Appalachia is predominantly male,[68] and this reality creates a context in which “miner” and “male” become conflated, a conflation that is so deeply ingrained that it is virtually undetectable. Two brief examples serve to illustrate this. The first comes from a speech given by John Banovic, then UMWA Secretary-Treasurer, to the Eleventh National Conference of Women Miners, held during the summer of the Pittston Strike. In the speech in which he honored women miners and traced the influence of his mother and of Mother Jones upon his union commitments, Banovic referred to “our union [as] a family,” and went on to claim,

> And we are a family with a deep sense of history. . . . One example is the group of miners’ wives, sisters and daughters who formed auxiliaries to help fight for a contract from Pittston and then joined with women miners in Virginia and called themselves the Daughters of Mother Jones. . . . [The Pittston strike] will be remembered because of the solidarity of our members on strike and their wives and children.[69]

In the general reference to UMWA “members,” those members become specifically gendered as male in Banovic’s reference to members’ “wives,” despite the predominance of female miners in the audience and Banovic’s acknowledgment of them earlier in the same speech.

The second example speaks to the rarity of women working as miners. Marat Moore recounts her own experience, as a young woman newly employed as an underground miner, being sworn in as a new member of the UMWA. The woman who administered the membership oath concluded, laughingly, by declaring, “Now you’re a man.”[70]

In addition to the preponderance of men in the mining workforce and the conflation of “miner” and “male,” the association of physical violence with men rather than with women serves to underpin “mining masculinity.” Male miners in central Appalachia have experience with violence in three major ways. First, miners, the overwhelming majority of whom have been men, experience violence in the mines, as an ever-present condition of work.[71] Violent death or injury, resulting from roof collapses, fires, explosions, or accidents involving mining machinery, is sufficiently common to mark mining as a highly dangerous occupation, akin to police work, fire-fighting, and deep-sea fishing.[72]

Second, many male UMWA members are experienced in weapons use, by engaging in hunting. Ownership of hunting rifles and other guns is common

among men in central Appalachia, whether or not they are miners, and the UMWA annual calendar and other union publications occasionally feature male union members in hunting scenes. One major union organizer described southwestern Virginia as an area “where people still pack guns regularly.”[73] Fewer women engage in hunting as a recreational sport and fewer women than men own hunting weapons.

Third, many male UMWA members have served in the U.S. armed forces and have military experience. Many active male union members and working miners are combat veterans of the Korean War or the Vietnam War; several had been decorated war heroes. At the time of the Pittston strike, it was claimed that southwest Virginia includes “the county with the highest per capita of Vietnam veterans in the United States.”[74]

This convergence of men and violence in central Appalachia has contributed to the foundation upon which traditional strike-related violence became “masculinized.”[75] As Michael Yarrow argues, as male miners articulate their mining masculinities in relationship to their class, their practice of being working-class men in labor movement struggles further develops and defines the meaning and experience of being a male miner on strike. Mining masculinity is associated with militancy in union struggles, and violence is directed at coal companies and their managers (and scabs). “Combativeness is not condoned in relation with mates but is honored in relations with class enemies.”[76] Women rarely engaged in strike violence.[77] The association of strike-related violence with male miners is recognized by the UMWA. In moving the UMWA members to a new form of collective action, men’s beliefs in the appropriateness of violence were recognized and explicitly addressed by the leadership. In speaking of this process during the Pittston strike, Cecil Roberts explained,

> It took a lot of education to convince the workers [that nonviolence is] what they should do. I mean, these are people who grew up, when somebody does something to you, you retaliate. And that mentality and culture had to be changed.[78]

Although strike-related violence has been repudiated by the UMWA, the gendered conditions of coal-mining employment and of masculine experience and activity persist. All working miners continue to be susceptible to the dangers of coal-mining; male miners continue to hunt; and the military and/or combat experience of some male miners continues as a reality of their personal histories.[79] The factors that underscored a strike-related violent masculinity were equally evident during the Pittston strike, but the UMWA leadership was able to recast the mining masculinities of its male membership to accommodate a transformation of the union’s collective action repertoire. The new repertoire was introduced in gendered terms because the old repertoire was so highly masculinized.

Configurations of Masculinity

Although "miner" and "male" persisted as conflated categories, the UMWA used two sets of rhetoric in the course of the Pittston strike that served to dislodge mining masculinity's connection to the old collective action repertoire. The first was an all-encompassing, apparently de-gendered rhetoric emphasizing "family and "community," consistent with the thrust of the UMWA's contract goals. "Miners" and "men" were not privileged in the UMWA strike discourse at Pittston, and the language of extended family—grandparents, children, wives—reflected the community-based nature of the struggle and replaced the male striking miner in the strike discourse.[80] The apparently de-gendered rhetoric, however, occurred without any consideration of the actuality of women's and men's opportunities, life chances, and gendered power relations in central Appalachia. Male miners were still central to the strike and although a displacement of "men" is apparent in the strike rhetoric, that rhetoric did not decenter men in the context of the struggle.

A second and competing rhetoric underscored the centrality of male miners as actors and masculinity as a vital component of the transformed collective action repertoire. This second rhetoric was highly specific to persuading striking male miners to discover the internal discipline necessary to resist violent (re)action and to solidify their commitment to nonviolent passive resistance in the face of police brutality and provocations. The second rhetoric was specifically gendered with reference to appropriate masculine behaviors, using explicit language concerning "manhood," "macho," and "manly." This rhetoric recognized the masculinities that underpinned (and were validated by) violent strike behavior, and recast them as foundational for passive resistance. The transformation of strike masculinity rhetoric was demonstrated in remarks by Cecil Roberts, who spoke at length about teaching male miners to accept a new collective action element so different from traditional male strike behaviors.

> It took a lot to, to convince them. We talked to these people. Here was my spin on it. I said, "All my life, I grew up in a coal camp, and I worked in the mines, and both my grandfathers were killed in the mines. What we always did, is when the companies wanted us to do something, we never did it. We just assumed because they wanted it, it was wrong." I said, "They wanted us to strike on February first, and we didn't do it, because if they wanted us to do it, it must be the wrong thing, for us to strike." So, as we prepared for the strike, I said, "Have you noticed all these video cameras that they put up everywhere? Has any of you thought about why they put those up?" I said, "This is Vance Security." I said, "They have all these listening devices, and they brought these people here and they're all carrying—armed with video cameras." And I said, "The reason they brought those with them is so that they can film you, committing violence, and the reason they want to film you committing violence is so they can fire you, so they can get an injunction, so they can get the union held in contempt of court, which will help them break the strike.

