Constructing identity and relating to difference: understanding the EU's mode of differentiation

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Abstract. The case of the EU points to the need to re-conceptualise the relationship between self and other in the IR literature. I argue that the literature forces us into an artificial choice between the liberal constructivist approach of disregarding the constitutive role of difference in identity formation and the critical constructivist approach of assuming a behavioural relationship between self and other, and therefore cannot account for the diversity in the EU's interactions with various states on its periphery. I identify three constitutive dimensions along which self/other relationships vary to produce or not produce relationships of Othering: nature of difference, social distance, and response of other. I analyse how the EU's interactions with Morocco, Turkey, and Central and Eastern European states are situated differently on these dimensions, and evaluate the question of whether the EU is a postmodern collectivity based on these analyses.

Introduction

Following Ruggie's characterisation of the European Union as 'the first "multi-perspectival polity" to emerge since the advent of the modern era',[1] many international relations scholars have stressed the 'post-modern', 'post-Westphalian', or 'post-nationalist' nature of the EU as a polity and collectivity.[2] In most such analyses, the EU's 'post-modernity' is argued to derive from how international politics is conducted among the community members. Identities in the modern nation-state system rest on the construction of clear and unambiguous inside/outside and self/other distinctions. In contrast, a postmodern collectivity entails 'moving beyond the hard boundaries and centralized sovereignty characteristics of the Westphalian,

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1 John G. Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations', *International Organization*, 47:1 (1993), p. 172.

2 For such characterisations of the EU, see, among others, Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, 'The European Union and Turkey', *Survival*, 41:1(1999), pp. 41–57, Lars-Erik Cederman, 'Exclusion Versus Dilution: Real or Imagined Trade-Off?', in Lars-Erik Cederman (ed.), *Constructing Europe's Identity: The External Dimension* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp. 233–56, esp. 248–50, and Ole Waever, 'Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-war Community', in Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 69–118.

or "modern" state towards permeable boundaries and layered sovereignty'.[3] Ruggie has argued that the conduct of international politics among EU members is remarkably different from modern nation-state politics and rather resembles the medieval system of rule with its 'overlapping forms of authority' and 'nonexclusive forms of territoriality'.[4] According to Wendt, the EU is a good example of 'collective identity formation' in international relations, where states begin to see each other as an extension of self rather than as other.[5]

There have not been sufficient analyses of whether the EU constitutes a 'post-modern' collectivity in terms of its relations with its outside. While clear-cut self/ other distinctions may have been replaced within the EU by overlapping and mutually constitutive identities, the EU as a collectivity may be replicating the modern, Westphalian 'mode of differentiation'[6] in terms of its external relations. In response to how the EU relates to its outside, some scholars have presented arguments for a modern mode of differentiation, arguing that the European collective identity has entailed the construction of its outside as inherently different and as a threat to its identity.[7] Others have presented evidence of a postmodern mode of differentiation, arguing that the EU's collective identity is founded not on the fear of 'others' but on the shared fear of disunity, and that the EU does not erect firm lines of boundary around itself, but 'large zones of transition' or 'frontiers'.[8]

It has not been possible to adjudicate between these rival claims on the basis of the empirical record of the EU's interactions with outside states. Scholars have drawn on cases of interaction selectively to find empirical support for their claims. While the cases of Morocco, Turkey, and Russia have supported claims of a modern mode of differentiation,[9] the EU's interactions with Central and Eastern European states have been used as empirical evidence that the EU is becoming (or has become) a postmodern collectivity.[10] By conceiving of differentiation in terms of the polar opposites of modern and postmodern, the literature is unequipped to explain the diversity in the EU's interactions with various states on its periphery. How is it that with respect to certain states, the EU constructs firm lines of boundary between self and other, and with regard to others, fluid and ambiguous frontiers? Scholars have failed to develop a theoretical account that can explain how and why these different modes of differentiation coexist in the context of the EU.

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[3] Buzan and Diez, 'The European Union', p. 56.
[4] Ruggie, 'Territoriality', pp. 168–74.
[5] Alexander Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', *American Political Science Review*, 88:2 (1994), pp. 384–96, and Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
[6] Ruggie, 'Territoriality', pp. 148–52.
[7] For example, Iver B. Neumann, 'European Identity, EU Expansion, and the Integration/ Exclusion Nexus', *Alternatives,* 23 (1998), pp. 397–416. Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: The East in European Identity Formation* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, 'The Other in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society', *Review of International Studies*, 17 (1991), pp. 327–48.
[8] For example, Ole Waever, 'Insecurity', pp. 90 and 100.
[9] Neumann and Welsh, 'The Other' analyses the case of Turkey. Neumann, 'Uses of the Other' studies the cases of both Turkey and Russia. Also for a discussion of the EU's Mediterranean 'Other', see Michelle Pace, 'The Ugly Duckling of Europe: The Mediterranean in the Foreign Policy of the European Union', *Journal of European Area Studies*, 10:2 (2002), pp. 189–209.
[10] Frank Schimmelfennig, 'Liberal Identity and Postnationalist Inclusion: The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union' in Lars-Erik Cederman (ed.) *Constructing Europe's Identity: The External Dimension* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp. 165–86.

The case of the EU points to the need to rethink and re-conceptualise the relationship between self and other in the IR literature. The growing constructivist literature on identity is caught in a misconceived debate where the broader behavioural question of how self interacts with others is conflated with the ontological question of whether or not identity is defined in relation to difference. While critical constructivist scholars rightly criticise liberal constructivists[11] for disregarding the constitutive role of difference in identity formation, liberal constructivists misunderstand this critique as positing a behavioural relationship of 'Othering' between self and other, and thus respond with evidence of the contingency and transformability of self/ other relationships. This article separates the ontological basis of self/other relationships from their behavioural manifestations. Identities are always constituted in relation to difference because a thing can only be known by what it is not. However, the constitution of identities in relation to difference does not necessitate a behavioural relationship between self (the bearer of identity) and other (the bearer of difference) that is characterised by mutual exclusion and the perception and representation of the other as a threat to one's identity. While acknowledging the ever-existing potential for difference to lead to such a behavioural relationship of 'Othering' between self and other, in this article I seek to identify the constitutive conditions under which this potential is realised. This interest in constitutive conditions enables me to also reconcile the liberal and the critical constructivist approaches to self/other interaction in a fruitful way.