"Now if they want you to commit violence, why would you do what they want you to do?" I said, "That's what Vance Security wants you to do. That's what their lawyers want you to do." I said, "If you do these things that they want you to do, then we'll lose this strike." And that made, I think, a lot of sense. So that the mentality was: if they want me to do something here, then I'm just not going to do it. They don't want me to set here and block the road; they want me to jump up and just hit one of them upside of the head. So I'm going to set here in the road because there's nothing—

And the other spin on that was: why did you take a ball bat down to the picket line before? So somebody couldn't take your job and run coal and force you in a position where you might lose the strike. Well, now, if you set in the road and they can't go to work or they can't bring the trucks in to haul the coal, the end result is: they don't get the production out, or the product, so you win the strike. I said, "The big issue here is winning the strike, *not showing your manhood over here*."[81]

Note that in this lengthy example, Cecil Roberts begins his characterization of his argument to male Pittston striking miners by reminding them that he is a man who is a miner. He recounts his family history of mining and masculinity, with specific gendered reference to male family members and to the dangers and sacrifices of coal mining that underpin mining masculinity (both grandfathers were killed in the mines). Roberts positions himself as exemplary in both class and gender terms. He then warns his male membership of the dangers of letting other men—security guards, lawyers, companies—determine the agenda of the miners' struggle and reminds them that miners' refusal to engage their opponents' agenda has historical precedents. Roberts concludes by reminding striking male miners that sitting down in the road is separable from their conception of masculinity and, by implication, unrelated to it. A striking miner need not relinquish his "masculinity," regardless of content, as a result of engaging in the new strike repertoire.[82]

Marty Hudson also employed a militant masculine rhetorical logic, arguing that traditional masculinity demands a discipline and a solidarity of restraint, an abnegation of violence based on manliness.

I always said, you know, anybody can throw a rock, anybody can do this, but, you know, it takes a *man* to do this, to exercise this kind of restraint, to exercise this kind of belief. [And] we had meetings on top of meetings on top of meetings, and it's all a matter of communication. But one of the other points that I believe in, and I exercise it, is that [I] never ask somebody to do something I wouldn't do. And if [the men] see that you're willing to do it, [it makes it easier for them to do it as well].[83]

Like Cecil Roberts, Marty Hudson employs the example of his own masculinity to ground the union's new strike actions in traditional conceptions of mining masculinity, and to demonstrate, in practice, that manliness as traditionally conceived is not repudiated by engaging in nonviolent passive resistance.

The UMWA employed exemplary mining masculinities by positioning their officers and staff as strike activists and not simply as strike leaders. Marty Hud-

son's example was manifested in his dramatic arrest on 5 June 1989. With UMWA District #28 President Jackie Stump and field organizer C. A. Phillips, Hudson appeared before U.S. District Court Judge Glen Williams, charged with violating court orders against mass picketing. According to Dwayne Yancey,

> When they offered no explanation and invoked their right not to incriminate themselves, Williams packed them off to jail "until you show me in concrete ways how you're going to comply with my order." Hudson, Stump and Phillips were handcuffed, shackled with leg irons and taken to a jail in Roanoke.[84]

Exemplary strike activism was evident at the highest leadership levels. UMWA International President Richard L. Trumka headed the union's negotiating team and continued to direct the union's business from UMWA headquarters in Washington. He visited the striking coalfield communities frequently throughout the strike, speaking at mass rallies. On August 23, Trumka subjected himself to a highly publicized arrest. With AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland and seventeen others, Trumka engaged in a sit-down demonstration on the Russell County Courthouse steps. Locking arms, the group sat down and blocked the entrance to the courthouse. They were arrested for obstruction of free passage.[85] The assembled and supportive crowd, observing the arrest and removal of the president of the UMWA and the president of the AFL-CIO, witnessed two powerful men actively engaging in nonviolent passive resistance.

Perhaps the clearest evidence of the UMWA's investment in the Pittston strike was the virtually constant presence in the striking communities of Vice President Cecil Roberts. Sent to southwest Virginia by President Trumka, and preaching the gospel of nonviolent protest, Roberts embodied the masculine male miner and powerful male labor leader. Jackie Stump is quoted as saying,

> Never before in the history of the Mine Workers that I know of did you have the vice president, one of the top line officers, come down here and live with the strike. You can put your faith in someone like that.[86]

Roberts spoke at demonstrations and rallies, represented the UMWA to the mass media, negotiated with state troopers, and encouraged UMWA rank-and-file members and their supporters. He was also arrested for engaging in nonviolent civil disobedience. Roberts explained,

> Then ultimately I decided to get arrested, which Martin Luther King did a number of times, 'cause you don't just tell or ask people to do something. Whenever it's appropriate, you have to do it yourself. It lifts people's morale up.[87]

UMWA videotapes record Virginia state troopers removing Roberts from a road, which he and dozens of protesters were blocking. When the International Union's

Vice President was quietly carried out of the road by two state troopers and put into a police van, it offered a model for rank-and-file members of the union's policy of nonviolent protest at the same time that it became more difficult for striking miners to argue for violent retribution. Eddie Burke, the major field organizer during the latter part of the Pittston strike, explained in an interview that part of the UMWA's commitment to nonviolence was to demonstrate staff and leadership commitment to nonviolence, just as such commitment was expected of the membership.

> One of the rules we had, is like whoever goes to jail, staffer goes with them. The staff person is the last one out of the jail. Promise. That's our promise. That was sort of like our declaration to them. If anybody goes to jail for nonviolence work, a staffer goes with each group.[88]

Overcoming Resistance

There was resistance, at first, to the change in repertoire. Cecil Roberts made it clear that the old ways would result in defeat:

> So many times, in talking to miners, "Now, some of you are talking about just going there and whipping this person. Let's be realistic. We're all tough enough in our own way," I said, "but you know, every one of these state troopers have got a pistol strapped to their side, and every one of them's got a shotgun in the car, and gas masks, and gas. Now if that's not enough, they can get the National Guard, and you know, they can bring tanks in here. Now, some of you may think we can deal with that, but I'm telling you, you can't. So let's be realistic about how we take this approach."[89]

Roberts, confirming mining masculinities ("We're all tough enough in our own way"), shifts the focus from violent response to emphasize the context in which violence is being proposed; the issue becomes one of who is best positioned in terms of weaponry, rather than who is most manly. Reinforcing the change to a nonviolent repertoire, Roberts links mining masculinities (being "tough") with being "realistic," underscoring the persistence of mining masculinities even as traditionally violent collective action is radically transformed.