The next section of this article critically reviews the constructivist IR literature on self/other interaction around two questions: (1) Does identity require difference in order to be? (2) Does constitutive difference between self and other necessarily produce a relationship of Othering? In the third section, I tentatively identify the constitutive dimensions along which self/other relationships may vary to produce or not produce behavioural relationships of Othering. I argue that the ontological relationship between identity and difference is complicated by different notions of identity (inclusive-exclusive) and their associated notions of difference (acquired-inherent). In addition, two other performative factors – practices that states engage in to perform and secure their identities – may intervene between the ontological relationship of identity/difference and a behavioural relationship of Othering between self and other: the social distance that self maintains with respect to other and the response of the other to the construction of its identity.

I do not pose these constitutive dimensions as an exhaustive list, nor do I claim an exhaustive list capturing all possible variation in self/ other relationships can ever be drawn. What is important for the purposes of this article is that these dimensions prove useful in accounting for the diversity in EU's interactions with various states on its periphery. In the fourth section of this article, I show how EU's interactions

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[11] Various scholars have employed modern/ postmodern and/or liberal/critical categories to differentiate between different variants of constructivism. See Emmanuel Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics', *European Journal of International Relations*, 3 (1997), pp. 319–63, and Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, 'Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism', *European Journal of International Relations*, 4 (1998), pp. 259–94. I use the distinction between liberal and critical constructivism specifically in the context of questions of self/other interaction. The distinction as it is drawn here may not be tenable as far as other questions are concerned. Ultimately, any such categorisation of scholarship is likely to encounter objections, but is useful for the purposes of this article.

with Morocco, Turkey, and states in Central and Eastern Europe are situated differently on the dimensions of difference, social distance, response of other, and hence exemplify different kinds of self/other relationships. With respect to each case of interaction, I discuss how these factors have interacted to produce or not produce relationships of Othering and the conditions under which they may. In conclusion, I revisit the question of whether the EU is a postmodern collectivity on the basis of these analyses.

Several caveats are in order regarding the scope and nature of the empirical case studies in this article. Certainly, I do not claim that EU's interactions with peripheral states are the only (or the most relevant) sites to study different forms of self/other interaction in IR or even the nature of the EU as a collectivity, and that other sites, such as the discourses around immigration and refugee policy, are not equally important. Secondly, since, in this article, the theoretical identification of the constitutive dimensions proceeds in tandem with the empirical discussion of cases, the cases cannot be – and should not be judged as – empirical 'tests' of the theory. In addition, the empirical identification of certain cases, such as EU-Turkey, EU-Morocco relations, as examples of particular types of self/other interaction should not lead to the misperception of them as fixed and static relationships.

Self/other interaction in IR theory

Does identity require difference in order to be?

The divergent influences of symbolic interactionism and poststructualist theory have created a division in the constructivist IR literature with regard to the import given to difference in identity construction.[12] In symbolic interactionism, identity formation is depicted as a process of socialisation through which an individual comes to see herself in the way that others do.[13] Thus, in symbolic interactionism 'other' does not denote the bearer of constitutive difference. 'Other' simply represents other individuals, who constitute self's identity by naming, recognising, and validating, but not by embodying the alternative and different identity.

Consistent with its symbolic interactionist roots, liberal constructivism has focused on processes of state socialisation.[14] It has argued that there is a social

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[12] IR constructivism also draws upon feminist theory, historical insitutionalism, sociological institutionalism, and structuration theory (Wendt, *Social Theory*, p. 1). But specifically on the relationship between self and other, the influences of symbolic interactionism and poststructuralism are more prominent.

[13] For classical statements, see George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1934), and Herbert Blumer, *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1969). For reviews, see Sheldon Stryker, 'The Vitalization of Symbolic Interactionism', *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 50:1 (1987), pp. 83–94, and Gary Alan Fine, 'The Sad Demise, Mysterious Disappearance, and Glorious Triumph of Symbolic Interactionism', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 19 (1993), pp. 61–87. Mead also underscores how the desire for self-esteem leads to the 'recognition of ourselves in our differences from other persons'; however, this is not in the sense of constitutive difference.

[14] For example, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'Norms and International Relations Theory', *International Organization,* 52 (1998), pp. 887–917, and Jeffrey Checkel, 'Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe', *International Studies Quarterly*, 43:1 (1999), pp. 83–114.

structure to international politics, constituted by norms, institutions, ideas, and collective meanings.[15] States acquire identities in the course of interaction with other states; they come to see themselves and each other in terms of the subject positions that are constituted by the social structure of international politics.[16] For example, liberal constructivists would argue that democracy as an identity category is socially constructed in that international norms, ideas, and collective meanings define the preconditions of a democratic state. States acquire identities as 'democratic' through social recognition, only if the fulfilment of these conditions are recognised and validated by 'other' states.[17]

In contrast, the constitution of identity and meaning in relation to difference forms the basis of the critical constructivists' approach to international relations. In studying the social structure of international politics, they have emphasised that the discourses on international norms, such as democracy and human rights, are intertwined with such oppositional structuring.[18] This is because democracy, to be a meaningful identity category, presupposes the existence of its logical opposite, non-democracy. Therefore, the discourses on the promotion of democracy and human rights are inevitably productive of two identity categories, a morally superior identity of democratic juxtaposed to the inferior identity of non- (or less) democratic, thereby 'constructing the very differences that transformation would ostensibly eliminate'.[19] Critical constructivists also contend that identities are 'performatively constituted' by practices of differentiation that distinguish the identity in whose name they operate from counter-identities.[20] For example, the performance of a democratic state identity entails representational practices that differentiate the democratic self from others constructed to be non- (or less) democratic.

In response, liberal constructivists downplay the role of difference in identity formation through various counter-arguments. One argument is that it is possible to distinguish between pre-social (corporate) and social identities of states, and corporate identities are 'constituted by self-organizing homeostatic structures', and as such are 'constitutionally exogenous to Otherness'.[21] According to Wendt, 'if a process is self-organizing, then there is no particular Other to which the Self is related'.[22] To the criticism that the concept of corporate identity establishes states as 'unequivocally bounded actors' and 'brackets the struggle . . . among many possible and rivaling selves',[23] Wendt responds by arguing that 'the self-organization hypothesis does not deny the ongoing process of boundary-drawing' but simply states that this is an internally driven process that does not involve 'the agency and discourse of outsiders'.[24]

[15] Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security' in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 33–75.

[16] Wendt, *Social Theory.*

[17] Amy Gurowitz, 'Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, and the Japanese State', *World Politics,* 51 (1999), pp. 413–45.

[18] Roxanne Doty, *Imperial Encounters* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

[19] Doty, *Imperial*, p. 136.

[20] David Campbell, *Writing Security* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), p. 85.

[21] Wendt, *Social Theory*, pp. 224–5.

[22] Ibid., p. 225.

[23] Iver B. Neumann, 'Self and Other in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations*, 2:2 (1996), p. 165.

[24] Wendt, *Social Theory*, p. 74.

Here, Wendt conflates two distinct processes. The constitution of identity in relation to difference does not mean that the constitution of identity necessarily involves the agency and discourse of outsiders, but that it presupposes the existence of alternative identities. And no process can be self-organising if it entails an ongoing boundary-drawing process because boundaries are by definition 'drawn' between a self and an other – even though the other may not be actively engaged in 'drawing' the boundary. The assumption of a self-organising collectivity presupposes unequivocal boundedness. The empirical examples that Wendt provides to sustain his case makes it clear that he conceptualises the self/other relationship in symbolic interactionist terms of recognition rather than post-structuralist terms of identity/difference: 'The Spanish state was a self-organized, objective fact for the Aztecs whether their discourse acknowledged this or not'.[25] While it is patently true that the Spanish state did not require the recognition of the Aztecs for its existence, does Wendt really mean that Spain's corporate identity (as bodies and territory) was not reconstituted by the construction of Aztecs as inferior subjects to be conquered?

A second way in which liberal constructivists downplay the role of difference in identity constitution is by arguing that some state identities, such as democratic, are type identities that involve minimal interaction with 'others' (only in the constitution of 'membership rules'), and represent characteristics that are 'intrinsic to the actors', such that 'a state can be democratic all by itself'.[26] Only 'role' identities, such as enemy, friend, or rival are relational and require the existence of an 'other' state. While it is true that democracy describes a state's internal system of rule and all states may become democratic if they fulfil the socially constituted criteria, democracy as an identity is constituted in relation to difference in two senses: first, its existence as an identity presupposes the conceptual possibility of non-democracy. Second, in a world where diverse regimes can claim to be democracies and the representativeness and accountability of democratic regimes are internally questioned, the 'performance' of a democratic identity entails the discursive differentiation of the 'fully' and 'truly' democratic self from the 'inadequately' and 'falsely' democratic other.

Liberal constructivists also present the possibility of collective identity among states as justification for their disregard of difference in identity constitution. Wendt's statement that 'collective identity brings the relationship between self and other to its logical conclusion'[27] indicates his belief that relations of difference are not inherent in the logic of identity, and can be entirely transcended. What he fails to see is that, while in the case of collective identities certain states may begin to see each other as 'extension[s] of self', the construction of difference remains integral to the production of the collective identity, itself. As Neumann aptly puts it, 'collective identity is a relation between two human collectives, that is, it always resides in the nexus between the collective self and its others'.[28] In no sense does the constitution of identity in relation to difference imply that the categories of self and other are fixed. It is perfectly possible that collective identity can expand to include what was previously its constitutive other; however, this expansion of identity will only

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[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid., p. 226.
[27] Ibid., p. 229.
[28] Iver B. Neumann, 'European Identity', p. 399.

reproduce the logic of identity in the now broader collectivity's interaction with a new constitutive other.

Selective empirical evidence from Europe has also figured prominently in efforts to downplay the role of difference in identity constitution. Waever, for example, argues that 'despite the wish of various post-structuralists and critical theorists to catch the EU and the West "Othering" various neighbors – Islamic Middle East, Russia, or the Balkans – the dominant trend in European security rhetoric is that the Other is Europe's own past (fragmentation), and those further away from the center are not defined as anti-Europe, only less Europe'.[29] Here, Waever conflates the onto-logical bases and behavioural manifestations of the EU's relations with its neigh-bours. As I will discuss in the next section, in arguing that the European identity is constituted in relation to external difference, poststructuralists or critical construc-tivists are not positing a behavioural relationship of Othering between EU and its neighbours. Hence, the absence of 'Othering' does not validate the treatment of Europe as a self-generated and self-sustained collective identity, not constituted in relation to difference.

In addition, the construction of 'others' as less, rather than anti-self, does not mean that their differences are not implicated in the construction of identity, but is simply descriptive of a different form of self/other relationship. Also, that difference is also located temporally (internally) does not mean that it is not simultaneously located spatially (externally). For example, by constructing Europe's past to be others' present state – as is the case in most development discourse – the past/present dichotomy maintains the distinction between inside versus outside. According to Neumann, the Russian other is differentiated from the European self on the basis of such a past/ present dichotomy.[30]

Waever's distinction between 'anti-Europe' and 'less-Europe' does point to the need, however, to qualify our conceptualisation of identity/difference to allow for variability in conceptions of difference. A similar distinction is introduced by Todorov in his discussion of the celebrated controversy between the philosopher Sepulveda and the Dominican bishop Las Casas during the Spanish conquest of Americas.[31] Sepulveda constructs Indians to be different on the basis of a civilised/ barbaric dichotomy, which represents fixed and entrenched characteristics. Las Casas, on the other hand, employs the dichotomy of Christian/pagan, which embodies the possibility of conversion. In my later discussion of the constitutive dimensions of self/other interaction, I draw a similar heuristic distinction between inclusive identities constituted in relation to acquired differences and exclusive identities constituted in relation to inherent differences.

In short, the constructivist IR literature is divided over the significance of differ-ence in identity formation. Critical constructivist scholars, who draw inspiration from post-structuralism, underscore the discursive necessities that make identity dependent on difference. In contrast, liberal constructivists understate and seek to downplay the role of difference in identity formation through various counter-arguments, which, in fact, compromise their premises on the socially constructed

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[29] Waever, 'Insecurity', p. 100.
[30] Neumann, 'Uses of the Other'.
[31] Tzvetan Todorov, *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), pp. 146–67.

nature of identities and collectivities. I believe that the resistance of liberal constructivists to conceding this ontological point stems from the fact that they associate it with a particular behavioural relationship between self and other. In the next section, I discuss how the constructivist IR literature approaches the behavioural relationship between self and other.

Does constitutive difference between self and other necessarily produce a 'relationship of othering'?

In liberal constructivism, as the terms 'self' and 'other' are not used to denote actors in a relationship of constitutive difference, self/other interaction has been studied as relations between any two distinct states, not as the relationship between self and its constitutive other. Accordingly, liberal constructivists have conceptualised the behavioural implications of self/other relationship as a uni-dimensional continuum that ranges from negative identification to positive identification.[32] Along this continuum, relations of identity and difference, and cooperation and conflict are assumed to co-vary. In negative identification, self sees the other as different, threatening, and inferior, and their relations are characterised by conflict and the ever-present possibility of war. In positive identification, the other is seen as similar, and as a non-threatening extension of self, and going to war with the other becomes a non-possibility.