Marty Hudson, in discussing the resistance among some miners to the new approach, connected nonviolence to mining masculinities, expressed through association with military service and with masculine "proud restraint":

> There was resistance from men to block roads and to do this. And I always said to them, you know, you can always go up the road and you can do what you want to do . . . but I'm going to tell you what's going to win the strike. I'm going to tell you exactly what's going to win. They actually believed the union; they believed the union because the union was honest with them. They saw that the officers were committed, the vice president of the union.
>
> I still recall those days of those guys who would wear their medals, you know, from wars . . . , getting arrested, and it was hard on me, I have to say. But it was much harder on them. It was a matter of pride, and a matter of they believed in what they were doing.[90]

In practice, traditional mining masculinity did not easily coexist with the experience of passive resistance. Embracing nonviolent passive resistance and relinquishing violent active resistance required considerable organizational and individual discipline, because state troopers were often brutal and careless in arresting demonstrators. Even under the most attentive and gentle of circumstances, state troopers were placing hands on resisting male miners and their supporters, and physically removing them from the road. As Marty Hudson told me during an interview,

> [The behavior of the state troopers] was almost inhumane. It was almost kind of degrading to [the miners]. It zapped away their personal esteem. These are people that have fought in wars that they may not necessarily have believed in but they fought in them. It was very difficult. They would always much rather [have] had a ball bat and been trying to bust out windows of the coal trucks.[91]

The problem of discipline in the context of nonviolent passive resistance was heightened by the composition of the state police force. Most of the troopers were men, but some were women, and therefore some male striking miners were being physically wrested by female state authorities, who, according to Marty Hudson, were especially punitive.

> But the first arrest, you know, they, they just jerked people around pretty rough actually the first couple days. And, you know, and actually it's a lot of, it was a lot of the women state troopers, for some reason, you know, they really, and there were several of them there. I guess they wanted to, wanted to be "state troopers" or something, I don't know what makes you want to.[92]

UMWA members and supporters saw the state police as the agents of the Pittston Company and the governor of Virginia. Rather than according the state troopers the respect normally granted to state authorities, the striking miners and their supporters considered the state police no better than the hired thugs of Vance Security. Class issues also complicated state troopers' expectations of their authority and their masculinity, given the strike location. The Pittston strike occurred in a part of the state normally disdained by the rest of the Commonwealth, one remarkably different from the Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.C.

> This was an insult for [the troopers] initially to have to leave Northern Virginia and Eastern Virginia to come down in the coal fields and deal with this class of people that, you know, that they didn't necessarily care about or never want to see, and they were "State Troopers." And . . . when they came to southwest Virginia, they weren't treated like state troopers. . . . When they came down there . . . half a dozen times before the strike started, it was kind of like, "You're only the company's security guard." And there was a lack, [the troopers] didn't have no intimidation factor. You know, they didn't intimidate people at all. And, I think early on in the strike they wanted to try to, you know. . . . I mean . . . it's just a matter of kind of macho: "I'm a state trooper and you're going do what I tell you to and you're going to get up and walk or I'm going to drag you." You know, those people, those people weren't intimidated to say the least. And the state troopers didn't like it. You know, they didn't like it at all.[93]

In the context of competing masculinities—of striking male miners, and of male (and female) state troopers, in a contentious class struggle—the UMWA employed dual rhetorics to reinforce the foundation of traditional mining masculinities, and to employ a reconfirmed mining masculinity as the grounding for the new UMWA collective action repertoire.

Costumes of Revolt

The UMWA reinforced their strike rhetorics with what Sidney Tarrow refers to as a "costume of revolt,"[94] by encouraging miners and their supporters to wear camouflage clothing throughout the strike. Easily available and inexpensive, camouflage T-shirts, pants, vests, hats, and jackets were acquired by and provided to community members and their supporters who engaged in mass demonstrations, rallies, and civil disobedience. Most veterans and hunters in the community already owned camouflage clothing and hence it was a quickly accessible strike uniform.[95] Retired miners, miners' children, even babies wore camouflage clothing to signal their support for the strike, creating "a sea of camouflage"[96] which is evident in the numerous videotapes, documentaries, news reports, and newspaper photographs of the strike.[97]

Camouflage, as a "costume of revolt," had important strategic value in the strike. First, it served to mask individual identity, protecting striking miners and their supporters from being singled out in company videotapes on the basis of their clothing. As Eddie Burke explained, the choice of this "costume of revolt" was

> a result of some unknown striker was picked out of the group of us that he allegedly threw a rock; that was a tactic that the company engaged on us. Well, our response was, "Why did you pick him out and not me? I was there." And the cop says, "Well, he said it was the guy in the plaid shirt, flannel shirt." Well, I have a flannel shirt on. Matter of fact, we all got together and took a group picture. There was like twelve or thirteen of us with flannel shirts on. And said, "How can he pick one flannel shirt out from another? It's almost dark."
>
> . . . the next day we ordered five hundred camouflage shirts . . . ; that's how we got into this color code thing. It wasn't a great masterful thought; it was a reaction to them trying to stuff us on something . . . , it was a part of a reaction to the system that we were playing in, so that got us to where it was hard to pick anybody out.[98]

The UMWA's counter-tactic of distributing and encouraging the wearing of camouflage clothing undermined the Pittston Company's ability to identify individuals in the videotapes filmed by Vance Security during the strike and increased the difficulties, for state troopers, of issuing arrest warrants.

Camouflage clothing provided a second tactical advantage, as the physical signifier of collective identity and collective solidarity during the strike. Camouflage—on clothing, signs, hats, banners—was immediately associated with support for the UMWA during the Pittston strike. High school students wore camouflage clothing to school; supporters from outside the coalfield communities brought

camouflage clothing with them on weekend visits; nationally prominent political figures, like the Reverend Jesse Jackson and Lane Kirkland, then President of the AFL-CIO, wore camouflage when they spoke at mass strike rallies. Wearing camouflage provided physical evidence of support for the UMWA and sustained community morale, reinforcing collective identity.[99] Communal solidarity served as a continuing resource, upon which the UMWA could draw over the course of the year-long strike.

The meaning of camouflage, however, was not completely within the control of the UMWA. Associations of camouflage with hunting and with the military meant that camouflage as signifier was embedded in violent masculinities, from which the UMWA's expression of camouflage could not completely escape. Michael Odom, President of Pittston Coal Group, "immediately branded the pickets' fashion statement as 'militaristic' [and] evidence of the union's violent intent."[100] Although unintentional, camouflage clothing was a powerful reinforcement of hunting- and military-based masculinities, and the violence and weaponry associated with each.[101] Despite the union's disavowal of this purpose or intent,[102] camouflage imported issues of violent masculinities into nonviolent collective strike actions, reinforcing mining masculinities but problematizing the nonviolent emphasis of the sit-ins and mass demonstrations.