The key point of liberal constructivists is the contingency and the transformability of the self/other relationship. The relationships of states can move along the continuum progressively towards positive identification, as relations of difference are transformed through the development of shared norms and understandings, into co-identification. How self/other interaction will be situated on the continuum is shaped by their interaction, and also structurally determined by the prevalent culture of anarchy.[33]

By neglecting the constitution of identities in relation to difference, however, liberal constructivists are overlooking an important source of potential tension and distress in the relationship between self and its constitutive other(s). Connolly argues that there is a 'double relation of interdependence and strife between identity and difference', which constitutes the 'paradox of difference' and makes identity 'a slippery, insecure experience'.[34] On the one hand, because identity is constituted in relation to difference, it is 'dependent on its ability to define difference'. On the other hand, it is 'vulnerable to the tendency of entities it would so define to counter, resist, overturn, or subvert definitions applied to them'. The paradox of difference – identity is dependent on difference, which is simultaneously threatening to identity – embodies the ever-present potential that the behavioural relationship between self

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[32] Wendt, 'Collective Identity', Janice Bially Mattern, 'Taking Identity Seriously', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 35:3 (2000), pp. 299–308, and Bruce Cronin, *Community Under Anarchy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
[33] Wendt, *Social Theory*.
[34] William E. Connolly, *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 64–6.

and other be characterised by the perception and representation of the other as threatening to self's identity. By disregarding the relationship of constitutive difference between self and other, liberal constructivists are also overlooking this potential.

In the critical constructivist literature, on the other hand, the fact that the potential for a behavioural relationship of Othering between self and other is not always realised remains somewhat understated. Campbell, for example, focuses exclusively on how the paradox of difference produces foreign policy practices that are dependent on discourses of fear and danger.[35] In securing their identities, states engage in 'boundary-producing political performances'[36] that construct the external realm as different, inferior, and threatening. Because difference is omnipresent inside and outside the state, the externalisation of difference and danger reproduces the distinction between 'internal' and 'external' by juxtaposing a unified and orderly 'inside' to a chaotic and different 'outside', and hence secures the state's existence. As Campbell argues, 'the principal impetus behind the location of threats in the external realm comes from the fact that the sovereign domain . . . is as much a site of ambiguity as the anarchic realm it is distinguished from'.[37] Externalisation also serves a disciplining function inside the state, by defining and representing dissident elements as 'foreign' and 'alien', and linking them to external threats.

Even though Campbell concedes that he 'paints a particularly negative picture of processes implicated in a state's identity', emphasising 'exclusionary practices, discourses of danger, representations of fear and the enumeration of threats', he justifies his position by arguing 'in so far as the logic of identity requires difference, the potential for the transformation of difference into otherness always exists'.[38] In the empirical examples that Campbell provides from US foreign policy, the logic of identity always and readily 'succumbs to the temptation of otherness'.[39] In each encounter with difference, the securing of US identity entails the perception and representation of the constitutive other within discourses of danger and fear, resulting in a relationship of Othering.

Other critical constructivists have been more attentive to the varied representational practices that characterise self/other relationships. For example, Milliken argues that the US Cold War identity was constituted also in relation to the differences of the non-US West and developing states that were part of the Free World and that these relations of difference were represented in leader/ partner and guardian/children terms.[40] In her analysis of (post-) colonial encounters between the North and the South, Doty also identifies the dominant representation of self/other as guardian/children.[41] Hence, relations of difference between the US self and the non-US West other and between the Northern selves and the Southern others are

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[35] Campbell, Writing Security, and David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

[36] Campbell, 'Writing Security', p. 69.

[37] Ibid., p. 70.

[38] Ibid., p. 77–8.

[39] Ibid., p. 93.

[40] Jennifer Milliken, 'Intervention and Identity: Reconstructing the West in Korea', in Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall (eds.), *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 94.

[41] Doty, *Imperial Encounters*.

based on more complex notions of difference that are cast in less negative and zero-sum terms. However, these rich descriptions of representational practices in different self/other encounters are not supported by an analytical framework that explains how the relationship between a self and its constitutive other is in some cases characterised by discourses of fear and identity threat and in other cases by less negative representations. The absence of an explicit acknowledgement of and an explanation for how these different self/other relationships are possible within the overall logic of identity/difference leads to misinterpretations of the critical constructivist approach as positing a behavioural relationship of Othering.

To sum up, the discursive dependence of identity on difference does not necessarily entail a relationship of Othering between self and other. This contingency, while acknowledged in some sophisticated analyses, remains understated and under-explored in the critical constructivist literature. On the other hand, liberal constructivists overlook important sources of potential tension and distress in the behavioural relationship between self and other by ignoring the ontological bases of their relationship. In the next section, I attempt to reconcile the two approaches by separating the ontological basis of self/other relationships from their behavioural manifestations and by exploring the conditions under which the potential for a relationship of Othering is realised.

Constitutive dimensions of self/other interaction

The logic of identity allows for a great deal of variation in self/other relationships. Some of this variation is in the substantive, emotive, and normative content of representational practices. The differences of the other may be represented through various, more or less favourable predicates, metaphors, and binaries, which are often very culturally specific. Through these representational practices, the constructed other may be idealised or completely denigrated, affirmed or negated, or even eroticised and exoticised.[42] What I am particularly interested in, however, is the variation in self/other relationships in terms of the degree to which the other is perceived and represented as a threat to self's identity. Needless to say, this is particularly important in international relations because of its potential security implications; the construction of the other as threatening to self's identity may produce conflict and legitimise violence towards the other.

While itself a representational practice, the construction of the other as threatening to self's identity is an outgrowth of the identity interaction that self and other engage in. Some interactions between self and other make self's identity more insecure; hence there is a greater need to reproduce and reinscribe self's identity in relation to the other, strengthening the tendency to represent the differences of the other in terms of discourses of fear and danger. In contrast, other possible interactions between self and other are securing of self's identity, lessening the necessity for the representation of the other as threatening to self's identity. In this section, I tentatively identify three important constitutive dimensions of these identity interactions.

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[42] David Spurr, *Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing and Imperial Administration* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993).