Camouflage was a powerful signifier during the strike that provided tactical advantages to the UMWA by obscuring individual identity and by reinforcing collective solidarity.[103] It also imported mining masculinities directly into nonviolent collective action. As the UMWA sought to shift its collective action repertoire, sustaining it by articulating a continuing mining masculinity, the union also provided male miners with the symbolic reinforcement of their manhood in the context of an action that might have served to undermine their understandings of manliness. The uniform of hunting and of the military became the UMWA's "costume of revolt" at the moment that nonviolent passive resistance became the union's new signature collective action.

All in This Together, but Not in the Same Way

Gendered political action is not simply a matter of reinforcing traditional understandings or stereotypes about male behavior. Gendering political action involves positioning both men and women in a context where masculinities are constructed in relation to other cultural values, including understandings of appropriate behavior for women. Two points merit restatement: first, gendered political action is the dynamic result of individual and collective agency, "embedded in social, political, and economic relationships, institutions, and practices."[104] Second, in regendering collective action in the Pittston Coal strike, the UMWA was not only calling upon mining masculinities as a resource for the transformed collective action repertoire. It was also reconstructing those masculinities in rela-

tion to women and "femininities," in relation to understandings of women's political capacity and the differences between women and men in mining communities. Robert Scates, reflecting on the 1890 Maritime Strike in Australia, makes this same point, when he writes that " 'manhood' . . . was never acted out in isolation; it was asserted, transformed, and defined in reference to 'womanhood' as well."[105] More generally, R. W. Connell argues that "masculinity is shaped in relation to an overall structure of power (the subordination of women to men), and in relation to a general symbolism of difference (the opposition of femininity and masculinity)."[106] In the Pittston strike, the UMWA actively constructed masculinities in relation to women in two ways: by organizing gender-specific actions and by articulating a rhetoric of gender difference in political struggle.

Two crucial gender-exclusive actions were organized by the UMWA. The first gender-specific mass action was initiated in the first week of the strike. The action was a mass occupation, by women, of the Pittston Coal Group headquarters in Lebanon, Virginia, involving a thirty-six-hour sit-in at the headquarters by thirty-nine women who identified themselves only as "Daughters of Mother Jones." The occupation grew out of women's pre-strike activism, involving informational picketing at Pittston headquarters, both of which were organized by the UMWA leadership. The occupation marked the first mass civil disobedience of the strike and, as an all-woman mass action, served to empower women in the strike.[107]

A second gender-exclusive mass civil disobedience of the Pittston strike came five months later with the Moss #3 takeover. The UMWA field staff organized a four-day occupation of Pittston's largest and most important coal-processing plant, involving ninety-eight male miners, a Protestant minister, and a prominent field organizer. Unarmed but prepared for a lengthy occupation, the hundred men walked into the Moss #3 plant, dismissed the security guards, and, with the support of thousands of demonstrators outside the plant, remained in Moss #3 for four days, withdrawing only on their own schedule, according to their own agenda.[108]

Both the Daughters of Mother Jones occupation and the Moss #3 occupation furthered the UMWA's cause in the strike. They attracted media attention;[109] they "[escalated] militancy while keeping the strike activity nonviolent;"[110] they empowered participants and supporters; and they were a resource for UMWA negotiators in bargaining. However, the UMWA, in employing these gender-exclusive actions, evidenced a rhetoric of gender difference that sustained mining masculinities as male miners came to terms with the new nonviolent collective strike action.

The UMWA articulated a rhetoric of gender difference at the outset of collective action, with the Daughters of Mother Jones occupation. As the first gender-exclusive strike action, the occupation was employed by the UMWA to exemplify a strike action that, undertaken by women, could therefore be undertaken by everyone. The UMWA leadership set forth a gendered rhetoric of women's difference that underscored mining masculinity. Marty Hudson, discussing the Daugh-

ters of Mother Jones occupation, positioned women's activism as exemplary for male miners:

It was kind of like to these men, these rough, kind of rough men who are rough, who are, you know, good-hearted, just men of, real men, saying, "Look what these women did. I mean, if they can go there and sit for thirty-some hours, take over a building for thirty-some hours, and you know, you guys ought to be able to do this."[111]

Eddie Burke offered a similar perspective. In reference to the UMWA's all-men takeover of the Moss #3 coal-processing plant, five months after the Daughters of Mother Jones occupation, Burke explained:

[The women] did theirs. See, the women, the Daughters of Mother Jones had done theirs. Part of our calming effect on some of these macho men was to say [that] what we're doing . . . the women have already done before us and it's time for us to like, step it up another notch, and if they had the courage, if they had the courage to go in and occupy the office facilities, goddam, truly to god, we can go over there. We got fifteen hundred people waiting on us. Sort of like, we used— . . . I know I used it as part of the calming effect is that, you know, we're not doing anything new, folks. The women have already done it, you know, our wives and members have already done this, and I used it as a calming effect. . . .[112]

In regard to nonviolent resistance generally, Burke reflected on the impact of women's presence during mass civil disobedience, using language that situated women's presence in relation to men's presence and to mining masculinities.

Well, clearly, it's just like using music. I mean, I don't know if that's—I don't want you to be offended. Women—maybe this is the answer you don't want, but there is a calming effect there. Clearly. I mean, it's obvious. I mean, some guy's not going to act like an asshole when a cop's getting ready to drag him off, and when he sees a woman being, you know, being limp, and going as we trained everybody, he's going to toe the line.[113]

Cecil Roberts seconded this perspective, making the more general argument that the presence of women in mass civil disobedience during the Pittston strike would have been impossible if there had not been the widespread adherence to nonviolence among striking male miners.

Well, first of all, I believe that the strikers would have insisted that women, their wives, daughters not be there if there was going to be violence. They would not have allowed them to be there. So by virtue of the fact that women were present, and kids, the miners themselves were not going to do anything to jeopardize their own families or hurt someone that they cared about. And miners have this culture too, I believe, that—you know it's a somewhat protectionist—that you don't do something to jeopardize someone you care about and all that. If you're going to have a confrontation, it'll be between the mine guards and the miners, over here away from all this.[114]

In their discussion of the Pittston strike, both Cecil Roberts and Eddie Burke nonetheless discounted any emphasis on women or on men as separate groups, and reiterated the class interconnectedness of women and men in the Pittston strike. Burke continued, in the interview, saying,

> But I don't really like to turn it into—but I guess there is some calming effect, but if you keep harping and your message is *community*, and this is *our* fight, this is not worker's fight, this is worker and spouse fight; this is preacher fight and congregation fight. I mean, as long as you can —I see, I don't think you don't even have to center in on those type of things; I think you can say, "Whoa. This is a community fight. This is us against them."[115]

Eddie Burke's claim that "this is a community fight" was an accurate description of the Pittston strike, but this claim does not refute the concomitant reality that configurations of mining masculinities were a major element in the UMWA's transformation of its collective action repertoire. In the context of community and union cultures that center on a male-predominant mining industry, with the highly masculinized occupation of deep-coal mining, mining masculinities were thrown into contrast with, and sharply distinguished from, women's strike actions. Mining masculinities were simultaneously reconfigured as they served as a resource for shifting the UMWA conventional collective action repertoire to focus on nonviolent, mass civil disobedience. As reconfigured masculinities helped to regender and to transform the UMWA's collective action repertoire, they also helped the UMWA, its members, and its supporters in the coalfields communities to sustain the strike.