Nature of identity/difference

First of all, self/other interaction is shaped by the inclusive/exclusive nature of the identity that the self claims in relation to the other. Inclusive identities, such as liberal or democratic, embody a conception of difference based on acquired characteristics. Exclusive identities, such as European (in a strict geographical sense) or Islamic, are defined around some inherent characteristics. By drawing this heuristic distinction, I am not claiming that there is an objective yardstick by which identities can be classified as inclusive and exclusive. Taking note of the fact that understandings about the nature of an identity as inclusive and exclusive are socially constructed and politically contested, I am solely pointing to the ways in which these constructions are associated with different kinds of discourses of difference. If difference is constructed to be deriving from inherent characteristics (the other as non-self), then the possibilities for change in the 'other' are by definition non-existent, and the other is placed in a position of permanent difference. If, on the other hand, difference is constructed to be deriving from acquired characteristics (the other as less self), then, by definition, there is the possibility that the other will become like self one day, so the other is only in a position of temporary difference.

When the distinction between inclusive and exclusive collective identities is employed in the literature, it is usually with the implicit (or explicit) assumption that inclusive identities would not have discriminatory and conflictual relationships with outsiders.[43] In contrast, in this article, I argue and demonstrate that both inclusive and exclusive identities can be characterised by relationships of Othering, but under different conditions. The other two dimensions of self/other interaction – response of other and social distance – influence whether inclusive or exclusive identities need to depend, for their sustenance, on the representation of the other as threatening to self's identity.

Response of other

The identity/difference nexus is performatively constituted by both self and other,[44] therefore a very important dimension of self/other interaction is how the other responds to the construction of its identity. By response of the other, I do not mean purposive acts that are necessarily directed back at the self. The discourses and practices that the other adopts in the course of performing its identity may have reproductive or undermining effects on the identity claimed by the self and the difference attributed to the other. As a heuristic simplification, I conceptualise the response of the other as a spectrum that varies between recognition and resistance. As an ideal-type situation, recognition by the other is securing of the identity of the

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[43] Schimmelfennig, 'Liberal Identity'.
[44] For a detailed discussion on how the discourses and identity performances of the other are implicated in the construction of self's identity, see Bahar Rumelili, *Producing Collective Identity and Interacting with Difference: The Security Implications of Community-Building in Europe and Southeast Asia*, unpublished thesis (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 2002), ch. 2.

self, and because the identity discourses and performances of the other reproduce the self's identity, there is no longer the need to reassert the self's identity in relation to the other. The other is not perceived, represented, or acted toward as an identity threat. In contrast, resistance by the other makes the identity of the self more insecure, and therefore creates a greater necessity to reinscribe the identity of the self and the differences of the other. In this alternative ideal-type situation, the behavioural relationship between self and other is marked by representations of threat and danger, as the self tries to secure its identity.

Recognition and resistance by the other are associated with different identity discourses and performances in case of inclusive and exclusive identities. In the case of inclusive identities, such as the democratic, recognition by the other takes the form of acknowledging self's superiority and aspiring to become like self. For example, if the state that is constituted as non-democratic acknowledges its short-comings, engages in efforts to promote democracy, and refers to the democratic state as a model, then such a response is securing of the democratic state's identity. If, on the other hand, it questions the status of democracy as a desirable system of rule or claims to be equally democratic, then its response would be undermining of self's identity. In the context of exclusive identities, such as the European, recognition entails the acknowledgement of separateness by the other and that it can never be like self. On the other hand, resistance entails a claim by the other to the identity of the self. While recognition reproduces the clear boundary between identity and difference that the exclusive identity depends on, resistance threatens the exclusive identity by blurring the boundary.

Social distance

A third important constitutive dimension of self/other interaction, I would argue, is how the self is socially distanced with respect to the other. One way states perform and secure their identities in international relations is through associating with or dissociating themselves from other states. States associate when they engage in acts that symbolise their co-belonging within the same identity community. Hence, association is different from cooperation because it entails a notion of society that cooperation does not necessarily possess. For example, while there are strong ties of cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia, their relationship is characterised by a relatively low degree of association.

Inclusive identities allow for association between self and other. Because inclusive identities, such as democratic or capitalist, construct the differences of the other to be based on acquired characteristics, such identities are secured by others who aspire to become like self. In this context, association with the other communicates the recognition that the other may, and indeed is willing to, become like self, and provides the self with the institutional means to influence the evolution of the other's identity. This sustains a relationship between self and other that is not characterised by the perception and the frequent representation of the other as a threat to self's identity. Dissociation, on the other hand, makes the inclusive identity more insecure, by leaving undefined whether the other aspires to self's identity, and depriving the self of institutional means of control. In contrast, dissociation is

securing of exclusive identities. Because exclusive identities, such as European or Islamic, construct the differences of the other to be based on inherent characteristics, such identities are secured by clear boundaries between self and other. The self dissociates from the other, the non-self, to inscribe such clear boundaries that indicate that the other may never become like self.

In the following section, I demonstrate how these dimensions have combined to produce or not produce relationships of Othering in the EU's interactions with states in Central and Eastern Europe, Morocco, and Turkey. Naturally, in reality, these dimensions do not exist in either/or forms. Inclusive/exclusive, recognition/ resistance, association/dissociation, Othering/not-Othering are all a matter of degree. Nevertheless, the distinction between self/other interactions that are characterised by relationships of Othering to a great degree and those that are not is real and consequential – even though it is necessary to concede that the perception and representation of identity threat can never be totally absent from an interaction.

Understanding the EU's mode of differentiation

As a statement of EU 'community' identity, I take the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, which states in Article O that 'any European country which respects the principles set out in Article F(1) – liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law – may apply to become a member of the European Union'.[45] Among the identity criteria listed in this statement, being European (that is, being geographically situated in Europe) is bounded and exclusive, thus embodying a conception of difference that is based on inherent characteristics. There is no possible way in which a state can alter its geographic situatedness, except for invasion or colonisation of other territories. The other identity criteria, respecting the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, are, on the other hand, inclusive and universal in aspiration. Any state can possibly become democratic and respectful of human rights, if it successfully adopts the necessary institutions.

In geographically demarcating Europe, European 'community' formation has been productive of inherent difference. Because only European states can become members of the European 'community,' questions of where Europe begins and ends have been fundamental to constructing a European collective identity.[46] However, these questions have never had definitive answers: Europe is merely a geographical construct, with no natural or pre-given boundaries; the geographical parameters of Europe have not only shifted throughout the centuries but also within the short

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45 Treaty Of Amsterdam Amending The Treaty On European Union, The Treaties Establishing The European Communities And Certain Related Acts, URL: <http://www.europarl.eu.int/topics/treaty/ pdf/amst-en.pdf>
46 William Wallace, *The Transformation of Western Europe* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990); Neumann, 'European Identity'; and Malcolm Anderson, 'European Frontiers at the End of the Twentieth Century', in Malcolm Anderson and Eberhard Bort (eds.), *The Frontiers of Europe* (London: Pinter, 1998), pp. 1–10.

history of the European 'community' as well. Therefore, demarcating a certain geographic area as Europe has only been possible by discourses and practices of differentiation, that have also historically shifted and changed.

Each attempt at demarcating the community has produced discourses of inherent difference. In objecting to Britain's membership in the EEC, De Gaulle had argued that the 'maritime' Britain was inherently different from 'continental' Europe.[47] Opponents to Turkey's membership in the EU argue that its history and culture make it inherently non-European. Its only solid boundary, the one dividing North Africa from Europe, is maintained with discourses of inherent difference. Nothing could be further evidence of this than the Community's response to Morocco's application for membership in 1987. No other state's application to the EU has received such an unequivocally negative response; all other applications have led to different institutional arrangements that left the possibility of full membership open. In European perceptions, Morocco was so clearly not-Europe that its claim to a European identity seemed totally incomprehensible and even ludicrous.[48]

On the other hand, in defining the European identity around the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and rule of law, the European 'community' has been productive of acquired difference. The institution of candidacy is a good example of how practices of differentiation help construct the European identity. By making certain states to be candidates before they can be members, Europe constructs them as inadequate in these characteristics that define the European identity. As a result, it differentiates the states in the community as the natural possessors of these morally desirable qualities. The institution of candidacy also grants the members of the community, as natural possessors, the authority to monitor and evaluate the progress of these outside states towards these moral ideals.

Central and Eastern Europe

While during the Cold War, European integration had become synonymous with Western European integration,[49] the end of Communist rule in Eastern Europe challenged the EU's assumptions about the meaning and definition of Europe. Participating in the challenge were the intellectuals and governments of the Central and Eastern European countries, who effectively pushed the cognitive boundaries of Europe to the East to group themselves with their Western neighbours. Their successful 'identity-politics strategies' emphasised their common history and civilisation with Europe and the importance of developing the European identity.[50]

The community-building discourse of EU lent recognition to their claims to a European identity, by constructing Eastern enlargement as the (long awaited)

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[47] De Gaulle, Press Conference in the Elysée Palace, 14 January, 1963, quoted in David De Guistino, *A Reader in European Integration* (New York: Longman, 1996).
[48] Neumann, 'European Identity', p. 398.
[49] Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, 2nd edn. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp. 185–6.
[50] Neumann, 'European Identity'.

unification of Europe. Any argument in favour of enlargement routinely referred to the CEES' European outlook, culture, history, and geography.[51] In the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 it was agreed that 'the associated countries in central and eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the Union.'[52] Eight CEES (except for Bulgaria and Romania) will be admitted as members in May 2004.

It may be argued that the EU's enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe is made possible by shared identity,[53] and therefore does not entail production of difference. However, while the CEES are constructed as similar on the basis of inherent characteristics, such as geography and culture, production of difference on the basis of acquired characteristics, that is democracy and capitalism, continues to play an important role in the interaction between the EU and Central/Eastern Europe. In addition to confirming their eligibility for membership, the 1993 Copenhagen Council also declared three conditions that the CEES had to satisfy: stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy, and the ability to take on the obligations of membership. Thus, in relation to Central and Eastern Europe, the EU constructs a space of superior/inferior, where it claims the superior identity of having stable and mature democratic and capitalist institutions. The dominant representations of Central and Eastern Europe often contrast the recentness of their transition to democracy and market economy with the stability and maturity of those institutions in Europe, and thereby constitute European identity. As Member of European Parliament, Claudio Azzolini remarked in a Parliament debate on enlargement: 'Throwing open the doors of the Union to those countries . . . [means] helping the young democracies to consolidate and recover in a spirit of solidarity and friendship'.[54]

Constructed as similar in terms of inherent characteristics, but different in terms of acquired ones, the European collective identity is secured in relation to CEES through association. The EU relates to the acquired differences of CEES through the institution of candidacy. The institution of candidacy helps maintain the space of superior/inferior between the states within the community and Central and Eastern Europe, by constructing the latter as lacking and inadequate. In addition, the institution of candidacy furthers the belief in the ability of CEES to develop strong and stable institutions, if rightly incorporated in the EU, reproducing the understanding of European identity as inclusive and universalist.

Because they are constructed as different, the CEES are always potentially threatening to European identity. However, in the interaction between the EU and the CEES, the potential for a relationship of Othering has not materialised because the CEES have been accepting of the construction of their identities. The detailed

[51] See for instance European Parliament Debate 'Enlargement-Agenda 2000', sitting of 3 December 1997, *Official Journal of the European Communities: Debates of the European Parliament,* URL: <http://www3.europarl.eu.int>

[52] Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, 21–22 June 1993. URL: <http://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/ec/cop_en.htm>

[53] Schimmelfennig, 'Liberal Identity'.

[54] Claudio Azzolini, MEP Union for Europe (UPE), 'Enlargement-Agenda 2000', sitting of 3 December 1997, *Official Journal of the European Communities: Debates of the European Parliament,* URL: <http://www3.europarl.eu.int>

pre-accession plans adopted by these governments basically state their agreement with the EU on their deficiencies and the mechanisms of improvement. In their rhetorical practices, they 'depict themselves as industrious students and list all the norms they have internalised'.[55] Even though a relationship of Othering is currently absent, it is important to recognise that the potential for it is present as long as the European collective identity is constituted in relation to the CEES. For example, if the CEES had not applied for membership in the EU after the fall of communist regimes, or if, in the performance of their identities, they had contested the superior democratic credentials of the EU states, then their differences would have set the basis for their perception and representation as threats to European identity.

Morocco

When Morocco applied for membership in the EC in 1987, the response of the EC was an absolute no. The application was not even forwarded to the European Commission for an opinion as is the regular procedure. Rabat was told that EC membership is open to Europeans only, and that Morocco is not part of geographical Europe.[56] Morocco is not an oft-told story of European enlargement; however, it marks a moment when EU clearly took an exclusionary stance against an outside state based on its inherent characteristics. All other membership applications had led to institutional arrangements that left the possibility of future membership open. By marking Morocco as inherently non-European, the EU left no possibility that Morocco may one day become a member.