VI. CONCLUSION

A realignment of a gender frame of mining masculinities was an important foundation for changing the collective action repertoire of the UMWA in the context of the Pittston Coal strike. In that strike, the UMWA's collective action repertoire was transformed from one that relied on conventional strike actions, picketing, and occasional violence to one that emphasized mass demonstrations and nonviolent protest. In persuading striking miners and their supporters to change their traditional strike actions, the UMWA employed a gender frame of mining masculinities in their action and rhetoric. As the strike was initiated, union leaders, members, and supporters drew upon their understandings of gender and masculinities in coalfield communities to undertake the new actions and to understand them in context.

The case of the UMWA strike against Pittston Coal Group suggests several conclusions regarding collective action repertoires and framing. First, it demonstrates, as an empirical case, that "the prior history of particular forms of contention in a locale constrains their subsequent use."[116] Second, collective action framing occurs in the context of practice and experiment, not only for mobilization purposes but with the aim of demonstrating and teaching particular actions to an already mobilized set of actors. Third, the Pittston strike suggests that established cultural frames may impose themselves upon collective action. Fourth, the UMWA experience, of a male-predominant labor union, strongly suggests that

gender frames may underlie political struggles and collective action choices even in movements where women have little if any political standing.[117] In this final section, each of these conclusions regarding collective action repertoires and the framing that facilitates their transformation is discussed.

My major argument in this article is that the repertoire shift of the UMWA could not have been accomplished in the absence of collective action framing that relied upon a gender frame of mining masculinities. The reiteration—in the UMWA's publications, in the public pronouncements of UMWA leaders, in the exemplary involvement of UMWA field staff, their president and their vice president in nonviolent protest to the point of arrest, and in retrospective interviews—of the connection between mining masculinities and civil disobedience serves as impressive evidence that gender framing was essential to transforming the UMWA's collective action repertoire. The UMWA leadership recognized the importance of mining masculinities in the strike context, evidenced by the ways in which they articulated and acted upon their belief that discipline, restraint, and pride in a masculinity that served to resist violence was essential to the successful assertion of peaceful, militant civil disobedience. As the UMWA leadership was consciously teaching its membership a new strike tactic, it was also articulating a realigned gender frame to accommodate and to support it.

Second, the Pittston strike indicates that framing serves not only mobilization purposes but also the goal of socializing an already mobilized group to a specific set of new actions. In the case of the Pittston strike, as in many labor union actions, an organized constituency preceded collective strike action, and that constituency—miners employed by the Pittston Coal Group—was legally empowered and collectively willing—even eager—to undertake collective action. In general, leaders and activists are faced with two mobilization tasks: developing, among potential supporters, the willingness to act collectively, and persuading activists to undertake a *particular* collective action. In the case of organized labor, the willingness to undertake collective action may already exist; in the case of the UMWA, the willingness to act immediately at the expiration of the contract, rather than to engage in strategic selective strike activity, was seen as something to be tempered rather than encouraged. Relieved of the first mobilization task, the UMWA leadership focused on the second, realigning its gender frame and emphasizing the new actions to be introduced in the course of the strike.

A third conclusion, suggested by the UMWA's collective action framing in the Pittston Coal strike, is that some cultural frames may "impose" themselves upon activists. In the Pittston strike, the UMWA's use of a gender frame was not the result of freely choosing among a variety of cultural symbols that might serve to summarize grievances and to mobilize activists. In addressing issues of mining masculinities in the context of introducing a new collective action element into its repertoire, the UMWA leadership recognized an existing gender frame based upon mining masculinities, accommodated established mining masculinities, and

acted to translate those masculinities into support for the new repertoire element. The UMWA strategists' gender reframing in the Pittston Coal strike occurred through adapting a preexisting and prevalent form of understanding and action, one that could be used either in defeating the new strategy of nonviolent protest or in developing, justifying, and sustaining it. Although it is the case that collective action framing is not simply "an automatic reproduction of cultural texts,"[118] the Pittston case indicates that some frames impose themselves powerfully on the strategic choices of collective actors.

Finally, the UMWA strike against Pittston suggests that gender may serve as a major framing device in social movements' collective action, even in movements where women have no direct political standing in terms of gender.[119] Gender framing is the employment of gendered values, symbols, beliefs, and language in defining forms of collective action. In feminist movements, where women have direct standing as *women*, gender framing around collective action may be readily apparent. In antinuclear movements or in race-based movements, where "gender and . . . lived gendered experiences are [not] explicated as primary in the movement and the movement's issues,"[120] gender frames may be invisible or appear "natural."[121] In the UMWA, with few female members, no national female elected leaders, and no women's issues being contested in the union's struggles, gender themes have nonetheless framed the union's traditional collective action repertoire. When realigned, they also served to facilitate a transformation of that repertoire in the context of the Pittston strike.[122] In the UMWA's strike against Pittston, where "the masculinity of mining . . . gives gender its relevance,"[123] a realigned gender frame offered the union an opportunity to transform its repertoire of collective action, an opportunity that may potentially be available to many other social movements.

NOTES

1. John H. M. Laslett, ed., *The United Mine Workers of America: A Model of Industrial Solidarity?* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 17.

2. John Laslett defines mining as "perhaps the most masculine of all industrial occupations, with the possible exception of logging or seafaring. . . ." Laslett, ed., *United Mine Workers of America*, 17. For David Morgan, mining is an occupation that, like the military, serves "as an important site in the shaping and making of masculinities," especially as mining "[links] physicality and masculinity" (David J. Morgan, "Theater of War: Combat, the Military, and Masculinities," in Harry Brod and Michael Kaufman, eds., *Theorizing Masculinities* [London: Sage, 1994], 168). Woolley and Reid, in their study of the Brookside Coal strike, describe the miners as "stubborn and quick-tempered and violent" (Bryan Woolley and Ford Reid, *We Be Here When the Morning Comes* [Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1975], 4).

3. See, for example, the discussion of company and state violence in John W. Hevener, *Which Side Are You On? The Harlan County Coal Miners, 1931-39*. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978), 142-43 (on the private deputy system) and 178-79.

4. In the context of the UMWA strike against Massey Coal, Dwayne Yancey wrote that "the UMW long had been considered the country's most violent union" (Dwayne

Yancey, "Thunder in the Coalfields," special report of the *Roanoke Times and World-News*, 29 April 1990, 2).

5. Two hundred miners in Pittston Coal Group's Eastern Coal Corporation Kentucky mines joined the official strike a month later, on 19 June 1989.

6. See Jonathan P. Hicks, "Labor Takes Heart," *New York Times*, 25 June 1989, 4:1.

7. Tilly defines a repertoire of contention as "the established ways in which pairs of actors make and receive claims bearing on each other's interests." Charles Tilly, *Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 43.

8. Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 143.

9. Tilly, *Popular Contention*, 42.

10. Charles Tilly, *The Contentious French* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1986), 390.

11. Ibid.

12. Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, 157.

13. Ibid., 158.

14. Tilly, *Popular Contention*, 44.

15. Ibid., 378.

16. Ibid., 377.

17. Ibid., 40.

18. Ibid., 42.

19. Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Review of Charles Tilly, *The Contentious French*," *American Journal of Sociology* 93 (1987): 1248.

20. David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest," in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, eds., *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 136.

21. Among the various frames that have been employed by social movements in undergirding their existing collective action repertoires are religious beliefs (see Doug McAdam, "The Framing Function of Movement Tactics: Strategic Dramaturgy in the American Civil Rights Movement," in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* [Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 338-55); "communities of memory" (see Elizabeth Faue, *Community of Suffering and Struggle: Women, Men, and the Labor Movement in Minneapolis, 1915-1945* [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991]; see also Richard Couto, "The Memory of Miners and the Conscience of Capital: Coal Miners' Strikes As Free Spaces," in Stephen L. Fisher, ed., *Fighting Back in Appalachia: Traditions of Resistance and Change* [Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993], 165-94); workerism (Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics* [Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992]); and individual rights.

22. David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review* 51 (August 1986): 464.

23. Ibid., 470.

24. Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 2 (1986): 278.

25. Ibid., 279.

26. See Faue, *Community of Suffering and Struggle*; McAdam, "The Framing Function of Movement Tactics."

27. See Guida West and Rhoda Lois Blumberg, "Reconstructing Social Protest from a Feminist Perspective," in Guida West and Rhoda Lois Blumberg, eds., *Women and Social Protest* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1990), 7.

28. Additional frames and values were also evoked in the strike; these include class-based collective identities (Michael Yarrow, "The Gender-Specific Class Consciousness of Appalachian Coal Miners: Structure and Change," in Scott McNall, Rhoda F. Levine, and Rick Fantasia, eds., *Bringing Class Back In* [Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991], 285-310), historically specific memories and values (Couto, "The Memory of Miners"), and religious beliefs (Jim Sessions and Fran Ansley, "Singing across Dark Spaces: The Union/Community Takeover of Pittston's Moss 3 Plant," in Fisher, ed., *Fighting Back in Appalachia*, 195-223), among others.

29. "Companies Cite Supplies in Coal Miner Layoffs," *New York Times*, 4 October 1984: A18.

30. Michael Gold distinguishes between "economic" and "unfair labor practice" strikes, writing, "Strikers who are protesting an unfair labor practice are treated differently from economic strikers. The employer may hire temporary—but not permanent—replacements if the strike is caused by an unfair labor practice." Where no unfair labor practice exists, employers are free to hire permanent replacement workers, under which condition "the strikes have lost their job for practical purposes; even if the strikers offer to return to work, the employer is free to keep permanent replacements on the job," (Michael Evan Gold, *Introduction to Labor Law* [Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1989], 44-45.) The National Labor Relations Board, in response to United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) complaints, eventually designated the Massey strike as an unfair labor practice strike ("Labor Board Backs U. M. W. in Coal Dispute," *New York Times*, 26 April 1985: A14).

31. "Judge Levies $200,000 Fine against Striking Mine Union," *New York Times*, 28 March 1985: A23.

32. See remarks by UMWA staff member Joseph Corcoran, quoted in the *New York Times*, concerning the union's inability to direct miners' strike activities as a result of the injunctions ("Six-Month-Old Coal Miners' Strike Grows Bitter," *New York Times*, 2 April 1985: A10). Dwayne Yancey reported that "a federal judge ordered the UMW to cease mass picketing and sitdown demonstrations. The UMW abided by the ruling, dispersing pickets throughout the Massey system. It was a decision the union would regret. Union leadership had little way to control their rowdy—and farflung—members" (Yancey, "Thunder in the Coalfields," 2).

33. These included exchanges of gunfire, the murder of a nonunion truck driver by a sniper, assaults and fight-related injuries, the use of jackrocks, rock-throwing, the torching of a coal truck, and other destruction of property. See "Coal Truck Driver Slain; Killing Linked to Strike," *New York Times*, 30 May 1985: A14. E. Morgan Massey, president of the Massey Company, referred to the strike as "a guerrilla war." The guerrilla war was engaged in by Massey employees as well as by striking miners. "Company Chief Demands End to Coal Field Strife," *New York Times*, 31 May 1985: A14.

34. The UMWA struck Massey on 1 October 1984, and ended the strike on 21 December 1985.

35. Author's interview with Cecil Roberts, Charleston, West Virginia, 25 June 1995.

36. Eddie Burke, a major field organizer for the Massey strike, argues that, "at best, the Massey/UMWA conflict could be described as a draw . . . —they lost millions of dollars and we lost several jobs" (Eddie Burke, "The UMWA/Pittston Strike: The Labor Movement's Experiment with Non-violent Civil Disobedience," unpublished paper prepared for the Samuel Gompers Union Leadership Award, 1990, 6). In an interview, Burke refers to

the Massey strike as "a scorched earth" strike (author's interview with Eddie Burke, Cambridge, Ohio, 3 August 1994).

37. Burke, "The UMWA/Pittston Strike," 4.

38. Ibid., 6.

39. Ibid., 7.

40. The Pittston Coal Group was, at the time of the strike, the major subsidiary of the Pittston Company. Other Pittston Company subsidiaries included Burlington Air Express, Brinks, Inc., and Brinks Home Services. In 1998, the Pittston Company recorded its highest profit record in the history of the corporation.