It may be argued that in its reply, EC merely stated an objective fact – Morocco is clearly in Africa and not in Europe – therefore, this cannot be considered as the *production* of difference, it is merely a *statement* of difference. Such an argument, however, elides several important points. First of all, the non-European status of Morocco is not as unequivocal as the Council's response to Morocco's membership application made it to be. The Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the North African coast, formally part of the EU, already challenge the claim that the Mediterranean constitutes a natural clear boundary between the European North and the non-European South.

Second, the incident demonstrates that what the EC sees to be an objective fact, Morocco's non-European location, is not recognised by the other side as such. It may be argued that Morocco's application and rhetoric were purely instrumental; however, that elides their continuing resonance. For years, Morocco has defined itself as a bridge between Europe and Africa,[57] a self-conception sought to be realised with a massive 17-mile tunnel between Spain and Morocco. As the king's economic advisor recently stated: 'Geographically, historically and culturally, Morocco is closer to Western Europe than most of Eastern Europe. The Strait of Gibraltar is just a

[55] Frank Schimmelfennig, 'International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment', *European Journal of International Relations,* 6:1 (2000), pp. 129.

[56] 'Brussels Rejects Rabat's Bid to Join EEC', *The Guardian,* 21 July 1987.

[57] 'M&M: Morocco', *The Economist*, 9 January 1993, p. 37–39.

geographical accident'.[58] Turkey's attainment of candidacy status in the EU in 1999 has encouraged Morocco to renew its membership bid. During his state visit to France on March 2000, Moroccan king Mohammed VI sought French support for a Moroccan application. The king's spokesman Hassan Aourid stated: "After the acceptance of the Turkish candidature, EU membership for Morocco is no longer taboo."[59]

Hence, in relation to Morocco, EU invokes predominantly exclusive aspects of its identity and constructs Morocco to be inherently different. This relationship of identity/difference is secured by EU's dissociation from Morocco. Dissociation is not only apparent in the rejection of Morocco's application for membership, but also in the nature of institutional relations. (To repeat, dissociation does not mean the absence of relations, but rather indicates not belonging in the same identity community). Morocco is a key state in the EU's Euro-Med strategy, and has an extensive free-trade agreement with the community. Still, the institutional relations that the Community has established with Morocco have been those that reproduce the construction of Morocco as an absolute other.

Morocco is also constructed to be different from Europe in terms of acquired characteristics, because of its monarchical rule, illegal occupation of Western Sahara since 1975, and maltreatment of prisoners.[60] However, given that Morocco is already marked as non-European, these deficiencies are in some sense considered normal, and Morocco is subjected to lower standards. For example, in a debate in the European Parliament on the situation of human rights in Morocco, one Member of the European Parliament (MEP) noted: 'Of course, there are human rights abuses in that country. . . . The fact is that there are various levels of culture and development. We should not simply say that everything has to be done in accordance with our standard.'[61] Unlike in Central and Eastern Europe, deterioration in its condition is not considered to be a failure of Europe in providing the right incentives, but as further evidence of its non-European character. Therefore, the EU's dissociation from Morocco does not make the inclusive aspects of the European identity more insecure.

As different, Morocco is always potentially threatening to Europe. According to my argument, the potential for a relationship of Othering would be realised in the context of effective resistance from Morocco to the construction of its identity as inherently different. However, despite several attempts, Morocco has so far not been able to successfully resist the construction of its identity as geographically non-European. The fact that Morocco's application is rarely mentioned in the narratives on European enlargement attests to that. In addition, Morocco also recognises the construction of its identity as different in terms of acquired characteristics, that is, democracy, and has taken measures to improve its record. During King Hassan's

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[58] Bradford Dillman, 'Morocco's Future: Arab, African or European?' *Foreign Policy*, Summer 2000. URL: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/morocco/dillman.html.

[59] 'Morocco's Quest to be European', BBC News, 3 April 2000. URL: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/699760.stm>

[60] 'Europe's African Dimension', *The Middle East*, April 1993, p. 8.

[61] Otto von Habsburg, MEP European Peoples's Party (PPE), 'Agreement with Morocco – Human Rights in Morocco and Western Sahara', sitting of 5 June 1996, *Official journal of the European Communities: Debates of the European Parliament,* URL: <http://www3.europarl.eu.int>

reign, Morocco undertook some political reforms, adopted a new constitution, and set up a Human Rights Commission. Given that Morocco is already constructed as inherently non-European, however, these reforms were not sufficient to constitute Morocco as a possibly-European state.

Turkey

Turkey first expressed interest in eventually becoming a member of the EU in 1959, right after the Community's inception. This has led to a series of different institutional arrangements between Turkey and EU, but Turkey's status as a potential member has continuously evoked heated debate within the EU and remained at best ambiguous.[62] Turkey is certainly not like Morocco, whose membership application was directly rejected on the grounds that it is not part of geographical Europe and hence cannot ever be a European state. But also unlike the CEES, the EU experienced and expressed a great deal of hesitation in declaring Turkey to be a candidate.

The EU's institutional relationship with Turkey is embedded in an identity interaction in which Turkey occupies a 'liminal' position with respect to the European collective identity.[63] Unlike Morocco or the CEES, Turkey is differentiated from Europe on the basis of both inherent and acquired characteristics. As I noted before, the European collective identity promoted by the EU is hybrid in terms of embodying both inclusive and exclusive aspects. This hybridity produces competing discourses on Turkey's identity in relation to Europe. The discourses that emphasise the exclusive aspect of European identity based on geography and culture construct Turkey as inherently different. On the other hand, the discourses that emphasise the inclusive aspects of European identity construct Turkey as different from Europe solely in terms of acquired characteristics. These underscore that while exclusion of Turkey is racist and hence incompatible with European identity, Turkey is significantly different from Europe because it is economically underdeveloped, has an unstable political system marked by pervasive military involvement, and a bad human rights record.[64] If and when Turkey develops economic and political institutions in line with European values and standards, it will rightfully become a member of the EU, despite what others may claim to be its inherent differences.

In the context of these competing discourses, EU has kept a fluctuating social distance towards Turkey. This ambivalent orientation resulted from the fact that

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[62] For accounts of Turkey's relations with the European Union, see Meltem Muftuler-Bac, *Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997); Ziya Onis, 'Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Turkey-EU Relations', *Government and Opposition*, 35:4 (2000), pp. 463–83; Pia Christina Wood, 'Europe and Turkey: A Relationship under Fire', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 10:1 (1999), pp. 95–115. Birol A. Yesilada, 'Turkey's Candidacy for EU Membership', *Middle East Journal*, 56:1 (2002), pp. 94–111; and Buzan and Diez, 'The European Union'.

[63] For a general discussion on the role of liminal entities in construction of identity, see Anne Norton, *Reflections on Political Identity* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988). Also for an argument about how Turkey's liminal position with respect to the EU affects Turkish-Greek relations, see Bahar Rumelili, 'Liminality and Perpetuation of Conflicts: Turkish-Greek Relations in the Context of Community-Building by the EU', *European Journal of International Relations*, 9 (2003), pp. 213–48.

[64] Among others, see the 2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession. URL: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_00/pdf/en/tu_en.pdf>

different social distances (association-dissociation) are securing of different aspects of European identity (inclusive-exclusive). In addition, Turkey's sustained resistance to the construction of its identity makes it more difficult for the EU to settle on a certain social distance with respect to Turkey. Successive Turkish governments have actively resisted constructions of Turkey's identity as inherently different from Europe by producing counter-arguments that construct Turkey as sharing Europe's collective identity.[65] In contrast to Morocco's, Turkey's counter-arguments resonate more strongly in Europe, making Turkey's resistance noticeable. Through its resistance, Turkey upsets the establishment of clear boundaries between Europe and non-Europe, and has a subversive impact on the exclusive aspects of European identity.

However, while resisting the construction of Turkey's identity as non-European, Turkish governments have, unlike their counterparts in Central and Eastern Europe, displayed an ambivalent attitude towards EU's conditions for membership. Through this ambivalent attitude, Turkey simultaneously contests the construction of its identity as different on the basis of acquired characteristics. There is a well-established identity discourse in Turkey that constructs Europe as a threat, flourishing on memories of the Ottoman Empire's dismemberment by European powers at the end of World War I. Paradoxically, this identity discourse is reproduced by those who seem to advocate a closer relationship with Europe, to question the legitimacy and validity of Europe's conditions for membership, such as minority rights for Kurds or the settlement of the Cyprus problem. An oft-voiced concern is that these conditions, cloaked in normative terms, actually represent Europe's strategic agenda of weakening or even disintegrating Turkey.[66] As evidence of Europe's ulterior motives, these groups point to the uncertainty surrounding Turkey's membership in the Community. By questioning and resisting the conditions of the European 'community', while aspiring for membership, Turkey has a subversive impact on the inclusive aspects of European identity.

Hence, in contrast to its interactions with the states in Central and Eastern Europe and Morocco, the EU is implicated in an identity interaction with its Turkish 'other' that makes the European identity more insecure. The constitutive conditions of this identity interaction are the hybrid nature of European identity, the ambivalent social distance kept by the EU in relation to Turkey, and the effective resistance of Turkey to the construction of its identity as different. This identity interaction has produced a greater need to restate and reinscribe the differences of the Turkish 'other' – even though Turkey certainly is not the most different. It has also strengthened the tendency to represent Turkey's differences within discourses of fear and danger, where almost any discussion on relations with Turkey would be accompanied with assertions of the need to defend Europe.

Conclusion

Does the EU replicate the nation-state form in terms of externalising difference and legitimising a violent relationship with its 'others' or has it succeeded in constructing

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[65] Ismail Cem (Turkey's Foreign Minister, 1997–2002), 'Turkey and Europe: Looking to the Future from a Historical Perspective'. URL: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupg/gb/01.htm>

[66] Onis, 'Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond' and Yesilada, 'Turkey's Candidacy'.

a postmodern community where self/other distinctions are blurred not only within the community but also in relation to its outside? This article has argued that the relationship between self and other is constituted in many dimensions in a way that cannot be reduced to these two alternatives. The diversity observed in EU's inter-actions with various states on its periphery is not an inconsistency but a represent-ation of the possibilities inherent in self/other interaction. The constitution of identity in relation to difference establishes a relationship of constitutive difference between self and other; however, this does not necessarily lead to a behavioural relationship based on the perception and representation of the other as a threat to self's identity.

Given the multiple dimensions along which self/other interactions vary, the answer to the question of whether the EU constitutes a postmodern collectivity depends on how we define a postmodern collectivity. If what we mean by a post-modern collectivity is one that is not constituted in relation to the differences of outsiders, this article has argued that that is not an ontological possibility. While temporal-internal and spatial-external differentiation practices often coexist, to argue that a community is solely based on temporal-internal differentiation requires the presumption be made that the community is unequivocally bounded, so that there is not the need to reinscribe the boundary between the self and external others. Not only does the contested nature of 'Europe' as a geographical construct make any definition of EU's boundaries inevitably equivocal, the absence of any spatial/external differentiation can ultimately only be based on a shared essentialist notion of European identity, which would contradict the normative bases of postmodern identity.

If, on the other hand, we define postmodern collectivity as one that is constituted in relation to difference but does not perceive or represent others outside of the collectivity as threats to its identity, then this article highlights some possibilities. First, I need to stress, however, that a postmodern collectivity ought not be thought of as some form of an evolutionary end state. Because relations of difference always carry the potential for relationships of Othering, the postmodern mode of differenti-ation can only be a precarious state that needs to be maintained by mutually reinforcing practices by self and other. Currently, the EU's relationship with CEES exemplifies a type of self/other interaction – based on discourses of acquired difference, association, and recognition by other – that is not characterised by a relationship of Othering, The maintenance of this interaction, as I have argued, is dependent on the continued recognition by CEES of their acquired differences from the EU states. This article also contended that the EU's relationship with Morocco is also characterised by an interaction that is not characterised by a relationship of Othering, even though it is conversely based on discourses of inherent difference, dissociation, and recognition. In this case, the absence of a relationship of Othering is again dependent on the continued recognition by Morocco of the construction of its identity as inherently different from the EU.

The case of the liminal Turkey indicates that the hybrid nature of EU's collec-tive identity poses the greatest challenge to EU's becoming a postmodern collectivity. While the inclusive and exclusive aspects of EU's identity both embody the possibility for self/other interactions that are not characterised by relationships of Othering – a precarious possibility always contingent on mutual practice, but still – the coexistence of the inclusive and exclusive aspects inevitably produces sites of

liminality where this possibility is non-existent. This is not to say that liminals are fixed identity positions; certainly with alternative constructions of EU's collective identity, the differences of specific liminals may be domesticated (reconstructed as acquired differences) or absolutised (reconstructed as inherent differences). One could argue, for example, that Turkey is tentatively moving beyond a liminal position as a result of the reconstruction of its differences more as acquired differences and the increasing tendency within Turkey to recognise the construction of its identity. The point is, however, that there will always be sites of liminality, and how the EU manages its interaction with these sites of liminality will significantly shape the character of the EU as a collectivity.