41. Burke, "The UMWA/Pittston Strike," 12.

42. For a detailed discussion of UMWA strategy in the Pittston strike, see Karen Beckwith, "Collective Action and Action Repertoires in the 1989-90 UMWA Pittston Strike," paper prepared for the NEH Summer Seminar on Political Histories of Collective Action, Sidney Tarrow, Director (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992). The five staff working groups were negotiations, legal, worksite strategies, corporate strategies, and international affairs. Burke, "The UMWA/Pittston Strike," 8-9.

43. For a brief discussion of the distinction between economic and unfair labor practice strikes, see Gold, *An Introduction to Labor Law.*

44. Author's interview with Marty Hudson, UMWA, Washington, DC, 2 September 1993.

45. Burke, "The UMWA/Pittston Strike," 13.

46. Roberts, interview. See also Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 105, where he observes, "As the state has increased its capacity for repression, violent protest has begun to pose extreme risks and high costs. The result is that even in authoritarian systems, opposition movements have become skilled at mounting unobtrusive, symbolic, and peaceful forms of collective action that are difficult to repress."

47. See James R. Green, " 'Tying the Knot of Solidarity': The Pittston Strike of 1989-1990," in Laslett, ed., *United Mine Workers of America*, 518-19.

48. Roberts, interview.

49. Hudson, interview.

50. These included UMWA members from non-Pittston mines who participated in wildcat strikes that began on 12 June 1989 and lasted for more than a month. By the time UMWA President Richard Trumka called for an end to the "memorial period" on 15 July, an estimated sixty thousand UMWA miners in ten states had stopped work, hundreds of whom traveled during that time to Virginia to support the UMWA and to participate in the sit-ins.

51. Hudson, interview.

52. Burke, interview.

53. Michael Kaufman, "Men, Feminism, and Men's Contradictory Experiences of Power," in Harry Brod and Michael Kaufman, eds., *Theorizing Masculinities*, 147.

54. Scott Coltrane, "Theorizing Masculinities in Contemporary Social Science" in Brod and Kaufman, eds., *Theorizing Masculinities*, 44.

55. Ibid., 41.

56. Ibid.

57. Jeff Hearn and David L. Collinson, "Theorizing Unities and Differences between Men and between Masculinities," in Brod and Kaufman, eds., *Theorizing Masculinities*, 100.

58. Ava Baron, "On Looking at Men: Masculinity and the Making of a Gendered Working-Class History," in Ann-Louise Shapiro, ed., *Feminists Revision History* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994), 148.

59. Maurice Berger, Brian Wallis, and Simon Watson, "Introduction," in Maurice Berger, Brian Wallis, and Simon Watson, eds., *Constructing Masculinity* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 1-7; Richard Fung, "Burdens of Representation, Burdens of Responsibility," in Berger, Wallis, and Watson, eds., *Constructing Masculinity*, 291-98; and Hearn and Collinson, "Theorizing Unities and Differences."

60. See Eve Kosofsky Sedgewick, " 'Gosh, Boy George, You Must Be Awfully Secure in Your Masculinity!" in Berger, Wallis, and Watson, eds., *Constructing Masculinity*, 12-13, where she challenges the "distinctive linkage between masculinity and the male subject" and asserts that "as a woman, I am a consumer of masculinities, but I am not more so than men are; and, like men, I as a woman am also a producer of masculinities and a performer of them."

61. Masculinities are not the only set of values and practices underlying the transformation of the UMWA's traditional repertoire. Other frames include, in the specific case of the Pittston strike, collective memories of the histories of mining communities, community-based class identity and class-based struggle, and Christian religious justice themes emphasizing faith, suffering, and triumph, among others. My argument here is not that a gender frame of mining masculinities was the sole organized and organizing construct for making meaning of the collective action changes in the Pittston strike, but rather that a gender frame was a major device for recognizing and adapting values and beliefs, and for reinterpreting and reinforcing experiences, that helped to establish new ways of acting for striking miners and their supporters.

62. Bruce Scates, "Mobilizing Manhood: Gender and the Great Strike in Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand," *Gender & History* 9, no. 2 (1997): 293.

63. Ibid., 295.

64. R. W. Connell writes, "As Mike Donaldson observes in *Time of Our Lives*, hard labour in factories and mines literally uses up the workers' bodies; and that destruction, a proof of the toughness of the work and the worker, can be a method of demonstrating masculinity" (R. W. Connell, *Masculinities* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995], 36).

65. Ibid., 42.

66. Ibid., 55.

67. Ibid., chapters 3 and 9.

68. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 535,000 men and 85,000 women are employed in mining across all job categories (86.3 percent male across all categories); excluding managerial, technical, and service jobs, 344,000 men and 7,000 women are employed in mining. Of these jobs, 98 percent are held by men (CPS Information, Office of Employment and Unemployment Statistics, BLS, 2 February 1999, available from: http://stats.bls.gov/cpsaatab.htm).

69. John J. Banovic, "Remarks before the 11th National Conference," *Coal Mining Women's Support Team News* 11, no. 3 (1989): 8. I raise this example not to embarrass or to criticize Banovic, or to single him out as especially guilty, but to illustrate the point. I still struggle in my own writings on the Pittston strike to avoid this conflation, and to explicate "male miners" when I am talking about male-exclusive situations, reserving "miners" as a term encompassing women and men.

70. Marat Moore, *Women in the Mines: Stories of Life and Work* (New York: Twayne, 1996), xviii.

71. For a discussion of the dangers to which coal miners are subject at work, see Price Fishback, "The Miner's Work Environment," and Alan Derickson, "The Role of the UMW in the Prevention of Work-Related Respiratory Disease," both in Laslett, ed., *United Mine Workers of America*; and Carol A. B. Giesen, *Coal Miners' Wives: Portraits of Endurance* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1995).

72. See Giesen, *Coal Miners' Wives*, Appendix B: "Other Women, Other Occupations," for a discussion of dangerous male-predominant occupations and wives' perspectives on their husbands' work in these fields.

73. Burke, interview. Woolley and Reid, *We Be Here When the Morning Comes*, 20, describe a union meeting during the Brookside Coal strike where "every miner was armed." For a description of the historically pervasive violence involving union organizing in the coalfields, see Hevener, *Which Side Are You On?*

74. Leaflet in support for the UMWA strike against Pittston Coal (Ithaca, NY: Catherwood Library, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University).

75. For a discussion of the importance of guns and the military to hegemonic masculinity, see Connell, *Masculinities*, 212-16.

76. Yarrow, "Class Consciousness of Appalachian Coal Miners," 294-95.

77. See, for example, Sally Ward Maggard's description of women's physical violence and use of their bodies in the Brookside Coal Strike (Sally Ward Maggard, "Gender Contested: Women's Participation in the Brookside Coal Strike," in West and Blumberg, eds., *Women and Social Protest*, 75-98). In no case were women described as using guns. See also Woolley and Reid, *We Be Here When the Morning Comes*, chapter 6.

78. Roberts, interview.

79. The UMWA emphasized miners' military service during the Pittston strike, and particularly during the takeover of Pittston's Moss #3 coal-processing plant. Eddie Burke explained, "We figured out how many—we had our little roster of how many of them were veterans and what wars they'd served in. We had a couple people in the Korean War. . . . We had a list of everybody's service to the country. . . . We . . . were going to wrap ourselves in the flag on that one." Burke, interview.

80. See Karen Beckwith, "Collective Identities of Class and Gender: Working-Class Women in the Pittston Coal Strike," *Political Psychology* 19, no. 1 (1998): 147-67.

81. Roberts, interview, emphasis added. Joe Corcoran, a UMWA staff member assigned to the Pittston strike, is quoted as saying that "people had to be in the field to reassure the men that 'this was OK, this is not unmanly' " (Yancey, "Thunder in the Coalfields," 3).

82. The association of restraint and resistance with masculinity is evident historically. See, for example, Sonya Rose, "Gender Antagonism," where union leaders in Lancashire, England, praised striking workers as "men who knew how to conduct themselves with proud restraint" (Sonya Rose in Scates, "Mobilizing Manhood," 296). See also quotation of Marty Hudson, below, in text.

83. Hudson, interview, emphasis in original.

84. Yancey, "Thunder in the Coalfields," 8.

85. This was Lane Kirkland's first arrest for union activities. His presence further underscored that nonviolent passive resistance was an appropriate action for powerful men, labor leaders and rank-and-file members alike. "Labor Leaders Arrested at Rally Backing Union Workers on Strike," *New York Times*, 25 August 1989.

86. Yancey, "Thunder in the Coalfields," 9.

87. Roberts, interview.

88. Burke, interview.

89. Roberts, interview.

90. Hudson, interview.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid. Lack of respect for state troopers was not a new experience in the Pittston strike. Woolley and Reid, *We Be Here When the Morning Comes*, 19, quote Louie Stacy, a

UMWA member and miner during the 1974 Brookside Coal strike: "Them state polices was sent in here to break the strike . . . and they seemed to have a personal grudge against us. The only thing we ever did was heckle them, call them [Kentucky Governor Wendell] Ford's storm troopers and stuff like that. They strutted around here like roosters and slung them sticks and gritted their teeth. You could tell they had a personal grudge."

94. Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 118.

95. "Camouflage was easily acquired," Burke observed. "A lot of people have camouflage. A lot of hunters, that's number one." Burke, interview.

96. Yancey, "Thunder in the Coalfields," 4.

97. Note that the strike newsletter, published by the UMWA, was titled "The Camo-Call."

98. Burke, interview.

99. See also Sessions and Ansley, "Singing across Dark Spaces," 204.

100. Yancey, "Thunder in the Coalfields," 4.

101. Yancey also describes camouflage as "fit for lurking in the weeds" (ibid.).

102. The UMWA repudiated Odom's claim. Eddie Burke dismissed the suggestion that camouflage had militaristic, or even militant, meaning. "No. I mean, no. I heard some of that bullshit. . . . That's not true. I mean, that's just one of these [claims], you know, people, like really state—after you do something, people come along and shape these great statements; it's just utter bullshit. . . . You know, 'cause I knew that everybody had camouflage. I mean, everybody wants to turn it in to this or that, or those type of—those are just somebody just trying to get on the map. . . ." (Burke, interview). See also Marat Moore, quoted in Green, " 'Tying the Knot of Solidarity,' " 530.

103. For a discussion of "cultures of solidarity," see Rick Fantasia, who defines them as "a cultural expression that arises within the wider culture, yet which is emergent in its embodiment of oppositional practices and meanings" and "the active expression of worker solidarity within an industrial system and a society hostile to it" (Rick Fantasia, *Cultures of Solidarity: Consciousness, Action, and Contemporary American Workers* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988], 17, 19).

104. Baron, "On Looking at Men," 150.

105. Scates, "Mobilizing Manhood," 286.

106. Connell, *Masculinities*, 223.

107. This action has been described and analyzed elsewhere in detail. See Beckwith, "Collective Identities of Class and Gender"; Yancey, "Thunder in the Coalfields," 4; Adrienne M. Birecree, "The Importance and Implications of Women's Participation in the 1989-90 Pittston Coal Strike," *Journal of Economic Issues* 30, no. 1 (1996): 187-210.

108. For more detailed descriptions of the Moss #3 takeover, see Sessions and Ansley, "Singing across Dark Spaces;" Yancey, "Thunder in the Coalfields," 10-13; Green, " 'Tying the Knot of Solidarity,' " 538-39.

109. Note, however, that the Moss #3 occupation attracted much less media attention than did the Daughters of Mother Jones occupation; in this regard, the Moss #3 action was disappointing. See Yancey, "Thunder in the Coalfields," 13.

110. Green, " 'Tying the Knot of Solidarity,' " 527.

111. Hudson, interview.

112. Burke, interview. Session and Ansley, "Singing across Dark Spaces," 200, reflect this, describing the Daughters of Mother Jones action as "breaking the ice."

113. Burke, interview.

114. Roberts, interview.

115. Burke, interview, emphasis in original.

116. Charles Tilly, “Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834,” in Mark Traugott, ed., *Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), 39.

117. Karen Beckwith, “Lancashire Women against Pit Closures: Women’s Standing in a Men’s Movement,” *Signs* 21, no. 4 (1996): 1034-68.

118. Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 123.

119. Beckwith, “Lancashire Women against Pit Closures,” 1038-42.

120. Ibid., 1038.

121. Baron, “On Looking at Men,” 148.

122. The potential pervasiveness of gender frames in collective action is supported by recent research on the U.S. black civil rights movement. See Doug McAdam, “Gender As a Mediator of the Activist Experience: The Case of Freedom Summer,” *American Journal of Sociology* 97, no. 5 (1992): 1211-40; Sara Evans, *Personal Politics: The Roots of Women’s Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left* (New York: Vintage, 1980); Ronnelle Paulsen and John P. Bartkowski, “Gender Perceptions of Success among Neighborhood Association Activists,” *Social Science Quarterly* 78, no. 1 (1997): 196-208; and Belinda Robnett, *How Long? How Long? African-American Women in the Struggle for Civil Rights* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). Suggestions of “social movement spillover” involving female activists in both the peace and feminist movements offer additional research possibilities for linking gender frames to general social movement collective action and changes in collective action repertoires. See David S. Meyer and Nancy Whittier, “Social Movement Spillover,” *Social Problems* 41 (1994): 277-98.

123. Laslett, ed., *United Mine Workers of America*, 17.